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Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials' possible conversion of funds",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | b |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials' possible conversion of funds",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | b |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | b |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 N.J.L. 332, 336",
"parenthetical": "allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | b |
The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 407 direct the court to consider the "event" as being the occurrence of injury. Id., advisory committee's note, 1997 amendments. The Fourth Circuit authority cited by Con-Way is not to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "628 F.2d 848, 857-58",
"parenthetical": "applying rule in both negligence and strict liability actions, policy of rule being to encourage remedial measures",
"sentence": "See Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21 (4th Cir.1988) (excluding evidence of automobile recall in products liability action based on faulty brake design, but admitting evidence of changes in brake design that were made before plaintiffs accident); see also Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir.1980) (applying rule in both negligence and strict liability actions, policy of rule being to encourage remedial measures)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "856 F.2d 17, 21",
"parenthetical": "excluding evidence of automobile recall in products liability action based on faulty brake design, but admitting evidence of changes in brake design that were made before plaintiffs accident",
"sentence": "See Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21 (4th Cir.1988) (excluding evidence of automobile recall in products liability action based on faulty brake design, but admitting evidence of changes in brake design that were made before plaintiffs accident); see also Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir.1980) (applying rule in both negligence and strict liability actions, policy of rule being to encourage remedial measures)."
} | 952,742 | b |
The admiralty statute does not limit jurisdiction to a particular party, as do the FTCA and the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. SS 51 et seq., 56. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "45 U.S.C. SS 51 imposes liability on \"[ejvery common carrier by railroad\"",
"sentence": "See Lockard v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 894 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.1990) (45 U.S.C. § 51 imposes liability on “[ejvery common carrier by railroad”); see also Iron Workers MidSouth Pension Fund v. Terotechnology Corp., 891 F.2d 548, 551 (5th Cir.1990) (no pendent-party jurisdiction under Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), over state-law claim to enforce lien)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 548, 551",
"parenthetical": "no pendent-party jurisdiction under Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 1132(e",
"sentence": "See Lockard v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 894 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.1990) (45 U.S.C. § 51 imposes liability on “[ejvery common carrier by railroad”); see also Iron Workers MidSouth Pension Fund v. Terotechnology Corp., 891 F.2d 548, 551 (5th Cir.1990) (no pendent-party jurisdiction under Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), over state-law claim to enforce lien)."
} | 10,547,498 | a |
P 11. We acknowledge that a 2007 amendment indeed later authorized the involvement of law enforcement in investigations and specified that such authorized involvement included posing as a child. Nonetheless, the State indicted Shaffer prior to the 2007 amendment, and we refrain from retroactively applying any interpretation of the later-amended statute to Shaffer's case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 U.S. 18, 25",
"parenthetical": "A statute imposing criminal penalties must be \"strictly construed\" in favor of the accused.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | 7,030,282 | b |
P 11. We acknowledge that a 2007 amendment indeed later authorized the involvement of law enforcement in investigations and specified that such authorized involvement included posing as a child. Nonetheless, the State indicted Shaffer prior to the 2007 amendment, and we refrain from retroactively applying any interpretation of the later-amended statute to Shaffer's case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 U.S. 18, 25",
"parenthetical": "A statute imposing criminal penalties must be \"strictly construed\" in favor of the accused.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 A.2d 602, 606-07",
"parenthetical": "Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | 7,030,282 | a |
P 11. We acknowledge that a 2007 amendment indeed later authorized the involvement of law enforcement in investigations and specified that such authorized involvement included posing as a child. Nonetheless, the State indicted Shaffer prior to the 2007 amendment, and we refrain from retroactively applying any interpretation of the later-amended statute to Shaffer's case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "A statute imposing criminal penalties must be \"strictly construed\" in favor of the accused.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | 7,030,282 | a |
P 11. We acknowledge that a 2007 amendment indeed later authorized the involvement of law enforcement in investigations and specified that such authorized involvement included posing as a child. Nonetheless, the State indicted Shaffer prior to the 2007 amendment, and we refrain from retroactively applying any interpretation of the later-amended statute to Shaffer's case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 A.2d 602, 606-07",
"parenthetical": "Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "A statute imposing criminal penalties must be \"strictly construed\" in favor of the accused.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | 7,030,282 | b |
P 11. We acknowledge that a 2007 amendment indeed later authorized the involvement of law enforcement in investigations and specified that such authorized involvement included posing as a child. Nonetheless, the State indicted Shaffer prior to the 2007 amendment, and we refrain from retroactively applying any interpretation of the later-amended statute to Shaffer's case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "A statute imposing criminal penalties must be \"strictly construed\" in favor of the accused.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | 7,030,282 | a |
P 11. We acknowledge that a 2007 amendment indeed later authorized the involvement of law enforcement in investigations and specified that such authorized involvement included posing as a child. Nonetheless, the State indicted Shaffer prior to the 2007 amendment, and we refrain from retroactively applying any interpretation of the later-amended statute to Shaffer's case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 A.2d 602, 606-07",
"parenthetical": "Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "A statute imposing criminal penalties must be \"strictly construed\" in favor of the accused.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (A statute imposing criminal penalties must be “strictly construed” in favor of the accused.); Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1189 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000); see also Commonwealth v. Cauto, 369 Pa.Super. 381, 535 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1987) (Solicitation of sexual abuse does not require criminal behavior by the person being solicited but merely complicity or participation in the commission of a crime.). Thus, in applying section 97-5-33 as codified in 2006 to this case, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the indicted offense of child exploitation, we fail to find any relief for the State’s burden to prove evidence of some involvement by a child. However, the record contains more than sufficient evidence proving Shaffer guilty of attempted child exploitation."
} | 7,030,282 | b |
As to the Barnett testimony, the prosecutor may not, by innuendo, attack a witness' credibility by asking about a witness' criminal conduct when the prosecutor has no basis for the question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor may not question character witness about accused's misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "482 F.2d 850, 852",
"parenthetical": "attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | 1,825,453 | a |
As to the Barnett testimony, the prosecutor may not, by innuendo, attack a witness' credibility by asking about a witness' criminal conduct when the prosecutor has no basis for the question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor may not question character witness about accused's misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | 1,825,453 | a |
As to the Barnett testimony, the prosecutor may not, by innuendo, attack a witness' credibility by asking about a witness' criminal conduct when the prosecutor has no basis for the question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor may not question character witness about accused's misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | 1,825,453 | a |
As to the Barnett testimony, the prosecutor may not, by innuendo, attack a witness' credibility by asking about a witness' criminal conduct when the prosecutor has no basis for the question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor may not question character witness about accused's misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1985) (prosecutor may not question character witness about accused’s misconduct absent good faith belief that misconduct occurred); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (attacking a witness’ character indirectly by insinuation “should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith”); see also United States v. Madden, 482 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (attempt to impeach witness by showing merely an accusation of misconduct has been uniformly prohibited)."
} | 1,825,453 | b |
As the United States Supreme Court recognized, the court in a partnership-level TEFRA proceeding is "not required to shut its eyes" to the tax consequences of the court's decision, even if the "formal adjustment" of the partners tax liability will occur at a subsequent proceeding. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "795 F.3d 1364, 1364",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]ax is paid only on the partner's individual returns, but [a partnership's] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level\"",
"sentence": "See BASR Partnership, 795 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]ax is paid only on the partner’s individual returns, but [a partnership’s] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level”); see also Keener, 551 F.3d at 1363 (holding that the statute of limitations is a “partnership item” under TEFRA); Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Based on Keener, we hold that the statute of limitations issue is a partnership item.”); see also I.R.C. §§ 6229 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing any tax attributable to a partnership item), 6501 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing tax under the I.R.C.)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 1363, 1363",
"parenthetical": "holding that the statute of limitations is a \"partnership item\" under TEFRA",
"sentence": "See BASR Partnership, 795 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]ax is paid only on the partner’s individual returns, but [a partnership’s] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level”); see also Keener, 551 F.3d at 1363 (holding that the statute of limitations is a “partnership item” under TEFRA); Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Based on Keener, we hold that the statute of limitations issue is a partnership item.”); see also I.R.C. §§ 6229 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing any tax attributable to a partnership item), 6501 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing tax under the I.R.C.)."
} | 12,322,582 | a |
As the United States Supreme Court recognized, the court in a partnership-level TEFRA proceeding is "not required to shut its eyes" to the tax consequences of the court's decision, even if the "formal adjustment" of the partners tax liability will occur at a subsequent proceeding. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "795 F.3d 1364, 1364",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]ax is paid only on the partner's individual returns, but [a partnership's] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level\"",
"sentence": "See BASR Partnership, 795 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]ax is paid only on the partner’s individual returns, but [a partnership’s] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level”); see also Keener, 551 F.3d at 1363 (holding that the statute of limitations is a “partnership item” under TEFRA); Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Based on Keener, we hold that the statute of limitations issue is a partnership item.”); see also I.R.C. §§ 6229 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing any tax attributable to a partnership item), 6501 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing tax under the I.R.C.)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1301, 1307",
"parenthetical": "\"Based on Keener, we hold that the statute of limitations issue is a partnership item.\"",
"sentence": "See BASR Partnership, 795 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]ax is paid only on the partner’s individual returns, but [a partnership’s] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level”); see also Keener, 551 F.3d at 1363 (holding that the statute of limitations is a “partnership item” under TEFRA); Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Based on Keener, we hold that the statute of limitations issue is a partnership item.”); see also I.R.C. §§ 6229 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing any tax attributable to a partnership item), 6501 (providing the statute of limitations for assessing tax under the I.R.C.)."
} | 12,322,582 | a |
Carter's constructive discharge claim fails because he is unable to show the intolerable nature of the abuse he faced. The "severe and pervasive" standard required to state a hostile work environment claim is lower than the "intolerability" standard required for a constructive discharge claim, and thus a finding that Carter's hostile work environment claim is actionable does not necessitate a finding that he was constructively discharged. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 311, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity of pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.2000) (“[W]orking conditions for constructive discharge must be even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment.”); see also Spencer v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 317 (3d Cir.2006) (“To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity of pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work environment.”); Griffin v. Delchamps, Inc., 176 F.3d 480 (5th Cir.1999) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 F.3d 1044, 1050",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]orking conditions for constructive discharge must be even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment.\"",
"sentence": "See Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.2000) (“[W]orking conditions for constructive discharge must be even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment.”); see also Spencer v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 317 (3d Cir.2006) (“To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity of pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work environment.”); Griffin v. Delchamps, Inc., 176 F.3d 480 (5th Cir.1999) (same)."
} | 4,202,490 | b |
Our starting point is the text of the IDEA. When Congress provides a "detailed exhaustion scheme," courts generally lack discretion to add additional exhaustion requirements to the scheme. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 509, 509-511",
"parenthetical": "holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 137, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to require exhaustion of \"optional appeals\" through state procedures after \"an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed\" by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | 11,357,107 | a |
Our starting point is the text of the IDEA. When Congress provides a "detailed exhaustion scheme," courts generally lack discretion to add additional exhaustion requirements to the scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to require exhaustion of \"optional appeals\" through state procedures after \"an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed\" by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 509, 509-511",
"parenthetical": "holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | 11,357,107 | b |
Our starting point is the text of the IDEA. When Congress provides a "detailed exhaustion scheme," courts generally lack discretion to add additional exhaustion requirements to the scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to require exhaustion of \"optional appeals\" through state procedures after \"an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed\" by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 509, 509-511",
"parenthetical": "holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | 11,357,107 | b |
Our starting point is the text of the IDEA. When Congress provides a "detailed exhaustion scheme," courts generally lack discretion to add additional exhaustion requirements to the scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 137, 146-47",
"parenthetical": "holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to require exhaustion of \"optional appeals\" through state procedures after \"an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed\" by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | 11,357,107 | b |
Our starting point is the text of the IDEA. When Congress provides a "detailed exhaustion scheme," courts generally lack discretion to add additional exhaustion requirements to the scheme. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to require exhaustion of \"optional appeals\" through state procedures after \"an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed\" by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | 11,357,107 | b |
Our starting point is the text of the IDEA. When Congress provides a "detailed exhaustion scheme," courts generally lack discretion to add additional exhaustion requirements to the scheme. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to require exhaustion of \"optional appeals\" through state procedures after \"an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed\" by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-511, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) “is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases”); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146-47, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (holding that it would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require exhaustion of “optional appeals” through state procedures after “an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed” by Congress in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”))."
} | 11,357,107 | a |
Upon being informed of his rights by a CID agent, PFC Reeves requests ed counsel and the CID agent terminated the interview. Later that day, when PFC Reeves was being in-processed for pretrial confinement, his company commander went to see PFC Reeves and "talk to [him]." Id. at 235. The CMA held that PFC Reeves's company commander had interrogated PFC Reeves; however, the CMA remanded the ease to the lower court as to whether PFC Reeves "initiated" the conversation with the company commander, which if true, "would [make PFC Reeves's statements] admissible." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "29 M.J. 177, 191",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a suspect who is in custody and has requested counsel cannot be interrogated unless and until he has 'initiated' a discussion\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 237 (citing Bradshaw); see United States v. Jordan, 29 M.J. 177, 191 (C.M.A.1989) (stating that “a suspect who is in custody and has requested counsel cannot be interrogated unless and until he has ‘initiated’ a discussion”) (Everett, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Watkins, 34 M.J. 344, 347 (C.M.A.1992) (plurality) (stating that Specialist Watkins, after having invoked his right to counsel, “initiated the subsequent exchange by asking the agent whether he preferred military or civilian counsel and how much punishment [he] was facing”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 M.J. 344, 347",
"parenthetical": "stating that Specialist Watkins, after having invoked his right to counsel, \"initiated the subsequent exchange by asking the agent whether he preferred military or civilian counsel and how much punishment [he] was facing\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 237 (citing Bradshaw); see United States v. Jordan, 29 M.J. 177, 191 (C.M.A.1989) (stating that “a suspect who is in custody and has requested counsel cannot be interrogated unless and until he has ‘initiated’ a discussion”) (Everett, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Watkins, 34 M.J. 344, 347 (C.M.A.1992) (plurality) (stating that Specialist Watkins, after having invoked his right to counsel, “initiated the subsequent exchange by asking the agent whether he preferred military or civilian counsel and how much punishment [he] was facing”)."
} | 4,280,743 | a |
One important factor in determining whether a claimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.R.D. 5, 8",
"parenthetical": "'Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h",
"sentence": "Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that a demand for a trial by jury “is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty”); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Mass.1988) (‘Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h), the existence of diversity as an alternative basis of jurisdiction will not entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.”); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D.Md.1967) (holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9(h) designation to trigger admiralty procedures)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "812 F.Supp. 620, 627",
"parenthetical": "holding that a demand for a trial by jury \"is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty\"",
"sentence": "Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that a demand for a trial by jury “is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty”); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Mass.1988) (‘Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h), the existence of diversity as an alternative basis of jurisdiction will not entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.”); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D.Md.1967) (holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9(h) designation to trigger admiralty procedures)."
} | 11,973,634 | b |
One important factor in determining whether a claimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9(h",
"sentence": "Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that a demand for a trial by jury “is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty”); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Mass.1988) (‘Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h), the existence of diversity as an alternative basis of jurisdiction will not entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.”); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D.Md.1967) (holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9(h) designation to trigger admiralty procedures)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "812 F.Supp. 620, 627",
"parenthetical": "holding that a demand for a trial by jury \"is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty\"",
"sentence": "Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that a demand for a trial by jury “is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty”); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Mass.1988) (‘Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h), the existence of diversity as an alternative basis of jurisdiction will not entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.”); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D.Md.1967) (holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9(h) designation to trigger admiralty procedures)."
} | 11,973,634 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a \"wire communication\" as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "1968 federal definition of \"wire communication\" includes conversations over automobile radio telephones",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | a |
We recognize that this decision runs counter to the numerical weight of authority in other jurisdictions where courts have interpreted either the original federal definition of "wire communication" or similar defi nitions in their own states. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state statutory definition of \"telephonic communication\" encompasses cordless telephone communication",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "messages sent through pocket pagers not \"wire communications\" under Florida statute because statute applies \"only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public\"",
"sentence": "See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 723, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1990) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (same); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (same); State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989) (radio portion of cordless telephone conversations not a “wire communication” as defined in Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law); see also Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Sup. 584 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (radio portion of automobile telephone communications not protected by 1968 federal wiretap act); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (messages sent through pocket pagers not “wire communications” under Florida statute because statute applies “only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public”); but see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (1968 federal definition of “wire communication” includes conversations over automobile radio telephones); People v. Fata, 159 App. Div. 2d 180, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1990) (state statutory definition of “telephonic communication” encompasses cordless telephone communication)."
} | 549,822 | b |
. Though styled a "conditional cross-appeal" in plaintiffs' response brief, we construe the argument as an alternative legal justification for the district court's judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.3d 661, 664",
"parenthetical": "\"Appellate courts reviewing grants of summary judgment may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.\"",
"sentence": "See ASARCO, Inc. V. Secy of Labor, 206 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir.2000) (\"It is a well settled principle that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor.”); see also Freeze v. City of Decherd, 753 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir.2014) (\"Appellate courts reviewing grants of summary judgment may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, considering preserved alternative legal arguments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "206 F.3d 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a well settled principle that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor.\"",
"sentence": "See ASARCO, Inc. V. Secy of Labor, 206 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir.2000) (\"It is a well settled principle that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor.”); see also Freeze v. City of Decherd, 753 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir.2014) (\"Appellate courts reviewing grants of summary judgment may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, considering preserved alternative legal arguments)."
} | 4,265,938 | b |
. Though styled a "conditional cross-appeal" in plaintiffs' response brief, we construe the argument as an alternative legal justification for the district court's judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "206 F.3d 720, 722",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a well settled principle that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor.\"",
"sentence": "See ASARCO, Inc. V. Secy of Labor, 206 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir.2000) (\"It is a well settled principle that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor.”); see also Freeze v. City of Decherd, 753 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir.2014) (\"Appellate courts reviewing grants of summary judgment may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, considering preserved alternative legal arguments)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "210 F.3d 1334, 1338",
"parenthetical": "applying similar standard to post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, considering preserved alternative legal arguments",
"sentence": "See ASARCO, Inc. V. Secy of Labor, 206 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir.2000) (\"It is a well settled principle that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor.”); see also Freeze v. City of Decherd, 753 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir.2014) (\"Appellate courts reviewing grants of summary judgment may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, considering preserved alternative legal arguments)."
} | 4,265,938 | a |
The PCRA provides specific criteria to be eligible for relief, requiring a petitioner to be serving a sentence and be able to prove that the conviction resulted from one of several enumerated events, including the ineffective assistance of counsel. See 42 Pa.C.S. 9543(a). Because Petitioner alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, her claims were cognizable under the PCRA and the writ of habeas co'rpus was not available. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "722 A.2d 641, 641",
"parenthetical": "holding that because an untimely PCRA petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the PCRA, the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable",
"sentence": "See Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 641 (holding that because an untimely PCRA petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the PCRA, the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"rare instances\" in which review outside of the PCRA is possible are those in which the petitioner \"never was eligible for review under the PCRA.\"",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232, 1236-37 (2001) (“rare instances” in which review outside of the PCRA is possible are those in which the petitioner “never was eligible for review under the PCRA.”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) (“Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.” (emphasis added))."
} | 7,303,667 | a |
The PCRA provides specific criteria to be eligible for relief, requiring a petitioner to be serving a sentence and be able to prove that the conviction resulted from one of several enumerated events, including the ineffective assistance of counsel. See 42 Pa.C.S. 9543(a). Because Petitioner alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, her claims were cognizable under the PCRA and the writ of habeas co'rpus was not available. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "771 A.2d 1232, 1236-37",
"parenthetical": "\"rare instances\" in which review outside of the PCRA is possible are those in which the petitioner \"never was eligible for review under the PCRA.\"",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232, 1236-37 (2001) (“rare instances” in which review outside of the PCRA is possible are those in which the petitioner “never was eligible for review under the PCRA.”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) (“Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "722 A.2d 641, 641",
"parenthetical": "holding that because an untimely PCRA petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the PCRA, the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable",
"sentence": "See Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 641 (holding that because an untimely PCRA petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the PCRA, the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable)."
} | 7,303,667 | b |
. While it is incumbent upon this Court to refrain from the politics of insurance rate making, this Court encourages persons aggrieved by the regulatory policies and decisions of the Commissioner to rely upon the political process for accountability purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 W.Va. 588, 588",
"parenthetical": "\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner's regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 W.Va. 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | 12,125,941 | a |
. While it is incumbent upon this Court to refrain from the politics of insurance rate making, this Court encourages persons aggrieved by the regulatory policies and decisions of the Commissioner to rely upon the political process for accountability purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 W.Va. 588, 588",
"parenthetical": "\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner's regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "542 S.E.2d 405, 410",
"parenthetical": "\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | 12,125,941 | a |
. While it is incumbent upon this Court to refrain from the politics of insurance rate making, this Court encourages persons aggrieved by the regulatory policies and decisions of the Commissioner to rely upon the political process for accountability purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 S.E.2d 439, 439",
"parenthetical": "\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner's regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 W.Va. 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | 12,125,941 | a |
. While it is incumbent upon this Court to refrain from the politics of insurance rate making, this Court encourages persons aggrieved by the regulatory policies and decisions of the Commissioner to rely upon the political process for accountability purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 S.E.2d 439, 439",
"parenthetical": "\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner's regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "542 S.E.2d 405, 410",
"parenthetical": "\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.\"",
"sentence": "See Appalachian Power, 195 W.Va. at 588, 466 S.E.2d at 439 (\"We are not at liberty to affirm or overturn the [Tax] Commissioner’s regulation or decision merely on the basis of our agreement or disagreement with his policy implications”); see also State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 589, 542 S.E.2d 405, 410 (2000) (\"While the reasons for separating the judiciary from politics are many and varied, there can be no question that the goal of removing politics and its attendant imbroglios from the judicial process is necessary to the proper functioning of our judicial system.”)."
} | 12,125,941 | a |
Plaintiff asserts that his administrative discharge resulted in the stigmatization of his name because of the Other Than Honorable status, thereby invoking a liberty interest for which he was denied. The court recognizes Mr. Weaver was stigmatized by the Other Than Honorable administrative discharge for reasons of sexual misconduct and, therefore, was entitled to due process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "185 Ct.Cl. 454, 467",
"parenthetical": "stigma attaches when, inter alia, the discharge certificate denotes the separation took place under derogatory circumstances",
"sentence": "See Canonica v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 516, 524 (1998) (citations omitted) (noticing that, although enlisted members of the armed forces do not retain a property interest in their employment because they may be discharged by the secretary of the individual service, they do hold a liberty interest in their employment); Keef v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 454, 467, 1968 WL 9154 (1968) (stigma attaches when, inter alia, the discharge certificate denotes the separation took place under derogatory circumstances); see also Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396, 397 fn. 1 (9th Cir.1977) (citations omitted) (stigmatization may occur upon the reception of a general discharge because the majority of discharges are honorable ones, and may result in significant disadvantages in the job market)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stigmatization may occur upon the reception of a general discharge because the majority of discharges are honorable ones, and may result in significant disadvantages in the job market",
"sentence": "See Canonica v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 516, 524 (1998) (citations omitted) (noticing that, although enlisted members of the armed forces do not retain a property interest in their employment because they may be discharged by the secretary of the individual service, they do hold a liberty interest in their employment); Keef v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 454, 467, 1968 WL 9154 (1968) (stigma attaches when, inter alia, the discharge certificate denotes the separation took place under derogatory circumstances); see also Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396, 397 fn. 1 (9th Cir.1977) (citations omitted) (stigmatization may occur upon the reception of a general discharge because the majority of discharges are honorable ones, and may result in significant disadvantages in the job market)."
} | 7,738,976 | a |
Plaintiff asserts that his administrative discharge resulted in the stigmatization of his name because of the Other Than Honorable status, thereby invoking a liberty interest for which he was denied. The court recognizes Mr. Weaver was stigmatized by the Other Than Honorable administrative discharge for reasons of sexual misconduct and, therefore, was entitled to due process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stigma attaches when, inter alia, the discharge certificate denotes the separation took place under derogatory circumstances",
"sentence": "See Canonica v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 516, 524 (1998) (citations omitted) (noticing that, although enlisted members of the armed forces do not retain a property interest in their employment because they may be discharged by the secretary of the individual service, they do hold a liberty interest in their employment); Keef v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 454, 467, 1968 WL 9154 (1968) (stigma attaches when, inter alia, the discharge certificate denotes the separation took place under derogatory circumstances); see also Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396, 397 fn. 1 (9th Cir.1977) (citations omitted) (stigmatization may occur upon the reception of a general discharge because the majority of discharges are honorable ones, and may result in significant disadvantages in the job market)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stigmatization may occur upon the reception of a general discharge because the majority of discharges are honorable ones, and may result in significant disadvantages in the job market",
"sentence": "See Canonica v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 516, 524 (1998) (citations omitted) (noticing that, although enlisted members of the armed forces do not retain a property interest in their employment because they may be discharged by the secretary of the individual service, they do hold a liberty interest in their employment); Keef v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 454, 467, 1968 WL 9154 (1968) (stigma attaches when, inter alia, the discharge certificate denotes the separation took place under derogatory circumstances); see also Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396, 397 fn. 1 (9th Cir.1977) (citations omitted) (stigmatization may occur upon the reception of a general discharge because the majority of discharges are honorable ones, and may result in significant disadvantages in the job market)."
} | 7,738,976 | a |
A review of the record reveals that Defendants did argue, during their Rule 29 motions, that the government had not proved the MS was subject to United States jurisdiction; but Defendants made no objection to the district court's failure to instruct the jury that it must find that the MS was subject to United States jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we would normally agree with the government that plain error review applies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "810 F.2d 1010, 1014",
"parenthetical": "district court has no duty to interpret imaginatively what lawyers say",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Madruga, 810 F.2d 1010, 1014 (11th Cir.1987) (district court has no duty to interpret imaginatively what lawyers say)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1374, 1380-81",
"parenthetical": "to preserve objection to jury instructions, party must object before jury retires, stating distinct grounds for objection",
"sentence": "See United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (11th Cir.1995) (to preserve objection to jury instructions, party must object before jury retires, stating distinct grounds for objection)."
} | 9,045,977 | b |
Illinois courts have allowed non-consumers to bring actions under the Illinois Fraud Act in certain situations, such as when a deceptive statement to consumers alters the natural competition in the marketplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2008 WL 360692, at *3",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[c]ourts have allowed businesses to sue under the [Illinois Fraud Act] for competitive injury when other businesses deceive customers\" and \"[i]n such situations, there is no requirement that the deceptive conduct be aimed at the plaintiff\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Browning v. AT & T Corp., 682 F.Supp.2d 832, 843 n. 7 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (stating that \"[c]ourts have occasionally held that a claim can be stated under the [Illinois Fraud Act] even where the alleged deceptive statements are not directed specifically at the plaintiff\" but that \"these cases are typically brought by corporate plaintiffs or involve allegations that the defendant was engaged in an attempt to deceive the public generally\"); See also Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable America, Inc., 2008 WL 360692, at *3 (N.D.Ill.2008) (stating that \"[c]ourts have allowed businesses to sue under the [Illinois Fraud Act] for competitive injury when other businesses deceive customers\" and \"[i]n such situations, there is no requirement that the deceptive conduct be aimed at the plaintiff\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[c]ourts have occasionally held that a claim can be stated under the [Illinois Fraud Act] even where the alleged deceptive statements are not directed specifically at the plaintiff\" but that \"these cases are typically brought by corporate plaintiffs or involve allegations that the defendant was engaged in an attempt to deceive the public generally\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Browning v. AT & T Corp., 682 F.Supp.2d 832, 843 n. 7 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (stating that \"[c]ourts have occasionally held that a claim can be stated under the [Illinois Fraud Act] even where the alleged deceptive statements are not directed specifically at the plaintiff\" but that \"these cases are typically brought by corporate plaintiffs or involve allegations that the defendant was engaged in an attempt to deceive the public generally\"); See also Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable America, Inc., 2008 WL 360692, at *3 (N.D.Ill.2008) (stating that \"[c]ourts have allowed businesses to sue under the [Illinois Fraud Act] for competitive injury when other businesses deceive customers\" and \"[i]n such situations, there is no requirement that the deceptive conduct be aimed at the plaintiff\")."
} | 4,266,642 | b |
This interpretation is also supported by reading the language of section 40-6-118(6) in tandem with the court's duties under seetion 40-6-115(3) to determine whether the PUC has regularly pursued its authority, whether the decision of the PUC is just and reasonable, and whether the PUC's conclusions are in accordance with the evidence. We have previously stated that in order to fulfill its duties, a reviewing court should have the same information available to it as the agency did in making its decision. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "135 Colo. 146, 154",
"parenthetical": "noting that a court reviewing the action of an administrative agency should be placed in the same position as such agency, and therefore the agency's knowledge of a fact that is acted upon should become part of the record",
"sentence": "Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146, 154, 309 P.2d 606, 610-11 (1957) (noting that a court reviewing the action of an administrative agency should be placed in the same position as such agency, and therefore the agency's knowledge of a fact that is acted upon should become part of the record)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "653 F.Supp. 1229, 1236",
"parenthetical": "\"if a court is to review an agency's action fairly, it should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision\"",
"sentence": "See also Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F.Supp. 1229, 1236 (D.D.C.1987) (\"if a court is to review an agency's action fairly, it should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision\") (qguot-ing Walter O."
} | 8,320,485 | a |
This interpretation is also supported by reading the language of section 40-6-118(6) in tandem with the court's duties under seetion 40-6-115(3) to determine whether the PUC has regularly pursued its authority, whether the decision of the PUC is just and reasonable, and whether the PUC's conclusions are in accordance with the evidence. We have previously stated that in order to fulfill its duties, a reviewing court should have the same information available to it as the agency did in making its decision. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "309 P.2d 606, 610-11",
"parenthetical": "noting that a court reviewing the action of an administrative agency should be placed in the same position as such agency, and therefore the agency's knowledge of a fact that is acted upon should become part of the record",
"sentence": "Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146, 154, 309 P.2d 606, 610-11 (1957) (noting that a court reviewing the action of an administrative agency should be placed in the same position as such agency, and therefore the agency's knowledge of a fact that is acted upon should become part of the record)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "653 F.Supp. 1229, 1236",
"parenthetical": "\"if a court is to review an agency's action fairly, it should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision\"",
"sentence": "See also Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F.Supp. 1229, 1236 (D.D.C.1987) (\"if a court is to review an agency's action fairly, it should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision\") (qguot-ing Walter O."
} | 8,320,485 | a |
Four years later, in 1991, the General Assembly amended the Public Records Act by replacing the phrase "state statute" with the phrase "state law." This Court has since held that the phrase "state law," added by the 1991 amendment, encompasses the Rules of Civil Procedure such that documents shielded by the Rules need not be disclosed pursuant to the Public Records Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 S.W.2d 662, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure",
"sentence": "See Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. appeal denied (Tenn.2005) (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16); Arnold, 19 S.W.3d at 786 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents protected by the work product doctrine, codified as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "159 S.W.3d 565, 576",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16",
"sentence": "See Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. appeal denied (Tenn.2005) (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16); Arnold, 19 S.W.3d at 786 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents protected by the work product doctrine, codified as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02)."
} | 8,374,475 | a |
Four years later, in 1991, the General Assembly amended the Public Records Act by replacing the phrase "state statute" with the phrase "state law." This Court has since held that the phrase "state law," added by the 1991 amendment, encompasses the Rules of Civil Procedure such that documents shielded by the Rules need not be disclosed pursuant to the Public Records Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "19 S.W.3d 786, 786",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents protected by the work product doctrine, codified as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02",
"sentence": "See Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. appeal denied (Tenn.2005) (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16); Arnold, 19 S.W.3d at 786 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents protected by the work product doctrine, codified as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 S.W.2d 662, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure",
"sentence": "See Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. appeal denied (Tenn.2005) (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16); Arnold, 19 S.W.3d at 786 (holding that the Public Records Act does not mandate disclosure of documents protected by the work product doctrine, codified as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02)."
} | 8,374,475 | b |
This argument is unavailing because Ramadan is not in tension with Fernandez. Ramadan did not change the legal landscape as to either constitutional claims (which could already be filed in this court under Fernandez) or as to non-constitutional challenges to the BIA's discretionary denials of motions to reopen (which still cannot be appealed to our court after Ramadan). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 980, 980-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Ramadan is inapplicable to the \" 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' standard\" because it is \"subjective\" unlike the \" 'changed circumstances' standard\" at issue in Ramadan",
"sentence": "See Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 654 (holding that the REAL ID Act “does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations”); see also Mendez-Castro, 552 F.3d at 980-81 (holding that Ramadan is inapplicable to the “ ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ standard” because it is “subjective” unlike the “ ‘changed circumstances’ standard” at issue in Ramadan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 F.3d 654, 654",
"parenthetical": "holding that the REAL ID Act \"does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations\"",
"sentence": "See Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 654 (holding that the REAL ID Act “does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations”); see also Mendez-Castro, 552 F.3d at 980-81 (holding that Ramadan is inapplicable to the “ ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ standard” because it is “subjective” unlike the “ ‘changed circumstances’ standard” at issue in Ramadan)."
} | 3,650,872 | b |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 740, 750",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 234-35",
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | a |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 740, 750",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | a |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 740, 750",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | b |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 234-35",
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | a |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | b |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | b |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 234-35",
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | b |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | a |
. This concept of disproportionality is not foreign to Fourth Amendment analysis. "The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of ... searches is almost too clear for argument." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... \"",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest",
"sentence": "New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing the scope of school searches); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\"[A] finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted when only a minor offense has been committed .... ”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (\"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes ... may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it.”); but cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (finding an arrestee's charges to be irrelevant to the blanket constitutionality of searches incident to arrest)."
} | 4,215,327 | a |
In ground three of his January 21, 2014 motion, appellant alleged that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for dismissal of the charges for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of ammunition after his conviction for armed burglary, on double jeopardy grounds: He contended he could not be convicted of possessing the same firearm or ammunition that served as the basis for his armed burglary conviction. In his initial brief, however, appellant contends that his dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of ammunition violate double jeopardy proscriptions, and that one of these convictions should be vacated, without regard to the armed burglary conviction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 So.3d 796, 797",
"parenthetical": "same and remanding for the trial court to vacate the conviction for felon in possession of ammunition because the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm carried a three-year minimum mandatory sentence",
"sentence": "See Bell v. State, 122 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of [separate] ammunition because section 790.23(1), Florida Statutes prohibits possession of “ ‘any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device’” (emphasis in original)); see also Strain v. State, 77 So.3d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (same and remanding for the trial court to vacate the conviction for felon in possession of ammunition because the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm carried a three-year minimum mandatory sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "122 So.3d 958, 961",
"parenthetical": "holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of [separate] ammunition because section 790.23(1",
"sentence": "See Bell v. State, 122 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of [separate] ammunition because section 790.23(1), Florida Statutes prohibits possession of “ ‘any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device’” (emphasis in original)); see also Strain v. State, 77 So.3d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (same and remanding for the trial court to vacate the conviction for felon in possession of ammunition because the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm carried a three-year minimum mandatory sentence)."
} | 6,885,268 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-91",
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 547",
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-91",
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-91",
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 547",
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 547",
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 547",
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 694, 699",
"parenthetical": "the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 694, 699",
"parenthetical": "the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno's remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his rights by reading and investigating the contents of the letter to Salerno's attorney after defendants were notified of the threat posed by the letter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 694, 699",
"parenthetical": "the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison officials \"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security\"",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors for determining whether regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (the reasonableness of searches and seizures by prison officials should be analyzed in light of the Turner factors); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security”)."
} | 4,146,477 | a |
A carve out may not exist unless ordered, or approved by the Court with the consent of the affected secured creditor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1998 WL 731611, at *6",
"parenthetical": "essential to a carve out is \"the agreement between the secured party and the beneficiary of the carve out\"",
"sentence": "See In re White Glove, Inc., 1998 WL 731611, at *6 (essential to a carve out is “the agreement between the secured party and the beneficiary of the carve out”); In re Blackwood Assoc., 153 F.3d at 68 (“a secured creditor’s collateral may only be diminished to the extent that the secured creditor waives its right to the protections afforded by the Code”); see also In re Trim-X Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir.1982) (the estate, and not the secured creditor, bears the cost of the administrative expenses of the estate)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "695 F.2d 296, 301",
"parenthetical": "the estate, and not the secured creditor, bears the cost of the administrative expenses of the estate",
"sentence": "See In re White Glove, Inc., 1998 WL 731611, at *6 (essential to a carve out is “the agreement between the secured party and the beneficiary of the carve out”); In re Blackwood Assoc., 153 F.3d at 68 (“a secured creditor’s collateral may only be diminished to the extent that the secured creditor waives its right to the protections afforded by the Code”); see also In re Trim-X Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir.1982) (the estate, and not the secured creditor, bears the cost of the administrative expenses of the estate)."
} | 3,500,949 | a |
A carve out may not exist unless ordered, or approved by the Court with the consent of the affected secured creditor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "153 F.3d 68, 68",
"parenthetical": "\"a secured creditor's collateral may only be diminished to the extent that the secured creditor waives its right to the protections afforded by the Code\"",
"sentence": "See In re White Glove, Inc., 1998 WL 731611, at *6 (essential to a carve out is “the agreement between the secured party and the beneficiary of the carve out”); In re Blackwood Assoc., 153 F.3d at 68 (“a secured creditor’s collateral may only be diminished to the extent that the secured creditor waives its right to the protections afforded by the Code”); see also In re Trim-X Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir.1982) (the estate, and not the secured creditor, bears the cost of the administrative expenses of the estate)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "695 F.2d 296, 301",
"parenthetical": "the estate, and not the secured creditor, bears the cost of the administrative expenses of the estate",
"sentence": "See In re White Glove, Inc., 1998 WL 731611, at *6 (essential to a carve out is “the agreement between the secured party and the beneficiary of the carve out”); In re Blackwood Assoc., 153 F.3d at 68 (“a secured creditor’s collateral may only be diminished to the extent that the secured creditor waives its right to the protections afforded by the Code”); see also In re Trim-X Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir.1982) (the estate, and not the secured creditor, bears the cost of the administrative expenses of the estate)."
} | 3,500,949 | a |
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b). A determination of a subpoena's reasonableness requires the court to balance the interests served by complying with the subpoena against the interests served by quashing it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.2d 725, 725",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena's reasonableness",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "28 B.R. 872, 874",
"parenthetical": "balancing \"the benefit of the information against the burden of production\"",
"sentence": "See Herron v. Blackford, 264 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir.1959) (holding that court should balance competing interests); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. 872, 874 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1983) (balancing “the benefit of the information against the burden of production”). This balancing of benefits against burdens calls for the court to consider, inter alia, whether the information is necessary and unavailable from any other source."
} | 6,499,754 | b |
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b). A determination of a subpoena's reasonableness requires the court to balance the interests served by complying with the subpoena against the interests served by quashing it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "76 B.R. 68, 69",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records \"relevant and not available from any other source\"",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.2d 725, 725",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena's reasonableness",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | 6,499,754 | a |
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b). A determination of a subpoena's reasonableness requires the court to balance the interests served by complying with the subpoena against the interests served by quashing it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.2d 725, 725",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena's reasonableness",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records \"relevant and not available from any other source\"",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | 6,499,754 | b |
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