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whereby judges allow their personal views about public | policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions”.3b | 5. “Judicial activism is a procedure to evolve new principles, |
courts for needy or to entertain litigation affecting the entire | society or a section of it”.3c | The concept of judicial activism is closely related to the concept |
of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). It is the judicial activism of the | Supreme Court which is the major factor for the rise of PIL. In | other words, PIL is an outcome of judicial activism. In fact, PIL is |
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM | The concepts of judicial review and judicial activism are closely | related to each other. But, there is a difference between them. The |
following points bring out this difference: | 1. Since about the mid-20th century, a version of judicial review | has acquired the nick-name of judicial activism, especially in |
the USA. In India, the participants in the debate mix up | judicial activism with judicial review. The former is that form | of latter in which judges participate in law-making policies, |
i.e., not only they uphold or invalidate laws in terms of | constitutional provisions, but also exercise their policy | preferences in doing so.3d |
2. The concept of judicial activism is inherent in judicial review, | which empowers the court to uphold the constitution and | declare the laws and action inconsistent with the constitution |
as void. Judicial activism is necessary for ensuring proper | discharge of duties by other organs.3e | 3. The term “judicial activism” came into currency some time in |
the twentieth century to describe the act of judicial legislation | i.e., judges making positive law. However, there is no | standard definition of the term “judicial activism”. As a whole |
it can be said that judicial activism stresses the importance | of judicial review and a powerful judiciary in the protection | and promotion of certain core rights.3f |
4. The expanded concept of locus standi in connection with | PIL, by judicial interpretation from time-to-time, has | expanded the jurisdictional limits of the courts exercising |
judicial review. This expanded role has been given the title of | “judicial activism” by those who are critical of this expanded | role of the judiciary.3g |
5. Judicial activism, as regards constitutional cases, falls under | the rubric of what is commonly called judicial review, and at | the broadest level, it is any occasion where a court |
JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM | According to Dr. B.L. Wadehra, the reasons for judicial activism | are as follows:4 |
(i) There is near collapse of the responsible government, when | the Legislature and Executive fail to discharge their | respective functions. This results in erosion of the confidence |
in the Constitution and democracy amongst the citizens. | (ii) The citizens of the country look up to the judiciary for the | protection of their rights and freedoms. This leads to |
tremendous pressure on judiciary to step in aid for the | suffering masses. | (iii) Judicial Enthusiasm, that is, the judges like to participate in |
the social reforms that take place in the changing times. It | encourages the Public Interest Litigation and liberalises the | principle of ‘Locus Standi’. |
(iv) Legislative Vacuum, that is, there may be certain areas, which | have not been legislated upon. It is therefore, upon court to | indulge in judicial legislation and to meet the changing social |
needs. | (v) The Constitution of India has itself adopted certain provisions, | which gives judiciary enough scope to legislate or to play an |
active role. | Similarly, Subhash Kashyap observes that certain eventualities | may be conceived when the judiciary may have to overstep its |
normal jurisdiction and intervene in areas otherwise falling within | the domain of the legislature and the executive:5 | (i) When the legislature fails to discharge its responsibilities. |
(ii) In case of a ‘hung’ legislature when the government it | provides is weak, insecure and busy only in the struggle for | survival and, therefore, unable to take any decision which |
displeases any caste, community, or other group. | (iii) Those in power may be afraid of taking honest and hard | decisions for fear of losing power and, for that reason, may |
have public issues referred to courts as issues of law in order | to mark time and delay decisions or to pass on the odium of | strong decision-making to the courts. |
(iv) Where the legislature and the executive fail to protect the | basic rights of citizens, like the right to live a decent life, | healthy surroundings, or to provide honest, efficient and just |
system of laws and administration. | (v) Where the court of law is misused by a strong authoritarian | parliamentary party government for ulterior motives, as was |
sought to be done during the emergency aberration. | (vi) Sometimes, the courts themselves knowingly or unknowingly | become victims of human, all too human, weaknesses of |
craze for populism, publicity, playing to the media and | hogging the headlines. | According to Dr. Vandana, the concept of judicial activism can |
be seen to be reflecting from the following trends, namely:5a | (i) Expansion of rights of hearing in the administrative process. | (ii) Excessive delegation without limitation. |
(iii) Expansion of judicial control over discretionary powers. | (iv) Expansion of judicial review over the administration. | (v) Promotion of open government. |
(vi) Indiscriminate exercise of contempt power. | (vii) Exercise of jurisdiction when non-exist. | (viii) Over extending the standard rules of interpretation in its |
search to achieve economic, social and educational | objectives. | (ix) Passing of orders which are per se unworkable. |
ACTIVATORS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM | Upendra Baxi, an eminent jurist, has delineated the following | typology of social / human rights activists who activated judicial |
activism6 : | 1. Civil Rights Activists: These groups primarily focus on civil | and political rights issues. |
2. People Rights Activists: These groups focus on social and | economic rights within the contexts of state repression of | people’s movements. |
3. Consumer Rights Groups: These formations raise issues | of consumer rights within the framework of accountability of | the polity and the economy. |
4. Bonded Labour Groups: These groups ask for judicial | activism is nothing short of annihilation of wage slavery in | India. |
5. Citizens for Environmental Action: These groups activate | an activist judiciary to combat increasing environmental | degradation and pollution. |
6. Citizen Groups against Large Irrigation Projects: These | activist formations ask the Indian judiciary the impossible for | any judiciary in the world, namely, cease to and desist from |
ordering against mega irrigation projects. | 7. Rights of Child Groups: These groups focus on child | labour, the right to literacy, juveniles in custodial institutions |
and rights of children born to sex workers. | 8. Custodial Rights Groups: These groups include social | action by prisoners’ rights groups, women under state |
‘protective’ custody and persons under preventive detention. | 9. Poverty Rights Groups: These groups litigate issues | concerning draught and famine relief and urban |
impoverished. | 10. Indigenous People’s Rights Groups: These groups | agitate for issues of forest dwellers, citizens of the Fifth and |
Sixth Schedules of the Indian Constitution and identity rights. | 11. Women’s Rights Groups: These groups agitate for issues | of gender equality, gender-based violence and harassment, |
rape and dowry murders. | 12. Bar-based Groups: These associations agitate for issues | concerning autonomy and accountability of the Indian |
judiciary. | 13. Media Autonomy Groups: These groups focus on the | autonomy and accountability of the press and instruments of |
mass media owned by the State. | 14. Assorted Lawyer-Based Groups: This category includes | the critically influential lawyers’ groups which agitate for |
various causes. | 15. Assorted Individual Petitioners: This category includes | freelance activist individuals. |
APPREHENSIONS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM | The same jurist Upendra Baxi also presented a typology of fears | which are generated by judicial activism. He observes: “The facts |
entail invocation of a wide range of fears. The invocation is | designed to bring into a nervous rationality among India’s most | conscientious justices”. He described the following types of fears7 |
: | 1. Ideological fears: (Are they usurping powers of the | legislature, the executive or of other autonomous institutions |
in a civil society?) | 2. Epistemic fears: (Do they have enough knowledge in | economic matters of a Manmohan Singh, in scientific |
matters of the Czars of the atomic energy establishment, the | captains of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, | and so on?) |
3. Management fears: (Are they doing justice by adding this | kind of litigation work load to a situation of staggering growth | of arrears?) |
4. Legitimation fears: (Are not they causing depletion of their | symbolic and instrumental authority by passing orders in | public interest litigation which the executive may bypass or |
ignore? Would not the people’s faith in judiciary, a | democratic recourse, be thus eroded?) | 5. Democratic fears: (Is a profusion of public interest litigation |
nurturing democracy or depleting its potential for the future?) | 6. Biographic fears: (What would be my place in national | affairs after superannuation if I overdo this kind of litigation?) |
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT | Meaning of Judicial Restraint | Judicial activism and judicial restraint are the two alternative |
judicial philosophies in the United States. Those who subscribe to | judicial restraint contend that the role of judges should be | scrupulously limited; their job is merely to say what the law is, |
leaving the business of lawmaking where it properly belongs, that | is, with the legislators and the executives. Under no | circumstances, moreover, should judges allow their personal |
political values and policy agendas to colour their judicial opinions. | This view holds that the ‘original intent’ of the authors of the | constitution and its amendments is knowable, and must guide the |
courts.8 | Assumptions of Judicial Restraint | In the USA, the doctrine of judicial restraint is based on the |
following six assumptions9 : | 1. The Court is basically undemocratic because it is non- | elective and presumably non-responsive to the popular will. |
Because of its alleged oligarchic composition the court | should defer wherever possible to the ‘more’ democratic | branches of government. |
2. The questionable origins of the great power of judicial | review, a power not specifically granted by the Constitution. | 3. The doctrine of separation of powers. |
4. The concept of federalism, dividing powers between the | nation and the states requires of the Court deference toward | the action of state governments and officials. |
5. The non-ideological but pragmatic assumption that since the | Court is dependent on the Congress for its jurisdiction and | resources, and dependent on public acceptance for its |
6. The aristocratic notion that, being a court of law, and | inheritor and custodian of the Anglo-American legal tradition, | it ought not to go too far to the level of politics–law being the |
process of reason and judgment and politics being | concerned only with power and influence. | From the above, it is clear that all the assumptions (except the |
second dealing with the judicial review) hold good in the Indian | context too. | Supreme Court Observations |
While delivering a judgement in December 2007, the Supreme | Court of India called for judicial restraint and asked courts not to | take over the functions of the legislature or the executive, saying |
there is a broad separation of powers under the Constitution and | each organ of the state must have respect for others and should | not encroach on others’ domain. In this context, the concerned |
Bench of the court made the following observations10 : | 1. The Bench said, “We are repeatedly coming across cases | where judges are unjustifiably trying to perform executive or |
legislative functions. This is clearly unconstitutional. In the | name of judicial activism, judges cannot cross their limits | and try to take over functions which belong to another organ |
of the state”. | 2. The Bench said, “Judges must know their limits and must | not try to run the government. They must have modesty and |
humility, and not behave like emperors.” | 3. Quoting from the book ‘The Spirit of Laws’ by Montesquieu | on the consequences of not maintaining separation of |
powers among the three organs, the Bench said the French | political philosopher’s “warning is particularly apt and timely | for the Indian judiciary today, since very often it is rightly |
criticised for ‘overreach’ and encroachment on the domain of | the other two organs.” | 4. Judicial activism must not become judicial adventurism, the |
Bench warned the courts Adjudication must be done within | the system of historically validated restraints and conscious | minimisation of judges’ preferences. |
5. “The courts must not embarrass administrative authorities | and must realise that administrative authorities have | expertise in the field of administration while the court does |
not.” | 6. The Bench said, “The justification often given for judicial | encroachment on the domain of the executive or the |
legislature is that the other two organs are not doing their | jobs properly. Even assuming this is so, the same | allegations can be made against the judiciary too because |
there are cases pending in courts for half-a-century.” | 7. If the legislature or the executive was not functioning | properly, it was for the people to correct the defects by |
exercising their franchise properly in the next elections and | voting for candidates who would fulfil their expectations or by | other lawful methods, e.g., peaceful demonstrations. |
8. “The remedy is not in the judiciary taking over the legislative | or the executive functions, because that will not only violate | the delicate balance of power enshrined in the Constitution |
but also (because) the judiciary has neither the expertise nor | the resources to perform these functions.” | 9. The Bench said: “Judicial restraint is consistent with and |
complementary to the balance of power among the three | independent branches of the state. It accomplishes this in | two ways: first, judicial restraint not only recognises the |
equality of the other two branches with the judiciary, it also | fosters that equality by minimising inter-branch interference | by the judiciary. Second, judicial restraint tends to protect the |
independence of the judiciary. When courts encroach on the | legislative or administrative fields almost inevitably voters, | legislators, and other elected officials will conclude that the |
activities of judges should be closely monitored. | NOTES AND REFERENCES | 1. His article entitled as “The Supreme Court: 1947” was |
published in the Fortune magazine. | 2. Black’s Law Dictionary. | 3. Merriam Webster’s Dictionary of Law. |
3a. V.G. Palishikar, Judicial Activism, AIR 1998, Journal | volume 8, p. 201. | 3b. Black’s Law Dictionary. |
3c. P.B. Sawant, Judicial Independence - Myth and Reality, | (Pune: Board of Extra Mural Studies), 1987, p. 70. | 3d. V.N. Shukla and Mahendra Pal Singh, Constitution of |
India, Eastern Book Company, Thirteenth Edition, 2017, | p. A-51. | 3e. Adish C. Aggarwal, Judicial Activism in India, Chapter |
12 in Judicial Activism in India: A Festschrift in honour | of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, Edited by Lokendra Malik, | Universal Law Publishing Co., First Edition, 2013, p. |
126. | 3f. Dr. Vishal Guleria, Judicial Activism: A Ray of Hope for | the Marginalised Masses, Chapter 22 in Judicial |
Activism in India : A Festschrift in honour of Justice V.R. | Krishna Iyer, Edited by Lokendra Malik, Universal Law | Publishing co., First Edition, 2013, pp. 292–293. |
3g. Justice A.S. Anand, Judicial Review-Judicial Activism- | Need for Caution, Chapter 1 in Judicial Activism in | India: A Festschrift in honour of Justice V.R. Krishna |
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