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In Bommai case (1994), the following propositions have been
laid down by the Supreme Court on imposition of President’s Rule
in a state under Article 356:
1. The presidential proclamation imposing President’s Rule is
subject to judicial review.
2. The satisfaction of the President must be based on relevant
material. The action of the president can be struck down by
the court if it is based on irrelevant or extraneous grounds or
if it was found to be malafide or perverse.
3. Burden lies on the Centre to prove that relevant material
exist to justify the imposition of the President’s Rule.
4. The court cannot go into the correctness of the material or
its adequacy but it can see whether it is relevant to the
action.
5. If the court holds the presidential proclamation to be
unconstitutional and invalid, it has power to restore the
dismissed state government and revive the state legislative
assembly if it was suspended or dissolved.
6. The state legislative assembly should be dissolved only after
the Parliament has approved the presidential proclamation.
Until such approval is given, the president can only suspend
the assembly. In case the Parliament fails to approve the
proclamation, the assembly would get reactivated.
7. Secularism is one of the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution.
Hence, a state government pursuing anti-secular politics is
liable to action under Article 356.
8. The question of the state government losing the confidence
of the legislative assembly should be decided on the floor of
the House and until that is done the ministry should not be
unseated.
9. Where a new political party assumes power at the Centre, it
will not have the authority to dismiss ministries formed by
other parties in the states.
10. The power under Article 356 is an exceptional power and
should be used only occassionally to meet the requirements
of special situations.
Cases of Proper and Improper Use
Based on the report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-state
Relations (1988), the Supreme Court in Bommai case (1994)
enlisted the situations where the exercise of power under Article
356 could be proper or improper13 .
Imposition of President’s Rule in a state would be proper in the
following situations:
1. Where after general elections to the assembly, no party
secures a majority, that is, ‘Hung Assembly’.
2. Where the party having a majority in the assembly declines
to form a ministry and the governor cannot find a coalition
ministry commanding a majority in the assembly.
3. Where a ministry resigns after its defeat in the assembly and
no other party is willing or able to form a ministry
commanding a majority in the assembly.
4. Where a constitutional direction of the Central government is
disregarded by the state government.
5. Internal subversion where, for example, a government is
deliberately acting against the Constitution and the law or is
fomenting a violent revolt.
6. Physical breakdown where the government wilfully refuses
security of the state.
The imposition of President’s Rule in a state would be improper
under the following situations:
1. Where a ministry resigns or is dismissed on losing majority
support in the assembly and the governor recommends
imposition of President’s Rule without probing the possibility
of forming an alternative ministry.
2. Where the governor makes his own assessment of the
support of a ministry in the assembly and recommends
imposition of President’s Rule without allowing the ministry
to prove its majority on the floor of the Assembly.
3. Where the ruling party enjoying majority support in the
assembly has suffered a massive defeat in the general
elections to the Lok Sabha such as in 1977 and 1980.
4. Internal disturbances not amounting to internal subversion or
physical breakdown.
5. Maladministration in the state or allegations of corruption
against the minis-tryor stringent financial exigencies of the
state.
6. Where the state government is not given prior warning to
rectify itself except in case of extreme urgency leading to
disastrous consequences.
7. Where the power is used to sort out intraparty problems of
the ruling party, or for a purpose extraneous or irrelevant to
FINANCIAL EMERGENCY
Grounds of Declaration
Article 360 empowers the president to proclaim a Financial
Emergency if he is satisfied that a situation has arisen due to
which the financial stability or credit of India or any part of its
territory is threatened.
The 38th Amendment Act of 1975 made the satisfaction of the
president in declaring a Financial Emergency final and conclusive
and not questionable in any court on any ground. But, this
provision was subsequently deleted by the 44th Amendment Act
of 1978 implying that the satisfaction of the president is not
beyond judicial review.
Parliamentary Approval and Duration
A proclamation declaring financial emergency must be approved
by both the Houses of Parliament within two months from the date
of its issue. However, if the proclamation of Financial Emergency
is issued at a time when the Lok Sabha has been dissolved or the
dissolution of the Lok Sabha takes place during the period of two
months without approving the proclamation, then the proclamation
survives until 30 days from the first sitting of the Lok Sabha after
its reconstitution, provided the Rajya Sabha has in the meantime
approved it.
Once approved by both the Houses of Parliament, the Financial
Emergency continues indefinitely till it is revoked. This implies two
things:
1. there is no maximum period prescribed for its operation; and
2. repeated parliamentary approval is not required for its
continuation.
A resolution approving the proclamation of financial emergency
can be passed by either House of Parliament only by a simple
A proclamation of Financial Emergency may be revoked by the
president at anytime by a subsequent proclamation. Such a
proclamation does not require the parliamentary approval.
Effects of Financial Emergency
The consequences of the proclamation of a Financial Emergency
are as follows:
1. The executive authority of the Centre extends to the giving
of (a) directions to any state to observe such canons of
financial propriety as may be specified in the directions; and
(b) such other directions to any state as the President may
deem necessary and adequate for the purpose.
2. Any such direction may include a provision requiring (a) the
reduction of salaries and allowances of all or any class of
persons serving in the state; and (b) the reservation of all
money bills or other financial bills for the consideration of the
President after they are passed by the legislature of the
state.
3. The President may issue directions for the reduction of
salaries and allowances of (a) all or any class of persons
serving the Union; and (b) the judges of the Supreme Court
and the high court.
Thus, during the operation of a financial emergency, the Centre
acquires full control over the states in financial matters. H.N.
Kunzru, a member of the Constituent Assembly, stated that the
financial emergency provisions pose a serious threat to the
financial autonomy of the states. Explaining the reasons for their
inclusion in the Constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar observed in the
Constituent Assembly14 :
“This Article more or less follows the pattern of what is called
the National Recovery Act of the United States passed in 1933,
which gave the president power to make similar provisions in
order to remove the difficulties, both economical and financial, that
had overtaken the American people, as a result of the Great
Depression.”
No Financial Emergency has been declared so far, though
there was a financial crisis in 1991.
CRITICISM OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
Some members of the Constituent Assembly criticised the
incorporation of emergency provisions in the Constitution on the
following grounds15 :
1. ‘The federal character of the Constitution will be destroyed
and the Union will become all powerful.
2. The powers of the State–both the Union and the units–will
entirely be concentrated in the hands of the Union executive.
3. The President will become a dictator.
4. The financial autonomy of the state will be nullified.
5. Fundamental rights will become meaningless and, as a
result, the democratic foundations of the Constitution will be
destroyed.’
Thus, H.V. Kamath observed: ‘I fear that by this single chapter
we are seeking to lay the foundation of a totalitarian state, a police
state, a state completely opposed to all the ideals and principles
that we have held aloft during the last few decades, a State where
the rights and liberties of millions of innocent men and women will
be in continuous jeopardy, a State where if there be peace, it will
be the peace of the grave and the void of the desert(. . .) It will be
a day of shame and sorrow when the President makes use of
these Powers having no parallel in any Constitution of the
democratic countries of the world’16 .
K.T. Shah described them as: ‘A chapter of reaction and
retrogression. (. . .) I find one cannot but notice two distinct
currents of thought underlying and influencing throughout the
provisions of this chapter: (a) to arm the Centre with special
powers against the units and (b) to arm the government against
the people . . . Looking at all the provisions of this chapter
particularly and scrutinising the powers that have been given in
almost every article, it seems to me, the name only of liberty or
democracy will remain under the Constitution’.
T.T. Krishnamachari feared that ‘by means of these provisions
H.N. Kunzru opined that ‘the emergency financial provisions
pose a serious threat to the financial autonomy of the States.’
However, there were also protagonists of the emergency
provisions in the Constituent Assembly. Thus, Sir Alladi
Krishnaswami Ayyar labelled them as ‘the very life-breath of the
Constitution’. Mahabir Tyagi opined that they would work as a
‘safety-valve’ and thereby help in the maintenance of the
Constitution18 .
While defending the emergency provisions in the Constituent
Assembly, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar also accepted the possibility of their
misuse. He observed, ‘I do not altogether deny that there is a
possibility of the Articles being abused or employed for political
purposes’19 .
Table 16.2 Imposition of President’s Rule (1951–2019)
Sl. States/Union No. of Times Years of
No. Territories Imposed Imposition
I. States:
1. Andhra Pradesh 3 195420 , 1973,
2014
2. Arunachal 2 1979, 2016
Pradesh
3. Assam 4 1979, 1981, 1982,
1990
4. Bihar 8 1968, 1969, 1972,
1977, 1980, 1995,
1999, 2005
5. Chhattisgarh -- --
6. Goa 5 1966, 1979, 1990,
1999, 2005
7. Gujarat 5 1971, 1974, 1976,
1980, 1996
8. Haryana 3 1967, 1977, 1991
9. Himachal Pradesh 2 1977, 1992
10. Jharkhand 3 2009, 2010, 2013
11. Karnataka 6 1971, 1977, 1989,
1990, 2007, 2007
12. Kerala 5 195621 , 1959,
1964, 1970, 1979
13. Madhya Pradesh22 3 1977, 1980, 1992
14. Maharashtra 2 1980, 2014
15. Manipur 10 1967, 1967, 1969,
1973, 1977, 1979,
1981, 1992, 1993,
2001
16. Meghalaya 2 1991, 2009
17. Mizoram 3 1977, 1978, 1988
18. Nagaland 4 1975, 1988, 1992,
2008
19. Odisha 6 1961, 1971, 1973,
1976, 1977, 1980
20. Punjab23 8 1951, 1966, 1968,
1971, 1977, 1980,
1983, 1987
21. Rajasthan 4 1967, 1977, 1980,
1992
22. Sikkim 2 1978, 1984
23. Tamil Nadu 4 1976, 1980, 1988,
1991
24. Telangana -- --
25. Tripura 3 1971, 1977, 1993
26. Uttarakhand 2 2016, 2016
27. Uttar Pradesh 9 1968, 1970, 1973,
1975, 1977, 1980,
1971
II. Union Territories:
1. Delhi 1 2014
2. Puducherry 6 1968, 1974, 1974,
1978, 1983, 1991
3. Jammu and 1 2019
Kashmir24
Table 16.3 Articles Related to Emergency Provisions at a Glance
Article No. Subject-matter
352. Proclamation of Emergency
353. Effect of Proclamation of Emergency
354. Application of provisions relating to distribution of
revenues while a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation
355. Duty of the Union to protect states against external
aggression and internal disturbance
356. Provisions in case of failure of constitutional
machinery in states
357. Exercise of legislative powers under proclamation
issued under Article 356
358. Suspension of provisions of Article 19 during
Emergencies
359. Suspension of the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Part III during Emergencies
359A. Application of this part to the state of Punjab
(Repealed)
360. Provisions as to Financial Emergency
2. The phrase ‘armed rebellion’ was inserted by the 44th
Amendment Act of 1978, replacing the original phrase
‘internal disturbance’.
3. Article 352 defines the term ‘Cabinet’ as the council
consisting of the Prime Minister and other ministers of
the Cabinet rank.
4. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980).
5. The term of the Fifth Lok Sabha which was to expire on
18 March, 1976 was extended by one year upto 18
March, 1977 by the House of the People (Extension of
Duration) Act, 1976. It was extend for a further period of
one year upto 18 March, 1978 by the House of the
People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act, 1976.
However, the House was dissolved on 18 January,
1977, after having been in existence for a period of five
years, ten months and six days.
6. The 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 had raised the
period of six months to one year. Thus, once approved
by both the Houses of Parliament, the proclamation of
President’s Rule could continue for one year. But, the
44th Amendment Act of 1978 again reduced the period
to six months.
7. The President’s Rule imposed in May, 1987 in Punjab
was allowed to continue for five years under the 68th
Amendment Act of 1991.
8. In case of dissolution, fresh elections are held for
constituting a new legislative assembly in the state.
9. Those nine States include Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh,
Orissa, West Bengal and Haryana.