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the Constitution, the power of judicial review has also to be | exercised with a view to see that the guarantees afforded by these | Rights are not contravened”.4 |
“The Constitution is supreme lex, the permanent law of the | land, and there is no branch of government above it. Every organ | of government, be it the executive or the legislature of the |
judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to | act within the limits of its authority. No one however highly placed | and no authority howsoever lofty, can claim that it shall be the sole |
judge of the extent of its power under the Constitution or whether | its action is within the confines of such power laid down by the | constitution. This Court is the ultimate interpreter of the |
Constitution and to this Court is assigned the delicate task of | determining what is the power conferred on each branch of | government, whether it is limited, and if so, what are the limits and |
whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits”.5 | “It is the function of the Judges, may their duty, to pronounce | upon the validity of laws. If courts are totally deprived of that |
power, the Fundamental Rights conferred on the people will | become a mere adornment because rights without remedies are | as writ in water. A controlled Constitution will then become |
uncontrolled”.6 | “The judges of the Supreme Court have been entrusted with | the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been |
conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure | that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is | maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in |
the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional | limitations”7 . | “The founding fathers very wisely, therefore, incorporated in the |
Constitution itself the provisions of judicial review so as to | maintain the balance of federalism, to protect the Fundamental | Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guaranteed to the citizens and |
to afford a useful weapon for availability, availment and enjoyment | of equality, liberty and Fundamental Freedoms and to help to | create a healthy nationalism. The function of judicial review is a |
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR JUDICIAL | REVIEW | Though the phrase ‘Judicial Review’ has nowhere been used in |
the Constitution, the provisions of several Articles explicitly confer | the power of judicial review on the Supreme Court and the High | Courts. These provisions are explained below: |
1. Article 13 declares that all laws that are inconsistent with or | in derogation of the Fundamental Rights shall be null and | void. |
2. Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court | for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights and | empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions or orders |
or writs for that purpose. | 3. Article 131 provides for the original jurisdiction of the | Supreme Court in centre-state and inter-state disputes. |
4. Article 132 provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the | Supreme Court in constitutional cases. | 5. Article 133 provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the |
Supreme Court in civil cases. | 6. Article 134 provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the | Supreme Court in criminal cases. |
7. Article 134-A deals with the certificate for appeal to the | Supreme Court from the High Courts.9 | 8. Article 135 empowers the Supreme Court to exercise the |
jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court under any | preconstitution law. | 9. Article 136 authorises the Supreme Court to grant special |
leave to appeal from any court or tribunal (except military | tribunal and court martial). | 10. Article 143 authorises the President to seek the opinion of |
the Supreme Court on any question of law or fact and on | any pre-constitution legal matters. | 11. Article 226 empowers the High Courts to issue directions or |
12. Article 227 vests in the High Courts the power of | superintendence over all courts and tribunals within their | respective territorial jurisdictions (except military courts or |
tribunals). | 13. Article 245 deals with the territorial extent of laws made by | Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. |
14. Article 246 deals with the subject matter of laws made by | Parliament and by the Legislatures of States (i.e., Union List, | State List and Concurrent List). |
15. Articles 251 and 254 provide that in case of a conflict | between the central law and state law, the central law | prevails over the state law and the state law shall be void. |
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW | The constitutional validity of a legislative enactment or an | executive order can be challenged in the Supreme Court or in the |
High Courts on the following three grounds. | (a) it infringes the Fundamental Rights (Part III), | (b) it is outside the competence of the authority which has |
framed it, and | (c) it is repugnant to the constitutional provisions. | From the above, it is clear that the scope of judicial review in |
India is narrower than what exists in the USA, though the | American Constitution does not explicitly mention the concept of | judicial review in any of its provisions. This is because, the |
American Constitution provides for ‘due process of law’ against | that of ‘procedure established by law’ which is contained in the | Indian Constitution. The difference between the two is: “The due |
process of law gives wide scope to the Supreme Court to grant | protection to the rights of its citizens. It can declare laws violative | of these rights void not only on substantive grounds of being |
unlawful, but also on procedural grounds of being unreasonable. | Our Supreme Court, while determining the constitutionality of a | law, however examines only the substantive question i.e., whether |
the law is within the powers of the authority concerned or not. It is | not expected to go into the question of its reasonableness, | suitability or policy implications”.10 |
The exercise of wide power of judicial review by the American | Supreme Court in the name of ‘due process of law’ clause has | made the critics to describe it as a ‘third chamber’ of the |
Legislature, a super-legislature, the arbiter of social policy and so | on. This American principle of judicial supremacy is also | recognised in our constitutional system, but to a limited extent. |
Nor do we fully follow the British Principle of parliamentary | supremacy. There are many limitations on the sovereignty of | Parliament in our country, like the written character of the |
Constitution, the federalism with division of powers, the | Fundamental Rights and the judicial review. In effect, what exists | in India is a synthesis of both, that is, the American principle of |
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE NINTH SCHEDULE | Article 31B saves the acts and regulations included in the Ninth | Schedule from being challenged and invalidated on the ground of |
contravention of any of the Fundamental Rights. Article 31B along | with the Ninth Schedule was added by the 1st Constitutional | Amendment Act of 1951. |
Originally (in 1951), the Ninth Schedule contained only 13 acts | and regulations but at present (in 2016) their number is 282.11 Of | these, the acts and regulations of the state legislature deal with |
land reforms and abolition of the zamindari system and that of the | Parliament deal with other matters. | However, in a significant judgement delivered in I.R. Coelho |
case (2007)12 , the Supreme Court ruled that there could not be | any blanket immunity from judicial review of laws included in the | Ninth Schedule. The court held that judicial review is a ‘basic |
feature’ of the constitution and it could not be taken away by | putting a law under the Ninth Schedule. It said that the laws | placed under the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973, are open to |
challenge in court if they violated Fundamental Rights guaranteed | under the Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 or the ‘basic structure’ of the | Constitution. It was on April 24, 1973, that the Supreme Court first |
propounded the doctrine of ‘basic structure’ or ‘basic features’ of | the constitution in its landmark verdict in the Kesavananda Bharati | case.13 |
While delivering the above judgement, the Supreme Court | made the following conclusions: | 1. A law that abrogates or abridges rights guaranteed by Part |
III of the Constitution may violate the basic structure | doctrine, or it may not. If former is the consequence of law, | whether by an amendment of any Article of Part III or by an |
insertion in the Ninth Schedule, such law will have to be | invalidated in the exercise of judicial review power of the | Court. The constitutional validity of the Ninth Schedule laws |
on the touchstone of basic structure doctrine can be | adjudged by applying the direct impact and effect test, i.e., | rights test, which means the form of an amendment is not |
the relevant factor, but the consequence thereof would be | the determinative factor. | 2. The majority judgement in the Kesavanand Bharati Case14 |
read with Indira Gandhi case15 requires the validity of each | new constitutional Amendment to be judged on its own | merits. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights |
guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account for | determining whether or not it destroys basic structure. The | impact test would determine the validity of the challenge. |
3. All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th | April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by | inclusion of various laws therein shall have to be tested on |
the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the | Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Articles 14 | and 19 and the principles underlying them. To put it |
differently, even though an act is put in the Ninth Schedule | by a Constitutional Amendment, its provisions would be | open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage |
the basic structure if the Fundamental Right or rights taken | away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure. | 4. Justification for conferring protection, not blanket protection, |
on the laws included in the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional | Amendments shall be a matter of constitutional adjudication | by examining the nature and extent of infraction of a |
Fundamental Right by a statute, sought to be constitutionally | protected, and on the touchstone of the basic structure | doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Articles 14 and |
19 by application of the “rights test” and the “essence of the | right” test taking the synoptic view of the articles in Part III as | held in the Indira Gandhi Case.16 Applying the above test to |
the Ninth Schedule laws, if the infraction affects the basic | structure, then such a law or laws will not get the protection | of the Ninth Schedule. When the triangle of Article 21 read |
with Article 14 and Article 19 is sought to be eliminated not | only the “essence of the right” test but also the “rights test” | has to apply. There is also a difference between the “rights |
controlled constitution conferring limited power of | amendment, an entire chapter is made in applicable, the | “essence of the right” test as applied in Nagaraj case17 will |
have no applicability. In such a situation, to judge the validity | of the law, it is the “rights test” which is more appropriate. | 5. If the validity of any Ninth Schedule law has already been |
upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such | law again on the principles declared by this judgment. | However, if a law held to be violative of any rights in Part III |
is subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th | April, 1973, such a violation / infraction shall be open to | challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the |
basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Articles 14 | and 19 and the principles underlying them. | 6. Action taken and transactions finalized as a result of the |
impugned Acts shall not be open to challenge. | The number of acts and regulations included in the Ninth | Schedule before and after April 24, 1973 are mentioned below in |
Table 27.1. | Table 27.1 Number of Acts and Regulations Included in the Ninth | Schedule |
Serial Amendment Number Number of Acts | Number (Year) and Regulations | Included in the |
Ninth Schedule | I. Included Before April 24, 1973 | 1. First Amendment (1951) 13 (1 to 13) |
2. Fourth Amendment (1955) 7 (14 to 20) | 3. Seventh Amendment (1964) 44 (21 to 64) | 4. Twenty-Ninth Amendment 2 (65 to 66) |
(1972) | II. Included After April 24, 1973 | 5. Thirty-Fourth Amendment 20 (67 to 86) |
6. Thirty-Ninth Amendment 38 (87 to 124) | (1975) | 7. Fortieth Amendment (1976) 64 (125 to 188) |
8. Forty-Seventh Amendment 14 (189 to 202) | (1984) | 9. Sixty-Sixth Amendment 55 (203 to 257) |
(1990) | 10. Seventy-Sixth Amendment 1 (257A) | (1994) |
11. Seventy-Eighth Amendment 27 (258 to 284) | (1995) | Note: Entries 87, 92 and 130 have been omitted by the Forty- |
Fourth Amendment (1978). | NOTES AND REFERENCES | 1. Justice Syed Shah Mohamed Quadri, “Judicial Review |
of Administrative Action”, 2001, 6 SCC (J), p. 3. | 2. Chief Justice Kania in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras | (1950). |
3. Chief Justice Patanjali Shastri in State of Madras v. V.G. | Row (1952). | 4. Justice Khanna in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of |
Kerala (1973). | 5. Justice Bhagwati in Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977). | 6. Chief Justice Chandrachud in Minerva Mills v. Union of |
India (1980). | 7. Chief Justice Ahmadi in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of | India (1997). |
8. Justice Ramaswami in S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sharma (1997). | 9. This provision was added by the 44th Constitutional | Amendment Act of 1978. |
11. Though the last entry is numbered 284, the actual total | number is 282. This is because, the three entries (87, | 92 and 130) have been deleted and one entry is |
numbered as 257A. | 12. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007). | 13. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). |
14. Ibid. | 15. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975). | 16. Ibid. |
28 Judicial Activism | T | he concept of judicial activism originated and developed in |
the USA. This term was first coined in 1947 by Arthur | Schlesinger Jr., an American historian and educator.1 | In India, the doctrine of judicial activism was introduced in mid- |
1970s. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice O. | Chinnappa Reddy and Justice D.A. Desai laid the foundations of | judicial activism in the country. |
MEANING OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM | Judicial activism denotes the proactive role played by the judiciary | in the protection of the rights of citizens and in the promotion of |
justice in the society. In other words, it implies the assertive role | played by the judiciary to force the other two organs of the | government (legislature and executive) to discharge their |
constitutional duties. | Judicial activism is also known as “judicial dynamism”. It is the | antithesis of “judicial restraint”, which means the self-control |
exercised by the judiciary. | Judicial activism is defined in the following way: | 1. “Judicial activism is a way of exercising judicial power that |
motivates judges to depart from normally practised strict | adherence to judicial precedent in favour of progressive and | new social policies. It is commonly marked by decision |
calling for social engineering, and occasionally these | decisions represent intrusion in the legislative and executive | matters”.2 |
2. “Judicial activism is the practice in the judiciary of protecting | or expanding individual rights through decisions that depart | from established precedent, or are independent of, or in |
opposition to supposed constitutional or legislation intent”.3 | 3. “Judicial activism can be defined as the process of law- | making by judges. It means an active interpretation of |
existing legislation by a judge, made with a view to enhance | the utility of that legislation for social betterment. Judicial | activism is different from judicial pessimism which means |
interpretation of existing provisions of law, without an | attempt to enhance its beneficial aspects”.3a | 4. “Judicial activism is a philosophy of judicial decision-making |
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