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Is it legal to own or operate a non-CA vehicle brought into CA? When a person moves to California from another state, and brings their vehicle with them, are they required to register the vehicle in California? Or do they have the option of extending the registration of their vehicle with their home state? According to pages of the CA DMV: New vehicles bought outside California must be registered in CA Unregistered vehicles must be registered within a few days of establishing CA residency Driving a vehicle with expired registration, whether with CA or another state, is unlawful However, it is unclear to me what happens with old vehicles. Let's say someone lives in Arizona, buys a car there, registers it with Arizona for several years and has Arizona plates. This person then moves to California and obtains a California Driver's License. Do they have the option to simply extend the AZ registration of their car, while driving the car in CA? Or are they required to get CA plates soon after they become a CA resident (by getting a CA DL)?	If you move to California, you have to register your vehicle in California. You can't continue to operate under the registration of the state you moved from. See California DMV brochure HTVR 33. Even if you don't become a California resident, you might have to register the vehicle in California: "A vehicle must be registered in California if it is based in California or is primarily used on California highways (located or operated in this state for a greater amount of time than any other individual state during the registration period, even if registered to a nonresident owner." California Vehicle Code section 4000.4. Also, getting a California driver's license is not what makes you a California resident. Rather, once you become a California resident, you are required to get a California driver's license. Again, from HTVR 33: "You are considered a California resident if you are present in this state on more than a temporary or transient basis for 6 months or more in a 12-month period (California Vehicle Code section 516) and/or California is the state where: You are registered to vote. You are gainfully employed. Your place of business is located. Resident tuition is paid at a public institution of higher education. Dependents attend a primary or secondary school. Homeowner's property tax exemption is declared. Property is leased for use as a residence. Residence is declared to obtain a license, privilege, or benefit not ordinarily extended to a nonresident. Your current driver license was issued. You are determined to be a resident as evidenced by acts, occurrences or events that indicate presence in the state is more than temporary or transient."	ECJ case C170/3 covers this (BPM on car imports to the Netherlands, when the car was not originally owned by the driver/importer) specifically. There are two requirements: You must own the car at the moment that you import it. Prior to import, you must have had a connection to the car. The first condition is logical; if your parents would still own the car they'd be exporting it to the Netherlands. The second one is satisfied by the fact that you drove the car since 2010. In ECJ C170/3 Mr. Feron imported a car that was originally bought by his employer, but it's otherwise similar enough.	Knowingly selling a car with an incorrect odometer reading is a crime unless this is disclosed properly. It also gives rise to a right of private action, that is the buyer can sue. The California Vehicle Code, Article 10. Odometers includes the following provisions which might be relevant to this issue: Sec 28050 It is unlawful for any person to advertise for sale, to sell, to use, or to install on any part of a motor vehicle or on an odometer in a motor vehicle any device which causes the odometer to register any mileage other than the true mileage driven. Sec 28050.5. It is unlawful for any person with the intent to defraud to operate a motor vehicle on any street or highway knowing that the odometer of such vehicle is disconnected or nonfunctional. Sec 28051 It is unlawful for any person to disconnect, turn back, advance, or reset the odometer of any motor vehicle with the intent to alter the number of miles indicated on the odometer gauge. The US National Highway Transportation Safety Agency (NHTSA), part of the federal DoT, has a page on "Odometer Fraud". It mentions that such fraud is a crime under federal law, as well as under state law. It advises reproving such fraud to the NHTSA in cases of bulk fraud, and reporting individual cases to a state agency. it gives links for both purposes. The US DoJ has a page on "THE FEDERAL ODOMETER TAMPERING STATUTES" It lists 49 U.S.C. § 32703(2).(Tampering); 49 U.S.C. § 32705(a)(2). (false statement); U.S.C. § 32703(4) (conspiracy) and 49 U.S.C. § 32709(b) (criminal penalties). 49 U.S. Code § 32705 provides that: (a) (1) Disclosure Requirements.—Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation that include the way in which information is disclosed and retained under this section, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee the following written disclosure: (a)(1)(A) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. (a)(1)(B) Disclosure that the actual mileage is unknown, if the transferor knows that the odometer reading is different from the number of miles the vehicle has actually traveled. (a)(2) A person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle may not violate a regulation prescribed under this section or give a false statement to the transferee in making the disclosure required by such a regulation. (a)(3) A person acquiring a motor vehicle for resale may not accept a written disclosure under this section unless it is complete. Ther is a page "How To Fight Odometer Fraud" from Jalopnik which mentions tht there is a private right of action, so that one can sue to enforce the above federal law, and also under various state laws. (This page also discusses how to detect and confirm tampering in some cases.) A page "California Lemon Law Lawyer Discusses Odometer Fraud" discusses how suits may be brought in such cases. This page, is of course, intended ti induce people to hire this law firm for such suits. It seems that such suits can include the award of attorney's fees and other costs. This makes it more attractive to consult a lawyer before proceeding with such suits. Many lawyers will offer initial consultations at little or no cost, so it may well be worth such a consultation.	Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.	As mentioned in the comments, the simple answer is 'probably not' because you probably haven't yet gotten around to taking your halftrack in to get the necessary paperwork to demonstrate eligibility for registration, even if said halftrack was eligible for registration. I'm also going to confine this answer to whether you can legally drive the halftrack on public roads. I am not aware of any special laws about merely owning a halftrack that (say) you keep on a farm as decoration, but in any case I think you are more interested in whether the vehicle in question can be registered. Vehicle registration standards are (mostly) dealt with under State and territory law. I can give you an answer for Victoria, to at least illustrate the issues and where to look for answers. However, (at least some of) the relevant standards appear to be uniform across Australia. The starting point is that it is an offence to operate a vehicle on a public road without registering said vehicle: Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), s 7. The Act provides that: the Regulations may prescribe how registration is applied for and granted or refused: s 9; and the Minister may prescribe standards for registration by notice in the Gazette: s 10. The standards cover "the construction, efficiency, performance, safety, design and equipment of, and the method of identifying" vehicles. I'm not good at searching Gazettes so I'm going to wave my hand over a gap and skip straight to things like: 'Guide to Modifications for Motor Vehicles' on the VicRoads website (VicRoads being the road traffic authority in Victoria, the government agency in charge of registering vehicles): https://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/~/media/files/documents/safety-and-road-rules/vsinumber8guidetomodificationsformotorvehicles.ashx?la=en 'National Code of Practice for Light Vehicle Construction and Modification (NCOP)', which is an Australia-wide document: https://infrastructure.gov.au/roads/vehicle_regulation/bulletin/vsb_ncop.aspx This is one of those areas where you probably need a mechanic more than a lawyer. Once you have satisfied yourself that your halftrack meets the applicable standards, you need to go and get a 'VASS Approval Certificate' ('Vehicle Assessment Signatory Scheme') from a certified tester and then register the vehicle with VicRoads. Happy driving!	A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from).	You can give your friend limited power of attorney in respect to selling your car, if you trust your friend enough with managing this transaction. Basically this is just a legal form you sign telling anybody who questions that you give your friend the legal right to stand in your place (in legal matters) and act as if they were you. The limited part is important as you don't want to give unlimited power of attorney (not sure you even can without more involved work), but you need to spell out exactly what your friend can do, like sign your title, sign and deliver a bill of sale, and complete a transaction in your name. Your friend would be signing their name to the title and submitting it with the power of attorney paperwork. In California, the DMV has a specific form for exactly this. You should print out, sign, and mail that form to your friend.	We cannot advise you to pay the fine or contest it, but we can say that the law is. A notation like "no tag" is not the same as a formal charge that would be filed against you if you were prosecuted, under Georgia Code 40-2-8. The law says (b)(2)(A) It shall be a misdemeanor to operate any vehicle required to be registered in the State of Georgia without a valid numbered license plate properly validated, unless such operation is otherwise permitted under this chapter Hence driving with expired tags is against the law. The state indicates that the penalty for non-renewal is "10% of Ad Valorem Tax due + 25% of License Plate Fees", the latter being $20. There is also a fine of $25 for operating a vehicle without a valid county decal; you presumably know what the current ad valorem tax on the vehicle is.
Can an employee be sued for gross negligence by reusing personal passwords at work? An employee is using some easy guessable reused passwords well known to Have I Been Pwned. OUCH. Something bad happens. Can an employee be sued? Option A: An organization does not have password policy. Option B: An organization has a policy but does not enforce it	Firstly: that depends on the jurisdiction. It might not even be possible at all for employers to attempt to sue their own employees for damages caused by negligence. Even terminating an employment contract for reasons of negligence is quite difficult in many jurisdictions. Second, if it is possible, the question is wether such legal proceedings could be expected to be successful. Employees making mistakes is part of the risk of doing business, and distinguishing a "mistake" from "negligence", "gross negligence" , or "intentional wrongdoing" by the employee ought to place quite a burden of proof on the employer. To be held negligent in the first place, the employer will have to to prove that the employee was aware of the fact that the password they used was common, well-known and extremely insecure. Knowledge of which passwords are common and well-known is, unless you are considered a skilled IT security professional, not something that a typical employee can reasonably be expected to know. Before there can be a case for negligence by the employee, the employer needs to make a strong case that: either the employee is that skilled IT security professional that really should have know better or the company can demonstrate that they provide all employees with adequate instruction and security training that includes how to select good passwords and which bad ones to avoid and that they seriously ensure both awareness of their password and security policies and compliance. even then, not enforcing a good password policy in your IT systems and assigning or allowing users to select weak passwords is in itself already negligent...	No employer has ever the right to withhold your pay check for work you have done. It is strictly illegal. Even if they had 100% evidence that you caused damage and were responsible for that damage, they still can't withhold your pay. They have to pay you, and then they can try to take you to court. The reason for this law is exactly cases like yours, where people try to avoid payment. If the "powerful attorney" tells you that you are not getting paid, then that "powerful attorney" is making a big mistake, because any lawyer would love to take your case to court and see the judge cutting the "powerful attorney" down to size. If you don't want a lawyer now, then you can write a letter by registered mail telling them that you worked for them, how much the payment due is, that they are legally required to make that payment, and that you will take them to court if they are not paying. If there is a conflict between law and a "powerful attorney", the law wins, and the law is on your side.	Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit.	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.	In the US, code that you write in the course of employment is the property of your employer. Otherwise, anything that you create is your property. The gray area is things that you write during your employment but not in the course of your employment (hence the terms of the employment contract are vital). Something that you write before becoming an employee is not "in the course of employment". However, if you use that code in the in the course of employment, you invite the argument that in fact the code was written in the course of employment. That argument can be squelched if you have an agreement with the employer that acknowledges that you are licensing your code to the employer in exchange for ... some consideration. It could be $1, or a similar unit of currency.	In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.
How much time is allocated for analyzing case law during a trial In a rather simple trial (driving infringement, penal court - NOT criminal), how much time is allocated to each party to analyze each others case law? Is it expected to be done during the hearing, or is it expected to be done in writing within X days?	Canada's local court systems and procedural rules vary, especially at the lowest level, by province. So, I'm just stating some general principals. General speaking legal arguments are limited to closing arguments of the parties after all of the evidence has been presented by both sides (because this limits legal arguments to those with evidentiary support rather than merely hypothetical arguments). Opening arguments are usually supposed to be limited to a recitation of what the facts in the case will show. Presentation of evidence and examination of witnesses is also not a time for this to be done. Some courts in some jurisdictions allow a defendant to make a "half-time motion" at the close of the prosecution's case, arguing that the prosecution has failed to meet their burden of proof to establish grounds for a conviction before the defense presents the defense's evidence. But, such formalities are often dispensed with in traffic court. Some courts allow post-trial motions to be made after a verdict within a certain number of days set by court rule asking the court to reconsider its decision or overturn a jury verdict, although these aren't always available in a traffic court case. Sometimes these issues are also raised in a pre-trial trial brief or in motion practice prior to trial. The amount of time allowed for closing, and discretion to consider arguments at times other than time usually allowed are in the discretion of the trial judge. Usually, courts are more lenient regarding formalities when a non-attorney is arguing a case. Usually, there is less opportunity to raise legal arguments following a trial if the traffic court is not a court of record and appeal is by trial de novo in a higher court, and there is more opportunity to do so if the trial is in a "court of record" in which a transcript is maintained and if the trial is a jury trial (although in a jury trial, the legal arguments are made out of the presence of the jury in a hearing over jury instructions, rather than before the jury). In a traffic case in a court of record, in front of a judge, five or ten minutes, at most, would be typical and trial briefs would rarely be considered, but the judge might listen longer or take the case under advisement and ask for further briefing, if the judge thinks that there is merit to a legal argument and wants to do further research (which would be extremely unusual in a traffic case).	Yes. It will hold up in court. IMHO, there is no difference in the admissible portions of the two testimonies. "Few minutes" vs. "One hour" is immaterial The difference between "a few minutes" and "one hour" IMHO is immaterial given: the witness was unconscious and say, between 45 and 60 minutes would match both descriptions of the time interval. What other people saw and heard is hearsay Testimony about what other people saw and heard (with a few notable exceptions) is hearsay and not allowed into evidence because it is generally unreliable and not subject to cross-examination. So after the rejection of the hearsay portions, there is no difference in the admissible portions of the two versions. Qualification By "hold up in court," I mean it will be allowed as evidence. The weight and veracity of the testimony would be determined by the (judge or) jury after cross-examination.	This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.	Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.	This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.	There may be two questions sort of embedded in here: How long does the government have before it violates Speedy Trial; and How long does the government have to turn over its evidence? Unfortunately, they're probably both impossible to answer at this point. Question 1 Under the Speedy Trial Act (18 USC 3161): In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. If a defendant consents in writing to be tried before a magistrate judge on a complaint, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date of such consent. IRA was indicted on February 16, 2018, so 70 days later would be April 27, 2018, which has obviously already come and gone. But their initial appearance wasn't until May 9, 2018, which pushes the time back to July 18, 2018. That would be the default latest date for a trial to begin, but the Act also allows delays for a variety of factors. Among them are delays "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant," which includes time the court spends considering the defendants' motions. So if IRA moves to dismiss the case, all the time spent fighting over that motion would "toll" speedy-trial time, meaning that it would stop the clock until the motion was decided. Another provision of potential relevance is 18 USC 3161(h)(8): Any period of delay, not to exceed one year ... [if] an official request .. has been made for evidence of any such offense and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country. So if there's evidence somewhere in Russia linking these guys to the crimes they're accused of, that might push speedy trial back by a year just to deal with that issue alone. So the short answer to Question 1 is that Speedy Trial requires the trial to begin on July 18, but that practically speaking, that probably won't happen. Question 2 The timing of discovery, the process of each side turning over its evidence to the other side, varies based on the kind of evidence involved, so there are usually multiple disclosures of evidence between the time of indictment and the actual trial. Under current DOJ guidelines, prosecutors are encouraged to provide "broad and early discovery." More specifically: Exculpatory evidence available under Brady v. Maryland should be turned over "reasonably promptly"; Impeachment evidence available under Giglio v. United States should be turned over "at a reasonable time before trial to allow the trial to proceed efficiently"; and Material available under Rule 16 should be disclosed "as soon as is reasonably practical." As you can see, these aren't really hard deadlines. The defense will ask for the documents, the government will turn over documents, and then they'll probably both fight about turning over some other documents, and then they'll wait for the court to decide what to do. So when does Mueller have to turn over his evidence? Probably the best answer we have right now is: "When a judge tells him to."	While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.
USA - Can business deny service to individuals who have views on a protected class? This question is probably a bit broad, but on what basis is an individual's views taken into consideration whether they should be provided service from both brick and mortar/websites? For instance, if you had the following people: Person A - who believes that abortions should be reserved only for emergency/medical cases, and talked about it regularly. Person B - who believes that transgender people should be allowed to service in the US military and campaigns for such. Person C - who believes that religious organizations that take political positions should not be given exemptions from taxation and laws. I've tried to pick fairly non-controversial examples, but I'd also like to include the more extreme versions (e.g. someone who dislikes Muslims and others who dislikes White/Caucasian individuals). Can an organization (secular, private), choose to deny service to those individuals based on their views on that topic? And what would that look like online vs in a physical store?	Yes, they're able to discriminate as long as its not illegal discrimination; and there's currently no law protecting people with these views. Both at a physical or digital store, they can be refused service and told to leave.	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange.	It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.	The key difference is the motivation for denying service. Generally, a business can deny service for almost any reason, or for no reason, and doesn't have to explain its reasons for doing so. However, laws may make it illegal to deny service for certain specific reasons. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So a business may not deny service for those specific reasons. In the Colorado case, there was a similar state law that also forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If they deny you service because of your political views, or the way you dress, or because they just plain don't like you as a person, that's legal. If they deny you service because of your sex, or race, or on the other bases in the Civil Rights Act, that's illegal. Obviously, since a business doesn't have to say why they're denying service, or could lie about the reason, this could make it hard for a plaintiff to prove that denial was in fact based on (e.g.) race. They might be able to do so by finding out about internal discussions within the business, or by showing a pattern of denial to customers of a particular race. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker made it easy by explicitly stating that he was denying service because of the customers' sexual orientation, or at least because of the same-sex nature of the marriage in question. This would appear to violate the Colorado state law. Had he just said no without giving a reason, it would have been harder for the plaintiffs to make their case. (A state commission held that the baker did violate the law, but the US Supreme Court reversed because, they said, the commission had improperly taken the baker's religion into account.) But there is no such law that forbids discrimination on the basis of political views, so Alex Jones can't make a similar case.	The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins.	tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner.	The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date.	A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt.
How to protect my idea in another country? I have an idea about possible creation of a product that in my opinion would be on demand among smartphone users. I have found a potential company In Switzerland and I think about offering them my idea. I am planning to patent my project before presenting it to them, however it seems like it would cost me a lot of money to apply for a patent in Switzerland due to my financial capabilities and considering that I am from a different country it is impossible for me to apply for a patent, but I really need to somehow protect my project before showing it! Do you know another way to do it? I would be glad to hear your opinion about this issue!	You can file a U.S. provisional patent application now, which you can then convert into a regular ("nonprovisional") application within a year. The provisional application is relatively simple and inexpensive, and it will give you an opportunity to explore your business possibilities and assess whether you want to spend more money on patent work later. It will also leave your options open for filing a PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) application that can be the basis of a later application in Switzerland (and many other countries as well, if you so choose). This way, you won't have to pursue the expensive translation and European filing fees until much farther down the road, but you'll still have the benefit of the original filing date of the provisional application. Another benefit of the provisional application: if you aren't ready to convert it within a year, you can simply abandon it and it will go unpublished, keeping all the information in it secret.	There are three questions relevant to this issue: Who owned the copyright in the first place? Was the copyright transferred? If not, was a license given to the site to use the content? In general, under most countries' laws, the person who creates an original work owns the copyright. The person with the copyright has the right to copy and distribute the work, and the right to prevent others from doing so. In some cases, such as where a work is created as a "work for hire" by certain employees under certain circumstances, the initial copyright is held by a third party. You will need a lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction and your circumstances to determine if this is the case. Finally, even if you own the copyright, you can license others to use your content. This may be in an express written document, or it may be an implied license--implied, for instance, by the act of posting it on their blog. The existence and scope of such a license is, again, something that will have to be determined based on your country's specific laws and your specific situation. The bottom line is: if you submitted articles to that blog, you can't complain that they posted them. Depending on the license in effect, you might be able to get them taken down, or you might not. You need a lawyer, not the internet, to tell you what your rights are in this very specific case.	could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".	It depends upon how much money is at stake. You could have a patent search done and consult a patent lawyer help you to evaluate your risk based upon the results. This would cost several thousand dollars but probably less than $10,000 (these amounts are much less than the cost of trying to get a patent for your app). If you do this and there is anyone who has an arguable infringement claim, you would ultimately have to decide for yourself, informed by the search results and your patent lawyer's advice, what to do. Even in a low risk case, you might be sued. Even in a high risk case, the patent holder might decide not to sue you for some reason (patents of the kind you are worried about are weak and often don't hold up in court, about 50% of patent cases that go to trial end up finding that the patent is invalid and that would be higher with a patent of the type you are worried about, but of course, it costs money to go to trial so people often pay nuisance settlements to avoid litigation). You could, instead, launch your app without a patent search and see if anyone sends you a cease and desist letter and then decide what to do from there, possibly consulting a patent lawyer at that point if necessary. It only makes sense to search in advance if your investment and potentially profits from the app are significantly greater than the cost of the patent consultation. If you've invested $100,000 in making the app and expect to make $200,000 of profits from the app, you should definitely confer with a patent lawyer up front. If you've invested $1,000 in making the app and expect to make $2,000 of profits from the app, you should move forward until such time, if ever, as you receive a cease and desist letter from someone claiming to have a patent that covers your app. Somewhere in between those amounts, what to do is a business decision and a judgment call.	Ideas aren't property Your employer does not own your ideas. However, neither do you. Ideas are not something that is protected by intellectual property law. To be IP, you need more than an idea. What is IP? The most common types are: Patents - protect inventions and new processes Trade marks - protect logos, words and other branding Copyright - protects art, writing, music, film, and computer programs Registered designs - protects the visual design of a product Circuit layout rights - protect layout designs or plans of integrated circuits used in computer-generated designs Plant breeders rights - protect the commercial rights of new plant varieties. The normal operation of IP law is that if a person is engaged under a contract of service (e.g. an employment contract) then their employer owns all the IP they make which includes progress towards something that might be IP (e.g. all the work that leads up to a patentable invention). However, if they are engaged under a contract for service (e.g. an independent contractor), then the worker owns the IP. The work the employer owns is generally limited to work in the course of the employment. So if you are a software developer they will generally own all code you write that is useful for their business but won't own the romantic novel you write in your spare time. In either case, the specific contract can override the default assumption. What can you do? You can certainly use the idea for the app but you can't use anything that is subject to your employer's IP. That means you can't use any code or copy the user interface - it all has to be redeveloped from scratch. You also can’t develop something that would be of use to their business while you are still an employee.	There is something called the exhaustion doctrine that says that once the holder of a patent sells a patented device, they have relinquished control over that particular instance of the patent implementation. Anyone who legally purchases this hardware has the right to run whatever software they want on it, as long the software is otherwise legal (software designed to defeat DRM would be an example of software that is is not legal).	If you have a truly novel and non-obvious game idea, you could patent it, and that would cost many tens of thousands of dollars if not hundreds of thousands of dollars (U.S.) in legal fees, etc. and probably a couple of years of patent prosecution, if your idea has not already entered the public domain through public display or sale. Most ideas for games are either not novel, or would be obvious to a person skilled in designing games. But, if your idea is really and truly new, you could do it.	Basically, you cannot do it. You are required to include the MIT license in any derivative work. However, that holds only for the parts that you import from this other project. You can identify which parts of the final product are copied from the MIT-licensed program (and indicate "these parts are subject to the following MIT license"), and then you can do whatever you want with the remainder that you wrote. The downside of not licensing your material is that nobody can use it. To use it, people would need permission, which is what a license is. If you don't license it, you don't give permission, so people can't use it. You presumably want to subject your own contribution to different licensing conditions, so then you would state those conditions and clearly indicate what parts of the code you wrote.
Does the US Executive Order 13884 (August 5, 2019) target the Property of the Government of Venezuela only or of all Venezuelans? Does the US Executive Order 13884 (August 5, 2019) (mirror) target the Property of the Government of Venezuela or of all Venezuelans? https://helpx.adobe.com/la/x-productkb/policy-pricing/executive-order-venezuela.html (mirror) says: The U.S. Government issued Executive Order 13884, the practical effect of which is to prohibit almost all transactions and services between U.S. companies, entities, and individuals in Venezuela. However https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/07/2019-17052/blocking-property-of-the-government-of-venezuela says: (d) the term “Government of Venezuela” includes the state and Government of Venezuela, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Venezuela and Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), any person owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the foregoing, and any person who has acted or purported to act directly or indirectly for or on behalf of, any of the foregoing, including as a member of the Maduro regime. For the purposes of section 2 of this order, the term “Government of Venezuela” shall not include any United States citizen, any permanent resident alien of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States, or any alien holding a valid United States visa. so it's unclear to me whether the US Executive Order 13884 (August 5, 2019) targets the Property of the Government of Venezuela only or of all Venezuelans.	so it's unclear to me whether the US Executive Order 13884 (August 5, 2019) targets the Property of the Government of Venezuela only or of all Venezuelans. Neither. By its literal text, it excludes any Venezuelan who is a citizen of the US, a green card holder, or lawfully present in the US, or who holds a valid US visa. More pertinently to your question, perhaps, it also excludes any Venezuelan who has never been an agent of (or purported to be an agent of) Venezuela or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.	Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might "take" land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent.	It is well established that the federal government has complete control over immigration. See especially Arizona v. US which holds that States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. De Canas v. Bica (1976), 424 U.S. 351 is also relevant to the application of field preemption to INA. In this case, the courts found that Congress had not (at that point) entered the field of employment of unauthorized workers, so state laws were not preempted by federal law. Laws can change, and with them, potential state powers. In Arizona the court held that Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” and with respect to issues of immigration, Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 adds provisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act, including employment-related law, thus Congress has entered the field of regulating immigration with respect to employment. Current 8 USC §1324b arises from various amendments to the INA, where the present expression "protected individual" was inserted, by Public Law 101-649, to replace earlier "citizen or intended citizen". Congress also introduced Temporary Protected Status in §302 of the law, which has specific (more restricted) provisions regarding employment. The evidence clearly indicates that Congress intended to include employment issues w.r.t. their supreme power regarding immigration. These discrimination provisions are in the field of immigration, and not discrimination legislation (where Congress has not preempted the field). Congressional silence must, in the light of what Congress did say, be interpreted to mean that the US immigration policy only offers certain specific protections, and states cannot add to or subtract from those protections.	The United States even allows private ownership of tanks and howitzers with only fairly modest regulation, although the demand is small and some sort of license is required. Most U.S. regulations would be at the state and local level. It is rare for state governments to place regulatory barriers on the ownership of what is basically an armored car, although detailing it in a manner that misleadingly conveys the impression that it is a law enforcement vehicle is usually prohibited. Security companies handling deliveries of cash and executive transportation services currently use equivalent vehicles on a regular basis. Some armaments might be regulated at a local, state or federal level in the U.S., to the same extent that they would be if they were freestanding. Even if the company declined to sell one to you, you could probably buy one in an auction of police department or military equipment that the selling government no longer needs. Such auctions are held on a semi-regular basis.	Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.	18 USC 960 provides a disincentive against such actions. Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both Also see 18 USC 959, covering enlistment. "At peace" is not statutorily defined, so it is not obvious whether the US is "at peace" with Ethiopia (Tigray war) or Russia (various offenses). A formal state of war has not existed between the US and another nation for 70 years.	You're looking for the Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This prohibits the police from harassing you and stopping you without cause. It is not self-enforcing, though, so you can sue for a violation under 42 USC 1983: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. This is the normal means of enforcing your rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as the First, Second, and so on.	united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it.
Service of Process to the Deceased Hypothetically speaking; One party to a lawsuit is dismissed. A year later Notice of Appeal if filed and service of same is sent to the dismissed party via standard mail. Then a month later the appeal brief is served on the dismissed party via certified mail but this mail is refused. It is learned that the dismissed party died the year before. The deceased man's wife appeared with him in court 2 years prior and did now that her husband was being sued. Questions; Did the deceased's family obligate themselves by not returning the the first service, that of the Notice of Appeal? As the next of kin are they obligated to receive the mail addressed to the deceased? What would be a possible remedy to keeping the claim active against this defendant albeit deceased defendant? thank you.	Note: The answer to the question is not the same in every U.S. state and territory. I have provided definitive answers only when there is unanimity or near unanimity. Did the deceased's family obligate themselves by not returning the the first service, that of the Notice of Appeal? No. Unless they expressly agree to do so in writing to be responsible for a decedent's debts (which almost never happens in the U.S.) next of kin of have liability regarding the debts of a decedent (at least by virtue of being next of kin, obviously, if they were, example co-defendant in a case who participated in the wrongful conduct, that could be another matter), except that it may result in a claim against the probate estate which reduces the size of their inheritances (potentially to zero), if timely asserted in the probate estate. As the next of kin are they obligated to receive the mail addressed to the deceased? No. Also, counsel for a decedent are terminated as counsel as a matter of law upon the death of a client. It is customary for a lawyer in the case (often, although not necessarily, the lawyer for the decedent if the decedent was represented by counsel at the time of death) to file a document usually entitled "suggestion of death" in the pending case when someone dies. But, no one is obligated to do so, and if the party is self-represented in the case (a.k.a. pro se), or that party's lawyers have withdrawn from the case, neither the decedent's former lawyers, nor anyone else in the case, may even be aware of that fact that the party to the case has died. What would be a possible remedy to keeping the claim active against this defendant albeit deceased defendant? File a claim in the estate of the decedent if the deadline for filing claims has not lapsed (which two years later, it may very well have). Normally, either a claims deadline that functions by operation of law (e.g. a state law non-claim deadline one year after the date of death), or a claim deadline arising from publication of a notice to creditors in the legal section of a newspaper in the area where the decedent died in a manner prescribed by state statute, would bar the claims, especially if the status quo was that they had been dismissed at the time of the decedent's death, even if there were still undistributed assets left in the probate estate after the deadline for filing claims has expired. It may also be possible to do a substitution of parties of the decedent's probate estate for the decedent in the pending case, if a probate estate has been opened and the deadline for filing claims has not yet lapsed. If a probate estate has not been opened, usually, after a certain amount of time, a creditor may open up the estate without the consent of the next of kin, or a public administrator will be appointed if there are no next of kin who have done so, and there are assets left to be managed in the probate estate. The law governing exactly when a probate estate has liability for the debts of a decedent incurred during life is a matter of state law that varies in significant detail between different states within the United States and is quite technical. I've written a couple of Colorado Bar Association journal articles on that subject applying Colorado law (Andrew Oh-Willeke, "Creditor's Rights In Probate - Part I and II", The Colorado Lawyer, May 2015 and June 2015). Note that the general rules may not apply in all cases to lawsuit brought "in rem" (i.e. adjudicating rights in a particular piece of property) although those kinds of cases aren't very common in federal court and would rarely involve the fact pattern set forth in the original post. Footnote Re Federal Civil Procedure For many years there was a lack of clarity, and/or a split of authority between U.S. Court of Appeals Circuits, over the proper time to appeal a ruling dismissing a party entirely from a case as a matter of federal civil procedure in various circumstances. It was resolved a few years ago, but I don't recall the outcome of that case. The general rule, expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is that the dismissal of a party in a case cannot be appealed unless the trial court certifies that decision as final for purposes of appeal which is a discretionary decision for the trial court judge.	Bob's will leaves everything to Abby. Bob has a brokerage account solely in his name with no TOD on the account. Bob then dies. It is my understanding that for Abby to get the money, you have to go through probate. Am I right about that? Yes, this has to go through probate. I have been told that when you are leaving everything to a spouse you can skip probate. I am thinking that is wrong. You are correct. This said, in a very small dollar estate (e.g. $20,000, with the actual dollar amount varying state by state), some states allow you to transfer assets by affidavit rather than via the probate process, if the sold heir at all and will beneficiary are the same and there are no unpaid creditors with a claim against those funds. New Jersey has two sets of small estate procedures for estates under $50,000. The cutoff is sometimes $10,000, sometimes $20,000, and sometimes $50,000 depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the simplified process sought. It isn't clear to me that they apply in cases where the decedent has a will and therefore is not intestate. Small Estates General Summary: Small Estate laws were enacted in order to enable heirs to obtain property of the deceased without probate, or with shortened probate proceedings, provided certain conditions are met. Small estates can be administered with less time and cost. If the deceased had conveyed most property to a trust but there remains some property, small estate laws may also be available. Small Estate procedures may generally be used regardless of whether there was a Will. In general, the two forms of small estate procedures are recognized: Small Estate Affidavit -Some States allow an affidavit to be executed by the spouse and/or heirs of the deceased and present the affidavit to the holder of property such as a bank to obtain property of the deceased. Other states require that the affidavit be filed with the Court. The main requirement before you may use an affidavit is that the value of the personal and/or real property of the estate not exceed a certain value. Summary Administration -Some states allow a Summary administration. Some States recognize both the Small Estate affidavit and Summary Administration, basing the requirement of which one to use on the value of the estate. Example: If the estate value is 10,000 or less an affidavit is allowed but if the value is between 10,000 to 20,000 a summary administration is allowed. New Jersey Summary: Under New Jersey statute, where as estate is valued at less than $50,000, a surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, may present an affidavit of a small estate before the Superior Court. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit, the surviving spouse shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. New Jersey: New Jersey requirements are set forth in the statutes below. TITLE 3B ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES–DECEDENTS AND OTHERS 3B:10-3. When spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner entitled to assets without administration. Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $50,000, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner upon the execution of an affidavit before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the assets are located, or before the Superior Court, shall be entitled absolutely to all the real and personal assets without administration, and the assets of the estate up to $10,000 shall be free from all debts of the intestate. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit as provided in this section, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. The surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall state that the affiant is the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner of the intestate and that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $50,000, and shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, and specifically the nature, location and value of the intestate’s real and personal assets. The affidavit shall be filed and recorded in the office of such Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.1; 2004, c.132, s.77; 2005, c.331, s.24; 2015, c.232, s.1. 3B:10-4. When heirs entitled to assets without administration Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $20,000 and the intestate leaves no surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, and one of his heirs shall have obtained the consent in writing of the remaining heirs, if any, and shall have executed before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the intestate’s assets are located, or before the Superior Court, the affidavit herein provided for, shall be entitled to receive the assets of the intestate of the benefit of all the heirs and creditors without administration or entering into a bond. Upon executing the affidavit, and upon filing it and the consent, he shall have all the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate and may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, the names, residences and relationships of all of the heirs and specifically the nature, location and value of the real and personal assets and also a statement that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $20,000. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.2; 2004, c.132, s.78; 2005, c.331, s.25; 2015, c.232, s.2. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S. 46:14-7 and R.S. 46:14-8 to take acknowledgments or proofs.	A federal court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte (i.e. without a request to do so from a party) if it is beyond its subject matter jurisdiction (a category of defenses including lack of standing) or fails to state a claim for relief on its face. A Motion to Dismiss filed in the case provides a roadmap for the judge to dismiss the entire case. It argues in essence: A Texas federal court can't assert jurisdiction over Georgia defendants. A federal court can't entertain claims against state officials in their official capacities for the kind of relief requested. The plaintiffs lack standing to sue. Subject matter jurisdiction defenses (and lack of personal jurisdiction defenses) are also not barred from being raised later in a motion to vacate the judgment, by a default judgment. The Texas federal court can also sanction parties for filing frivolous claims by, for example, awarding all of the costs and attorney fees incurred by the defendants against the party bringing the suit in a motion requesting that relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against the parties and/or their attorney. I would not be surprised if the Plaintiffs' attorney in this case, Paul M. Davis, was disbarred and bankrupted by it. Class action lawsuits can't proceed as such until certified by the court. Furthermore, a summons has to be personally hand delivered with a complaint to be served in a way that is sufficient to result in an entry of a default judgment, even if the complaint is otherwise valid. This is unlikely to have occurred in all 600+ cases. There are several instances in which a "clerk's default" has been entered, but that simply indicates that a return of service (even if facially defective) was filed by the Plaintiff and that the number of days set forth in the summons for a response has lapsed. In contrast, prior to entering a default judgment, which must be done by a judge, the judge must review the complaint to determine if the court has jurisdiction over the case and if a valid legal claim is stated in the complaint.	If that person becomes incapacitated or is deemed unfit to make their own decisions, will I be required to be physically present (for example, to sign something) to make those decisions if called upon? While it is customary for someone making decisions as weighty as removal of life support, to come to the hospital or care facility in person and discuss the issues with treating physicians, it isn't required. When you are physically there it is easier for you to personally assess the patient's condition rather than just taking someone else's word for it, and you have more informal access to everything that is going on in terms of people coming in and out of the patient's room, providers you wouldn't have known to speak to initiating conversations with you (e.g. there is typically an ER nurse for each shift, several residents doing rounds checking on a patient, and often also an outside specialist doctor involved in the treatment team). It is also usually easy when you are physically in a hospital to locate someone knowledgable and familiar with the kinds of issues you are facing at the moment to provide spiritual and religious guidance if you feel this would help you make your decision, while your neighborhood clergy person may not have a good understanding of these issues since they don't come up as often for someone is doesn't frequently spend time around people being treated in hospitals or hospices. And, this kind of pastoral counseling requires not just religious knowledge but an understanding of the options that are being presented through the lens of what is religiously and morally important about the differences between the different options. When I was an attorney for a hospital handling these issues for the hospital, we would have been willing to work with an out of state medical power of attorney agent without their physical presence. But, the fact that this was deep in the Rocky Mountains far from other urban areas (i.e. Grand Junction, Colorado) may have influenced a willingness to be flexible since it would often take a lot of time and money for someone to arrive in person. Also, while the medical power of attorney gives a specific person authority to act, an advanced medical directive is simply a document that goes into a patient's medical record that advises treating providers of the patient's intent and doesn't actually need next of kin approval or a medical power of attorney agent's say so to implement, although better practice is to seek that consent first in case there are any reasons why that advanced medical directive might have been procured improperly from someone lacking capacity or subsequently revoked. There usually will be forms for a medical power of attorney agent to sign, not authorizing a particular medical procedure, but authorizing treatment in general and providing personal and financial information about the patient in connection with admitting that person. But, these days, hospitals are relatively comfortable with handling that paperwork via fax or scanned copies sent via email, and some of the more flexible hospitals will even accept photos of signed documents sent via text message.	Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.	Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party.	Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.	The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media.
How can a company compel a W2 employee to sign a non-compete agreement? Assume the company is in Delaware and been taken over by a larger corporation: If one already has the job, is it possible to for the larger corporation to compel existing employees to sign non-compete agreements? Assume subject is in DE and is a W2 employee (no contract or 'term')	A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful).	It is not necessary for an agreement to be verbose and written by a lawyer, for it to be binding. There is some danger in having untrained people writing up agreements (they don't know the distinction between "what the law says" versus "what we had in mind"). The agreement is binding, but their interpretation of the contract language does not automatically prevail. The statement "ALL TUTORS ARE PAID 8 HOURS, unless told otherwise" is slightly problematic since it is not true (you can't pay time, you pay money for time spend). With no other statements about time and payment, and just looking at the words, this says that an employee will be paid for 8 hours work, period. Unless they say something different. That could mean "even if you work 20 hours, you only get paid for 8" (illegal under various labor laws), or it could be "even if you only work 2 hours, you get paid for 8" (the most reasonable interpretation). The interpretation "You are limited to 8 hours of work per pay period / contract" is not a reasonable interpretation: that isn't what the clause says. Such a limit could be clearly expressed ("can work up to 8 hours" is a clear way to state the limit), and since they didn't say anything like that, that is not how the courts will read the clause. They can, however, inform you otherwise, e.g. say "your minimum automatic pay is now 2 hours", or "we will only guarantee 2 hours work", and at that point that's what the number is. Since this is (presumably) a take-it or leave it contract which they wrote up and you didn't actually negotiate, any unclarities are legally interpreted in your favor. If you have worked more than 8 hours and they are using the contract language to argue that you won't be paid for the overage, that is not at all likely to hold up in court. Under terms of the contract (interpreted as stating a minimum guarantee of hours), they can inform you that your new minimum is 0 hours. Also, unless there is some kind of tenure clause, they can terminate the contract at will, and maybe they'll hire you under a different contract. What the terms of employment were for you in the past does not matter, what matters is what the current terms are. If you did not pay attention to the fact that they changed the terms of the agreement as of this quarter, that is not their problem. If they decided to change to "actual hours worked" after the current contract was formed, and they informed you of that fact later, then thereafter that is what the agreement is. Until you are notified of that change, the guaranteed minimum is what it says in the contract. In case their argument is "The university sets this policy, the department made a mistake in not informing you", the university has to take responsibility for the errors of their inferiors.	You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee.	are they legally allowed to make me to pay for it now? Unfortunately, yes. Contract law entitles them to charge you that amount only because --as it appears from your inquiry-- you signed the contract with (or despite) your awareness of that clause. Perhaps from other terms in your contract you might have the possibility to overcome that liability. For instance, apropos of the fact that you possessed the requisite knowledge beforehand, whether the company intentionally misled you into thinking that you would gain any valuable knowledge from the training (other than the very particular way the company wants certain tasks to be performed). However, that is hard to assess without knowing more details of your situation.	are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability.	I don't think so. When it comes to wages, there may be a Tarifvertrag (union-negotiated wage schedule), which may apply even if the employee in question is no union member. It is enough if the employer is member of the employer's association negotiating the schedule, or in certain other cases. (Clever, really, by extending union benefits to non-members they weaken the unions ...) The Tarifvertrag stipulates minimum wages for certain positions, and it may define those positions implement that. An employer could not underpay a skilled machinist by calling her a 'gadget specialist' or similar non-scheduled position. But the deputy department head is likely paid above the highest bracket of the wage schedule, called außertariflich (AT, beyond the schedule). At this level, it comes down to individual negotiations between the employee and employer.	Does a contract become null and void if some or most of its terms were not followed by one (or both) of the parties? No. Parties' temporary or systematic waiver of their contractual rights does not alter the validity or terms of that contract. Parties entitled to resume enforcement of their rights anytime. A party's noncompliance with his obligations gives the counterparty a viable claim of breach of contract, although the proper approach would be to first try to solve the dispute outside the court. In the employment scenario you describe, the employee is entitled to --at least-- back pay as per the second contract (the difference between $75 and $50) subject to the statute of limitations, which under NJ is six years for contract disputes. See Hagans v. Nickerson, Superior Court of NJ (Oct. 2022), (citing NJSA A:14-1(a)). This precludes the recovery of some of the back pay if "the employee wishes to enforce during his 7th or 8th year of employment". A "retroactive" enforcement of other rights might be available, depending on the nature of those rights and other details. But nothing prevents the employee to henceforth enforce all of his rights pursuant to the current contract. Can the employer argue that the employee "waived his right" to the second contract by not enforcing it and acting as if it never existed? As explained above, no. Nor does it make sense for the employer to argue in terms of "a right to the second contract". A contract establishes a set of rights [and obligations], whence "a right to a set of rights" would reflect the employer's poor understanding of the ramifications of the contract he signed.	I've litigated cases like these before. The IRS enforcement reaction is swift and severe. Penalties for the employer are heavy and rarely waived. It would be rare for a business like this to stay operational long enough to issue a W-2. A business like this would probably be shut down by the IRS and have the people responsible for the payroll function, at a minimum, promptly burdened with tax liens, within four to six months. These cases also constitute a significant share of all criminal tax prosecutions. The odds of someone doing this spending several years in federal prison is high. Generally speaking, if the wrongdoing is fully on the part of the employer without the collusion or knowledge of the employee, the IRS will not force the employee to double pay the taxes that should have been withheld by the employer in this situation. Instead, this IRS will try to recover the amounts that were withheld from the employees but not delivered to the IRS. It will seek to recover these amounts from the employer and also from other responsible persons in the organization (and from outsourced professionals) with the authority to pay the IRS who did not do so. There may be circumstances, if push comes to shove, where the IRS could collect from the employees in a case like this one (I've never had occasion to need to research that issue), but that would be the rare exception and not the rule, in practice. On the other hand, if the employer simply does not withhold taxes or prepare W-2s at all, and either 1099s people who should have been classified as employees (or files no information tax returns at all), the IRS will generally insist that the employee pay income taxes on the full amount owed and that they pay the employee part of payroll taxes. It will also pursue the employer for the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employer will also be jointly and severally liable for any taxes that should have been reported and subjected to withholding that are not paid by the employee (perhaps because the employee spent all the money). Sometimes cases like this are also criminally prosecuted, but it is less common to do so.
Is there any law in the Unites States (in NYC) requiring plumbing inspections after ___ years in apartment buildings? I live in Brooklyn, NY and recently my apartment unit toilet had a minor clog and overflow (when I wasn’t home) that the landlord is insisting has caused water damage in his basement (I saw there was damage) and he wants me to pay for the fix. I hired a plumber and contractor to come (out of my own pocket), and they verified that I did not cause the damage. I checked with the local building department and found out my building hasn’t had a plumbing inspection since 2003. Is this legal? From doing some quick googling it seems that people recommend getting plumbing inspections every few years for traditional homes, so I’d imagine it’s recommended for apartment buildings as well. But I’m wondering if there is a law that requires it?	NYC local laws are available here. There is a new law (152 of 2016) requiring inspection of gas piping systems every 5 years. There is a facade inspection rule (11 of 1998), other rules about elevators. Plumbing must be inspected when installed or modified (part of the permit process) but there is no law requiring periodic inspection of existing plumbing.	My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm.	No. There are plenty of Quebecois laws covering what you must have water for (food prep, bathrooms, etc) and that if you are using the water in any fashion that it might come in contact with a human mouth (i.e. food preparation, etc) it must be drinking water (as defined in the document I linked), but no such laws requiring free distribution of drinking water on request by restaurants. It's worth noting, I suppose, that tap water must be provided by restaurants in their bathrooms for the washing of hands and that said water must be of drinking water quality, but they are not required to offer it in a glass, free of charge. Anecdotally, I will also note that there are laws in several other Canadian jurisdictions that DO require free drinking water on request, but those laws also do not stipulate the glass must be provided for free.	This is not a place for specific legal advice, but you shouldn't be afraid of the small claims court; I'm doing that myself and it really is a low-risk and straightforward way to get money that is owed to you. Step 1: Get the boiler repaired or replaced as necessary. Keep the receipts. Don't be tempted to get an upgrade or anything else to push expenses that are legitimately yours on to the other party; find out what the cheapest thing is that you can reasonably do to fix the problem and then do that. Step 2: Write a letter to the seller in which you set out the facts of the case and demand the cost of the repairs. Also include any other expenses you have had to incur, like money for your time off work while the repair is done. End it with "If you do not agree to pay this money within one month then I will take action in the county court to recover the money". Send it by recorded delivery and include a copy of the repair receipt (NOT the original). Step 3: If you do not get your money then go here and follow the instructions. You have to pay an up-front fee to the court which gets added on to the amount you are claiming. That is the only money you are putting at risk if you lose. The whole thing is as informal and straightforward as possible, and is purposely designed so that you don't need a lawyer, nor can you or the other side claim for the cost of a lawyer if you win. This is why your lawyer is pushing you to do this by yourself: he knows that his fees would be out of proportion to the amount in question, and you wouldn't be able to get that money back even if you won. The only other wrinkle is if the other party has moved far away: in general if a hearing is needed then it will be held near them rather than near you, so you might have to travel.	The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.	Under the Residental Tenancies Act of 2004, the landlord is obligated to carry out necessary repairs to both the structure and interior of the dwelling. The Act provides that this obligation (as with others) cannot be "varied, modified, or restricted" by a rental contract. Meanwhile, the tenant is obligated to not do any act that would cause a deterioration in the condition the dwelling was in at the commencement of the tenancy (with "normal wear and tear" explicitly disclaimed from the tenant's responsibilities). The landlord is not obligated to repair damages caused by the tenant violating that obligation. So the landlord is generally responsible for repairs (and, in fact, if the tenant had needed to arrange for the door to be repaired themself, they would have been able to deduct the cost from rent). If the tenant had broken the door, it would have been a breach of their responsibilities. But if a neighbor, or even the tenant's partner, had broken the door, it would not have violated the tenant's obligation and so the landlord would remain responsible for the repair.	If you introduced the bedbugs, liability could flow to you by way of the landlord keeping your security deposit (if there is one) and explaining when sending you notice that a portion/all of your deposit was withheld due to you causing the infestation for the purposes of remediation. The inverse is also true, in that if you do not have a deposit, you could be sued in housing/small claims court for the infestation if you were negligent in some way (grabbed the mattress curbside and didn't put a bedbug proof sealed cover on the mattress. Since you said you rent a room, my curiosity is piqued as to whether it came with the bed (mattress). If the bed came with the room, it is almost certainly not your fault. Even when there are statutes/codes/regs delineating a lessor's/lessee's obligations and rights re pest control (from jurisdiction to jurisdiction) they rarely exclude the right to general civil remedies. I used to represent my municipality and remember reading that bed bugs are difficult to treat unless the bed is disposed of and all bedding is washed in hot water with a disinfectant and even that can not ensure their removal because if you brought them in because of access to them on a regular basis (e.g., if you are a maid at a motel), then you may continue to introduce them. If the room had no bedbugs and you brought the bed in and now it does, it may be easier to prove who created the unsafe/unsettling condition, as opposed to ants, roaches, spiders, which can be introduced in myriad ways.	Desuetude is the Latin word. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desuetude Typically there is more to it than just that there was no enforcement for a while. It usually occurs when prosecutors agree not to prosecute and judges don't punish or punish harshly for it. Normally an HOA is just rules for your apartment building and not actual laws so it would not apply there.
Is a notice of intent to vacate legally binding in California? I am in the process of moving to a new apartment. I paid the security deposit, and signed the lease. About one week before the agreed move in date, the landlord informed me that the previous tenant, despite having given their 30-day notice of intent to vacate some time ago, is now asking to stay longer. They claim that therefore my only options are to move in later, move into a different apartment, or accept a refund of my security deposit and move on. The landlord believes the are obligated to let the existing tenant stay, even though the tenant already gave a notice of intent to vacate. Is this true? (I can find various unofficial sources online which say "no, they are not obligated to do this", but does California law address this explicitly, or is there any case law about this?)	The landlord is obligated to let the existing tenant stay in that they cannot legally physically remove them or change the locks without a court order. The business between the landlord and holdover tenant doesn't involve you. All that matters is that the landlord told you that the unit would not be ready for you. Your lease should have a section describing what happens should the unit not be ready in time.	Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.	No illegal eviction took place, if he wasn't a tenant The term of the room rental was specified beforehand. There was no renewable or extension clause in the rental agreement. Bob also is not a tenant: he is a guest in a hotel. The Hotel offers cleaning services, as the OP specified. By overstaying, his items now were trespassing, the removal was legitimate. However, there is a point at which a short term renting of a hotel becomes living at it. Where this is is often dependant on how long or in what way you stay. Where's the line between a Tenant and a Guest? THAT is the operative question. When does a Guest/Lodger become a Tenant and can get eviction protection? In germany a couple of Hotels actually do have renters with a special rental contract - which is vastly different from the normal room rental. For example, the Maritim in Hamburg has year-rentals. These are actual renters with a rental contract and eviction protection, that give up some tenant rights for services (e.g. room cleaning service for limits in remodeling). However, overstaying at a hotel can actually become a crime: Einmietbetrug - obtaining a room in a hotel or a residency but not wanting to pay or mischaracterizing your ability to do so - is a variant of fraud and thus can be punished under §263 StGB; Under the operating law, a hotel guest is not afforded with all rights of a tenant, unless they are explicitly pointed out like with longstay contracts. In california the line is 30 days, in new-york-state it is the same but they also need to not have a different residency. in england-and-wales, the operative case when someone is a lodger or tenant is Brillouet v Landless (1995) 28 H.L.R. 836: a hotel Guest is not a tenant, even after more than a month of stay. In fact, courts following this case argue, that such a person is only licensed to be on the premises, and the license could be revoked without eviction procedures. In fact, the Brillouet v Landless case is very close to the example. Brillouet rented a room in September, and extended the stay. Then he did not pay (or rather, his accommodation services didn't. In October, Landless sought to get rid of Brillouet for non-payment, just telling him to leave. Brillouet applied for an injunction against the eviction and got a temporary one (to preserve the status-quo) till the hearing. Mere days later, and the first instance court handed out judgement against the application of an injunction to protect Brillouet. The Hotel guest, so the court, was not a tenant under the Housing Act 1988: The Protection from Eviction Act depends on premises having been let as a dwelling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of protection from eviction and seeing no tenancy (emphasis mine): It is an essential prerequisite of any tenancy that the tenant should have, so it is said in some of the authorities, exclusive possession. In my judgment the facts of this case particularly when one bears in mind that Mr Brillouet upon his own assertion avails himself of at least some of the facilities (he goes to the restaurant occasionally for his breakfast) — come nowhere near demonstrating that he has or has had within this room exclusive occupation. At best in my judgment he could conceivably be a licensee. One then has to examine once more the terms of the statute to ascertain whether he is a licensee entitled to protection under the 1977 Act. As the section to which I have alluded makes plain, only licensees who occupy as a dwelling premises which they do occupy are entitled to protection. If, as in my judgment the facts here clearly demonstrate, the occupant is no more and no less than a hotel guest properly so-called, then the accommodation is not let to the licensee as a dwelling. Street v Mountford (1985) AC 809 most likely doesn't apply if any hotel services are offered by the hotel. In the case, Mountford was found a tenant because Street did not offer any services beyond the room and furnishings itself. The presence of any service would change the pattern significantly, as the House of Lords decided: It applies against Bob if the hotel offers cleaning service/room service, and by offering service beyond the room and the furnishing within it, it is lodging, not a tenancy: The occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance or services which require the landlord or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises. A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own. [...] Street provided neither attendance nor services and only reserved the limited rights of inspection and maintenance and the like set forth in clause 3 of the agreement. On the traditional view of the matter, Mrs. Mountford not being a lodger must be a tenant. Mehta v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (2000) 32 H.L.R. 45 doesn't apply, as that case revolved around a verbal contract with the manager for 6 month exclusive use of rooms. Mehta became a tenant by that contract and eviction protection applied. In contrast, due to how agreements with hotels are generally written, Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) might apply: If the contact specified that the hotel does have unlimited access (which is typical) and that reassignments of rooms (like, another guest in the room) might apply, then there is no tenancy. Could Bob be a tenant? For Bob to be a tenant under the E&W interpretation (following the pattern established by Street & Brillouet), the facts must be such, that several things must be true: Exclusive possession: No services are offered at all beyond the room. For example, there can't be any shared facilities with the rest of the hotel that Bob has access to, and services such as room cleaning or fresh towels or laundry are not offered either. Not using them is not enough, they can't be offered at all. (both Street, Brillout) If in exclusive Possession, Bob still isn't a tenant if he is what Street calls a service occupier. That's an employee who is given a place to sleep in to perform his duties to the employer, like a Butler or Maid. (Street) Bob is also not an owner in fee simple, trespasser or mortgagee in possession, or an object of charity - for which all other rules apply. (Street) In the alternative, one fact makes them automatically one: There was a contract that in its form stipulates they are a Tenant (Mehta v RBS)	In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.	When a person dies intestate, California law (or the law of any other state) does not allow a presumed heir to unilaterally legally take over the estate, or part of the estate. This most likely involves a court procedure to decide who gets what. However, if all parties agree, it would be possible for one or more heirs to occupy the house without them owning it – this creates a legal mess that can be difficult and costly to untangle, so presumed-heir squatting is not a good idea. Ultimately, the property will have to go through probate in order for it to be sold to someone else. Obviously, property taxes and other assessments must be paid, but the state does not care who writes the check. There are also liability issues, if the property damages other property (example: the underground oil tank ruptures and pollutes the neighbors' property). If one of the heirs disputes the arrangement, they can sue to force proper disposition of the estate. Creditors may also have a legal claim against the estate. A person can petition the court (here is the form) to be appointed as the personal representative of the deceased. If someone else has "taken" the property, this petition triggers questioning as to who is entitled to a share of the estate, and the court will assure that it is distributed according to law, and if this is an adversarial process, each interested party may need to hire their own attorney (thus it is best to reach an agreement beforehand).	"an agreement by email for the cost of rent and damage deposit etc." may well constitute a lease. If it doesn't specify a term or ending method, it is probably a month to month lease. If nothing is specified about notice to leave, you probably should gt 30 days notice. The law in BC is the Residential Tenancy Act. However, many localities have laws that modify or supplement the provincial law. You probably need legal assitance beyond the scope of this forum. a Tenant Resource Advisory Center (Trac) might be able to help. Their web sitre also provides links to various other resources, including legal referrals. The Tennant Survival Guide offers pointers to legal aid. This site offers additional resources. So does the BC Law institute Note, even if you have certain legal rights in theory, the person from whom you are renting may not respect these. Consult legal or community sources to determine your best approach. This question is really beyond the scope of this forum.	We don't give specific legal advice and one might VTC, but I think your phrasing is not quite right, and you are just curious about the possibility of binding the landlord to a term across leases. The first thing that a term in a contract has to so is say exactly what must be done by whom (or not done). You need to describe more precisely what it means for all future rent and rent increases to be commensurate with the current rent. You can think of conditions like "no more than 2% per annum" or "no more than 15% per annum", and then you can figure out what number is acceptable to the two of you. I would be surprised if you could come up with an agreeable number. Second, you'd have to make this limit "perpetual", which is pretty much impossible. You could negotiate the terms of the next lease today which would prevent an increase of rent by more thay you're happy with, but until governmental controls say exactly what a legal rent increase is, the property owner has the right to raise the rent by a million dollars, and you have the right to move elsewhere. It's as hard to permanently lock a landlord into an arrangement as it is to lock a tenant into renting a specific residence. Every year, you have the right to terminate the lease if the rent goes too high for you, and every year the landlord has the right to raise the rent if the current arrangement isn't sufficiently profitable. Incidentally, you might want to check with AHFC to see if you can actually do this. Your expectations don't determine what relief they provide, just make sure that you provided accurate answers to their questions and reported all income that you're required to report.	You are never obligated to sign a contract. You already have a lease agreement in place, which will be enforceable for the agreed-upon duration. The lease can be changed if both parties agree to it, but one party cannot unilaterally demand that other agree to any changes to the contract - a landlord can't, for example, change your lease agreement to increase your rent payment in the middle of your lease term and demand that you sign it. The landlord is certainly allowed to ask, in the hopes that both parties can come to an agreement, but again, both parties need to agree in order for an existing contract to be changed.
How to change the code so that it does not fall under the violation of the license "partial copying" Good afternoon! I'm interested in a legal issue regarding code licensing. I am writing an Ansible role for two companies, and each company wants to impose its own license on this code: “full or PARTIAL copying is prohibited”. The point is that I am writing a role for the same environments and services. Naturally, it turns out that the roles are very similar. And since the changes in the code can not be swung in the role of Ansible, no matter how you say it, it will be at least recognizable. For example: - name: "Oracle \| Install basic Oracle 7 repos" yum_repository: name: "{{ item.name }}" description: "{{ item.description \| default ('No descr') }}" baseurl: "{{ item.baseurl }}" gpgcheck: "{{ item.gpgcheck \| default ('0') }}" gpgkey: "{{ item.gpgkey \| default ('file:///etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-CentOS-5') }}" state: "{{ item.state \| default('present') }}" enabled: "{{ item.enabled \| default('yes') }}" priority: " {{ item.priority \| default('20') }}" with_items: "{{ linux_oracle_yum_repo }}" tags: - update In both companies, this piece of code is similar to one and it does not work out to change much. I ask for a little help in the legal issue of this situation: HOW much do I need to change the code so that it does not regarded as "partial copying"? Is this changing a one character in a file? Or in the whole program? Or changing one line? Or need to dial a certain percentage of the code difference? Or is it enough just to change a name the variables and the descriptions? Thank you for help!	If you change a single character, that's clearly a partial copy. Copyright protection has a limited extent, however. The protected work must be original and not obvious. For example, there are only so many ways to write a function that computes the average of two numbers, so the copyright owner of one body of code cannot claim infringement by the author of a second body of code simply because they both have a function float Average(float a, float b) { return (a + b) / 2; } A surefire way to avoid infringing copyright is to specify the function of the code and then have someone who has never seen the code write it from scratch. This is sometimes called clean-room engineering. Otherwise, there is no way to answer your question definitively. If you create a modified copy of the code (a "derived work" in copyright terminology), there is no strict formula available to evaluate the extent of the infringement. It comes down to a case-specific analysis of the facts by a judge. Depending on the jurisdiction, which you have not specified, there may be specific laws or judicial precedent that guide the judge, but the determination will still require a specific analysis of the facts. For example, if the alleged infringer raises these arguments, the judge would have to determine how obvious the code is, or whether the copyright claimant even owns the copyright to the code.	Yes you can. What you do is called mere aggregation. Your app and the GPL container run isolated and do not share memory space: they are clearly separate programs vs parts of one program, so your app does not get infected by GPL.	There is no contract between you (the licensee) and the licensor of the software. The creator of the open source software just says "here's the software, you may use it if you like, as long as you fulfil some conditions. ". No contract, no liability. I think the developer would only be liable if they intentionally created software that causes damage. (Which has happened, some open source browser plugins have recently been modified to run bitcoin mining software, or worse. I suppose the miscreants could follow all the GPL rules or whatever license is used).	The MIT license is non-exclusive. If S is the sole copyright holder, S can issue any other non-exclusive license in parallel, and can also stop offering the software under the MIT license. However, open source licenses such the MIT license are generally understood to be irrevocable, so S cannot prevent other people from using the software who already received it under the MIT license terms. But: only if S is the sole copyright holder. There is no particular reason to believe that S would be the sole copyright holder. One does not gain a copyright ownership just by supervising other people, although an employer might gain copyright ownership over works created by employees (e.g. the US “work for hire” doctrine). That the copyright notices only mention S's name is an indication that S might be a copyright holder, but that's neither sufficient nor necessary for showing that S holds sole or joint copyright in the software. This leaves three relevant scenarios: S might be the sole copyright holder, in which case, yes, S can effectively discard the MIT license. This might be the case e.g. if there was some other copyright assignment, outside of the MIT license. What copyright transfers or assignments are valid depends on the local laws, e.g. some jurisdiction do not recognize copyright as transferable and at most allow the assignment of economic aspects of copyright. S might not be the sole copyright holder, but have additional permissions to the work. For example, there might have been extra licensing agreements, outside of the MIT license. Or S might have special rights for a work of joint authorship, if and only if the jurisdiction recognizes such additional rights. S might not be the sole copyright holder and not have any agreements outside of the MIT license. Then S has no additional rights, and is bound by the terms of the MIT license. This doesn't have to be a problem: S can still pretty much do whatever S wants with the code, as long as S fulfils the license terms. These are pretty simple: just keep a copy of the copyright+license notice with any copies of the software the students created.	The GPL that covers the OpenJDK certainly allows you to write and distribute your own Java implementation. On that point, your reading is absolutely correct. However, if that implementation is a derivative work of the OpenJDK, then the GPL requires you to make your derivative implementation available under the GPL as well, per the GPL's copyleft rules. If you follow the rules of the GPL, you can do exactly what you propose. Note that the Supreme Court ruling in Oracle v. Google found that using only API structure and names, without copying any underlying implementation, constitutes fair use, and therefore doesn't require copyright permission. If you hold your implementation to that standard and use/look at only interfaces while authoring your new implementation, then your new work is broadly allowed under copyright law, so you do not need to rely on the GPL's permissions (and therefore neither do you need to follow its requirements). Google didn't want to have to abide by the terms of the GPL, probably because due to concerns that the any GPL terms that applied to their Java implementation might also apply to other components of their system, which they wished to keep closed-source. In other words, if Google had claimed their acquired their right to use the APIs under the GPL, then they would have been required to put potentially the entire operating system under the GPL, which they had not done nor wished to do. For this case, the GPL has been largely ignored because Google has not followed the requirements of GPL in licensing their Java implementation (and operating system that uses it), so there's no point in Google trying to claim that their right to use the API came from the GPL. Furthermore, Google claimed that they didn't use any of Oracle's copyrighted material, so it's not possible for them to say their use of Oracle's material was licensed under the GPL, as they claim there was no use whatsoever, licensed or otherwise. This is explained at length on fosspatents.com's article "Q&A on the Dec. 4 Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright hearing before the Federal Circuit": 2. Q: Does this litigation involve Google's rights to use certain Java code under an open source license? A: No. Google could have incorporated Java into Android on open source terms, but chose to eschew the GNU General Public License (GPL) because of its "copyleft" feature. [...] If Google had ever claimed in this litigation that Android's incorporation of Java was authorized under the GPL, this would have been inconsistent with its claim that it didn't use any copyrightable material (you can only license something, on whatever terms, if it's protected) and, far more importantly, a blatant violation of Rule 11 (truthful pleading standard) resulting in sanctions for Google and its counsel. The GPL affords you four freedoms: it allows you to use software without paying for it (freedom 0), to modify its source code as you please (freedom 1), to redistribute copies (freedom 2), and to distribute your modified versions to others (freedom 3). But once you exercise freedom 3, you're subjected to the copyleft rule: you must make your modified version available under the GPL. As a result, Google would have had to publish Android under the GPL. But it did not. [...] [...]Google seeks to exercise as much control over Android as possible. If Android had to be released under the GPL (and only under the GPL, or at least a compatible copyleft license), Google would have a hard time keeping a growing number of core Android components like its Mail and Map clients or even the new on-screen keyboard (again, more about that in the next section) closed -- and Google's hardware partners would have to release their proprietary enhancements such as Samsung's Touchwiz and HTC Sense under the GPL, which would run counter to their objective of differentiation because their competitors could then use the same code.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses.	The code and the “look” of the user interface is protected by copyright - you can’t duplicate either. You can create your own app with the same functionality.
Starting a business: is it legal to hire freelancers if you haven't registered the company yet? The reasons I would want to delay the registration of this business as much as I can are: I don't foresee having a single dollar of revenue until at least 2 years later (the product I'm building is way immature at the moment; users that are testing at the moment are only using the "free" edition). Given the above, the first months of operating would be all costs (employees, plus any bureaucracy costs) with no income. And last but not least, I didn't think of a name yet! I'm perfectly aware that a business receiving income without having been registered would be illegal (because all businesses need to pay taxes from their income), but how about starting to pay workers (freelancers, not full-time employees) out of my pocket? Is this illegal?	You don’t need a company to run a business As an individual (sole-trader) you can operate a business, hire employees and contractors and do everything else a business does. The purpose of a company is to separate and protect your personal assets from your business assets. As a sole-trader you are personally responsible for all the liabilities of the business - if it goes bust, you go bust. If the business is operated by a company, then, providing you and the company follow the law, your personal assets are not at risk if the company becomes insolvent.	Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.	The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.	The usual method is that every country charges you income tax for income that you make while your body is in the country. Big exception is the USA which wants a chunk of every income, and some countries like Germany calculate your tax rate based on world wide income, but charge that tax rate on your income in Germany. "Double taxation agreements" usually have the purpose that if two countries think you should pay tax on the same money, then somehow you only pay once. If you were a US citizen, then being tax-free in Indonesia wouldn't help you at all, because the USA would want full US tax minus zero Indonesian tax. In the UK, you need to check what money you have to pay tax on as a UK citizen, especially in the first and last year when you are still in the UK. For the use of a bank account in which country, ask a lawyer. Especially as making a stupid mistake could be very costly. It may be easier to set up a company in Indonesia and your company pays the company, because it is very unlikely that your UK company wants to learn about Indonesian tax law and risk getting it wrong.	No it’s not illegal It’s called retailing: https://youtu.be/ywSkKkuGQ2A https://youtu.be/k8OreiHU91Y https://youtu.be/XpR6y1sNArU You are allowed to advertise the products you sell. Even if you don’t make them. You can even use their trademarks to identify them - that’s what trademarks are for.	Making a profit does not make the act illegal: it is illegal without there being any profit. The act of copying without permission is what makes the act illegal. Profit might maybe enter into the matter if you are talking about the "fair use" defense, since certain kinds of works can be partially copied for certain purposes. You could quote a few lines from a novel in a review, for instance. The judgment of whether a given act of copying without permission is allowed under fair use is complex and involves a balancing act. Profit becomes relevant in that a non-profit use favors fair use and a for-profit use disfavors it. Wholesale copying of works of art as you describe is illegal (is infringement). However... "illegal" is a pretty broad concept. If you infringe on my intellectual property, you almost certainly will not suffer any consequences unless I sue you. Taking "illegal" to mean "in violation of the law", infringing copyright is illegal because it violates the law, but I have to make a federal case out of your infringement – I have to sue you. As it happens, it can also be a crime to infringe copyright, and in that case, the government and not the copyright holder pursues the matter. If a person knowingly infringes copyright, he might be prosecuted, thus the Megaupload case which in the US is realized in the indictment US v. Dotcom. Moreover, profit motive is a required element for criminal infringement. (Also note that you don't have to actually make a profit for the profit element to be present). You cannot sue a person unless they have harmed you, so if you know that Smith copied Jones' work you can't sue Smith for harming Jones. (This is what they call "standing"). You might sue Smith, but not for infringement itself. If they sold you an illegal infringing copy, then you could sue. Or, their infringement could diminish the value of your legal copy. This website gives a multi-nation overview of criminal copyright infringement laws.	Fairly easily. You want to use their API. They give you the conditions for using it. As long as their conditions aren't illegal or unreasonable, you need to adhere to them to use their API. Is it illegal to not include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name? Almost certainly not. Is it an unreasonable term? Almost certainly not. If you want to include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name, you can try - but you can't then use their API.	In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment.
What does O/C stand for? The abbreviation or notation O/C appears in many references to legal proceedings in Georgia, such as: "O/C Theft by Taking" and "O/C Driving While License Suspended". What does O/C stand for or mean? (Source https://sowegalive.com/2019/04/01/bainbridge-and-decatur-county-arrest-reports-4-1-19/)	"Original charge." It's the charge that had someone in court to begin with, and eventually leading to the new charge listed.	New York has a "stop and identify" law which says that a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. However, there is no requirement to carry an identifying document or to prove your verbal statements of identity. For that matter, there is no requirement that you have your license in your possession when driving, you simply have to be duly licensed. In this case, the officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime, so you do have to tell him your name, address, and what you were doing. In Washington, there is no stop-and-identify law, so you don't even have to tell the police who you are. There does exist a requirement to identify yourself if you are stopped for an traffic infraction: (1) Any person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop. (2) Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction. (3) Any person requested to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself or herself and give his or her current address. However, the proposed scenario does not fall under this requirement because you weren't stopped. Also note that the limited ID law of Washington does not compel you to provide a document, it compels you to provide information. It is a misdemeanor to drive without a valid Washington license, but it is only an infraction to drive having been issued a license but not having it in your possession, as long as you provide an alternative ID document. So if you drive without a license in WA and are stopped, you have to show an ID document or suffer the misdemeanor alternative. But again, in this scenario you were not driving and were not stopped, you will not be forced to provide a document. Because driving without a license is a misdemeanor and the officer did not observe you driving, under Washington's arrest without warrant law, he cannot arrest you for suspicion of having committed the misdemeanor of driving without a license. (The arrest without warrant law is a bit more complicated, see the 11 exception subsections, none of which apply here). If your goal is to try to be forced to show your driver's license, you might try Indiana, where the law says A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person's: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver's license, if in the person's possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor. But again, you were not stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation, so you may keep your license in your wallet.	There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.	In my opinion, the news report is mischaracterizing the situation, either because the person who provided the information was confused or sloppy, or because the reporter was confused (it is impossible to tell on its face). Probable cause to arrest can, and often does, arise from an oral statement of a witness to a police officer, even if a witness refuses to back their oral statement to a police officer with a written one. And, in the narrow and strict sense, a complaint is a court document, usually signed by a prosecutor, commencing criminal legal proceedings against a criminal defendant (in lieu of an indictment, or pending the issuance of an indictment). A complaint in this narrow and strict sense would not usually be signed by an ordinary citizen witness to a crime. Sometimes, however, the word "complaint" is used in a broader, non-technical sense to refer either to any report made to police complaining about misconduct by someone, or in a different technical sense to refer to a written and signed report made by a witness to the police. It is likely that what really happened is that after receiving an oral report that the individual had threatened people, none of the witnesses who provided this oral report was willing to sign a document summarizing their oral report of being threatened for the police (perhaps out of fear of retaliation by the accused person, or out of a desire not to harm the accused person's long term future prospects). Then, the police department, as a matter of department policy (rather than any requirement imposed by law), declined to pursue a criminal case based upon the threats, when no one was willing to publicly and in writing commit to their oral reports, because they would need a testifying witness in a later court case.	It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.	Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.	It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed.	I happen to have a recent American major rental brand folio with terms and conditions on the floor next to me. The key sentences for this brand are You agree we may, in our sole discretion, pay all tickets, citations, fines and penalties on your behalf directly to the appropriate authority and you will pay us for what we paid to the appropriate authority or their designated agents plus a reasonable administrative fee and You agree to indemnify and hold us harmless for any tickets, citations, fines, penalties and administrative fees First, as this is printed in the mass-printed jacket they put the rental agreement printout into at the desk, it's stretching things to say this is "slipped in". Second, they are a commercial enterprise interested in profitable operations to keep their cars generating revenue. It makes commercial and equitable sense that they would want to protect themselves from fines that could accrue to the car's title; to have a business process that closes out risk to their title or having their cars booted or towed due to unpaid tickets at some point; and to not have a business process that commits labor hours to appealing tickets or assisting you in appealing tickets. Third, by this example, the renter has directly granted the rental company agency to pay tickets, fines and penalties on the renter's behalf. Whether other rental companies would use the same language or not or negotiate with you to adopt your language is a commercial decision. What is the exact language your rental company used?
What does "object to the form" mean? I've been reading the notes for a recent prolific court case, and in the records of what was said the phrase "Object to the form." comes up quite a lot. What does this phrase mean? (If it is at all relevant, I believe the law in play is US law, but I do not know where exactly the case is taking place.) As requested in the comments, here are some examples from the case notes, with names redacted. Example 1: A I don't recall. Q Is it possible? A It's a possibility. MR. [REDACTED]: Object to the form. Example 2: Q. And, indeed, you would agree with me that if this individual claimed that Ms. [REDACTED] had something to do with the events listed in Narrative 1, you would have folded up on it, as the investigating detective, right? MS. [REDACTED]: Object to the form. THE WITNESS: Either myself or Detective [REDACTED] would have.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	The language "I therefore place you on notice that" in your proposed missive is superfluous and adds nothing that is legally relevant. Flourishes like that are common among former paralegals, court clerks, common law country notaries, and other non-lawyers who want to sound legalistic but don't really have the relevant legal knowledge. It is common to say "I put so and so on notice that" in a legal opinion or a summary of a case, but mildly uncommon and not necessary to put those magic words in the notice itself in a situation like this where there is no prescribed statutory language that must be used on a specific legal form. In this situation the important thing is that the person is actually made aware of the situation, not that you conform to a statutory form. Also does it add anything to have stated the effect if they do not do so ("This may be detrimental..."), if the matter proceeds to a court case? If they complain of a lack of an opportunity to inspect in a later court case, it allows you to say, "I told you so and I gave you a chance to do something about it" which might be fairly convincing to a judge and would probably overcome any arguments that you engaged in spoliation of evidence.	The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.	I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.	Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences \| Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.	I think the answer is that, despite the wording in the question, this case is simply easier. Note that the Attorney General is listed as the applicant, rather than the appellant. The case is a straightforward action for contempt of court but since the court in question is the Supreme Court, it heard the case itself (although with a different set of judges).	The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected.
Definition of automatic firearms in the US I want to know about the legal definitions of automatic firearms in the US. I don't care about what people think an automatic firearm is, just about what legally qualifies one as such. The only legal definition I was able to find online is this one: The term “semiautomatic rifle” means any repeating rifle which utilizes a portion of the energy of a firing cartridge to extract the fired cartridge case and chamber the next round, and which requires a separate pull of the trigger to fire each cartridge. (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/921) This, however, only defines semi-automatic rifles. It does not define, for example, semi-automatic handguns or fully automatic rifles.	The legal definition you are probably looking for is machinegun rather than automatic weapon. It can be found in 26 U.S. Code § 5845, which in relevant part says: The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. Historical notes; TLDR The core of this definition dates back to the 1934 National Firearms Act (NFA) . The legislative history of that act includes testimony of Karl. T. Fredrick in front of the house ways and means committee. Mr. Fredrick, then president of the National Rifle Association (NRA), had devoted years to the study of earlier firearms legislation. He criticized earlier legislative attempts to define machine guns, calling them wholly inadequate. The earlier legislative definition was: "Machine gun", as used in this Act, means any firearm which shoots automatically more than twelve shots without reloading. Mr. Fredrick expressed several concerns with this definition, particularly with regard to the phrase more than twelve shots without reloading. His propoed language was substantially broader: A machine gun or submachine gun, as used in this act, means any firearm by whatever name known, loaded or unloaded, which shoots automatically more than one shot without manually reloading, by a single function of the trigger. Note that neither of the later two quotes is current. Thus the core of the definition used today, was in fact provided by an officer of the National Rifle Association, but that definition has been changed in the process of clarifying and codifying the law.	The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.	The relevant regulations in 49 CFR 1540 refer to weapons, not firearms, and unless you are specifically permitted, you cannot carry a weapon in your carry-on luggage. The interpretation of "weapon" is given here, which says Weapons are objects that may be used to attack another. TSA considers an item to be a weapon under 49 CFR 1540.111 if it is created for use as a weapon or is so similar to an item created as a weapon that it appears to be, or is easily used as, a weapon. Weapons include firearms, as well as realistic replicas of firearms that may reasonably be thought to be actual weapons. Such realistic replicas are prohibited because their similarity in appearance to real weapons may allow them to be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew. The screener has the discretion to determine when a replica is so realistic that it should be prohibited. Other toy weapons will be allowed in the sterile areas and cabin. Partial weapons and parts of weapons also are prohibited because they may be carried separately by collaborators for assembly subsequent to entry or boarding. In addition, partial weapons may appear to be operative and could be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew.	TL;DR: It's controversial, but it looks like it also protects the rights for the individual. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. While the exact explanation is a matter of opinion, it reads like it's a subject, a reason and a right to the subject. Your question is essentially whether or not the subject is a group, an individual or both. The definition of "Militia" can be multiple things though, due to the age of the 2nd Amendment it changed over time and wasn't very exact to begin with. "the Militia ... civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." "And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." In a militia, the character of the laborer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of a soldier." "the militia system ... implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms." . This site explains it quite well in my opinion. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The first two phrases are related to each other. The fact that the third phrase is separated from the verbal phrase by a comma indicates that the verbal phrase has more than the third phrase as its subject. The abbreviated grammatical construction actually renders the meaning of the Second Amendment as: "Neither a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, nor the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall be infringed." So what does the Supreme Court think about the explanation? Current Supreme Court case law defines the Second Amendment (second part) as protecting from infringement by the federal and state governments, the right of the individual to keep and to bear a weapon which is part of the ordinary military equipment or which use could contribute to the common defense. Three cases are cited: U.S. v. Planned Parenthood v Casey (120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)) U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990)) U.S. v. Miller (83 L. Ed. 1207 (1939)) According to the SAF the Justice Department includes individuals to be protected by the 2nd Amendment. The Justice Department’s enlightened interpretation of the Second Amendment as an individual right was hailed today by the firearms civil rights organization that has supported a key Texas case that led to a federal appeals court ruling upholding the individual rights concept. And: “Today’s constitutional scholars, including Prof. Laurence Tribe, confirm that the Second Amendment is an individual right,” LaCourse continued. “For years, our own Justice Department has been deaf and blind to such scholarship, and the Fifth Circuit ruling forced the government to face the facts. Solicitor General Olson and Attorney General John Ashcroft deserve credit for their courageous reversal of four decades of constitutional denial.” While the above is biased, it does state the opinion of non-trivial parties.	Yes In 2010, on the last day of her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Elena Kagan, was asked “Do you believe it is a fundamental, pre-existing right to have an arm to defend yourself?,” by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma. When Kagan began to answer by stating that she “accept[ed]” the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms, Coburn interrupted to clarify that he was not asking whether she believed the right to be protected by the Constitution, but rather whether she considered it to be a “natural right.” “Senator Coburn,” replied Kagan, “to be honest with you, I don’t have a view of what are natural rights independent of the Constitution.” The full exchange is as follows: Coburn: Do you believe it is a fundamental, pre-existing right to have an arm to defend yourself? Kagan: Senator Coburn, I very much appreciate how deeply important the right to bear arms is to millions and millions of Americans. And I accept Heller, which made clear that the Second Amendment conferred that right upon individuals, and not simply collectively. Coburn: I'm asking you, Elena Kagan, do you personally believe there is a fundamental right in this area? Do you agree with Blackstone [in] the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defense? He didn't say that was a constitutional right. He said that's a natural right. And what I'm asking you is, do you agree with that? Kagan: Senator Coburn, to be honest with you, I don't have a view of what are natural rights, independent of the Constitution. And my job as a justice will be to enforce and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Coburn: So you wouldn't embrace what the Declaration of Independence says, that we have certain God-given, inalienable rights that aren't given in the Constitution that are ours, ours alone, and that a government doesn't give those to us? Kagan: Senator Coburn, I believe that the Constitution is an extraordinary document, and I'm not saying I do not believe that there are rights pre-existing the Constitution and the laws. But my job as a justice is to enforce the Constitution and the laws. Coburn: Well, I understand that. I'm not talking about as a justice. I'm talking about Elena Kagan. What do you believe? Are there inalienable rights for us? Do you believe that? Kagan: Senator Coburn, I think that the question of what I believe as to what people's rights are outside the Constitution and the laws, that you should not want me to act in any way on the basis of such a belief. Coburn: I would want you to always act on the basis of the belief of what our Declaration of Independence says. Kagan: I think you should want me to act on the basis of law. And that is what I have upheld to do, if I'm fortunate enough to be confirmed, is to act on the basis of law, which is the Constitution and the statutes of the United States. See Transcript	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.	It could probably be argued that a bullet intentionally shot from a gun is abandoned property, and thus the shooter has no claim to its return. In addition, such a bullet might be evidence of a crime, to be seized by law enforcement, although that would not affect its ultimate ownership, at least not in the US. Intent matters in such cases. A person who shoots a gun probably does not reasonably expect to retain possession and control of the bullet, whatever may have been shot at. Well, someone shooting at a properly controlled target for practice on his or her own property probably retains ownership of the bullet.
GDPR on Proxy Users I believe I have a good overall understanding about the GDPR legislation, in terms of what needs to be protected, etc... My questions here are about the scope of GDPR. Does GDPR apply to people who: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) 3) EU users who are using a Proxy/VPN outside the EU 4) USA users who are using a Proxy/VPN in the EU My website is mostly "anonymous", but users can set a Birthdate, Gender, Country, and can send Private Messages, Public Posts, Photos, etc... Also, things like IP and Device are logged for moderation/statistic purposes.	The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.	I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law.	I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel).	From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info.	GDPR killing genealogy websites? I could see GDPR totally killing genealogy websites if they follow the rules strictly, but would they really want to do that. Seems to me genealogy has an important historical role. Treat living persons with anonymization I assume you don't have data to identify a person or contact the living person. How would you contact to get consent to show personal information if you only have a name, impossible right? GDPR tries to stop abuse of personal data, yes, and your family tree certainly is personal data. However those who come to your website would mostly want to search and edit the non-living, search back in the history, thus the current generation follows the family tree and are not the point of entry. You can provide certain anonymization to those alive by not displaying the first names in full, maybe just the first letter. You may want to hide address, spouse, children for current generation. You could make those available for view/edit first by going through a secondary login, "not a robot". Further you may remove living people from search results and hide from search engines so they do not have ability to index the current generation. That would make it harder to abuse if you're going after an individual, but at the same time doesn't lock out the people providing information.	A VPN operator has to follow the laws in the country where they operate. If the laws in Sweden say that a VPN operator must keep logs of user activity, then they have to keep logs of user activity. If it makes you feel better: There are two kinds of VPN operators. Those that say they log, and those that lie about logging.	Yes When personal data is processed in the context of an EU/EEA/UK establishment (for example, by a company with offices in the UK), then all these processing activities must fully comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the data subjects are located. For the UK GDPR: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the United Kingdom or not. For the EU GDPR: The GDPR applies to: a company or entity which processes personal data as part of the activities of one of its branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed; or …	As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. That's not exactly true, consent is merely one of six possible legal basis for processing (article 6). For example, processing of personal data can also be lawful if it necessary to perform a contract, legally mandatory, or in the public interest. The court decision acknowledges that but rules out another basis in this case because it considers that it is possible to serve fonts without relying on a third-party ([…] der Einsatz der Schriftarten auch möglich ist, ohne dass eine Verbindung von Besuchern zu externen Servern hergestellt werden muss). Confusingly, it only refers to article 6(1)(f) when it seems to me that (b) would also be plausible but maybe this wasn't raised during the proceedings? If the data controller cannot invoke any other basis for the lawfulness of the processing then yes, the only thing left is asking for consent, i.e. invoking article 6(1)(a). But that doesn't mean that you should expect to be asked for consent each and every time your personal information is being used. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. Yes, implying consent doesn't really make sense under the GDPR definition (article 4, see also article 7): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action European data protection authorities have issued guidelines that detail what that means and clearly reject “bundling” different data processing. The regulation also makes it clear that data subjects should be able to withdraw consent at any time, which does not seem possible with the fonts on golem.de My reading of all this is that assuming consent because you are using a service (or even created an account or checked a box at some point) simply isn't valid consent. Either you don't need consent at all in the first place or what you need is freely given, specific consent and “implying” consent or bundling it with a registration process achieves exactly nothing. But this is still extremely common and it might take some time before enforcement and case law definitively settle this question. Smart data controllers trying to avoid collecting consent (like Meta) have abandoned any claim that signing up to the their services would constitute consent (because that's transparently not the case) and try to bypass the issue entirely using another basis like contractual necessity. This is also being litigated. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. That sounds more like the way EU directives work. Regulations are supposed to be immediately applicable (no implementation in national law necessary) with minimal differences between countries (except when they explicitely provide for that). Of course, enforcement would still mostly be in the hands of national court systems and (in Germany) provincial data protection authorities but there are mechanisms to ensure consistency (the European Data Protection Board, prejudicial questions to the CJEU, infringement proceedings from the European Commission…).
What are the legal affects of not mentioning heirs or successors in this act? The Meeting of Parliament Act 1797 starts with: Whenever his Majesty, his heirs or successors, shall be pleased, The Prorogation Act 1867 starts with: Whenever (save as herein-after excepted) Her Majesty shall be pleased, The former explicitly mentions heirs and successors, whereas the latter doesn't. Is there a difference, legally, between the phrasings? To me, the latter would seem only to apply to the reigning monarch at the time of the act's passing (or, perhaps, any female monarch in the future). Practically, though, this doesn't seem the case, bringing me to question why the phrasing is different at all, when such detail seems to be put into the way these are worded.	Section 30 of the Interpretation Act 1889 (PDF only) says In this Act and every other Act, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act, references to the Sovereign reigning at the time of the passing of the Act or to the Crown shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as references to the Sovereign for the time being, and this Act shall be binding on the Crown. The words "for the time being" mean that any mention of Queen Victoria (or indeed any other monarch) is to be taken as a mention of whoever the reigning sovereign is at the time. By referring to prior Acts, this Act explicitly makes any reference where "heirs and successors" were not mentioned into a reference which includes them. This Act was repealed in its entirety by the Interpretation Act 1978, which says basically the same thing at Section 10: In any Act a reference to the Sovereign reigning at the time of the passing of the Act is to be construed, unless the contrary intention appears, as a reference to the Sovereign for the time being. The 1978 Act merely says "Any Act", which includes Acts prior to its commencement (this is defined at Paragraph 1 of Schedule 2). It also omits reference to "the Crown" which may or may not be significant; the Crown is a bit of a nebulous concept.	Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).	That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.	The personal representative is empowered by law (esp. §3311) to undertake actions on behalf of the deceased, and enjoys certain legal immunities against personal liability for their actions. The personal representative can do things that a random person off the street can't do. Until you are appointed by the Register of Wills as personal representative, you aren't a personal representative. There are provisions for limited disposition of the estate without letters of testamentary such as paying employees of the deceased, paying the funeral home, but not in general any "non-emergency" distribution / disposal. Even with appointment as PR, one has a fiduciary obligation to equitably distribute the estate. That means that the PR has to respect the interests of both of the heirs. If the PR decides that some object is trash and throws it out, they could be liable to an heir who has an interest in the object. Of course, the heir with that interest may have to take the PR to court, so normally people just talk this out. As an intermediate step, an heir's attorney can write a letter to the PR advising them of the legal ramifications of breaching their fiduciary duty.	First, I don’t believe the author is using quotation marks to indicate an actual quotation, it is being used for emphasis and to group the words as a concept. That concept is that while it may seem undemocratic for a judge to overturn a law enacted by a democratically elected assembly, the “higher democracy” is that it protects the democratic institutions themselves by limiting the power of the legislature to what the higher law of a constitution allows.	Ohwilleke's answer (i.e. 'there isn't a simple answer') covers the general principles clearly. But for your specific situation (England and Wales, appeal to the High Court Chancery Division or Court of Appeal), the answer is "Do nothing irrevocable if possible; if necessary, apply for interim directions to the Court". The Chancery Masters are used to this sort of application, and though somebody will presumably be diappointed by the decision, the trustees have no liability.	This will depend on the exact wording of the will. If the will is well-drawn, it will provide alternative recipients in case the primary recipient of a bequest dies before the testator (will-maker) does. But as a general rule, if A makes a will leaving particular property to B, but B dies before A does, that bequest is void. If the will specifies an alternate recipient, the property goes to the alternate. If not, or if all specified alternates die before the testator does, the property becomes part of the residual estate of the testator. (The residual estate is that part which is not subject to a specific bequest.) The testator can specify a line of descent for a bequest: "I leave my house to Joan and her heirs". In that case, if Joan died before the testator, the house would go to whatever person or persons inherit from Joan. This was once a somewhat common form of bequest, but now is much less common. A will normally includes language leaving the residual estate to some person (or several people) or some entity (it can be an organization, such as a church or a charity). This is often done with language such as "I leave all the rest of my estate to ..." OR "Everything not include above i leave to..." or "I give all the remainder and residue of my estate to...". The executor does not choose, but rather follows the directions of the will on who gets the residue of the estate. I am not sure what happens if the will does not name a residuary legatee, or if the person so named dies before the testator. That will depend on the specific law of the jurisdiction. In the US, this means state law, and will vary from state to state. The comment by Dale M says that assets not provided for in the will are inherited as if the person was intestate, that is, as if the person had no valid will. The law in each jurisdiction specifies exactly what rules are followed in the case of intestacy. In general this is that property goes first to the teatator's spouse and children, but if there are no living spouse and children, to more distant relatives. Eventually, if no relatives close enough can be found, property escheats, that is, goes to the government. The exact rule varies by jurisdiction -- in the US by state.	There is not uniformity of law on this question, which is usually decided in the period after a death, but before a will is admitted to probate or an executor is appointed (typically in three to five days). As a result, the legal jurisdiction (usually a country or sub-national state or autonomous region) involved matters a great deal. For example, Italy used to presume that you did not want organ donation if you didn't execute a document during life saying that you did, and now has the opposite presumption. Similarly, many jurisdictions used to give a blood relative priority over a same sex partner, but now recognize a civil union or same sex marriage as having priority over a blood relative. Some jurisdictions give you some say over, for example, whether your body's organs will be donated or your body will be used for medical research. Some have formal documents that can be drafted and there are such things as "negative" provisions that are documents saying who cannot do something with your body. Other jurisdictions, as user6726 suggests, have a fixed priority system for determining who is next of kin and that applies strictly. Needless to say, a critical issue is how any such directive would be enforced. Obviously you, being dead, can't do that, and documents don't simply crawl out of desk drawers and walk themselves into court houses after your death either. Your wishes will never be enforced unless someone takes it upon themselves at the critical moment, to take action, and in that case, local law determines under what circumstances that person's statement regarding your wishes will be honored. Often, the person who might step up to take action doesn't learn of your death and of the location of your body until it is too late. If you die in circumstances where your identity is unknown, or where no relatives can be located and no directives can be located, some public official or whomever else ends up in possession of your body (often a corner) will have to decide for themselves what to do without your input.
Is self-defense mutually exclusive of murder? A Dallas man is charged with murder. The narrative indicates that the man shot the intruder in his back yard as the intruder approached with a pickax. Assuming that the homeowner does not have a duty to retreat and that he does have lawful cause to defend himself (from intruder with a pickax), why \ how does the narrative fit a murder charge? UPDATE: That being said, I would expect that the intruder being shot in the back of the neck does NOT help the defendant's claim of a justifiable shooting.	The simple answer to the question you asked is that they are not mutually exclusive. Self-defense and “castle doctrine” are defenses. A person can be charged and tried for murder, and one or both of those can be their defense. But shooting someone in self defense does not guarantee immunity from a charge or trial. In the first place, you need to show that it was indeed justifiable self-defense. As a source for this answer, see Texas state law library. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/gun-laws/stand-your-ground That site itself says that the laws are complicated and refers readers to “plain English” from which I selected https://www.bhwlawfirm.com/deadly-force-self-defense-in-texas/ For self defense, the site says: Texas law provides for a justifiable defense at trial when using deadly force if the person claiming self defense: Reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary; Had a legal right to be on the property; Did not provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and Was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force was used. For protection of property, it says Under Texas Penal Code §9.42, a person may use deadly force against another to protect land or property if: He is the owner of the land; He reasonably believes using the force is immediately necessary to prevent arson, burglary, or robbery; and He reasonably believes that the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means. OK! To summarize the story linked by the OP, homeowner hears and then finds a man outside breaking into homeowner’s shed. He confronts intruder who then moves toward homeowner with a pickaxe. Homeowner shoots and intruder runs off. let us agree that the first shot was allowed under Texas law, preventing a robbery and perhaps an attack with a pickaxe. The homeowner says that he then shot again “into the night.” At this point he is shooting a fleeing person. We can even leave out all of the irregularities once he calls 911 two hours later to report an invasion in progress even though the intruder was dead. In any case, there is also the questions are: Is the homeowner’s version of events true in the first place? If we accept everything he said, was the shot the killed the man justifiable under Texas law? These are for the prosecutor to decide if it is worth trying and the jury to decide. Back to your question of how can they charge him if he had a right to stand his ground? Further, even if a person has a justification for using force, he may still be arrested and face trial. Self defense is a defense against a murder charge, not a get out of jail free card.	Edit: because this question has tagged the United States, the answer below discusses US law, not the law of any other country. Because they're separate crimes that, as a general rule, don't merge, and prosecutors like to charge multiple crimes when they can because it gives them leverage in plea negotiations. You could also charge attempted murder if there's been an actual murder, it's just that it would kind of be a waste of time since they would merge upon conviction. You're close on the view that assault is attempted battery. But, note that generally assault is placing someone in imminent fear of receiving a battery, whereas as an attempt usually requires a 'substantial step' towards commission of the actual offense, so the ambit of assault is slightly larger than the ambit of attempted battery (again, generally speaking).	Assuming these are common law crimes (Kenya is a common law country - sort of) or statutory crimes that have codified common law crimes without substantially changing them. It is not attempted murder - this requires an intent to kill. Pulling the trigger would have that intent, pointing it doesn't. It is assault if it puts the victim in fear of immediate harm (pretty sure it would). There are probably some statutory firearms offences too.	Ah, but destroying the insulin is not "tantamount to to murdering the victim". Any pharmacy or hospital can supply more. Once the villain is secured, or the cop and victim are away from the villain, additional supplies can be obtained. That does not justify deadly force. (And since the T J Hooker series was set in a large US city, such supplies would have been readily available, 24/7. If the setting was far away from any such supplies, the case would be different.) However, if the cop has plausible reason to fear that the villain will attack him or the victim, and pose a serious threat of injury or death, the cop can use as much force as is reasonably required to defend himself or the victim, including deadly force if that is needed. He may not use more force than is reasonably required, but in practice once it is established that there was a valid threat, or reasonable grounds to believe that there was a threat, the cop's judgement on how much force was needed will only be overruled in a really egregious case. Under current law, the cop may not use deadly force simply to stop the suspect from escaping, unless there is some unusual factor involved. I think the law may have been interpreted differently on that point when the TV show was made, in the early 1980s.	No. Under Texas Penal Code Title 2 Subchapter A, one of three three conditions must be true to use the defense-of-others defense, that the person against whom force is used unlawfully and with force entered the person's residence, vehicle of business (not applicable), or attempted to forcibly remove the person from same (idem), or attempted aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Abortion is not statutorily murder in Texas, even if it is illegal.	Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics	Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon.	Does castle doctrine mean any guest at a house can kill uninvited guests? No. You have a completely faulty reading of the Castle doctrine (Wikipedia). The Castle doctrine allows a person... protections and immunities permitting one, in certain circumstances, to use force... And, those circumstances: Castle doctrines lessen the duty to retreat when an individual is assaulted within one's own home. Deadly force may either be justified... "when the actor reasonably fears imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm to him or herself or another"... While Castle doctrines may not provide civil immunity, such as from wrongful death suits, which have a much lower burden of proof. Aspects of the castle doctrine vary according to jurisdiction.
Can Congress overrule Marbury v. Madison by statute? Can the United States' Congress pass a statute (by simply majority of both houses, then signed into law by the President) which says: Using the power granted to us by Article III, Section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is henceforth regulated as follows: Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appelate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statute passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. Congress would do so by exploiting its power under Article III, Section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution: the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make In case of a positive response to the question above, can Congress do so also regarding the Supreme Court original jurisdiction, although apparently the Constitution gives Congress the power to make exceptions and regulations against the Supreme Court only for appellate jurisdiction?	Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.	The US courts (including the US Supreme Court) do not have an army or even a police force under their direct control, except for a few court bailiffs. Ultimately, if the executive simply defies the courts, the only remedy is a political one. A court can order a person held unlawfully to be released from detention, but the jail/prison authorizes might ignore such an order. A court might order DACA applications to be accepted, and if they are not, might rule that deportations or other negative actions are unlawful. A court might hold persons who defy its orders in contempt, and send marshals to jail such persons. But if the executive branch in an organized way defies such orders, there is no judicial power to compel obedience to court orders. This is why the judiciary has famously been called the "least dangerous branch" of the government: it cannot actually do anything without at least the tacit cooperation of the executive. Cherokee Case (Worcester v. Georgia) There was a reference in the comments above to the the Cherokee Indians case, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In that case the US Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall held that the Georgia laws purporting to seize Cherokee lands were invalid as violations of Federal treaties. President Jackson was strongly displeased by this ruling. He was supposed to have said: John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. It appears that President Jackson probably did not say that, at least not publicly. But in fact Jackson did not take any steps to enforce the decision, and the decision was in fact not enforced. The lands were seized, and the Cherokee were forcibly relocated across the infamous trail of tears. This event shows that a court ruling (proper or improper) may have no effect if the executive branch refuses to obey or enforce it.	The Constitution says "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States". As supreme military commander, the president alone gets to say whether or not to commit troops for such an expedition. Congress does have the power to control the purse. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that Congress cannot command the president.	Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.	The Supremacy Clause. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [emphasis mine] This is also known as the "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It prevents any law of any state from acting contrary to the federal constitution. A comment correctly cites multiple cases that use this clause, in part, as the basis for SCOTUS' authority to review State Supreme Court decisions. So in your hypothetical, the federal issue in play is the clarity of the federal constitution which supersedes state law.	In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article.	The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes).	A law that conflicts with the Constitution is void The enactment of a treaty is still a law. Even though the US has a Constitutional mechanism for ratifying treaties, once ratified, they are the “law of the land”.
How does "mistake of fact" apply as defense in the Amber Guyger Case? Amber Guyger was convicted of murder: entering the apartment of Bothum Jean and shooting him. She claimed she thought she was in her apartment. How would a defense of "mistake of fact" apply in said case? IANAL and seek to understand the subject matter	Amber Guyger was convicted of murder under Texas Penal Code section 19.02: A person commits the offense of murder if the person 1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or 2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits and act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. The Texas mistake-of-fact defense is codified at Penal Code section 8.02: It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense. To assert a mistake of fact defense, then, you need to demonstrate that you reasonably believed something that changes whether or not you met the mens rea requirement of intentionally or knowingly causing a death/serious bodily injury. An example would be firing a gun at what you reasonably thought was a corpse, or a mannequin, or Superman. In any of those circumstances, you would not have intended or known that you were going to cause someone's death. If you reasonably believed your gun was unloaded, you would not have known you were going to kill someone if you pulled the trigger. In Guyger's case, Whether she was in her apartment or someone else's, she still knew that putting two bullets in a man eating ice cream would cause his death or serious bodily harm. In the Guyger case, the defendant claimed she was mistaken about what apartment she was in, but that doesn't change whether she had the intent to kill Mr. Jean. That mistake does implicate the Texas "Castle doctrine" statute, Penal Code section 9.32: A person is justified in using deadly force against another ... when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary ... to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. ... The actor's belief ... that the deadly force was immediately necessary ... is presumed to be reasonable if the actor ... knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used ... unlawfully and with force entered ... the actor's occupied habitation If her mistake was reasonable, that would give her reason to believe Mr. Jean had unlawfully and with force entered her home, making it presumptively reasonable that she used deadly force. But the mistake of fact defense only looks at mistakes that change whether you committed the offense, not whether an affirmative defense is available to you, so it doesn't really change whether the defense is available. Nonetheless, it's generally accepted that a person can use self-defense doctrines like this even when they're mistaken about whether they're in danger. The question for the jury in those cases is whether the defendant's mistake was reasonable. Because the jury convicted her, it necessarily did not believe that she had made a reasonable mistake.	Errors in the Question Of course, this is not actually what really happens. What really happens is that the original crime is not tried. It is simply ASSUMED to have taken place and there is a presumption that the original actor was guilty of some crime. Obviously this is incorrect and unjust. This is incorrect. To convict a person of being an accomplice, in either US or UK courts, there must be evidence proving that the crime took place. This an essential element of the crime. It need not be proved who committed the crime as a principal, although there is often evidence about that. But an essential element of the crime of being an accomplice is that the underlying offense is a crime and did occur. Like all other elements of a crime, this must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. That is not the theory that the legislatures of either the US or the UK have adopted. Indeed I do not think that any common-law country has adopted this theory. The law could be changed, and one might argue that it should be. But what the law should be, as opposed to what it is, is not generally on-topic here, as opposed to in politics.SE. Accomplice The LII Definition of "Accomplice" is: A person who knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally gives assistance to another in (or in some cases fails to prevent another from) the commission of a crime. An accomplice is criminally liable to the same extent as the principal. An accomplice, unlike an accessory, is typically present when the crime is committed. Nothing there suggests that the principal must be convicted first. The Wikipedia article "Accomplice" says: An accomplice differs from an accessory in that an accomplice is present at the actual crime, and could be prosecuted even if the main criminal (the principal) is not charged or convicted. An accessory is generally not present at the actual crime, and may be subject to lesser penalties than an accomplice or principal. ... The fairness of the doctrine that the accomplice is still guilty has been subject to much discussion, particularly in cases of capital crimes. Accomplices have been prosecuted for felony murder even if the actual person who committed the murder died at the crime scene or otherwise did not face capital punishment. In jurisdictions based on the common law, the concept of an accomplice has often been heavily modified by statute, or replaced by new concepts entirely. In The Wikipedia article "Accessory (legal term) In the section on "England and Wales it is said: A mens rea {guilty state of mind] is required even when it is not required for the principal offender (for example, when the principal commits a strict liability offence). The defendant must intend to do the acts which he knows will assist or encourage the principal to commit a crime of a certain type. In R v Bainbridge (1960) 1 QB 129 the defendant supplied cutting equipment not knowing exactly what crime was going to be committed, but was convicted because the equipment supplied was not used in the ordinary way, but for a criminal purpose instead. The accomplice must also know of all the essential matters that make the act a crime ... In the section "United States" it is said that: U.S. jurisdictions (that is, the federal government and the various state governments) have come to treat accessories before the fact differently from accessories after the fact. All U.S. jurisdictions have effectively eliminated the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, either by doing away with the category of "accessory before the fact" entirely or by providing that accessories before the fact are guilty of the same offense as principals. The Model Penal Code's definition of accomplice liability includes those who at common law were called accessories before the fact; under the Model Penal Code, accomplices face the same liability as principals. It is now possible to be convicted as an accessory before the fact even though the principal has not been convicted or (in most jurisdictions) even if the principal was acquitted at an earlier trial.(Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(e) (2d ed. 2003).) 18 U.S. Code § 2 - Principals provides that: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. Note that there is no requirement that a principal be first tried or even identified to convict one who abetted a crime. All accomplices are abettors, although not all abettors are accomplices. The Model Penal Code (MPC) published by the American Law Institute says, in section 2.06 of the code, that: § 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. ... (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a victim of that offense; or (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. (Emphasis added) The official commentary on subsection (7) says: Subsection (7) speaks to the relation between the prosecution of the accomplice and the treatment of the person who is alleged to have committed the offense. In accordance with modern developments, this subsection provides that the accomplice can be prosecuted even though the other person has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, has an immunity to prosecution or conviction, or has been acquitted. The MPC was the result of a 10-year review of the laws then existing in the various US states. It was an attempt to rationalize existing laws and provide a consistent framework for criminal law in the US. It was offered to the states for adoption in whole or in part, and several states have adopted significant sections of it, and others have been guided by it in revising their legal codes. Section 2.06 (7) makes it clear that no previous prosecution of a principal is required for prosecution of an accomplice in any state that has adopted the MPC. Effect of the Theory of the Question The question asserts: Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. If courts adopted that as a rule, it would mean that if the principal escaped, or died, no accomplice could be prosecuted. Indeed consider the case of a crime boss, who is often an accomplice to the crimes of his (or her) henchmen. Such a boss would need only to have the actual criminal sent out of the country, or killed, to be quite safe from prosecution under the proposed rule. Hardly an improvement to my eyes. Such a rule would also mean that an accomplice could not be pressured, by means of a threat of prosecution, to disclose the actual criminal, or testify against that criminal. Again, not desirable. Use of UK Law I would add that in my answer to the linked question, sources from several US states were cited, and no UK sources. Indeed UK law does not seem to have been cited in the comments either, but this is a matter on which US and UK law are quite similar.	The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	X can be convicted of murder in all jurisdiction in the United States (and probably the other common law jurisdictions). The issue here is two-fold. Contracts that involve illegal actions are not enforceable. In fact, the contract killing example you gave is a classic illegal agreement/contract. See the Wikipedia articles on illegal agreements and contract killings. Most criminal prosecutions involving bodily injury or death proceed regardless of the victim's wishes. This is because the prosecution represents the State's interests and can prosecute a case where the victims want it dismissed. Consider and example where the "battered spouse" doesn't want to testify against his/her abuser. The prosecution can still bring changes where the victim is not cooperative. It just makes proving their case more difficult. Check out this article from the DOJ that discusses how victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement or other prosecutorial decisions. http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6439-input-into-plea-agreement One could make an argument that the affirmative defense of consent could apply; however, most states have consent statutes like Colorado's that would not apply to murder. See C.R.S. § 18-1-505(2), which states: When conduct is charged is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. This statutes basically says consent doesn't apply where someone received serious bodily injury (murder would meet this standard), unless they are in a lawful athletic sport, such as boxing.	There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another.	There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.	Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Can Slack really claim not to be a data controller? I'm an EU resident. I just sent in a GDPR removal request to Slack. Their response: Per our Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, your Workspace Primary Owner (Customer) controls Customer Data. Customer owns all of the submitted content, including profile information, and Slack processes Customer Data on the Customer's behalf: https://slack.com/privacy-policy#collect. A Workspace Primary Owner, as the data controller, is responsible for determining whether profile information requires deletion. If you wish, you may also want to reach out to your Workspace Primary Owners as we can only delete profile information upon their request. If you have any questions about this process, please refer to this page in our Help Center: https://get.slack.help/hc/articles/360000360443-Delete-your-profile-info-from-Slack Somehow this doesn't feel right. Slack claims that the organisation (or person in many cases) running the Slack is the data controller, but the "data controller" doesn't even have normal access to more than 10000 messages if they're not paying Slack. Does this make sense legally? And what if this "data controller" doesn't comply to my request? Or is dead or doesn't even exist anymore? Isn't it Slack's responsibility to remove my data in this case? This reddit thread is related. Which got me to 1a of [Article 17 of the GDPR], that states the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; To me this clearly applies to most (probably all) of the Slacks that I was on, since most of my data (i.e. messages) are not even visible anymore. Is this correct?	The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack.	I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data".	That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.	I agree with Ben that there are many exemptions to the right to be forgotten. For example if messages are removed from a mailing list archive, the replies to deleted messages will become useless. That would impact the right of freedom of expression and information of those authors. That is one of the exemptions to the right to be forgotten. So there is no right to delete complete messages. Replacing references to names and email addresses, is a very good solution. It must not be possible to de-anomize the data. So having [email protected], it must not be possible to get back A. Person <[email protected]>. Sure, everyone who received a copy of those messages can find that message in their own archive, and see the author that way. But that is because they simply have a copy of the full archive. The right to be forgotten is independent of someone else having the same information you request to delete. For example google removes search results in its index, even though the same information can still be found on the original website. To fully exercise the right to be forgotten, you have to make a request to everyone who has that data. In Austria there is a recent case (ECLI:AT:DSB:2018:DSB.D123.270.0009.DSB.2018) (available only in German) where someone's data was anonymized after asserting his "right to be forgotten". He did not agree and wanted his data to be fully deleted, so he filed a complaint at the Austrian DPA. The DPA denied his request. I have tried to make a translation of the relevant part of the judgment, note that many references are to other Austrian judgments or books (where I listed the ISBN instead). D.1 The binding part of the GDPR does not contain the term "anonymisation". Only recital 26 states that the GDPR does not apply to anonymous data. D.2 The term "erasure of personal data" as used in Art. 17 is neither found in the binding part nor in the recitals. In Art. 4(2) erasure and destruction are listed as alternative forms of processing which are not necessary identical. This means that erasure does not necessarily requires final destruction. (cf. K121.375/0012-DSK/2008, with regard to Directive 95/46/EC, where also a distinction was made between erasure and destruction; cf. ISBN 978-3-406-72006-2). Such a differentiation also results from the case-law of the Constitutional Court (cf. VfSlg. 19.937/2014). Therefore, the person in charge is entitled to make a choice with regard to the means - i.e. the manner in which the data is deleted - (cf. again ISBN 978-3-406-72006-2, according to which reference is made to the destruction of keys or other decryption devices without the removal of the data itself; cf. in this sense also ISBN 978-3-406-71932-5, which refers to the impossibility of perceiving the information previously embodied in the data to be deleted; cf. also ISBN 978-3-406-72007-9, according to which deletion is to be understood as any kind of conceilment of stored personal data; cf. also Warter, Dako 2/2018, 39 [40], according to which the result of the deletion action is decisive). The removal of the personal reference from personal data ("anonymisation") can thus in principle be a possible means of deletion within the meaning of Art. 4(2) in conjunction with Art. 17(1) GDPR. However, it must be ensured that neither the person responsible himself nor a third party can restore a personal reference without disproportionate effort (cf. RS0125838, according to which it is not sufficient to merely change the data organisation in such a way that "targeted access" is not possible any more; cf. also the judgment of the CJEU of 19 October 2016, C-582/14, 45 ff.). Only if the person responsible aggregates the data in a way that no data can be identified, can the resulting data stock be described as anonymous (i.e. without personal reference) (see Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques of the former Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP216, p. 10). The Administrative Court has also ruled - with regard to the comparable legal situation under the DSG 2000 - that a redaction (blacking out), for example, can be regarded as a form of deletion. By making the name of the data subject and all other data relating to him or her unrecognisable, his or her request for deletion is complied with (cf. the decision of 23 November 2009, 2008/05/0079). So anonymisation is sufficient to comply with a right to be forgotten request.	I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a "processing activity" and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the "original" is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.	The GDPR is about "processing" not "storing", so your actions definitely fall under the GDPR. Also you have stored the email address and the email you sent in your "Sent" folder. You need to reply with all the information you have associated with that email address. This will at least be the email you already sent. If you scraped the email address from GitHub then you have it in a table with (presumably) other information such as the repository where you found it, in which case send that row of the table with the associated column headers. If you really just have a list of email addresses then say so. If you merely saw the email address and then typed a fresh email then say so.	From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes.	Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.
What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? a) Ask party in deposition whether they made the statements and if they deny it, gather other evidence or witnesses that confirm that they made the statement? b) Ask the party at trial whether they made the statement and let the jury decide whether they made the statement? Are there other scenarios / approaches?	What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).	Yes, you may call a defendant as a witness and compel the defendant to testify in a civil case. If you need this testimony to prove your case, you should have the clerk issue a subpoena for trial to the defendant and have that subpoena personally served by a process server upon that defendant (sometimes a witness fee, a mileage allowance, and a copy of the relevant statute must also be included in the package). There should be a standard court form available to do this. The subpoena to appear and testify at trial must be delivered to the defendant by the process server a certain amount of time in advance (usually two days, but court rules vary). Also, when you call a defendant as a witness you may generally examine the witness with leading questions, which is something that you are not usually allowed to do with witnesses that you call in your own case. Forcing a defendant to testify to the indisputable facts is a good way to meet your burden of proof towards establishing those facts. But, when you call a defendant as a witness, you should limit your questions to those you know the answer to and can ideally prove with other evidence if the defendant lies. Don't try to tell the entire story of the case with the defendant, just the undisputed facts. The one narrow exception to this would be a criminal contempt of court proceeding (i.e. one seeking the remedy of throwing the offending party in jail where there is no way to obtain relief by taking the action requested) prosecuted by a party within a civil case, to which 5th Amendment protections would apply. But, this would not apply to the kind of case described in the original post.	I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.	What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial.	By producing sufficient evidence at trial. In this case, the most likely sources of evidence would either be eye witnesses (if someone witnessed the forgery) or expert testimony (i.e., handwriting experts). Any experts would have done an analysis and would testify about the results of their analysis. Any eye witnesses would testify to what they personally observed. Judges are not handwriting experts. They don't evaluate signatures. Judges are law experts. They evaluate evidence. Sworn testimony (subject to cross-examination) by a qualified handwriting expert stating so would be evidence of a forged signature. The handwriting expert would conduct all the necessary analysis, then provide a conclusion and their testimony in exchange for a fee. Also, patterns of deceptive conduct (that can be found during discovery) could be introduced as evidence to impeach the credibility of the testimony of any witness (including your counterparty). I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. Please do not do anything based on anything I have written because I really don't know what I am talking about. I'm just stumbling around in the dark like everybody else. If you need help with a case, please hire a real attorney and even offer to pay them for their time and expertise.	Will he break any laws by saying that (assuming the actual truth cannot be found out)? The statement made outside the courtroom is not itself perjury, since it is not made under oath. But that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be legal consequences. It would be powerful evidence in a perjury prosecution (surely enough for a conviction even standing alone long after the trial is over but within the statute of limitations for perjury in the jurisdiction from the date of the sworn statement, if any), and would be a waiver of 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination, generally, in the perjury case. It might also be strong evidence (enough to convict standing alone) in a timely obstruction of justice prosecution. This statute of limitations could also run from the date of the sworn statement, or from the date of a false unsworn statement that caused a conviction to be reopened. If the statement made in court was favorable to the prosecution, it might bring these charges after the conviction in the underlying case is final. But, the out of court statement would probably be grounds for the party benefitting from the original statement to seek a mistrial or to have a judgment set aside if the verdict or judgment is consistent with the sworn statement. If the out of court statement was made before the trial was over, the witness could be recalled and the out of court statement could be used to impeach the in court statement. It might constitute a probation or parole violation. If the witness were testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the out of court statement would probably breach the deal and deny the witness the benefit of the cooperation deal. The out of court statement might constitute contempt of court if made while the proceeding in which the statement was made was still pending. Depending on the nature of the statement, the out of court statement might constitute defamation for which some one whose reputation was tarnished might sue for money damages. (There is immunity from civil liability for in court statements.) It would violate the ethical rules of many professions. For example, an attorney would probably be disbarred for doing that. Arguably, in this situation, the statute of limitations could run from the later unsworn statement date rather than the date of the sworn statement. If the witness is a state or federal government employee, this could lead to impeachment proceedings, in the state legislature, or Congress, respectively. The aftermath of the Lewinsky Scandal (link below) involving Bill Clinton touches on many of these possibilities: Further investigation led to charges of perjury and to the impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 by the U.S. House of Representatives. He was subsequently acquitted on all impeachment charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in a 21-day Senate trial. Clinton was held in civil contempt of court by Judge Susan Webber Wright for giving misleading testimony in the Paula Jones case regarding Lewinsky and was also fined $90,000 by Wright. His license to practice law was suspended in Arkansas for five years; shortly thereafter, he was disbarred from presenting cases in front of the United States Supreme Court. Easier and Harder Cases The easier cases are those where it is undeniably clear from other evidence that the witness lied under oath, and the out of court statement merely puts the cherry on top of an already solid perjury case. The hard cases aren't the cases where "the actual truth cannot be found out". Instead, the hard cases are the cases where there is strong evidence that the statement made in court, under oath was true. For example, suppose Ted Cruz is asked in court: "Were you the Zodiac killer?" (A crime ridiculously attributed to him despite the fact that it is something that happened when he was a small child who live many hundreds of miles away.) And he says, "No" in court, but then leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "I am the Zodiac killer, I lied about that under oath in court today." Similarly, suppose that a DNA test on a certain blue dress shows a perfect match to President Bill Clinton and Bill Clinton says under oath in court, that the substance tested came from him on a certain day, in a certain place, when a certain person was wearing it, in a certain way (also confirmed by a witness and surveillance video). Then, he leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "Someone else was the source of that genetic material. I never met that person, and I was in Kenya on the day alleged and I've never set foot in the White House. I lied about all of this under oath in court today." In these cases, there is no plausible way to make an obstruction of justice or perjury charge stick, or to upset a verdict or judgment consistent with the truthful sworn statement. Contempt of court is still possible, as would professional ethics violations, but other consequences would be less obvious, because the act would come across more as absurd instead of something that genuinely confounds the truth. The legal consequences associated with the conduct in the original post are mostly aimed at sanctioning genuinely fraudulent conduct. Our legal system is more confused about how to respond to lies so blatant that they only amount to feeble and ineffectual gaslighting that no reasonable person familiar with the circumstances would believe (but that might incite crazy conspiracy theory thinking supporters). The harder case would lie in the uncanny valley between a bad joke and a pathetically weak attempt to mislead people, even though the law is clear about how to deal with clear sarcasm and convincing attempts to lie that can't be clearly proven or disproven with other evidence.	Senators, and anyone else for that matter, can ask any questions they want. The witness is required to answer the questions only if under subpoena, and only if the answer of the question would neither require disclosure of privileged information nor violate a 5th Amendment right (which is a form of privilege). Many things that are the subject of an NDA are not privileged information, and the fact that someone claims that something is a trade secret does not automatically make it privileged information. Privileges can be established by statute, court rule or at common law.	Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened.
Wave Broadband service refusal and thank you for your time, I have a question in terms of the legality of a dispute between wave and myself. My grandma is displaying the signs of altzheimers so my girlfriend and myself moved in with her, however she has been forgetting to pay her bills so we took over paying rent, power, garbage etc. My girlfriend works from home, and therefore needs to be able to access the internet, however when we tried to contact Wave about setting up internet, we found out that my grandma had an unpaid bill with them, (that she refuses to square up) so they refuse to provide to this address regardless of the fact it wouldn't be in her name, nor would she be using it. Is this legal? I was under the impression it was illegal to attempt to hold somebody accountable for another's debt.	Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission.	There is little prospect for suing over this measure. The university has a legitimate interest in verifying that access to online systems is only granted to authorized users, and simple passwords are considered to be insufficient. (I don't intend to argue about password technology, I'm just making the observation that two-factor authentication is better than single-factor authentication). I have not encountered this requirements in US banks yet, but I have encountered it in Norway where an online transaction always requires with a password and a code generated by a gadget of the type you alluded to. I surmise that your university mandates that all payments be done online, which means that you must have access to a computer in order to pay a bill. It is not reasonable to expect people to have a computer that is connected to the internet at all times, but it is reasonable (and often done, by universities) to expect people to be able to so connect some of the time. So likewise, it is not reasonable to expect that people will have their authentication gadget available at all times, but it will be available some of the time, and thus there is no insurmountable impediment to paying the bill (or accessing the library, or reading email...). These gadgets do, however, potentially run afoul of ADA, but presumably they know that and can make accommodations.	Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.	No, it is not illegal. The company has no standing to punish you for that. Companies can't sue random people for sending random email... that was largely settled under the (YOU)-CAN-SPAM Act, when in the guise of standardizing US anti-spam laws, spam was largely legalized and state laws were pre-empted and barred from existing. However, all the other laws still apply Laws on harassment, for instance. Sometimes people with mental illness think another human "owes them" a relationship (which kind of misses the point of what a relationship is, but never mind that). And those people, who sadly are an all-too-common cliché, tend to act badly in very predictable ways. As such, we have plenty of laws on the books (and plenty of family court judges who have seen it all) to dispense consequences to the misbehavior and protection to the victim. All those laws really don't care in which medium one might violate them: sky-writing, naval light signal, email, whatever.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	I would agree with @DaleM that it is probably legal to install such a camera, however I think that you may have recourse - Apparently, California has Civil Stalking Laws and you may be able to get a restraining order prohibiting him from monitoring your front door. (You may also look into harassment, which would be related)	Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.	There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.
Can I Sue the Police? Long story short: My son was backed into by a truck earlier this month. They left the scene. I called the police, they showed, up I wrote a statement and everything. My son later was in the hospital complaining of pain and has had a few visits since. I reached out to the officer, never heard back. I went to the police department today and found out that the officer did not fill out a MVA or anything and in his dispatch report he said no crime was committed and no charges were filed when my son was injured and I told the officer that I wanted to press charges against the person that hit my son.	A traffic accident is often not a crime even when someone is injured. So suing the police is unlikely to get you anywhere. You can get a lawyer and ask what your chances are to sue the driver who is the person who actually caused the injury, not the police.	Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.	can really anyone in Germany call the police on others without proof of anything? Anyone anywhere can call the police without proof of anything as long as they have a phone. The question is, what will the police do about it. Police in Germany are more professional and less corrupt than in many countries in the world (e.g. they are much less corrupt than police in much of the United States or police in Southern Italy or Mexico, or in much of the "third-world"). Most German police are unlikely to exercise their power unless they are genuinely deceived into thinking that you committed an actual crime. But, German cops are human too. Some German cops are bad cops and even good cops aren't perfect truth detectors or bias free. and if so what are my rights? There has to be some evidence to arrest you or prosecute you, but testimony from people who claim to be eye witnesses is a form of evidence and proof. People are routinely convicted of crimes (everywhere in the world) based solely upon the testimony of other people with no additional proof. This is usually a good rule. As a society we don't want the criminal justice system to let people who commit crimes that are witnessed by lots of truthful witnesses and testified to, to go free just because there is no non-testimonial evidence. But because people lie (or are simply mistaken about the truth) sometimes, it isn't a perfect way of determining who is guilty and who is innocent. You also have the right to lodge a complaint of criminal defamation with the police in Germany and in Germany hundreds of thousands of such cases are prosecuted by police every year. Making false accusations against you (or even just insulting you in an extremely offense manner) as they did is a minor crime in Germany. and the person I mentioned had 2 of his employees with him but I am sure and I know for a fact they are on his side and I had no witnesses with me so how can I prove I am innocent? if they agreed on making up a story against me? The possibility that people will be wrongfully arrested and wrongfully convicted of crimes because people lie and authorities believe the people who are lying is a constant risk. The best you can do is to tell your story consistently and honestly and hope that you are believed. But it is impossible to eliminate the risk that people will lie and be believed and that you will suffer the consequences, even if you are doing everything right. In the long run, you may want to avoid people who you think would lie and make false accusations around you, and to have the presence of either friendly witnesses and/or audio/visual recording at times when you are in their presence. You may also, as a long run strategy try to figure out if there was anything you could have done to prevent them from being out to get you so badly that they would make false accusations against you. While I don't want to blame the victim, and often enough, especially for example, if you are a foreigner or otherwise different in a homogeneous community some people are doing to hate you for no reason, sometimes their real motivation may be a failure to follow social norms that are not actually illegal, or a misunderstand that could be cleared up.	There is a good amount of case law addressing this question going back two centuries. Legally, as soon as you are subject to "excessive force," you are allowed to defend yourself as you would against any assault, even if that force is being used in the course of an otherwise lawful arrest. Furthermore, in some states you are still allowed to resist unlawful arrest. Unfortunately, the matter is no longer as clear as it used to be. (There is a lot of material on this subject; just search for resisting unlawful arrest.) For example, police reflexively invoke a virtual safe harbor by shouting, "Stop resisting!" while battering arrest subjects. Video evidence has uncovered a plethora of examples in which this was done to subjects who were not only not resisting, but even later determined to have been incapable of resisting. If you intend to defend yourself against police, even when justified by law, you need to realize that the system is stacked against you. Police carry the means of escalating to lethal force. So, for example, if you are being beaten but you are potentially able to physically overpower and restrain an officer, you will likely then be met with baton blows or tasers. Since a baton is a deadly weapon, you would be (in theory) justified in shooting an officer attacking you with one. But as soon as any officer shouts "gun!" you will be shot, and most likely killed. Police seem to be given the benefit of the doubt by prosecutors and grand juries when they claim, "I feared for my life." You (even if you survive) will likely have any such claim subject to a full criminal trial. So even though you can legally defend yourself against excessive police force, these days you will almost certainly be unable to in practice.	The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.	In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.	There will be a local rule regarding what police have to do with a person in custody. Here are the rules for Seattle. The main relevant rule is that they must take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of the detainee. They must use seat belts, unless the vehicle does not have seat belts in the detainee area. Additionally, they are not to respond to routine calls while transporting a detainee, but they may may respond to a threat to life safety. Typically, high speed response indicates a threat and not a noisy dog complaint. There is no obligation to refrain from responding, nor is there a requirement to release detainees. I don't think there is a clear and bright line: it comes down to what an officer would (in light of department instructions) judge to be reasonable. The officer may be wrong and the department may be wrong in what is legally "reasonable", and this could come out as a result of lawsuits and Dept. of Justice investigations. You can file a complaint with the Civil Rights division of the DoJ, see here.	You are describing a liability suit. My sense is that based on the facts you describe you will face two serious challenges to making a successful case. Damages and liability. In order to win a liability case, you must first establish that you have been damaged in some way. According to your facts, your damages are at best, the replacement value of a used controller. I'm guessing that's what, $20 or so? That doesn't cover the cost of an attorney's time to even begin to hear your version of the facts, much less give you advice or pursue a case for you. After you establish damages, you must prove the company is responsible or has some share of liability for causing your damages. Again, I think this is going to be an obstacle for you. Not placing a warning that the game will affect you by causing you to throw your controller and be mean to your mom would be unprecedented if you were to prevail. AFAIK.
Whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? On one hand, the jury gets to see substantive evidence but the other side is alerted to it before trial and can prepare. On the other hand, with impeachment evidence, the other side can be surprised, but the jury does not get to see it. Which tends to be more effective?	What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial.	If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.	They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction.	My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance).	There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.	The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides.	Short Answer Statements of jurors about their deliberations are not allowed to be considered for any purpose, subject to very narrow limitations which do not apply in the fact pattern you are asking about in this question. The General Rule And Its Exceptions Consideration of juror statements, subject to narrow exceptions, is barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which has a state or territorial equivalent that is substantially similar in every U.S. jurisdiction that has true jury trials (as opposed, for example, to courts-martial which look like jury trials but are not jury trials from a legal doctrine perspective). Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which is the model for the lion's share of these rules reads as follows: Rule 606. Juror (a) At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence. (b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. (1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. This is subject to exceptions only in a few extremely limited circumstances: To document interference or influence on the jury from outside the jury during the trial or deliberations (e.g. bribery of a juror, a juror's consultation of outside facts, blackmail of a juror, counsel for a party providing information not authorized by the judge to the juror). This is covered by Rule 606(b)(2)(A) and 606(b)(2)(B). To establish that a mistake was made filling out the verdict form (e.g. testimony immediately following a jury trial that the jurors confused the names of two co-defendants and incorrectly filled out the jury form convicting each one of the crimes where the jury found the other co-defendant guilty). This is covered by Rule 606(b)(2)(C). Under an exception created just this year for the first time (the source opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court by a 5-3 vote in this case, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado (March 6, 2017), is here), to document that one or more jurors essential to the verdict reached the result as a result of a racially/ethnically discriminatory reasons (e.g., one or more of the jurors who voted to convict in a case resulting in a conviction said "let's convict him because he's Hispanic" and then did so). This is not expressly covered by Rule 606(b), but the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally necessary to allow it. The situation you pose does not involve any of these exceptions. Instead, it concerns the internal deliberations of a jury not subject to outside influence, and it does not involve racial or ethnic bias in deliberations. So, this information is legally irrelevant and may not be considered by any court at the trial or appellate level. Procedural Aspects Of This Question Of course, in all of these scenarios including the exceptions, the mere fact that a juror says something publicly is meaningless legally. But, there is no means by which a lawyer in a case (or anyone else) can obtain information about juror deliberations through a subpoena or other compulsory court process. The only way anyone could find out about improper jury deliberations is if a juror voluntarily discloses these facts. Any effort to introduce consideration to this statement would have to be submitted to the trial court (generally, the trial court that handled the original case, but sometimes a habeas corpus action trial court) in either the form of a sworn affidavit of the juror, or live witness testimony of the juror under oath in the trial court in a post-trial hearing of some sort. This would have to be submitted by a lawyer for the defendant (or less often by the prosecutor in the case, seeking to right a wrong discovered by the prosecutor, for example, in the context of a separate bribery investigation conducted by the prosecutor's office). The juror or a third-party would not have standing to challenge the verdict or to bring juror statements to the court's attention in a legally effective manner. A statement of a juror about the verdict or how it came to be at a trial can only be considered at the trial court level and only: (i) in a post-trial motion for a new trial, which can be considered on direct appeal, (ii) in a collateral attack on the original verdict in a different kind of post-trial motion (state practice differs regarding what these motions are called), or (iii) in a collateral attack through a separate civil action (called a habeas corpus action) to set aside a jury verdict. Generally speaking, appellate courts never consider new evidence in any kind of case and can only consider evidence that is part of the official trial court record. The only true exception to this rule is that it may consider a post-trial fact that would terminate the case for procedural reasons (e.g. the existence of a settlement by the parties, or the death of a defendant during the pendency of the appeal or earlier which would render the appeal moot). Appellate courts can take "judicial notice" of certain matters that constitute general knowledge not specific to the case before them (e.g. the existence and duration of the U.S. Civil War, or the distance between New York City and Chicago, or the name of elected officials at the time the facts of the case took place). But, evidence concerning juror statements is not something about which judicial notice may be taken. Policy Considerations Why do we have such a rule when allowing this testimony could prevent serious miscarriages of justice? In rough order of importance, the reasons include the following: To protect the ability of a jury to engage in "jury nullification", which is an issue also informed by the double jeopardy protections of the 5th Amendment to United States Constitution (applied to state and local proceedings by virtue of incorporation through the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and parallel state constitutional protections) against revisiting a jury acquittal in a criminal case for any reason. To minimize the burden jury service places on jurors who would otherwise routinely be interrogated by lawyers unhappy with their verdict after the trial even if they didn't want to speak with those lawyers. To protect the finality of verdicts on appeal and in post-trial proceedings as this would add another set of grounds to disturb a court decision in addition to those which can be observed in the court record. Non-Obvious Consequences Of This Rule One important consequence of this rule is that "harmless error" analysis by an appellate court, which is conducted when there is a legal error made in a jury trial to determine if the error, if it had been corrected, was material enough to change the outcome of the case, is always conducted on a hypothetical and theoretical basis rather than based upon actual factual knowledge of what would have or would not have influenced the jury's decision. Another important consequence of this rule for appellate practice is that jury verdicts will be upheld in any case where it would be possible for the trial court record to allow a jury to come to the conclusion that it did, whether or not the jury actually considered the arguments and facts it would have had to have considered to correctly reach its verdict. Thus, it is frequently the case that a jury misunderstands the jury instructions or the facts of the case and makes an incorrect decision as a result, but that verdict is upheld on appeal because it would have been possible for a jury which, for example, found witnesses that the actual did not actually believe were telling the truth to have been truthful to rule in the manner that it did. Another practical effect of this rule is that it is easier to overturn a judge's decision on appeal because the judge must articulate his or her factual and legal basis for each ruling, than it is to overturn a jury verdict, since a jury need not articulate the reasoning behind its verdict except to the extent that it is given and completes special verdict forms when it deliberates.	What are the legal consequences of substantive factual errors in an opinion? None. I assume that this specific ruling is not affected in any way by the text of the opinion? Correct. I assume that even an opinion of the form "We got high and decided to rule wrongly for fun" wouldn't actually negate the ruling? Probably not, but it might precipitate a constitutional crisis or lead to an impeachment. How does this affect the precedent? It doesn't. Will courts in the future consider the true facts of the case (whatever they perceive them to be), No. will they accept as legal fiction that the facts were as the Court describes them? Yes. Could it be legal for the district to repeat exactly the same set of actions in exactly the same set of true circumstances as before, since those won't be the same circumstances that the Court claimed to rule on? In such a case, is the lower court bound by the Supreme Court's characterization of the facts of the case, Generally speaking the lower courts are bound by characterizations of the facts made by the appellate court. But, it depends to some extent on the procedural posture of the case. In most cases, the findings of fact made by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing are binding on appellate courts in the U.S. unless they are not supported by any admissible evidence presented at trial, but there are some exceptions to this rule and there is considerable art as well as science that goes into properly characterizing the evidence presented at trial. But, for example, many appellate cases are appeals from a dismissal of a case on a motion to dismiss at the outset of a case, in which all allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint in a civil matter are taken as true for sake of argument, and the legal issue presented is whether the Plaintiff can prevail if all of those facts are true. In a case in that procedural posture, assuming that the appellate court reversed the trial court and found that the facts alleged state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then the remand would be to move forward with discovery and other pre-trial procedures in the case and ultimately a trial, if necessary, to determine the actual facts of the case as opposed to the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff in the complaint or petition. Not infrequently, when appellate courts are divided over what happened in the trial court, one side of the debate, looking at the raw testimony and exhibits presented at trial, will conclude that the admissible evidence presented at trial did not support the findings of fact in a mixed question of fact and law made by a trial court judge, while another side of the debate will accept the trial court judge's findings of fact uncritically. It often isn't easy to know, from reading an appellate court opinion alone, which side is which in this regard. can it use the true facts of the case as long as it obeys the ruling itself? Usually not. Usually, facts relied upon by an appellate court are by definition the correct facts (apart from clerical errors - e.g., an appellate court once misspelled my name in a court opinion, and the lower court wasn't bound by that mistake). This said, as noted above, the precise procedural posture of the case, nature of the court's opinion, and scope of the remand order is highly relevant to what a court can do on remand.
What is the purpose of a Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? While looking up interpretations of the meaning of Karnivool's "All I Know", I saw the following meaning of the song: This is the Karnivool's Notice of Understanding and Intent. From Black's Law Dictionary: Understanding: an agreement to "stand under", or be bound by, the terms of a contract. In all common law jurisdictions under the British Empire (Australia, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, etc), you can send a notice to the government, informing them what your understanding of the world is. Further, you inform them what your personal laws are, and how you are going to live your life. Lawyers and Law Students in these countries have been encouraged to remove themselves from being bound by all the acts, statutes, and codes of their particular country of origin. The rest of us (slaves) are never told that we can do this. Seems someone told the band. :) Songmeanings He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights?	He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.	First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.	So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other.	Typically an Answer would have two parts. The first part presents the Defendant's side of the story raised in the Petition in an effort to assert that the Petition when viewed in light of the actual facts hasn't demonstrated a right to relief. The second part sets forth "affirmative defenses", most of which are procedural in nature. An affirmative defense raises some set of circumstances not discussed in the Petition that make it appropriate to deny relief even when, but for the defense, if everything in the Petition was true, this would suffice to establish grounds for relief. For example, procedural defenses might include: failure to meet a deadline, failure to give notice to the proper persons, failure to pay a filing fee, failure to include required information (such as a case number or a statement of facts or a signature) in the Petition, or lack of standing to file the Petition on behalf of the child because parental rights or legal guardianship are absent or because the person filing the Petition isn't an adult. The notion is that the Reply, in theory, should limit itself to responding to the newly raised procedural defenses stated in the Answer, or to new documents provided with the Answer, instead of trying to argue and resolve every dispute of fact or credibility issues between the Petition's version of the facts and the Answer's version of the facts. When in doubt, talk about it in the Reply. At worst, it is beyond the scope of what should be included in a Reply and can be ignored by the hearing officer as harmless. And, sometimes the hearing officer will decide that they want to know what is said even if it isn't strictly within the proper scope of a Reply. Certainly provide any documents that weren't previously provided that rebut the claims in the Answer.	The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose.	The warning notice is intended for viewers and participants, not for the court to make its own official record of the proceedings. Presumably, it was this court record that the judge released for educational purposes under his own Order via Twitter. In which case, there has been no contempt of court.	A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act.	If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will.").
Could I write a new Frankenstein book since it's public domain? I was largely just wondering about this as there are a number of very fun, interesting things that could be done with the character.	Mary Shelley's Frankenstein is indeed public domain so you are free to use that character. However, a lot of what we think of as "Frankenstein" is not Mary Shelly, for example, the iconic Frankenstein look dates from the 1931 film which may still be under copyright. You can use elements that are public domain, you can't use elements that aren't.	This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it.	There is no copyright in an idea. A retelling of a story could be a derivative work, and the making of it a violation of the author's rights to authorize the creation of derivative works (17 USC 106 in US law. article 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention). However, the originals of most "fairy tales" are long out of copyright, and new versions of them may be created and published in any form, for pay or not, by anyone who chooses to do so. Some "fairy tales" are in fact original creations recent enough to still be under copyright protection. (at most 95 years in the US for works published before 1978, 70 years after the death of the author in many countries). In those cases a new version would probably be a derivative work, and require permission from the copyright owner. In some cases a particular author added significant elements to the plot of a fairy tale or folk tale recently enough that the version which introduced those elements is still protected by copyright. In any such case, a new version or retelling that included the new (protected) plot element might well be found to be a derivative work, and so require permission. Basing any retelling only on versions clearly out of copyright will avoid this problem.	No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.	"The rights to this work reverted to the author in 1951" means that back in 1951 the publisher's contract to print the book ended, and the author resumed full rights. (This might have been done by the author, or the publisher, depending on their contract.) It does not mean that the copyright lapsed or that the work entered the public domain. "Ms. Margaret Wilson" was presumably the author or the author's agent, or perhaps the publishers representative back in 1951. She may or may not be alive, and the firm of "Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc" may have been the new publisher (unless it was the old one, the question is not clear, and without the title I can't cross check). If DS&P was the new publisher, the rights might now be held by E. P. Dutton, as they seem to have acquired the rights to the bulk of the DS&P catalog. In any case, the copyright would (if it is in force) now be held by the author's heir, or whoever the author might have sold or given it to. Someone will be the legal owner. That it is not being marketed does not release the copyright or license the work for general use. If there was no other heir, it would have become government property. In the US, it would become the property of the state where the owner was a legal resident. If this was a work by a US author first published in the US, copyright needed to be renewed after 28 years, which would have been in 1959 (plus or minus one year, I believe). If the work required copyright renewal, and this was not done, then the work is in the public domain, and can be freely used by anyone. Records of copyright renewals, by year, are available for download from Project Gutenberg, or can be searched at the US Copyright Office. There is no way to be sure how the "scanning institution" determined that "No known copyright restrictions" apply, short of asking that institution. It is possible that they checked for a copyright renewal and did not find one. If you use content from this work, and the copyright is still in force, the copyright holder or an exclusive licensee could sue for copyright infringement. There is no way to tell if this would in fact happen. It may well be that the legal holder does not even know that s/he owns this copyright. Obviously, in that case, a suit is highly unlikely. But that would be entirely at the risk of anyone who used such content. Under US law, such use might or might not be considered "fair use". This would depend on several factors, and there is not enough information in the question to even guess. Fair use is an active defense, that an accused infringer may assert in court. It also does not apply in non-US cases. The odds are probably against any such suit being brought, but the amount at stake if one was brought could be large.	Yes, you can do that, assuming that the pictures are really in the public domain (i.e. due to their age, and not only claimed to be). But you probably shouldn't, but you'll probably want to add a label to the images anyway (what it depicts, who the original painter is, etc). So adding a "public domain" tag to each image shouldn't be a big issue. You can do that on a separate page as well, giving the source for each. Note that while using pd images does not create a copyright violation, even if you blatantly say that you created them yourself, it could still be considered plagiarism. When writing a science book or even a thesis, this could get you into trouble.	The article is public domain. The pictures aren’t If this was first published in the British Empire (as it then was), then The UK is the place of first publication. What follows is its status under UK law, other jurisdictions may have different results. The original article is public domain because H. C. P. Bell died in 1937 meaning copyright on everything he wrote expired 31 December 2007. If he’d lived until 1951 or later it would still be under copyright (in 2021). However, this isn’t the original article because: Text on this page extracted from an original copy of Annual Report. The photographs were taken when I visited the site in 1991, and again in November 1995. The bits that this unknown author added, including the photographs, are their copyright. Since they were clearly alive in 1995 (due to the well known pirate aphorism “dead men take no photos”) the copyright in those is still current.	You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.
Are criminal and civil cases pursued differently if the victim is a celebrity? If a person attacks a famous footballer/soccer player, who is worth millions of dollars, by causing him severe physical damage, and the perpetrator happens to be identified and tried, will this attacker be punished according to penal law only or will they be also sued by the club owning this particular professional player and then face another trial against the club he plays for? I mean, yes, a crime against a person is always a crime and this highly condemnable, but is the thing usually managed differently when the victim is a celebrity?	In general, the perpetrator can be sued by anyone who suffered harm as a result of his actions. The fact that he's also being prosecuted criminally doesn't change that, nor does it matter whether or not the victim is a "celebrity". The perpetrator could, for instance, be sued by any or all of: the victim himself, for his pain and suffering and loss of earnings the victim's club, for the financial loss due to the player not playing the victim's medical insurer, for the cost of his care. However, even if any of these plaintiffs win their case and are awarded some huge sum of money, it doesn't help them if the perpetrator doesn't have the money. They can only actually collect what the perpetrator has, and possibly some fraction of his future earnings (which are not likely to be very much if he is in prison). So unless the perpetrator is quite wealthy, it's unlikely they would go to the trouble and expense of a lawsuit.	Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court.	Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No	Calling someone an "asshole" is, at least in the US, an expression of opinion and so is not defamation. Saying that someone has committed a crime may be defamation, but not if that person has in fact already been convicted of that crime. In general if a statement is provably true, it is not defamation. If all that this hypothetical firm does is to post facts as found in court decisions, along with their unfavorable opinions of losing parties who they did not represent, it is hard to see any defamation case being valid. And I don't see any other obvious legal problem with doing this. It would probably anger other lawyers, and might make it harder to negotiate settlements or do other deals. If this firm announce that they refuse to accept as clients "cheats, crooks and similar people" and then make it public that they refused to represent some specific person, A, then A might claim that this portrayed him or her as a "cheat or crook" and was defamatory. The exact wording of their publicly announced policy, and of any announcements that they decline to represent A, would matter a good deal, as would the jurisdiction's exact law of defamation. In some places, codes of ethics promulgated by a Bar Association might be violated by such a policy, but such codes are usually not enforceable in the general case. I don't see any obvious grounds for disbarment proceedings.	england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia	This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals.	Yes, a person can be charged with the murder of person or persons unknown The reason that police are really keen to identify the victim include (in no particular order): It will probably clear up a missing persons case; So they can inform the next-of-kin; Being able to place a named person who loved and was loved before a jury rather than nameless corpse increases the chance of conviction - all else being equal.	There are problems with the claims. In summary: someone that in Sweden acts to defend themselves while "in peril" when subjected to — or are in imminent risk of — a criminal attack, will not the convicted, unless the act is "blatantly unjustifiable". Context We have a problem here in Sweden with people being ill-informed about the right to self-defence, and this is compounded by people with opinions spreading myths about it. Often these myths err on the side of claiming you have less rights than you really have. So, two things before we go on... The characters may have been unreliable. Do not ever assume that just because a character says something in a work of fiction, that the character is meant to know what they are talking about. And even if they are meant to know what they are talking about... The author may have been unreliable, and done their homework poorly. Keep this in mind... That said, the right to self-defence is not infinite. The law According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2 and 6... If you intentionally kill someone, you get convicted of "murder" If you intentionally kill someone, but there were mitigating circumstances, you get convicted of "manslaughter" If you act in reckless disregard for the risk your actions are causing, and this leads to the death of someone, you get convicted of "causing the death of another", or what we here can call "reckless killing" And Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 24, § 1 states that an act performed in "peril" shall only lead to a conviction if the act was "blatantly unjustifiable". "Peril" is enumerated to exist in cases of... A commenced or imminent criminal attack on person or property A person has gained or trying to gain unauthorized access to a room, house, yard or ship A person refuses to leave a domicile after being told to If — when caught red-handed — a person uses violence or threats of violence to resist stolen property from being retaken When judging whether an act is "blatantly unjustifiable", the prosecutor must look at... the nature of the attack that caused the peril the significance of that which the attack was aimed at (such as a human life) other significant circumstances That last bit is interesting because it takes human psychology into consideration, and let the defendant's assessment of the peril be the standard by which the act is judged. The claim Let us start with the easy bit first... "if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time." Murder? No. According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2, a person that kills an intruder in their home could at the most be charged with manslaughter, because there are mitigating circumstances, i.e. the person felt threatened and there was a home invasion in progress. In order for this to become murder, she would more or less have to have invited the assailant or in any other way drawn them in with the intent to kill them. Yes, she prepared to defend herself or a potential intrusion, but without knowing for certain that the assailant would come at certain time or at least a certain day, any kind of premeditation towards killing is more or less impossible to prove. With this, murder is off the table. That claim is simply wrong. Whether it is the author or the character that is erring, I cannot say. So, manslaughter then, or the even lesser degree, called "causing the death of another", or reckless killing. Manslaughter would come up of she — when whacking them with the club — did so with the intent of killing them. The operative word here being intent. The prosecutor has to prove that intent. Sure, we can dream up scenarios where this is the case; the classic reason for why people do get convicted even acting in peril is when they keep harming the assailant after the danger has passed. But — again — just preparing for a potential intrusion is not enough to prove that intent. Finally, reckless killing. This is where such cases usually ends up. And — again — this usually happens because the defendant did something when the danger has obviously passed; the criminal attack was no longer imminent but passed. Conclusion Unless the protagonist in question had set up lethal traps; unless they had foreknowledge of an attack; unless they invited the assailant in with the intent to kill them; unless they fend off the attack and gets themselves into a perfectly safe situation and then proceeds to beat the assailant to death; and unless all of this can be proved, then it cannot become murder. Manslaughter or reckless killing, yes, there will be an investigation for that, but from the description of the situation — the protagonist fearing the assailant is dangerous and means them harm — preparing a home defence with strategically placed golf clubs does not in any way preclude the prosecution being dismissed as justifiable self-defence. Only(!) if the home invasion was obviously harmless, and/or the protagonist keeps harming the assailant after the home invasion has been staved off / neutralised, can a conviction for manslaughter or reckless killing become a possibility. Summary Yes, in Sweden a prosecutor will look at the case when you kill someone. But — no — in the situation described, a home invasion by someone perceived as wanting to cause harm, this is very unlikely to become "murder", for lack of premeditation. The remaining possible charges — manslaughter or reckless killing — will only result in a conviction if the situation was obviously and provably harmless in the eyes of the defendant, and they still killed the assailant.
Who owns data on a company cell phone? Does an employer own the data on a cell phone provided to its employee? If so, is there a cause of action against an employee who provides a copy of the cell phone to a third party without authorization?	An employer owns the data on a cell phone provided to its employee if the employer has made that a condition of employment. The employer might own the data independently (e.g. the employer created it). Or, the employer might own it if the employee created it in the course of their employment. It's not where the data is that determines ownership, it's who created it. It is also possible that an employee could create data on a phone which is not in the course of their employment, but was also contrary to company policy (don't put your data on our phone). If you violate company policy on use of equipment, the simplest course of action that will follow is getting fired, or losing some company benefit. Conceivably you might get sued, but that would require more than simply getting an unauthorized text message. If we assume that the phone contains company intellectual property, copying that content would be a violation of copyright or patent law, so the employee can be sued for that. If there is a specific employment-related agreement (a non-disclosure agreement), the employee could suffer other consequences including being sued for something.	What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.	… would face and voice count as personal information under GDPR? Absolutely. Does person B have the right to erasure … No. The right to erasure only applies in certain circumstances. While the initial reason for collecting personal data was consent, once it has been incorporated into a film, the processor now has a legitimate interest in the data. The right to erasure does not apply when there is a legitimate interest.	If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on.	If your friend was a salaried W2 full time exempt employee hired by the company to, among other things, write software like this, then the fact that it was developed "off the clock" with the employee's own resources means nothing once he gives it to the company. I mean if I give you a present and it blows up and breaks your arm, I'm still liable even if we didn't have a "contract" - especially if I knew it would blow up. Your friend's position is even worse since the relationship entails the employee's having the employer's best interests in mind. If I were your friend, I'd either figure out how to fix this or take gnasher729's advice from the comments and find a country where it's easy to hide from parties public and private. Maybe buy a bunch of canned food and go live on a boat?	Maybe not. The ICO says that The right of access enables individuals to obtain their personal data rather than giving them a right to see copies of documents containing their personal data. It might be valid to interpret the DPA / UKGDPR in a way that the relevant personal data undergoing processing in their system is the existence of the letters, but that you are not entitled to a copy of the letters. This is in line with the purpose of the right to access, that you can check what data they are processing about you and whether it is correct. If that argument holds and the data subject insists on receiving a copy of the letters, it might be legitimate to charge them a fee for these copies. But in practice: The data controller might not make this argument and just hand over the copies. It is worth a try. A right to access founded in data protection might not be the only way to receive a copy of these materials. If the letters are relevant for legal proceedings, they could perhaps be requested during the disclosure process.	If they can compel you to show your insurance paper and you don’t want to unlock your phone to do that, then you need to bring it in paper form or suffer whatever consequences there are for not showing them. “Unlocking your phone” doesn’t mean you have to hand it over. Practice how to lock your phone quickly (iPhone: Press a specific button for four second), or just one press if you set up the phone for that. Unlock the phone away from the officer, locate the insurance paper, show it without leaving the phone out of your hand.	If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.
Cyclic definition of "US Person" by the IRS The IRS classifies taxpayers into categories of "US Person" and "Foreign Person" based on their immigration status. However, the definition appears to be cyclical: According to the IRS: The term ''United States person'' means: ... (list of explicit qualifiers) Any other person that is not a foreign person. On the same page, A foreign person includes: ... (list of explicit qualifiers) Any other person that is not a U.S. person A naive reading of the rules would result in a logical paradox where any person/corporation that is not explicitly classified would not fall under either of the two categories. What does this imply for a person/corporation that does not fall under any of the qualifiers listed?	As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.	There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.	It is illegal to discriminate on the basis of "national or ethnic origin" This is spelled out in the Canadian Human Rights Act s3(1). However, a person's citizenship is something that can (must) be discriminated on. Unless it is being used as a proxy for "national or ethnic origin". Right to work in Canada To be allowed to work in Canada, person must be a: Canadian citizen (including dual-nationals), non-Canadian citizen and hold a work-permit, non-Canadian citizen and be doing exempt work. So, an employer asking about citizenship to determine eligibility is fine. An employer asking to discriminate in favour of group 1 over group 2 or 3 is not.	Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not.	To narrow this down to a specific country, you can read about the Syria sanctions here. Sanctions under US law are against a country, and against named individuals: there are no sanctions against "Syrians". A person cannot engage in transactions in (certain) goods of Syrian origin, and you cannot invest in (businesses in) Syria. A Syrian citizen who is resident of a non-sanctioned country is not subject the the limitations that exist on Syrian citizens who are resident in Syria. However, this legal fact is not universally know, so your question does reflect an existing belief. It is entirely possible that a person who believes that there is a law of attainder against Syrian people might cause problems, but if they get advice from their legal department, they will find that also being a Syrian citizen is not an impediment to legally investing.	The order refers in sec. 3(c) to "immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12)". That section specifically names Iraq and Syria, plus "points to" potential areas of concern, as identified by the Sec'y of State and Sec'y of Homeland Security. The full list extends to Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and is set forth at 81 FR 39680. The cited authority is 8 USC 1182(f), a section about inadmissible aliens, which says Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. Thus he has authority to exclude permanent residents from re-entry (they are aliens, and re-entry is a subcase of entry), and has done so for 90 days. In the case of Syrian nationals, under sec 5(c) of the order, they are excluded until the order is changed. Sec. 5(c) of the order specifically declares Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry of nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States and thus suspend any such entry until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent with the national interest. The long-term ban on Syrians also specifies "as refugees", so "such entry" might not be interpreted to refer to entry of refugee or non-refugee Syrian nationals who are permanent residents. The 90-day ban in 3(c) ("immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens") does not include any further restrictors, apart from the various government-official visas that are exempted, so there would be no basis in the order for excluding permanent residents. Whether this will be strictly enforced is a separate question, though in the period when the order was active (a day), it was applied to permanent residents. Sec. 3(g) allows exceptions "on a case-by-case basis, and when in the national interest". A recent (Saturday the 28th) White House briefing says that green card holders "will need a case by case waiver to return to the United States". The ban includes immigrants and non-immigrants, so it doesn't particularly matter how "immigrant" is defined – what matters is what an alien is. Still, "immigrant" is defined in 8 USC 1101 (15) as any alien, except a bunch of categories such as diplomats, tourists, business visitors, people in transit, students, and fashion models and similar, working temporarily here. Any permanent resident has an immigrant visa (but at any rate is an alien, and is either an immigrant or a non-immigrant). Returning to the words of the order, neither 3(c) nor 5(3) limit the ban to issuance of visas, it refers to entry. Not all entry by foreign national requires a visa. The word "visa" is mentioned, so it is possible to construe that mention as contextually restricting the ban to visas, however 3(a) which is entitled "Suspension of Issuance of Visas and Other Immigration Benefits to Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern" orders the review "to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA" which indicates that there is no such limitation. 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(C) does say that a permanent resident is not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States". Admission itself is defined in 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(A), when applied to an alien, as "the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer". While a permanent resident is not seeking admission (and is not applying for admission), it would still be consistent with the law to forbid admission (legal entry). If you read 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(C) as granting permanent residents widest latitude to enter without restriction, then that has the absurd consequence that permanent residents are subject to no scrutiny at all. The absurdity is avoided if "seeing admission" is a step prior to and is distinct from "being admitted" i.e. "lawfully entering".	If a newly naturalized citizen immediately emigrates from the US back to their country of origin (although continues to file and pay relevant expat taxes). This used to be grounds for expatriation, but in 1964, in Schneider v. Rusk, the supreme court ruled that it was impermissible. The law was subsequently amended to remove the relevant provision.	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.
D&D Monsters and Copyright We are making a college board game, and would like to know if we can use a few monsters from dnd to make our game. We don't use the same name as you do, just the images from online and the books.	No. The images are copyrighted, and you are using them in a way that would leave you with virtually no argument for fair use. The factors for fair use are set out in 17 USC 107, and they indicate that the courts would reject your use: The purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes: There's no indication that your use would be for nonprofit or educational purposes. The nature of the copyrighted work: Works of fiction and art are highly creative works at the heart of the policy for copyright protection. The amount of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: You are apparently copying entire images, though I suppose you could argue that each image is just one small portion of a larger book or website. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: You are trying to create a board game, putting yourselves basically in direct competition with the makers of D&D. I generally prefer a pretty liberal interpretation of what constitutes fair use, but this just has virtually nothing that would make me comfortable arguing in your favor.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	Presumably you are referring to works commonly called "fan fiction." Under copyright law these might be considered "derivative works" and therefore subject to the rights of the copyright owner. However, they might also qualify for exemption from copyright enforcement under "fair use." It appears that the legality of fan fiction is not settled law, and the outcome of legal challenges have turned on facts specific to each case. Decent background on the question is summarized on wikipedia.	Each episode of the show as a whole, and all the individual images in it, are protected by copyright, but the idea of a holophonor, or indeed any idea, is not. The more closely anyone else's drawing of a gadget resembles one from the show, the more likely it would be to be found to infringe copyright. The same is true of a character image. The more distinctive and original the image, and the more closely someone copies it, the more likely a finding of infringement would be.	It's complicated You still own your own posts First off, you own everything that you originally created. Posting it on Stack Exchange doesn't affect your rights to your own content. Incorporating suggestions If you copy any of the text from posts that were created by others, you must comply with the CC BY-SA license. The exact version will depend on when the content was posted, and can be viewed by clicking the "Share" link or viewing the post's timeline via the clock icon on the left. Currently, new posts are licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, which requires you to (basically) provide attribution with the creator's name, a link back to the content, and an indication of whether changes were made. A more detailed description of the exact requirements is here. You would also be required to license the work that you incorporated it into under the same license. However, game mechanics aren't copyrightable. If you merely used mechanics suggested in the posts without actually using the actual creative expression (for instance, names or description text) from the posts, you would not be required to provide any attribution or use any particular license, because you didn't use any copyrightable material from the post. A thank-you would still be nice All that said, it's still a nice thing to do to provide some sort of informal thanks to those who provided valuable assistance, even when you're not legally required to do so.	You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing.	Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.	Copyright is hard. The movie has a copyright, and so has its ship model. This is the original copyright. The boardgame has a token. That thing has its own copyright, no matter if it's a parody of another thing or not. The copyright holder might not be the boardgame maker, but it is under copyright. In any way, parody is fair use, so no harm here. The model has a copyright, but also infringes on the film's copyright as it is a derivative of the film. If the film copyright holder wants, they can have it taken down and sue the maker. In any way, this model is available under a specific license. The model license is clearly Non Commercial. The CC-A-NC license can't be changed to one that is commercial. You can only add more No categories. The questions: 1 - No. Your work is a derivative work of both the model AND the boardgame. You don't parody the boardgame. 2 - You need a license from not one but at least two sources: the model author and the boardgame copyright holder. You might even need a license from the original film company. 3 - YES. He made the model, he can license it as he wants, but the license might be ineffective: He might have coverage under an explicit fan license with the movie company to make the model (allowing sharing under such other license) or not (when it might be silent acceptance of fan works, am implicit license or just plain lack of knowledge of the infringing model) - determining if the company wants to pursue is not your legal battle. Your battle is more likely with the copyright holder (of movie and boardgame) anyway because you lack a valid license from them. "I used this infringing model and breached the license I got it under" is... a very precarious point in court. 4 - No. You used the other work, you can't get out of the CC-A-NC license by altering the item. It'll always be a derivative work of the model you put in. You only get copyright in the changes. The resulting item has shared copyright with the original model maker. He gave you a license to do that, but the unbreakable condition unless you get a different license is: You can't ever sell this, you HAVE to tell them that I was part of this design.
Could vigilante anti paedophile sting operations actually result in a conviction? There is a lot in the news in Ireland currently about vigilante groups posing as children online in order to catch paedophiles "grooming" and ultimately meeting with the fictional child, which turns out to actually be the group at which point they can confront them. To me this sounds a bit like entrapment, if that's even a thing in Ireland... My question is, is there a crime actually being committed here? Is it enough that the perpetrator thinks they're committing one? And would the evidence end up being rendered inadmissible anyway considering it wasn't Gardai but untrained members of the public who were collecting it? Not to mention the possibility of entrapment as I mentioned earlier ( I.e. a crime might not have been committed if the vigilantes hadn't set it up in the first place) The question is about Ireland but I world be interested in answers about other jurisdictions also if that's allowed on the site...	It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up).	It is unlikely that the US, or any government, would condone any kind of crime. The reason for this is that the law must be seen to be impartial and applied fairly to all those subject to it. What happens if tomorrow, the government decides they don't like you? It is possible that this type of activity, or activity amounting to it, would be sanctioned in specific, authorised cases. But the government throwing a lynch mob at anyone is a bad idea for order and a peaceful society.	Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else.	"Does threatening to attack cultural heritage constitute conspiracy to commit a war crime..." Almost certainly not. It's a threat to commit a war crime, but is probably not illegal in and of itself. On the other hand, if the Commander In Chief were to ask his generals what would be involved in mounting a cruise missile attack on the Meidan Emam in Esfahan, that would be conspiracy to commit a war crime (as would supplying the requested information).	He would be thanked and sent on his way. We don't generally punish people for preventing murders, even if they are rogue cops or soldiers. If you wanted him to plausibly land in legal peril, he'd probably need to do more than simply save someone's life. The most obvious possibility, I think, would be if he were to continue inflicting harm on the attacker after cuffing him. At that point, there's probably no justification for a continued use of force, so he could face assault charges there. Also possible would be that the way he handled the situation -- the amount of force he used, the failure to de-escalate, failing to call for assistance -- just violates some police or military policy. I don't know if that would jam him up in the way you're looking for, though.	There is no direct equivalent to the American-style plea bargain, but there are some similar procedures: Basis of Plea A defendant can offer a written guilty plea to a lesser offence with the same (or closely similar) facts as the offence charged, which has to be accepted by the court to take affect. The prosecutor must consult with and seek the views of all victims, and if the plea is accepted it must not be misleading or untrue. The Attorney General's Guidance provides more information on the process and the detailed requirements (which are too long to repoduce here). Assisting Offenders The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 offer the option for a "minor-player" defendant to assist the prosecution and/or police by providing information to secure convictions of the principle offenders in return for immunity from prosecution (section 71), a restricted use undertaking (a version of immunity) (section 72) or a reduced sentence (section 73). Immunity requires full and frank disclosure of all previous offending (referred to as "cleansing"), but for whatever reason the defendant does not "cleanse" they may still be eligible for a lesser sentence. Either way the assistance - either as evidence at trial or as intelligence given in confidence - should be substantial and verifiable to be eligible. Statistics There is, as far as I can, no publicly available detailed statistics on these procedures, presumably the reason is that vast majority of the former cases go unreported and, despite some being public, there is a real risk of retribution to the informant in the latter.	The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks).	Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents.
I pay for a service, but I miss the broadcast Say, I pay for a broadcasting service, and lets say due some circumstances I miss it. Does the original copyright (or the fact that it allowed me to watch it), allow me to source the content elsewhere? I in no way am sharing the content that was aquired elsewhere. Edit: Likely I will watch it one time and delete it afterwards. Edit: I know the alternative source is infringing copyright. But does that have any effect on me?	No This is not a copyright issue as you are not making a copy (save for a transient one in your cache which is allowed). You are allowed to record it for personal time-shifting as that is fair use/dealing. The broadcaster either owns the copyright (unlikely) or has a contract with the copyright holder that allows them to broadcast it. Assuming the broadcaster chooses or is not permitted to subsequently stream it, if you miss it, you miss it. Your contract with the broadcaster is over. Their obligation was to make the broadcast available to you, yours was to pay for it - nobody is obliged to watch it. You can, of course, seek the content from any other legal sources, complying with their terms including payment if necessary.	Copyrights, in general, relate to the right of copying or reproduction. Another’s copyright may be substantially violated and causing harm even if one doesn’t monetize on it: A free access to the work of art may mean that anyone who would otherwise pay for a copy or any sort of license will not pay. This is the reason why in most countries torrenting is illegal. The last question is rather difficult to answer in a meaningful way: If one doesn’t get caught ever then one doesn’t get caught; if one does, then he does. I haven’t found the channel through which such unauthorized copies would enter “the public domain” and therefore it is hard to even make a guess on the probabilities of such infringement to be discovered and one getting sought damages on. There are exemptions under “fair use” rights mostly in common law jurisdictions, and there are examples of non-enforcement or decriminalization in certain other jurisdictions under certain conditions. (See also: Is it illegal to infringe copyright if your boss or your client ordered you to do it?)	It infringes the copyright. It can easily be proved that both XOR1 and XOR2 derive from the source work by XOR-ing the streams with each other. It's just like any encrypted copy: it infringes the copyright, but only those who can decrypt it are in a position to know that it infringes the copyright. The posts on the forum are illegal because they infringe the copyright; it doesn't matter that they are derived works rather than the work itself, just as your drawing of a copyright-protected image infringes copyright because it is a derived work without being the work itself.	A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.	This is likely not fair use. At first blush it appeared similar to things one might see in The Onion (parody print and online newspaper) or other parody publications or shows (SNL, Key and Peele, etc.). In this case, the context would have likely been deemed transformative. However, since they are selling coffee called "Dumb Starbucks" while using their trademark, they would be be found liable if sued. You can parody a trademark brand, so long as the work is transformative such that the use of the brand goes from selling coffee to making a commentary in which the brand itself is relevant. Amendment I don't think this would pass the test as a parody/commentary. Originally, I failed to notice that they are actually selling coffee. This takes it out of fair use and they would almost certainly lose if sued. If they never sold the coffee, but just had it open as a performance art (like I had originally read this) giving the coffee away to complete the parody, I think they'd be fine. However, they are literally using the Starbucks logo, and selling the same product. This is clearly an infringement of their copyright and not fair use. Sorry for the confusion.	The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.	The answer depends in part what venue you're talking about, e.g. Reddit, Facebook etc. The details are revealed somewhere in the Terms of Service for that venue. The general pattern is that you are allowed to use that venue, provides you grant permission for the service to do what they do with your content. You cannot legally send them a take-down notice for your stuff, because a take-down notice requires you to say that the stuff was posted without your permission (and that is false – and you can be punished for making that statement). There could be a venue where they do not hold you to an irrevocable license, in which case you could revoke that permission (but not Reddit: you granted them a "royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, or publicly display your user content in any medium and for any purpose, including commercial purposes, and to authorize others to do so"). I've seen a site that actually asserts ownership of user-contributed content (I don't know if their TOS ended up being litigated) – if is not at all hard to write a TOS that includes transfer of copyright, rather than granting of a license. The only hard parts are (1) figuring out what you want in terms of permission to use and (2) whether your answer to (1) means nobody will use your service. SE and Reddit TOS probably are as close as you need to get for what you describe.	It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting".
I'm owed compensation for assault. It's been almost 8 years and I haven't seen a penny [Oxfordshire, England] When I was 15 [I am 22 now], I was mugged and beaten up by a group of three young men, the youngest of this group being 18. I called the Police, and the guys were caught. As it turned out, only 1 of these guys got any sort of punishment, was sentenced to a number of hours public service and a £200 fine for assault on a minor. I haven't seen a penny and it's almost been a decade. I was never advised by the police as to how to follow up this inquiry and I feel so betrayed by the British justice system. The last I heard of this was that the guy who owes me was on benefits so he wasn't able to pay me a lump sum but surely the State should've stopped paying this guy benefits since he goes around lamping kids? Is there anyone who knows how I can follow this up? I understand that the money I'm owed isn't a whole lot, but it's the principle that this guy as an adult attacked a kid for no reason and isn't even paying the full price for it even though it left me with huge anxiety issues later on in my life.	The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation.	I can't say how they are typically settled, and there are no hard-and-rules that I can find. However, Gov.uk offers this: You’ll have to pay the person or business you owe the money to, or their solicitor. The name and address will be on the judgment form. Do not pay the court. Make sure you can prove you’ve paid. Send a cheque or postal order by post, or make a bank transfer. Do not send cash through the post. Keep a record of your payments and make sure you pay in time. If you’re paying in instalments, ask the person or business you owe the money to about the best way to pay. You may want to set up a standing order to pay the money directly from your bank account. As for A insisting on a cash payment, it's B's debt and as long as it's not unreasonable and in accordance with the Order B should decide on how it is settled if they can't come to an amicable arrangement.	Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law.	There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.	I assume you're talking about this case: Bus lane camera mistakes woman's sweater for number plate. No he couldn't just ignore it - because that doesn't actually result in it getting put in front of a human (judge or otherwise). Instead the fine would escalate and ultimately be passed to a collections agency. Only challenging the Penalty Charge Notice (as this person did) would get a human involved. As a bonus, if the automated fine happens to come with a S172 notice to identify the driver ignoring that is an offence in of itself (irrespective of the original alleged offence), and in many cases carries a worse penalty (£1000 and 6 points IIRC). what if this item of clothing became fashionable and was therefore causing this person to receive hundreds of these fines every week? While it's unlikely to get to that stage - the item of clothing on its own wouldn't do it, there needed to be a specific partial-obscurement of the garment as well, it's not impossible, after all perhaps it's their favorite sweater, they always carry their bag like that and cut across the bus lane on their way to work etc. In those circumstances there's nothing legally that changes, I'd expect the poor vehicle owner to be on first name terms with the people at the council enforcement call centre in question sooner rather than later. Re edit: Suppose I want to annoy somebody as much as possible, what's to stop me from printing a t-shirt with their actual number plate on it, then walking around past all sorts of cameras, knowing that they will receive multiple fines every day and have no choice but to keep calling and explaining. After all, the council has no duty to make it easy for someone to get through on the phone, so, potentially, I could walk around bus lanes and car parks all day. I could get some friends to do this all over the country in different local authority areas and the victim could - literally - have not enough hours in the day to have to keep fighting false fines. Would they not have some recourse to sue for harassment or "vexatious litigation"? In all honesty I don't know for sure what would happen in this scenario - I can't think of a similar enough case. But I would expect targeting an individual in this manner would qualify as harassment pretty easily and for which there are both criminal and civil actions that can be taken. I suppose hypothetically you could argue that the "number plate shirt" is effectively being used to make false allegations that the car's registered keeper had committed crimes, which opens up avenues to prosecution for Perverting the Course of Justice or wasting police time. But I have no idea how likely that would be to be pursued.	Given that Bob has no obligation to pay anything to Charles, who has no legal duty to do anything, I don't see how Charles could have liability to Bob. If Charles wants to, he can decline to pay a reward to Bob or can pay an amount smaller than Charles hoped for as a reflection of Charles' delay.	But lately he has had his friend use my PayPal account. Someone will send me money and then I transfer it to where he tells me. To cash app or venmo. That's money laundering. Definitely illegal. He said it's money owed for cellphones. People in jail aren't supposed to have cellphones. You are helping him break the law, which means you are helping him break the law.	You have no injury and so no basis for a suit, unless your claim is that the educational institutions you attended were fraudulent (in which case you'd most likely sue them, or try to petition the government for existing relief procedures for such cases). Since you don't, you have no injury. All parties entered their loans under the understanding that paying them off was necessary and potentially long term and arduous. The government forgiving amounts on existing loans does no injury to those who already paid. There is no injury in you having done what you agreed to do, in accordance with governing laws. Forgiving some debt for some people is just an act of executive largesse, and does not hurt you in any legally cognizable form. Indeed, it could be said that you have benefitted from having paid them off. For since doing so you have no longer been burdened by them, saving you both money and potential credit score or even legal issues, whereas those who still have debt are still so burdened. Plus paying them off yields benefits in your credit score and general loan worthiness; you can expect to have been able to get meaningfully better interest rates than someone identical to you but with substantial student debt. These are all benefits nobody who gets forgiveness will retroactively receive. At best, going forward they will get to be on similar footing as you. And having more people on the same beneficial footing as you is not a legally cognizable injury in fact to you.
Hold Harmless-Want on half of LLC and NOT self I recently applied to a position to teach yoga, as an independent contractor. I have formed an LLC, and now the gym would like me to sign a hold harmless agreement. I want to make sure the LLC is signing the agreement, and not myself so that any potential claims would have to be brought through the LLC. Is it enough to sign the hold harmless as "manager of [LLC name]"? I also filled out the W-9 with the LLC name in addition to my own.	SHORT ANSWER The hold harmless agreement binds you individually if you sign it individually. But, you may have liability to the firm you are contracting with as a matter of law anyway, as an individual, unless that is expressly waived by contract with the person who might otherwise sue you. You should get liability insurance for yourself and your LLC. If the place you are working with doesn't have a waiver in place with students already, you should have your students sign one that is drafted by a lawyer in your particular state. I don't address this is the long answer, but you also shouldn't have signed a W-9 for yourself individually. Only the LLC should have had to fill out the W-9, although this probably doesn't do any great harm. LONG ANSWER Two Main Kinds Of Liability: Contract and Tort There are two main kinds of liability (there are other kinds of liability too, but they come up much less often). One is for entering into a contract with someone and failing to perform that contract causing the other person not to receive the benefit of the bargain, which is called contractual liability. The other kind of liability is called tort liability. Tort liability arises when you have a non-contractual legal duty towards someone (i.e. a duty that arises as a matter of law), you breach that duty, and that duty causes someone to suffer damages. If you also have a contract with that person tort liability can be limited, but not eliminated. The most common form of tort liability by far is liability for "negligence" in which the duty that arise as a matter of law is the duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances to refrain from causing harm to another person. Limiting Contractual Liability It is possible to limit contractual liability by saying so in the express language of the contract. Only parties to a contract have liability under a contract. It is also possible to have broader or narrower scopes of an indemnification clause, or to limit another person's right of subrogation against you (i.e. the right to sue you to pay part of what they had to pay when they are held liable for a wrong you committed). A disclosed agent of a principal (or employee of an employer) including a manager of an LLC, is not contractually liable for breaching the principal's (or employer's) contract. An undisclosed agent or principal (i.e. someone acting on behalf of another but acting as if he or she is acting on his own behalf) is liable on the contract along with the principal or employer. The principal is liable on contracts entered into by a disclosed purported agent with mere "apparent authority" to do so, even if the agent is not actually authorized to enter into the contract, and the principal in that case has recourse only against the agent. So, if you sign a contract in your capacity as a manager of the LLC, rather than in your person capacity, and you do not personally guaranty the contract, you do not have contractual liability on the contract. Typically, to do so, you would sign the contract like this (the italic portion would be signed and underlined; the rest would be printed): XYZ, LLC By Leonara the Great Leonara the Great, as Manager Tort Liability Vicarious Tort Liability Of An Entity A principal or employer, including an entity, has "vicarious" liability for the acts of all of the principal or employer's agents and employees within the scope of their agency or employment, even if the principal or employer prohibited those people from doing that as a matter of policy, contract or a specific instruction not to do so. So, the LLC is liable for anything you do related to the LLC's yoga business. Liability Of Disclosed Agents, Employees, Managers And Officers Of Entities As explained below in a case that is representative of the overwhelming majority rule in the U.S., a human being is responsible to third parties for torts in which he participates in the absence of a waiver for that person, even if acting an an agent or employee or contractor of another company: (I have no idea why I can't get this to appear as text rather than as an image). Limiting Tort Liability Tort liability cannot be limited in the absence of a contract with the person actually harmed, or via a statute that limits tort liability. It is possible to contractually waive tort liability to a person signing a waiver, in advance of a tort occurring, not predicated on contract that arises from negligence or as a matter of strict liability, but not in cases of intentional conduct, reckless conduct, willful and wanton conduct, conduct amounting to bad faith, and conduct that amounts to "gross negligence". Gross negligence is a failure to act using reasonable care that is so extreme and obvious that is comes close to being reckless in character. Practical Options Almost every business that engaged in activities that could give rise to personal injuries buys liability insurance that covers lawsuits against the business and the employees and agents of the business (i.e. in this case, your LLC and you personally acting on behalf of the LLC) to address this risk. This provides two benefits to you and your company: (1) it provides a lawyer, free of charge, to defend you if you are sued for a covered risk, and (2) it pays awards against you in a lawsuit or via a settlement related to a covered risk, up to a stated dollar amount. Insurance is a near necessity, because not all risks can be waived and even if you have a waiver that is upheld by a court, that doesn't prevent you from having to hire a lawyer to defend yourself in that lawsuit. Just to provide a reality check that this really is what people do, my wife was an independent contractor pilates instructor for a while and while she did that she paid for liability insurance in addition to having waivers signed by her students. (Bigger studios will have waivers for students already in place that cover you.)	There are three answers here. First, as is common on this site, you are using the term, "legal" and "illegal." Those are not legally meaningfully terms. A good lawyer won't use those terms to mean allowed or disallowed. We talk in terms of potential civil or criminal liability, or other sanctions and consequences. To say that something is "legal" does not communicate much. Second, all contracts are governed by a duty of good faith. That means that you cannot try to "trick" someone with the terms of the contract and expect to enforce that contract against them and you cannot try to skirt your obligations by finding a tricky form of compliance not within the mutual understanding of the agreement. As with all things, defining good faith is not easy, and depends on the specific context of a situation. It is worth distinguishing between the duty of good faith, and the duties one owes to a fiduciary; good faith is surely far less, but nevertheless still meaningful. Third, a defense to non-performance of a contract is that the agreement as written is unconscionable. A contract that is a grossly unfair deal where the contract was not actively negotiated (i.e. Blindly signing a bad form contract), may fall under this category. Note: I am not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; contact a licensed attorney in your area; do not rely on my statements; I merely am providing a general answer that is academic in nature.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this.	Those two situations should be legally equivalent. The key thing is that you intend to agree to the contract, and are taking physical steps that are intended to manifest your agreement. If you had added an electronic signature to the PDF file, and transmitted this to the company, it should also be legally equivalent, and just as binding as the pen and paper method.	The basic requirement is that any communication using the trade name be possible to trace back to the LLC using the trade name, either with a disclosure in the communication itself, or with a trade name (a.k.a. doing business as a.k.a. dba) registration that links the trade name to the entity in the public record. If this is not done, business conducted in the trade name may be treated as a sole proprietorship or general partnership of the people actually conducting the activity, rather than an activity of the limited liability company behind it, thus depriving those people of limited liability protection.	The date and location of the signature merely documents when/where the signature was made, and doesn't have a lot of legal significance for ordinary contracts. This information is probably only useful if you need to argue that you could't have signed the contract because you weren't in that town on that day. Despite this small lapse your contract is perfectly valid, in particular you are required to make any payments that are part of this contract. It doesn't make sense to get this corrected. However, if any actual information (for example, you address) changed, then you should notify the gym to update the information.	Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.
Personal Reports We Are Entitled to BY LAW (Other than Credit Reports from Experian, Equifax, Transunion) Are there personal reports US citizens are BY LAW, entitled to other than credit reports from Experian, Equifax and Transunion. For instance, I could have sworn I saw a government website on MIB, i.e. your personal medical information that insurance companies have on you. Now I cannot seem to find it on any government website that says we are entitled to this report BY LAW. Two part question 1a - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their MIB (online or by phone). And I don't mean MIB.com. I am looking for government website that would reference something like MIB, i.e. for instance Federal Trade Commission website references annualcreditreport.com 1b - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their other personal records (online or by phone)	1a - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their MIB (online or by phone). And I don't mean MIB.com. I am looking for government website that would reference something like MIB, i.e. for instance Federal Trade Commission website references annualcreditreport.com There isn't one. The right to medical information is a right you have vis-a-vis individual heath care providers and insurance companies that have your medical information. The U.S. government does not have access to this information and doesn't facilitate you getting this information, except that you could sue in federal court to get it if the person required by law to provide it to you didn't give it to you. (The fact that the U.S. government does not have access to individual health information is one of the reasons that major medical research studies that capture a sample of the entire population of a country for a given time period are often done instead in foreign countries that have comprehensive medical records databases. In the U.S., the best possible alternative is often to look at the medical records of servicemen and veterans who received government provided health care, or to create very large voluntarily long term studies of populations such as doctors and nurses.) Even in the case of credit reports, the government website merely ends up directing you to a private sector website maintained by credit reporting websites and is not a government website. 1b - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their other personal records (online or by phone) You can apply to the U.S. government via one of the IRS websites to get transcript of your past tax returns for a certain number of years. You can apply to the Social Security Administration to get your earnings history for Social Security purposes and I think that can be done from their website or by telephone. There is a U.S. government website called PACER at which you can get copies of all non-sealed filings in all federal court cases, and all filings in court cases to which you are or have been a party. There is U.S. government website at which you can ascertain whether or not a building, including your home, is in a flood plain. There is a U.S. government website that allows you to locate people who are currently incarcerated in federal prison. There is a U.S. government website that allows you to review census data from time periods when almost everybody is dead. I believe that old immigration records can also be accessed in this manner. There is a phone number at the Veteran's Administration where veterans can ask about their personal veteran's benefits. I'm not sure if that have a website from which they can do so yet. Last time I checked, a long time ago, they didn't. There are several websites and phone numbers that federal employees can access to get their personnel record type information. This is absolutely not a comprehensive list. It shouldn't be hard for you to research yourself the current web address for these sites which changes fairly often anyway. You can get many other kinds of information from the U.S. government that is about you via the Freedom of Information Act (a.k.a. FOIA), but generally speaking, this information isn't available via a website or by phone. Usually, you have to request it in a written letter or application unless a new website allowing you to do this that I don't know about has been created recently.	I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky.	There is little prospect for suing over this measure. The university has a legitimate interest in verifying that access to online systems is only granted to authorized users, and simple passwords are considered to be insufficient. (I don't intend to argue about password technology, I'm just making the observation that two-factor authentication is better than single-factor authentication). I have not encountered this requirements in US banks yet, but I have encountered it in Norway where an online transaction always requires with a password and a code generated by a gadget of the type you alluded to. I surmise that your university mandates that all payments be done online, which means that you must have access to a computer in order to pay a bill. It is not reasonable to expect people to have a computer that is connected to the internet at all times, but it is reasonable (and often done, by universities) to expect people to be able to so connect some of the time. So likewise, it is not reasonable to expect that people will have their authentication gadget available at all times, but it will be available some of the time, and thus there is no insurmountable impediment to paying the bill (or accessing the library, or reading email...). These gadgets do, however, potentially run afoul of ADA, but presumably they know that and can make accommodations.	The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request.	Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.	She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.	The first issue is to understand that opening up an account with a utility to provide natural gas services is considered an extension of credit. This matters because the FTC requires, under the fair credit reporting act and its general power to issue regulations targeted at preventing fraud, that people who open up new credit accounts to verify the identity of the applicant in an effort to prevent identity theft by fake applicants in some cases. Potential creditors must use “reasonable policies and procedures” to verify the identity of an applicant before issuing credit in the consumer's name. This regulatory stance is supported by Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605A(h)(1)(B) a.k.a. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1 (h)(1)(B). The pertinent part of the statute states: (B) Limitation on users (i) In general No prospective user of a consumer report that includes an initial fraud alert or an active duty alert in accordance with this section may establish a new credit plan or extension of credit, other than under an open-end credit plan (as defined in section 1602(i) 1 of this title), in the name of the consumer, or issue an additional card on an existing credit account requested by a consumer, or grant any increase in credit limit on an existing credit account requested by a consumer, unless the user utilizes reasonable policies and procedures to form a reasonable belief that the user knows the identity of the person making the request. (ii) Verification If a consumer requesting the alert has specified a telephone number to be used for identity verification purposes, before authorizing any new credit plan or extension described in clause (i) in the name of such consumer, a user of such consumer report shall contact the consumer using that telephone number or take reasonable steps to verify the consumer’s identity and confirm that the application for a new credit plan is not the result of identity theft. The FTC in issuing its regulations and the utility company, as a matter of policy and expediency, have decided that it the utility company must do credit checks on all prospective customers and will speed up the application process for people who have "fraud alerts" or "active duty alerts" on their credit reports by requiring verification from everyone instead of finding out that they can't get a credit report for a particular customer without verification and then having to go back to the customer to get it.	Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.
Serving the individual or the company or both? If a person is sued in their official and individual capacity, do you serve: a. just the individual b. just the company or c. both the individual and the company?	Both. The process server deliver's one set of documents addressed to the individual in their individual capacity, and one addressed to the company. If the individual in an official capacity and the company are both parties, as well as the individual in an individual capacity, you serve three sets. Even if the law ultimately is in your favor that serving just one set is sufficient, serving one set of documents for each defendant removes any argument that would have to be litigated as non-minimal expense and producing delays in the case, and it is cheap to do so relative to what is at stake in any case worth suing over.	Both outcomes are possible. A's insurance company would resist full replacement, so B would probably have to sue and prove that full replacement was necessary. Since the basic idea behind compensation is making the person whole after having been harmed, and what is the harm in a more limited repair job? The jury would contemplate all of the details regarding B's apartment. Then it matters just how crisp the floor was originally, and how aesthetically offensive a mere 99% match would be. It would not hinge solely on B's self-serving statement that he would not accept less than 100% match. But the award would not be limited to "the cheapest possible repair".	Different courts have different practices, but I believe the general practice is for plaintiffs to use exhibit numbers, and for defendants to use exhibit letters. As with most procedural questions, the final decision belongs to the judge. The repetition in letters comes in when you get to the end of the alphabet. After you've used A-Z, you go to AA, BB, CC ... ZZ, then AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on.	A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt.	Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that.	Only if the company consents While some jurisdictions have by statute allowed corporations to be bound by pre-incorporation contracts, New York is not one of them and holds to the common law principle that a person cannot enter a contract before that person exists. In your circumstances the company is only bound by the second contract. So, who is bound by the first? Well, corporations can only act through agents and agency law tells us that an agent who purportedly acts for a non-existent principal is actually acting on their own behalf. So, the person(s) who signed for Company X on the first contract are personally bound to the contract. Unless they explicitly told Company Y that they wouldn’t be. It seems that they didn’t so Company Y can require performance of the first contract by them and of the second by Company X. Company Y must, of course, fulfil its obligations under both contracts - it needs to bear this in mind if it is actually impossible to do both, for example, transferring the same property to the signers of the first contract and Company X or becoming a full time employee of both. If so, it might be in Company Y’s best interests to let the first contract “die”.	I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.	This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement.
Is it okay for letting agency to deny me viewing for not telling them my employer name and how long I had been in a profession? Is it okay for a letting agency to ask me these questions ? What is the name of company I work for ? The property I am renting at the present is through agency or a landlord? How long I have been working as a software developer? They also asked me for how much I am earning and some other questions which I answered. When I further inquired they told me that until I answer these question they won't let me view the property and answers will be used for pre-screening. Is it okay for letting agency to deny me viewing for not telling them my employer name and how long I had been in a profession ? I know if I liked the property and for referencing they may need letter from my employer but I wasn't at this stage yet.	The other answers don't quite spell it out, so I will. There is no law in the UK requiring landlords or their agents to show a property to all parties interested - refusal to show a property may however in some cases fall under discrimination laws, so that might be something you can pursue if you feel the refusal is due to your gender, race or sexual orientation. While they may have to justify their data collection under the GDPR, that is entirely separate to their refusal to show the property to you.	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck	As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.	The relevant bit of legislation — Human Rights Act 1993 s22 — protects applicants and employees: Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, it shall be unlawful .. to refuse ... offer .. terminate ... retire ... by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. So, if you never advertise but always invite people (i.e. offer them job straight away) then there are no applicants (as at no point does anybody apply for the job), and hence no employment discrimination. If you invite them for a "non-discriminatory screening interview" then there is no discrimination by definition of "non-discriminatory" :) behavioural / relational / mental / spiritual I'm pretty sure these criteria would be discriminatory in a advertised position. None of those criteria are prohibited grounds of discrimination (s21). However, it would be a good idea to clearly define them as "a genuine occupational qualification for the position" by drafting a job description and explaining why those traits are crucial for the business.	I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use.	There is a general common law doctrine of contract interpretation which tells us that ambiguities are construed against the drafter. In your case, had the employer intended to require two years of work (or else reimbursement back to them) they could have explicitly stated this. The fact is, the contract is written as it is for a reason, likely to entice you to accept the offer of employment. They softballed the requirements to get you to take the job and now they are trying to play hardball. I would hope that a court would find this and tell the employer to think about these clauses next time. The fact is, after a deal goes south is a bad time for an employer to start explaining what these terms mean. You have fulfilled your half of the bargain. If the facts are as you say they are then you satisfied the "best of my ability" condition. Another problem you might have is if the employer does not take you to court but instead continues to make threats, maybe sends a collections agency after you. In that case you will need to get an injunction to stop the employer. In other words, get a court to state that you do not owe them any money and enjoin them from continuing to as if you do. EDIT: as a commenter mentioned, a contract may explicitly provide that ambiguous terms will not be construed against either party.	The tenant is responsible for damage beyond “fair wear and tear” which this obviously is. If it is as bad as you suggest then it may require professional forensic cleaning which can run to thousands of pounds. At some point, things like carpets etc. can be cheaper to replace than to repair. There is no upper limit (beyond, at the extreme, the cost of demolition and rebuilding the dwelling), however, there may be a practical limit being the amount the tenant can pay before going bankrupt.
Who is held accountable in case of violation of JSON license's specific 'no evil' clause - the end user, the distro, or both? The JSON license, as well as the jslint (and the 'jshint' derivative) license, is an otherwise unmodified version of the MIT License except for one peculiar clause which reads: The Software shall be used for Good, not Evil. As a result, some software developers and distributors take the (IMO) unfortunate route of not using, or not distributing, the software components licensed under these terms (that is, except for those who managed to get an exception clause added to them). One such example is Debian. In a open issue to the jshint repository, some users voice their complain that the atypical clause prevents Debian from packaging jshint in their official repositories. What I want to ask is: say the Debian Project were to distribute jshint in their official repositories. Assume this act is qualifiable as 'good' (not evil). No violation of the license so far, I suppose. Now consider the case of a Debian user who uses his Debian computer to practice evil (for instance, extortion, terrorism, you name it). Who would be liable for violation of the license terms? The Debian user, who performed the wrongdoing; the Debian Project, who distributed the software; or both? In other words: if a court were to take the clause at face value and enforce it, would the user be the sole defendant, or would the Debian Project also? The clause states "The Software shall be used for Good, not Evil" - but I assume the distribution of the software by the Debian Project qualifies as use (right?). In that context, is the Debian Project liable for whatever evil their users might be willing to execute by means of a computer running the Debian OS? Or, I suppose, the same question in other words would be: Is it a risk for the Debian Project to distribute jshint in their official repos?	That “shall be used for Good, not Evil” clause is a moral category, not a legal category. From a legal perspective, it is likely meaningless and/or unenforceable. Neither Debian nor users of that software should expect any legal risk for using or distributing the software. However, software under that license will never make it into Debian because it violates the Debian Free Software Guidelines. The DFSG is not a contract in the legal sense, but it forms part of the Debian social contract with its users. It is not in the interest of the Debian project to include software unless the software is free to use for any purpose. While the JSON license's usage restriction is likely meaningless in practice, it clearly tries do do exactly what the DFSG wants to prevent. In the Open Source community, there is a broad consensus against the JSON license. The DFSG, slightly edited, was adopted as the Open Source Definition. Consequently, the JSON license also fails to be an Open Source license. The Free Software Foundation also looked at the license, and concluded: “This is a restriction on usage and thus conflicts with freedom 0. The restriction might be unenforcible, but we cannot presume that. Thus, the license is nonfree.”	Encoding is making an unlicensed derivate or copy Let's say instead of a video file, we take a short story. For the sake of argument, let's take For sale: baby shoes, never worn. We can apply the Cesar-7 Chiffre and get Mvy zhsl: ihif zovlz, ulcly dvyu. Or we use the NVA's TAPIR pattern: 56644 83690 62182 90838 15005 07883 69596 41698 29183 81317 41483 76644 38289 That is obviously nonsense. But all these patterns are at least derivative of the original work. But in fact, they full encode the message, only in a different format, and are reversible. This means we don't just make a derivate, we made a copy, which can be read with the proper means. It is the sole right of the author or rightsholder to license making copies, no matter how they are encoded. Or to rephrase: If it is reversible, it is a copy. If it is not reversible, it is a derivative. Neither is allowed. Subquestions who is liable? The one encoding the file committed copyright infringement for making an unlicensed copy. Period. No way around. The one downloading the file committed copyright infringement by copying the unlicensed copy. No matter if they knew what it was or decoded it, they made a copy of an (encoded) unlicensed copy. Deleting the file btw does not make the copyright infringement go away. can that person make a legitimate argument in court that he just randomly generated the "abstract art" [...] ? That would be perjury. They chucked a whole work into an algorithm. Saying anything else but "I chucked the work into the algorithm" is perjury. Which incidentally can be easily proven if the algorithm is reversible - it will prove the input. is the person who wrote the program [...] make the argument that the program isn't meant to specifically decode copyright material They can, but they are not even on the hook for copyright infringement in the first place. They provide a tool with legitimate uses, such as transmitting messages in a secure way. Encoded files inside other images are for example used by journalists to get files out of oppressive regimes. The liability araises only at the user who uses it illegally. But if so, would it then make a difference if the offline program decodes the file into system RAM only, and not to a file on disk? No. Think about an ISO file. ISO files are 1:1 copies of how a CD is written. They can be burned 1:1 onto a CD without any extra preparation, which is their legitimate use: be easy to distribute and verify copies of for example installation files. ISO files can also be mounted in a virtual CD drive, which emulates a CD drive. If you legitimately got the Windows ISO from Microsoft (or a licensed retailer) directly, you can mount it or burn it, or use it for all legitimate purposes. However, downloading the ISO for a game doesn't change that you made an illegal copy of the game, no matter that you need to mount or burn the ISO to actually access it.	The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.	Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code.	You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling.	The origin of a lawsuit will not be a license, but copyright law. Licenses are exemptions from copyright law enforcement. The original author holds the copyright. That person did offer a license O to the third party, but that third party did not take up that offer. Hence, there is a copyright violation, and a cause for a lawsuit. It is up to the original author what might be demanded there, but the usual demand is such suits is for damages. However, it is common practice to settle the case amicably outside the courts by agreeing to the original license O, although this may come with undisclosed extra terms. The problem with a lawsuit is that enforcement of the original license offer O is hard, because copyright law generally does not cover such licensing. The license terms L are mostly irrelevant as that person is not a copyright owner so there is nothing to be licensed.	First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.	It is not correct to say that drugs are, for example, broadly illegal in many western countries Some specific drugs, or specific categories of drugs, are illegal in certain circumstances, by specific statutes. Which ones vary by jurisdiction. So the analogy breaks down. As for the main question, if by "software cracking" is meant creating a modified version of the software that operates differently, for example by-passes authentication, or allows unlimited "lives", that would most probably be creatign a derivative work of the software. Creating a derivative work, even if it is never distributed, is copyright infringement under US law: 17 USC 106 (2) lists as one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder the right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; This also covers the right to authorize preparation such works. So merely creating a "cracked" version of the software is technically infringement. However, infringement (of this sort) is not a crime, and no border officer or other government official will care about it in the slightest. It is up to the copyright owner to take legal action, normally by filing suit. If the modified software is never distributed nor advertised, it seems unlikely that the owner will ever even learn of it, and less likely that the owner will sue if s/he does learn of it. Damages in such a case, if the owner brought one, would probably be small, indeed not enough to make it worth the owner's time and trouble. If the cracker starts with an instance of the unmodified original software,m and edits it in place, never making a new copy, s/he is still preparing a derivative work, and (unless permission was obtained, or the work constitutes a fair use) it is still, copyright infringement If the modified software were posted online, the owner could send a takedown notice to the hosting site. If it were being sold, then a suit would be more likely. If what the cracker creates is not a modified version of the software, but instructions for modifying it, it is less clear that that would even be infringement. If the instructions are for evading an access control mechanism, that might be unlawful under 17 USC 1201 the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. But again it would be up to the owner to take legal action, the government will not care until and unless the owner takes action. (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material. The above answer is specific to the united-states but on this point the laws of other North American and European countries are, i believe, similar, as is the Berne Copyright Convention, at least on the matter of derivative works.
Selling old DVD-burned porno movies for less Normally DVD movies involve a license with rights to the actresses and other people. In the late 80s a license was heavily protected mostly by stakeholders like Brazzers. So I bought a porn movie for $22.99 can i now sell it for $3?	Yes. You can sell it for whatever you can get for it. The license allows you to watch the DVD. If you sell the DVD, you won't be able to watch it - but the buyer will. This is same principle that books are subject to copyright, but there is nothing stopping you selling your books second-hand to a dealer.	The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.	Check the website's terms of service. Check to see if you're violating these terms, and check to see if the script you are making enables other people to violate them. Courts don't often look kindly on actions whose sole purpose is enabling someone else to do something that is prohibited. If you're making a script that helps people do something they're allowed to do, in a way that's better for at least somebody and makes nobody worse off, that's often a different story. Major websites will generally indicate whether or not you're allowed to do this. Some sites are fairly strict about prohibiting scraping (e.g. Craigslist, which at one point shut down Padmapper's alternative more-useful presentation of their content). Others, like Wikipedia, much more actively encourage reusing content from their sites as long as you meet certain conditions such as a link back to the original source.	Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always	The players behind KAT don't make themselves known. The owners of Pirate Bay were known and were personally legally pursued. That's the place to start. Law enforcement can't criminally charge anyone if they don't know who is responsible. Second is that KAT complies with DCMA takedown rules. They publicly claim to at least. PB was known to have a more f-off attitude. The US Justice Dept does pursue KAT which is why KAT changes domains so often. They do get shut down. Law enforcement has better things to do. The record and movie studios and industry-groups have money and technology to pursue infringers. It's my impression that law enforcement is happy to let the copyright holders do the heavy lifting and the government can come in with criminal charges.	The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.	I think it is probably public domain. I would suggest contacting Jon Mulvaney at the Criterion Collection. They recently remastered "The Kid" and will know all about the rights for public showings. Also, if you want to show their remastered version, which is very high quality, they can explain the process.	You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)
If I use CC-BY-SA image in a video, must the whole video be CC-BY-SA? I would like to use an image from Wikipedia, licensed with Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike (CC-BY-SA) license, as a part of my video. The image would appear in its original form, possibly scaled. Does this make my video a derivative work which must be "shared alike" or is it enough credit the image properly?	You may find the ShareAlike interpretation on the creativecommons.org wiki helpful here. The Examples section says: ShareAlike photo being used unmodified in a larger work. Unless the larger work would be considered an adaptation of it, using a ShareAlike photo as a separate element within it does not require original materials in the larger work to be ShareAlike or compatible. The larger work may be licensed under any terms. This would suggest that simply displaying the image in your film would probably not require you to apply an SA licence to your film. I imagine you would still be expected to cite the source according to standard CC requirements. However note the disclaimer at the head and foot of the page that this is not legal advice.	Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video.	The UK copyright Act has the concept of "fair dealing" which is more restricted that the US concept of "fair use". For your purposes, Section 30 appears to be applicable: 30 Criticism, review and news reporting. (1) Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made available to the public. (1A) For the purposes of subsection (1) a work has been made available to the public if it has been made available by any means, including— (a) the issue of copies to the public; (b) making the work available by means of an electronic retrieval system; (c) the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public; (d) the performance, exhibition, playing or showing of the work in public; (e) the communication to the public of the work, but in determining generally for the purposes of that subsection whether a work has been made available to the public no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act. For your reviews, you would need to properly attribute the source of the image that you were using and that source must be legitimate. If you can't find a clear legal pathway from the image you have to the actual copyright holder you could be in trouble (e.g. an image from someone else's blog where that image may have been uploaded illegally). Your best bet is to go to the studio concerned and use images from their official public releases with proper attribution.	No. The Creative Commons license seeks to promote recognition of the original author's work through attribution, but does not provide the same framework for enforcement that the DMCA would. The proper approach in cases such as the deleted Wikipedia article and subsequent reuse would be to provide a courteous notice to Wikipedia of your original publication and ask to be listed as the original author or be provided attribution. In the absence of relief there, then what rights you have would be determined by the Wikipedia Terms of Service. Since, and I am assuming here, that you are not generating billions of dollars on the original publication in royalties, seeking to bring a DMCA type enforcement on a Wikipedia article dispute would be like trying to swat a fly with a sledgehammer. (or more commonly in divorce, two people having hearing and spending thousands of dollars on attorney's fees fighting over a blender -- they are free to do it, but they would have been much better off buying 500 new blenders...) Keeping perspective and providing a courteous letter is probably your most cost efficient first step in situations like this. And in all areas of law, just remember, you catch more flies with honey than you do with salt. (meaning taking the courteous approach usually affords better results than a scalding letter breathing hell-fire and brimstone) In followup to earlier comment: Presuming you would be covered by the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Copyright of 1996 (as a U.S. Citizen you would be), and your copyright is on file with the United States Copyright Offices (same presumption) as prerequisite to suit, then there is nothing that prevents you from invoking the protections under general copyright law and under the DMCA (inlcuding the Takedown provisions). Note: these are not the only prerequisites to taking action, but instead the minimum critera to qualify, and note this does not pass on the wisdom of doing so (there are often significant consequences to improperly invoking previsions of certain acts).	I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.	More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts.	What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.	"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.
EU Cookie Law can I use cookies before users' consent? I am trying to get my website to be EU Cookie compliant and I have encountered some plugins which have something called "implied consent" in other words a popup appears on the website saying something like Cookies help us deliver our services. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies. along with two buttons: "Read more" and "Got it". So my question is: Can I use cookies before the user has clicked on any of the buttons?	The ePrivacy directive (Article 5(3)) requires prior informed consent for storage (or access) of information stored on a user's terminal equipment. In other words - you must ask users if they agree to most cookies and similar technologies before the site starts to use them. That is not always technically possible or creates catastrophic UX, so take a close look at which cookies are exempt from consent according to the EU advisory body on data protection: Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption (original, dead link) (user‑input cookies (session-id), authentication cookies, user‑centric security cookies, multimedia content player cookies, user‑interface customisation cookies, third‑party social plug‑in content‑sharing cookies etc.). Update 2019: Europe’s top court says active consent is needed for tracking cookies. There are few exemptions of cookies that generally do NOT require consent: User input cookies, for the duration of a session Authentication cookies, for the duration of a session User centric security cookies, used to detect authentication abuses and linked to the functionality explicitly requested by the user, for a limited persistent duration Multimedia content player session cookies, such as flash player cookies, for the duration of a session Load balancing session cookies, for the duration of session. User interface customisation cookies, for a browser session or a few hours, unless additional information in a prominent location is provided (e.g. “uses cookies” written next to the customisation feature	GDPR Article 4 paragraph 1 says: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 says Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. ... The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. Recital 30 says: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This may leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers and other information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural persons and identify them. An IP address hashed through a cryptographically secure one-way hash cannot reasonably be used to establish the original IP address, nor to geolocate, nor to directly identify the data subject. However if such addresses are stored in a database with a link to the subject's individual record, or to other data which identify the data subject, then they would clearly be personal information. The ICO's page on "What is personal data" says: ‘Online identifiers’ includes IP addresses and cookie identifiers which may be personal data. The page from GDPR.EU on "Personal Data" says: Any information that can lead to either the direct or indirect identification of an individual will likely be considered personal data under the GDPR. ... Any data that relate to an identifiable individual is personal data. The page on "Personal Data" from gdpr-info.eu says: Personal data are any information which are related to an identified or identifiable natural person. The data subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, especially by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or one of several special characteristics, which expresses the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, commercial, cultural or social identity of these natural persons. In practice, these also include all data which are or can be assigned to a person in any kind of way. For example, the telephone, credit card or personnel number of a person, account data, number plate, appearance, customer number or address are all personal data. Since the definition includes “any information,” one must assume that the term “personal data” should be as broadly interpreted as possible. This is also suggested in case law of the European Court of Justice ... See also "Can a dynamic IP address constitute personal data?" If a hashed IP address is stored so that it can be related to a specific individual, it is personal data. as such, it would be subject to the GDPR. To store it one would need to identify a lawful basis under GDPR Article 6 This could be the Data subject's consent, or the Controller's legitimate interest. In either case the information should be included in the list of personal information collected (often in a privacy policy document), disclosed to the subject on request, adn deleted on request if possible. If that is done, such a use of a hashed IP, although personal information, would seem to be compliant. If a hashed IP is stored in such a way that it cannot be related to any particular user, then it would not constitute personal information, and no compliance issue would seem to exist. Limiting the retention time of a hashed IP is a good practice which would reduce any possible impact it might have.	GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls.	No, a company cannot suspend your GDPR rights – contracts can't override the law. Your rights as a data subject apply as long as your personal data is being processed. However, there is no requirement in the GDPR that they fulfill your data subject rights through a self-service mechanism like a “download my data” button. They can require you to use another support channel. (But Google offers infamously bad support.) In some cases, the service may legitimately decide that they cannot give you access to the data, for example if they believe that you are not the actual data subject (e.g. if they think that you hacked the account). The right to access must not adversely affect other people (Art 15(4)). If they have doubts about your identity, they can require further information to verify you (Art 12(6)). If your requests are excessive or unfounded (if you are spamming them), they can also turn down the requests (Art 12(5)).	Consent for cookies is not mandated by the GDPR, but by some member states' implementation of the ePrivacy directive. Specifically, cookie consent isn't required for processing personal data (which the GDPR is about), but for storing anything on the user's device unless this cookie is technically necessary (e.g. session cookies, preferences). This leads to a situation where you might not need consent for the analytics themselves, but still need consent for the cookies that are used to track a user for analytics. In practice, the cookie consent requirements are handled very differently. Some sites ignore this requirement, others show a notification banner that doesn't collect active consent like the GDPR would require. Yet other sites bundle cookie consent with other consent issues into a single consent management solution. Currently, the passive notification looks like a best practice in general. However, the actual privacy laws in your member state might have more specific requirements. With regards to consent for Google Analytics, note that the use of anonymizeIP does not directly affect whether you have to collect consent. The purpose of collecting site analytics might fall under your legitimate interest either way (consent is just one among many legal bases). But using the anonymizeIP feature conforms to the GDPR's data minimization principle. Some optional GA features (that share this data, or enrich it from other sources, or use it to target ads) might still require consent. The GA documentation doesn't always make this distinction clear.	The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.	First, when using profiling third party services (Analytics is "profiling" as defined by the GDPR), your main concern is not such a trivial thing as cookie compliance, but the security of processing I've analyzed Google's IP anonymization in some detail (as part of the DPIA I do for clients). My conclusion is that for most of the web-sites we manage, Google's IP anonymization is adequate to ensure security of processing as required by the DPIA process. However, on some sites that are likely to visited by users interested in what the GDPR calls "special categories of personal data" (Article 9), we either do not use Google Analytics, or we add additional layers of security in case the USA Government orders Google to disregard the stipulations in the DPA and hand over the data (yes, the US Government can legally do that - read the fine print in the Privacy Shield accord). As for Facebook Analytics, I think you've simply misunderstood their policy. Nowhere in that policy document does Facebook say that they "are not collecting Personal Identifiable Information". AFAIK, they collect tons of it, in all sorts of obnoxious and sneaky ways. What they actually say about PII in the context of Analytics is this: We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. Let me remind you that one of their "analytics partners" was Cambridge Analytica, so if this promise not to share is true, it looks like a pretty new policy. OK, moving on to cookie compliance. To you (the controller), both Google and Facebook are processors. Given the history of the NSA and the methods it have used and AFAIK still use to get US-based companies to hand over the personal data about Europeans through orders issued by secret FISA courts, plus the fact that total nutcases currently are in charge in the USA, I am not going to rely on the privacy policy of any US-company for protection of personal data. So if I make use of Google Analytics (and I often do, they provide a great service), I always make sure that my users opt-in on that (hard cookie concent), even I make use of their IP anonymization feature (YMMV). As for Facebook, the fact that they promise not to share PII with third parties is irrelevant because they collect personal data. You will always need consent from your users to hand over their PII to Facebook in the first place. This is not optional. PS: If was a user, that consent would never been granted, no matter how great or valuable your site might be. If you have any sort of relationship with Facebook, I'll give you my personal data when you pry it from my cold, dead hands.
Is Stack Exchange allowed to unilaterally change previously published content license? The original thread can be found here: Stack Exchange and Stack Overflow are moving to CC BY-SA 4.0 As far as I understand, Stack Exchange can move on to CC BY-SA 4.0 for content published in the future, but they are not allowed to unilaterally change the license of previous publications. Several threads have been created requesting answers regarding this issue from Stack Exchange, however, the only answer from moderator did not give any meaningful explanation. Since this is a legal issue, I would like to ask of Law Stack Exchange community to give expert opinion on this matter. Can Stack Exchange change the license for previously published content without the consent of users?	What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.	To the extent that Admin is running a business rather than a free relay server, Admin will have various legal concerns. As I understand the system as you describe it, a user uploads some content to a machine, operated by AMastodonAdmin, which then makes that content available to others. W.r.t. US law, the admin needs to be concerned with a number of things. Copyright violation is one: he may get sued for contributory infringement. The DMCA safe harbor provision reduce the risk, if complied with. Defamation is another potential issue (a publisher is liable for damages under defamation law, as well as the author). "Section 230" may provide protection, but there is a large body of case law mentioned in there that would heave to be taken into consideration – and two upcoming Supreme Court cases. (Basically, Section 230 says that "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider"). The administrator has a property right to include / exclude anyone they want to, on their machine, except that a contract between Admin and User might limit his right. A TOS is a contract, which typically says "You can use my machine in a specific way as long as you follow these rules". Requiring payment in exchange for access limits Admin's right to do whatever they want. For free-access systems, there is typically a clause saying "we can kick you off if we want", though also implying that they will only kick you off for a specific action ("violating community standards"). In order to legally receive content from User, you need permission from User to redistribute their intellectual property (therefore a TOS is virtually mandatory). This would include a warranty from User that they have the right to upload whatever they do upload, granting a correct license to Admin (read the Stack Exchange TOS), and while you are at it, you should say explicitly that if a user misbehaves, they can be banned. Silence is legally problematic, compared to explicit permission or prohibition, because then there may be a long legal wrangle over whether lack of prohibition is implicit permission. Admin technically should care about GDPR, though enforcement may make this a non-issue. A US company operating as Admin would have a real concern with GDPR, but a guy running a free basement server, having no ties to the EU, might ignore GDPR, the same way they might ignore some other nation's law against apostacy.	australia Assignment and licencing of Copyright is dealt with in s196 of the Copyright Act 1968. Copyright is personal property and, subject to this section, is transmissible by assignment, by will and by devolution by operation of law. Whether someone can renounce ownership of personal property under Australian law is not entirely clear. It appears that the answer is probably yes if the owner forms the intention to abandon it. However, that does not make it public domain and the copyright might be able to be claimed by the "finder" of the abandoned property. There appears to be no provision in the law for "destroying" the personal property that is copyright. Unlike, say, a car, it is not physically possible to destroy copyright. Notwithstanding, a copyright owner who purports to disclaim copyright has probably granted a permissive, royalty-free, non-revocable, non-revocable, perpetual licence to everyone and this would bind their successors in the copyright which is practically no different from a work that is public domain. Even if this were not the case, the copyright owner would almost certainly be estopped from enforcing copyright against anyone who had taken up their offer of "public domain".	The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal).	Choice 2 is what the writers of the license have in mind. You own the physical media on which the copy is delivered, such as a DVD or floppy disk (if there was physical media). But you do not own the copy of the software, you merely have purchased a license to use it, which may be revocable under specified circumstances. This is different from the law in the case of a book. Why you buy a book, you own a copy of the book, although you do not own the copyright to the book, and may not make additional copies. The license model was adopted by commercial software distributors for several reasons, but largely to avoid the "first sale doctrine". When you buy a copy of a copyrighted work, you have the right (under US law at least) to lend, rent, sell, or give-away that copy. You do not need the permission of the copyright holder to do any of these. Those in the commercial software business did not want customers to be able to do those things legally. By making the software subject to a license, which is a contract, they could write that license to restrict or prohibit those rights. Sellers also wanted to prohibit reverse engineering of the software, and to restrict use of the software. (For example, to limit the user to installing it on a single computer.) There was at first much dispute over the enforcability of such license agreements. But most US courts now accept them as valid and enforceable, and copyright law has been modified to take account of them. Specifically, 17 USC 109 (2)(b)(1)(A) seems to include a legislative acceptance of this rule.	You will need a license for any library that you are including in your product. Including libraries that you didn't really want to include, but which are needed by another library that you intentially include. And you will have to agree to all the licenses simultaneously, which may be difficult. If several libraries have conflicting licenses (that is you cannot possibly respect A's and B's license at the same time), then you must remove one of the libraries until no conflicts are left.	Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal.	This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.
Apartment mgt breaking lease before my move in I signed a lease agreement with an apartment community last week. The start date of my lease is Nov 10,2019. I received a call from community management today telling me that the apartment we signed up for will not be available. They told me that the current residents decided to break their lease earlier and that is how the management offered us that place. Today the residents called them and said that they no longer wish to break their lease. Therefore I have to look into other options. Now this sounds unreasonable. Why should I be at the receiving end of such a convoluted situation between the current resident and management? Is there anything that I can do in this regard.	Your contract is the only relevant one in your relationship with your landlord If they have broken it you can sue for damages. However, you have to actually read the lease to see if they have broken it - if they are doing something the lease permits, they haven’t broken it.	No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off.	In Texas, if the lease states that the landlord can inter for some purpose, the landlord can enter for that purpose. I assume there is no statement in the lease. Then the landlord has no right to enter except in emergencies and for routine inspections or repair. This right, however, stems from the courts and not statutes, and you could theoretically sue the landlord to prevent such an inspection (you would need a good attorney, to overcome the presumption that reasonable routine inspections with notice are allowed).	My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.	I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.	I haven't listened to the podcast, but this is probably referring to the anticipated "Renters Reform Bill". A white paper was published on 16 June 2022. There is no Bill before Parliament yet, so the mooted changes are quite a long way from happening. (Additionally, the usual political churn may mean that this does not happen at all. The Secretary of State has already changed, and will likely change again once there is a new Prime Minister; political priorities may shift in all sorts of ways; there could be a general election; etc.) One proposal from the government is (section 3.1): We will abolish Section 21 evictions and simplify tenancy structures. To achieve this, we will move all tenants who would previously have had an Assured Tenancy or Assured Shorthold Tenancy onto a single system of periodic tenancies. Tenants will need to provide two months’ notice when leaving a tenancy, ensuring landlords recoup the costs of finding a tenant and avoid lengthy void periods. This will provide greater security for tenants while retaining the important flexibility that privately rented accommodation offers. This will enable tenants to leave poor quality properties without remaining liable for the rent or to move more easily when their circumstances change, for example to take up a new job opportunity. Landlords will only be able to evict a tenant in reasonable circumstances, which will be defined in law, supporting tenants to save with fewer unwanted moves. Currently, tenants on an AST cannot leave their tenancy during the fixed term, unless the tenancy agreement specifically provides for this with a "break clause". A break clause might say that after six months, the tenant is allowed to terminate the arrangement with one month of notice to the landlord. Or there might be no break clause at all, so that the arrangement can end early only if the landlord and tenant agree ("surrendering the tenancy"). Once the fixed term ends, it can be renewed for another fixed term, or terminated, or else it rolls on to become a "periodic tenancy", typically month-to-month. The tenant can give notice to quit during this time. The government's proposal seems to amount to having no initial fixed term, but a statutory periodic tenancy from the get-go. As far as timing, the white paper says: We will provide at least six months’ notice of our first implementation date, after which all new tenancies will be periodic and governed by the new rules. Specific timing will depend on when Royal Assent is secured. To avoid a two-tier rental sector, and to make sure landlords and tenants are clear on their rights, all existing tenancies will transition to the new system on a second implementation date. After this point, all tenants will be protected from Section 21 eviction. We will allow at least twelve months between the first and second dates. Again, the Bill has not been introduced to Parliament or even published in draft, so Royal Assent is a long way off.	A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).	Even with a verbal lease, evictions must be done legally; the landlord can't evict you with out going through a legal process that takes time, and can't legally dump your possessions outside, or ask someone else to do it. In addition, according to MassLegalHelp, there are temporary changes to evictions due to Covid-19: • Evictions and foreclosures are on hold. • Your landlord cannot lock you out or shut off your utilities. Read the link Housing - MassLegalHelp for more information and help if needed.
Parsing definition of "urgent concern" under 50 U.S.C 3033? Can someone help validating my parsing of a legal definition of "urgent concern" in the cited section. If a complaint is not related to a intelligence activity, does it qualify as an intelligence whistleblower report? In the news are "whistleblower" allegations claiming to be an "urgent matter" under 50 U.S.C. 3033 (k) (5). Included in that section is the following definition appears: (G) In this paragraph, the term “urgent concern” means any of the following: (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters. (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity. (iii)An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee’s reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph. The whistle-blower quotes the above definition incompletely. After reading the now-released complaint and related MEMCON, I can't see how it relates to an intelligence activity within the responsibility and authority of the DNI. In fact it seems to me a difference of opinions concerning public policy matters. I have to wonder if the whistle-blower, ICIG and Speaker of the House misjudged the legal protections applicable to this report.	The first paragraph on the nature of the concern in the ICIG letter to McGuire clarifies what the alleged violation of the law is: Here, the Complainant's Letter alleged, among other things, that the President of the United States, in a telephone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on July 25, 2019, “sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President’s 2020 reelection bid.” U.S. laws and regulations prohibit a foreign national, directly or indirectly, from making a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election. Similarly, U.S. laws and regulations prohibit a person from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such a contribution or donation from a foreign national, directly or indirectly, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election. Further, in the ICIG’s judgment, alleged conduct by a senior U.S. public official to seek foreign assistance to interfere in or influence a Federal election would constitute a “serious or flagrant problem [or] abuse” under 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(G)(i), which would also potentially expose such a U.S. public official (or others acting in concert with the U.S. public official) to serious national security and counterintelligence risks with respect to foreign intelligence services aware of such alleged conduct. That is, it is alleged that it is a violation of federal election law for a foreign national to aid a US election (by providing information, which might be of value). The underlying statute is ambiguous. One reading is that the term refers to a deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information and also A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order The alternative is to take the entire list and limit the scope of the violations etc. to those within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information The interpretive canon known as the "last antecedent rule" favor the narrowest scope possible the immiidately above phrase. The law does not require a Supreme Court quality analysis of the underlying law: the proper interpretation of that statute is far from obvious, see here. Whether or not the last antecedent rule would be actually invoked in a final appeal is very hard to say, but generally the courts disfavor the supposition that any statute is ever written ambiguously (that still doesn't tell us what the scope of the last phrase is). The wording of the ICIG letter clearly indicates his interpretation of the scope of the DNI phrase, as not being limited to only intelligence activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information. However, the ICIG letter also notes that the Director of National Intelligence has responsibility and authority pursuant to federal law and Executive Orders to administer and operate programs and activities related to potential foreign interference in a United States election Additionally, Executive Order 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Influence in a United States Election declares that the ability of persons ... outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections... constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States putting the combination of foreign + elections within the scope of the DNI. The ICIG letter also reasons that alleged conduct by a senior U.S. public official to seek foreign assistance to interfere in or influence a Federal election would constitute a “serious or flagrant problem [or] abuse” under 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(G)(i), which would also potentially expose such a U.S. public official (or others acting in concert with the U.S. public official) to serious national security and counterintelligence risks with respect to foreign intelligence services aware of such alleged conduct.	A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.	There is actually more than one law covering whistleblowers, so the other answer is only partially correct. According to the NYT, the case in question here is also covered by the Inspector General Act of 1978 Do whistle-blowers have a right to remain anonymous? Only in a limited way. Another part of the Inspector General Act says that agency watchdogs “shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the inspector general determines such disclosure is unavoidable.” In line with that law, the inspector general for the intelligence community, Michael Atkinson, did not include the whistle-blower’s name in his report to the acting director of national intelligence, Joseph Maguire. Mr. Maguire testified last week that he did not know the name of the person [...] But the legal prohibition on disclosing the official’s name applies only to Mr. Atkinson. It does not bar Mr. Trump and his allies from trying to identify him or disclosing his name if they figure it out. (It would be illegal under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act for any official to disclose his name if he is a covert agent, but no one has suggested that he is.) The same information can be found in an OIG FAQ Q: Will OIG reveal employee identities or the fact that they cooperated? A: OIG investigators will respect the confidentiality of Department employees as provided by law. Section 7 of the Inspector General Act states that “[t]he Inspector General shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation.” During the course of some investigations, it may be unavoidable that the identities of individuals involved will become known. However, OIG strives to protect the confidentiality of Department employees who provide OIG with information. In addition, employees should be aware that reprisal against any employee for cooperating with OIG is forbidden by the Inspector General Act and DAO 207-10, Section 4. Further, OIG takes whistleblower protection very seriously and, along with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, investigates alleged reprisals against employees for making protected disclosures to OIG. So Paul's spokesperson seems to be correct.	Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..	Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.	It ultimately depends on what Congress said when the relevant law was passed pertaining to that form of discrimination, how the enforcing agency has written the regulations, orders that have been issued, and how the courts have interpreted the law and regulations. EEOC Notice 915.002 states that Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), an employer may ask disability-related questions and require medical examinations of an applicant only after the applicant has been given a conditional job offer. Such questions must be "job-related and consistent with business necessity". There is a statutory underpinning to this declaration, 42 USC 12112(d) that The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a) shall include medical examinations and inquiries and Except as provided in paragraph (3), a covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability. except that A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions. EEOC also says that In general, it is assumed that pre-employment requests for information will form the basis for hiring decisions. Therefore, employers should not request information that discloses or tends to disclose an applicant's race unless it has a legitimate business need for such information. Such inquiries are illegal in the sense that the EEOC "prohibits" it, and in the case of disability there is a direct statutory mandate to prohibit it. There is a legal principle, "Chevron deference", that says that the courts should defer to an agency's interpretation as long as Congress hasn't directly addressed the question and the interpretation is not unreasonable. Title 29(A)(35)(B) states the standards for detecting age discrimination for entities receiving federal funds, and while age discrimination is illegal, asking a person's age is not prohibited by specific regulation. The EEOC provides this manual regarding general race and color discrimination, and the section on "Evaluating employment decisions", where they say determining whether race played a role in the decisionmaking requires examination of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. The presence or absence of any one piece of evidence often will not be determinative. So asking a person's race is not per se a violation of the law, but it is an act interpreted by the EEOC to be evidence of race discrimination. On the other hand, asking about disability is totally illegal so there's no "totality of evidence" to the process. The footnotes in the manual point to relevant case law: there is no case law that says "asking a questions about a protected category is per se proof of discrimination", but it can be used as part of a pattern of evidence.	Probable cause is not required to issue a subpoena. But, a recipient of a subpoena (or a party to a case in which a subpoena is issued, or a person whose records a subpoenaed), may file a motion to quash the subpoena in the court that issued it, before the information is disclosed pursuant to the subpoena. A claim that the subpoenaed material is privileged is always a legitimate reason to quash a subpoena. A subpoena can also be quashed on the grounds that the materials sought are unrelated to the matter for which it is issued, or that it is unduly burdensome in a manner unrelated to a legitimate interest in obtaining the information sought (this list of objections is not exhaustive). You can see an example of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from a federal grand jury, together with the subpoena itself attached to the motion at the end of the linked file as an exhibit, at this link. The federal court rule governing subpoenas in federal criminal cases is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17. In federal court civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 applies. Short of actually quashing the subpoena, the court issuing it could also modify the obligation by imposing a protective order on the materials to be disclosed (e.g. trade secrets or private financial information). This would prevent the materials disclosed from being shared with people other than the recipient. Incidentally, the penalty for failing to respond to a subpoena is for the person to whom it is directed to hold the person in contempt of court, punishable by incarceration or a fine (often a fixed amount per day). Often, if testimony is part of what is required, a warrant for the arrest of the person who fails to appear is summarily issued by the court. Footnote regarding terminology Strictly speaking, the word "subpoena" unmodified, refers to a subpoena directing the person to whom it is addressed to testify under oath at a certain place and time, sometimes a grand jury, sometimes a trial in a court, sometimes a deposition, sometimes an arbitration, and sometimes an interview with a government official. When a subpoena is asking for the turnover of records or things or data it is strictly speaking called a "subpoena duces tecum" (from the Latin duces tecum, meaning "you shall bring with you"). Historically, in response to the subpoena duces tecum, the custodian of the records would appear personally at a deposition or grand jury proceeding or trial with the records or things and would testify under oath briefly at that time to authenticate them. These days, the federal rules of evidence and most state rules of evidence provide that the custodian of records can sign an affidavit, or a declaration (i.e. a statement made under penalty of perjury which is not notarized), regarding the authenticity of the records (and their status as "business records" or "public records" where appropriate). Then, this affidavit or declaration is delivered along with the records by a courier or mail, in lieu of actually providing live testimony regarding the authenticity and business records status of the records. Delivery of documents by courier or mail or electronically, accompanied by an affidavit or declaration is what is usually done these days, except in exceptional cases where the authenticity and/or business records status of the records is genuinely in dispute and complicated in some way. For example, in person testimony of the custodian of records might be required in a case where there are allegations of forgery of documents or that digital files were hacked.	As a native English speaker I would read this as requiring the DPO to monitor all the things listed (i.e. you are correct). Furthermore it would be ridiculous for the DPO to be personally responsible for doing all of these things. If you were supposed to perform "assignment of responsibilities" yourself that would pretty much make you the Chief Operations Officer. If you are only required to monitor job assignments for compliance then by the same logic you are only required to monitor training. Having said that, there is an established principle in the safety industry that compliance should have an independent reporting line up to the top management, and I think its the same for financial regulations too. You cannot be an effective DPO if you are just watching from the sidelines. So I would expect a DPO to have: Line responsibility for audits and routine compliance work such as privacy impact assessments, with a dedicated team of people if necessary. This ensures that there is an independent reporting line from everyday work up to the DPO. Do not accept a situation where data protection work is carried out by the project and then handed to you to file once it is complete, because it never will be. Project managers have a lot of competing priorities and they are extremely good at avoiding anything that sits between them and project completion. You MUST have your own people in the project to see what is happening and the power to stop a project if it is not compliant. If they won't give you that, turn down the job. Budget responsibility for training (with the work actually done by specialist contractors or the company in-house training department) Notification of job assignments where data protection is part of the responsibility.
Is it legal for restaurants to use fish in their vegetarian meals? For many years, I've had to avoid Chinese restaurants and take-aways purely because they sell "vegetarian" choices which contain fish sauce, prawns, squid etc. I appreciate that there is a cultural difference such as Buddists eating oysters, but from the standpoint of an English vegetarian, I feel that it's not right that they can mislead in this way. So my question is: Are there any laws or regulations which regulate "vegetarian" menu items? What constitutes a vegetarian menu item? What are the consequences of advertising or claiming a dish as vegetarian when in fact it contains a non-vegetarian ingredient? Note: the original question did not specify a jurisdiction. The England and Wales tag has been added based on the question details. But answers on any jurisdiction are welcome until the original author clarifies his jurisdiction.	UK and EU There is is no legally binding definition of the terms "vegan" and "vegetarian" at EU or member state level. In 2019, the EU began work on legislation for those definitions. However, under the UK's Food Information to Consumers (FIC) regulations (that implemented certain provisions of the EU directive of the same name), food information must be accurate, clear and easy to understand. This is intended to protect consumers from false or misleading labelling. The UK's Trade Descriptions Act also prohibits false or misleading labelling. The UK's Consumer Rights Act 2015 says "Every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term that the goods will match the description". And in the UK deliberate mislabelling is criminal fraud. I imagine other jurisdictions have similar laws. In 2006 the UK's Food Standards Agency published vegetarian and vegan guidance for food labelling. Unfortunately I can no longer find it on the FSA's website (food.gov.uk). However, it had the following definitions: Vegetarian The term ‘vegetarian' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of products derived from animals that have died, have been slaughtered, or animals that die as a result of being eaten. 'Animals' means farmed, wild or domestic animals, including for example, livestock poultry, game, fish, shellfish, crustacea, amphibians, tunicates, echinoderms, molluscs and insects. Vegan The term 'vegan' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of animals or animal products (including products from living animals). Now, those definitions weren't/aren't legally enforceable in themselves but an enforcement agency might use them as criteria when investigating a complaint. Related: fish and molluscs are key allergens Also under the FIC: Food businesses include restaurants, cafés and takeaways, and businesses that produce, manufacture or pre-pack food. Food businesses must tell you if they use any of the 14 key allergens as ingredients in the food and drink they provide. They must supply allergen information for every item that contains any of the 14 allergens. The 14 allergens include fish and molluscs (e.g. mussels and oysters). The consequences You are free to ask the food business to list the ingredients (indeed this is the advice to people with allergies) You are free to report your concerns to the food business (they really must list their uses of those key allergens) You are free to not give your custom to the business In the UK you can report businesses that you don't believe meet the legal requirements to the National Food Crime Unit. But if there is no direct intention to deceive or deliberate dishonesty it is not a 'food crime' and should not be reported to the NFCU. These non-crime concerns should be reported to the relevant local authority if you get no satisfaction from the business.	Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.	You are correct in that the GST is 10%. It never has been (and likely never will be!) 2.5%. You're also correct that some items (generally considered as 'essentials') are GST free. For example, the ATO includes 'most basic food' on its list of GST-free items. However, these GST-free items are completely GST free, and restaurant meals certainly don't class as basic food. Perhaps interestingly, the wholesale sales tax when it was first introduced in 1930 was set at 2.5%, but it wasn't at that rate for long (see A brief history of Australia's tax system). If I had to guess, I'd say this is probably a dodgy set up in this restaurant's point-of-sale system (there's also no such thing as 'GST2'). Hopefully their returns to the tax office are not as dodgy!	I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.	Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.	Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually.	It depends on what rights the copyright owners choose to grant. In the case of the skillet, assuming that it was properly licensed, it seems safe to assume that LucasFilms or their agent intended that it be used to create cookies using an image of Darth Vader, so that use was approved by them. Whether commercial use of the image, by selling cookies, was included in such a license, cannot be determined from the info in th4 question. Quite possibly not. Even if such a license was granted, it would be hard for one who bought the skillet second hand to prove that, in the face of a challenge from LucasFilms . So if they brought suit over such a use, they might well win. As to the bakeries where cakes and other good with images of cartoon and movie characters are sold, they should have bought rights that allow them to make and sell such products. They may have. Or they may be infringing, but the copyright or trademark owners choose not to sue. It depends entirely on what agreements the various bakeries may have entered into, and those are not normally public.	The relevant guidance is here, at sections 3.4 and 3.6. It is surprisingly(?) confusing, the result of trying to account for exceptions both historical and otherwise motivated. The biscuit/cake distinction is not the one to focus on, because some biscuits are zero-rated (I think this category is basically the fairly plain biscuits like custard creams or bourbons) and some are standard-rated (those with chocolate, but also some others as far as I can tell). The following are supposed to be standard-rated: biscuits wholly or partly covered in chocolate (or some product similar in taste and appearance) any item of sweetened prepared food, other than cakes and non-chocolate biscuits, which is normally eaten with the fingers Later, in the 'zero-rated' column of a table of examples we have both Cakes including sponge cakes, pastries, eclairs, meringues, flapjacks, lebkuchen, marshmallow teacakes and Scottish snowballs and Biscuits coated with icing, caramel or some other product different in taste and appearance from chocolate There is some further clarification here: In most cases, the borderline between cakes and confectionery causes few problems, but there are products whose status as cakes is not self-evident. They will normally be marketed as cakes, through bakeries and supermarkets rather than through confectionery outlets, and will be displayed with cakes and biscuits rather than in the confectionery section. The style of packaging used will also normally follow the pattern for bakery products, with a number of individual portions boxed and cellophane wrapped so the contents are revealed. They are also usually eaten as part of a meal rather than between meals as confectionery. Later in that page they discuss flapjacks vs. cereal bars and admit that flapjacks are classed differently because flapjacks were around when VAT was introduced and cereal bars weren't. Based on this, I think fig rolls are likely classed as confectionery rather than cakes, so get standard-rated for tax. If they wanted to invest in the legal battle that Jaffa Cakes had, they might well win, but 'to the man on the street' they are a sweet product sold for eating between meals in its own packaging, and so they naturally fall into that intended category. EDIT: After all that, I found this wholesaler who states that fig rolls are zero-rated. Perhaps they do get classified as cakes or plain biscuits, then.
Is price discrimination based on age legal in the EU? Article 21(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states that: Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. Recently while travelling in an EU country, I used a swimming pool. The pool had a discounted rate for students. One party in my group tried to obtain the student discount but was refused as it was only available for students aged 25 or younger. This seems to me to be a clear case of discrimination based on age. Effectively, students who are 26+ are charged a different rate to students who are up to 25. Are there any other EU laws or cases which would suggest that such a pricing structure is legal?	"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services	Content Warning: this post mentions rape / non-consensual sex and discusses (in some non-explicit detail) coercion of minors. As of Tuesday, March 1st, 2016, according to the Indonesian Penal Code (translated version; I cannot read Indonesian), Indonesia's age of consent is 16 years old (18 for homosexual acts). Indonesia also does not have close-in-age exemptions (for example, in Canada, the age of consent is 16 years old, but a 14-year-old can consent to a partner less than 5 years older, and a 12-year-old can consent within 2 years). I cannot verify this source but according to Wikipedia, which cites this PDF, the age of consent could be raised to 18 years under the Child Protection Act arguing that sexual acts can cause bodily or mental harm and "child" is defined as anyone under 18 years of age. As an example, according to Wikipedia, a court case in 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald) saw this used to convict an Australian man. There is nothing weird about this law. I left this as a comment, but let me elaborate in an answer. Your misconception is that persuasion is an innocent and ethical thing. The harsh reality is that children are, on average, more ignorant than adults and lack judgement, foresight, and rationality at times, and there are disgusting individuals that will exploit this fact to get children to do things they otherwise wouldn't such as sex, or drugs. Additionally, age comes with a power imbalance - think a teacher using their power over a student to convince or coerce them into having sex with them. That is not strictly violence, nor telling lies, or "forcing" in the strict sense, nor trickery, but a reasonable individual would still consider that to be not real consent. The fact is that children can only consent if it is entirely of their own accord and judgement and there is no extrinsic pressure forcing or persuading them to. In fact, I argue that adults are subject to this too and persuading or coercing an adult into having sex is also disgusting (but doing this to children is far more abhorrent). But since children are considered by law to lack the judgement to protect themselves against coercion and realize they should reject and get away from their persuader, the law instead protects them. Persuading someone is not necessarily non-consensual. It holds a high chance of being non-consensual, and consent is only considered real when it is a) not coerced, and b) the subject is legally capable; that is, not intoxicated, not a minor (by whatever the age of cosnent is), etc. If all obscene acts with a girl under 18 are illegal, why doesn't the law simply say don't do obscene acts with a girl under 18? Because sex with people between 16 and 18 is legal (in Indonesia) under the right conditions. Although I must say, since you word it as "obscene acts", then of course they're illegal. Obscene acts are, by definition, morally reprehensible and/or legally incriminating, so illegal things are illegal, is basically what you're saying. Just say "having sex" if you mean "having sex". Why does the law prohibit persuading girls to do obscene acts but does not prohibit the actual doing of the obscene act itself? Kind of weird. This makes no sense at all, and hopefully after reading my answer you understand why this makes absolutely no sense. How in the earth anyone can have sex with someone without persuading? He walks the street and accidentally plug his penis in? ... Rape? There are many ways to have sex with someone without persuading them that I don't think I have to list. Your main mistake is still conflating persuaded / coerced consent as real consent. In summary, persuasion is not some innocent matter of convincing someone in a friendly manner to have sex. It includes coercion, abusing one's power, exploiting a child's ignorance and limited judgement or foresight, and other reprehensible factors. Consent cannot be given if the individual is too young, impaired, unable to legally give consent, or coerced into it.	This is unlawful sex discrimination In fact, its incredibly close to the example given on this website: A nightclub allows women in for free but you have to pay because you’re a man. This is unlawful discrimination because of your sex. How do they get away with it? Did you complain or report them? No? That’s how.	Part 3 of the Equality Act is the Part that applies to the provision of services to the public, which includes "the provision of goods." This Part prohibits service providers from discriminating as to the terms on which a provider provides the goods to the customer. Indirect discrimination is defined at Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. It establishes that indirect discrimination is a form of discrimination: 19 Indirect Discrimination (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3) The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. In characterizing the "practice" that is being applied, the Court of Appeal has said this word is not a term of art and is not to be construed narrowly or in a limited way (see Ishola v Transport for London, [2020] EWCA Civ 112). A fair way to characterize the "practice" being applied in this circumstance is that the store is "selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150 and Nike Jordan 4128s (men's) at £200." (If instead the "pratice" were characterized more narrowly—selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150—then the analysis would not even get past 19(2)(b). Likewise, if the "practice" were characterized more broadly—selling both the women's and men's versions at a discount from time to time, not necessarily at the same time—then the analysis will also have difficulty getting past 19(2)(b).) The question is whether the application of this practice indirectly discriminates against "male purchasers." 19(2)(a): does the Nike store apply this practice to male and non-male purchasers? Yes. (This is why we're in an indirect discrimination analysis rather than direct discrimination.) 19(2)(b): does this practice put male purchasers at a disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that male purchasers are more likely to want to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. (I could also see a tribunal cutting the analysis off at this stage, depending on how much weight they place on choice. I know that Canada avoids inquiring into the "source" of the disadvantage or blaming it on an individual's choice, but I have no idea what the approach in the U.K. is to this aspect.) 19(2)(c): would this practice put a particular male claimant at that disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that the particular claimant wants to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. 19(2)(d): is it the case that the Nike store cannot show the practice to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? My prediction is that the store would be able to justify the practice as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. One example of a legitimate aim: a charging policy at swimming pools that disproportionately affected "disabled swimmers" was found to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, being part of "an overall financial structure which covers the provision of a wide range of public services" (https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2022/1588.html) Other examples of legitimate aims: "running an efficient service," "requirements of a business," "desire to make a profit." However, Economic reasons alone are not enough to justify discrimination. Someone can’t justify discrimination by saying it’s cheaper to discriminate. But costs can be taken into account as part of the justification if the person can show there are other good enough reasons for the treatment. So, depending on the business rationale, and the proportionality of the discount compared to the business need (e.g. cost of holding extra stock, risk of failing to sell stock as a new model comes in, etc.), the price differential could be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This will depend on the evidence. I predict most stores would be able to justify a modest and occasional price differential, even in the case that the production costs of each shoe are identical. Summary I see four ways through this analysis, each leading to the conclusion that this would not be indirect discrimination: a narrow characterization of the "practice" as simply selling the women's version at £150 (probably too narrow of a view) a broad characterization of the "practice" as selling all versions at a discount from time to time, albeit not necessarily at the exact same time a view that any disadvantage experienced by men is due to their choice not the price discrepancy (dubious) the price discrepancy is a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim (admittedly, a thin analysis requiring more research)	Here I assume from your cases that you are interested in the regulation of private activities (with human rights code etc.) instead of constitutional restraints on the government (under the Charter). The constitution only prohibits discrimination in law (or government policies) based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context. Canada is a federal country with 10 provinces and three territories each having the powers to legislate under the constitution (for the provinces) or under federal devolution acts (for the territories). They all have different laws. And in constrast to the United States which is often thought to be less "centralized", in the domain of properties and civil rights (including human rights, employment and housing etc.), the federal government in Canada cannot legislate over these areas generally but it can regulate these things in domains where otherwise belong to the federal jurisdiction (e.g. airlines, interprovincial railways, banks but not credit unions, telecoms, the postal service, the armed forces). Federal laws regulating human rights and employment like the Canadian Human Rights Code and Canada Labour Code apply only to those under federal jurisdiction. In most situations, provincial laws apply and are different for each province, including the list of protected characteristics (e.g. citizenship or suspended criminal records are not protected, at least not directly, in all provinces). So you will have to look at the law in your province of interest. Generally the human rights Code or Act should be comprehensive, but exceptions may arise in other special laws (e.g. union memberships are often protected in the Labour Code; disability accommodations may have separate laws). In general does something .... count as illegal discrimination? Another point is that discrimination is not generally illegal; you are free to buy Pepsi instead of Coca Cola. Discrimination based on protected characteristics is not necessarily illegal; a gay man can choose to have a man instead of a woman for his partner. In Canada, both federally and in each province, what is generally illegal is when individuals are adversely differentiated due to a protected characteristic in the course of providing a good, service, facility or accommodation available to the general public, or in relation to housing and employment. Even then, discrimination based on protected characteristics can be legal if certain requirements are met. These usually include employment or service requirements in good faith, programs designed to improve the circumstances of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups ("affirmative action"), and "traditional" exceptions (e.g. age-based discounts). Religious organizations can also discriminate based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, at least when they are not carrying out commercial provision of goods and services available to the general public. For example, it is not against the law for an employer to provide gender-separated bathrooms (it may even be a requirement). In many if not all provinces, it is not illegal for businesses to give child or seniors discounts. In some provinces, a landlord who will be living on the same premises with shared bathrooms and kitchens is not subject to human rights laws or have reduced burden to accommodate. Insurance companies also often have greater leeway in their business decisions, since their business model is usually and inherently built on discrimination (of risks which can correlate with protected characteristics). There are also social expectations and conditions that "rank" a hierarchy of grounds and circumstances (justifiably or not) which may lead to more or less scrutiny over different grounds of protection and areas of service (e.g. an insurance policy discriminating on race is socially absolutely not acceptable where discrimination due to age in insurances are acceptable and discrimination due to gender is controversial; addiction-based disability claims may also attract more scrutiny; employment and housing are considered much more important and in detail compared to retail discounts). Public policy overwhelmingly favours or at least more carefully consider claims from the traditionally socially disadvantaged groups. that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more In Canada, the discrimination you are thinking of are often referred to as "adverse effect discrimination", sometimes also called "indirect" discriminations, where a practice neutral on its face adversely impact individuals based on a protected characteristics. It is not necessarily separately or explicitly spelled out, but results from the purpose of human rights legislations. The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 But not all policies that cause disproportionate impacts are necessarily illegal. Insurance rates based on postal codes may discriminate against areas where a racial, ethnic, religious, age etc. group concentrates. But it can be justifiable as a reasonable good faith business requirements if the discrimination is based on an objective, reasonable criteria (e.g. flood risks or claim rates). The extent that a protected characteristic is relevant to the impacts must be considered. An arbitrary, artificial, stereotypical policy are more likely to be illegal than a considered, reasoned, well-founded one. Does intent matter? A discriminatory practice is "objective" and a good or neutral intent does not prevent a practice from being illegal discrimination. However, evidences of intent of discrimination are often illegal discrimination in itself and in any case, they can be used as evidences to prove discrimination cases and undermine the on-the-face neutrality of an action in question. Malicious intent or lack of can also be relevant in determining appropriate damages awarded to the complainant. Newfoundland and Labrador for example makes this explicit in their human rights law: Discrimination in contravention of this Act does not require an intention to discriminate. Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1 But the reasoning has been established by the Supreme Court going back at least to 1985 and apply to the interpretation of all human rights codes in Canada (unless an intent is specifically required): The intent to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination. Rather, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. The aim of the Ontario Human Rights Code is to remove discrimination ‑‑ its main approach is not to punish the discriminator but to provide relief to the victim of discrimination. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 However, intent or reasons also matter for the proper course of remedy. If a policy that is neutral on its face causes adverse effects on individuals due to protected grounds, it must be eliminated if there is no rational reason for the policy to exist. A neutral policy that are genuinely established for proper business reasons is also not illegal if upon request reasonable accommodations to the requirements are provided or attempted to the point of undue hardship. In general, human rights laws impose a duty to accommodate upon persons subject to them like service provides, employers or landlords so that actions are taken, if possible, reasonable and not posing an undue hardship to the provider, to to eliminate or reduce the negative impact an individual suffers due to a protected characteristic. I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. The first step is to determine whether using candles are in fact part of a sincere religious practice, the hindering of which would violate the rights of the believer. Simply liking the scent of candles when they read the Book is likely not enough to establish that the freedom of religion would be violated. Lighting Shabbat candles on the other hand is much more likely to be recognized as a religious practice. If a discrimination practice is established at first view, the landlord would need to justify its decision, e.g. fire safety. It is not exempt just because "the rule is applied to everyone equally". If the reason for the discrimination is justifiable and reasonable accommodation is not possible, it is not illegal. Conformation to e.g. legal requirements like fire or health and safety codes is often a defence for private individuals (though the complainant may raise claims against the government). However, a duty to accommodate (to a reasonable extent) still exists, e.g. the landlord may need to consider the tenant in priority for similar properties under its constrol that allow open flames (if available). IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Like said above, adverse effects based on protected grounds can be illegal discrimination and can give rise to a duty of accommodation. But this case is more tricky and I didn't find any clear case law on similar situations. It would depend on if the company did all it commercially reasonably could do to eliminate or reduce the impacts. A physical limitation caused by hardware (e.g. filter lenses) may be more easily justified than a lack of darker-skinned training samples in their statistical learning algorithm. Even if a successful discrimination claim is established, the damages may also be limited in this context (but an automatic system that decides on home mortgages and are discriminatory unjustifiably can lead to significantly more damages).	Because the Austrian has equal rights to an Irish wholesaler wrt fireworks The freedom to provide services means that a national of any EU country has the same rights as a national of any other EU country including the home country. However, they all must still comply with local law.	Education level is not an FHA protected category. However, whenever you give one broad group preferential treatment over another, you'll raise eyebrows. Someone might argue, for example, that while your incentive does not explicitly mention a protected category like race or sex, it might disproportionately impact one group in a protected category over another. In fact, the Supreme Court in 2015 addressed this question in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project. They found (albeit by a 5-4 vote) that disparate impact could, under certain circumstances, be the basis for a discrimination claim under FHA. The Wikipedia article on this subject is informative. As for your case, it really depends on what you are trying to accomplish with the policy, and what you reasonably predict it will do. For example, given that in most areas, white people more often have graduate degrees than black people, then if this policy did in fact end up advantaging white tenant over black tenants, someone might claim that you are in effect discriminating on the basis of race. I would not want to be on the defending end of that claim. In general, if you want to be safe from FHA's wrath, you need to evaluate each applicant on their individual merits as a tenant, not their membership in some group. Whenever you treat one person differently from another person, you should have a reason that clearly derives from your business interests as a landlord, and you should write it down. Legal questions aside, it seems like a really bad idea to offer incentives like this. I can't imagine it achieving any legitimate business goal, and I can easily imagine it making tenants or applicants feel cheated and devalued. And when people feel cheated and devalued, even if they haven't legally been wronged, they often seek legal redress. Or slash your tires. The fact that grad degrees would not be required under your policy isn't relevant. In the eyes of the FHA, any disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category is discrimination. The only real question here is whether this is disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category.	"When ever I enter my college I'm forbidden to drink energy drinks..." You are under a contract and bound by the rules and regulations of the college; read the contract you signed when you registered for classes and paid tuition. That contract will stipulate what you are allowed to do and not do in classes, in your interactions with tutors and faculty, and on the college grounds, either public or private, and probably covers a dress code, phone usage, and on and on. The only "loophole" you have available is to stop going to college. In addition, you are 17 and a minor under the law in many jurisdictions; this means you have fewer "rights" than an adult. And, the contract is technically between your parents and the college, not you and the college.
Can governments require administrators of groups on social media platforms to buy licenses? The Kenyan government now wants administrators of WhatsApp groups and other social media platforms to pay for licenses. Is this possible with the GDPR, Facebook privacy policy, etc., as the proposed law also requires such administrators to keep all the data of the users of the platform and submit the same to the authorities when required. Bill summary	If the Kenya legislature passes such a law, they can impose such a requirement on Kenyans who want to create such social media groups. Note that this is a license from the Kenyan government, not a copyright or trademark license. In effect, it is a tax on running a social media group, along with various regulations. I have no idea if this bill is at all likely to pass. If it does pass, it might be hard to enforce, as it would probably require cooperation from Facebook and other social media platforms, and the companies which run those platforms are not located in Kenya, and might not cooperate.	Elon Musk doesn't own Twitter He is part of a consortium of investors that own it. What he can and can't do with it will be constrained by any agreements that exist between those investors and, as CEO, a duty to all of the shareholders and to the company itself. However, that jus begs the question: can the "owners" of a company dissolve it? Yes. Or, more precisely, the directors acting for the shareholders can cease operating the company, collect all that it is owed, pay all that it owes and distribute wherever is left over to the shareholders. If there won't be anything left over, then the directors have a duty to point an administrator/liquidator to finalise the company. One of these two things is, ultimately, what happens to every company sooner or later.	According to Josh Aas, Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Executive Director, (the umbrella 501(c)(3) for Let's Encrypt): "It is not against our terms to charge for services using our certificates, though we'd strongly prefer that HTTPS just be part of every offering as a default with no additional fees." My host sells SSL letsencrypt certificates - Help - Let's Encrypt Community Support That said, what your old company is doing is charging for their time and expertise (aided possibly by their own automated software they developed) to install SSL certificates for their own webhosting customers on their own servers. The company is not reselling the SSLs; they are selling the service of installing the certificates. It's not easy to install and automate the updating of 90-day SSLs from Let's Encrypt. So what your old company is doing is making it easy - for a fee - for their customers to use a somewhat difficult to use free service with the rest of their paid webhosting. The customers are not getting any information about what certificate they are buying. That could be. Check the TOS and information that each customer gets when they use the webhosting service with an SSL from Let's Encrypt. Many customers may only be concerned with if the SSL works, or not. And I'm sure the webhosting company does not divulge all aspects of their services to their customers, especially concerning security of their webservers and other business systems.	Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.	First, when using profiling third party services (Analytics is "profiling" as defined by the GDPR), your main concern is not such a trivial thing as cookie compliance, but the security of processing I've analyzed Google's IP anonymization in some detail (as part of the DPIA I do for clients). My conclusion is that for most of the web-sites we manage, Google's IP anonymization is adequate to ensure security of processing as required by the DPIA process. However, on some sites that are likely to visited by users interested in what the GDPR calls "special categories of personal data" (Article 9), we either do not use Google Analytics, or we add additional layers of security in case the USA Government orders Google to disregard the stipulations in the DPA and hand over the data (yes, the US Government can legally do that - read the fine print in the Privacy Shield accord). As for Facebook Analytics, I think you've simply misunderstood their policy. Nowhere in that policy document does Facebook say that they "are not collecting Personal Identifiable Information". AFAIK, they collect tons of it, in all sorts of obnoxious and sneaky ways. What they actually say about PII in the context of Analytics is this: We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. Let me remind you that one of their "analytics partners" was Cambridge Analytica, so if this promise not to share is true, it looks like a pretty new policy. OK, moving on to cookie compliance. To you (the controller), both Google and Facebook are processors. Given the history of the NSA and the methods it have used and AFAIK still use to get US-based companies to hand over the personal data about Europeans through orders issued by secret FISA courts, plus the fact that total nutcases currently are in charge in the USA, I am not going to rely on the privacy policy of any US-company for protection of personal data. So if I make use of Google Analytics (and I often do, they provide a great service), I always make sure that my users opt-in on that (hard cookie concent), even I make use of their IP anonymization feature (YMMV). As for Facebook, the fact that they promise not to share PII with third parties is irrelevant because they collect personal data. You will always need consent from your users to hand over their PII to Facebook in the first place. This is not optional. PS: If was a user, that consent would never been granted, no matter how great or valuable your site might be. If you have any sort of relationship with Facebook, I'll give you my personal data when you pry it from my cold, dead hands.	The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you.	This article is a useful introduction to restrictions on political advertising in the EU, where §3.4 (p 33) covers Italy. Silenzio elettorale is covered by art 9. of Norme per la disciplina della propaganda elettorale. The statutory situation is not entirely clear to me, but the main controlling fact relevant to the internet question is that AGCOM issues rules. An English legal analysis (from an Italian law firm) is here. Their undernourished analysis of the silence period is Finally, Italian legislation prohibits political propaganda on election day and on the day before. Although AGCOM is not competent for ascertaining infringements of said prohibition, it considers important to call everyone to turn the attention on these provisions. Indeed, they are important to guarantee effective protections of the constituents. As such, in the Authority’s opinion, the prohibition applies to all media. Clearly, the law applies to internet platforms. What is not clear is whether the prohibition as applied to web pages is against "adding content", or does it require the elimination of previously-distributed content and scrubbing of links to such content. Perhaps the matter will be clarified in court one day.	The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack.
Company retained my card details after payment completed and suffered a breach. What are my options? A mortgage broker company had a severe systems breach. A lot of information on their clients has been divulged due to the nature of mortgage applications. After the breach, when the company was questioned about what information was actually in the breach, it was found that full card details were retained for a payment made, and not destroyed afterwards. A formal request was made as to the reason the card details were retained. A letter has been sent apologising for the delays in processing the request. It has a lot of fluff about how to stay secure, what they have done since, and apologising for a late reply due to the large number of requests (My original request was more than 30 days before the letter). It specifically doesn't answer the question of why my card details would have needed to be retained, nor does it admit explicitly that they should not have been. Instead, the letter includes an offer of £100 in "apology", and comes with a form requesting the £100 that will "be final settlement of any and all claims I have out of or in connection with the matters referred to ... [in this letter]" This to me seems a clear "get out of jail for £100" attempt, relying on the fact that next steps and severity aren't known. I am a software engineer and I know from that angle how strict GDPR is, and I also know that this mortgage broker company have been the "recommended" broker for our new housing estate of nearly 200 homes. So I am curious as to what a next step could be. It seems that taking the £100 would be foolish, knowing how strict the GDPR rules could be, but I am somewhat out of my depth on next step. Could I write to the company pointing out that they still haven't answered my query as the first step and force them to concede specifically that it was not necessarily held? Is further compensation unlikely and should I simply accept the offer?	The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.	If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.	england-and-wales The government grants limited rights of return (thanks Jen), for which you are entitled to a cash or cash-like refund (e.g. reversal of a credit card charge as described below). The vendor has the option to go above and beyond that statutory minimum as a courtesy to the customer. In that non-compulsory zone, they have the liberty to offer store scrip rather than a cash refund. Of course, any business can try to cheat you, and then you have to stick up for your rights by insisting or reporting to relevant authorities. united-states If you buy with a credit card, the rules and contractual obligations of the credit card companies oblige the merchant to accept returns by doing a refund to the card. It's important to understand how this happens: the merchant isn't just picking an arbitrary amount of money and doing a new "sale in reverse"... they are identifying a specific past transaction that already happened, and modifying or reversing it. That is a system safeguard so they don't credit the wrong person or be tricked into a reversal on a transaction that never happened. That's why they want your receipt. On a cash transaction, it is sellers prerogative whether to issue cash or store credit. Issuing store scrip is a reasonable option to deter theft and fraud. For instance someone who wanted an item could get it for free, by buying the item, taking it home, returning the next day without the item, grab another identical item off the shelf and sneak over to the CS line and "return" it with yesterday's receipt. With cash sales, that would be completely untrackable, and the thief is gone. With credit card, they have your identity; with scrip they can "flag" the scrip in their system to either prevent its use and/or have a security officer detain you if you try to use it. For instance American home stores will cheerfully take re-saleable condition items back even without a receipt, but will issue a store voucher for the value rather than cash. That policy would be a disaster if they refunded cash. As it is, I find it rather convenient! So if you want the convenience of cash refunds, you can just use credit cards - gaining the feature at the expense of anonymity.	The provider has a legitimate interest in the data subjects data, and therefore they can override the right of deletion. See this example from the UK's Information Commissioners Office: A finance company is unable to locate a customer who has stopped making payments under a hire purchase agreement. The customer has moved house without notifying the finance company of their new address. The finance company wants to engage a debt collection agency to find the customer and seek repayment of the debt. It wants to disclose the customer’s personal data to the agency for this purpose. The finance company has a legitimate interest in recovering the debt it is owed and in order to achieve this purpose it is necessary for them to use a debt collection agency to track down the customer for payment owed. The finance company considers the balancing test and concludes that it is reasonable for its customers to expect that they will take steps to seek payment of outstanding debts. It is clear that the interests of the customer are likely to differ from those of the finance company in this situation, as it may suit the customer to evade paying their outstanding debt. However, the legitimate interest in passing the personal data to a debt collection agency in these circumstances would not be overridden by the interests of the customer. The balance would be in favour of the finance company. Article 17 of the GDPR, the "Right to be forgotten", says this: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: A) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; B) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; C) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); In your example, it's obvious that the personal data is still necessary for performance of the contract (Art 6(1)(b)) such as collecting payment, or for fulfilling legal obligations (Art 6(1)(c), Art 17(3)(b)) such as the obligation to keep financial records. Thus, there continues to be a legal basis for processing/keeping the data and rejecting the erasure request in whole or in part. Things are slightly different when the legal basis for this processing was consent (Art 6(1)(a)) or a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f)). Consent can always be withdrawn, but this kind of data collection is not typically based on consent. You can sometimes object to processing under a legitimate interest (see Art 21) but that doesn't work when the data controller has overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing. Such overriding grounds might be the legitimate interest to pursue the debt, and Art 21(1) and Art 17(3)(e) explicitly call out the “establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims” as overriding grounds. So that covers requests under A, B and C. Things like legal basis and erasure/objection must be analyzed on a per-purpose basis, so it is possible that you could get a partial erasure, such as erasing information that's only necessary for marketing (compare also objection per Art 21(2)). But its quite clear to me that a data subject cannot get out of paying a bill by using the GDPR.	They provide a snail- and e-mail way to end the contract here. This will not eradicate the €50 that they say you owe, but you can sort that out separately. That email address might also respond to inquiries about the validity of the charge. At any rate, they also give a link to online dispute resolution per Art. 14, para 1 of the EU Online Dispute Resolution Regulations. GDPR does not give one the right to be deleted so as to avoid an existing liability.	Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.	While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.	"Fraud" requires an intent to deceive. In cases like this I would fall back on the saying, "Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence." Practically speaking: the email you received from them is an amendment to their Terms of Service. I.e., your contract with the company starts with their standard Terms of Service, and is modified by any agreement you reach that explicitly supersedes the ToS. Based on your description it is your credit card company that is in violation of its duty to adjudicate chargebacks. If you refuse the charge, and present the email agreement and evidence of A's "failure," then the card company has no grounds to impose the charge on you (unless the merchant in its response to the chargeback can convincingly argue that the email agreement is invalid).
Is modifying an academic transcript illegal? On my University of Washington unofficial transcript, it says ANY ALTERATION OR MODIFICATION OF THIS RECORD OR ANY COPY THEREOF MAY CONSTITUTE A FELONY AND/OR LEAD TO STUDENT DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS. Finding the bit about "student disciplinary sanctions" was quite easy. Finding the bit about "felony" is quite hard. What "felony" - if any - is this referring to? The closest I've read about are articles relating to fraud. Is that what this is referencing to? I'm starting to believe this is just a scare tactic. I'm narrowing this question down to exclude scenarios (and scenarios similar to) where you're hired somewhere because of falsified transcripts and cause the company damage. I'm looking for a federal law that specifically prohibits transcript modification and only that.	This refers to state law (not federal law) RCW 9A.60.070, titled "False academic credentials". It is against the law to issue a false academic credential, and also to use a false academic credential. Getting to the penalty part, issuing a false academic credential is a class C felony, but knowingly using a false academic credential is only a gross misdemeanor. A false academic credential is a document that provides evidence or demonstrates completion of an academic or professional course of instruction beyond the secondary level that results in the attainment of an academic certificate, degree, or rank, and that is not issued by a person or entity that: (i) Is an entity accredited by an agency recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council or has the international equivalents of such accreditation; or (ii) is an entity authorized as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iii) is an entity exempt from the requirements of authorization as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iv) is an entity that has been granted a waiver by the student achievement council from the requirements of authorization by the council. Such documents include, but are not limited to, academic certificates, degrees, coursework, degree credits, transcripts, or certification of completion of a degree. It then depends on the way in which you modify the transcript. One thing you could do is add text indicating that you received a BA degree, when in fact you did not receive any degree: this would be a false academic credential. If you want to go all the way for a felony charge, you have to issue and not just use a false academic credential. To issue a false credential, you have to do one of the following things: (a) Grants or awards a false academic credential or offers to grant or award a false academic credential in violation of this section; (b) Represents that a credit earned or granted by the person in violation of this section can be applied toward a credential offered by another person; (c) Grants or offers to grant a credit for which a representation as described in (b) of this subsection is made; or (d) Solicits another person to seek a credential or to earn a credit the person knows is offered in violation of this section. whereas the misdemeanor of using a false credential is (paraphrasing para 2) falsely using or claiming to have a credential issued by an accredited institution for certain purposes. Those purposes include advertisement of a business, or with the intent to get a job, license, promotion, admission to educational program, or getting a government position. However, there is also a law against forgery, which is if a person with intent to injure or defraud: (a) He or she falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or; (b) He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged. A forged instrument is defined as "a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or altered", and a "written instrument" is (a) Any paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or its equivalent; or (b) any access device, token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, or other evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification. and forgery is a class C felony. You can be charged with both crimes.	I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	It's almost certainly legal and is commonplace in much of the world- especially in technology-related fields. There is a legitimate reason for a recent degree in a changing field such as Computer Science. A degree from 2019 would have covered very different topics than one from 2009, which would be unrecognisable from one from 1999. While I agree it is more likely that valid applicants will be young (under 35), there is no reason to believe this was the intention. For this to be illegal it would have to be done with the puropse of deterring older applicants. If you're still convinced it's illegal and want to spend time and money on this, lawyer up. If you're looking for advice on how to be considered anyway, I know for a fact this has been asked on Workplace before.	It isn't "illegal" but there are negative consequences to doing so. The civil penalties for failure to file a tax return are a percentage of the tax not paid (5% per month up to a maximum amount, plus interest). There is a small penalty for not filing an information tax return (like a 1099) when you have to file one and don't owe money, but there is usually not such a nominal fine for a personal form 1040. The statute of limitation on IRS efforts to audit a tax return or to impose additional tax for additional amounts owed doesn't begin to run until a tax return is filed. Criminal penalties require an intent to deprive the government of money. If he had more withheld than he owed, he probably isn't subject to any realistic significant civil or criminal consequences, but it is highly risky if he actually owed more than was withheld from his paychecks, and it deprives him of an ability to get refunds if too much was withheld (and possibly also stimulus check refunds) after three years. The issue here is really that it is hard to see that the downsides of not filing a tax return are hard to match to the benefits of filing a tax return, which for a wage and salary earning teacher, are very slight (you could pay someone to do it for $100-$300). Also, the lack of tax returns could hurt the teacher if the teacher ever has to apply for credit or get divorced or file for financial aid for the teacher's own kids to go to college. Of course, if he had lots of unreported side income, upon which he has not paid taxes, then there are serious civil and criminal consequences.	As a state university, the institution would be subject to First Amendment restrictions on their restrictions. They cannot prohibit expression of religious or irreligious viewpoints, they cannot prohibit expression of racist or anti-racist viewpoints, and so on. That said, there may be some murk pertaining to anti-discrimination legislation and the concept of a hostile environment. See for example this statement from U. Michigan: the underpinnings of any such restrictions are pretty broad (see the USC statement, including titles VI and VII of theCivil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and so on – those sorts of concerns apply to private schools as well). SWOSU has a long list of prohibited activities. The only rule that marginally looks like it could cover bad language is the ban on General misconduct that adversely affects the student's suitability as a member of the university community such as immorality, commission of major crimes, inciting disorders, association with known criminals, peace disturbances, disorderly conduct, and all acts that recklessly endanger the students or others. And that would be an incredible stretch. The residence handbook states, pertaining to the rooms, that Obscene material, including, but not limited to, pornographic literature, X-rated movies, and displays of profanity or language that is offensive to others may not be displayed. I assume that someone would be offended by the B word, so you can't display that on a poster in your room. This does not apply to verbal profanity or profanity in the lobby. Since they don't make the residency agreement publicly accessible, I can't see what they might have said there that implies a no-profanity rule. I should mention that university employees often over-interpret their authority, so it is not guaranteed that this is actual university policy (even is distributed by the front desk in a dorm). It may, however, be necessary to sue the university in order to get a clear indication that this is official policy, and that the policy is not a violation of the First Amendment. I would expect that the rationale has to do with "hostile environment". A second runner-up would be that it's about "disorderly conduct", which is where Florida A&M places their anti-profanity rule.	There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.	I don't know too much about Mauritian contract law, but I'd assume you'd have to identify some legal obligation that the school breached. Here, the school offered you a full ride in its electrical engineering program, and has delivered on its promise. The fact that you don't like the program anymore probably doesn't make then liable for anything. In terms of false advertising, it's hard to say anything without seeing their advertisements.
What Supreme Court cases, other than Nixon v. United States, have directly applied or interpreted U.S. Const. Art. I, Section 3, Clause 6? Background Impeachment in the United States is mostly handled by the legislative branch alone. Hence the Courts have not typically applied restrictions or said much about impeachment other than Nixon v. United States: Primary Holding The political question doctrine is triggered when the text of the Constitution has shown that an issue lies outside the scope of the courts, or there is no judicial standard for resolving the issue. This is the only Supreme Court case that I know of which directly applies U.S. Const. Art. I, Section 3, Clause 6 (i.e. the Trial of Impeachment) in any context. I would like to know from a legal perspective any other limitations and or interpretations that the Supreme Court has given to U.S. Const. Art. I, Section 3, Clause 6. Hence my question Question What Supreme Court cases, other than Nixon v. United States, have directly applied or interpreted how the Trial of Impeachment works on the federal level?	Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up."	The US courts (including the US Supreme Court) do not have an army or even a police force under their direct control, except for a few court bailiffs. Ultimately, if the executive simply defies the courts, the only remedy is a political one. A court can order a person held unlawfully to be released from detention, but the jail/prison authorizes might ignore such an order. A court might order DACA applications to be accepted, and if they are not, might rule that deportations or other negative actions are unlawful. A court might hold persons who defy its orders in contempt, and send marshals to jail such persons. But if the executive branch in an organized way defies such orders, there is no judicial power to compel obedience to court orders. This is why the judiciary has famously been called the "least dangerous branch" of the government: it cannot actually do anything without at least the tacit cooperation of the executive. Cherokee Case (Worcester v. Georgia) There was a reference in the comments above to the the Cherokee Indians case, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In that case the US Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall held that the Georgia laws purporting to seize Cherokee lands were invalid as violations of Federal treaties. President Jackson was strongly displeased by this ruling. He was supposed to have said: John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. It appears that President Jackson probably did not say that, at least not publicly. But in fact Jackson did not take any steps to enforce the decision, and the decision was in fact not enforced. The lands were seized, and the Cherokee were forcibly relocated across the infamous trail of tears. This event shows that a court ruling (proper or improper) may have no effect if the executive branch refuses to obey or enforce it.	No, That Would not be treated as a Conflict of Interest There is precedent. The four Justices appointed by President Nixon did not recuse themselves on cases involving Nixon, including subpoenas to turn over White House tapes recording conversations involving Nixon and his close advisors. Indeed it was a decision against him in such a case that apparently was the final thing that caused Nixon to resign. It is worth noting that there is no binding law or rule of practice specifying when a Justice must recuse, which is different than the rule for all other Federal judges. Congress could pass a law imposing a mandatory code of ethics on the Justices, but has not done so.	There is a legal doctrine of executive privilege, where the executive branch can resist subpoenas, but that privilege is limited (US v. Nixon). Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. SCOTUS pointed to the kinds of cases where such privilege would be valid Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution. But otherwise, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice Decades later, Harriet Miers claimed executive immunity (as White House counsel) to a subpoena to testify before the Committee on the Judiciary, and the district court ruled rebuffed that claim There are powerful reasons supporting the rejection of absolute immunity as asserted by the Executive here. If the Court held otherwise, the presumptive presidential privilege could be transformed into an absolute privilege and Congress's legitimate interest in inquiry could be easily thwarted. if the Executive's absolute immunity argument were to prevail, Congress could be left with no recourse to obtain information that is plainly not subject to any colorable claim of executive privilege. However, executive privilege has been invoked dozens of times since Nixon – there are no other SCOTUS decisions. We should set aside current political posturing. POTUS might claim executive privilege, and then the question is whether the courts would order Banon to testify. We don't know the basis for such privilege, but we can assume that it would involve national security issues (thus might be within the penumbra of the Nixon ruling). Traditionally, executive privilege has involved the person who is president, not the person who ended up becoming president, so it would be extremely surprising if the courts upheld immunity in a pre-election matter.	There's no settled legal answer to this, but there seems to be a general consensus that this would not be legal under the Impeachment Clause, which says: The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. There would be two main issues here: 1. Can a president pardon himself? It's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. The main argument in favor of self-pardons is that the constitution grants broad pardon authority for any offense against the United States, making an exception for impeachment, but not for self-pardons. The response to that is that the constitution uses all kinds of broad language that everyone agrees is not as broad as it sounds; Congress is not allowed to abridge the freedom of speech, but perjury laws are nonetheless constitutional. There are several theories as to why the self-pardon would be illegal, but they mostly come down to two main ideas -- that our legal system does not permit anyone to be the arbiter of their own case, and that a person subject to impeachment may not be pardoned. 2. Can a president issue secret pardons? Again, it's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. And again, the primary argument in favor of secret pardons is that the Pardon Clause grants broad pardon authority without requiring that pardons be publicized. The main arguments against are (1) that presidential pardons are inherently public acts, as they have no effect if the justice system doesn't know about them, and (2) that the Presidential Records Act requires official White House records to be transferred to the National Archives.	Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.	Without regards to the actual case and the particular countries involved, I am wondering how it is even possible that a court in one country orders the whole another country to do something, let alone when the two countries do not even formally have diplomatic relations. The main statute that is relevant in the U.S. is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) of 1976. In general foreign states are immune from liability in U.S. courts (and most courts of the developed world) subject to certain exceptions, the most common of which are as follows: Foreign state waives its immunity explicitly or implicitly Commercial activities by foreign state in or directly affecting the United States Property taken in violation of international law is at issue Rights in U.S. property acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are at issue Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury, death or damage to or loss of property caused by its tortious act or omission, occurring in the United States Enforcement of an arbitration agreement made by the foreign state with or for a private party Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking or their support, if the foreign state is a designated sponsor of terrorism Admiralty lawsuit to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, based on commercial activity The exception above in bold was probably the one applied in the North Korean case. The only countries to which that exception applies are North Korea, Syria, Sudan and Iran. (There are also separate similar rules related to countries with whom the U.S. is in a declared war.) There is sporadic ongoing constitutional separation of powers litigation in the U.S. over whether a FISA authorized lawsuit can proceed over the objections of the President as expressed by the U.S. State Department. The argument that FISA is unconstitutional in this context is that diplomacy and foreign policy is exclusively an executive branch power to the exclusion of Congress and the judiciary, but for the most part, this extreme position has been rejected in recent years. A conservative U.S. Supreme Court, however, could revisit this question (conservative judges tend to favor more absolute executive branch authority in foreign affairs). Once a party wins, however, the winner needs to identify foreign assets subject to the jurisdiction of the court from which to collect the judgment, such as gold deposits or U.S. governmental or corporate bonds or ships docked in U.S. ports, owned by the country. In strong contrast to the case above, the UK media recently overtly demonstrated disobedience of a New Zealand court name suppression order: a man arrested in NZ for allegedly committing an appalling crime was granted temporary name suppression, and that was ignored by the UK media. I am wondering if there is anything that would stop a New Zealand court to hold the UK to account just like the US court just did North Korea. In the New Zealand case, the remedy would be to bring suit against the particular newspapers or reporters involved, rather than the state. But, the U.K. might not enforce those judgments if those defendants lost, so enforcement might be limited to New Zealand based assets and persons, and then, only if the New Zealand court found that it had jurisdiction over the defendants under New Zealand law. So, this isn't really analogous. So, in general, are there any internationally recognised laws/treaties/protocols etc. that define if/when a court in one country can assert jurisdiction over the whole another country and hold it to account? Or is that completely up to the court and whatever extremes it dares to come up with? See above in the U.S. case. Most countries have similar statutes or case law to FISA which codified the case law applying customary international law at the time that it was adopted. One example that comes into my mind is the European Court of Human Rights: if a country signed the European Convention on Human Rights, it can be held to account by the court. But what conventions, if any, can be applied to the two cases above? The European Court of Human Rights case is one of consent to the jurisdiction of an international body by treaty. Countries like the UK and NZ have statutes or treaties governing when a foreign judgment (e.g. a judgment from a New Zealand court) will be recognized domestically. There are also usually laws governing when people present in one state will be extradited to another, usually in the form of a bilateral treaty between the affected states.	Amendments to the US Constitution are part of the US Constitution, and this includes the so-called Bill of Rights. The doctrine of applying parts of the US Constitution to states, known as incorporation, comes from the 14th amendment: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The scope of the doctrine of incorporation is logically limited to amendments because the original articles of the constitution state how the federal government is run, and does not guarantee any rights or privileges to individuals. Amendments 1,2,4,8 are fully incorporated against states, 5 and 6 are partially incorporated, third and 7th are not incorporated, and for 9th and 10th there is no ruling. This arrangement derives from decisions by the Supreme Court, interpreting the 14th Amendment and the concept of "due process". If a state were to passe a law forbidding criticism of the governor (violating the First Amendment), an individual could sue to have the law found unconstitutional. Because, under the 14th Amendment, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article", Congress can and has passed a law prohibiting violation of civil rights: 42 USC 1983. Since the state in this hypothetical scenario has violated federal law, the federal government (Dept. of Justice) has standing to sue the state for violating federal law.
What is the effect of a law which relies on false statements? Under the Firearms Act of Canada, the SVD Dragunov is banned as a variant of the AK-47. The SVD is a completely different design which shares no important parts (a single screw in the buttstock), and you'd be hard pressed to find a firearm expert who would agree that it's a variant of any Kalashnikov design. Here is the text: The firearm of the design commonly known as the AK-47 rifle, and any variant or modified version of it except for the Valmet Hunter, the Valmet Hunter Auto and the Valmet M78 rifles, but including the: (a) AK-74; (b) AK Hunter; (c) AKM; (d) AKM-63; (e) AKS-56S; (f) AKS-56S-1; (g) AKS-56S-2; (h) AKS-74; (i) AKS-84S-1; (j) AMD-65; (k) AR Model .223; (l) Dragunov; ... It seems to me this would be equivalent to say, a law banning steam locomotives specifically naming the Ford Mustang as a steam locomotive. While a Ford Mustang shares some common traits with a steam locomotive, such as being motorized transport that requires fuel, it's quite obvious that a Ford Mustang is not a steam locomotive. I'm specifically looking for examples in common-law countries where this sort of thing has been challenged or ruled on instead of being ignored.	Without getting into the merits of the legislation, the short answer is that the existence of a false statement/factual error in the law has no effect on the law. The legislature has essentially used a term to explain which firearms are prohibited, and then it defined that term. Sometimes the legislature's definition will generally match the definition used by the general public; sometimes it will seem as though they just pulled something out of thin air. Most lawyers would agree that it is not best practice to have definitions that don't seem to match their antecedents, but they would also agree that such definitions continue to hold the force of law.	The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.	So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely.	Pre-1991, Wisconsin criminal law ONLY prevented handguns (as well as various other things such as nunchuks and tasers) from being possessed by minors (being people under age 18), in section 948.60. https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1987/related/acts/332 The Hunting code is a civil code, and it places restrictions on the use of firearms by people aged under 16, at 29.304 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/29.pdf This meant that prior to 1991, the possession of an AR-15 by a 15-year-old would not face any criminal penalties, only the civil penalty provided under 29.971 ($1000 fine). In 1991 the Wisconsin Senate passed a law which updated 948.60 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1991/related/acts/18 Because 948.60 is a criminal law cross-referencing a civil one, the wording ends up confusing, but the effect of the revised 948.60 was that: a minor who went hunting with any firearm without a hunting accomplishment certificate (29.593 of the civil hunting code) a child under 16 who possessed a firearm of any kind except in accordance with 29.304 would for the first time be guilty of a crime, after the 1991 law passed. In addition, because 948.60 does double purpose as the supply of a weapon to a minor section, an adult supplying a child with an illegal short-barreled weapon (as defined in 941.28) is also guilty of 948.60, along with the minor themself. Therefore, 948.60 gives criminal effect to breaches of 29.304. Hence, children aged under 16 ONLY (29.304 does not apply to 16 or 17 year olds), and the person supplying them must comply with 29.304, or commit a misdemeanor under 948.60 as the minor (subject to age of criminal responsibility of 10), or a felony as the supplying person. Thus: Age 0-11 - can only carry a firearm during a hunter education class under supervision by an instructor, or carrying it, unloaded, to or from said class, by their parent, or an adult designated by their parent Age 12-13 - ditto, but can also carry a firearm while accompanied by their parent or adult designated by their parent Age 14-15 - ditto, but can now possess a firearm if they have a hunter education program certificate, including from other states or countries, if evidence is provided to the department So we can see that: under Wisconsin code 29.592, no person may hunt without an accomplishment certificate, and that for a 16 or 17 year old ONLY, such hunting with a firearm becomes a criminal offence under 948.60 the person supplying a gun to an 0-11 commits a crime, as does the child if they are 10-11 it would appear to be legal for a parent to accompany their 12 or 13 year old to a riot armed with an AR-15, or for the parent to designate a person to do this a 14 or 15 year old who has a hunter competency certificate can attend a riot armed with an AR-15 unaccompanied a 16 or 17 year old can attend a riot with an AR-15. However, unlike 18+ year olds they cannot attend with a handgun, since 948.60 is only intended to ban minors from handguns, while giving teeth to other restrictions on the use of rifles and shotguns by minors.	The first passage quoted appears to be from the North Carolina General Statutes section 14-269.2 (Weapons on campus or other educational property) The roughly corresponding section of South Carolina law is SECTION 23-31-215 (Issuance of permits.) subsection (M) (5). It is quite different in both wording and content. I do not find the second quoted passage in an online search, and I presume it is of the school's own writing. If you were in elementary school "about 10 years ago" it would seem that you are probably in high school or college now. Rules for those institutions are often quite different from elementary school and from each other. I have no way to evaluate what the school regulations on such subjects might be, but it is probably safer to leave your empty casing at home, although no rule you have quoted or that I can find online would prohibit it. An expended cartridge or casing is not a "gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind" and so this provision of NC 14-269.2 would not apply, even in North Carolina. An expended cartridge is not likely to be defined as a "weapon" either, and so the second quotes passage should not apply, although it is possible that the school regulations define "weapon" differently so that an expended cartridge is included. I have no way to know what other provisions the school regulations might include that would be relevant.	There are several federal excise taxes on firearms. The main ones are (dispensing with the fine definitional details and Internal Revenue Code citations): A tax on transfers of firearms of $5 per concealable firearm and $200 per firearm on certain other firearms; a $500 per year firearm's dealers tax which is increased to $1000 if you import more than a certain number of firearms per year; a 10% of sales price excise tax on pistols and revolvers; and an 11% of sales price excise tax on other firearms and on ammunition. Of course, like any other business, firearm's dealers also have to file annual income tax returns on their revenues less their expenses on tax forms that depend upon the form of organization of the business (e.g. C-corporation, S-corporation, partnership/LLC, trust, etc.). The IRS has the right to examine the books and records of people who owe or are believed to owe taxes without going to a court to obtain permission to do so. Treas. Reg. § 1.601.105. Subject to certain exceptions, information obtained by the IRS in a review of a taxpayers records and their return information are confidential. 26 U.S.C. § 6103. There are criminal penalties for (slightly over simplifying) tax offenses including willfully failing to keep records necessary to file tax returns, willfully attempting to evade or defeat taxes, willfully failing to collect and pay taxes where required by law to do so, and willfully making false statements to IRS employees or on returns. 26 U.S.C. § 7201-7212. If the government provides probable cause to a federal judge or magistrate in connection with a possible criminal tax prosecution that there is probable cause to believe that a taxpayer has committed a criminal tax offense, then the government may obtain a search warrant to seize records without the advanced notice available in the usual civil record examination process. For example (not based on any facts I have been told about or read about in this particular case), suppose that a former employee of a firearm's dealer or an ex-spouse of one of the owners of the business, told the IRS that the dealer intentionally lied on their excise tax return by underreporting the number of firearms the dealer sold and that the dealer then kept the sales taxes collected from unreported buyers who completed Form 4473, and told the IRS criminal division investigators where the Form 4473s were kept at the dealer's offices. In that case, it would be routine for the IRS to obtain a federal search warrant to obtain those forms to seize and review in connection with an excise tax fraud investigation. If there was just an income tax audit, bank records and accounting records obtained by subpoena from banks and accountants would usually be sufficient. But this would cease to be the case if the inventory records obtained by subpoena from the dealer's suppliers, for example, and the accounting records, didn't match. If there was evidence of unreported firearm sales income, or of unreported excise taxable sales, the IRS would usually need to compare the the Form 4473s of the business to its income and excise tax returns filed with the IRS. It would be routine to obtain these records with a search warrant rather than a civil office record review with advanced notice if tax fraud was suspected. The Form 4473s due to IRS confidentiality requirements, wouldn't be publicly available to anyone by the IRS and criminal investigators (not even members of Congress or local law enforcement), and would probably only be presented in redacted or summary forms in a criminal tax fraud prosecution at trial. In all likelihood, the IRS doesn't care about the customers who filled out the Form 4473s at all, and isn't even bothering to investigate them (except possibly to spot check for fake social security numbers or names, which appear on the forms, to see if fake information was used to Form 4473s used to substantiate tax records). Instead, the IRS is probably simply tallying them up and noting dates of sale, putting them in a spreadsheet, and seeing if they are different from what was reported to the IRS on the dealer's tax returns. If the dealer, for example, paid the proper excise taxes on 800 guns in 2022, but had 1200 Form 4473s in banker's boxes at its offices, then the people involved in the tax fraud at the dealership are probably going to go to federal prison for a few years. Indeed, they would probably just plead guilty rather than going through a futile trial where documents with their own signatures on them from boxes seized in their shop clearly establish their guilt in that case. Federal firearm excise tax fraud prosecutions aren't terribly common, but they are about as plain vanilla as they come in the world of federal criminal prosecutions. This certainly doesn't portend any threat the Second Amendment rights or any crack down on the firearms industry. In terms of this message this sends, this is really no different that seizing the electronic records of a gas station that filed false gasoline excise tax returns to show how much gasoline was actually sold, and prosecuting the people who engaged in the tax fraud for that. The argument that a Form 4473 isn't a "financial record", when it provides documentation of all of the information except the price on all of the dealer's firearm sales (Manufacturer, Model, Serial Number, Type of Firearm, Caliber or Gauge, number of firearms sold, and check boxes for tax exemptions), and the fact the some of the federal firearm excise taxes due don't even depend upon the price of the firearm, isn't a very strong one. Even if the search warrant didn't single out Forms 4473s from other kinds of business records, this would probably just be harmless error, because the IRS absolutely has the right to ask for and seize Form 4473s in connection with the tax fraud investigation, just like any other business record of a firm suspected of not paying its taxes. These records aren't protected by any evidentiary privilege in a federal tax fraud prosecution. Also, combined with past sales fliers and catalogues and business records about sales pricing for different products from the dealer in its accounting records, it would be fairly trivial to use this information to recreate a very accurate forensic reconstruction of the gross firearm sales revenues of the dealer and the amount of excise taxes that should have been paid. It would be tedious work, but it would be extremely damning evidence of tax fraud if the estimated sales significantly exceeds the sales reported on the dealer's tax returns. Even if the some of the documents in a particular banker's box aren't within the scope of the search warrant (for example, perhaps someone put Christmas Cards and as well as accounting ledgers and cancelled checks in the same box), the IRS would not be beyond its rights to grab all of the banker's boxes of documents, review them at their leisure in a government office, and then return the contents of the boxes that turned out to be something other than what the IRS requested a search warrant to seize. A good faith belief that the boxes seized has some financial records in them would justify taking them away, reviewing their contents, and returning materials that were beyond the scope of what was sought. The IRS criminal division agents don't have to look through the many, many banker's boxes page by page at the dealer's place of business to screen them at that time at that level of detail. Similarly, the IRS agents are not required to assume that boxes actually contain what the label on the outside of the box says that the box contains. Of course, if the Form 4473s corroborate the tax returns filed by the dealer apart from minor clerical errors or uncertainties about the exact sales prices of sales reported on them due to irregular discounts provided by a dealer who sometimes haggled over the prices of used firearms, the dealer would be vindicated and the informant who triggered the investigation and prosecution (if there is evidence that this informant willfully lied to IRS investigators) might even be prosecuted for making an intentionally false report to a law enforcement officer. The dealer wouldn't be entitled to reimbursement for criminal defense expenses or harm to the dealer's reputation, but it would still be a huge PR coup and the criminal charges would go away, probably long before a trial was even held. Montana Attorney General Austin Knudsen absolutely knows all of the facts in the post above. His claimed fear of a crackdown on gun users is something he is doing to willfully mislead the people of Montana for political gain. He may also be throwing stones at federal prosecutions because he was irritated that the IRS and Justice Department didn't keep him in the loop on this tax investigation in his state which he sees as his turf, even though it was purely a matter of federal tax law violations which his office didn't have jurisdiction over. Indeed, the IRS may have kept him in the dark and out of the loop from this investigation, in part, in order to protect taxpayer and gun owner privacy by not sharing confidential IRS investigation information with state law enforcement officers, something that it is not allowed to do.
How do publicly issued documents differ in countries that signed the Apostille convention? As an example, Canada didn't sign the Apostille Convention while the United States did. Practically speaking, what is therefore the difference between the documents issued by these two states? Or in other words, why wouldn't other countries accept documents issued by Canada where they would accept documents issued in the US?	Documents from countries which did not sign (or to be received by non-signatory countries) must be certified by the foreign ministry of the source country (or its equivalent) and then further certified by the foreign ministry of the receiving country, before such documents can be used in legal proceedings. The Wikipedia article says: A state that has not signed the Convention must specify how foreign legal documents can be certified for its use. Two countries may have a special convention on the recognition of each other's public documents, but in practice this is infrequent. Otherwise, the document must be certified by the foreign ministry of the country in which the document originated, and then by the foreign ministry of the government of the state in which the document will be used; one of the certifications will often be performed at an embassy or consulate. In practice this means the document must be certified twice before it can have legal effect in the receiving country. For example, as Canada is not a signatory, Canadian documents for use abroad must be certified by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa or by a Canadian consular official abroad, and subsequently by the relevant government office or consulate of the receiving state. This seems to answer the question rather completely.	Official identity documents have security features that would be missing from a copy. When a government agency is entitled to check your documents, they are also entitled to check the security features of your documents. Think about it -- if you could get away with handing over a copy, then someone else could hand over a photoshopped copy with your name in it.	When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well.	No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.	I'm not sure if you are asking for each of the countries listed, but I am assuming that they are there merely for example. In the US, the are a variety of different rules for its different court systems. As a rule, each State can make its own rules for its court system, and the overarching Federal system has its own rules as well, although they run off of the same principles. As such, the answer varies on which state the court is located in and possibly the type of document. In California, for example, different documents have different retention times for different documents. For example, documents for civil cases default to 10 years of retention, while adoption paperwork is retained permanently. For a criminal matter, the judgement (the final product that says if the accused is found guilty or innocent, and for what crimes) is retained permanently, while all other documents are retained for the greater of 50 years or the maximum length of sentence imposed. When the retention period for a document is over, the document is not automatically destroyed(at least in California). Instead, the appropriate official sends an official notice to all the parties in the case that the document is to be destroyed, and if no response is received to transfer the documents, the documents can be destroyed. (Source:http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=68152) Note: I have said "document" throughout, which originally meant a piece of paper. However, recently, documents have been submitted electronically, and sometimes older documents are electronically scanned.	The US flag is not protected by copyright. Nothing as old as the flag is protected by copyright under US law. Indeed no work published in the US prior to 1925 is now protected, except for works of non-US origin protected under the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) 4 USC sec 8 purports to PRESCRIBE the treatment of the flag, and paragraph (g) says: (g) The flag should never have placed upon it, nor on any part of it, nor attached to it any mark, insignia, letter, word, figure, design, picture, or drawing of any nature. However, as this Wikipedia article points out, 4 USC 8 and related sections are advisory, not binding, and no penalty is provided for violating them. 4 USC 3 provides a $100 fine: or 30 days jail time for: Any person who, within the District of Columbia, in any manner, for exhibition or display, shall place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States of America; or shall expose or cause to be exposed to public view any such flag, standard, colors, or ensign upon which shall have been printed, painted, or otherwise placed, or to which shall be attached, appended, affixed, or annexed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, or drawing, or any advertisement of any nature; or who, within the District of Columbia, shall manufacture, sell, expose for sale, or to public view, or give away or have in possession for sale, or to be given away or for use for any purpose, any article or substance being an article of merchandise, or a receptacle for merchandise or article or thing for carrying or transporting merchandise, upon which shall have been printed, painted, attached, or otherwise placed a representation of any such flag, standard, colors, or ensign, to advertise, call attention to, decorate, mark, or distinguish the article or substance on which so placed shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The words “flag, standard, colors, or ensign”, as used herein, shall include any flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of either, or of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented on any substance, of any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States of America or a picture or a representation of either, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any number of either thereof, or of any part or parts of either, by which the average person seeing the same without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United States of America. 18 USC 700 was a criminal statute punishing anyone who: mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States But 18 USC 700 was struck down by the US Supreme Court as a violation of the First Amendment in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) Se also the full text of the decision. The decision said, in relevant part: The Government concedes in these cases, as it must, that appellees' flag burning constituted expressive conduct, Brief for United States 28; see Johnson, 491 U.S., at 405-406, 109 S.Ct., at 2540, but invites us to reconsider our rejection in Johnson of the claim that flag burning as a mode of expression, like obscenity or "fighting words," does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). This we decline to do.4 ... Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is "related 'to the suppression of free expression,' " 491 U.S., at 410, 109 S.Ct., at 2543, and concerned with the content of such expression. The Government's interest in protecting the "physical integ rity" of a privately owned flag5 rests upon a perceived need to preserve the flag's status as a symbol of our Nation and certain national ideals. But the mere destruction or disfigurement of a particular physical manifestation of the symbol, without more, does not diminish or otherwise affect the symbol itself in any way. ... As we explained in Johnson, supra, at 416-417, 109 S.Ct., at 2546: "[I]f we were to hold that a State may forbid flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that role—as where, for example, a person ceremoniously burns a dirty flag—we would be . . . permitting a State to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox' by saying that one may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag's representation of nationhood and national unity." Although Congress cast the Flag Protection Act of 1989 in somewhat broader terms than the Texas statute at issue in Johnson, the Act still suffers from the same fundamental flaw: It suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact. The above quotes without acknowledgement West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) where the majority opinion includes the often-quoted passage: If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. Any legal device to prohibit modified versions of US flags, particularly when these are in fact being used to make or symbolize political arguments or positions, would fall under the same rule, and would be equally unconstitutional.	You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No.	My own answer to the question is yes, but not directly. As with many other laws it would take a court ruling to definitively spell out how international agreements are applicable to a given situation. Unfortunately it doesn't seem that such a court ruling was ever produced so far: Google Scholar fails to list any US court cases relevant to the Convention on Road Traffic. The only somewhat relevant case is Busby v. State in which the court rules that one cannot drive in Alaska with an IDP after having been previously restricted from driving in Alaska. The court does stress out that: The Convention does forbid a signatory country (or subsidiary state) from imposing or enforcing license revocations in a manner that discriminates against residents of other signatory countries. But Busby does not claim that he was the victim of such discrimination. Busby's license was revoked for conduct that would have led to license revocation if committed by an Alaska resident. (Indeed, Busby's license was revoked while he was an Alaska resident.) And Busby does not claim that he was singled out for prosecution because he was a resident of a foreign country—i.e., that the State would not have charged him with the offense of driving with a revoked license if he had still been an Alaska resident. This could possibly mean that the court believes that the Convention only applies to foreign residents, but its not spelled out specifically. Searching for Canadian court cases likewise doesn't turn up anything useful. The only relevant case is R. v. Lawend where the person in question was trying to drive in Ontario on a foreign license after previously having had their Ontario license suspended. Here the court rules similar to the decision in Alaska in that having a foreign license does not allow one to circumvent locally imposed license restrictions. Searching for UK case law doesn't turn up any relevant court cases. Australian case law is likewise mute on the subject. There is also a relevant legal opinion by the Department of State quoted in the Digest of United States practice in International Law, 2002: Reading these provisions as a whole, we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the CRT, (1) must permit an alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first year after the alien’s admission; and (3) may, in accordance with Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued authorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with respect to the driving privileges of aliens. In Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 2014 the author further analyses how the 1949 Geneva Convention is applicable within the United States. First, to settle the definition of "international traffic": Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of minimum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well as to international traffic. The author the meaning behind Article I of the Convention: Article 1 states in part that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year.” This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties recognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing, but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might have understood to be directly enforceable. And finally on the issue of whether or not the treaty is "self-executing": For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Geneva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might conclude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures” and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially. So it seems absolutely clear that the Convention intended for participating countries to allow foreign drivers to drive abroad for up to one year. However international treaties are not self-executing by default in Canada, unlike the US: Canada is bound by the terms of treaties that it enters into and breach thereof may give rise to international claims. However, in Canada treaties are not self-executing; they do not constitute part of the law of the land merely by virtue of their conclusion. So even though British Columbia is violating the 1949 Geneva Convention one cannot directly rely on said international agreement to enforce their rights. But another state party could theorethically sue Canada on behalf of its citizen to request that Canada rectifies its laws with accordance to the agreement.
Airport Security - advanced check, 4th amendment breach I am a traveller, have a long Muslim name and I encounter frequent advanced searches at airports. Searching someone based solely on their name is obviously illegal as per the 4th amendment, but I assume bigotry exists so I learned to deal with it. However, what follows is a special case. Let us say I wanted to go from airport A to airport C, and I need to transfer flights along this journey at airport B. Airport B decided to do an advanced search, causing me to miss my flight to airport C since the advanced search had taken too much time. Is this a breach of the 4th amendment? Since the advanced search would be considered unreasonable in this scenario as it caused me to miss a flight, and the only justification that airport security could provide for the search was my name which is already illegal. Surely in this case airport security would be obligated to skip an advanced search on me since I have another flight shortly, but they decided not to; the only confounding variable that could have caused this was my name. This is specific to the United States.	The 4th amendment is irrelevant because you consented to being searched as a condition of passing through security - you don’t have to fly. You cannot revoke that consent once x-ray screening or metal detection has commenced i.e. once your bags are checked, your hand luggage is in the scanner or you have entered the metal detector. The relevant issue is whether there has been a violation of the 14th amendment requiring equal treatment. If the ethnicity of your name is the sole reason you were selected for advanced screening then that is clearly a violation of this. However, if it is only one factor among several then it isn’t. However, the problem is that TSA agents are not required to articulate their reasons for selecting you (or anyone else) and indeed, they do not have to have a reason. Therefore it is almost impossible to prove that this has happened. Several cases in the wider “policing” regime have suggested that even if statistically certain groups are disproportionately targeted then that is not evidence of such targeting in a particular case. Further it is not clear if you would even have standing to sue - to prevent this kind of discrimination you have to show that you personally at risk of harm in the future. Clearly this state of affairs is problematical - there is little doubt that airport screening, not just in the USA but worldwide is tainted by this sort of bias. The data shows it as well as plenty of anecdotal evidence - I’m 1st generation Australian with UK and Australian parents, my son’s girlfriend is 2nd generation but her grandparents were Thai: she gets stopped way more than I do. This is bad not just because it’s antithetical to human rights but also because it is demonstrably less effective than purely random screening - where there is bias, that bias can be gamed. This article from a TSA employee states "Behavior Detection Officers (the guys who walk around and watch to see if you look creepy) are useless, and there are widespread rumors within TSA that the BDO program won’t be around for much longer." "The guys" are people and, like all of us, are subject to overt and subconscious bias in deciding what "look[s] creepy". Notwithstanding, security is never “obliged” to “skip” a search even if the reason for that search is arguably illegitimate. You made the travel arrangements and you take the risk that you will not have enough time between flights for this or any other reason.	In part, we don't know because there are currently no rules that address certain outcomes, so it will depend on who is on the Supreme Court when the issue is raised. A warrantless search will not be legal beyond current doctrines regarding crime in progress and imminent danger, even if it involves time travel. So you will need a warrant, and you will need probable cause to get it. Currently, if you break into a person's house to discover that there is a body there, you can't get a warrant to legitimize that illegal search. Adding time travel does not change anything. In situation 1, I assume they have probable cause and a warrant but the evidence was destroyed by the time of the search at time T+n. As long as prior time T is still after the crime, a warrant to search at time T would not be a problem. In scenario 2, there is nothing preventing them from stopping the crime or arresting the perpetrators in the act. However, if they travel back in time and break in to a suspect's house in order to witness the crime, that is an illegal search. You could likewise arrest a person before he escapes to the phantom zone, if you have probable cause that he had committed a crime – by the time of the arrest. Forward time travel poses a more serious challenge, as articulated in Minority Report. It would, or should, be very difficult to issue an arrest warrant at time T based on knowledge of a crime committed at T+n. Because of the arrest, the crime was not committed and there was no probable cause, so there should have been no warrant (oh no, paradox).	It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.	Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws.	was the idea that all searches and seizures, reasonable or otherwise, require a warrant? No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This means that unreasonable searches are prohibited. A prohibited search can't require a warrant because the search is prohibited. If a warrant was issued for an unreasonable search then the warrant was issued in error.	Short answer: Maybe. Long answer: The answer here varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Normally, the process goes like this: The application for the warrant is usually made under seal or otherwise in secret to prevent the target from trying to hide evidence. So before it's been executed, you can pretty much forget about accessing it. After the warrant is executed, though, there are differing answers to this question. The Supreme Court gave us a test for this kind of question in Press-Enterprise II, which held that the First Amendment gives us a qualified right to access court proceedings and records. The right applies when public access makes sense using the "experience and logic" test: Has the Anglo-Saxon experience typically been to provide access, and does logic tell us that access has beneficial effects for the judicial process? But lower courts have disagreed about how to apply the test. The Eighth Circuit allowed access to warrants in a defense-industry corruption investigation in In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, but the Ninth Circuit denied access in to warrants in the same investigation in Times Mirror Co. v. U.S. I think, though, that the Ninth Circuit decision would have come out differently if the investigation had already ended. Just to mix things up further, the Fourth Circuit has also allowed access, but based on common law principles of access, rather than the First Amendment. That was Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz. Same in the Second Circuit: In re Application of Newsday, Inc. Individual states also have their own rules, but those are of course subject to limits under the First Amendment. When I wanted a copy of a warrant, I would go first to the clerk of the court whose judge signed the warrant. I would tell them what I was looking for, and I pretty much always got it. I would rarely submit a FOIA request, especially if the warrant was issued by a federal agency. Those requests sit in a queue for months or years without being reviewed, and the agency virtually always denies the request anyway. When law enforcement agencies and courts have copies of the same record, you're almost always going to have better luck getting access from the courts, which are set to open by default. If the court denies the request, try again after there's an indictment, and again after the trial.	with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.	Identification rules vary from state to state, but there is no state which would require a person in Mr. Walker's position to identify themselves to law enforcement. The passenger is compelled to produce identification to law enforcement through the threat of illegal violence.
What is a court order? How is it different than a settlement? I had brought a case against my ex-landlord. One of the claims was he wouldn't return some property of mine. In the settlement agreement, he said he would make available for pickup my property. He did not, and has been stringing me along ever since. The settlement was neither reached by ourselves, or through small claims court. It was reached through the Civil Resolution Tribunal which is something new. CRT doesn't enforce orders and leaves it up to the Provincial Court. However I'm not sure if this is applicable in my case because a settlement was reached and there was no order. The settlement was reached in the "Facilitated Phase" and the case manager drew up the contract. I asked them what happens next and their reply was " there was no order issued you would need to refile". What is meant by this? What's an order? How's it different than a settlement agreement? When I "refile" can I make new claims (such as cost for starting a new action, time spent trying to pickup belongings)? In this previous question I asked, there was talk about how settlements are different if they are reached in or out of court. I do not get what difference this makes?	A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end.	There's good information at https://www.gov.uk/private-renting-tenancy-agreements/your-landlord-wants-to-end-your-tenancy. There are several types of tenancy with different rules, but in all of them, the landlord has to give you a certain amount of notice to move out, and it has to give a specific date. "Three months from when a buyer is found" doesn't seem to fit that, so I would say you have not yet received formal notice to move out. This statement may have just been a courtesy to give you more advance warning. So for instance, if you are in a tenancy that requires two months notice, the landlord may have intended this to mean "I plan to send you formal notice about one month after a buyer is found." Of course, this is not binding; he could send you formal notice tomorrow if he changes his mind. As far as I know, the sale of the house is really irrelevant in all of this. You don't automatically have to move out just because the house is sold; if you're not explicitly told to leave (with appropriate notice) then you don't have to, and you'll just start paying your rent to the new landlord. If you have a fixed-term tenancy, then the sale of the house doesn't shorten it. I am not sure what the point is of getting angry at the estate agents. Your tenancy is a matter between you and your landlord, and the estate agents have nothing to do with it. They work for your landlord, not for you.	You reach a settlement instead of a judge deciding a court case if both sides agree that a settlement is better for them than paying court costs, lawyers cost, the risk of losing, having embarrassing details published, distraction for a business, waste of time, and the stress of a court case. If the plaintiff wants to be able to publish details of the case, there is a lot less reason for the defendant to enter a settlement agreement. You complain that third parties miss out on possible information. That’s exactly why it isn’t there, because the defendant doesn’t want it to be there. The defendant might offer “I’ll give you $ 1,000 if you agree not to say a word about the case.” If the plaintiff says “I want $ 1,000 and tell the world about what happened”, then the defendant will likely say “take our offer, or take us to court and our lawyers will do their best so you get nothing”. The defendant will just not offer the kind of settlement you are looking for. And the plaintiff will do what is best for them, not what is best for anyone else. You have to remember that a settlement cannot be forced upon both sides, it must be something that both sides agree on. It's easiest to agree if you give the other side what they want if it doesn't cost you much, and then get things that you value more in return. As a plaintiff, not telling the world about the case is something that costs me nothing, but may have high value for the defendent. On the other hand, I value cash from the defendent a lot, while the defendent may be rich and can easily afford it. Because both sides have to agree, the terms are likely to incorporate something that both sides want.	The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).	Different jurisdictions have different laws about arbitration and there can be a distinction between domestic and international arbitration. Notwithstanding, most jurisdictions use the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as the basis for their domestic law so there is a lot of commonality between jurisdictions. 1. Can I be compelled to arbitrate? No, arbitration requires the agreement of all parties to the dispute. However, you may have given your consent to arbitration when you entered a contract or agreed to terms and conditions; if so, then that agreement is binding and you will be required to arbitrate. If a matter for which there is a valid arbitration agreement is nevertheless brought before a court, a party can argue that the proper venue is arbitration and the court will almost certainly agree and refuse to hear the case. Arbitration agreements are subject to what is called the "severability" principle which means that they remain binding even if the contract they are contained in is ultimately found to be void. So it remains within the power of an arbitrator appointed by a contract to validly decide the contract that appointed them is void. 2. If I don't think the tribunal has jurisdiction, what can I do? You make submissions to the arbitration tribunal on jurisdiction and they are required to consider if they have it or not. This is the "competence-competence" principle: an arbitrator is competent to decide if they are competent to hear the dispute. Depending on the size of the matter, the tribunal may rule on their competence in the final decision or issue an interim ruling. If a party thinks the tribunal has wrongly decided they do or don't have jurisdiction then they can, within the limited time usually allowed, ask the court to review the decision - in the meantime the arbitration continues. 3. If I disagree with the award, what can I do? Not a lot. Arbitration is intended to be a final and binding method of dispute resolution. Because, unlike a court summons, it was agreed to by all the parties (see above), the legal attitude is "you made your bed, you lie in it". Article 34 provides that a court can set aside the decision for: incapacity in the arbitration agreement. Since the arbitration agreement is itself a contract it can be void for all the same reasons a contract can (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) that you weren't told about the arbitration that the dispute is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement that the arbitration tribunal wasn't composed as agreed the matter is not subject to settlement by arbitration by law (e.g. workplace disputes are often excluded from arbitration) the award is against public policy (e.g. the award requires illegality) Article 35 provides that a court can refuse to enforce an award for all of the reasons above plus if a court has set the decision aside under Article 34. Appeals are rarely allowed and even more rarely successful. For example, stats from the UK under s68 and s69 of their domestic Act (equivalent to Article 34 and 35 respectively) indicate that success rates for challenges are about 3%.	england-and-wales northern-ireland General rule It doesn't make any difference. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides: Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. Provided you meet the following elements: Properly addressing Properly pre-paying Properly posting, then you can take advantage of the above deemed delivery rule. It also makes no difference whether or not the recipient "might or might not bother to open" it. What matters is when it was delivered. The rebuttable presumption is that the notice is effective when it would have been "delivered in the ordinary course of post" (e.g. next day for first class, etc.). To rebut that, the burden of proof shifts to the recipient, who must prove (on balance of probabilities in a civil case) that it was delivered late or not at all. In practice that will be extremely difficult in the majority of cases. You might try to make an argument that "letter containing the document" implies an envelope. However, in my view, the ordinary meaning of the word letter means a piece of paper with some written words on it. A letter is still a letter even when it isn't inserted in an envelope. "Contains the document" suggests to me that the document is found within the words written on the piece of paper. Exceptions The phrase "unless the contrary intention appears" means that if a particular Act contains its own rules of service which contradict Section 7, then Section 7 will be overridden.	Probably not Once you and the store have entered into a contract the price in that contract is determinative. However, most online stores' terms are very clear there is no contract when you place your order or when you get their automated reply; the contract comes into existence later when they do something. For example: With respect to products sold by Amazon AU, your order is an offer to us for you to buy the product(s) in your order. ... The Order Confirmation is acknowledgement that we have received your order, and does not confirm our acceptance of your offer to buy the product(s) ordered. We only accept your offer, and conclude the contract of sale for a product ordered by you, when we dispatch the product(s) to you and send e-mail or post a message on the Message Centre of the website confirming that we've dispatched the product to you (the "Dispatch Confirmation"). ... Now, even without these terms, it's unlikely that your offer and the company's automated response created a binding contract because the company (as in, an actual person acting for the company) did not consent to the formation of the contract. Consent is fundamental: see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?. What you received was an "order confirmation" - a reiteration of your offer to the company, not an acceptance of your order. Consumer protection Most jurisdictions have consumer protection laws that make it illegal to display an incorrect price. However, in most, that does not oblige the retailer to honour the price, it just exposes them to fines from the regulator.	It seems like a lot of "punishments" can be applied to a person without having to go to court. Yes, because everyone has the right and freedom to associate, or dissociate, with other people, and the freedom of contract, at least when the state does not decide to interfere. The state, owing to its monopoly of legitimate violence, has a duty towards everyone under its rule and the people in many countries decided that the state's power should be significantly limited with judicial supervision where individual rights and freedoms are implicated. Other individuals or legal persons do not in general owe a duty to be friend with you or to sign or continue a labour or rental contract with you. At the same time, the people and their government have also decided in certain situations there exists a power imbalance (e.g. between the landlord and the tenant, the employer and the employee, groups suffering from discrimination and stereotypes) where unlimited freedom of association and contract not only harms the individual's human dignity but also harms the society as a whole (e.g. homeless and unemployment, which may lead to increased crimes etc.). Thus, in some situations, the law prohibits discrimination and provides for legal rights generally for the more vulnerable. However, this is a decision that is undertaken by each jurisdiction. A court order is only required if the law says that you normally have a legal entitlement but the state or someone else wants to take it away or limit it, or if the law explicitly requires a procedure before the court. Since you tagged the question with canada... Can a person be fired ... without a court order? Yes. However, in Canada, all jurisdictions have labour laws that regulate dismissal of an employee. Dismissal without cause usually requires notice period and/or severances, depending on the length of employment. Dismissal for cause can be challenged in court and the employer has the burden of proof to justify the cause on a balance of probabilities (more probably than not) and the terminated employee will have the right to have them heard before the court and present their evidences. If the person occupied a unionized position, they may also be able to file grievances with the union before an arbitrator, depending on the text of the collective agreement. The collective agreements also often provide for procedural requirements before the dismissal of an employee in a unionized position. Violation of these procedural requirements may lead to the annul of dismissal or awards of damages. Can a person be banned ... without a court order? Yes. You have no general right to be on another person's property in Canada. Your rights end where others' property (or other) rights begin. Like said in the beginning, this is a societal decision and an act of balancing particular to each jurisdiction, for example, in some places, there exists a right to roam over certain publicly accessible lands. The property owner or another person otherwise legally authorized has the authority to decide who they want on their property (which means what is one's own), subject to certain narrow exceptions, under common law and provincial trespassing acts. Your neighbour cannot prevent you from crossing on their land if you have a valid easement and are not abusing it. But if you are abusing your easement, your neighbour may take you to court for an order. Here the property owner includes the state. However, like almost all decisions made by the state, in Canada and many other countries with the rule of law, can be judicially reviewed for their reasonableness, and sometimes correctness. Like all decisions made by the state, trespassing notices may be challenged if the decision is arbitrary or without legal basis. Can a person be evicted ... without a court order? No. In all jurisdictions in Canada, eviction, that is, the forced removal of tenant from a premise, can only be carried out by sheriffs or other legally authorized officers upon an order from a court or tribunal (often called Landlord and Tenant Board or similar), with exceptions for certain tenancies (e.g. where the landlord and the tenant share living area). Court order is not required for the termination of a tenancy; but the termination of tenancy can only be achieved if the tenant agrees or a tribunal or court orders so. Does Habeas corpus come into play in any of these situations No. Habeas corpus means "that you have the body", which is an order from a judicial official to command the state to bring someone in its custody before the court, so that the legality of their detention by the state may be determined. In Canada, habeas corpus only protects liberty interests of an individual.
Fair Use of Photos as a Derivative Work This question comes specifically from a particular example. Within Ethics for the Information Age (Quinn), 5th Edition, there is a chapter on Intellectual Property, and while most of it is well-explained, this section on fair use confuses me: Fair use Example #2 An art professor takes slide photographs of a number of paintings reproduced in a book about Renaissance artists. She uses the slides in her class lectures. In this example, it is ruled that the professor's slides are most likely not fair use, because even if the original painting is in the public domain, the photograph of the painting appearing in the art book is probably copyrighted. This leads me to my question: How can a photograph of a painting be a derivative work, and not a reproduction? As far as I can reason, there is absolutely nothing being added to the art, except possibly some filters or lighting differences, but without receiving any specifics to that end, I find this difficult to rationalize. I'm not arguing whether photography in general is copyrightable, naturally, but I am questioning how a photo taken of a public domain piece, without modification and presumably appearing almost identical to the original work, can be considered derivative.	If the photos are exact or "slavish" reproductions of flat (2D) art, then under Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) the photos are not original, and have no copyrights of their own. If the art was not under copyright (for example published before 1924) then neither are the photos. If the art is still under copyright, the photos are "copies" and the permission of the copyright holder (of the original art) is required unless they fall under the fair use exception, which photos taken for and used in classroom instruction, and for no other purpose, might well fall under. However, if the photos are so taken that angle, lighting, filters, and other aspects under the control of the photographer make a difference to the photo, then they will generally constitute new works, and if the art is under copyright protection, will be derivative works of the originals, and both the copyright holder on the original art, and the photographer will hold rights. One rule of thumb is if the photo shows the frame of the painting, it probably has original elements of lighting and viewing angle. The more the photo approximates a scan of a flat work of art, the less original it is. Photos of sculpture, architecture, and other non-flat (3D) art works (and objects) inherently involve artistic decisions about viewing angle, lighting, etc, and will pretty much automatically be original enough for copyright protection. If the original art is out of copyright but the photo is an original work the photographer will hold rights, but no one else will (unless the photographer sells or transfers the rights). In that case it does not make much sense to call the photos "derivative works" as that term is intended to indicate that the works are subject to another's copyright, which these are not, because there is no copyright on the original. Or one could call them derivatives of a public domain work -- the effect is the same. Under the case of Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), a work must have a certian minimum degree of originality to be protected by copyright under US law. Both Bridgeman and Feist are US cases, but many other countries have followed their logic and apply similar rules to copyright issues. It is not uncommon for those who have taken photos of art to assert copyright protection which a court would not uphold, but this will not be judged unless someone copies these photos, and the photographer (or someone claiming through the photographer) sues, and then defense challenges the validity of the asserted copyright. The statements in the text quoted by the OP may be based (in part) on such untested assertions of copyright.	united-states The first sale doctrine, (17 U.S.C. § 109), allows one who legitimately purchases a copy of a copyrighted receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. However, it does not allow one to change it. Under US law, doing so would create a derivative work, which would potentially violate copyright, but may indeed fall under the affirmative defense of "fair use" (which is determined on a case-by-case basis). (The rationale is that the first sale doctrine applies to a single article; one who makes a "fair use" derivative work can claim their own copyright, and thus make more copies). The more "transformative" the derivative work, the better chance it stands of being found fair use. Merely ripping up a work, and reassembling it to form a "mosaic effect" is unlikely to pass muster, for example. A derivative work that comments on the original work, especially social or political commentary, or on a sentiment strongly associated with the original work, is more likely to be deemed fair use. Painting polka dots the Statue of Liberty is unlikely to do well, whereas putting images of a political or social commentary nature on the Statue of Liberty is (for example, I believe I've seen one such with faces of individuals of a variety of ethnicities superimposed on the statue, making a statement of America (associated with the statue) and its history of immigration and multi-ethnic makeup). (Although the Statue of Liberty is very much not under copyright, for a number of reasons). Another aspect is how much, and how central a portion, of the original work is used. Using the pedestal the Statue of Liberty stands on would probably be better than the statue its self, for example.	Under U.S. law (17 U.S. Code § 101 ) A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” But probably, focusing on this definition doesn't get to the heart of the question you seem to be asking. A more important matter becomes what protections does a copyright exclude? This is covered in § 102 (b), which says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The similarities you describe seem to be more ideas and concepts rather than Heinlein's expression of those ideas. I have looked no closer than the description used in the question, but the movie seems unlikely to have violated a protected right. Others might disagree.	Reproducing someone else's copyrighted material without permission is a violation of that copyright. This includes using it to promote your Twitter account. This is a violation of copyright law and of Twitter's TOS. There may be Fair Use exceptions- this question is arguably fair use. However, it's extremely unlikely your intended post counts. In the case of the image in question, royalty-free means you pay for a single licence for that image and can then use it as much as you want (according to that licence). You can post that image in as many of your tweets as you like- you don't have to pay each time. If you don't want to pay for images you use, use public domain images, images with licenses that allow you to use them, or create them yourself.	"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.	Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.	(Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander \| Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action.	You are referring to Section 29.22 of the Copyright Act of Canada. This allows for format shifting for private purposes but only if the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made is not an infringing copy and the individual legally obtained the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made among some other conditions. In the case of downloading a copy from the internet, the source is likely an infringing copy (violating the first condition) and you wouldn't have legally obtained the copy of the work from which the reproduction is made (you don't even have the copy from which the reproduction is made, since it is on a remote server somewhere).
Can the employer fully access employee data according to EU law? The computers at the company I work for recently show the message below during log on. This computer system is the property of Company. It is for authorised use only. All activities conducted on and information accessed, processed, stored or sent using this system may be examined. By using this system, all users aknowledge notice of, and agree to comply with, the Company IT Acceptable Use standard. Unauthorised or improver use of this system may result in disciplinary action. By continuing to use this system you indicate your awareness of and consent to these terms and conditions of use. Log off immediately if you do not agree to the condictions stated in this warning. Is the statement legal according to European regulations? Besides, it is my work computer, it is not that I have an option not to log on. Related question for Norway	The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43).	No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you.	With respect to the first question, discussing an idea in a non-encrypted email is not a publication that forfeits the right to patent an idea, even though it is not 100% secure. In the same way, talking about an idea for a patent with your patent lawyer in a secluded booth of a coffee shop in person does not constitute publication of the idea for this purpose, even if someone is secretly spying on you at the time. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. It is possible that the contract makes even ideas that you come up with yourself while employed by the company the property of the company. If so, you are legally in the wrong and the idea belongs to the company. But, proving the reality that you are stealing the idea from the company is harder if there is nothing in writing. An email discussing an idea while you are employed would have to be disclosed in litigation with your employer over whether the patent applied for belongs to you or to your employer under an employment agreement. If you didn't put it in an email, it wouldn't exist to turn over in litigation.	GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls.	Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.	According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.	The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack.	An EULA, or "End User License Agreement", is a contract between the software user and the software publisher. It usually protects the interest of the software publisher, e.g. you can only use it on one computer; you may not alter it or distribute it without written agreement etc. In this case, the EULA specifies that: The software may be harmful to the user's computer The user's personal data may be sent to third parties The software may used to aid or perform illegal activities The software publisher is not responsible for any damage caused by using this software First thing first, is this a valid contract? Let's take a look at the essential elements of a contract: Offer and Acceptance Intention Consideration Capacity Consent Legality Possibility of performance The Legality element specifies that the contract must not be something disapproved by law. Botnets are used for attacking other computers, i.e. an unlawful act. Installing botnets may violate the Section 3A of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in the UK. Sharing user's personal data may also violate data privacy laws. Let us, for the moment, assume the contract is valid. Item number 4 still causes a problem: an overly broad liability waiver. While liability waivers are common and normal, one can argue that the said waiver in this case seems to cover intentional or reckless acts. Such items in a contract are deemed as unenforceable. Parental control systems and remote observation systems are different. They can be used legally, and this legal use is common. Thus, distribution of these systems is legal. Needless to say, it is very difficult to argue that virus and botnets share the same. Of course, one can still use a remote observation system in an illegal way. In this case, the software user is liable, but the software publisher is not liable because the user's behavior is beyond their control.
"Impersonating" a government agent for an Alternate Reality Game Say I'm creating an alternate reality game where I want players to be contacted by an FBI agent through email. Ideally, in order for players to remain immersed, the email would appear to be actual communication from a real FBI agent. Since players have to provide an email address beforehand, and they do so in the context of the ARG, they should be aware that these emails are not actual FBI communication, but there's a real risk that players either sign up other people who are unaware or that players sign up and forget about it before receiving anything. My question is two-fold: is it legal to impersonate a government agent if most reasonable parties don't actually believe me to be a government agent? And if not, what precautions should I take to ensure no one thinks the emails are legit, hopefully without hurting immersion? (I'm based in the United States, but the game could be played by any English speaker, so I tagged the question with international - let me know if I should change that)	18 USC §912 provides that: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. I do not think that in the context of a movie, play or game the person portraying an FBI agent or other LEO is "acting as such", and surely this does not involved obtaining "any money, paper, document, or thing of value". The Wikipedia article on Police_impersonation says: Dressing up as a police officer in costume (e.g. for Halloween), or pretending to be a police officer for the entertainment purposes or a harmless prank toward an acquaintance is generally not considered a crime, provided that those involved recognize the imposter is not a real police officer, and the imposter is not trying to deceive those involved into thinking they are. Nevertheless, replica police uniforms sold in the UK must not be identical to the uniforms currently used by the police, and traders have been jailed in the past for selling on genuine uniforms. Many films and TV shows have portrayed FBI agents, in some cases actual agents by their real names. This goes back as far as the 1935 moviw G-Men starring James Cagney. Many examples are listed in the Wikipedia article Federal Bureau of Investigation portrayal in media, and many of them used realistic badges and depictions. They were not treated as criminal impersonations, even when the FBI or its officials strongly disapproved of particular movies. The somewhat similar US federal law 10 USC 772 prohibits wearing military uniform by persons who are not authorized, but paragraph (f) provides that it is permitted: While portraying a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a theatrical or motion-picture production may wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force. A Vietnam-War-era court case held the restriction "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force" to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech, and held that unauthorized wearing of a uniform was only punishable if there was charged a proved an "intent to deceive". I would expect a similar limitation of 18 USC §912. That said, if the email was such that a reasonable person might well be deceived into believing that it really came for an actual FBI agent or other government employee, there might be a problem. The suggestions on that point in the answer by user hszmv seem reasonable to me. An imaginary "Confederal Department of Interrogation" say, keeps things firmly in an alternate reality.	Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? No. There is not enough information that would lead to a finding of either. It is unclear how customers would be allegedly affected (if at all) by the release of a product at a different store, let alone where the goods or services at issue are digital and require no physical presence at a venue or premise. Except for very specific factual circumstances, a change of sales venue would hardly be cognizable as deceptive or unfair practice. Also, prior to purchasing or reserving a game, there is no contract between the public and the developer/supplier. Potential customers typically are not entitled to a specific performance by the developer. Even if [Phoenix Point] supporters' decision were provably based on the prospect of release at Steam, your description nowhere reflects that there was a mutually conscious exchange (or promise of an exchange) of considerations involving the parties' support of a game and the counterparty's release of the game at a specific venue. Absent that meeting of the minds, either party's reliance or expectation on the other is irrelevant. Generally speaking, the sole cruciality of either party's motives does not create legal obligations.	One does not lose legal rights by becoming a government official, so POTUS retains the right to sue for defamation, hold copyright, sue for trespass or breach of contract, and so on. The standards for defamation change when one becomes a "public figure" (you have to show "actual malice"), but this is much broader than being a government official. Anything that is a "work of the US government" is not protected by copyright, so presidential decrees, as government works, are not protected by copyright. I do not know of any state where one legally loses publicity rights as a function of being famous, or being an elected official. California Civil Code §3344 spells out the right of publicity in that state, which says that anyone who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent can get sued. However, there is a "fair use" escape clause: For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a). The law doesn't say exactly what constitutes a "political campaign" or "public affairs broadcast or account", but since politicians get caricatured in the papers all the time, with no requirement for consent, it is highly likely that the use you point to would be found to be part of a "political campaign" or "public affairs account". Additionally, under the First Amendment, you can criticize a government official, and that right is not limited to just critical words. It is obvious that the things on sale are basically criticism of POTUS, and you can't use the law to suppress such criticism. Accordingly, one could also criticize Tom Cruise (not a government official) using his likeness on such an object. However, one cannot exploit his image to sell perfume.	Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.	Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics).	Disclaimer: Not a lawyer or even living in US. I try to write the answer under US law. Other countries law may differ. Make sure you consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction. Here is my understanding of the individual examples: You don't need permission legally, because you are only accessing your own account and your own information. You are the only one damaged by the intrusion and therefore, nobody can really file a lawsuit against you. This is often used by security researchers when the subjects are uncooperative. That being said, if it is an actual pentesting client, you may want to refrain from it regardless. You don't need a permission to modify hardware you own. This is completely legal and not considered an attack. It would qualify as an upgrade, such as replacing a component in your laptop. You are allowed to do that. You should have a permission here. This is an intentional penetration test and you should have permission to do this. The same as 3. This is an intentional penetration test and you should get a permission. Though if you logout immediately and don't mess with the interface, it may not be illegal on the basis that you did not cause any damage or steal any information, or it may be illegal under some circumstances. It may also be impossible to prove that you did not do anything while there.	In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.	Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).
Who has authority to determine whether death was natural, accidental, suicidal, or homicidal? My understanding is that generally (and in broad strokes) it is the responsibility and authority of a jurisdiction's Coroner (a.k.a. Medical Examiner) to determine the cause and manner of any death not certified by an attending physician. Suppose someone is found dead after a fall. Suppose the Coroner, on reviewing the body and scene, finds nothing but deadly injuries consistent with the fall and the circumstances in which the body was found. Now, one of four scenarios is possible: The person died of natural causes and then fell (natural death) The person fell accidentally (accidental death) The person fell intentionally of their own volition (suicide) The person was caused by another to fall (homicide) Does the Coroner have the final say on cause of death? Or do any other offices have the right to investigate a death to look for evidence of homicide in opposition to a verdict of the Coroner? For example, Can police pursue an investigation independent and contrary to that of the Coroner? Does a District Attorney (when not the Coroner) have the means and/or authority to conduct an independent and contrary investigation?	Short Answers Does the Coroner have the final say on cause of death? No. The trial judge (or jury) has the final say. Can police pursue an investigation independent and contrary to that of the Coroner? Theoretically, yes. But I would expect that would happen only in unusual circumstances. Like, maybe an internal investigation. Standard procedure is for the prosecutor, police and medical examiner to work together to investigate crimes and prosecute criminals. Does a District Attorney (when not the Coroner) have the means and/or authority to conduct an independent and contrary investigation? Yes. But it's unusual. See answer to number 2. Or do any other offices have the right to investigate a death to look for evidence of homicide in opposition to a verdict of the Coroner? Same answer as #2 and #3. Explanation They work together on the same team The medical examiner is a state employee and usually works on the side of law enforcement. If a medical examiner were to report a cause of death that did not support evidence of a crime, that information would have to be made available to any potential defendant. In the hands of any competent attorney that should be sufficient basis to create reasonable doubt and achieve an acquittal. I doubt many prosecutors would ever consider hiring an outside examiner in this case except under highly unusual circumstances like an internal investigation as mentioned above. The defendant must create reasonable doubt In the alternative scenario, when evidence of a crime is supported by the M.E. report, it would be up to the defendant to produce reasonable doubt by cross-examination or producing expert testimony that contradicts the M.E.'s conclusion. This might or might not include hiring an independent third party forensic pathologist as an expert witness. Dr. Cyril Wecht is a famous one. All opinions are subject to error, disagreement and cross-examination All that said, the "cause of death" reported by the Coroner is just a medical opinion and is subject to error and disagreement like any other opinion. It's just that it's unlikely that disagreement would come from the side of law enforcement in most cases. For further reading, here is a link to the Coroner's Handbook. At the bottom of page 11, it acknowledges: Causes of death on the death certificate represent a medical opinion that might vary among individual medical-legal officers.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.'	This assumes there is a difference under the law between reckless and negligent homicide (which does not exist everywhere). In Washington state there is a distinction between 1st and 2nd degree manslaughter, per RCW 9A.32.060 and .070. What could be called reckless homicide is when (a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or (b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child. and 'negligent homicide' would be A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. The distinction is laid out in RCW 9A.08.010, compare A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. and A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. However, it is important to know what "knows" means: (i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or (ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense. The fact that X has manufactured a nutty belief that killing a person doesn't lead to death does not override the fact that a reasonable person would know that stabbing a person in the heart will in fact kill them, and is murder. You could put that in contrast to the situation where he has a belief that stabbing a victim in the butt will cure him, and he is unaware that the victim's heart is freakishly in the wrong place, near his wallet – that would be negligence (being unaware). In general, you aren't given legal credit for having bizarre beliefs about how the universe works, unless it can be turned into an insanity defense.	I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances.	This is a quite complicated area of evidence law in the U.S. as there are many statements which are inadmissible under the hearsay rule, but there are also many statements that would otherwise be hearsay that fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule. In U.S. federal court practice, hearsay is governed mostly by Federal Rules of Evidence 103, 104(a), 201, 801-807, and 1101. Most state court rules of evidence in the U.S. with regard to hearsay closely track the Federal Rules of Evidence. Some states do not follow this pattern but are substantively very similar as the Federal Rules of Evidence largely track of the common law rules of evidence before they were codified. Rule 801 provides two exclusions from the definition of hearsay and a foundational definition. Rule 802 prohibits the introduction of hearsay into evidence unless an exception applies. Rule 803 provides 23 exceptions to the rule. Rule 804 provides five more exception to the rule. Rule 807 provides a final residual exception. So, in proceedings where the hearsay rule applies there are 31 main exceptions to the general rule, in addition to the argument that the general rule does not apply, but this still excludes lots of statements. Rule 201 (judicial notice) is another exception. Some of the main reasons to admit hearsay are that: It is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (e.g. to prove the someone was present and talking at a place not that what they said was true, or to prove that someone said something defamatory or fraudulent, or to prove the someone made a "verbal act" with legal significance like agreeing to a contract or ordering someone to do something). It is a statement of a party opponent or someone affiliated with a party opponent (i.e. someone affiliated with the other side in the lawsuit or criminal case). It is a prior statement of a person made under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is a business record or public record or an "ancient document" (currently ancient means before 1998 in the federal courts, and typically more than twenty-years old in the state courts). It is a market quotation. It is a statement made describing things "in the moment", for medical diagnosis, or when the facts were fresh in the "declarant's" mind. It pertains to rights in real property, or to family relationships. It is a statement contrary to the interests of the person making it. It is a statement made when the declarant's death was believed to be imminent (i.e. a dying declaration). It is a statement made against someone who caused the witness to be unavailable. There are reasons that the statement is reliable and the intent to provide the statement is cleared with the court in advance. The matter upon which a statement is made is of general public knowledge not reasonably subject to dispute, is easily confirmed without doubt by a court, or is from a learned treatise. Hearsay objections are also waived if a timely objection isn't made to them. See Federal Rule of Evidence 103. And, courts have some discretion to allow hearsay testimony on immaterial matters or matters that are not seriously disputed in the case for expediency's sake. Rules 104(a) (excluding preliminary matters) and 1101 set forth when the hearsay rule applies and when it does not. Rule 1101 excludes from the rule a variety of preliminary matters, mostly in criminal cases such as: grand-jury proceedings extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case; sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. Rule 805 governs the complicated situation of hearsay within hearsay. Rule 806 coordinates the hearsay rule with rules on how it is proper to introduce evidence about the credibility of a witness. There is also a constitutional rule of criminal procedure, called the "confrontation right" that established minimum standards for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in criminal trials even when a court's procedural rules do not exclude it. Most states also have a hearsay rule pertaining to oral promises made by dead people called the dead man's statute, and limitations on introducing oral statements related to written agreements called respectively, the parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds. In contrast, in the U.K. courts, roughly speaking, hearsay is generally admissible when the person making the underlying hearsay statement is available to testify, or is unavailable, which subsumes a large share of the U.S. hearsay rule, and makes much more hearsay admissible. U.K. practice would also allow admission of almost anything without a U.S. hearsay exception since they are derived from British common law evidence rules related to hearsay. The main purpose of the hearsay rule is to prevent a defendant in a criminal case or lawsuit from being denied an ability to cross-examine witnesses in court because they would like to present evidence by affidavit or letter instead, effectively placing that burden on the prosecution in criminal cases, or on a plaintiff in simple civil cases, rather than forcing the defendant to pro-actively subpoena witnesses for the other side in the case. The rule has a broader sweep than that, but that is its core purpose.	If the victim is unable to prove who the culprit was, then it will be impossible to prosecute that person criminally or sue them for civil damages. Incidents like these are rarely enough to cause a police department to throw sufficient investigative resources at it to crack the case without some reason to believe that it is part of something bigger. An unfortunate fact of life is that most perpetrators of crimes and torts get away with it and are not caught. And, if the only available witness is willing to lie to cover up the name of the guilty party (probably out of a desire to not have the dog put down), it is that much harder. A private investigator might be able to solve the case, but the cost of hiring a PI would probably exceed the benefit that could be obtained if the PI was successful.	I'll use Wisconsin as a jurisdiction. If you file a false death certificate, that's a felony. But you probably wouldn't go that far. It could be disorderly conduct. In Wisconsin disorderly conduct is described as follows: Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. There's also a statute prohibiting "Disrupting a funeral or memorial service" but it won't apply in this case unless disorderly conduct applies. It would raise the penalty to a class A misdemeanor (or a class I felony if you somehow did it again after being convicted once.) On the civil side, there could be an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, either for the false report of your death, or for a "corpse" suddenly coming to life. This kind of lawsuit requires "extreme and outrageous conduct", but if this isn't, I don't know what would be.
If someone sent me a gift in exchange for a favor and I did said favor can I be required to return the gift? A friend recently mailed me an X-Box One and a Samsung Galaxy S10 in the condition that I complete Nightwave Season 2 for them in a PlayStation Network Video Game known as Warframe. So I did log on his account and complete this for him every single day from when this started. Then midway during this, he added an extra stipulation that was NOT a part of the original deal after the gift was sent out: That I should help him find a job on a casting website called Casting Networks. It should go without saying but I feel altering the terms of a conditional agreement midway without the expressed consent of the other party is illegal and unethical. Would I be required by law to give him back his phone after completing the original agreement, but not completing the additional provisions added without my consent. I feel I don't have to return this phone since it was given to me as a gift.	am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed.	The European laws have specific sections regarding digital goods. The following two passages are relevant to you: From Returning unwanted goods: Warning! Please note that you may not use goods that you have received before deciding to withdraw from the purchase. The right to withdraw exists to allow you to examine the product in the same way as you would in a shop, not to give you 14 days free use. Be aware also that more specific rules apply to digital content (e.g. downloading or streaming music or video). From Shopping online: Digital content Specific information requirements apply when you buy digital content online, e.g. when downloading or streaming music or video. Before you make the purchase, you must also be informed how the content operates with relevant hardware/software (interoperability) and about its functionality, including whether any geographical restrictions apply to the use of the content and if private copies are allowed. You also enjoy the right of withdrawal within 14 days from concluding the contract for online digital content. However, once you start downloading or streaming the content you may no longer withdraw from the purchase, provided that the trader has complied with his obligations. Specifically, the trader must first obtain your explicit agreement to the immediate download or streaming, and you must explicitly acknowledge that you lose your right to withdraw once the performance has started. So yes, the law specifically allows you to waive that right when purchasing digital goods. So long as Steam has correctly advertised the product's system requirements and other key details, you lose your right to withdraw from the purchase the moment you start downloading it to your system.	Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.	Only if you ask Valve for permission first, and they agree in writing. I'm not a lawyer, but when I was reading through the Subscriber license you linked, this stuck out to me: You are entitled to use the Content and Services for your own personal use, but you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Content and Services to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Content and Services to others without the prior written consent of Valve, except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use); (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; or (iii) exploit the Content and Services or any of its parts for any commercial purpose, except as expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use). The part that I've bolded is probably the part that makes this against the Terms of Service, since in order to post these sorts of automated messages to their service, you'd need to use a "utility program" to "emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services". I doubt that Valve would ever agree, since such a program could very easily be used to create spam bots that works bombard users with unsolicited advertisements, but maybe Valve would be willing to cut deals with AAA video game companies to let them deploy tools to automatically manage their store pages.	Consumer Protection In addition to whatever the provisions of the contract may be, consumer protection laws will apply to this transaction, and will override any contrary provisions in the contract. There are federal protections, mostly administered by the FTC. The State of California also has consumer protection statutes, the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and False Advertising Law (FAL). Contracts may not override these laws except where a specific provision permits such contract terms. Federal Rules The official FTC page "What To Do If You’re Billed for Things You Never Got, or You Get Unordered Products" states: The federal Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule applies to most things you order by mail, online, or by phone. It says: Sellers have to ship your order within the time they (or their ads) say — that goes whether they say “2-Day Shipping” or “In Stock & Ships Today.” If they don’t give a time, they must ship within 30 days of when you placed your order. If there’s a delay shipping your order, the seller has to tell you and give you the choice of either agreeing to the delay or canceling your order for a full refund. If the seller doesn’t ship your order, it has to give you a full refund — not just a gift card or store credit. ... Disputing credit card billing errors within the 60-day dispute period By law, you have to dispute a credit card billing error in writing within 60 days of the date that the first statement that has the billing error was sent to you. Otherwise, you may get stuck with the bill. ... Disputing credit card billing errors after the 60-day dispute period ends What if you agreed to delivery on a date in the future that turns out to be more than 60 days after your statement showing the charge was sent to you — but the delivery didn’t arrive or you rejected it because it was not what you agreed to purchase? Can you still dispute the charge? You’re likely outside the protection of the Fair Credit Billing Act. Still, some credit card issuers may extend the 60-day dispute period when a shipment is delayed. Send a dispute letter to your credit card company. Include copies of any documents showing the expected and actual delivery dates, including any notice the seller sent you about the shipment delay. See also the official "Business Guide to the FTC's Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule" The actual Federal Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule is at 16 CFR Part 435; relevant parts of this rule provide: (435.1 (b)) "Prompt refund" shall mean: (1) Where a refund is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2)(ii), (d)(2)(iii), or (d)(3) of this section, a refund sent by any means at least as fast and reliable as first class mail within seven (7) working days of the date on which the buyer's right to refund vests under the provisions of this part. Provided, however, that where the seller cannot provide a refund by the same method payment was tendered, prompt refund shall mean a refund sent in the form of cash, check, or money order, by any means at least as fast and reliable as first class mail, within seven (7) working days of the date on which the seller discovers it cannot provide a refund by the same method as payment was tendered; (§ 435.2) ... it constitutes an unfair method of competition, and an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller: (a) (1) To solicit any order for the sale of merchandise to be ordered by the buyer through the mail, via the Internet, or by telephone unless, at the time of the solicitation, the seller has a reasonable basis to expect that it will be able to ship any ordered merchandise to the buyer: (a) (1) (i) Within that time clearly and conspicuously stated in any such solicitation; or (a) (1) (ii) If no time is clearly and conspicuously stated, within thirty (30) days after receipt of a properly completed order from the buyer. Provided, however, where, at the time the merchandise is ordered the buyer applies to the seller for credit to pay for the merchandise in whole or in part, the seller shall have fifty (50) days, rather than thirty (30) days, to perform the actions required in this paragraph (a)(1)(ii). (a) (2) To provide any buyer with any revised shipping date, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, unless, at the time any such revised shipping date is provided, the seller has a reasonable basis for making such representation regarding a definite revised shipping date. (a) (3) To inform any buyer that it is unable to make any representation regarding the length of any delay unless: (a) (3) (i) The seller has a reasonable basis for so informing the buyer; and (a) (3) (ii) The seller informs the buyer of the reason or reasons for the delay. (a) (4) In any action brought by the Federal Trade Commission, alleging a violation of this part, the failure of a respondent-seller to have records or other documentary proof establishing its use of systems and procedures which assure the shipment of merchandise in the ordinary course of business within any applicable time set forth in this part will create a rebuttable presumption that the seller lacked a reasonable basis for any expectation of shipment within said applicable time. (b) (1) Where a seller is unable to ship merchandise within the applicable time set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, to fail to offer to the buyer, clearly and conspicuously and without prior demand, an option either to consent to a delay in shipping or to cancel the buyer`s order and receive a prompt refund. Said offer shall be made within a reasonable time after the seller first becomes aware of its inability to ship within the applicable time set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, but in no event later than said applicable time. There are further provisions which deal with the situation where a delayed order is further delayed, and what consent the buyer may have already given to any delay. In short, where the seller is unable to meet its estimated time for shipment of the order, the seller must promptly inform the buyer, in no case later than the original estimated shipment date, and must offer an option to cancel the order. Unless the buyer explicitly consents to the delay (definite or indefinite) the seller must send a prompt refund, which means within 7 working days. No contract purporting to waive or modify these rights is valid or enforceable on these points, although if the initial order explicitly states that the date of shipment is indefinite, and the customer agrees to this, no shipment date can be enforced under this rule. California Laws California Civil Code section 1723 requires that a retail store selling goods allow returns or exchanges for at least 7 days, or else prominently post its actual policy. But that does not apply to goods ordered for later delivery. The California Business and Professions Code section 17500 makes it unlawful for: any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, or to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact connected with the proposed performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading This would include advertising a shipment date which was not reasonably achievable, and which the seller knew or should have know was likely not to be met. The California Civil code section 17770 makes unlawful: (10) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity. This may not apply to the fact pattern described in the question, depending on what the seller knew and when.	Is there any sort of implied expiration date for a contractor's completion for medium size contractor jobs (< $10k)? Absent a provable deadline, the question would be whether the delay is reasonable (or habitual) under the circumstances. The contractor's presumption that he can do whatever he wants regarding unspecified aspects of a contract is inaccurate. Those matters can still be decided on the basis of contract law and/or under principles of equity. See also the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts, at §235(2) and §243 regarding non-performance of a contract. Will my verbal complete-by date hold up in lieu of any written complete-by date? It depends on each party's credibility. Proving that he essentially ignored your follow-up requests will make it harder for him to credibly refute your assertion about the verbal deadline. In case none of your follow-up efforts (or none of his responses) are in writing or if he denies that you repeatedly called him, you might want to subpoena his phone service provider --if the matter goes to court-- and file as evidence the resulting production of records.	This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software.	This is actually pretty standard. You have a contract with a business to provide some service, and you get a bargain on the price of the service as long as you stay with them for some period, such as 2 years. You could get the 'pay as you go' option which doesn't have a termination fee, but that costs more if you are sure you can commit to what you signed up for, for that period. So it's not that you can't terminate the contract, it's that you can't just walk away from your obligation (what they call a "minimum term agreement"), cost-free. The early-termination fee is part of the cost of moving. You have to look in the Legal Agreements & Contract part of Account Details on your account to get the specific agreement that you are bound by. Generally, you are subject to that fee, unless the subscriber dies, or is in the military and is shipped out. You can also transfer your service from area to area – I assume you either are moving to an area without Xfinity service, or you elected to not use Xfinity in that location. It is legal for a business to put their business interest above that of a customer, even in the case of regulated "utilities".
What is the penalty if the British Prime Minister does not seek an Article 50 extension? The recently-passed European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 (a.k.a. the Benn Act or the Surrender Act, depending on one's politics) seems to be unprecedented in that it creates a legal obligation for a single Crown subject—the Prime Minister. Specifically, § 1(4) states that: The Prime Minister must seek to obtain from the European Council an extension of the period under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union ending at 11.00pm on 31 October 2019 by sending to the President of the European Council a letter in the form set out in the Schedule to this Act requesting an extension of that period to 11.00pm on 31 January 2020 in order to debate and pass a Bill to implement the agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including provisions reflecting the outcome of inter-party talks as announced by the Prime Minister on 21 May 2019, and in particular the need for the United Kingdom to secure changes to the political declaration to reflect the outcome of those inter-party talks. However, usually legislation includes details of the punishment to be administered to those to break the law. For example, § 1 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 states that ‘Whosoever shall be convicted of Murder shall suffer Death as a Felon.’ This Act doesn't mention any punishment, however. What, then, happens to the Prime Minister if he refuses to seek an extension (which seems to be Johnson's plan) and thereby breaks the law? Is there some sort of ‘default’ punishment for lawbreaking in England & Wales that is used when no more-specific punishment is stated?	A writ of Mandamus A person with standing (say an MP), can apply to the court for a writ of mandamus. This is an order from the court requiring the person to do the thing they are legally obliged to do. Failure to follow a court order is contempt which in England and Wakes is punishable by imprisonment for up to 2 years.	First of all, the wording in your question hints at the UK deliberately launching a missile (even if it is a test one) towards the USA. Nothing in the news piece you link to support that supposition, the general idea is a missile that was launched towards the Atlantic Ocean that steered off route. From your link: The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states. The NPT limits other states from researching (including testing) nuclear weapons and/or delivery vehicles. In exchange, they get access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Treaty preambles are general, introductory texts that explain the intent of the treaty. They are not binding, and the language clearly shows it (Hint: It states "Desiring to", "Recalling to". Binding agreements use "Shall", "Shall not", "May" or "May not", and are more specific about what are the restrictions). As stated above, the test was not "in North-America". It was from international waters "towards Africa", probably to be sunk before it reached land1. There is no notion anywhere that there was an intention of violating the airspace of any country. Certainly, the UK would be responsable if one of their missiles test fails and the missile ends causing damages, and the USA can protest any violation of its airspace, even if unintentional. But it is not "a test of ballistic missiles in North America", and certainly the USA has no more rights outside its territorial waters than, say, Gambia does. The only restriction would be the internationally stablished procedures for testing missiles, which are setup to avoid any kind of issues (the test scheduled date and path is published2 with time enough for third parties to take notice). So yes, it is business as usual. 1Idea: African countries are countries, too, and they have the same right as the USA for their airspace not to be violated by the military from other countries. 2Both to allow for air traffic to avoid dangerous areas, and to ensure that anybody detecting the launch does not think that it is an attack.	There is RIPA which allows a court to force you to divulge a decryption key. The penalty for not doing so is up to two years in prison, five if terrorism is involved. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), Part III, activated by ministerial order in October 2007,[20] requires persons to supply decrypted information and/or keys to government representatives with a court order. Failure to disclose carries a maximum penalty of two years in jail - Wikipedia - Key Disclosure Law Section 49 of Part III of RIPA compels a person, when served with a notice, to either hand over an encryption key or render the requested material intelligible by authorities. Anyone who refuses to decrypt material could face five years in jail if the investigation relates to terrorism or national security, or up to two years in jail in other cases. Controversially, someone who receives a Section 49 notice can be prevented from telling anyone apart from their lawyer that they have received such a notice. - The Register - UK police can now force you to reveal decryption keys - Refuseniks face jail time The act can be read on the government website It describes, for example, grounds for not complying ... 53 3) For the purposes of this section a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if— (a) sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it; and (b) the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.	The "letter" you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a "country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions", which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of "embargo restrictions"). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians.	You have your answer already in the quotation you give. Her petition to appeal in forma pauperis was presented on February 26, 1931, and granted on March 17, 1931 At that time the Appeals (Forma Pauperis) Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 22) was in force. This created a limited form of legal assistance for paupers that paid for, amongst other things, counsel to appear before the House of Lords on appeal. See the costs order made by the House of Lords on remitting the case.	In English law during the late Medieval and early modern period (from 1321 to 1798), it was possible for Parliament to pass a "Bill Of Attainder". This declared a person guilty of a crime, often treason, by legislative act, without any trial or other legal process. See the Wikipedia article for more detail. Often a Bill of Attainder not only decreed that a person (or people) was guilty, but also confiscated the convicted person's property, preventing his (or rarely her) heirs from inheriting, and possibly rendering those heirs ineligible to hold public offices or peerages. The heir would also be prevented from inheriting through the attainted person. For example, property held by the father of the attainted person would not pass to the child of the attainted person. This was called "corruption of the blood", and was viewed with particular horror by many during the colonial period and before. It effectivly treated the heirs of the attainted person as illegitimate. Attainder was usually followed by execution, possibly by torture. The bill might specify the specific fate of the person attained. The US constitutional provision prohibits declaring people guilty of crimes by legislative act, and prohibits sentences for crimes that take property or rights from the family or heirs of the convicted person, even in cases of treason. At least that is how it has been interpreted. Fines may be levied, but may only fall on the actual property of the person convicted. The US Supreme Court has dealt with this clause in several cases: Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (law requiring lawyers to swear that they had not supported the confederacy held unconstitutional); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (Law requiring an oath that the person had not supported the confederacy for a professional license held unconstitutional); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (a state law barring convicted felons from practicing medicine upheld); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), (a state law newly requiring that practising physicians must have graduated from a licensed medical school upheld); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (federal law which declared three specific persons "subversive" and barred them from federal employment overturned); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (federal law which required elected labour leaders to take an oath that they were not and had never been members of the Communist Party USA, and that they did not advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government upheld); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (law which made it a crime for a former communist to serve on a union's board overturned); and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (law seizing Nixon's presidential papers upheld).	Germany If we actually talk about criminal law, your question is answered by §§ 1 and 2 StGB (the German penal code) – official but of course not binding translation: § 1 [No punishment without law] An act may only be punished if criminal liability had been established by law before the act was committed. § 2 [Jurisdiction ratione temporis; lex mitior] (1) The penalty and any ancillary measures shall be determined by the law which is in force at the time of the act. (2) If the penalty is amended during the commission of the act, the law in force at the time the act is completed shall be applied. (3) If the law in force at the time of the completion of the act is amended before judgment, the most lenient law shall be applied. (4) A law intended to be in force only for a determinate time shall be continued to be applied to acts committed while it was in force even after it ceases to be in force, unless otherwise provided by law. (5) Subsections (1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to confiscation, deprivation and destruction. (6) Unless otherwise provided by law, measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation shall be determined according to the law in force at the time of the decision. (Note that the last section has been voided in part by the Federal Constitutional Court but this is not relevant here.) which is a legal principle given by the German constitution, in particular by Article 103 para. 2: An act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act was committed. To answer your specific questions with the above rules in mind: The law you are sued for is deleted while your process is going In that case you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted before a case is raised against you (what you did was illegal while you did it) Same answer, you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) You are out of luck. Only if there would be a new decision for an unrelated reason, your punishment would be taken back. There is a new law while your process is going The new law has no relevance at all. There is a new law after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) Again, no relevance to your case. In another areas of the law the answers to your questions could actually be different but there would be too many cases to consider for a comprehensive answer.	england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia
Can the UK government use an 'order of council to suspend the Benn Act'? The ex prime minster of the United Kingdom, John Major, has warned that Boris Johnson could use an 'order of council' to suspend the Benn Act (European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019). Is this possible? https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/news/106861/sir-john-major-warns-boris-johnson-could	No. There are almost no constitutional lawyers (at least, that I have seen make pronunciations on the subject) who seem to think that this is a serious means of forcing a no deal Brexit; such an attempt would be obviously unconstitutional and would almost certainly be injuncted in court within hours of such an order being issued. Orders of council cannot stymie an Act of Parliament, this is a well established constitutional principle. See https://davidallengreen.com/2019/09/brexit-padfield-and-the-benn-act/	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.	I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.	Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder).	I cannot recall an example where a breach of such guidance in-and-of-itself is an offence: it's when the underlying legislation is contravened that one is committed. Note that the cited article say this: this guidance is of a general nature. Employers should consider the specific conditions of each individual place of work and comply with all applicable legislation and regulations, including the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This guidance does not supersede existing legislation or regulations across the UK More broadly, and away from the NHS, the relationship between guidance and statute was examined in The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) where adherence to social distancing measures impacted on safe working practices on building sites, causing delays and an increase in costs. The court determined that: It follows that government advice or recommendations, whether before or after either set of Regulations came into effect, cannot have imposed or ordered a denial of access or a hindrance in access, however strongly worded the advice or recommendations were, since they did not have the force of law.	Article 75 says that It devolves upon the Storting: (a) to enact and repeal laws; to impose taxes, dues, customs and other public charges, which shall not, however, remain operative beyond 31 December of the succeeding year, unless they are expressly renewed by a new Storting Article 97 says that "No law must be given retroactive effect" . The combined effect of these provisions is that any changes in the law effected this year could apply to tax years after 2020 but not including 2019. So the law as written supports your understanding. Skatteetatten seems to agree since the rules are listed as covering 2019.	You are free to ask them to stop. If they do, great. If they don’t, you legal options depend on if they are legally able to make such noise at that time or not. I am not familiar with UK law but typical laws give wide powers to the owners of infrastructure to construct/repair it. Again, typically, permits may be required but exceptions exist for urgent work. If they have such a permit (or don’t need one) your legal options are nil. If they don’t you can go to court seeking an injunction to stop them until they do.
Do you loose liability protection if doing work for your LLC on your personal computer? Do you have potential of loosing liability protection if doing work for your LLC on your personal computer (ie. a computer purchased with personal funds and not accounted for as being owned by the LLC)? For example, what if had customer data like purchase orders stored in a folder on you personal computer? Does this count as treating the LLC as an extension of their personal affairs, rather than as a separate legal entity since you are commingling the usage of your personal property?	No more than using your own phone, eyeglasses or underwear while working for the LLC. These are all tools of trade than one wold expect employees of the LLC to bring to their job (especially underwear). There is potentially a problem if assets of the LLC are alienated for personal use rather than the other way around. However, that would be subject to a reasonableness test - using your work computer to book a personal holiday is eminently reasonable. Where there is a real liability issue is if the use of that personal asset caused damage to third parties e.g. if the personal computer was hacked and damage resulted. This would allow a potential plaintiff to bypass the LLC and sue the owner directly (or, more likely, as well).	Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.	Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	In dealing with financial, medical, insurance and basically any other forms found in the U.S. do I have a legal responsibility to identify myself as Divorced? Or in other words, could identifying myself as Single as opposed to a divorcee incur any type of liability of which I should be aware? Since you specified the financial and medical contexts, yes, sometimes it is mandatory to disclose that you are divorced. Any time your signature is involved, be as accurate as the form allows. The worst consequence I can think of is actually pretty bad ("penalty of perjury" is no joke, and whether or not it should, divorce does impact a surprising number of especially financial considerations.) If possible, it would be better to simply not answer at all than to sign off on something other than the most accurate option available. In these contexts, the designation as having been divorced is often an archaic throwback predating no-fault. For example, divorce adversely impacts your credit (more than the loss of a partner's presumed earning power, the reasoning here is basically that marriage was a long-term commitment you entered into willingly that was not fulfilled.) Jobs or employment opportunities demanding a very high degree of personal integrity may be negatively impacted by having, or having had a divorce, by the same reasoning (the examples that pop to mind are officers the military, depending on the career field.) Divorce can be interpreted as an indication that the individual in question is currently not as stable in their personal life and affairs (moving, figuring out joint custody, jealous/vindictive ex, etc.) as a prospective lender or employer requires. As far as healthcare is concerned, it can have an impact on health care services and how providers interact with you, your ex, etc. (for example, your child's pediatrician.) Having had a divorce can be a flag to health care provider to screen for depression, anxiety, blood pressure, and so forth; likewise, insurance companies consider divorce a "major life event" that qualifies you to change your coverage out-of-season (I don't know, but wouldn't be surprised if divorce somehow impacted your rates because of statistical increased risk of specific ailments.) Furthermore, there can be far-reaching implications for others - how long you were married determines whether or not social security benefits are conferred to a surviving spouse, for example, or calculating your kid's FAFSA in five or ten or fifteen years.	That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.	That is, if my mom is sued by somebody for some reason, does that mean I am being sued, and my personal assets are at risk, rather than just hers'? Having power of attorney doesn't mean that you become "one and the same" person, it just means that you can stand in their place legally. If somebody sues your mother, you are authorized to act on your mother's behalf, but that doesn't mean that you are liable for any judgement. Of course there is a fiduciary responsibility to act in your mothers best interest, and violating that can open you up to suits that you are responsible for (because the suit would be against you, not your mother). And, what if she runs out of money, would I be personally financially liable for covering her expenses? No, you wouldn't be. Debts would be settled the same way as if she didn't have anybody acting as PoA. She (you) could declare bankruptcy on her behalf and have the debts discharged. This doesn't obligate you to pay them. And then, what if I simply don't have time to deal with her affairs, that is where I am being put in a position where I have to choose between keeping my job and my personal relationships at home versus going to deal with things over there, would having POA force me to do the latter? This is a personal decision for you. You could alternatively pursue having her declared as an "adult ward of the State". You need to consult a lawyer if you take on full power of attorney, to both protect you, your assets, and your responsibilities. This is something that you really need a lawyer to draft so that the lines are clear, and the expectations are as well. You may need to get a court involved if she is not of clear mind to sign these papers.	If you are facing felony charges, you need to hire a criminal defense lawyer, not ask for legal advice on the Internet. Do not talk to the police without your lawyer present. Do not attempt to represent yourself in any kind of hearing. Ignore any advice based on what seems fair or reasonable to someone on the Internet unless it is based on a real case in North Carolina or written by a real lawyer. That said, it appears to me that you have at least two strong defenses. First, if you you returned the laptop (It will help if you sent it by registered mail or otherwise kept a receipt, although, remember, they need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you kept it), that shows you had no “intent to steal” or “purpose to steal” it, which is a necessary element of the crime. Second, according to the University of North Carolina criminal law blog, you appear to have been charged with the wrong offense (although I don’t think that will actually help you if the prosecutor decides to bring the charge that matches what your former employer alleges you to have done). It cites a relevant North Carolina Supreme Court ruling on the difference between larceny and embezzlement, State v. McDonald, 45 S.E. 582 (N.C. 1903). I would focus on getting yourself cleared of these charges first. You can ask your lawyer if there is any recourse you might have against your former employer. I’m skeptical that suing them would be worth it, but I don’t know the circumstances. If you have proof of what they said to you and about you, hang on to it.
Does Executive Privilege override 5 U.S.C. App. §8H (c)? With respect to the testimony of Acting Director of National Intelligence McGuire before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives on September 26, 2019, that as a member of the Executive Branch, Executive Privilege prevented him from sending the now infamous "Whistle-blower complaint to the Congressional Intelligence Committee's. By what legal theory does Executive Privilege override the plain wording of statute that: "(c) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subsection (b), the head of the establishment shall, within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the intelligence committees, together with any comments the head of the establishment considers appropriate." This question is limited to the Directors responsibility to Executive Privilege and not other legal reasons opined by the Office of Legal Counsel in DoJ. Thanx	Executive privilege is a constitutional doctrine rooted in the separation of powers. Because it’s based on the Constitution, Congress cannot limit it by statute any more than Congress could limit the President’s authority to veto laws.	We may soon have a more definitive answer. A Grand Junction, Colorado newspaper is suing a politician for calling it "fake news", and the resolution of that case and the hypothetical that you propose would turn on the same legal principle. It is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit would prevail, because "fake news" probably doesn't constitute libel per se, because the comment could be construed as hyperbole or as a statement of opinion (neither of which are actionable), and even potentially, because a "speech and debate clause" defense under the state constitution might apply (depending upon the context in which the statement was made by the politician). The context of the particular tweet cited generally defines specified organizations as "the FAKE NEWS media" rather than accusing them of any particular instance of making a false statement, so it is probably an opinion or hyperbole. But, if the statement were made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and if the term "fake news" in the context in which it was used could be legitimately construed the imply a statement of fact which is not true, it wouldn't be impossible for the lawsuit to succeed, and depending upon the context of the statement, it could have such an implication. A suit against Trump could also implicate Presidential immunity doctrines which are more robust than immunity doctrines for other public officials, particularly if the "fake news" comment could be construed as part of the official duties of the President (for which there is absolute immunity) as opposed to his unofficial duties. The immunity question is a closer one than the question on the merits of defamation law about which there is much more case law to flesh out what is and isn't covered.	The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).	An executive order is a way of memorializing in writing Presidential authority that is either expressly granted to the President by the constitution or statute, or is left to President by implication either from a lack of guidance or as a result of the structure of the constitution and historical precedent. Congress has wide discretion to legislate in a manner that limits the power to make executive orders and pass regulations, and can mandate that the administration issue regulations in a certain area or refrain from issuing regulations in a certain area where the Executive branch is denied discretion or denied the right to set overarching policies as opposed to deciding things on a case by case basis at a lower level in the bureaucracy. In principle, Congress could so micromanage the executive branch that it would be unconstitutional, but that is basically a hypothetical concept with no meaningfully well defined boundaries. The hard cases involve grants of regulatory authority subject to further approval by a subpart of Congress like a committee, as opposed to a full fledged act of law (something called a "legislative veto") which has dubious constitutional status despite being common. The main "meta-legislation" governing regulations in general in the federal government is the Administrative Procedures Act. Subject to the limitations imposed by Congress, a President can take any approach desired to making and changing regulations, but the APA does impose meaningful limits, in particular, on how and how fast, existing regulations can be changed, which may make it hard to eliminate two regulations for each new one that the administration wants to pass or is mandated by Congress to adopt to implement statutes it has passed. But, because a "regulation" is not a meaningfully defined unit, it is a pretty meaningless edict. You can satisfy it simply by cramming two sections of a bunch of regulations into one, essentially reformatting it for political cosmetics rather than making substantive changes, or by incorporating something else by reference. So, the 2 for 1 EO is basically an aspirational statement of policy and attitude more than it is a meaningful constraint. No one could sue the administration or invalidate a regulation it passed because it didn't comply with this EO.	Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.	It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.	This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions.	You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.
Attorney Client Privilege Document If a client submits a document labeled 'attorney-client' to a government agency, it becomes public record (per the US government authority). If the document is obtained from the government (sent by the government to an inquiring mind), is it effectively NOT attorney-client privileged? UPDATE \ CLARIFICATION The disclosure by the client to the government is intentional in the form of a complaint. The disclosure of the document to any requestor is also not accidental.	Attorney-client privilege is normally waived if a privileged communication is voluntarily disclosed. Submission of an attorney-client privileged document to a judge to review in camera does not waive the attorney-client privilege. Most of the case law involves inadvertent "oops" style disclosures of attorney-client privileged documents (keep in mind that big lawsuits often involve exchanges of terabytes of data that have to be reviewed page by page for attorney-client privileged materials by armies of junior lawyers and paralegals, so mistakes are inevitably made now and then), which is a somewhat convoluted area of law. Basically, if it is caught soon enough, the person accidentally receiving it can be ordered to not look at it any more and to destroy it without keeping copies if it remains within an accidental recipient law firm or government agency's possession and has not been further disseminated into public records yet. In particular, such documents can't be presented as evidence at trial if the mistake is caught before it is too late to correct the mistake. In those cases, the legal system does its best to pretend that the mistaken disclosure of attorney-client privileged materials never happened.	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	Yes, you can be compelled by the government to reveal information: All it takes is a judge agreeing with a plaintiff or prosecutor that it has some relevance to a complaint over which the court has jurisdiction. If that point arrives and you want to protect that information you only have three choices: Get a legal team good enough to convince the court otherwise. Face the consequences of contempt of court for failing to supply the information requested. Flee to another jurisdiction before #2 happens.	According to the IRS site Use Form W-9 to provide your correct TIN to the person who is required to file an information return with the IRS to report, for example, ... income paid to you ... Since the client is already obliged to file an information return disclosing the payments already made, you should provide the W9 without delay. You would be obliged to provide your TIN even if your final invoice was never paid. In any case, it costs you nothing to furnish this information when asked. If it is more convenient for the client's accounting to provide the W9 now, why not do so? Arguing over this point will not make you remembered more fondly when the client has another project. It may be that the client has encountered or fears to encounter a contractor who was paid and then never furnished a W9, leaving the client to have to explain why the proper 1099 was not filed with the government.	It is common in state FOI or open access laws to exempt from disclosure records pertaining to police investigations. In some cases police procedures are also exampled. 91-A:5 Exemptions. (included in the document linked in the question) lists 6 exemptions, part of number IV is: Without otherwise compromising the confidentiality of the files, nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a body or agency from releasing information relative to health or safety from investigative files on a limited basis to persons whose health or safety may be affected. This seem to imply an exemption for "investigative files", although no such exemption is specified in 91-A. However, I find it hard to see how the amount of ammunition purchased by the state as a whole reveals "police procedures" in a way which would compromise security or be reasonably exempt. In any case the state budget is almost surely a matter of public record, and it may well indicate the dollar amount of ammunition purchases, even if it does not give the number of rounds purchased. Or proceedings may be taken under the law. 91-A:7 Violation says: Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may petition the superior court for injunctive relief. The courts shall give proceedings under this chapter priority on the court calendar. Such a petitioner may appear with or without counsel. The petition shall be deemed sufficient if it states facts constituting a violation of this chapter, and may be filed by the petitioner or his counsel with the clerk of court or any justice thereof. Thereupon the clerk of court or any justice shall order service by copy of the petition on the person or persons charged. One might inquire of the office of the court clerk for more details on how this is done, and any fees.	In most jurisdictions, the lawyer would have two options: Resign from counsel and never talk about the confession. Take the counsel and defend the client as best they can without mentioning that they know the client is guilty. In most jurisdictions, there is something called "attorney client privilege". It means that whatever a client says to their attorney is confidential (there are usually exceptions to this, but usually none which are relevant for this question). The court can not force the attorney to testify against their client. The job of the defense counsel is to achieve the best possible outcome for their client. If the client pleads not guilty, then the attorney's duty is to do their best to convince the court that their client is not guilty, even when they know it to be false. There are a few limits, for example attorneys are usually not allowed to use underhanded strategies like falsify evidence or compel witnesses. But breaking attorney-client privilege by telling the court about a private confession without the consent of the client would be a major case of misconduct and would in many cases cost the attorney their legal license (at least!). And besides: A defense attorney who knows their non-guilty-pleading client is guilty can actually go through the process without ever explicitly claiming that the client is innocent. In order to convict someone for a crime, the prosecuter must prove the clients guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant doesn't necessarily need to prove they are innocent, they just need to create doubt. The defense attorney can fulfill that duty by raising questions like "If my client had committed the crime, then how do you explain [...]", "What reason would my client have had to commit this crime?", "Does this piece of evidence really prove anything?" or "How can we be sure that the witness is telling the truth when she says [...]?". All very good questions which need to be answered by the prosecution, even if the defense already knows the answers. At no point does the defender have to claim "my client is innocent". The defender just needs to claim "You have not yet proven beyond reasonable doubt that my client is guilty".	Suborning perjury is a criminal offense, at the federal level under 18 USC 1622, and is especially bad for a law firm to do. An attorney has a duty to not allow a client to lie in a legal proceeding, so instructing a client to lie is worse. Legally speaking, you are not compelled to turn them in to the (local US) authorities, unless your country has some odd law requiring citizens to report crimes in foreign countries. Two things can possibly come out of forwarding such an email to the authorities. One is that they will gain access to privileged communication, which they may not be able to use against the client. The other is that they will have evidence of the attorney committing a crime, which is not privileged. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1: There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told. We take no stance on moral questions as to whether you should or should not.
Was new law created when the UK Supreme Court ruled against the prorogation? The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that: a ruling on a prorogation was justiciable and that the duration of the prorogation Boris Johnson advised the Queen to enact, was unlawful Does this mean new law was created yesterday, by creating new legal precedent?	Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.	Why has this never been interpreted by SCOTUS? It has never been interpreted by any court, because the interpretation you're advocating is nonsensical, and nobody has ever tried to advance it in any court. Therefore, no court has had an opportunity to rule on it. Congress, however, has (at least implicitly) interpreted this clause to mean that all natural-born citizens are eligible to be president if they also fulfill the other requirements, regardless of when they were born, so that is the prevailing interpretation unless someone manages to challenge the interpretation either before congress or in a court. If such a challenge is made then there will be an explicit ruling.	Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.	Lèse majesté is not prosecuted in the UK While it is still technically illegal to advocate the abolition of the monarchy under the Treason Felony Act of 1848, more recent freedom of speech laws means that it is not possible to bring a successful prosecution. The only reason it hasn’t been abolished is that Parliament has better things to do and, since the government doesn’t bring charges under it, the courts can’t quash it. So, the Monarch has the same legal protections as anyone else.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.	Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.	A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law.
Could a Scottish court 'block' a parliamentary shutdown? It has been reported recently that a group of UK parliamentarians have petitioned the Scottish Court of Session, the top civil court in Scotland, to grant an interim interdict and an emergency hearing to the case filed last month (PDF). The matter at issue is "the lawfulness et seperatim constitutionality of Ministers of the Crown advising HM Queen to prorogue the parliamentary session": This has been reported as "MPs ask Scottish court to block Westminster shutdown". Does a Scottish court have the authority to issue such an interdict, or to hear such a case? How would the court enforce any ruling made or interdict granted? I would have thought an more appropriate venue for such a case would be the High Court of England and Wales (parliament sitting in Westminster, in London, England) or the UK Supreme Court (it being a matter which affects the whole UK for the top civil court to hear), though I am not sure cases can originate in the latter. A ruling is expected today (2019-09-04) which may offer additional insight.	Probably not. As I understand it, the case is being run in Scotland on the belief that Scottish constitutional law is more likely to allow this claim than English law is. That is why the case is not being run in the High Court of England and Wales. The case can't start in the Supreme Court because (apart from specific kinds of disputes) the Supreme Court only hears appeals (see the Constitutional Reform Act 2005). If the Court of Session rejects the case, the plaintiffs might then appeal to the Supreme Court, which would hear the appeal under Scottish law. Scottish law is different to English law, but there's only one Parliament and one Crown. The letter you linked to goes to great lengths to highlight possible differences between Scottish and English law, but they all occur prior to the Treaty of Union which took effect in 1707. The Scottish Parliament's Union with England Act 1707, section 18, says that Scottish law continues in force except insofar as it is inconsistent with the Treaty. A law which provided for Ministers' or the Crown's powers to be curtailed in Scotland but not in England (in respect to a single indivisible subject matter such as the Parliament) would be inconsistent with the core proposition of the Treaty, which is the creating of a joint Crown and a joint Parliament (sections 1 and 2 of the Act). The above difficulties are to say nothing of the low likelihood that any court can: (a) stop Ministers from giving advice, given that the Minister is not exercising any power (only the Queen can actually prorogue Parliament); or (b) stop the Queen from proroguing Parliament (since Her Majesty is the source of the court's authority, and not subject to it). (For completeness it should be noted that the Scottish Parliament that passed the Union with England Act 1707 and the current Scottish Parliament are two entirely different things. The current Scottish Parliament was created by the UK Parliament's Scotland Act 1998, and its powers are set out in that Act. The current Scottish Parliament is prohibited from legislating with respect to the union with England (schedule 5 paragraph 1).) The letter also says that proroguing Parliament would be inconsistent with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That Act expressly says that: the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed on exit day (section 1); and up until two years after exit day, the Government can make regulations with the force of law to deal with deficiencies in UK law caused by Brexit, e.g. the conferral of powers under UK law on an EU body (presumably the regulations could transfer that power to a UK body) (section 8). The Act goes on to say that, if it gets Parliament's approval for a withdrawal agreement, the Government can make regulations with the force of law to implement that withdrawal agreement. If there is no withdrawal agreement, then there's no need for the Government to get Parliament's approval. Not only does the Act not say that Parliament needs to sit in order to consider Brexit, but it expressly sets out a coherent way to deal with the consequences of a no-deal Brexit, namely the regulations made under section 8. The case is pretty weak and would require a very adventurous judge to approve it. EDIT: Well fuck me: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2019/41.html	He's not a judge in a courtroom with all the power of a federal judge. He's temporary presiding officer of the Senate, in charge of enforcing Senate rules. The Senate calendar is under control of the majority leader who passed the rules of how the trial would be run. If the rules don't say "must adjourn for the day by X o'clock" then Roberts would not be allowed to do so on his own, he needs a Senator to ask for adjournment and then get consent from the rest of the Senate.	Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.	The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court.	You have your answer already in the quotation you give. Her petition to appeal in forma pauperis was presented on February 26, 1931, and granted on March 17, 1931 At that time the Appeals (Forma Pauperis) Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 22) was in force. This created a limited form of legal assistance for paupers that paid for, amongst other things, counsel to appear before the House of Lords on appeal. See the costs order made by the House of Lords on remitting the case.	It seems to me that some commentators/articles have inadvertently conflated different legislation and a recent event involving the seizure of equipment from protester Steve Bray in Parliament Square. Some articles about Steve Bray have named or otherwise referred to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 without an explanation of any link between that person and this law - to me there is no link in the context of Bray's equipment seizure (the police may have mentioned other newer powers to Bray). Among other things, section 143 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (as amended) explicitly prohibits the unauthorised use of "amplified noise equipment" (including but not limited to loudspeakers and loudhailers) within Parliament Square and (the amendment) "the Palace of Westminster controlled area". Westminster Council provides a map in pdf format of the respective areas: Appendix to Protocol for enforcement of provisions in relation to noise nuisance in the vicinity of Parliament. Before the PRSRA 2011, sections 137 and 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 gave the Home Secretary the power to prohibit the unauthorised use of "loudspeakers" in "designated areas" no more than one kilometre around Parliament Square. Part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 amends the Public Order Act 1986 in relation to "public processions and public assemblies", including clauses related to "noise". Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 abolished the common law offence of public nuisance and created the statutory offence of "intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance". This more recent legislation has been criticised in relation to protests generally (not solely those that involve megaphones), e.g. by the Joint Committee on Human Rights its witnesses in their scrutiny of the-then Bill. Quote: The Bill introduces a new statutory offence of “intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance” which was previously an offence at common law. There is a wide range of non-violent conduct that may be caught by the statutory offence, which potentially criminalises some forms of peaceful protest. The offence carries a maximum sentence of 12 months if tried summarily and 10 years if tried on indictment. A person can also be issued with a fine.77 A number of our witnesses raised concerns about the impact of these changes and its compatibility with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. We share some of those concerns. In summary the explicit prohibition of "amplified noise equipment" is limited to Parliament Square and "the Palace of Westminster controlled area" but one can easily imagine the police claiming that a protester's use of a megaphone is a public nuisance.	Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.	england-and-wales Yes, double jeopardy applies The common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict apply equally to foreign offences; this is black letter law in Halsbury's Laws of England. Scotland is "foreign" for these purposes. There is no analogue to the odd US dual sovereignty doctrine. The general exception to double jeopardy regarding the re-trial of serious offences under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply here, because of an odd anomaly created by the statute due to criminal justice being devolved to the Scottish Parliament. As a result, according to the Crown Prosecution Service: There are no provisions dealing with qualifying offences [for retrial after acquittal] in Scotland as criminal justice is a matter for the Scottish Parliament. At present, the law in Scotland has not been changed so that these provisions do not apply to acquittals that take place in Scotland.
UK - Landlord refuses to remove personal items My partner and I have recently begun renting a house in the UK. The rental is a high value one (around £4000/month) and the property is large, and fully detached. The initial tenancy is for 12 months. The property is rented basically unfurnished, with only a couple of items on the inventory, and our tenancy agreement grants us full use of it and its grounds. The landlord lives abroad and operates through a local estate agent. When we viewed the property, we noted that the two garages and an adjacent storage room (which they call "the basement") were largely filled with the landlord's personal items - old exercise equipment, construction materials left over from building renovation, crates of old toys etc. We were assured by the agent that anything we didn't want to use would be removed. We subsequently made an offer, signed the tenancy agreement and begun our tenancy. We collected all of the landlord's leftover personal items into one of the two garages, and requested our agent to collect them as agreed. However, we were then told that the landlord did not wish for some of their items to be removed. The agent copied us in, very unprofessionally, on an email from the landlord, where she said she was very upset that the tenant had gone through their basement and moved their personal items - and that they were to be moved back into the basement. We replied and made it very clear that we did not agree to store the landlord's personal items in any part of our property, and that this was not part of our tenancy agreement. We also stated that if the landlord wished to store their personal items in the basement or other parts of the property, then that would have to be through a separate arrangement with us. We gave a date by which we would like these items removed, and finally pointed out that we are very concerned that we do not have full use of the property that we are paying for. The agent acknowledged this, but have nevertheless now removed only a selection of the landlord's items, telling us that the landlord has instructed them to return the rest to the basement. At this point one of our garages is half filled with crates of the landlord's personal rubbish and unable to be used as a garage. None of this stuff is mentioned on the inventory. We would really prefer not to burn bridges with our landlord and the agent by resorting to legal threats at this stage if we can avoid it, as we really like the house and would like to continue living there - but we would also really not give up some of our limited space to store the landlord's crap for free! What are our options in this situation, and what's our legal position? I have come across some sources stating that this sort of situation counts as partial eviction, due to the landlord denying us use of / access to some of the property - is that accurate? Is there some way we can convey this to them, gently enough not to cause a major rift? If it doesn't work out amicably, what's the best recourse we can have?	The landlord is in breach of the contract You have three options: Accept the breach, Take legal action, Negotiate some other agreement. Option 1 means you put up with the situation, option 2 means you annoy the landlord - both options suck. If you go with the second option you could seek damages in the small claims court. If you want an order for the items to be removed then you need a court with equity jurisdiction which needs a County Court.	You can always politely ask a person to leave, which could solve your problem. If that doesn't work, you will have to take legal action: you cannot change the locks or force him out (without the risk of a costly lawsuit). In Washington this would probably be the slower ejectment process, since you are not in a landlord-tenant relation. The actual process depends on the laws of your jurisdiction, though it is doable in any US jurisdiction. You probably have to hire an attorney to navigate the process, since an unlawful detainer action would likely be dismissed (that is, you have to file the correct action, not just some action that's in the ballpark).	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.	We don't give specific legal advice and one might VTC, but I think your phrasing is not quite right, and you are just curious about the possibility of binding the landlord to a term across leases. The first thing that a term in a contract has to so is say exactly what must be done by whom (or not done). You need to describe more precisely what it means for all future rent and rent increases to be commensurate with the current rent. You can think of conditions like "no more than 2% per annum" or "no more than 15% per annum", and then you can figure out what number is acceptable to the two of you. I would be surprised if you could come up with an agreeable number. Second, you'd have to make this limit "perpetual", which is pretty much impossible. You could negotiate the terms of the next lease today which would prevent an increase of rent by more thay you're happy with, but until governmental controls say exactly what a legal rent increase is, the property owner has the right to raise the rent by a million dollars, and you have the right to move elsewhere. It's as hard to permanently lock a landlord into an arrangement as it is to lock a tenant into renting a specific residence. Every year, you have the right to terminate the lease if the rent goes too high for you, and every year the landlord has the right to raise the rent if the current arrangement isn't sufficiently profitable. Incidentally, you might want to check with AHFC to see if you can actually do this. Your expectations don't determine what relief they provide, just make sure that you provided accurate answers to their questions and reported all income that you're required to report.	In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction.	There are several questions in the OP. The answers to all of them depend on the lease terms. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? Yes, usually. Regardless of who is on the lease, Person A is on the lease. In order to terminate or break the lease, Person A will have to negotiate termination. Most residential leases provide for joint and several liability for lease obligations. That means the co-signed lease is like three non-exclusive leases, one each between landlord and Persons A, B, and C. So Person A has to find a way to break the Person A lease. Other than a breach by either party, that likely can only be done by negotiation with landlord. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? Absent some other relationship or understanding between them (that is, other than the lease,) likely none. Persons B and C are each fully responsible to pay all of the rent. In other words, as far as the landlord is concerned it does not matter who pays the rent as long as it gets paid. If it doesn't get paid, the landlord can evict and sue all 3 for non-payment of rent. But the lease likely does not discuss the relationships between A, B, and C - whether they pay pro rata by time in the unit, by space used, per capita, or whatever. Landlord doesn't care, and is not the counterparty to those decisions. That said, if there is a relationship between A, B, & C (for instance, if A & B had a contract describing who would pay what, and B entered into another contract with C,) that will determine their relative obligations. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. This may create liability between B to A, C to A, or B & C to A. It is even conceivable that it creates a liability from landlord to A, if A had a reasonable expectation that the lease would not be amended absent A's consent. And the amendment may not be enforceable against A. So, for instance, A may be able to kick C out of the unit and bar C from reentry. It will not effect A's liability to pay rent.	You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner.	The default rule is that a landlord can refuse to rent to anyone for any reason, in which case the landlord can refuse to rent in this case. There are civil rights laws that limit this discretion in the case, for example, of discrimination based on race, or family status. But, those laws often have exemptions for owners of small amounts of property (e.g. a unit in their own home), which can't easily be determined from the question. If a civil rights law applies, the landlord must choose among potential renters on a non-discriminatory basis - the landlord doesn't have to rent to anyone in particular, but can't use the prohibited reasons to make the choice. If the default rule does not apply because a civil rights law unrelated to immigration bars discrimination against a tenant, someone's undocumented immigrant status probably doesn't provide an absolute defense to the civil rights law, but might be one factor among many that a landlord could consider in choosing among available tenants in much the same way that credit ratings, income, and a prospective tenant's criminal record, and other factors might be considered.
Question on Soliciting Positive Online Reviews in Exchange for Goods/Services I was hoping someone more knowledgeable would be able to help. I left a very honest three-star review online for the boarding facility where we have taken our dog several times. It wasn't an overwhelmingly negative review being only three stars, but I did mention something that was very concerning to me. They keep forgetting to document our dog's rabies vaccination, which makes me wonder how well they are keeping vaccination records with all the other dogs that stay there. I simply made a note of it in the review, which again was just an honest summary of my experience. Anyway, a mere few hours later, they call my husband regarding the online review. They asked him to ask me to update the review to five stars and basically retract everything I said. In exchange, they would offer us two free nights of boarding. There's no way this is legal, right? I can't seem to find a lot on the internet in regards to a business actually asking you to update a review in exchange for goods. I've had businesses offer an incentive for leaving a review, but in those situations they did not specify whether the review needed to be positive or negative. I was also aware of the incentive prior to writing. In this case, I am being offered free services that are contingent upon me changing (read: lying) and updating my review. Not only does that feel gravely wrong to me, but it really sounds alarms in regards to their boarding practices. I think they are concerned that I brought up their lack of vaccination record keeping. I don't know the legalities surrounding boarding facilities and what they are required to have, but their reaction to my review makes me think they are NOT engaging in legal business practice, and perhaps it is worse than I thought. Does anyone have any more information on businesses soliciting customers to not only leave reviews, but to update negative reviews to positive reviews in exchange for goods or services? Additionally, does anyone have any suggestions on taking further action? I am now genuinely worried that they are letting dogs stay there with zero vaccination records which is obviously a huge liability. I feel like I am in a position where I should do the right thing and pursue this further. I would want to know about this if I was any other customer here. It's also important to note that the conversation regarding the exchange of goods was over the phone, so unfortunately I do not have written proof of this conversation. Thanks in advance for your help!	I only address the core legal question. The first question regards where the review appeared: on the facility's own web page, or on some third party web page? In the latter case, there is the possibility that soliciting a modified review in exchange for something of value violates the terms of usage for that web site. There are also US federal regulations pertaining to advertising, as well as state regulations. The federal regulations are here. The main question is whether what you say constitutes an endorsement, as specified here. They define an endorsement as: any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. The regulation in fact gives some helpful examples (reading them helps to clarify what an "endorsement" is), the last of which involves a dog: Example 8: A consumer who regularly purchases a particular brand of dog food decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by the same manufacturer. She writes in her personal blog that the change in diet has made her dog's fur noticeably softer and shinier, and that in her opinion, the new food definitely is worth the extra money. This posting would not be deemed an endorsement under the Guides. Assume now that the consumer joins a network marketing program under which she periodically receives various products about which she can write reviews if she wants to do so. If she receives a free bag of the new dog food through this program, her positive review would be considered an endorsement under the Guides. The distinction at issue is whether the suggestion of receiving something of value might influence a person's statements. You can pay for a positive review, as a reward for saying nice things, as long as the reviewer had no reason to think that they would get get something in return for a review. Taking your review to be an endorsement, as required here, Endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. The regulation does not require you to reveal every thing that came into your mind in writing the review, but it is pretty clear that suppressing the concern about vaccination paperwork and the star count constitutes a dishonest statement of opinion of the endorser. Material connections must also be revealed: When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must be fully disclosed. For example, when an endorser who appears in a television commercial is neither represented in the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the endorser knew or had reason to know or to believe that if the endorsement favored the advertised product some benefit, such as an appearance on television, would be extended to the endorser In the 7th example under material disclosure, they describe a blogger who received something of value in connection with a review: the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the gaming system free of charge I should point out that these regulations are written by the FTC, and the implied interpretation (such as that the blogger should disclose... with no clearly stated penalty for failure to disclose) is an FTC interpretation. 15 USC 52 prohibits false advertisements for services affecting commerce. This is the jurisdictional aspect of their complaint against Cure Encapsulations, where defendants paid for reviews on a third-party website (this case involves a relationship between defendant and a fourth-party company that apparently hunts for and pays reviewers). This is apparently the first instance in which the FTC has gone against a business for paying for reviews on a third party web site, so it's not a foregone conclusion that they will prevail in court. Still, Chevron deference means that they will probably win at least on the jurisdictional question. The main difference is that in the Cure Encapsulation case, the violation was even more egregious in that the individuals were not even customers, and in this instance the would-(not)-be review was not the honest opinion of the endorser.	That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) \| HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act \| Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money.	Is It Legally Binding? While their customer service sucks, your oral authorization of the charge is legally binding (I take payments that way almost every day in my own business, it isn't an unusual business practice in small professional businesses). You authorize oral authorization of payments over the phone in the credit card agreement that your credit card company sends you every year that you don't read and throw away. The provider has to collect more information for a credit card payment over the phone than they do for an in person swipe in a credit card machine (e.g. your credit card billing address) and they are fully responsible for wrongful charges if they deal with an imposter. By regularly checking your credit card statements, you can confirm that no incorrect charges are present. Tax Issues If you want to take a tax deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses, you simply need to tote up the amounts your are entitled to from your own records, and put it in the appropriate box on your tax forms. You don't have to attach documentation to your return. If the IRS disputes your payment, you can offer up your credit card statements and your photograph of the receipts, and if necessary, medical records to show that you received the services, to show that the payment really happened and are deductible. Your credit card company's records, reflected in your monthly credit card statements, are considered very reliable for tax purposes. You have the burden of proving that the expense was incurred and is of a type that qualifies for a deduction by a preponderance of the evidence in the event that there is a dispute that is litigated, which means that you must show that it is more likely than not that you incurred a deductible expense of that kind in that amount in that tax year. Privacy Issues While there are financial information privacy issues associated with this transaction, HIPAA, which covers medical records, normally wouldn't apply to a credit card payment that indicates the person paid, the person paying, the account, the amount and the date, but not a description of the medical services provided or to whom they were provided, which is what is normally on a credit card receipt. The financial privacy issues are also partially addressed by the provider's merchant agreement with the credit card company which contains terms requiring them to maintain certain kinds of security with respect to your financial information (which is not to say that the provider actually follows all of the requirements of their merchant agreement scrupulously, which is why data breaches happen all the time in businesses both large and small).	You need to look at the domain registrar's TOS to determine their polices for canceling a domain after the fact in the way they did, i.e. claiming the domain is "premium" and as such allowing them to cancel and raise the price and re-offer the domain. The registrar may, in fact, have such a policy in their TOS that you agreed to when you opened an account with them and registered a domain. "Clicking through" and accepting a TOS is a binding contract. Their policy may hinge on an "escrow" hold on the domain for a certain time until your payment clears, they do due diligence, or other reasons, and by agreeing to the TOS you allowed them to reserve the right to cancel or re-offer the registration. However, such a policy is at least (I think) ethically challenged and at most could be illegal - US and local laws in your your jurisdiction may come into play - in terms of ICANN's policies. You may have success opening a complaint with ICANN, the international organization that oversees domain registrars and works to resolve complaints such as cyber-squatting, issues with the way registrars operate, etc. See Registrant Rights and Responsibilities Under the 2009 Registrar Accreditation Agreement - ICANN. If the registrar doesn't have a clear policy on the form of cancellation and re-offer you have been subjected to, your next step is definitely looking at Dispute Resolution Options - ICANN. Keep all your documents and emails, and log all phone calls or chats with the registrar. Make screenshots of your Cloudflare account and Google's web cache. And, it might be helpful to do a Google search for that registrar and "domain cancellation" or more relevant keywords to see if anything similar has happened in the past and the outcomes; those stories may give you ideas for other options. You may also need to find a local lawyer to advise you on your next steps, or talk to a free legal aid clinic in your area.	The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done.	what can I do to either head them off, or prevent them from charging us for a service we don't use, and have no intention of using, and is also not under contract anymore? That kind of notifications always should be made in writing, and in a way that allows you to prove that the other party received it (e.g., by email or a printout letter with a copy signed by the other party as receipt). If you are aware that the gym has recorded your phone call, you should ask it (and that means in writing) to preserve that recording in the event that the matter ends up in court. The sole request might reveal to the gym that you are willing to bring court proceedings if the gym insists to act unlawfully. Even if the gym eliminates the records despite your request not to do so, that would weigh against them because it would constitute spoliation of evidence. It would be helpful if in your email or letter you reflect that you even went to the gym, in accordance with the directions the gym gave you. If the gym persists with charging you and/or reports you to a collections agency, your first and easiest recourse is to file a grievance with the Michigan consumer protection agency (I don't know the exact name, as agencies' names may change over the years). For now, as a precaution, you might want to send your phone service provider a request for preservation of records of the call(s) through which you gave your 40-day notice. That is the typical term for asking the phone company to create a back up of your records, since by default phone companies keep records for about a year. Ask that the preservation include the standard information: source number, target number, date/time of the call, and duration. Regardless of whether the gym records phone calls, the fact that visiting the gym now takes you a three-hour drive [each way] suggests that the purpose of your phone call was to give the 40-day notice. Hence the potential relevance of retrieving those header records from your phone service provider.	The statement ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. could certainly be considered as defamatory. However, in the US and many other countries, truth would be a valid defense, if the person making the statement could prove that the statement is true. I don't see how it could be construed as solicitation. If worn on a shirt into ABC, the management could surely ask the wearer to remove it. If that request is refused, they could ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer has a valid membership, then it would depend on the exact terms of the membership contract, and provisions of local law, whether ABC could insist that the wearer leave, or have the wearer arrested for trespass should the wearer refuse. Any regulations incorporated by reference into the contract would also matter. At least in the US. walking back and forth on a public sidewalk just outside ABC's door, wearing such a shirt or carrying a classic picket sign with such a message would be pretty clearly legal, provided that others are not unduly obstructed, and no valid local ordinance is violated. In the wear-the-shirt-inside case, if the wearer refuses to remove the shirt or leave, the management would probably call law enforcement. LE will not want to decide whether wearer has the legal right to remain in the club wearing the shirt. They will probably ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer protests that s/he has a valid membership and thus a contractual right to stay, who knows what they would do. If they still ask the wearer to leave, the wearer would be wise to comply and perhaps take legal action to enforce his or her membership rights, which will depend on the contract details as mentioned above. A lawyer would probably be very helpful if the wearer wants to take that route. The wearer would be wise to remain polite and appear calm, not yelling or using epithets.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
Fully Executed Lease with "typo" We have a fully executed lease which states the landlords responsibilities. This is essentially a chart which "checks" what the landlord pays vs. what the tenant pays. Water, sewer and electricity are all "checked" as "landlord pays". We have operated under this assumption, and have even begun getting "electricity" charges on our rent, as we expected. That being said - we came home yesterday and found the lights off. We called our service provider and they essentially said that the leasing company has the apartment in their name, but they haven't paid it, and to get it in our name to get the service back on we would need to wait 72+ hours while they investigate. We went back to our leasing company going WTF and they're saying "they made a typo" and this is our problem to deal with. We were given no indication at any point that we would need to set up electric service in our name, and especially given that they have had multiple contacts with us in recent months over unrelated issues, we have never been told it was our responsibility to do something beyond pay them through our rent. We are now getting a lot of flack from them, saying that they are not responsible for it, won't help and don't care. Our electricity service provider is requiring the leasing company to pay the charges which are in arrears to get our service back on (at such time we can put it in our name). I'm looking to see what kind of ground they have to stand on to behave this way, as they have signed a legally binding, fully executed lease which we had no indication was not correct in its entirety. Additional info - we live in Maryland	If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.	Generally speaking, you signature and delivery of the lease to the landlord makes it possible for the landlord to enforce. Particularly when, as in the question, the landlord presented the lease to you as an "offer" which you accepted without modification, it is probably binding upon the landlord even if the landlord does not sign it or return a copy with the landlord's signature. In jurisdictions that have a statute of frauds, your part performance by sending checks in the lease period consistent with the lease, and the landlord's part performance by continuing to allow you to occupy the premises without objection, would probably make the statute of frauds (which generally requires a signed writing by the party against whom a lease is enforced) to be inapplicable. On the other hand, if you materially changed a version provided by the landlord, there is a real question over whether there has been an offer and acceptance, or a meeting of the minds, agreeing to the new lease. Materially here meaning changes that are more than updating your contact details and go to the heart of the lease contract.	Don't trivialize this because it appears to be minor and inexpensive. If something goes wrong, you could be liable for damage. You should have an idea of what a reasonable cost should be based on the rent and condition of the property. Discuss it with the landlord. If the landlord chooses to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, acknowledging that you aren't responsible for reimbursing the landlord for the cost or acknowledging receipt by the landlord of any contribution from you and a statement that the contribution fulfills your lease requirement. If you're going to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, agreeing to the choice of replacement parts and the choice of anyone you hire to do the work. It might be nice to think you can save money by doing it yourself. But if anything happens and there's damage, you could be liable. You should have renter's insurance. You should check your renter's insurance policy to see what, if anything, it says about tenant responsibility for repairs. Your insurance might pay for it. More importantly, will your insurance protect you if something goes wrong and there's damage? I recommend you copy this and modify it as you see fit or, if you don't this is correct, make up something that you think is correct. Keep an electronic copy on your computer. But also have a notebook in which you keep how-to papers, so you don't have to figure it out all over again at some time in the future and to use the how-tos you accumulate to help you make new how-tos as necessary. Also keep documentation, especially warranties. Scan receipts (receipt ink is notorious for fading over time) and warranties, keep them the electronic copies on your computer and print the receipts and put the printed receipts and original receipts with the warranty papers in the notebook. Keep a manilla envelope with receipts, warranties, instructions, and any papers you receive from anyone you hire to do the work. When you move out, you should give the envelope to the landlord so the landlord will be able to maintain what was installed and obtain warranty service if necessary.	In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved.	Has this contract been translated (badly) from another language because the construction of the clause is cumbersome and confusing? Does the contract say that I can have guests over 1 night without charge? Without charge, yes. However "Without Landlord's prior written consent, Tenant has no excuse to accommodate ..." so you need the landlord's permission for overnight guests. If so does it only start charging on nights after the first? No, if a person stays more than 1 night (with the landlords permission) then this triggers the landlord's right to charge. See below for how much they can charge. Is it supposed to be 10% of monthly rent $137 per guest per night? "With temporary commendation, day-based, and additional 10% of rent each person is applied." The term is ambiguous, I can see three ways that this would be interpreted: If you have a guest who stays more than 1 night in a month they can charge 10% for that guest for that month (i.e. 2 to 31 days all for the same price). For 2 people for 2 days this would be $1,400 x 10% x 2 = $280. They can charge 10% of the monthly rent per night that the guest stays. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2 = $560 As, 1 except the rent would be pro-rata. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2/31 = $18.06 Assuming that the landlord put forward this contract the interpretation adopted in the absence of other evidence would be the one least advantageous to the landlord i.e. 3. However, there is other evidence - the landlord accepts that the rate is pro-rata - he has just failed to account for the 10%, so 3. again. How is overnight defined? Well, is it defined in the contract or by the law where you are? If not, it would take its normal English usage - "for the duration of the night". If they arrive before sunset and leave after sunrise the next day then they have stayed overnight. What if they came over at 9am and slept in the day? It says nothing about requiring your guests to sleep. If they party overnight then they are overnight guests. If they sleep all day but don't stay overnight they are not overnight guests. What about 2 am? If sunrise is after 2am then this is not overnight.	Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.	No illegal eviction took place, if he wasn't a tenant The term of the room rental was specified beforehand. There was no renewable or extension clause in the rental agreement. Bob also is not a tenant: he is a guest in a hotel. The Hotel offers cleaning services, as the OP specified. By overstaying, his items now were trespassing, the removal was legitimate. However, there is a point at which a short term renting of a hotel becomes living at it. Where this is is often dependant on how long or in what way you stay. Where's the line between a Tenant and a Guest? THAT is the operative question. When does a Guest/Lodger become a Tenant and can get eviction protection? In germany a couple of Hotels actually do have renters with a special rental contract - which is vastly different from the normal room rental. For example, the Maritim in Hamburg has year-rentals. These are actual renters with a rental contract and eviction protection, that give up some tenant rights for services (e.g. room cleaning service for limits in remodeling). However, overstaying at a hotel can actually become a crime: Einmietbetrug - obtaining a room in a hotel or a residency but not wanting to pay or mischaracterizing your ability to do so - is a variant of fraud and thus can be punished under §263 StGB; Under the operating law, a hotel guest is not afforded with all rights of a tenant, unless they are explicitly pointed out like with longstay contracts. In california the line is 30 days, in new-york-state it is the same but they also need to not have a different residency. in england-and-wales, the operative case when someone is a lodger or tenant is Brillouet v Landless (1995) 28 H.L.R. 836: a hotel Guest is not a tenant, even after more than a month of stay. In fact, courts following this case argue, that such a person is only licensed to be on the premises, and the license could be revoked without eviction procedures. In fact, the Brillouet v Landless case is very close to the example. Brillouet rented a room in September, and extended the stay. Then he did not pay (or rather, his accommodation services didn't. In October, Landless sought to get rid of Brillouet for non-payment, just telling him to leave. Brillouet applied for an injunction against the eviction and got a temporary one (to preserve the status-quo) till the hearing. Mere days later, and the first instance court handed out judgement against the application of an injunction to protect Brillouet. The Hotel guest, so the court, was not a tenant under the Housing Act 1988: The Protection from Eviction Act depends on premises having been let as a dwelling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of protection from eviction and seeing no tenancy (emphasis mine): It is an essential prerequisite of any tenancy that the tenant should have, so it is said in some of the authorities, exclusive possession. In my judgment the facts of this case particularly when one bears in mind that Mr Brillouet upon his own assertion avails himself of at least some of the facilities (he goes to the restaurant occasionally for his breakfast) — come nowhere near demonstrating that he has or has had within this room exclusive occupation. At best in my judgment he could conceivably be a licensee. One then has to examine once more the terms of the statute to ascertain whether he is a licensee entitled to protection under the 1977 Act. As the section to which I have alluded makes plain, only licensees who occupy as a dwelling premises which they do occupy are entitled to protection. If, as in my judgment the facts here clearly demonstrate, the occupant is no more and no less than a hotel guest properly so-called, then the accommodation is not let to the licensee as a dwelling. Street v Mountford (1985) AC 809 most likely doesn't apply if any hotel services are offered by the hotel. In the case, Mountford was found a tenant because Street did not offer any services beyond the room and furnishings itself. The presence of any service would change the pattern significantly, as the House of Lords decided: It applies against Bob if the hotel offers cleaning service/room service, and by offering service beyond the room and the furnishing within it, it is lodging, not a tenancy: The occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance or services which require the landlord or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises. A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own. [...] Street provided neither attendance nor services and only reserved the limited rights of inspection and maintenance and the like set forth in clause 3 of the agreement. On the traditional view of the matter, Mrs. Mountford not being a lodger must be a tenant. Mehta v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (2000) 32 H.L.R. 45 doesn't apply, as that case revolved around a verbal contract with the manager for 6 month exclusive use of rooms. Mehta became a tenant by that contract and eviction protection applied. In contrast, due to how agreements with hotels are generally written, Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) might apply: If the contact specified that the hotel does have unlimited access (which is typical) and that reassignments of rooms (like, another guest in the room) might apply, then there is no tenancy. Could Bob be a tenant? For Bob to be a tenant under the E&W interpretation (following the pattern established by Street & Brillouet), the facts must be such, that several things must be true: Exclusive possession: No services are offered at all beyond the room. For example, there can't be any shared facilities with the rest of the hotel that Bob has access to, and services such as room cleaning or fresh towels or laundry are not offered either. Not using them is not enough, they can't be offered at all. (both Street, Brillout) If in exclusive Possession, Bob still isn't a tenant if he is what Street calls a service occupier. That's an employee who is given a place to sleep in to perform his duties to the employer, like a Butler or Maid. (Street) Bob is also not an owner in fee simple, trespasser or mortgagee in possession, or an object of charity - for which all other rules apply. (Street) In the alternative, one fact makes them automatically one: There was a contract that in its form stipulates they are a Tenant (Mehta v RBS)
How is the UK Supreme Court able to void the prorogation of the UK Parliament? In the UK, in practice, the government has power, but in theory the power lies in the hands of the Monarch, who acts on the advice of her Ministers. The Prime Minister advised the Queen to prorogue Parliament, and she duly did so. The Supreme Court has since found that that advice was unlawful. Therefore, they say, Parliament has not been prorogued. “This court has already concluded that the prime minister’s advice to Her Majesty was unlawful, void and of no effect. This means that the order in council to which it led was also unlawful, void and of no effect and should be quashed. This means that when the royal commissioners walked into the House of Lords it was as if they walked in with a blank sheet of paper. The prorogation was also void and of no effect. Parliament has not been prorogued. This is the unanimous judgment of all 11 Justices.” How, though, does this jibe with the legal fiction that Her Majesty has the power to prorogue Parliament whenever she so wishes, and that the Prime Minister merely advised her to do so, having no power to order her? If his advice was unlawful, surely her action in response to that advice was nonetheless lawful, as the fiction is that she acts in her own right, not merely as an automaton controlled by her Prime Minister.	The sovereign has the power to prorogue parliament at will, but actually exercises the power only on the advice of the PM (actually, according to paragraph three of the decision, it is exercised on the advice of the privy council). Other of the sovereign's powers are delegated to the courts. The court is not unfamiliar with exercising the sovereign's power to void her own acts, as acts of parliament and acts of government ministers are also nominally acts of the sovereign. While the courts cannot void acts of parliament, they can indeed void executive acts. Two relevant quotes follow. From paragraph 30, relating to the sovereign's lack of discretion in exercising the prerogative to prorogue parliament: It is not suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to accept that advice. In the circumstances, we express no view on that matter. That situation does, however, place on the Prime Minister a constitutional responsibility, as the only person with power to do so, to have regard to all relevant interests, including the interests of Parliament. From paragraph 32, on the justiciability of questions concerning prerogative powers: ... political controversy did not deter the courts from holding, in the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, that an attempt to alter the law of the land by the use of the Crown’s prerogative powers was unlawful. The court concluded at p 76 that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”, indicating that the limits of prerogative powers were set by law and were determined by the courts.	Here's a 2002 law review article by MP Henderson that does a rundown of ineffective assistance of counsel standards and precedents in both the UK and US (and also details shortcomings and inconsistencies in both, which is the true focus of the article, though not particularly relevant to this Q&A). The short of the matter is that bdb484's summary of the basic standard for the US is essentially the same in the UK: both focus on the practical impact of the counsel, rather than the actual efficacy and skill of the counsel. Meaning that if the court concludes that the result of the trial would have been the same with an effective counsel, then the results of that trial will stand. This is usually phrased in legal parlance as a "miscarriage of justice" issue. This results in a few seemingly glaring absurdities being ignored when the evidence against the defendant is seen as too strong to defend against, like sleeping through trials. The specific case detailing the standard test in the UK is R (Aston) v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2004] EWHC 2368, and is essentially the same 2-part test as the Strickland test detailed in bdb484's answer: was the conduct outside the range of that of a reasonable counsel/advocate, and if so was it materially relevant enough to alter the verdict? The article I linked at the start states (with several citations, for the quotes in particular, here omitted): Courts in the United Kingdom are highly deferential to counsel's decisions. Also, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct will fall within the wide range of reasonable effective assistance. Additionally, courts in the United Kingdom will make allowances for the "distorting effect of hindsight". As the result of such discretion, "[c]onducting the trial without, or even contrary to, the instructions of the client, mere errors of judgment or even negligence, may not be sufficient to set up an inference of an unfair trial." And it's that last bit that's relevant to your question: simply defying the instructions of the client as concerns which evidence to present is not necessarily (and is unlikely to be) a basis for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. What constitutes a "fair" trial is a fairly broad umbrella; it doesn't require perfect counsel, nor that all conceivable avenues of defense be explored. Both UK and US lawyers are expected to both abide by the instructions of their client, while also being granted the leeway to present the case in the manner they deem best. This is spelled out quite clearly in the Scottish case Anderson v HM Advocate, where the High Court spelled out four points for what constitutes (in)effective assistance of counsel. To quote Henderson's summary again (which again has many citations here omitted) First, the accused has the right to a fair trial and to have his or her defense presented to the court. If counsel's conduct deprived the accused of those rights, a miscarriage of justice could result. Second, counsel must abide by the client's instructions, and not disregard those instructions. However, counsel must conduct the case as he or she thinks best. Third, counsel determines how the defense is presented, and the accused is bound by counsel's decision. Finally, counsel, not the accused, decides whether or not to attack the character of a Crown witness. Again, it's the third point that largely crushes your hypothetical's chances of success on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. For it is the counsel that ultimately decides how to present the defense, which includes what evidence and testimony to seek to include, and this is a binding decision upon the accused. The counsel in your hypothetical may have decided that the value of the evidence was significantly weaker than the client thought, and this generally falls under the umbrella of reasonable discretion for the advocate. Only if you can show the act to not present the evidence was outside the behaviors of a reasonable (generic) advocate, and also that it materially impacted the verdict, could you expect to prevail. As a bit of aside, there is something of an issue on whether or not there is a right to effective assistance of counsel in the UK. The right to a fair trial was really only expressly codified in The Human Rights Act of 1988, but that does not specify a right to effective counsel, only the right to a fair trial. A trial can be fair with no counsel at all. By contrast, in the US the 6th ammendment has been held to grant a right to both a fair trial and effective counsel in criminal matters, and the government must foot the bill to provide the accused with an attorney if requested/needed (the accused can waive this right, and there is a certain reasonableness where courts will eventually tell a defendant "oh well, figure it out yourself" if they keep rejecting their court appointed attorneys and demanding a new one). In the UK access to legal counsel is largely considered only available to those who can afford to pay for it, with the government fronting the bill only in exceptional cases (e.g. the courts deems it desirable to do so in the interests of justice). This right to a fair trial rather than a right to legal counsel seems to be why the UK currently places the emphasis on the practical impacts of the alleged ineffectiveness, rather than the alleged ineffectiveness itself. My understanding of US jurisprudence suggests it's rather more practical in justification: the courts don't want to do do-overs over procedural issues when the result is a fait accompli, as it consumes lots of time and resources and risks the general ravages of time on evidence, will, and memory.	Historically, this was true in the Icelandic Commonwealth in the Middle Ages, and in some democratic Greek city-states in the classical era. Similarly, in non-democratic feudal regimes, the lord or monarch was both the law giver and sitting in court was also the arbiter of all disputes arising under the lord's own laws. In places like Saudi Arabia where the monarchy's power is more than symbolic, the system still works this way to a significant extent. The practical reality in most one party Communist states is similar. In the United Kingdom, historically, the Appellate committee of the House of Lords (staffed by a subset of aristocrats usually appointed for life by the Prime Minister to the post) was the highest court of appeal of other courts in the British Commonwealth (with the Judicial committee of the Privy Council handling final appeals from outside Britain), and it was also a court of original jurisdiction for certain criminal cases against other aristocrats to satisfy the Magna Carta's notion that one is entitled to a jury of one's peers. Top level general purpose legislatures rarely serve as courts at the highest level, except in very isolated political matters. A good example of narrow quasi-judicial legislative power is the power of the Congress in the U.S., to be the ultimate judge for Congressional election disputes and of some Presidential election disputes. Congress also has quasi-judicial jurisdiction over impeachments of government employees whether or not they are elected, and over expulsions for cause of its own members and over other ethical sanctions of its own members. Many other legislatures have some sort of quansi-judicial impeachment and/or explusion power exercised as a whole by by some committee within it. It is common in the United States for administrative agencies, within their narrow area of competence to exercise both quasi-legislative power to enact regulations with a broad mandate in a subject area, and also to have quasi-judicial power in that same subject area. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Merit System Protection Board, for example, all operate in this fashion to some extent. Likewise, it is very common at the local government level for a city council and its planning board to carry out both legislative roles and quasi-judicial role when disputes come up regarding its land use regulations. Similarly, school boards routinely both establish employment regulations and other school rules, and serve in a quasi-judicial role with respect employee discipline or termination, and with respect to student discipline. This dual role is also common for the boards of other public institutions like hospitals and state colleges, and for private non-profit organizations. A recent example in that kind of situation is Colorado's State School Board which both exercises legislative power over when charter schools (i.e. public schools not under the direct supervision of any elected local school board) may be formed, and has the ultimate and final judicial review role over decisions by local school boards to grant or deny school charters.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful.	The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress.	This is an appeal from the decision in A Local Authority v JB [2020] EWCA Civ 735. In the part of the hearing to which you refer, Lord Stephens is asking the appellant’s counsel about the following principle, quoted at [31] of the judgment under appeal: When considering capacity to marry, the question is whether X has capacity to marry, not whether she has capacity to marry Y rather than Z. The question of capacity to marry has never been considered by reference to a person's ability to understand or evaluate the characteristics of some particular spouse or intended spouse: Re E (and Alleged Patient); Sheffield City Council v E and S [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam). In Re E, Munby J said at [91]: The point is suggested by Miss Waddicor's very pertinent rhetorical question: Can it seriously be suggested that the court has the right to vet E's suitors, to decide that X is suitable but that Y is unsuitable, to select who E is to marry? The answer to that question, in my judgment, is that the court quite clearly has no such role. The ‘father of the bride test’ is the proposition rejected here: that the Court of Protection could play the traditional role of the father of the bride, by granting permission to marry a particular person, rather than determining the person’s capacity to marry in a more general sense.	They still have the power They generally don’t because: Most activities of a criminal nature no matter how novel can be shoehorned as a new instance of an existing crime. Parliament is much more pro-active in its legislative agenda. The judicial system moves much more slowly.
Am I liable to my employer if I keep my notebooks past the term of employment? As I work, I keep a notebook. At a high level, it is a list of things I need to accomplish on a given day, or within the next few weeks. Sometimes I also use it as scratch paper, which means that I write down names of things (I am a programmer, so that might mean potentially sensitive information for a malicious agent). When I work with scratch paper in the office, it is sufficient to deposit it in the recycling bin in the office, my managers see no need for it to be specifically destroyed. The employee handbook makes the general statements about not bringing home company documents, but does not mention personal notebooks specifically. I am in an employment structure that sees me in a series of different short term positions (roughly 4 months each) at a series of different companies. At the end of each engagement I take my notebook home (as I do every evening), and place it on a shelf, where it stays. Are there specific laws or precedents that cover this? Specifically for Canada and the US, but I am also interested in general. Or would this entirely be governed by company policy?	If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.	You need a lawyer There is no magic phrase to do what you want. The company will care about defending their assets, while you will want to defend yours. Only a lawyer will be able to tailor the condition that makes sense based on what your job's domain covers and your side projects. It is entirely possible that your personal projects conflict with your employer's, and you must then put your personal projects on hold or risk getting sued. e.g.) developing two pieces of software that does the same thing. Your lawyer will be able to advise on how that looks and what to do. No random strangers on the internet can give you accurate advice.	Germany may be different, however in the United States this would be considered work-for-hire and the employer would be the rightful owner of the source code. Regardless of jurisdiction, and from a more practical point of view, you are better off not having a copy of the source code. Using it as reference or example in the future could easily turn into (unintentional) copyright infringement. If, in the future, you write code you would like to be able to freely keep and reuse in any project, make sure the owner/employer licenses it using something like the BSD, MIT, or ISC license.	It is not necessary for an agreement to be verbose and written by a lawyer, for it to be binding. There is some danger in having untrained people writing up agreements (they don't know the distinction between "what the law says" versus "what we had in mind"). The agreement is binding, but their interpretation of the contract language does not automatically prevail. The statement "ALL TUTORS ARE PAID 8 HOURS, unless told otherwise" is slightly problematic since it is not true (you can't pay time, you pay money for time spend). With no other statements about time and payment, and just looking at the words, this says that an employee will be paid for 8 hours work, period. Unless they say something different. That could mean "even if you work 20 hours, you only get paid for 8" (illegal under various labor laws), or it could be "even if you only work 2 hours, you get paid for 8" (the most reasonable interpretation). The interpretation "You are limited to 8 hours of work per pay period / contract" is not a reasonable interpretation: that isn't what the clause says. Such a limit could be clearly expressed ("can work up to 8 hours" is a clear way to state the limit), and since they didn't say anything like that, that is not how the courts will read the clause. They can, however, inform you otherwise, e.g. say "your minimum automatic pay is now 2 hours", or "we will only guarantee 2 hours work", and at that point that's what the number is. Since this is (presumably) a take-it or leave it contract which they wrote up and you didn't actually negotiate, any unclarities are legally interpreted in your favor. If you have worked more than 8 hours and they are using the contract language to argue that you won't be paid for the overage, that is not at all likely to hold up in court. Under terms of the contract (interpreted as stating a minimum guarantee of hours), they can inform you that your new minimum is 0 hours. Also, unless there is some kind of tenure clause, they can terminate the contract at will, and maybe they'll hire you under a different contract. What the terms of employment were for you in the past does not matter, what matters is what the current terms are. If you did not pay attention to the fact that they changed the terms of the agreement as of this quarter, that is not their problem. If they decided to change to "actual hours worked" after the current contract was formed, and they informed you of that fact later, then thereafter that is what the agreement is. Until you are notified of that change, the guaranteed minimum is what it says in the contract. In case their argument is "The university sets this policy, the department made a mistake in not informing you", the university has to take responsibility for the errors of their inferiors.	That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached.	The page you link is a good summary. It describes the employer obligations under the Ontario Employment Standards Act. Eating periods are described at section 20: 20 (1) An employer shall give an employee an eating period of at least 30 minutes at intervals that will result in the employee working no more than five consecutive hours without an eating period. Exception (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the employer and the employee agree, whether or not in writing, that the employee is to be given two eating periods that together total at least 30 minutes in each consecutive five-hour period. This section has been applied several times by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and appears to have been given its plain meaning. There are two ways that the Act lets an employer provide those breaks: Provide full 30-minute eating period(s) so that the employee works no more than five consecutive hours without an eating period. By agreement, provide two eating periods that total 30 minutes, "in each consecutive five-hour period" If proceeding by option two, the 30 minutes of eating period have to occur "in each consecutive five-hour period." The Ontario Labour Relations Board has described these two options and has said that option two requires the breaks to be "within" each consecutive five-hour period. See Rusty's at Blue Inc. / M & S Accounting v Erica Solmes, 2022 CanLII 56373 (paragraph 125, emphasis in original): Section 20 requires an employer to give an employee an eating period of 30 minutes after no more than five consecutive hours of work, or (with the agreement of the employee) two eating periods totalling 30 minutes within each consecutive five-hour period. Whether an employee is entitled to a single 30-minute eating period or to two eating periods totalling 30 minutes, the eating periods must be uninterrupted. The other answer and the page you link also describes an "exceptional circumstances" exception, but that is describing section 19 of the Act. Those exceptional circumstances can only let an employer get around the requirements of sections 17 and 18. Those are not relevant to the eating-period requirements. An employer may require an employee to work more than the maximum number of hours permitted under section 17 or to work during a period that is required to be free from performing work under section 18 only as follows	You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.	Canada In Canada, "the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein" (Copyright Act § 13(1)). Also, "[w]here the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright" (Copyright Act § 13(3)). Nothing in your description of the situation describes to me an employer/employee relationship, so in my opinion, § 13(3) is not implicated. Even if there were an agreement or contract to transfer copyright to an LLC or assign it to the other individuals, absent an actual writen assignment, the original owner still owns the copyright. "[N]o assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right..." (Copyright Act § 13(4)). In University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd, there was a contract that required assignment of copyright. "The examiner was the first owner, and he has not assigned the copyright in writing signed by him or his agent. The copyright therefore remains in the examiners, subject to the obligation under the contract of employment to assign it to the University or as it may direct." Even though copyright was owed to the University, it didn't become theirs until the written assignment took place. United States Similarly, in the US, "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.", and "in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author" (17 U.S.C § 201). "A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." (17 U.S.C § 204) Conclusion In both Canada and the US, transfer of copyright requires an affirmative act (a written, signed document, or a note or memorandum, etc.) Since nothing in your description indicates that the author has prepared a signed, written, instrument of conveyance or note or memorandum of the transfer of copyright, the copyright still belongs to the original author.
Does the app TikTok violate trademark? TikTok, previously known as Musical.ly, is a for-profit app that runs on IOS and Android which allows it's users to upload short videos at includes a backtrack. The app was launched in 2017. Kesha Sebert is an American singer, songwriter, rapper, and actress, who on August 7, 2009, released the song Tik Tok, which went on to be a "chart-topping" song, and to date has sold 25 million copies. Although, the app Tik Tok does not profit from merchandise sales, could they be in violation of the song Tik Tok's trademark since it's still profiting?	As usual with trademarks, the key question is "will reasonable people be confused about the source or affiliations of the product or service". Trademarks are, as you already know, limited to a particular industry or area of business, in general. Displaying user videos is not exactly the same thing as a particular popular song, but they just might be close enough for some consumer confusion tom occur. Whether reasonable people are in fact confused into thinking that the app is in some way sponsored by the makers of the song is a question of fact. A trademark suit would probably need to present some sort of evidence that confusion had occurred or was likely. It also may make a difference whether "Tik Tok" has been registered as a trademark. In the US, registration gets greater protection than mere use. (In some countries there is no protection without registration.) It is also possible that the app has already licensed the rights to the term from the trademark owner for the song. This would avoid a potential suit. It is also worth noting that the term "Tik Tok" is not original with the song. It dates back, in that spelling, to at least the "Oz" books by L. Frank Baum and others Tik-Tok of Oz dates from 1914, and the character of the Tik-Tok from the book Ozma of Oz (1907). Terms that are not original coinages are less strongly protected in trademark law, and the app could claim to be alluding to the Oz character, not the more recent song. A comment by ub3rst4r says that: the term "Tik Tok" is registered as a trademark in the USA by "Bytedance Ltd" (which is the company that operates the app). If that is correct, the US Patent and Trademark office (PTO) came to at least a preliminary conclusion that this trademark did not infringe anyone else's trademark. That doesn't meant that an infringement suit is doomed, but it would make any such suit harder and less likely. It seems that, as described in this news story a company selling watchs under the name "Tic Tok" was sent a cease and desist letter on behalf of the singer Kesha Sebert. The firm responded by filing a suit for a declaratory judgement. The case is Wimo Labs LLC v. Kesha Sebert, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:11-cv-02978. However, google does not show any resolution of this case, one way or the other. This was brought to my attention in a comment by StephanS. As this docket record shows, the case was dismissed by agreement without prejudice, apparently after a settlement (as stated in the comment by user muru). Thus there was no ruling on the merits of the case.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	Copyright subsists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression..." 17 USC §102 Originality requires "independent creation plus a modicum of creativity". Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) The creator of a work generally owns the copyright to that work. 17 USC §201 Twitter's Terms of Service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). So, you maintain the copyright ownership, and you grant Twitter a licence to do whatever Twitter wants with that work. This allows Twitter to show your tweet around its network and to allow for re-tweeting etc. (Although, it could have done those things with a less permissive licence.) You are not giving other users that licence.	We can't tell you if you can do that or not, because that would be specific legal advise. You should consult an attorney who specializes in trademark law to get an estimation of how risky it would be to use that name. So I am just giving you a couple general pointers. Names are not protected by copyright, but by trademarks. The purpose of trademarks is to prevent consumer confusion. They are supposed to prevent someone from selling a product under a name which consumers might mistake for official merchandise of someone else. Media companies in particular tend to be very protective of their trademarks, because merchandising is often one of their main sources of revenue. And they don't want to share that revenue with people creating knockoff products. Also, they must fight for their trademark in court, because when they only enforce it selectively, then they risk that a court will consider the mark so widely used already that it is no longer worth protecting. But the show is from the 1950s. Is the trademark still protected after all that time? Maybe. There are registered trademarks and unregistered trademarks. Registered trademarks, which usually but not always are followed by an "®" symbol, need to be renewed in regular intervals. So if someone still pays for the renewal, it might still be a protected trademark. Unregistered trademarks, which usually but not always are followed by a "™" symbol, are protected as long as they are "used in commerce". Which means that if the IP owner of that show still sells products branded as "Winky Dink and you", they can probably still claim unregistered trademark protection. In order to find out, you would need to do your own research or pay your attorney to do a trademark research for you. Are your proposed names even a trademark violation? Perhaps, perhaps not. That's for a court to decide. Personally I think that "Winky Dink and Me" is more infringing than "My Winky Dink Syndrome", because the first is a lot closer to the original name and brand image, giving it a higher likeliness of causing consumers to mistake it for an official "Winky Dink and You" product. But that's an argument you got to make in court. Estimating the chance that the judge will side with you and how much in legal costs it will take you to get to the point where you are even going to have the opportunity to make that argument is a job for your attorney.	In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.	No, the musical composition itself (i.e., what you might express tangibly in sheet music) has copyright distinct from the copyright that exists on Led Zepplin's recording of the song. Your new cover will still be a derivative work of the musical composition. When you record a cover of a copyrighted song, you must get permission from the composer (or current copyright holder of the composition). In the United States, however, you can compel the copyright holder to grant you license under 17 USC §115. Under a compulsory license, you pay a fixed fee per copy of the cover that you distribute (currently 9.1 cents), and the copyright holder must allow you to distribute those copies. See the circular Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords from the U.S. Copyright Office. I am not aware of other countries that have a similar compulsory license scheme, so in those jurisdictions, you would need to negotiate a license with the publisher or an intermediary agency they use. However, even if you did get a compulsory license to distribute your cover song, you must get permission to synchronize the song with a video. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers describes the copyright holder's exclusive synchronization right: A synchronization or "synch" right involves the use of a recording of musical work in audio-visual form: for example as part of a motion picture, television program, commercial announcement, music video or other videotape. Often, the music is "synchronized" or recorded in timed relation with the visual images. Since the synchronization right cannot be acquired under a compulsory license, you will need to have the publisher (or whoever the copyright holder is) agree to license the synchronization right to you under whatever terms the two of you can agree upon.	Sound recordings can be, and new ones normally are, protected by copyright. The copyright would usually be held by the person who made the recording, or that person's employer, not by the speaker if that is a different person. Use of such a recording without permission might well be copyright infringement. But more clearly and directly, broadcasting a statement: I am {performer} and you are listening to {song name} on my favorite station {station name } without authorization from the performer would in many jurisdictions violate the performer's right of publicity, giving the performer grounds to sue the station. It might well also be false advertising, implying that the performer had endorsed the station when s/he has not done so. That would depend on the specific laws of the jurisdiction where the broadcast was made. A suit over publicity rights or an action for false advertising would probably be simpler than a copyright suit in such a case. I think that most if not all such announcements are made with the consent of the performers involved, and are probably recorded directly by such performers. (For one thing it is usually in the performer's interest to cooperate with stations and networks that play the performer's work.) If such announcements were somehow artificially synthesized, but with the permission of the performer, and of any owner of copyright in any recording used, I don't think there would be any legal problem. If an AI was trained to create a good imitation of a person's voice with9ut diretly copying a recording, I am not at all sure if there would be any copyright infringemetn under current law. That may be an area where the law will need to change to respond to the technology. But if such an imitation were used without permission to make the kind of statements discussed above, the personality rights issue and false advertising issue would still be there. Those do not in any way depend on whether the announcement uses a copy of a recording or not, those are both about the use of someone's name and reputation without authorization. In fact, even if the announcement did not pretend to use the performer's voife, those woudl still bne an issue. Suppose the announcer saids, in his orm her own voice: {Performer} said to tell you that s/he is glad thit his/her song is being playing on his favorite outlet {station name}. There is no technical fakery there, deep or shallow, but if done without authorization it is still a problem, or would be in some jurisdictions at least. If technology is used to create a plausible imitation of someone's voice, but it was not distributed with any claim, direct or implied, to be that person, then the case is different. I suspect that in most jurisdictions there would be no grounds for legal action, just as celebrity imitators do not need permission as long as they don't fake endorsements.	The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation.
Absurdly high painting bill deducted from apartment security deposit I moved out of a 2 bedroom apartment in Los Angeles under a month ago and have just received my deposit back with ~$1200 taken out for re-painting. This is for a below average size 2 bedroom apartment (just under 1,000 sqr ft) and during the move out inspection they didn't mention a full re-paint. During the move out inspection, the property manager only mentioned light touch ups, with wording along the lines of "repainting a few scuff marks, but it shouldn't cost you too much". I know this is all soft wording and I don't have anything that explicitly states I can't be charged $1200, but do I have any ground to dispute this kind of bill in California? I should also note that I didn't receive a detailed itemized bill, receipts, photos of the damage repaired with this amount, or any additional information. Just a paper (and check) stating the 2 deductions from the deposit ($1200 for repainting and $300 for cleaning).	In a normal residential lease, the tenant is responsible for damage beyond ordinary wear and tear. Scuff marks may or may not be ordinary wear and tear depending on their severity and how they were caused. For example, scuff marks in a hall or stair caused by normal movement would be ordinary wear and tear and therefore the landlord's cost while a scrape caused by moving furniture in or out would be the tenant's cost. If these were tenant's issues they would have to be extensive and severe to justify a total repaint.	You did not specify a country or the specific contracts that might rule your condominium. At least in some jurisdictions indeed the repair cost of private portions cannot be shared. Moreover, you may not be required to pay some costs for common portions if you refuse to do so and won't make use of them. Do I have to sue them to fix this issue? A lengthy law-suit is too costly for me. If I refuse to pay $2k and only pay 1.2k, will I be facing any legal troubles? You will probably manage to continue paying just 1.2k, and have them have to sue you if they want to collect that supposedly owned money from you. However, there might be some requirements about providing notification of your refusal in a certain way or before some time elapses. I would recommend you to consult a local lawyer, it will be well-spent money. Plus, that refusal is actually sent by your lawyer (rather than just telling you how/what to say), should make your "law-understanding neighbor" think twice about going forward with their attempt of having you pay for it.	Can a landlord legally charge for pet rent even when no pets are present in the apartment? Yes. Absent any indication in the lease that your cats would not move in immediately, the landlord is right. I assume that your lease reflects mutual knowledge of your intent to bring your cats over (via a marked checkbox or in "d) Pet1 Details: ... Pet 2 Details ..."). If so, according to the lease, you officially have pets in the apartment. To avoid being charged unnecessarily, you should have (1) ensured that the contract reflects the intended delay regarding your cats, or (2) asked the landlord to amend the lease once it is imminent that you will bring your pets over. One or multiple administrative reasons justify a landlord to charge pet fees even if there are no pets in the apartment. For instance, the landlord might need to notify his insurer whenever an additional rental unit will host pets, thereby resulting in adjustments to a premium. Likewise, the number of pets might be a factor when a cleaning company bills the landlord. The lease was signed with the impression that the $40 would only be necessary if we brought pets. Hence the relevance of determining whether or not the lease objectively reflects that you notified the landlord of your intention to bring pets and, if so, when it would become effective. If the latter is not specified, it defaults to the start date of the lease. It also sounds like if we never mentioned pets until, say, 6 months in, they would charge us pet rent for the previous 6 months even though the pets were not present. It depends. If the landlord "busted" you, then he could sanction you in accordance with the terms of the lease. Instead, if you subsequently requested an amendment to the lease, then the landlord would only charge you from the date you officially bring the pets. But the effective date needs to be reflected in the lease/amendment. Should I take this to court and get a lawyer? No. First, for the reasons I mentioned above. Second, because lawyers want money, and they will detect right away that there is really not much to recover in a controversy like this one. Third, because complaining about a relatively small amount ($40/month) tells the lawyer that he or she won't get much money from you either (and lawyers want your money). And fourth, because the yearly total of pet fees indicates that the matter would have to be filed in Small Claims Court, where --if I am not wrong-- parties are not allowed to be represented by counsel. Going to court is not "peanuts". Even if your were allowed --and you managed-- to retain a lawyer, you would end up paying so much in attorney fees to someone who might not be forthcoming, let alone diligent. If you no longer plan on bringing pets, just ask the landlord to amend the lease accordingly.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.	Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose.	When screening potential tenants, what is the proper way to turn them down, and the legal implications if the tenant asks for more details? The "proper" way to turn someone down depends on why you decided to turn him or her down. As long as you did not decline to rent to a tenant because of information you learned in a credit report or commercially available criminal background check, you are not required to notify them. However, it is a good business practice to notify them in writing as Nij's post suggests. However, it would be a good idea to keep a copy of the letter for you records and possibly write down some notes. Such as, "other applicants had higher income," or "could not verify rental history." These kinds notes one the letters you mail out will be you friend should you ever be accused of improper discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc.. Declining to Rent Based Upon a Credit Check or Commercially Available Background Check: The federal law that governs credit checks and commercially available background checks is the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). The FCRA regulates "consumer reports," which includes credit reports and criminal background checks that are assembled by companies. (The FCRA does not apply if you, yourself, are going to the state police or courthouse to get background check records). Under the FCRA, requires that people who make decisions against someone based on information in a credit or background check, notify that person. The FCRA calls this decision against someone an "adverse action" and requires that you provide the affected party the following information: The name, address and telephone number of the company that supplied the consumer report, including a toll-free telephone number for companies that maintain files nationwide; A statement that the company that supplied the report did not make the decision to take the adverse action and cannot give the specific reasons for it; and A notice of the individual's right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information the company furnished, and the consumer's right to a free report from the company upon request within 60 days. The FCRA calls this notice an "Adverse Action Notice." See 15 U.S.C. 1681m. An adverse action notice can be oral, written, or electronic. Obviously, written or electronic would be the best since you can prove that it was sent. Also, be aware that the FCRA has civil penalties if it is violated. The Federal Trade Commission has a helpful guide that lists some of the basics of when you do and do not need to provide adverse action notice. Website: Using Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need to Know Brochure: FTC Facts for Business However, it does not cover criminal background checks, which have many of the same rules as the credit checks under the FCRA.
Declining Binding Arbitration of credit cards and banks (after sign up) Recently Chase was making a change to its user agreement and was automatically assuming your consent to abide by binding arbitration unless you opted out explicitly by sending them a snail mail with a self written/typed, freestyle letter. I now see some user agreement changes from other credit card providers/banks and it looks like they already have a binding arbitration clause. If I understand this correctly, this prevents me from filing lawsuits against those companies. Is there a way to specifically reach out to these card providers and opt-out of the binding arbitration? I realize this may have more to do with legal than money but it is pertinent in both areas.	Is there a way to specifically reach out to these card providers and opt-out of the binding arbitration? Sure, you can write and ask. But you've signed a binding contract to open an account (or accepted new terms for an existing account) that has a binding arbitration clause in it. Both parties have to agree to renegotiate a contract. Why would a bank renegotiate the contract with you? Or draft a custom contract just for you without arbitration? If you don't like their contract with arbitration terms, there's nothing in it for them; they'll simply say adhere to the contract, or close your account. Or they will close it. But, there can be exceptions; read the credit card agreement. Sometimes there are exceptions for members of the military that allow no arbitration clauses. And sometimes you can opt out of arbitration within the first 90 days of opening an account. And check your state laws, too, and the agreement for any state carve outs regarding binding arbitration.	The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.	The companies agree to resolve the dispute with a neutral arbitrator. This is similar to a court action, but instead of a judge or panel of judges, there is an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The two parties to the dispute must agree to this in advance. For more information, you can consult the rather thorough Wikipedia article on the subject: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitration	No. Arbitrating rather than litigating when not required to do so by contract is almost never considered to be a legally compensable harm as a result of pro-arbitration legal policies. The consumer would be required to continue arbitrating and couldn't change course at that point. In practice, this fact pattern is unlikely, because the consumer needs the relevant details from the contract to commence arbitration. Other examples of unavailable contracts are hard to compare. It is a fact intense analysis.	The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done.	First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea.	As noted in your update, Cal. Civ. Code section 1947.3 says (a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a landlord or a landlord's agent shall allow a tenant to pay rent and deposit of security by at least one form of payment that is neither cash nor electronic funds transfer. Paragraph 2 related to cases of recent bounced checks, and it sounds like you don't have that problem. From the personal finance angle, if you liked the convenience of the online service but don't trust the new ACH agent, your bank may have an "online bill pay" service where they can withdraw money at a designated time each month and send it. Chase has such a service, no charge, they do an electronic transfer if the payee accepts them and otherwise mail a paper check.	To start with, this is a highly technical issue upon which different jurisdictions may differ, and in which different rules may apply in different circumstances either by agreement or by statute. Also, similar situations are sometimes treated differently in this regard in bankruptcy and out of bankruptcy. The majority rule is that the lender may choose which remedies - such as collateral and guarantee rights, to enforce, and the lender may choose in which order to enforce them. For example, most jurisdictions allow a lender to collect from a guarantor even when collateral is available to the lender, in lieu of foreclosing on the collateral. Sometimes, however, special rules apply. For example, if the guarantor is a government agency (e.g. the Small Business Administration or the Veteran's Administration), often the lender is required to take all reasonable efforts to collect from the borrower and recover the amount owed from collateral, before the guarantee can be invoked. Similarly, sometimes the law distinguishes between an accommodation party who receives no consideration in a transaction who signs as a direct debtor, and one who signs in a guarantor capacity. Those jurisdictions may require a good faith effort to collect from direct debtors (often including attempts to foreclose upon collateral) before attempting to collect from guarantors who sign as such. There are also arrangements, such as credit default swaps or a situation when a consumer provides a credit card payment authorization which a creditor can use in the event of a default (or the large dollar amount equivalent of such an arrangement called a "letter of credit"), in which the line between what constitutes collateral and what constitutes a guarantee can be blurred.
Under GDPR EU law, can I sue big tech companies (Facebook, Google, Apple) for acquiring and storing my personal data without my consent? Many of my friends have social media accounts (Instagram, Facebook, etc.) where they regularly post photos of them and where occasionally I appear in them. Many of my friends have their personal assistance in their phones that is constantly hearing what happens in the vicinity of the phone. Sometimes, since they are my friends, these apps record my voice and process it. I never consented to these companies to process and store my data, only my friends allowed it. However there is little doubt that these companies also have all these information about me, my facial expression, my voice signature, and many other personal information. I have two questions: Is this permissible under EU private data law? Can I sue these companies for illegally storing so much information about me? How can I prevent that such companies have so much information about me?	Per GDPR Art 79, you can sue data controllers if you consider your rights to have been violated. Where you have suffered damages due to GDPR infringements, you also have a right to compensation per Art 82. However, your rights may not have been violate as far as the GDPR is concerned. Under the GDPR any kind of personal data processing needs a clear purpose, and that purpose needs a legal basis. One possible legal basis is consent, but there also are others (such as legitimate interest). Just because you didn't consent doesn't mean that your rights have been violated. Where processing is based on legitimate interest, you can object to that processing of your personal data – but your rights must be balanced against that legitimate interest (Art 21). If your friends post a photo and you only appear in the background, your friends' legitimate interest to post that photo likely outweighs your rights. In practice, suing Facebook because of GDPR infringement is not a sensible way to achieve the outcomes that you likely want. First, this is expensive. Second, it is arguable whether Facebook or your friends should be the defendant. Third, removal of existing data won't prevent the processing of new data in the future. It would be more sensible to treat this as an interpersonal rather than a legal problem, and to talk with your friends so that they don't include you in their photos that they would like to share online. I've focussed on photos because their situation is fairly clear. Voice snippets might not count as personal data when you are not identifiable in them. Personal assistant apps should not be listening continuously, but only start recording when a wake-word is recognized.	I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations.	There are two relevant bodies of EU law to consider here. The GDPR covers processing of personal data. Personal data is any data where the data subject can be identified directly or indirectly. The ePrivacy directive is also relevant, and covers how you may access and store information on the user's device. Directives are not directly applicable law. Instead every member state translates the directive into national law. In the UK, ePrivacy is implemented by PECR. Is the data you collect personal data in the sense of the GDPR? Yes: that hashed unique device ID or a system-provided advertising ID likely is personal data, and any linked data would then be personal data as well. This is going to be the case in particular if you store user accounts on your server and can connect these bug reports to a user. Consider also whether the game save could include personal data, and whether the video clip could be analyzed to identify the data subject. Does this mean collecting this information in bug reports is forbidden? No, the GDPR doesn't forbid or allow anything outright. Instead, you should go through the compliance process. In a nutshell: determine the purpose of this processing, e.g. “fixing bugs” find an Art 6 legal basis for this purpose, e.g. “Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest” or “Art 6(1)(a) consent” if the legal basis is legitimate interest, you must balance that interest against the data subject's interests determine whether your compliance requirements include creating/updating your Records of Processing, or whether you have to write a Data Protection Impact Assessment implement the processing in a manner that respects GDPR principles such as Transparency and Data Minimization if the legal basis is legitimate interest you must implement an opt-out solution if the legal basis is consent, you must request consent first in a manner that satisfies the Art 7 conditions for consent – and allow consent to be revoked easily prepare to satisfy data subject rights: information requirements per Art 13, usually done in the privacy policy right to access, rectification, erasure, and data portability right to object (opt-out) and to restrict processing be aware of your general requirements a data controller to process this data securely, e.g. use HTTPS connections to transmit bug reports, take steps to protect your own accounts (e.g. 2FA), and ensure you have a suitable contract with any data processors that act on your behalf, e.g. cloud providers or contractors I would question whether your bug reports really need to include a device ID. That isn't forbidden, it just complicates compliance a bit. And what about ePrivacy? The ePrivacy directive is known for its cookie consent requirements. But these consent requirements apply when accessing any information on the user's device, or when applying equivalent fingerprinting techniques. Your game save is not an issue because it is necessary for the game. But that device ID and other system information is more difficult. So what to do? Compliance isn't trivial, but certainly possible. You will likely process the bug reports under your legitimate interest, but might still have to collect consent for accessing a system ID due to ePrivacy. Such a screen might look like this: Oh no, the game crashed! Do you want to send a bug report to the developers? Your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, collect system information and send bug report No, do not send bug report You could make an argument that a bug report can be sent in any case, and that you just need ePrivacy consent to collect useful system information. For example: Oh no, the game crashed! When sending a bug report to developers, do you want to include extra system information (link to details) that helps fixing the problem? In any case, your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, send bug report with extra system information No, send anonymous report	Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR.	First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time.	GDPR definitely applies. Your scenario seems to raise two questions: What is the legal basis for processing? Are the security measures appropriate? Legal basis Every processing activity of personal data requires a legal basis. Most well-known is consent, but there are six categories in Art 6(1) GDPR including legitimate interests and necessity for performing a contract with the data subject. Conditions on consent are laid out in Art 7 GDPR. You say that data subjects “explicitly agree to the website's privacy policy and GDPR”. The GDPR does not generally expect “agreement” to a privacy policy, as information per Art 13 is an unilateral notice. Such general agreement also cannot constitute valid consent. In the context of certifications, the legal basis would likely be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject: You were contracted to provide this validation service to the data subjects. You should however make it clear which information will be displayed on the validation page (other than a valid/not valid) response. For example, I am concerned that showing the email address would not be strictly necessary for providing the validation service. You should also consider whether this validation service is a core component of your certification service, or whether there should be an opt-in or opt-out here. Security Measures The GDPR requires that you implement appropriate security measures, “taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms” of the data subjects (see Art 32 GDPR). This gives you a lot of leeway to determine what measures are appropriate, but also criteria that you must consider in your determination. A number of security measures are explicitly suggested and must also be considered: pseudonymization and encryption ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience of your systems ability to restore the service (e.g. backups) processes for regularly testing and evaluating your measures Aside from generic IT security measures like backups and providing the service over a HTTPS connection, I would be concerned about “insecure direct object reference” style attacks on the database. If I know that certification no 1234 exists, I could try to get the information for other numbers like no 1233 and so on. This would leak personal data. Basic defenses could include requiring additional information such as the data subject's name to be provided, or using anti-bot measures such as captchas and rate limits. However, the real solution is to avoid sequential IDs, and to generate sufficiently large tokens with a cryptographically secure random number generator. Instead of a “certification number”, it would be better to view this as a “validation code”.	The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.	In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards.
Why was Ryan Holle convicted based on supposedly knowing a crime? In this question, someone asked if someone told you that he committed a crime, that doesn't mean that you know it's true. Can anything be done when people admit to crimes through an online game? If you have knowledge of a serious crime then you can (and in some jurisdictions, are required) to report it to the police. However, you don't have such knowledge People say things that aren't true. They do this a lot on the internet. In fact, it was I who shot JFK: I did it 5 years before I was born which is a neat trick but not beyond the abilities of the mafia/Cuban/Russian syndicates I was working for, when they catch me I will tell them how it was done. That's because he may lie. He may made stories up. Not just because someone told me he murdered someone means he really did. In fact, many famous people, admit that they committed a crime. Obama admitted using ganja. Steve Jobs admitted using LSD. Why aren't they convicted? Because we don't know they really did it. Someone told Ryan Holle they gonna rob somebody. Ryan thought it's a joke. Latter he lend his car. Why did the jury presume that Ryan knows that someone would rob a car simply because they said so? They could be joking. Based on what I see, Ryan probably didn't know they gonna rob somebody. If he knew, he wouldn't lend the car. Why would he? Do they have agreement to split the spoils of robbery? He lend the car, not renting it. He gets nothing out of the robbery even if it's successful. Why would anyone risk long jail time lending a car if he knew there is a robbery. Chance is he didn't know. Why did people convict Ryan anyway?	The state argued, and the jury was convinced, that Mr. Holle turned over his keys specifically intending to facilitate the robbery. They necessarily found that Mr. Holle was not telling the truth when he said he thought it was all a joke. I don't know what evidence they had to demonstrate that, but I could imagine that there was testimony indicating Mr. Holle knew that these people had engaged in similar acts before, that the group spoke of the plan with a level of specificity that made him aware they were not joking, or that he saw them taking other steps to prepare that let him know they were planning a crime. It doesn't matter if he wasn't renting the vehicle or didn't have an agreement to divide the spoils. The question of "why" he facilitated the crime is technically irrelevant to the legal question of whether he facilitated the crime. Nonetheless, I could imagine several reasons why he would have lent his car: he wanted to ingratiate himself with this group, he was bullied into doing it, he believed he would get some of the pot they stole, he didn't like the target, and so on. The fact that he was risking prison time is a uniquely poor argument that he didn't know what he was doing. The risk of punishment is always present for committing a crime, and yet we know that people commit crimes all day, every day. Why do they do it? Probably a good question for psychology.SE.	“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.	The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, "and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter."	A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself.	Police continue to investigate Following an acquittal, there are two possible positions for the police: they are certain the acquitted person performed the act but they were not guilty (for all sorts of reasons). The investigation is closed because although the police know who did it, there was no criminality due to the not guilty verdict. The evidence in the court shows that the accused did not commit the act. Ergo, someone else did. The police will keep looking for that someone else. Note that the proposed scenario is highly dangerous for you. First, the exculpatory evidence may be inadmissible, particularly if it is an alibi (see Can I surprise the prosecution with an alibi defense at trial?). To rely on an an alibi defence, it must be raised with the prosecution before the trial. You would have to have said that you were where the phone footage was shot before the trial starts and the police may have therefore discounted you as a suspect from the get go. Second, you are now committing a crime, usually called an attempt to pervert the course of justice and this action may also make you an accomplice to the murder after the fact. You beat the rap on the murder and then spend a lot of time in prison for those two.	Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.	If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y.
Time share fees I have a time share which I have difficulty using as the places I want to go are never available when I want them. I have tried to sell it with no success. It is paid for but there are hefty fees yearly. I tried to find out from the company whether I can just stop paying and forfeit the ownership but they would not answer. I would like to know whether there would be any legal repercussions if I just stopped paying the fees?	Yes You have a contract and, while I don't know what it says, its a fair bet that not making payments the contract requires you to make would be a breach of that contract. This would allow the other party to sue you for the unpaid fees as well as interest on them and the consts of collection (collection agency fees, legal fees etc.). In addition they can report you as a defaulter (which you would be) to any and all credit reporting agencies which would wreck your ability to get credit in the future. If the do sue you and succeed (as the probably would) they can seize your assets to sell them to recover their debt - since the time-share appears to have limited value they would probably seize your savings or your car instead. You need to read the contract to find out how you can end it legally.	The funding of public-service broadcasting in Germany was changed effective 2013-01-01. Under the current rules (Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag, in German), a monthly fee is to be paid for every single unit of housing (flat or single-family house), unless it is uninhabitated. It is otherwise immaterial how many people live there or whether any of them owns a receiver¹ or not. Certain people are exempt from the broadcasting fee or eligible to a reduced fee; however, in a multi-person housing unit, this only applies if each inhabitant satisfies the criteria for exemption or reduction. The “ARD ZDF Deutschlandradio Beitragsservice”, or Beitragsservice² for short, is the entity tasked with collecting the broadcasting fees. According to section 2(1) of the Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag, if a housing unit has multiple inhabitants, they are jointly and severally liable for the broadcasting fee. This means that the Beitragsservice gets to choose which inhabitant they claim the money from; and apparently, in your case, they have chosen you. You, in turn, can claim a proportionate amount of the fee from your flatmates or former flatmates, according to general principles of civil law. This may be difficult in practice, though, if your former flatmates aren’t willing to pay or are hard to reach; enforcing your claim may be time-consuming and costly. Regarding the announced visit, I can only speculate. One possibility is that the Beitragsservice might want to check whether your flat is really just a single unit of housing; if one of your flatmates, e.g., has a separate entrance, their room might be another unit for which they would have to pay their own broadcasting fee. (Note that Beitragsservice representatives have no special rights; you are never required to invite them in.) A second, more unpleasant possibility is that the matter has already progressed and a bailiff will appear in order to carry out a distraint. (They do have special rights, and it is not a good idea to try and lock them out.) If the letter is indeed from the city administration, that unfortunately hints at the second possibility. In that case, you should definitely see a lawyer, as soon as possible. ¹ Note that under the rules valid until 2012, where it did matter, a computer with Internet access was also considered a radio, termed a “neuartiges Rundfunkgerät” (“novel radio receiver”). ² It used to be known as Gebühreneinzugszentrale, GEZ, an acronym that is still often used informally.	I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.	client must provide me a suite in his hotel that costs $10K for a night based on a contract we held in the past (the contract has expired as of 31-Dec-18 but he never rendered the service because I didn't ask for it. The contract mentioning $10K has expired and is no longer relevant. You had a chance for a $10K suite before 31 Dec 2018 but you did not take it. There is no obligation on the client to keep this chance for you indefinitely. What happens now ($6K suite) is a completely new contract you have accepted. You are not entitled to anything in relation to the $10K suite from the past opportunity.	Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.	Pretty much everything you need to know about the ownership and licensing of your material on Medium is in the Medium TOS you contractually agreed to when you signed up with the service. Basically, you granted Medium a license to use the work, but you did not agree to an exclusive license nor turn over copyright to them. Part of that Terms of Service – Medium Policy reads: Content rights & responsibilities You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. You’re responsible for the content you post. This means you assume all risks related to it, including someone else’s reliance on its accuracy, or claims relating to intellectual property or other legal rights. You’re welcome to post content on Medium that you’ve published elsewhere, as long as you have the rights you need to do so. By posting content to Medium, you represent that doing so doesn’t conflict with any other agreement you’ve made. By posting content you didn’t create to Medium, you are representing that you have the right to do so. For example, you are posting a work that’s in the public domain, used under license (including a free license, such as Creative Commons), or a fair use. We can remove any content you post for any reason. You can delete any of your posts, or your account, anytime. Processing the deletion may take a little time, but we’ll do it as quickly as possible. We may keep backup copies of your deleted post or account on our servers for up to 14 days after you delete it. Pertaining to presenting Medium content in an iFrame on another site, this is reasonably close to not allowing that: You may not do, or try to do, the following: ... (2) access or search the Services by any means other than the currently available, published interfaces (e.g., APIs) that we provide;... You can use Embed Code Generator \| Embedly to embed an iFrame of a Medium page on another site. But contacting Medium via the email at the bottom of the TOS would tell you for sure if it is OK. Comments on your pieces on Medium do belong to the owner. And You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. appears to cover the idea of copying your material from Medium to your own site. If in doubt, ask them.	You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)	If you want to get out, and are willing to lose $270, you can not sign the lease and demand a return of your security deposit. You could ask for a return of the other fees as well, but you are less likely to be successful. They would probably have trouble enforcing a security deposit against you if you didn't have a lease with them, and would probably have trouble demanding you sign a lease when they changed the unit. You should probably get it all back, because you applied for it, but it probably isn't worth litigating over. I would also encourage you to turn to social media sites if they have one, or to sites like Yelp, if they do not. Many businesses are sensitive to this and if you are truthful if could provide you with some leverage.
Facebook contract Vs Minors A minor's ability to contract at face-value is straight forward, any contract with a minor that is not for necessities (food, medicine, clothing, and lodging), and was not approved by the parents/guardian, can be dis-affirmed by the minor as long as its before they become the age of majority. But how does Facebook handle their agreements with minors? Facebook, a social networking site that allows minors thirteen years of age or older to use their site without parental supervision (in compliance with COPPA); Facebook receives it's revenue from collecting personal information about its users and targeting the user with ads that might line up with their values or interests. Although Facebook is in compliance with COPPA, it still holds agreements with individuals that have not yet reached the age of majority, and uses their information for things like "testing" and "research". Can Facebook legally conduct these "research and testing" activities with minors and their accounts if the contracts(TOS) with Facebook's users that aren't the age of majority are considered voidable/unenforceable? UPDATE It seems as though Google, YoutTube, and other large tech companies (e.g. tiktok) have been found in violation of COPPA, with this new information can FaceBook conduct their "research and testing" with minors information without violating COPPA.	Facebook can continue to gather and exploit data, modulo the requirements of COPPA, because it does not depend on obligating a minor to do something, such as pay money or dig a ditch. In general and because of copyright law, nobody has the right to use anything that Facebook provides unless Facebook grants the user permission. The user has no obligation to provide anything to Facebook – if it did, the minor would arguably be exempt from that obligation.	We can start by looking at the text of the law. US federal law 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B) says: Any person who... knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains— (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). I'm not sure how much posting the name without the link would protect you, given that you posted it with the explicit intent that someone would go and look at it. On the other hand, your intent was not to "advertise" or "promote" it, and you didn't actually "distribute" the material.	Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.	No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations.	Users grant StackExchange a licence: You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. That should be determinative, but there was also some question as to whether StackExchange users can be deemed to have agreed to these terms. For this reason, I'll also review some case law relating to what are known as "click-wrap" agreements where the terms are made available via a hyperlink. In my opinion, StackExchange's way of displaying links to their Terms of Service during registration meets the requirements that have in the past been sufficient for courts to deem the user to have read and agreed to those Terms of Service. See for example, Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F. 3d 110 (2012), especially the section titled "Notice" for reference to other cases: A person can assent to terms even if he or she does not actually read them, but the "offer [must nonetheless] make clear to [a reasonable] consumer" both that terms are being presented and that they can be adopted through the conduct that the offeror alleges constituted assent. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F. 3d 17 (2002)1 frames the notice test in terms of a "reasonably prudent offeree" and whether they would "have known of the existence of license terms". In Guadagno v. E Trade Bank*, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (2008), the court found that clicking on an acknowledgement icon near an underlined, highlighted link to an agreement was acceptance of that agreement: In the instant case, a highlighted, underlined link to the Agreement was directly above the acknowledgement box, along with notice that "The following contain important information about your account(s)." A reasonably prudent offeree would have noticed the link and reviewed the terms before clicking on the acknowledgment icon. I think the most similar case is Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 Dist. Court, SD New York (2012), although not at an appellate level. In order to have obtained a Facebook account, Fteja must have clicked the second "Sign Up" button. Accordingly, if the phrase that appears below that button is given effect, when Fteja clicked "Sign Up," he "indicat[ed] that [he] ha[d] read and agree[d] to the Terms of Policy." This is very similar to StackExchange's sign-up process: That court outlined a lot of case law and concluded that "Fteja assented to the Terms of Use and therefore to the forum selection clause therein". A DMCA takedown could be successful if submitted by somebody other than the StackExchange user where that other party asserts copyright ownership in the contributed material. This could happen if a StackExchange user infringed copyright by posting material that they didn't have the right to reproduce. 1. Opinion authored by now Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor.	Contract law involves a number of parts, the most relevant here being the formation of a contract, and the enforcement of its terms. There are various rules about formation, such as that you cannot hold a gun to a person’s head to force them to say yes (the courts would then say there was no contract), and then under other conditions a term in a contract might be illegal, for instance the courts will not order a person to commit a crime as one of the conditions of a contract. In the scenario that you propose, no term of the contract involves an illegal action, the only presumed illegality is in the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract. Duress is illegal, because there is no voluntary mutual assent. That’s not the case here. So there is no established legal impediment to finding that a contract was formed. There are ample opportunities to test the theory that an element of illegality in the formation of a contract makes the contract void, for example if a physical instrument used in creating or transmitting the contract was used illegally (the paper was stolen, the paper was used without permission of the owner); the assent was made while trespassing; the contract language infringes copyright. Given the court’s very strong commitment to recognizing and enforcing contracts, it is highly unlikely that the courts would reject a contract over a technicality of this type §97.113 of the FCC rules states the prohibited transmissions, the two relevant clauses being that the prohibited list includes (2) Communications for hire or for material compensation, direct or indirect, paid or promised, except as otherwise provided in these rules; (3) Communications in which the station licensee or control operator has a pecuniary interest, including communications on behalf of an employer, with the following exceptions… (2) is not clearly applicable, since the communication is not for material compensation (e.g. A is not paying B to make a transmission). (3) is more likely applicable, since the parties each have a pecuniary interest in the communication. The exceptions involve being compensated for making a communication, or one can on an irregular basis offer amateur radio apparatus for sale or trade. Since the FCC regulations only provide bare languages and no explanatory texts, and they decline to provide any examples (this seems to be a policy thing), and there is substantial unclarity as to what the restrictions mean, see this analysis. A finding of letter-of-the-law violation in this case cannot be made by the court in which breech of contract would be litigated. Instead, the FCC would have to first make a finding of law-breaking, then a party would have to prove in a separate cause of action that because of illegality in the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract, there never was an agreement.	It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification.	The exception is often called a Romeo and Juliet exception colloquially when applied to statutory rape laws. See, e.g. here. It is an exception to the age of capacity to consent to sexual conduct, not an exception to the capacity to consent to a contract. When children are very young (typically in the range of 7 to 12 as set by statute of common law, it is 6 in North Carolina) they lack the capacity to commit a crime, which has to do with the age of the offender and not the mutual ages of those involved. Is the principle described above called something? How old is it? Did the Romans apply a similar concept? The medieval Catholic church? The principle that you described is a misunderstanding of the law and is incorrect. No jurisdiction has adopted it in the sense that you articulate. When these instances are not punishable as crimes they are not punishable for different reasons. So, the question of "how old is it?" is a category error that has no answer. The medieval Catholic church did not have any criminal or contract jurisprudence. Both of those domains were handled by secular officials, usually either feudal lords or the officials of a "free city". In the medieval period, feudal secular law was often arbitrary and often came down to the personal whims of the individual holding the title. As @hmvsm appropriately notes, however, it did have doctrine about when a child was morally responsible for sins, but final adjudication of whether you sinned or not was ultimately determined in the afterlife, and the church doctrine of forgiveness of sins made the issue moot to a great extent. The Roman Empire, of course, did have secular laws, but its laws in the area of contractual capacity, which are largely replicated by modern European civil codes, didn't contain the principle that you propose. To the best of my knowledge, the modern concept of statutory rape was unknown in the Roman world. The lack of hard age based cutoffs was, in part, because vital statistics record keeping was nowhere near universal, so many people did not even know their exact age in a legally provable manner. Approximate age in the very late Roman Empire would often have been determined based upon time elapsed since an infant baptism as recorded by church officials, but Christianity went from being very rare to universal between about 275 CE and 450 CE, and Rome fell not long after that point.
Is this considered "bad faith"? In California, landlords cannot retain security deposits at the end of tenancy in bad faith. If a landlord provides an itemized statement of deductions but fails to disclose that it was written by a family member (who made them outrageously high), would it result in punitive damages?	A landlord may have an agent, whether an employee or a family member, prepare an itemized statement of deductions on the landlord's behalf. The landlord is just as responsible for its contents as if the landlord had prepared it personally, and the tenant need not know or care who actually prepared it. If it is knowingly excessive, that may constitute bad faith no matter who prepared it. The tenant's options for challenging the statement of deductions are not changed based who exactly prepared the list.	Can a landlord keep a security deposit if my apartment rental application is approved, but I back out of signing the lease? That can't be legal, right? No. That is a violation of California CIV 1950.5. Although 1950.5(b) reflects that one of the permissible purposes of a security deposit is "to reimburse the landlord for costs associated with processing a new tenant", item (e) limits that amount "as [is] reasonably necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision(b)". A deposit of 1.5 times the monthly rent clearly is excessive for "processing a new tenant", let alone processing an applicant who never became a tenant because no lease agreement was entered. All other permissible uses of security deposit are inapplicable in your matter. Furthermore, if the landlord required a separate payment for the application, then your application fee satisfies the provision in 1950.5(b). This means that the landlord has the obligation to reimburse you 100% of the security deposit.	Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction.	You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company.	You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over.	The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky.	Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? No. Your description reflects that in this particular scenario there is no tenancy contract. The only actual contract relates to the holding deposit, and your description suggests that both parties fully complied with their obligations pursuant to that contract. Accordingly, neither party has a viable claim against the other. Regardless of whether verbal agreements are cognizable under UK tenancy law, the meeting of the minds you portray is that this tenancy ought to be formalized only by signing a contract. That supersedes customer's prior verbal expressions of intent about moving in. The landlord incurred expenses that either were covered by the customer's holding deposit or were unreasonable. An example of the latter is the fees "landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly)", a task that any person can perform with a text editor at a negligible cost. Likewise, "turn[ing] down other potential tenants" is covered by the holding deposit the customer paid. As for taking "a detailed inventory", that is a task the landlord would perform with any potential tenant and which would render the same outcome regardless of who the tenant would be. The holding deposit must be associated to a deadline or holding period. Beyond that deadline, it is up to the landlord to grant customer's requests for postponement. But the landlord is not entitled to compensation for a risk he deliberately took without even requiring a [renewed] holding deposit. what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? That depends on the deadline associated to the holding deposit. Once the holding period has elapsed, the landlord is entitled to do with his property whatever he wants. The customer would have a claim only if (1) landlord withdraws prior to the deadline and (2) customer provably intended to move in.	Your question seems to be about abandoned property and whether Missouri’s statute on disposing of property after a tenant abandons his/her property applies. See Mo. Rev. State. Ann. § 441.065 (“Abandonment of premises, disposition of remaining property.”) Assuming there was no agreement (in writing or orally) for the 19 year-old to pay rent, he was most likely a guest and not a tenant. As a guest, landlord-tenant laws, would not apply to the property that that was left at the nice family’s house. The definitions section of Missouri’s landlord-tenant statutes (and common sense) support this analysis. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 441.005. Therefore, the issue them becomes did the 19 year abandon his property? To that question, I think the answer is yes. Missouri Courts have defined the test for “abandoned property” in Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 1989), stating: Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership so that the property ceases to be the property of any person and becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1974). Abandonment of property requires intent plus an act. Id. A sufficient act is one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention of the owner of personal property neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession. Id. Intention to abandon may be inferred from strong and convincing evidence and may be shown by conduct clearly inconsistent with any intention to retain and continue the use or ownership of the property. Herron, 782 S.W.2d at 416. So to synthesize that passage from Herron, the court is saying that there is a 2 part test for determining if property is abandoned. Did the person intend to abandon the property? Did they commit some act to show this intention? If the answer is yes, to both, they the “first taker” or person that gets possession after the property is abandoned is the new owner. Here, it seems that the 19 year-old intended to abandon the property. He left without explaining why and stated that he would not unload the property if the nice family tried to return it (implying he would not accept the property back). Looking at the second part, him moving without giving notice, and telling the nice family that he won’t accept delivery of the property are both acts showing his intent to abandon the property.
Can video of a person's permission to take video make the video legal? Let's say I'm in someone's home, recording people with a video camera. Later, one of the people I recorded claims that I didn't get their permission, and that therefore, it was illegal to record them, and so they file charges against me. However, the fact is that I did get their verbal permission, and recorded it on the video I took. It's my understanding that the Exclusionary Rule prevents video taken illegally from being used as evidence. But the evidence that the video is legal is on the video itself. So my question is, could the video itself be used as evidence that the video is legal?	There are several misunderstandings here. First of all, the US exclusionary rule applies only to evidence gained by the police, or by people acting as agents of the government, and not always to them. Secondly it applies only in criminal cases. The question does not say which state this would be in, and these are largely matters of state law, so it makes a difference. But I don't know of any state where taking a video without explicit consent, in a place where the person has a right to be, is a crime. In some states it would not even be a tort. If a video is taken without the subject's consent, that may be an invasion of privacy, and the subject might be able to sue (not "file charges). In such a case the video itself would absolutely be put in evidence, and if it recorded verbal permission to take the video, the case would be promptly dismissed, quite possibly with sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. Even if the video were taken by a police officer, and was presented as evidence in a criminal case, the office could testify to the verbal permission. That would be enough for the judge to view the video as part of a suppression hearing (which is not before a jury). If the judge saw and heard verbal permission to take the video, that would be an end to the motion to suppress, unless it was claimed that the permission was somehow coerced or faked, and evidence supported such a claim.	There is no common law offence of electronically recording a private place/activity, but many jurisdictions have legislation that makes it an offence: e.g. Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic), s 7. Whether evidence collected through illegal surveillance is admissible will depend on the legislation in each jurisdiction. For example, in Victoria, such evidence is inadmissible unless the court decides that admitting the evidence is sufficiently desirable: Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138. This discretion reflects 'the fundamental dilemma... between the public interest in admitting reliable evidence (and thereby convicting the guilty) and the public interest in vindicating individual rights and deterring misconduct and maintaining the legitimacy of the judicial system': Australian Law Reform Commission (2006) 'Uniform Evidence Law', [16.84].	There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.	It is, in most jurisdictions, not a crime to download YouTube videos. For criminal law, the answer is that it is not illegal. In many jurisdictions, downloading music or video of any kind from the internet is not a crime. Thus, police has no power to punish you for downloading, and even less power to shutdown such "downloader" websites. YouTube's Terms of Service seem to disallow such downloads so YouTube has the right to terminate the agreement with the downloader. They may prevent you from viewing any more videos, for example. However, I think Google does not even have a technical measure in place to do that. Google is not interested in preventing you from using YouTube (its servers can handle that) and that is pretty much the only punishment it can use. Google could use the Terms of Services to say that the downloader-websites are breaking them and thus should not have access to YouTube. The websites could be sued for breaking the Terms of Services (and the court could order them to stop) and Google can block those websites from accessing YouTube by technical measures. It appears it did so in at least one case. Google could sue you (or the websites) for advertisement revenue loss, but it is unlikely. In theory, Google loses advertisement revenue from the video playbacks you would have done on YouTube but did not play because you downloaded the video and played it offline (contrary to the Terms of Service). Google might attempt to sue a downloader website on this basis and try to make it give it money. It would be difficult for Google to prove that it deserves such money, though. I cannot imagine how it would prove that "you would have played the video online, again, with advertisements, if you didn't download it. Note that when you replay a video from browser cache, advertisements do not replay. Why Google doesn't sue downloader-website more often? It's expensive. Google could pay a lot of money to shut down a website via court order but if it really wants to do so, they can apply a technical measure (such as IP block) instead. It is much cheaper and has the same effect. This may change in the near future. There's a some talk around about European court rulings and directives that may change this. It is quite possible that in the near future, even viewing illegally uploaded music on YouTube will be criminal. I find this doubtful because of the difficulty of proving knowledge ("How was I supposed to know that it wasn't an official clip?"). As for whether downloading to a file (as opposed to downloading to the browser cache) will become criminal, I really doubt that.	There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.	"Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video.	It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.	Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.
Does Mojang break the law with restrictions in their EULA for Minecraft? Minecraft is a world building game that is produced/sold by Mojang AB. Minecraft may be played both offline (local data) or online (connecting to a server). Minecraft's EULA says that you may not sell items to players (real money) that give them in-game benefits outside of cosmetics. However, that is Minecraft's clients EULA. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the servers are not owned by Mojang and they are not using Mojang's proprietary software. Wouldn't this be like selling a television set and saying to broadcasters they must follow any rules I impose.	The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.	There is no loophole because a work released in object code form only — without the Corresponding Source — is not released under GPLv3, even if you say it is. GPLv3 only requires them to also provide whatever source came with it False. Providing the Corresponding Source is compulsory (§6 as pointed by @cHao). If they do not have access to it, it means the work has not been released under GPLv3.	IF part of your code and data is non-open-source, you can't release this software under the MIT license. However, from what I know, CS:GO uses real-life weapons, and their names aren't protected by copyright. Weapon stats aren't copyrightable either. With skin names, you should be safe as well, since there isn't enough (or any) lore around them to establish them as literary works. However, if you are using any in-game descriptions or images, they are copyrighted content and can't be legally copied without permission from Valve. Which might be easy to obtain by writing them.	Can you locate your license (generally not a trivial task)? It may appear under Help-About and a click to view EULA. The EULA specifically addresses redistribution of parts of the software and number of installations you can make with a single license. They do not say what uses you make make of the software, except that "You may not rent, lease, lend or provide commercial hosting services with the Software". There is no express prohibition against commercial or non-commercial political use of the product: anything not prohibited is allowed. The fact that they say nothing about the content that you create with Word means, they have declined to have a say in the matter. (I am not sure about the wording of the "Educational" versions of Office: those are somewhat negotiated between the institution and MS).	Go to the Source If you follow the Legal link at the bottom of the page and read the terms of service, among other things, it says (my emphasis): 1. Access to the Services Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Stack Exchange may offer to provide the Services, as described more fully on the Network, and which are selected by Subscriber, solely for Subscriber’s own use, and not for the use or benefit of any third party. ... Subscriber certifies to Stack Exchange that Subscriber is an individual (i.e., not a corporate entity) at least 13 years of age. ... 2. Network Content ... The Network is protected by copyright as a collective work and/or compilation, pursuant to U.S. copyright laws, international conventions, and other copyright laws. Other than as expressly set forth in this Agreement, Subscriber may not copy, modify, publish, transmit, upload, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in this Section), create derivative works based on, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content, software, materials, or Services in whole or in part. Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. From time to time, Stack Exchange may make available compilations of all the Subscriber Content on the Network (the “Creative Commons Data Dump”). The Creative Commons Data Dump is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. By downloading The Creative Commons Data Dump, You agree to be bound by the terms of that license. Any other downloading, copying, or storing any Content for other than personal, noncommercial use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from Stack Exchange, or from the copyright holder identified in such Content's copyright notice. In the event You download software from the Network, the software, including any files, images incorporated in or generated by the software, and the data accompanying the software (collectively, the “Software”) is licensed to You by Stack Exchange or third party licensors for Your personal, noncommercial use, and no title to the Software shall be transferred to You. Stack Exchange or third party licensors retain full and complete title to the Software and all intellectual property rights therein. 3. Subscriber Content You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. ... Consequences Under Clause 1 Subscribers to Stack Exchange must be individuals (natural persons in legalese). The proprietor of LearnHub.org are unlikely to be an individual and are therefore not a Subscriber under the terms of use. Under Clause 2, everything on Stack Exchange is copyright and some things are trade marked as well. The copyright for posts vests in the Subscriber and is licenced to SE (CC BY-SA 3.0) or vests in SE directly as the creator. Clause 8.1a. of CC BY-SA 3.0 requires SE to grant a licence to any recipient of a distribution (e.g. on a web site) on the same terms. For this reason the limitations on the copyright in Clause 2 can only apply to those items where copyright vests in SE directly; not to the content of the Subscriber posts. Assuming that it is only Subscriber posts that they are reproducing then they either need to: Comply with CC BY-SA 3.0 and attribute the work as required by that licence; what they have put up does not on the face of it do that because: They are referring to an earlier version of the licence Attribution under 3.0 is detailed in Clause 4.c. and this doesn't meet the criteria. Have been licenced by the original copyright holder; which seems unlikely. Meet the fair use criteria; attribution would not be required but would certainly be polite. Fair use turns on the specific facts of the case - on the face of it they could put forward a credible argument that their use is fair use. Complications Jurisdiction matters here; copyright laws are not uniform across the world. For example, Australian copyright has a much more limited "fair use" concept than the US and also creates a "moral copyright" of the author that exists independently of the copyright of the owner. For signatories to the Berne Convention; the country of origin for simultaneously published works (which online posting is) and therefore the law applying is the country that gives the shortest term of protection. The convention is annoyingly silent of what that means if there is more than one qualifying "Country of Origin"; this leaves scope for litigants to try to apply the most favourable domestic law that could be applicable and the case could be brought in any of several jurisdictions. This is the stuff that makes lawyers rich!	Only if you ask Valve for permission first, and they agree in writing. I'm not a lawyer, but when I was reading through the Subscriber license you linked, this stuck out to me: You are entitled to use the Content and Services for your own personal use, but you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Content and Services to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Content and Services to others without the prior written consent of Valve, except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use); (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; or (iii) exploit the Content and Services or any of its parts for any commercial purpose, except as expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use). The part that I've bolded is probably the part that makes this against the Terms of Service, since in order to post these sorts of automated messages to their service, you'd need to use a "utility program" to "emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services". I doubt that Valve would ever agree, since such a program could very easily be used to create spam bots that works bombard users with unsolicited advertisements, but maybe Valve would be willing to cut deals with AAA video game companies to let them deploy tools to automatically manage their store pages.	It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.	My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee.
What plaintiff Pro -se can do if a Federal judge in civil personal injury case denied all her requests for subpoenas? I am a Pro-Se Plaintiff in civil personal injury case against Walmart where I was badly injured. Since beginning of 2018 I am not able to receive subpoenas and Open Records from Atlanta Federal Court. Clerks by direction of the Judge counted my Requests for Public Open Records as a Motion and Judge Denied my requests. Also all my requests for subpoenas also were denied by the Judge. Judge also denied my Motion to Compel and Motion to extend the discovery period, but I need to gather information for the Trial. What I can do?	The simplest solution is to hire an attorney to do this for you. If you want to do it the hard way, you need to try to figure out why your motions were denied. For example, did you file proper motions, or did you just write on a piece of paper "I need all of Walmart's records"? Why do you think that a court will / should supply you with an Open Record (of what)? A real lawsuit is not like Judge Judy where you tell your story and hope the judge has sympathy on your plight. Did the judge say / write anything about why he is denying your requests?	D should be subpoenaing anything and everything they need from anyone and everyone, including E. No matter how good terms you are on, if you are involved in a lawsuit you should not be relying on anyone's good faith to supply you what you need. Suppose you ask nicely and they say yes but, for whatever reason, they don't supply them by your court date. Without a subpoena, if you ask for a continuance the judge will say "tough t*^%^$s"; with a subpoena they will say " Yes certainly, oh, and Mr Sheriff, here is a warrant for the documents, go and get them for me please. Oh and a warrant for the arrest of the person who ignored my subpoena." Where do you want to be?	They can still be sued - they just can’t be found liable For example, as an adjudicator, I have immunity for acts and omissions done in good faith as an adjudicator. A suit could be brought alleging lack of good faith and/or acting as other than an adjudicator. If these were proved (and barring corruption it’s a very high bar) the adjudicator would be liable. However, adjudicators are often joined with the claimant (usually the Respondent is the plaintiff) and the ANA (Authorised Nominating Authority - the organisation that appointed the adjudicator, who also have immunity) not so they can be held liable but so that they can be subpoenaed and forced to give evidence - if they aren’t parties to the suit they can refuse to do this. My standard response when this happens is to write to the court saying “I submit to the decision of the court save as to costs” meaning I am not going to contest anything unless you try to make me pay costs - which I don’t have immunity from.	What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.)	A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions.	In the US, there are a number of non-government organizations which take on such cases, such as the ACLU or the Institute for Justice; individual law firms may also take such cases pro bono. There is no automatic right to free representation in case a constitutional issue is alleged, so if IJ doesn't like your case they won't take it. These are private organizations: there is no general government agency that one can call on, other than the Public Defender's office in case you are charged with a crime and can't afford legal defense. (A constitutional issue may arise in a case that a PD might handle, but you can't e.g. call on the public defender to sue the government for infringing your 2nd Amendment rights.) A state attorney general could file suit against the US government over a constitutional issue, as Washington's AG did in the case of the Trump travel executive order, where the underlying issues were constitutional. An individual might inspire a state AG to take on an issue, but the AG would be representing the interests of the state, broadly, and not individual interests.	The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.	It is true that judges in the US have absolute immunity from any lawsuit for damages arising from their performance of judicial functions. This applies even if those actions were corrupt, malicious, or illegal. The only exceptions to a judge's immunity to a lawsuit is if the conduct alleged was not a judicial action, or if the judge was acting in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See, among others, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9. However, the term "lawsuit" doesn't refer to criminal charges. Footnote 1 of Mireles specifically says criminal liability isn't blocked by judicial immunity. While a judge can't be sued for damages for rigging a trial, the judge can be prosecuted for doing that.
How does a preliminary hearing differ from a full trial? Apparently "preliminary hearings" are to determine whether or not the defendant should be sent to Superior Court for a "full" trial. (My "source" for this is "Perry Mason.") What exactly is a "preliminary hearing"? Is it a "halfway house" between say, a grand jury indictment and a trial? Or given the sequence of arrest and "preliminary hearing," is it the grand jury indictment process itself?	A "preliminary hearing", of the kind depicted in the Perry Mason novels, is a procedure in California and some other states. It is an alternative to a Grand jury proceeding. It is used to determine whether there is probable cause to put the defendant on trial. Such hearing are mostly rather routine, and rarely reach the level of drama shown in "Perry Mason". But the prosecutor does present witnesses, which the defendant's lawyer can cross-examine. The defendant may, but rarely does, also present witnesses. Note that Mason stories sometimes involved a full trial, not just a preliminary hearing. Gardner, who wrote Perry Mason, was a practicing attorney in CA, and most of the law as he shows it was accurate when he wrote, but he often showed legally possible but highly unlikely events to improve the drama of his stories.	With only prosecutor(s) and a court reporter, are jurors at all instructed to not simply "rubber stamp" the prosecution's desire to indict? Not really. They are told their job and the legal standards that they are required to act according to, however, and the federal judicial branch does have a short handbook for grand jurors. Are the terms and concepts necessary for them to function as a jury (e.g. "preponderance of evidence") explained to them? Yes. But grand juries don't operate on a preponderance of the evidence standard. The sole evidentiary standard in a grand jury proceeding is the lower "probable cause" standard. Likewise, lots of evidence which would not be admissible in a criminal trial is admissible in a grand jury proceeding. The main kind of evidence not admissible in a grand jury proceeding is evidence which is "privileged" against court disclosure (e.g. attorney-client communications). If so, by who? The prosecutor and the handbook linked above. Is there a standard "script" or talking points for such instruction? Prosecuting attorney's offices in jurisdictions that usually use grand juries typically have a set of forms. In federal practice, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 is the primary source of guidance, and the Justice Department (which handles all or virtually all federal criminal prosecutions) has detailed policies and procedures for handling grand jury practice (and a 405 page practice manual) that his a matter of public record. There is some case law on what the content of an indictment must look like and on the grand jury process. Some state and local jurisdictions with routine use of grand juries probably have standard court forms for certain parts of grand jury process, and there may be some standard forms in local rules for some federal courts. But there isn't a national judicial branch sanctioned official set of court forms for grand juries in the federal criminal justice system. The rather lax supervision of grand juries reflects the fact that they are a road bump in the criminal justice process with a pretty low threshold to meet that faces sterner tests later in the process: Is there probable cause to support the charges requested by the prosecutor against the named defendants? About half of U.S. states allow prosecutors to do this without a grand jury approval, unilaterally. Every grand jury indictment must either be consented to by the defense, or approved by the court following a trial with a much higher proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, to result in a conviction resulting in the imposition of punishment. A judge in a separate hearing determines if there will be pre-trial detention or bail conditions prior to the criminal trial.	The court reporter keeps a contemporaneous, verbatim, shorthand record of the proceedings (and often has an audio tape to refer to as well), and the official copies of exhibits admitted into evidence are also maintained by the court. But, the final version of the official transcript takes at least a couple of days per day of testimony the court reporter heard to finalize (and, of course, a court reporter doesn't necessarily work transcribing day after day on one case, the court reporter may have other jobs to take down testimony at the same time that an official transcript based upon testimony that the court reporter previous took down in shorthand is requested, it can often take weeks or months). Sometimes drafts of official transcripts are provided to the testifying persons or counsel for review to catch errors in transcription, before being finalized. I don't know what Minnesota practice is on that fine detail in criminal trial transcripts. The official transcript is used for purposes of appeal (and usually only actually prepared in final form only if there is an appeal) and sometimes for post-trial motions, but is not prepared in time to be available to the jury, and is quite expensive (several hundred U.S. dollars to single digit thousands of U.S. dollars per typical day of testimony). Given the advances of technology, it should be easy these days to produce a printout pretty quickly. Is there a case to made to start doing this even though it might have been impractical in the past? It isn't unheard of (especially in big dollar commercial cases) to have a private court reporter making a working copy of a transcript that is available in real time or by early evening after each day of testimony, but these working copies are not done to the same standards of accuracy as official trial transcripts for purposes of appeal and are done at a high price premium by elite court reporters who can transcribe faster than the average court reporter can.	How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.	You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency.	As you said, "serious" is a subjective description of a crime, but most lawyers would probably have the same first reaction when asked to make the distinction: Is it a felony or a misdemeanor? Felonies are objectively more serious because they come with longer sentences, as well as a variety of awful collateral consequences -- lost voting rights, disqualification from gun ownership, etc. By that standard, unlawful entry into the United States (8 U.S. Code § 1325) is not, in most cases, a serious crime. For a first offense, it's a misdemeanor punishable by at most six months in jail. For subsequent offenses, though, it's a felony punishable by up to two years. I'd agree that the sentences meted out suggest that the judges don't view this offense as a particularly serious one. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it was pointless to prosecute. For instance, the first prosecution enables a harsher sentence if the immigrant lands in front of the judge again, and I'd bet that a fair share of the harsher sentences involved repeat offenders. Also, if you think that being a nation of laws means that we should always enforce every law (or if you at least believe this when it comes to immigrants), then the prosecutions are their own reward.	It's not clear what you are asking ("How can this be legal?"), so I suppose it may mean that you don't understand the relationship between dismissal of a charge and admissibility of evidence. Or you think that physical evidence is required by law. You might try clarifying the question. A prosecution can be dismissed with prejudice or without prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice means that the charge cannot be pursued again, whereas dismissal without prejudice allows re-filing the charges, and is basically a temporary delay. Dismissal with prejudice can occur especially when the defendants fundamental rights were violated, for instance with illegally-obtained evidence. Dismissal without prejudice may arise because the prosecution needs to gather more evidence. The fact that a prosecution had started with an intent to use certain evidence does not mean that the evidence is itself now inaccessible. So in principle, any evidence that would have been used in an earlier prosecution can still be used. In the case of a felony, it does not legally matter how much time has elapsed since the alleged crime and the prosecution. So on the face of it, there is still a viable prosecution. Physical (forensic) evidence is not required to obtain a criminal conviction, all that is required is testimony that "fully satisfies or entirely convinces [the jury] of the defendant's guilt". That can be the testimony of two witnesses. While "hearsay" evidence is excluded, the definition of "hearsay" is complicated, since hearsay is what people generally think is hearsay but certain things are excluded from the definition of hearsay (therefore are admissible). FRE 803 spells out the exceptions: 803(4) is widely used to allow testimony by the in the case of sexual assault of children. This article surveys a number of relevant cases, and see also this article – the point is that testimony from a psychologist, social worker, parent or other person as to what the child said can be admissible.	To consider obstruction of justice, it's not necessary to consider the impact of a delayed nomination on the work of the Supreme Court. 18 USC 1505 provides that a felony has been committed by Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress Since there's no suggestion of threat or force, the issue would be whether the lawyers' actions were corrupt, and whether the delay constituted an impediment. I am doubtful that either could be established. Furthermore, section 1515(c) says that This chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding. Returning to your theory about preventing or delaying the confirmation of a nominated justice, there does not appear to be anything in the law that criminalizes this. The court having 8 members does not prevent it from hearing any case unless 3 of the 8 have recused themselves from the case, as the Supreme Court's quorum is six justices.
How many legal wives does Winston Blackmore have? On wikipedia it says Winston's father only had one legal wife: Anne Mae was the first of Ray's six wives, and the only wife he was legally married to. Winston's father only had one "formal wife", the one on the marriage certificate. So I assume that Winston might also only have one legal wife and one legal marriage certificate? If he only has one legal wife, how could he be arrested for polygamy?	The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime.	Assuming that neither one of Matthew's parents are blood relatives of either of Daisy's parents, then they do not share a blood relation that would forbid their marriage under any law or standard of incest of which I have heard. (As for describing the relationship of Matthew and Daisy: The best English term is step-siblings, even though the order of parental relationships that produced them may not be the most common sequence that produces step-siblings.)	Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law.	Ensuring that you are compliant with all laws is a notorious problem. For example, nobody has successfully enumerated even the number of criminal laws under the U.S. (federal) code! There's a book that delves into this problem called 3 Felonies a Day. The title alludes to the (unverifiable) suggestion that a typical person unwittingly commits three felonies a day. (There is some discussion of that claim on Skeptics.SE ... and regular amusement published at https://twitter.com/CrimeADay.) In practice, you can look for safe harbors. Obtaining and following the advice of a licensed lawyer offers some indemnification. For example, if you are part of an institution you can vet your planned activities with its ethics and/or legal counsel. If those activities are later found to have violated a law then that approval could conceivably (but not certainly) transfer liability to the institution.	No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.	From the legal perspective, the most important step is establishing legal paternity. IN Code 16-37-2-2.1 covers the process of establishing paternity via affidavit, which has to be executed in a prescribed and timely manner and with cooperation by both parties. Paternity can also be established by court action (very complex). With legal paternity established, then in terms of parental rights and responsibilities, it is immaterial that you are not married. If you don't live together, then the question of custody and visitation, and child support, would need to be resolved (with a lawyer involved). This article surveys the situation with Indiana Law w.r.t. unwed fathers (see especially section III), though most of it is about the situation where actual paternity is distinct from legal paternity.	One can find contradictory claims out there. Here is an English version of the marriage law. There is a surprising amount of legal rigamarole (in Norway, as well) pertaining to clearing "impediments". Assuming that the parties have done their part, then we move to Chapter 4. Article 16: Marriage may take place before a minister of the church, a representative of a registered religious organization empowered to perform such ceremonies, cf. Article 17, or before a civil official so empowered So turning to Article 17: Religious solemnization of marriage shall be performed by the ministers of the National Church, and priests or other representatives of registered religious organizations in Iceland who have been empowered to perform such ceremonies by the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs and that is now part of the Ministry of the Interior. I can't find any indication that ULC has been approved. There are 49 religions officially listed by Statistics Iceland, including Siðmennt, a secular humanist organization which gained official status on May 3rd, 2013 when the organization was officially registered as a secular life stance organization under a law passed in the Icelandic Parliament on January 30th of that year. A formal ceremony was held by the Interior Minister Ögmundur Jónasson who had strongly supported our cause, to mark this historical event. As a result, Siðmennt gained the same legal and funding status as religious life stance organizations in Iceland. Weddings conducted by Siðmennt celebrants since then are legal and couples no longer have to go to government offices for that purpose. In light of the fact that Siðmennt is officially listed and ULC is not listed, I would conclude that you did not accidentally marry anyone, even if they had dealt with the impediments.	The phrase in question is clarifying that if the wall (excluding the support) is on one person's property, and the support crosses into another person's property, then it is not a party fence wall. Why make this clarification, given that if a wall doesn't stand "on lands of different owners", it can't be a party wall anyway? Architect's Legal Handbook: The Law for Architects suggests that this is because there is a different rule for walls which separate buildings, hence the need to highlight the difference (emphasis mine): ...rights of adjoining owners do not arise where only the foundations project on the to the adjoining land if the wall concerned is a boundary wall, not being part of a building, but they do arise if such a wall separates buildings belonging to different owners.
Are lawyers allowed to come to agreements with opposing lawyers without the client's knowledge or consent? Through his lawyer, a client asked for, and received a professional courtesy from the opposing side. The opposing counsel had attached a condition to this professional courtesy that the client didn't know about (only the two lawyers discussed this matter). The client now finds the condition more of a "give up" than the original favor. Is a lawyer allowed to make such a deal without consulting the client? And since it is a matter of professional courtesy as opposed to a legal right, does such a deal even have any meaning?	This depends very much on the nature of the agreement, and whether it affects the client's rights and obligations. It may also depend on which US state this is in. If the agreement is "We will hold the negotiating meetings at your office instead of mine." the client's rights are not affected and the client probably has no veto. If the agreement is "Yes we will plead guilty to manslaughter." it isn't valid without the client's consent. If the client is giving up any rights or making any significant concessions, then the client's consent is probably required, but I can give no better answer without an indication of the subject of the agreement.	There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule.	Andy would be almost immediately disbarred and might also be held in contempt of court. Andy would be disbarred for reasons including his violations of the duty of confidentiality owed by Andy to his client Dave under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in a context like this one. This would be considered an open and shut blatant violation of one of the highest and most serious ethical obligations that an attorney has, and is neck and neck with the rule against stealing money from your clients as a ground for near automatic disbarment. The clarity and severity of the breach of professional ethics by Andy in this regard (and other aspects such as his fiduciary duties to his clients and duty of zealous and diligent advocacy for his client) leaves no ambiguity regarding the appropriate level of discipline. Andy might be held in contempt of court for reasons including knowingly disrupting a court proceeding in which he was or is an attorney of record. He can't quit representing Dave until the court grants his permission to do so. Dave's trial would probably not go forward or his conviction would be set aside. In all likelihood, a trial with a new prosecutor not exposed to the information would be arranged to avoid the taint of the breach of privilege. This would be because providing the prosecutor with inadmissible evidence taints the ability of the prosecutor to proceed untainted by inadmissible evidence and would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel which is one of the grounds for setting aside a conviction for a violation of the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution, which grants the right to effective counsel. what if Dave was openly admitting to having committed the crime, This is utterly irrelevant. Criminal defense lawyers aren't only or mostly for innocent people, and their main job isn't really to get people acquitted of crimes they committed. Instead, a criminal defense lawyer's job is to hold the prosecution to their duties to prove their case, to force the criminal justice system to comply with civil liberties protections, to prevent convictions of excessive charges for the conduct committed, and finally to secure appropriate sentences for their clients (which usually means negotiating a plea bargain). Criminal defense lawyers prevent defendants from being convicted and sentenced in circumstances where they wouldn't have been convicted or sentenced if they weren't ignorant of the legal system (which most criminal defendants are). what if Dave was . . . was boasting about committing more crimes as soon as Andy gets him off the hook. A vague statement like this does not trigger any right of Dave to take any action differently. It's basically bravado or a statement about his own character in general. What if Dave was openly boasting about acts of terrorism he was about to commit, etc. If he was about to commit an act of terrorism but was thwarted, Andy needs to keep his mouth shut. If Andy knows that Dave is about to imminently commit a specific terrorist act then this very distinct fact pattern raised different issues and belongs in a separate question. The crime-fraud exception to the duty of confidentiality, and the way that an ethical lawyer can take appropriate action in a way that minimizes harm to the client, all involve considerations very different from those in the main question. Is Andy forced to be a tool/bystander to Dave's villainy? Is Andy ever allowed to take action against Dave without consequence? The duty of a lawyer not to use his services to further a crime is also a very distinct fact pattern. But, failing to report imminent unilateral acts by a client in furtherance of a crime or fraud is very different from not using information about a client's past actions or vague future intentions against the client, and is also different from using a lawyer as a tool to commit a crime or fraud. These are three distinct situations. A different analysis applies to each one.	Mediation is non-binding Mediation and conciliation are non-binding methods of dispute resolution. If properly conducted, a mediator does not make any suggestions as to how the parties might resolve a dispute; they simply maintain a space where such a resolution might occur. If the parties reach an agreement, that agreement might be a legally binding contract. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If it is, then it could be enforced by a court. If it isn't then compliance is voluntary. What you describe is not mediation However, the agreement facilitated by Bob & Fred's mutual friend either is or is not a contract and the same circumstances follow.	In general, one can dismiss a lawyer at any point by simply informing the lawyer that no further services are wanted or will be paid for. If the lawyr and client have a contract, then any provisions on the contract about termination would need to be followed, unless the lawyer was in materiel breech. It is probably best to make the notice of cancellation in writing, but this is not mandatory unless a contract calls for it. The lawyer can still bill for cervices performed before the cancellation. If the lawyer has already ordered and contracted for services (or goods) to be used in representing the client, and those orders cannot be cancelled, the lawyer may be able to bill for them. Whether discharging the lawyer is wise is a very different question. There might (or might not) be good reason for dealing with the father's estate before that of the brother. But the client can choose what legal services s/he wants, even if the choice is unwise.	This practice is probably not illegal, but I think it is at best ethically dubious. The invoice specifies ""Advising in relation to employment agreement with X", but according to the question no advice about X was given or even asked for, and while advice about Y was discussed, no such advice was given. That suggests that the asker owes the solicitor nothing. However the asker was informed of the hourly charge and then continued to discuss the issue. it could be argued that the constitutes an implicit contract to pay that rate for those discussions. It seems that the asker never said "does that rate apply to this telephone call", nor did the solicitor say "that hourly clock starts now if you want to continue". This leaves the situation less clear than it could have been. The second email, as described, seems to imply that the work of giving advice had not yet commenced, and thus no fee was due for services to date. A person in this situation could reply with a letter (sent by email or postal mail or better both) saying that no advice was given, no useful service was performed, and there was no agreement to pay for any service, so no fee is due. If the solicitor takes this to a court case, the asker may well want to consider consulting a different legal professional. This is a case where the exact facts may well matter, so no more precise answer can, I think, be given here.	The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done.	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
Do you have to disclose you are recording a call that is already being recorded? I'm calling my credit card to dispute being charged twice for something. When I start to hold for an operator I'm prompted that the call may be recorded for whatever reason. If I also want to record the conversation for my own records, do I have to disclose that? IMO they are consenting to being recorded by recording the call, but they never specifically said I could record.	Massachusetts is a 'two-party' state. So you'd have to have consent from them to record. You could probably travel to a 'one-party' state such as one of the states listed here and call them while recording. In a one-party state, only one of the parties to the conversation needs to know about the recording. In those states you don't even need to inform them. It would be interesting to see if the law applied to where the call center is located. When calling credit card companies these days, the call may be routed to any number of places depending on call loads, and those places might be out of country as well.	Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud.	Just at the offset this does not constitute legal advice, just some opinions I have on this point. Technically, you would not be prohibited to generate speech and use it however you like. Under normal circumstances any output generated by the system that does not contravene the service agreement would be your intellectual property. This would include the text and speech generated. Once you go about the request limit you would naturally be required to pay, but until that time you can use the service as a paying customer. Just to clarify this point I would like to make reference to the service license agreement, clause 3, which make reference to the following prohibitions: (a) copy, modify, create a derivative work of, reverse engineer, decompile, translate, disassemble, or otherwise attempt to extract any or all of the source code of the Services (subject to Section 3.4 below and except to the extent such restriction is expressly prohibited by applicable law); (b) use the Services for High Risk Activities; (c) sublicense, resell, or distribute any or all of the Services separate from any integrated Application; (d) create multiple Applications, Accounts, or Projects to simulate or act as a single Application, Account, or Project (respectively) or otherwise access the Services in a manner intended to avoid incurring Fees or exceed usage limits or quotas; (e) unless otherwise set forth in the Service Specific Terms, use the Services to operate or enable any telecommunications service or in connection with any Application that allows Customer End Users to place calls or to receive calls from any public switched telephone network; or (f) process or store any Customer Data that is subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations maintained by the Department of State. Unless otherwise specified in writing by Google, Google does not intend uses of the Services to create obligations under HIPAA, and makes no representations that the Services satisfy HIPAA requirements. If Customer is (or becomes) a Covered Entity or Business Associate, as defined in HIPAA, Customer will not use the Services for any purpose or in any manner involving Protected Health Information (as defined in HIPAA) unless Customer has received prior written consent to such use from Google. Similarly, as specified here: Customer will not, and will not allow third parties to: (i) use these Services to create, train, or improve (directly or indirectly) a similar or competing product or service or (ii) integrate these Services with any applications for any embedded devices such as cars, TVs, appliances, or speakers without Google's prior written permission. These Services can only be integrated with applications for the following personal computing devices: smartphones, tablets, laptops, and desktops. In addition to any other available remedies, Google may immediately suspend or terminate Customer's use of these Services based on any suspected violation of these terms, and violation of these terms is deemed violation of Google's Intellectual Property Rights. Customer will provide Google with any assistance Google requests to reasonably confirm compliance with these terms (including interviews with Customer employees and inspection of Customer source code, model training data, and engineering documentation). These terms will survive termination or expiration of the Agreement. You should also take a look at this and this. However, as per the terms of the agreement the speech generated would be your intellectual property, unless otherwise specified. Good luck!	As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).	Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.	No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.	It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter.	According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application.
What happens if Congress declares war, but POTUS refuses to fight it? By Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the US Constitution, the power to declare war is with the Congress. Today (03/20/17), during a committee hearing, Ms. Speier, accused Russia (I assume she meant the Russian Federation) of having committed an act of war against The United States. If she introduces a resolution to declare war on the Russian Federation and convinces enough of her Republican colleagues to join her in voting for this resolution, and (because he has too many "Russian ties") President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Is he required to act on such a resolution? If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. These decisions are, clearly, subject to review by federal judges, as was demonstrated with both of his "travel bans" (which would be more appropriately called "travel restrictions"). Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? Are there any other implications of Congress declaring war which a POTUS does not choose to execute? I know none of this happened before, but we are in unprecedented territory here, so I am curious to know what kind of warning signs should I watch for when a member of Congress declares that RF has attacked us directly and makes this declaration in her official capacity (not politicking it, but while sitting in her committee chair on Capitol Hill in an open hearing). EDIT: Point 1: As an example of why stating that RF committed acts of war against the United States is significant, here's how the declaration of war against the Empire of Japan was phrased: "Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United states of America: "Therefore be it "Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United states and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United states." While no such resolution was introduced (so far on 3/23/2017), the justification for war declaration has been cited. It has been cited almost word-for-word as it was previously cited, in at least one, previous resolution making a declaration of war. Point 2: This is NOT a question about immigration. I have no interest in any opinions or competing legal theories on whether crossing borders, which are protected and enforced, is considered "unauthorized immigration" or a limited-in-form "invasion". I am going with the opinion that it is universally considered to be a form of invasion if a border is enforced and actively protected. If you wish to challenge such an opinion, please, do so in response to other questions, questions you raise yourself, or in any other forum. I am interested solely in legal views as to what is the answer to my question based on the assumption that all the premises of my question are correct. If you wish to challenge the premises of my question, you will not be answering it to my satisfaction. EDIT 2: Since people are clearly not able to separate the issue of border defense from some cases of "immigration", let's open it up to the scope in which so many seem to want to view it. As a hypothetical, what happens if Congress declares war, POTUS refuses to fight it, but private parties begin to engage agents and armies of the adversary state in private hostile actions? Would POTUS have limited authority to stop them? Would his authority to stop them be more limited than it would be had the war not been declared? Would his attempts to thwart private parties, attempting to execute war actions against a nation with whom we would then be at war, be against policy and would be subject to the same type of criminal prosecution as when no state of war exists? The reason I think this example pertinent is because judicial constraint on war powers is tantamount to judges' ability to order inaction when the executive deems an action necessary. But any ability to order inaction can be easily turned into an ability to allow an action through administrative rebranding of paramilitary groups as "private" or even "law-enforcement" rather than military. So the actual legal theory which brands certain federal defensive forces as "civilian" may serve the purpose of putting those forces within their own silo of decision-making, making any Presidential attempts to constrain them subject to judicial review. And, in a time of POTUS flatly refusing to prosecute a war declared by Congress, a judiciary would be able to provide (through constraint of executive powers) the power to prosecute such war to the "civilian" defensive forces. This isn't purely hypothetical, either. This is essentially how it came to be that Lincoln put some of the Supreme Court justices under house arrest. They were interfering with the prosecution of the Civil War. Any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism. What enforcement mechanisms exist to prevent judges from enabling separate decision-making silos within the "civilian" defensive forces of the federal government which do not answer to the President because of judicial restraint and which can legally prosecute a war based on Congress' expressed declaration of war?	If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations.	"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).	I haven't found any cases where this defence has worked. I strongly suspect that that's because it never has. Every piece of advice I've read on this unsurprisingly suggests you'd be a fool to attempt to rely on this defence in court, including some cases in which defendants have attempted to rely on it and have failed. There are a couple of Freedom of Information requests to the government which state very clearly that it won't work: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statute_law_4 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/consent_of_the_governed The last link is particularly clear on the matter: every citizen of the UK tacitly consents to be governed, according to Blackstone. And this one makes it even clearer: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18097/response/56511/attach/html/3/TO%20255452%20TO09%205866.doc.html Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Acts of Parliament override common law. So it simply wouldn't be possible to argue that you choose to live under the common law alone; no court in the land would allow it, as it's a cornerstone of our legal system that Parliament is sovereign, and therefore that statutes enacted by Parliament will 'trump' the common law. Parliament derives its sovereignty from the fact that the current government is elected and therefore represents the citizens of the UK, and for this reason, Acts of Parliament take priority over case law. On that basis, it wouldn't be possible for a citizen to argue that they choose not to abide by statute: their consent is tacitly assumed. Based on all the above, then, I would say no: the 'common law' defence will never hold water if relied on in court.	"Does threatening to attack cultural heritage constitute conspiracy to commit a war crime..." Almost certainly not. It's a threat to commit a war crime, but is probably not illegal in and of itself. On the other hand, if the Commander In Chief were to ask his generals what would be involved in mounting a cruise missile attack on the Meidan Emam in Esfahan, that would be conspiracy to commit a war crime (as would supplying the requested information).	Can any one uses this law to sue US for killing people in Iraq for example? No. This proposed law is limited to suing people or organizations involved in supporting terrorism in the US. The problem with it is if it becomes law and is used, the precedent will be set to allow lawsuits against foreign actors for such decisions. So a middle eastern government, e.g. Iraq or Iran, could pass a law allowing lawsuits against those who could be in some way responsible for war crimes during the Iraq war. So someone could sue the individuals directly responsible, their commanders for not stopping them or preventing them, the organization to which the individuals belonged, the government of the individuals, the members of the coalition, and the United Nations. And this would be done in that country's courts, not international courts with some claim to impartiality. The proposed law is a bad idea, but quite popular. There were some low level members of the Saudi Arabian government who supported actions taken by the group involved in the 9/11 attacks. The families of the victims are understandably annoyed by this. And yes, they are actually seeking justice, just not in the best way. This wouldn't make a good basis for blackmail, as there is no way to stop it. Blackmail is based on offering two alternatives and allowing the victim to pick one. This wouldn't be controllable like that. Once launched, it would be difficult to pull back.	The comments have already pointed out that the President of the United States is still a citizen, and all of the rights of a citizen are still protected for them. Additionally, the Administration is allowed to take policy positions which are antagonistic to a person or group's cause, even if that group is practicing their rights to express their views legally. To give a different example, the President and his administration may denounce the position of a group of Neo-Nazis marching legally. So, any argument that the President is acting in an official capacity while making antagonistic comments also probably fails, as the Administration is allowed to take a position on any issue they deem worth taking a stand on. As noted in another answer and in comments, the applicable laws appear to be 18 U.S. Code § 227, which provides for punishment of government officials who attempt to influence employment decisions through official acts for political purposes, and 42 U.S. Code § 1983, which provides for civil action when a person deprives, or causes the deprivation of, another person's rights under color of law. 18 U.S. Code § 227 likely does not apply for two reasons The President may show that his conduct was not purely for political purpose The official statements made do not qualify as official acts per McDonnell v. United States, as they are not a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"; that question or matter must involve a formal exercise of governmental power, and must also be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official 42 U.S. Code § 1983 might apply if the official statements were found to be acting under color of law, but I think the statements made so far will fail to meet the qualifications for this statute. Blair v. Bethel School District gives three qualifications for conduct that would allow recovery under this statute: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. The President's and Administration's official speech appears to fail the second criteria. First, it is questionable whether it qualifies as an "Adverse Action" - in Blair, as well as Hartman v. Moore and Gibson v. United States, the adverse action against the Plaintiff caused actual damage or indignity. However, even if we assume the official speech qualifies as an adverse action for the purposes of the statute, it still appears to be permissible for effectively the same reasons as the first and third arguments presented in the decision: First, the adverse action Blair complains of was a rather minor indignity, and de minimis deprivations of benefits and privileges on account of one's speech do not give rise to a First Amendment claim. The actual effect of the Administration's speech has a minimal direct effect on the players it speaks against. The decision further states: The most familiar adverse actions are “exercise[s] of governmental power” that are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature” and have the effect of punishing someone for his or her speech Official speech by the Administration is not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." While this is not a complete definition for "adverse action," it gives a sense of severity, which official speech does not appear to meet. Additionally, the President's right to speech, and the Administration's authority and need to make official speech as directed by the President is a competing interest in this case, as was the interest of the Board in Blair: Third, it is significant that Blair isn't the only party in this case whose interests implicate First Amendment concerns. To the contrary, we assume all of the Board members have a protected interest in speaking out and voting their conscience... The decision does note that: The point isn't that the vote against Blair was protected speech simply because it was expressive. Almost all retaliatory actions can be said to be expressive, including those that are manifestly unconstitutional. But, while Blair certainly had a First Amendment right to criticize Seigel and vote against his retention as superintendent, his fellow Board members had the corresponding right to replace Blair with someone who, in their view, represented the majority view of the Board. Similarly, it's probable that a court would find that the President's right to speech and their Administration's corresponding authority to speech against the players' right to protest is equally weighted or even weightier, such that stifling the official speech is as bad or worse than the alleged chilling effect of the speech. Some examples of things that clearly would fall afoul of 42 U.S. Code § 1983 would be the President or the Administration misappropriating funds to use to pay NFL teams not to hire players who kneel during the national anthem, or signing an Executive Order preventing players who kneel during the national anthem from playing - in both cases, they are taking actions which fall outside the powers of their office, which would qualify as acts made under color of law and clearly chill the players' First Amendment rights.	There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.	Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter.
What is the correct way of discharging contract when parties can't agree on shipping? When selling stuff on TradeMe, one way of specifying shipping options is "To be arranged". That is, seller can skip researching shipping options/costs and only worry about it once the item is contractually sold. This is made clear to the buyer. Essentially, buyer and seller enter a contract without specifying shipping terms. They only agree to "arrange shipping" (or, at least, attempt to). It will not be uncommon that, when making such arrangements, the buyer realises that shipping costs are too high for them. Or, the buyer wants the seller to use a courier service which is impracticable for them to use. Then, if the parties agree to rescind the contract, they do so. Happy days. But what if one party does not want to rescind and insists on performance? Can such a contract be discharged by frustration or another similar way?	There is no contract Specifically, an agreement to agree is void for uncertainty. If the total cost of shipping was an insignificant fraction of the value of the contract then there might be sufficient certainty - that is, it could be argued that the buyer (or seller) has agreed to pay a reasonable rate for shipping. However, in the context of most items on the site this is unlikely to be the case. As an aside, your use of the term "rescind" is incorrect. Rescission occurs when one party breaches a term of the contract and the other party elects to terminate (and optionally seek damages) in response. The correct term for both parties agreeing to release the other is "termination by agreement".	From a legal POV, we can mostly remove the fact that you re-orderd the item from someone else and now don't know whether the expected shipment is in fulfillment of contract 1 or contract 2. Assume that there was only one order, the seller or manufacturer (it could be either) believed they were out of stock, then cancelled the order and issued a refund (which you did not refuse to accept). That is the end of the contract -- it has been cancelled. They cannot unilaterally create a new contract that you are bound to. That does not mean you get a free grape crusher (or similar item) - that would be "unjust enrichment". There are a number of steps you could taks, apart from just paying them again, or making them sue you to get their money. One is that you can allow them to pick it up and return it, after it is delivered. You can also contact "them" (perhaps the manufacturer, perhaps the intermediary company) and tell them so that they can stop the shipment. They may advise you to refuse the package so that the shipper sends it back (not totally unproblematic). Given that it is possible that the item being shipped is in fulfillment of contract 2, it is important to not leap to a uncertain conclusion. To complicate the matter further, Amazon is a party to this deal, so this may be Amazon's error. They will cancel orders and refund payments for various reasons, for example a vendor failing to provide certification documentation in a particular format. What matters in this case is that you are not obligated to pay twice or to incur expenses for returning the item.	This is actually pretty standard. You have a contract with a business to provide some service, and you get a bargain on the price of the service as long as you stay with them for some period, such as 2 years. You could get the 'pay as you go' option which doesn't have a termination fee, but that costs more if you are sure you can commit to what you signed up for, for that period. So it's not that you can't terminate the contract, it's that you can't just walk away from your obligation (what they call a "minimum term agreement"), cost-free. The early-termination fee is part of the cost of moving. You have to look in the Legal Agreements & Contract part of Account Details on your account to get the specific agreement that you are bound by. Generally, you are subject to that fee, unless the subscriber dies, or is in the military and is shipped out. You can also transfer your service from area to area – I assume you either are moving to an area without Xfinity service, or you elected to not use Xfinity in that location. It is legal for a business to put their business interest above that of a customer, even in the case of regulated "utilities".	As a buyer, you can write anything you want (aside from anything illegal) into a contract, i.e. to withhold the last payment on a item until you check off the final product specs, but that won't make a difference unless the manufacturer agrees to the contract. A contract that is agreed to (written and agreed to (typically signed), or verbal and verbally agreed to) is legally binding; a contract not agreed to is little more than a wishlist. If this involves, as you say, online purchases or when the customer is remote and working through an agent, a contract can still legally binding, but the contract may be more complex. You may need to draft more stipulations into the contract with all involved, (agent and manufacturer); but again, those mean nothing if the contract is not agreed to. See Contracts - Legal Information Institute for an outline of the steps of making a contract: An agreement between private parties creating mutual obligations enforceable by law. The basic elements required for the agreement to be a legally enforceable contract are: mutual assent, expressed by a valid offer and acceptance; adequate consideration; capacity; and legality. The enforcement of breaking a contract is a completely different situation. You may draft arbitration arbitration (Legal Information Institute) into the contract; or may go to civil court.	Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.	Let's say you have an actual contract where you give A something of value in consideration of which B gives you something of value. That way, the exchange is legally enforceable and is not just a cancellable promise. This is all written up clearly, and you become a creditor. One thing to bear in mind is that you may have to wait in line so that others are paid first. For example, taxes have to be paid, also secured creditors have to be paid. Nearly at the end of the list, unsecured creditors such as you are paid, and finally heirs can receive shares of what is left. I don't know what you mean by "recognizing" a debt, but what a financial institution could do is treat a debt as an asset, for the purposes of a loan. For instance, a bank might lend you $10,000 where you pledge your home as a thing of value that they can take in case you default on repayment. You cannot force a bank to accept a particular asset as collateral, so the answer to the "how" question is "by persuasion". Since your asset has an indefinite value between $0 and let's say $10,000, you would have to persuade the bank that there is negligible risk to them. In the case of property used as collateral, when you default the creditor can use the courts to seize your property and sell it, but they can't seize the property of a third party who owes you something, they would have to wait possibly for years for the third party to die and see what's left. Investment instruments might be used as collateral, but only if they can be liquidated reasonably promptly. The risk to the bank is extremely high, but if you are very persuasive, they might accept such a debt as collateral.
Are public monuments like the Elizabeth Tower and the Eiffel Tower copyrighted? Let's say I want to make a miniature replica of Big Ben and sell it online. Do I need any kind of permission for that? I'm assuming that given its age, Big Ben has to be public domain. But I'm not sure. I've tried contacting the British Parliament and other institutions related to Big Ben, but never got an answer.	I'm just going through high-level concepts with this answer, it's possible I miss a detail. Architectural works are indeed copyrightable works in accordance with Berne Convention Article 2(1). Both Big Ben and Eiffel Tower are no longer under copyright due to their architects dying more than 70 years ago. French moral rights do not expire (UK moral rights expire with the economic rights). Most relevant to this question are the rights to attribution and against derogatory/damaging/prejudicial treatment defined by Berne Convention Article 6bis(1). Copyright law is on a per-country basis and under Berne Convention Articles 3 & 4, foreign works are accorded equal rights to domestic works. French moral rights apply within France. Taken together, in the UK these architectural works are in the public domain. In France, economic rights (copyright) have expired, but moral rights still exist. Miniature replicas should be fine, but be sure to include attribution.	I don't think it's in the public domain. It is true that "works of the United States Government" cannot be copyrighted (17 USC 105). However, "work of the United States Government" is defined as a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties. (17 USC 101) The pool photographer isn't an officer or employee of the United States Government; he works for the New York Times. The satire question is separate and I don't know the answer to that.	If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here.	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.	"Only the owner of copyright in a work has the right to prepare, or to authorize someone else to create, a new version of that work." Copyright in Derivative Works and Compilations http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf So if you have not been granted authorization, you are violating the right of the owner. It's always recommended that you get permission. Practically speaking, if the owner does not give you permission, there is probably someone else with a similar photo who will! Pretty famous recent case: Barack Obama "Hope" poster	In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.	Beethoven's Piano Sonata is public domain There will be copyright in the performance but as you are specifically hiring the musician to perform the piece for you to record, you would own the copyright in that as a work for hire provided this is stated in the contract.	Can a system include such information? it is surely technically possible. Would it be a violation of copyright? That depends. First of all, any such information can be included if the copyright holder has granted permission, probably in the form of a license. But in that case this question would probably not have been asked. I therefore assume that no permission has been granted. (It doesn't matter if a request was made and the answer was "no", a request was made but ignored, or no request was ever made. No permission is still no permission.) The names of fictional locations are nor protected by copyright. Including, say, "Rivendell" or "Hobbiton" in the selection list for a timezone setting would not infringe the copyrights held by the Tolkien estate. But a map is a different thing. If the OS includes and can display a map of a fictional region, one that is copied from or based on a map published with the fiction, or by some third party, then that would almost surely be copyright infringement, and the copyright holder could choose to sue for infringement. S/he might choose not to sue, but that is a risky gamble to take. If this is in the US, statutory damages could be awarded, and could intheory go as high as $150,000, although they are not likely to be as high as that, that is just the maximum legal limit (per work infringed, not per copy). The standard is whatever amount the court thinks "just", up to the maximum. (If proof of willful infringement is not made, the upper limit is $30,000, still a sizable sum.) If the OS designer created the map independently, using names from the fiction, but not otherwise basing it on the fiction, and in particular not imitating any map created by anyone else, then it may well not be infringement, but it would still be wise to consult a copyright lawyer. The question would be more helpful if it made clear just what would be hypothetically included in the OS, and to what extent it would be based on someone else's work. There is also the question of why someone would want to include fictional places, but that really doesn't change the legal issue.
Can Congress, or any other body, subpoena the President's tax records? President Trump's tax records, and the question of whether Congress can access them, have been on the news for years. In all this time, I've never heard any analyst debate whether or not a president is legally required to release his tax records. In the past, many candidates released their tax records. Is this just a norm as opposed to a rule? Can Congress demand a president release his records? Is the NY attorney subpoenaing Trump's tax records under a different pretense? Is it part of their criminal investigation? Are the laws on this matter regarding private citizens different than for public officials?	There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.	I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	Once a person is sworn in as POTUS, there are only two legal mechanisms for involuntary removal of that person from the office: Article II Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides only that: The President ... shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The 25th Amendment was passed to establish clear procedures of official succession. Its Section 4 also provides an elaborate mechanism whereby "the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" can precipitate a process that would allow Congress, within 21 days, to transfer the office to the Vice President. Otherwise, there is no contemplation in the law of a "backsies" mechanism for removing a person from the office because "it should have gone to someone else." (The idea that a person who was in the designated line of succession, but in the wrong order, was sworn into office does not seem nearly as problematic as other events that have happened in real history. For example, in the 2000 Presidential Election it was conceivable – and some people probably maintain in fact – that the "loser" of the election would be sworn into office. The U.S. Supreme Court settled the legal questions before the inauguration. However, the realization at the time was that any legal challenges or decisions after that date would be moot, because "election error" is not a cause to remove a sitting U.S. President.) The question of a previous President reappearing, and his successor refusing to cede the office, takes us to the height of speculation. In this case I would merely note that I can find no law pertaining to Presidential Transition in which an outgoing President is "stripped of authority" or "removed from office." Rather, the acting POTUS is effectively the most recent person sworn to the office, and not removed from it.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?	The US election authorities already record who voted in which elections, and that information is a matter of public record. When I was active in politics some years ago, and at one point a candidate for local office, my campaign and others routinely purchased from the state a "voter list" for each district. This list showed each registered voter, with that person's name, address, age (to the nearest year), party of registration if any, and in which of the last several (I think 10) elections that person had voted. These were delivered in electronic form, and could be sorted and analyzed in whatever way the purchaser pleased. I understand that similar lists are available in every US state, I think from a legal point of view, a picture would reveal no more information than these already-public lists, and since they have not been successfully challenged as unconstitutional, I don't see that the pictures would be subject to such a challenge, unless it could be shown that taking such pictures had a chilling effect, that is, that taking them made certain categories of voters, such as minority voters, less likely to vote. I am not aware of any specific federal or state laws on taking pictures of voters. But if there were a chilling effect, that would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Fourteenth amendment. That clause has been central, or at least significant, in most challenges to voter restrictions, both successful and unsuccessful. But since, as far as I know, no state or other US jurisdiction has tried this, there is no caselaw on point, and one cannot be sure how such a case would be resolved. Whether this would be good policy is a very different question, and where it would be politically acceptable is yet another. Neither of those are on topic here on Law.se, although they might be on Politics.SE.	I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.	Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system.
California Emission Standards If indeed the headline is correct: Trump revokes waiver for California to set higher auto emissions standards, the waiver grants California the authority to set higher standards in favor of the environment. That being said, is there anything in law. that prevents California from setting the bar higher in the absence of said waiver?	Various US Federal laws, including the Clean Air act, identify air pollution as a matter of interstate commerce, and assert exclusive Federal control over it, except as specifically permitted by those laws. The Clean Air act specifically provides for the California exception to set higher standards, and for other states to follow the CA rules if they so choose. What is not clear, at least to me, is whether the law permits the President to cancel the CA waiver at will. But in the absence of such a waiver, I believe that no state may set different standards on auto or other emissions from the Federal standards. This is to avoid having many different state standards, and to facilitate a national market, which is something Congress is empowered to promote in this way. Of course, nothing prevents automakers from choosing to adhere to stricter standards than any law requires. They could even advertise "Buy X, the cleanest, greenest cars on the market". Whether this would pay I don't know. I gather that various states intend to sue, claiming that the action is unlawful. I am not clear what legal arguments they will advance for this. 42 USC §7543 (aka Clean Air Act section 209) provides: §7543. State standards (a) Prohibition No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment. (b) Waiver (1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that— (A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious, (B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title. (2) If each State standard is at least as stringent as the comparable applicable Federal standard, such State standard shall be deemed to be at least as protective of health and welfare as such Federal standards for purposes of paragraph (1). (3) In the case of any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine to which State standards apply pursuant to a waiver granted under paragraph (1), compliance with such State standards shall be treated as compliance with applicable Federal standards for purposes of this subchapter. The word "shall" near the start of 42 USC 7543 (b) (1) seems to require the issuance of a waiver whenever: a) a state adopted standards prior to March 30, 1966, b) the state standards are at least as strict as the federal standards, c) the state standards are not arbitrary and capricious d) the state needs the standards, and e) the state standards are consistent with section 7521(a). a) and b) clearly apply to the CA standards. I don't know if an argument can be sustained on any of the other issues, nor exactly what grounds the current administration has advanced for canceling the waiver.	In general, ignorance of a law is an excuse only when the law specifically says it is. There are extreme cases where a law has been found invalid because it did not give people enough notice. Actually, only one case I know of -- Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The city of Los Angeles passed a law making it illegal for anyone who had ever been convicted of a felony to remain in the city for five days without registering as a felon. Lambert was arrested on suspicion of doing something else, but convicted for being an unregistered felon. The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of Lambert's due process rights to convict her of a crime she had no way of knowing about, or even suspecting. This is a very rare, extreme case, and does not apply to things where people might be expected to suspect that there might be a law. Otherwise, notice of a law is only required if the statute says so; for example, if a speed limit law requires the posting of signs, but the signs aren't posted, the law may not be in effect. However, ignorance still isn't an excuse--if the sign is posted, but you just didn't notice it, you're still on the hook.	No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the "Vagueness Doctrine" which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.	I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about "yielding". The law incorporates both "yield" and "stop", the former being "and allow the other person to proceed". Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute "not yielding". While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.	Dale is right; here are the details from CA statutes: Since 1872, CA law has told CA courts to assume the parties to contracts in CA are reasonable, not crazy. If the literal reading of the contract is crazy, the California Civil Code's rules for the Interpretation of Contracts tells its courts: ignore the crazy reading. Here is what the statute says: § 1636 A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. To win under this section, you would need to claim that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. No judge would believe this. § 1637 For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, if otherwise doubtful, the rules given in this Chapter are to be applied. To win under this section, you would need to claim that there is no doubt that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1638 The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity. To win under this section, you would need to claim that it was reasonable that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1640 When, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded. To win under this section, you would also need to claim that both you and the landlord really intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Since no judge would believe this, any judge would rule that the wording was a mistake, and should be disregarded. § 1643 A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties. Ditto.	A good starting point would be the SCOTUS opinion, or everything on SCOTUSblog, especially the application for injunctive relief filed on Aug. 30. There is a long sequence of petitions and orders which ask the courts either to issue an injunction preventing the law from taking force, or to vacate an administrative stay of proceedings by the lower court regarding petitioner's challenge. The lower court denied the petitions, therefore petitioners turn to SCOTUS to get an injunction against the law. Then you can turn to the SCOTUS opinion to see what the reasons were, for and against the petition. The majority position is that an applicant must carry the burden of making a “strong showing” that it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” that it will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” that the balance of the equities favors it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest. The majority concludes that The applicants now before us have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law at issue. But their application also presents complex and novel antecedent procedural questions on which they have not carried their burden. Immediately after this the court comments that federal courts enjoy the power to enjoin individuals tasked with enforcing laws, not the laws themselves. However, it is unclear whether the named defendants in this lawsuit can or will seek to enforce the Texas law against the applicants in a manner that might permit our intervention The law states that Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who and the named respondents (government workers of various sorts) all appear to be precluded from filing an action – thus an injunction against the judge is superfluous since he cannot file a lawsuit anyhow. It is also unclear whether SCOTUS can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’s law. When SCOTUS say "it is unclear" in this context, they mean that petitions did not adequately demonstrate that the court can in fact issue such an injunction. It's not that SCOTUS cannot decide such matters after extensive consideration of the facts / arguments and discussion, it's that the standards for an emergency action require something that the court found lacking in the petition: we cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail in an injunction or stay application. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.	The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."
As an employer, can I compel my employees to vote? Obviously an employer absolutely can't require employees to vote for any particular candidate (or even to vote for any candidate rather than spoiling their ballot), but if it was included as a clause in employees' contracts that they must (in company time) attend the appropriate polling station and "participate" in some defined set of elections (eg "all local and national governmental elections and referenda"), and that failing to do so was a disciplinary offence, would such a clause be enforceable? Would an employer legitimately be able to fire someone for failing to comply? Looking for answers in relation to the UK.	Nobody so far has discussed Electoral law e.g. Representation of the People Act 1983 There are various clauses that may be relevant, one of which is: A voter shall be guilty of bribery if before or during an election he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or for any other person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting. Subsection 2 similarly makes it an offence to offer employment to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting but somewhat less concisely. I believe this would make such a contract unenforceable.	The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights agrees in Art. 8 that The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure...(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. "Exercised in conformity with the law" does allow some restrictions on striking. In the US, the NLRB sets rules governing legal vs. illegal strikes, for example a strike in the face of a no-strike contract provision, or a strike to compel an employer to fire an employee who doesn't pay union dues when no union-security agreement is in effect. So you would have to look at the labor law of Israel to see what strikes are legal vs. illegal, and that also requires looking at individual union contracts. Theoretically, a nation could enact a law authorizing any one-day strike as a form of political protest, but there is no such law in Israel as far as I can tell (this article introduces the various relevant laws of Israel). The point is that international law on this point requires corresponding national law, as state above. ICCPR does not create a special right to conduct political strikes against a third party.	You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.	The US election authorities already record who voted in which elections, and that information is a matter of public record. When I was active in politics some years ago, and at one point a candidate for local office, my campaign and others routinely purchased from the state a "voter list" for each district. This list showed each registered voter, with that person's name, address, age (to the nearest year), party of registration if any, and in which of the last several (I think 10) elections that person had voted. These were delivered in electronic form, and could be sorted and analyzed in whatever way the purchaser pleased. I understand that similar lists are available in every US state, I think from a legal point of view, a picture would reveal no more information than these already-public lists, and since they have not been successfully challenged as unconstitutional, I don't see that the pictures would be subject to such a challenge, unless it could be shown that taking such pictures had a chilling effect, that is, that taking them made certain categories of voters, such as minority voters, less likely to vote. I am not aware of any specific federal or state laws on taking pictures of voters. But if there were a chilling effect, that would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Fourteenth amendment. That clause has been central, or at least significant, in most challenges to voter restrictions, both successful and unsuccessful. But since, as far as I know, no state or other US jurisdiction has tried this, there is no caselaw on point, and one cannot be sure how such a case would be resolved. Whether this would be good policy is a very different question, and where it would be politically acceptable is yet another. Neither of those are on topic here on Law.se, although they might be on Politics.SE.	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43).	In the U.S. a board member would not be an employee just by virtue of being a board member, even if they were compensated for attending board meetings. The CEO, an employee, might or might not also be a board member. Employees can be fired by their manager. A board member can't be fired from the board but, typically, only removed by a vote of shareholders. They are not assigned tasks by managers of the company. This is 100% clear in CA under employment code 622 (a) “Employee” does not include a director of a corporation or association performing services in his or her capacity as a director. I was a CEO of a private company I co-founded I was a board member as a result of voting myself on the board via my stock ownership. The majority of the board could fire me as CEO but I would still be a board member. If outside board members did get compensation, it would be as a consultant, paid with a 1099. The CA code does say that a board member could take on actual work, like auditing financial information, that might fall under the activities of an employee.	Under federal law, an employer may impose direct deposit as a condition of employment. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act at 15 USC 1693k only says that employers may not require an employee to have a bank account at a particular bank: No person may— (1) condition the extension of credit to a consumer on such consumer’s repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers; or (2) require a consumer to establish an account for receipt of electronic fund transfers with a particular financial institution as a condition of employment or receipt of a government benefit. If the employee is allowed to choose their bank, then such a condition is legal under this law. The government's interpretation of this law is clarified in 12 CFR 1005 Supplement I at 10(e)(2): Payroll. An employer (including a financial institution) may not require its employees to receive their salary by direct deposit to any particular institution. An employer may require direct deposit of salary by electronic means if employees are allowed to choose the institution that will receive the direct deposit. Alternatively, an employer may give employees the choice of having their salary deposited at a particular institution (designated by the employer) or receiving their salary by another means, such as by check or cash. That said, individual states can create their own legislation, and many have made it illegal under state law for an employer to require direct deposit. You didn't name a particular state so I can't be more specific, but there is a chart here created by a payroll company showing the legality of such policies by state. Note that in some sense, the employee is not really being "compelled" or "mandated" to have a bank account - if the employer insists on using direct deposit, the employee is free to go look for a different job. US law does tend to recognize that there is a major power imbalance in employer-employee relationships, so there are many regulations; but at its root, it's treated as a contract between two independent parties who may each set whatever conditions they want, and enter into the contract only if they can agree. In contexts other than employment, I would expect even fewer restrictions on how a bank account could be set as a condition for something. For instance, it could be a condition for using a particular product or service. Again, if you don't want to open a bank account, you are free to not use that product or service.
What is the equivalent for "Consideration" (English common law) in Spanish speaking countries? Consideration is a concept of English common law and is a necessity for simple contracts. Consideration may be thought of as the concept of value offered and accepted by people or organisations entering into contracts. Anything of value promised by one party to the other when making a contract can be treated as "consideration": for example, if A signs a contract to buy a car from B for $5,000, A's consideration is the $5,000, and B's consideration is the car. Translating into "Consideración" just does not work at all, there must be a concept to explain the same in Latin-American Countries. For instance, how do you call this in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, etc.? Or in Spain? Any hint is very welcome.	What is the equivalent for “Consideration” (English common law) in Spanish speaking countries? Prestación. Perhaps not all Spanish speaking countries adopt a one-word term, but the notion of consideration definitely exists in civil law. It is quite mistaken to presume that the concept is unique to common law systems. The Civil Code of both Spain (see art. 1257) and México (art. 1793) are in terms of "transmission or transfer of rights", which fits the meaning of consideration. The Civil Code of Spain in its art. 1254 refers to "[consent] to give something or perform [prestar] a service" (brackets added for clarity), whence the term prestación qualifies as consideration in several --if not all-- types of contract. In fact, article 1274 literally mentions "prestación or promise".	There isn't enough information to give a reliable answer in the abstract. It is a hard concept for lots of people to understand, but words don't have the same meaning in every context. Law is not physics or chemistry. Words that mean one thing in a particular instrument or statute could mean another thing somewhere else, even if exactly the same words are used. More context would be helpful in determining a meaning. It could be a reference to a type of use, like AirBnB or other short term rentals (e.g. use as a hotel or hostel). It could also be a reference to a type of building that is not permanent such as tents, RVs, or other non-permanent structures intended for residential occupancy. Usually, a look at what the adjacent and framing language of the covenants say would clarify the intent as would some sense of the kind of structures built or intended to be built in the vicinity. It also isn't clear from context if the emphasis is on "residential" (e.g. in a property with a storage facility included), or on "temporary" (e.g. in a posh suburb).	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	Yes Yes Yes However, these are pretty standard contract terms. Many, many terms survive the end of the substantive agreement. For example, terms with respect to ongoing confidentiality, dispute resolution, warranties, termination itself etc. The second is so common it actually has a named legal doctrine: reading down. In the absence of such a clause, if the contract inadvertently exceeds what the law allows, it preserves the contract rather than leaving both parties without contractural protection.	I don't know of a specific legal term but such clauses are quite common in contracts which consist of more than one document. The English words "priority", "prevail" and "precedence" have the meaning you want, however, "precedence" runs the risk of being confused with "precedent" which does have a very specific legal meaning. A clause similar to: If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity between the English and Japanese language versions of the contract, the English version shall prevail. You need to make very sure that this clause can be translated unambiguously into Japanese!	The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.	The user gains the use of the software, the EULA issuer gains the limitations on how the user of the freeware will use it, that for example, prevent the freeware user from exploiting the issuer's labor by reusing it for profit. Consideration doesn't have to be monetary. As a practical matter, sometimes the business model is to give the software away as a loss leader and to have the issuer make their money with training and consulting on how to use it. Also, even in the absence of consideration, a promise upon which the person benefiting from the promise reasonably relies is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Further, EULA stands for "end user license agreement" and there are many times that license agreements aren't full fledged contracts. They are merely limited grants of permission to use something, often not even amounting to a full fledged property right or contract right. For example, if I let my neighbor walk into my living room while we talk and have tea, the right of the neighbor to be in my living room is called a license, even though it is not a contract. A license can be embedded in a contract, but it doesn't have to be.	It depends on the language used to pass the statutes, but if in doubt then Spanish prevails. See section 13 of the Civil Code: In case of discrepancy between the English and Spanish texts of a statute passed by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, the text in which the same originated in either house, shall prevail in the construction of said statute, except in the following cases: (a) If the statute is a translation or adaptation of a statute of the United States or of any State or Territory thereof, the English text shall be given preference over the Spanish. (b) If the statute is of Spanish origin, the Spanish text shall be preferred to the English. (c) If the matter of preference cannot be decided under the foregoing rules, the Spanish text shall prevail.
Does the iconic WWII-end "Kiss" photo depict sexual assault? One of the most famous images from the end of World War II was of a sailor kissing someone who looked like a nurse in Times Square, celebrating the victory. As described in a featured article in Naval History Magazine, based on a book-length version, notes that "The two participants in the world’s most famous kiss didn’t even know each other, nor was their photograph staged." He was drunk, and the photographer thought he'd done something similar with another woman before the picture (neither of whom were his new girlfriend, several steps behind). The liquor running through his veins transfixed his glassy stare. ...He focused on Greta, the “nurse.” She remained unaware of his advance. That served his purpose well. He sought no permission for what he was about to do. ...With background noises barely registering, he rushed toward her as if in a vacuum. Though George halted his steps just before running into Greta, his upper torso’s momentum swept over her. The motion’s force bent Greta backward and to her right. As he overtook Greta’s slender frame, his right hand cupped her slim waist. He pulled her inward toward his lean and muscular body. Her initial attempt to physically separate her person from the intruder proved a futile exertion against the dark-uniformed man’s strong hold. With her right arm pinned between their two bodies, she instinctively brought her left arm and clenched fist upward in defense. The effort was unnecessary. He never intended to hurt her. As their lips locked, his left arm supported her neck. His left hand, turned backward and away from her face, offered the singular gesture of restraint, caution or doubt. The struck pose created an oddly appealing mixture of brutish force, caring embrace, and awkward hesitation. He didn’t let go. As he continued to lean forward, she lowered her right arm and gave over to her pursuer—but only for three or four seconds. He tried to hold her closer, wanting the moment to last longer. And longer still. But they parted...He just had to kiss her. He didn’t know why. The photo was taken August 14, 1945. Though the participants didn't learn of it until 1980, this was "Life magazine’s most reproduced photograph, and one of history’s most popular." It very likely came to the attention of people who happened to be in the law enforcement system. The sailor later died at age 95, having not faced negative consequences, and even sued the magazine seeking stronger recognition for being the guy in the photo. The woman has also passed away. The question here is, does that photograph depict sexual assault? Why or why not?	In 1945? Not a chance. Basically, the only sexual crime that existed then was rape. In 2019? In New York, it appears the answer is still no. All sexual crimes require “sexual contact”: 3. “Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing, as well as the emission of ejaculate by the actor upon any part of the victim, clothed or unclothed. While lips may be considered “intimate parts”, there would appear to be no intention “of gratifying sexual desire”.	As per this question & answer, in the US there is no expectation of privacy in public places (not to be confused with private places where public is allowed e.g. supermarkets). Photos taken in public belong to the photo taker and he/she is free to use them in whatever way. No privacy is violated here. The fact that the person whose photo was taken was a celebrity does not change anything. It would have been completely their fault to expect privacy in a public place and behave rashly.	I think you'll find the definition of "human shields" used in practice in Western courts narrower than what Russia claims (it is), e.g. In the Review of the Indictments in the Karadžić and Mladić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia qualified physically securing or otherwise holding peacekeeping forces against their will at potential NATO air targets, including ammunition bunkers, a radar site and a communications centre, as using “human shields”. Having said this, turning your own civilians into "incidental targets" for enemy fire (or "collateral damage" as it's more popularly known) when said fire is (legitimately) targeting armed forces, is usually not particularly smart. But there's a line between that and war crime.	This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator. Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual. It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.	Yes, maybe australia In Australia, child abuse material is classified as the sexualised depiction of persons under 16 (or in some cases 18). This applies under both State and Commonwealth laws. Common charges in NSW will be possessing, disseminating or producing child abuse material under s 91(H) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Further Commonwealth offences can be found in circumstances where a communications carrier has been used for the purposes of delivering child abuse material. Within this field, there are subtle variations in circumstances. The court would need to decide if the pictures were a “sexualised depiction”. Context matters. I don’t know of any cases on point but convictions have been secured for sexualised cartoons of children and pictures of fully-clothed children in sexual poses.	According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case).	Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH.	united-states The composition of a photograph, a painting, or an image of any sort is one of the elements that can be protected by copyright, and indeed one of those aspects that make an image original and thus a proper subject of a copyright under US law. A new image that imitates the original and distinctive composition of another might be held to be a derivative work, and thus an infringement of copyright if done without permission. Note that the composition must be original. A photo of, say, two people standing side-by-side has been done many times, and would probably not have any distinctive element of composition. The images shown as part of the question look rather distinctive to me, but for all I know this is a cliche that has been done over and over. If this came to an actual lawsuit a defendant could present evidence showing the composition to have been previously used by others, and thus common coin, free for anyone to adopt. This would be similar to the Scènes à faire concept. Things that have been done over and over are not original and are thus not protectable by copyright. That would ultimately be a judgement for the court to make, dependent on the facts of a specific case. I suspect this answer is correct for the laws of many countries, but I can only confirm it for US copyright law.
What does it mean to test the law? UK Parliament passed a law recently in an attempt to block a no-deal Brexit. Government representatives keep saying that the PM will "test the law". Which seems to be different from "breaking the law". What does it actually mean?	Testing the law means running a case under that law and having a court rule on it. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary does not give opinions on whether a bill proposed or an act passed by the legislature is legal or not - they decide controversies that arise under those acts. The executive is obliged to follow the law so if they do something the law prohibits or don’t do something the law requires then someone with standing (usually someone affected by that act or omission) can take them to court and seek an order for them to stop (an injunction) or to do what they are required to do (a writ of mandamus). In the present situation, it’s my understanding (and I may be wrong) that Parliament has enacted a law that requires the Executive (in the person of the relevant Minister of the Crown) to request an extension from the EU if Parliament has not approved a Brexit deal. Testing the law would mean the Minister not doing that or stating an intention not to do it. A person with standing can then petition the court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to do it. If the Minister still refuses they would be in contempt and subject to being gaoled until they did.	I haven't listened to the podcast, but this is probably referring to the anticipated "Renters Reform Bill". A white paper was published on 16 June 2022. There is no Bill before Parliament yet, so the mooted changes are quite a long way from happening. (Additionally, the usual political churn may mean that this does not happen at all. The Secretary of State has already changed, and will likely change again once there is a new Prime Minister; political priorities may shift in all sorts of ways; there could be a general election; etc.) One proposal from the government is (section 3.1): We will abolish Section 21 evictions and simplify tenancy structures. To achieve this, we will move all tenants who would previously have had an Assured Tenancy or Assured Shorthold Tenancy onto a single system of periodic tenancies. Tenants will need to provide two months’ notice when leaving a tenancy, ensuring landlords recoup the costs of finding a tenant and avoid lengthy void periods. This will provide greater security for tenants while retaining the important flexibility that privately rented accommodation offers. This will enable tenants to leave poor quality properties without remaining liable for the rent or to move more easily when their circumstances change, for example to take up a new job opportunity. Landlords will only be able to evict a tenant in reasonable circumstances, which will be defined in law, supporting tenants to save with fewer unwanted moves. Currently, tenants on an AST cannot leave their tenancy during the fixed term, unless the tenancy agreement specifically provides for this with a "break clause". A break clause might say that after six months, the tenant is allowed to terminate the arrangement with one month of notice to the landlord. Or there might be no break clause at all, so that the arrangement can end early only if the landlord and tenant agree ("surrendering the tenancy"). Once the fixed term ends, it can be renewed for another fixed term, or terminated, or else it rolls on to become a "periodic tenancy", typically month-to-month. The tenant can give notice to quit during this time. The government's proposal seems to amount to having no initial fixed term, but a statutory periodic tenancy from the get-go. As far as timing, the white paper says: We will provide at least six months’ notice of our first implementation date, after which all new tenancies will be periodic and governed by the new rules. Specific timing will depend on when Royal Assent is secured. To avoid a two-tier rental sector, and to make sure landlords and tenants are clear on their rights, all existing tenancies will transition to the new system on a second implementation date. After this point, all tenants will be protected from Section 21 eviction. We will allow at least twelve months between the first and second dates. Again, the Bill has not been introduced to Parliament or even published in draft, so Royal Assent is a long way off.	I found an example of "is illegal" in RCW 78.52.467: "If the department believes that any oil, gas, or product is illegal...". There are some examples of "shall be illegal", e.g. RCW 39.84.050 "It shall be illegal for a director, officer, agent", where "illegal" is used predicatively. I tenatively conclude than the latter kind of use is less frequent that the adjectival use. Black's Law Dictionary 2nd Pocket ed does not include "illegal" except in some "illegal"+noun constructions, but it does list "unlawful" alone. "Unlawful" has been used since 1387 (J. Trevisa translation of Ranulf Higden Polychronicon), whereas "illegal" only goes back to 1626. Legal language tends to be very conservative, so the fact that "unlawful" got there first (aided no doubt by the fact that it is an Anglo-Saxon construction, not a medieval Latin borrowing) gives the term priority in legal usage. It sounds more legal to say "(un)lawful" that "(il)legal".	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.	The Law Commission already does this, including: repealing legislation that no longer serves any practical purpose creating consolidation bills, which merge multiple acts (or parts of act) into a single one. Because Law Commission bills do not create or change the law, they typically have an expedited passage through Parliament.	The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK.	What a statute means can be difficult to determine. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation that could be helpful: Textual: The plain meaning doesn't confine "use" to a few particular types of uses. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. Legislative history/legislative intent: The previous version of the subsection did limit prohibited uses to only composing, sending, or reading electronic messages. Given the amendment, it seems that the legislature no longer desired that limitation. When the bill was introduced, Rep. D'Amico stated the purpose of the bill was to "[expand] the prohibition on driving while using an electronic communication device to include uses beyond composing, sending, or reading an electronic message." During debate, when asked what a person should do that doesn't have Bluetooth, Rep. D'Amico suggested "You put it on speaker phone". When asked, "Where would you place the phone?", Rep D'Amico replied, "Wherever you feel like; just not next to your ear." During the same debate, D'Amico described the bill: "What House Bill 1247 does is ban handheld cell phones while driving a vehicle." In my opinion, the declaration of the bill's sponsor, and the debate surrounding the bill treated it as expanding the prohibition from including only texting and email to also include voice conversations. As far as I can tell, the full scope of "using" under this statute hasn't been tested in court, but I could see this going either way. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. However, a court might also be convinced by the legislative intent that only aims to add handheld voice communications to the previous list of prohibited activities (or it least it could be argued that this is the case). Further, under a purposive construction, a court could even look beyond the explicit legislative intent and find that the core purpose was to prevent distraction, in which case "using" could include any activity on your electronic device that distracts you as if you were texting, or making a phone call (eg. selecting the next song to play in your music app).	The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.
Postpone the date for moving into a new apartment In Oregon, tenants are usually required to provide a 30-day notice prior to moving out. My new landlord wants me to move in immediately after my background check. They don't provide a 30-day waiting period prior to moving in. So I will be effectively paying for both apartments for a month. Is there any way I can persuade the new landlord to start renting apartment as close as possible to the end of 30-day period? What are the legal means I can leverage to postpone the move-in date? Can I appeal to any statements in a law? The leasing agreement is not signed yet.	Is there any way I can persuade the new landlord to start renting apartment as close as possible to the end of 30-day period? If you already signed a contract with the "immediate move-in" clause, it is going to be difficult to persuade the new landlord. That is because the landlord would have no incentive to postpone his source of income and there is no statute or legal provision available to you on that. If you have not signed the contract, then you two can still negotiate until either party leaves or you reach an agreement. Under contract law, the latter is referred to as knowingly and willfully entering a contract.	Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing.	As soon as possible. Liability There is no contract here so you would be relying on the tort of negligence and/or trespass. If you have suffered damage from somebody else's negligence then they are liable for your loss. Part of the problem that you face is you need to determine exactly who was potentially negligent. It probably isn't your neighbour! It is quite likely that your neighbour was using a contractor; a contractor is not an agent and so your neighbour has not been negligent, the contractor has. If you were to sue your neighbour in those circumstances you would lose. You need to take steps now to find out exactly who the person was who caused the damage - that's the person you would need to sue. To win a negligence claim, you need to prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. If the facts are as you say: They probably have a duty, They probably failed in that duty, See below, You have clearly suffered harm or damage. Types of loss or damage The treatment of loss or damage under the law depends on what type of loss it is: Direct loss includes the repair and rehabilitation of the property - this would generally be recoverable, i.e. legally it is a cause of harm. Consequential loss includes the loss of rental income during the period that the property is unavailable. Alternatively, a court may consider that the loss is the cost of you providing alternative accommodation to the tenant if this was an obligation on you; this could be more or less than the rent. It would also include relocation costs etc. This is also generally recoverable. Pure economic loss would include loss of earnings if the tenant terminated the lease and you were unable to find a replacement or were forced to lower the rent as well as any advertising or agent's costs. While it is possible to recover this, it is quite likely that this would be considered unforeseeable and therefore not a legal cause of harm. The legal reasoning is that the loss (tenant terminating the lease) is too far removed from the proximate cause (damage to the unit) to hold the defendant responsible for it. You have already indicated that the tenant is trying to use the circumstances to their advantage; this is not something that could have been foreseen. Duty to mitigate loss You have a duty to mitigate the loss caused by the negligence. This would normally include ensuring that repairs were carried out in the most time and cost-efficient way possible. The defendant is only liable for reasonable costs; not actual costs. Insurance If a third party is liable for the loss, then they are liable for the loss irrespective of if it is covered by your insurance. Your insurance company can sue in your name to recover whatever they have lost; while they can, they will only if they believe it is commercially worthwhile. You need to talk to your insurer to determine what they will cover and what they won't and if they are going to seek to recover and what they will do if you seek to recover - they may choose to take the lead and tack your stuff on the back.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.	My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.	You have a contract - if you break it, you can be sued. A contract is a legally binding promise that the state (through its courts) will enforce. You promised to pay the deposit - you must pay the deposit. You promised to pay rent on a regular basis for the period of the lease - you must pay that rent. You don't want to live there? Fine, the lease probably doesn't require you to. So long as you keep paying the rent, you don't have to. If you break the lease, then the landlord can sue you for the damage that they suffer - this is typically the value of the rent until they can find a new tenant and if that tenant is paying less than you, the difference between that amount and your rent for the balance of the lease. If you want to renegotiate the contract (for example, to end it early), you will need to ask your landlord but they are under no legal obligation to release you from it. They may be willing to do so out of the goodness of their heart and/or if you pay them.	Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.	If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice.
Does creating an account or making a purchase apply consent for all marketing communications? Many companies I have registered with or interacted with sign me up to their email newsletters without my providing my consent. For example, I created an account using my email and hired a bike from a bike sharing company through their app. Now I am on their email newsletter. Does the company have the right to send me marketing emails based on the fact that I purchased something from them even though I didn't give my explicit consent for my data to be processed in that way? Is consent assumed for every kind of processing/communication based on one reason (a purchase or making an account)? Can I withdraw my consent for marketing specifically?	Under the GDPR, consent is not the only legal basis that allows processing of your personal data. Other legal bases such as legitimate interest exist as well. So the question is: does the company have a legitimate interest to send you these emails? The answer is that this case is more about direct marketing, less about personal data. The circumstances under which direct marketing emails can be sent are covered by the ePrivacy directive, which is implemented in the UK via PECR (Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003). PECR and ePrivacy introduce a concept known as soft opt-in: where a natural or legal person obtains from its customers their electronic contact details for electronic mail, in the context of the sale of a product or a service, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same natural or legal person may use these electronic contact details for direct marketing of its own similar products or services provided that customers clearly and distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge and in an easy manner, to such use of electronic contact details when they are collected and on the occasion of each message in case the customer has not initially refused such use. (ePrivacy Directive, Art 13(2)) In plain language, they are allowed to send unsolicited marketing emails to existing customers, under the following restrictions: this only applies to customer relationships the marketing must be for similar products or services you must be able to object to further messages, i.e. unsubscribe upon collection of contact details you were given the opportunity to opt out	As Rick mentioned in comments this would most definitely be considered processing of personally identifiable information (PII) under the UK GDPR. You mention "advertising" and "marketing purposes" so it's pretty clearly not for your own personal household/family use and that means you would have to comply with the GDPR. That means you're going to need what's called a "Lawful Basis" for processing this data. There's six different ones: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) You haven't provided enough information for to hazard a guess at what your basis would be but the ICO has an on-line tool which would give you a starting point. It's a very good idea to make sure you have all your i's dotted and all your t's crossed before you start processing any PII - and that includes documenting the process. Otherwise, what consequences may I face if I do so? In some ways the consequences of non-compliance are "what have you done?" coupled with "how much have you got?", the maximum penalty is £17.5m or 4% of your annual turnover (whichever is greater) and fines issued under the UK GDPR to date have ranged from mere pocket change to almost enough to buy a tank of petrol. Widen it to the EU and small property owners association got a €500 slap on the wrist and Amazon managed to net themselves a €746m fine.	am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed.	No, they can't do that. GDPR Recital 42 states: Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. Here's some more context on consent requirements.	No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.	The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request.	Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. 'By clicking agree or continuing to use this site you agree to our privacy policy' Neither of theses options is considered clear consent. Continuing to use the site, is implied consent, which is not sufficient. Also it does not give you the option to reject. Clicking agree to agree the privacy policy is not specific enough. You must offer a separate opt-in box for everything for which you need consent. The privacy policy is just a text in which you explain your privacy policy. It is not a contract which needs agreement. Also keep in mind that withdrawal of consent must be as easy as giving it. So you must be able to return to the settings and change them. Having said that, it is possible to configure Google Analytics in a way you don't need consent; Accept the Data Processing Amendment Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Accept it Click Save Disable Data Sharing Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxex Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options Click Save Disable the User-ID feature Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Turn off these options Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Even though you don't need consent, you still need to add a few lines to your privacy policy: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Dutch DPA has a more complete manual, but unfortunately it is not available in English.	"1) Can I use an pre checked tick box under GDPR?" Nope. "Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent." (Recital 32) "2) Since GDPR also requires the data collector to ensure that the user is not under the age of 13 so I am planning to ask the users age only for that region i.e. EU Region. Now will simply mentioning that "By continuing you acknowledge that you are above 13 years" will work or will I have to ask the users age?" You have to require some affirmative action. Implicit consent (just continuing) is not acceptable (ibid.) "3) The GDPR requires the data collector to have a proof of the users consent. Now what kind of proof will be required for my App? I am ensuring that the user cannot move forward without providing the consent (only once) is that sufficient as a proof or is any other proof required?" If you are collecting data about the user, you should record the time and date consent was given as part of the user profile. If you are not collecting data about the user (this is only done by third party services such as Google analytics etc.) and there are no user profile, then preventing the user from using the app will have to do. The GDPR also requires data-minimization, and creating a user profile to record consent when no user profile is otherwise required will violate data-minimization-principles.
Opinion Estoppel As I understand it, estoppel is the notion that once a position is taken (i.e. all swans are white) that another contrary position may not be taken (some swans are black). That being said, counsel was hired by a board member to provide an opinion on a corporate procedural matter. The attorney replied with the position that person A is not a 'black swan' and then issues a follow-on opinion two years later to opine the same person A is a 'black swan'. The paper opines a procedure to address the black swan issue, however, the board never implemented the procedure. The standard boilerplate is provided at the end of the opining indicating that ABC lawfirm does not have an obligation to update the client as the law changes and that the opinion is not legally binding. If the two opinions were presented in a court, does the notion of estoppel apply (in the sense that the opinion has flip-flopped and is not solid)? Is the latter opinion weakened (from the viewpoint of a judge or arbitrator) by the notion of estoppel? The opinion's procedure was not implemented for several years, does the inaction create precedent to support continuation of the current process?	The question somewhat misstates the concept of estoppel in a legal sense. Estoppel does not mean that one is prevented from changing one's opinion. Estoppel means that when one gives a third party cause to rely on one's position, by word or conduct, one cannot then adopt an altered position and use it to legally attack that third party. For example, if one has invited a person onto one's land, one cannot turn around and sue them for trespass. In the case in the question, the Board hired counsel to give them an opinion, which was given. Two years later, a contrary opinion was offered, along with a recommendation for action, which was not followed. No third party was induced to rely on either opinion to its detriment. No estoppel seems relevant. And by the way estoppel is an equitable defense that would be raised by the third party, not unlike the defense of "clean hands". If the board acted on the first advice to its detriment, and thinks that their counsel was negligent in not having gotten the advice correct the first time, they might possibly have a case for legal malpractice, but only if they can get experts (other lawyers) to say that their counsel was in fact negligent , and also prove that this did in fact harm them. If they didn't act on the advice, harms seems less likely, although the details would matter a lot.	In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.	To paraphrase the Princess Bride: "I don't think those words mean what you think they do". The "truther-activist", "sovereign citizen", and "Citizen vs. Human Being" concepts will only hurt you. It has never succeeded, to my knowledge; It has failed multiple times. Let me tell you a little about myself to illustrate what I mean: I am a software developer (and it seems from your profile, you are at least somewhat computer inclined, so this will hopeful make sense to you). The business side of the company I work for think that myself and my team write "magic code", and having the system do whatever they ask for is just a matter of pressing enough buttons in the correct order. It totally insane, and it completely analogous to what you are propose. The court is a carefully designed system, and you don't have the power to make arbitrary changes to it. Certainly not through the "arbitrary button presses" of "legal fiction". Some things to note Legal fictions are never summoned. People are. Organizations are. See initial paraphrase with regards to "legal fiction". Your legal fiction has not been summoned, you have. You will be appearing as yourself, not a straw man. I'm sorry to break it to you, but whomever you have heard this from is wrong, and in the most best case scenario, they are confusing what they want to be true for reality. If they have received any money from you in relation to this opinion, then they are almost certainly a scammer and a liar. If you insist on going further with this nonsense, then you WILL lose, regardless of what actual facts you have. My condolences. Now, to answer the question you asked: Yes, you can file a monition for discovery before first appearance (but not before pleading). You can file by mail, and in some jurisdictions, online. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/goingtocourt/caseBasics.shtml.	As your question is concerned on English law, a clear answer is yes but is specific for English law. Barristers from the same chamber may represent opposing sides in a case. This is normal and common practice. Barristers are independent practitioners in the British and many other common law systems who represent clients in court but are not in charge of the case as a whole. As a result, they may be instructed to represent clients whose interests diverge, and each barrister is responsible for deciding whether or not to accept a particular case. While each barrister acts independently and is free to take on any case they choose, chambers are groups of barristers who share resources and facilities. Even if they are representing opposing sides in the same case or different cases, barristers are typically required to adhere to the professional code of ethics and maintain client confidence. It is important to note that ethical rules prohibit lawyers from representing opposing sides in the same case, and the concept of barristers and chambers does not exist in some jurisdictions, such as the United States.	The court's job is to resolve the dispute. The parties are in court specifically because there isn't agreement on what the terms of the contract were or even if there is a contract at all. If one of the parties contends that there is no contract then the court will have to determine if there is or isn't. Even if both parties agree there is a contract the court will need to satisfy itself that there is. This is a jurisdictional matter; in the absence of a contract the court can't make a ruling. Having decided there is a contract, there is something about the contract they don't agree on - if they agree then why are they in court? Each party will state their position on the dispute and provide evidence that supports that position. The court will decide based on the evidence and on the balance of probabilities which version is more correct. It is a given that the parties are in dispute about the exact terms of the contract, whether this was because of an initial misunderstanding, someone didn't read it or someone saw an opportunity to screw someone else doesn't matter. The court will decide what it thinks the parties thought (or should have thought) at the time on the basis of the evidence and the law.	Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument.	british-columbia The lawyer must give "an open and undisguised opinion of the merits and probable results of the client’s cause." "When advising a client, a lawyer must be honest and candid and must inform the client of all information known to the lawyer that may affect the interests of the client in the matter." As long as the lawyer is satisfied that "the client has the ability to understand the information relative to the decision that has to be made and is able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the decision or lack of decision," the lawyer can take instructions from that client. The lawyer would only be required to withdraw if the client persists in instructing the lawyer to act contrary to professional ethics.
Can an employer reprimand an employee for posting negative reviews on social media? If an employee posts on social media that a company is bad to work for, can they get fired or reprimanded for it? What if they gave specific examples, like how the employer reduced their wage without an explanation?	You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions.	united-states Protections for workers from wrongful termination from employment in the U.S. are among the weakest in the developed world. Unemployment benefits If you are fired and there is not a "good cause" basis to fire you, you are entitled to unemployment insurance in almost all U.S. states (at least if you have worked for the employer long enough). Firing you because you discovered a payroll accounting problem and brought it to the employer's attention would ordinarily not constitute "good cause" for unemployment insurance purposes. Unemployment benefits last only a limited period of time, are for only a fraction of what you earned when you were employed, and can be terminated if you fail to actively look for work or find new employment. Whistleblower protections There are whistleblower statutes that prohibit employers from firing someone for reporting certain kinds of employer misconduct (although the remedy is usually a large dollar damages award - typically more than unemployment benefits, rather than reinstatement). But it isn't entirely clear that one would apply in this case, particularly without knowing which state if it is in the U.S., is involved. There is not one omnibus whistleblower protection statute at the federal level or in most U.S. states that prohibits firing or punishing an employee in every case where misconduct is revealed (this kind of conduct by an employer is also sometimes called "retaliation" or a "retaliatory firing"). Instead, there is a patchwork of whistleblower protections for particular kinds of misconduct that is reported by the employee. One would have to determine if this particular kind of misconduct would fit one of those statutes. For example, there are at least five different agencies that enforce whistleblower protections at the federal level: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) With the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to ensure safe and healthful working conditions for workers by setting and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education and assistance. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) The U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) helps to reduce deaths, injuries, and illnesses in the nation's mines with a variety of activities and programs. The Agency develops and enforces safety and health rules for all U.S. mines, and provides technical, educational and other types of assistance to mine operators. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), protects workers, promotes diversity and enforces the law. OFCCP holds those who do business with the federal government (contractors and subcontractors) responsible for complying with the legal requirement to take affirmative action and not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, disability, or status as a protected veteran. In addition, contractors and subcontractors are prohibited from discharging or otherwise discriminating against applicants or employees who inquire about, discuss or disclose their compensation or that of others, subject to certain limitations. Wage and Hour Division (WHD) The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) mission is to promote and achieve compliance with labor standards to protect and enhance the welfare of the nation's workforce. The agency enforces federal minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and child labor requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. WHD also enforces the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, wage garnishment provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and a number of employment standards and worker protections as provided in several immigration related statutes. Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) The Veterans’ Employment and Training Service prepares America's veterans, service members and their spouses, for meaningful careers, provide them with employment resources and expertise, protect their employment rights and promote their employment opportunities. There are also typically whistleblower protections related to union activity at an employer. Employees of the government and government contractors have stronger protections for whistleblowers than most employees. The Wage and Hour division whistleblowing rules might apply, but that would depend upon detailed facts not present in the question about the exact nature of the errors in the payroll system. Whistleblower protections might apply under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, but typically that protects only employees of large or publicly held companies. Similarly, whistleblower protections arising from securities laws are typically only applicable to publicly held companies or companies that are going public.	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.	Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck	Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc	Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.	BC employers are required to give workers three days of unpaid personal illness & injury leave per calendar year. However, this protection only applies to workers who have held a job for more than 90 days. If you have not held the job for that long, it does not appear that any protections apply to you. Note that (as of March 2021) there are separate rules concerning COVID-19 exposure & illness. There may also be protections that apply to you if you are a union member, or if you work in a federally regulated job (banks, national trucking companies, airlines, and some others.)	The Company is performing wage theft I have never heard of a wage method that pays a salary according to hours but doens't pay for hours over 40. Monthly Salary, by definition, is paid regardless of hours. Your contract doesn't give hours, it just gives a monthly total. That's a contract, and you should be paid according to the contract. In terms of fairness, it certainly isn't right to dock pay for weeks you worked less than 40 but not give you credit for weeks you wored more than 40. Now, it's not clear if you moved to direct employment for the second month. If you did, the first month would be a contract violation, and the second would be a violation of wage & labor law. A company can't pay you salary as an exempt (exempt from hourly wage laws, like management) employee and also dock you pay according to hours worked. So what can you do? If you are still a contractor and actually want the job, not much more than arguing with payroll. Since you (why?) decided to be a contractor instead of a direct hire, you have exactly zero protections to getting let go. If you are a direct employee, you have protections from bringing action about being paid fairly, though your long-term prospects there would be problematic if you have to take the company to task using the government. Any HR rep should know all of the above. But never just go to HR without talking to your manager first. Remember that HR works for management, and working against your manager is generally a bad career move.

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