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See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b). A determination of a subpoena's reasonableness requires the court to balance the interests served by complying with the subpoena against the interests served by quashing it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.2d 725, 725",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena's reasonableness",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "28 B.R. 875, 875",
"parenthetical": "recognizing relevance of information and that \"need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]\"",
"sentence": "See In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (E.D.Pa.) (affirming denial of motion to quash in part because subpoenaed lawfirm records “relevant and not available from any other source”) (emphasis added), aff'd, 838 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.1987); In re National Trade Corp., 28 B.R. at 875 (recognizing relevance of information and that “need for this information outweighs the burden to [appellants]”); see also Herron, 264 F.2d at 725 (suggesting that need is one factor of a subpoena’s reasonableness)."
} | 6,499,754 | b |
Second, it was not Dawkins himself who "wrote" Scott up -- as Dawkins was not Scott's superior -- but rather a captain. See Scott Dep. at 335. The complaint contains only allegations regarding Dawkins, however. Moreover, to the extent that Dawkins "assisted" a captain in "writing] her up" frivolously, this evidence alone is insufficient to show adverse action, as writing a reprimand for violating company policy does not itself constitute an adverse employment action. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 68, 68",
"parenthetical": "\"An employee's decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience ... 'personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy' and 'snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under SS 704(a",
"sentence": "See Cody v. County of Nassau, 577 F.Supp.2d 623, 645 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (defendant’s “falsely accusing plaintiff of being absent without authorization,” “threatening plaintiff with future counseling notices and disciplinary actions,” “writing plaintiff up for leaving work early,” and similar actions were not adverse employment actions); Nix v. Cino, 2006 WL 2711625, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006) (“Mere reprimands or threats of disciplinary action, absent any other negative results, such as a decrease in pay, do not qualify as adverse employment actions.”); cf. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct, 2405 (“An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience ... ‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under § 704(a).’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "577 F.Supp.2d 623, 645",
"parenthetical": "defendant's \"falsely accusing plaintiff of being absent without authorization,\" \"threatening plaintiff with future counseling notices and disciplinary actions,\" \"writing plaintiff up for leaving work early,\" and similar actions were not adverse employment actions",
"sentence": "See Cody v. County of Nassau, 577 F.Supp.2d 623, 645 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (defendant’s “falsely accusing plaintiff of being absent without authorization,” “threatening plaintiff with future counseling notices and disciplinary actions,” “writing plaintiff up for leaving work early,” and similar actions were not adverse employment actions); Nix v. Cino, 2006 WL 2711625, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006) (“Mere reprimands or threats of disciplinary action, absent any other negative results, such as a decrease in pay, do not qualify as adverse employment actions.”); cf. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct, 2405 (“An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience ... ‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under § 704(a).’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,181,008 | b |
Second, it was not Dawkins himself who "wrote" Scott up -- as Dawkins was not Scott's superior -- but rather a captain. See Scott Dep. at 335. The complaint contains only allegations regarding Dawkins, however. Moreover, to the extent that Dawkins "assisted" a captain in "writing] her up" frivolously, this evidence alone is insufficient to show adverse action, as writing a reprimand for violating company policy does not itself constitute an adverse employment action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 2711625, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"Mere reprimands or threats of disciplinary action, absent any other negative results, such as a decrease in pay, do not qualify as adverse employment actions.\"",
"sentence": "See Cody v. County of Nassau, 577 F.Supp.2d 623, 645 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (defendant’s “falsely accusing plaintiff of being absent without authorization,” “threatening plaintiff with future counseling notices and disciplinary actions,” “writing plaintiff up for leaving work early,” and similar actions were not adverse employment actions); Nix v. Cino, 2006 WL 2711625, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006) (“Mere reprimands or threats of disciplinary action, absent any other negative results, such as a decrease in pay, do not qualify as adverse employment actions.”); cf. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct, 2405 (“An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience ... ‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under § 704(a).’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 68, 68",
"parenthetical": "\"An employee's decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience ... 'personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy' and 'snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under SS 704(a",
"sentence": "See Cody v. County of Nassau, 577 F.Supp.2d 623, 645 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (defendant’s “falsely accusing plaintiff of being absent without authorization,” “threatening plaintiff with future counseling notices and disciplinary actions,” “writing plaintiff up for leaving work early,” and similar actions were not adverse employment actions); Nix v. Cino, 2006 WL 2711625, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2006) (“Mere reprimands or threats of disciplinary action, absent any other negative results, such as a decrease in pay, do not qualify as adverse employment actions.”); cf. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct, 2405 (“An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience ... ‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under § 704(a).’ ”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,181,008 | a |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "488 U.S. 51, 57",
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 180, 192",
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 180, 192",
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 180, 192",
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "488 U.S. 51, 57",
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "488 U.S. 51, 57",
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
From the time Lovasco was decided in 1977, the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to discuss in more depth the due process standard as established by Marion and Lovasco, and has only tangentially discussed the Marion/Lovasco standard in cases involving other issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, \"the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (in a case involving right to appointment of counsel for federal prison inmates who were placed in administrative detention pending indictment for crimes committed in prison, the Court stated, in dicta, “the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a case concerning whether defendant's due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion's language that \"no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them\"",
"sentence": "See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 883, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (in a case concerning whether defendant’s due process rights were violated by the police destruction of evidence in the absence of bad faith motives by the police, the Court cited Marion’s language that “no actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged and proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them”)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
The parties did not advance this ground before the district court -- i.e., focusing on Mr. Pursley's opportunity vel non to cross -- examine Mr. Cluff-nor did the district court address it. However, we clearly have the discretion under certain specified circumstances to affirm a district court on a previously unexplored ground. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.2d 508, 511",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the judgment of a district court is correct, it may be affirmed for reasons not given by the court and not advanced to it.\"",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 707 (“We may affirm the rulings of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (10th Cir.1999) (“[W]e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Laird v. Shell Oil Co., 770 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir.1985) (“[W]hen the judgment of a district court is correct, it may be affirmed for reasons not given by the court and not advanced to it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "188 F.3d 1215, 1217-18",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 707 (“We may affirm the rulings of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (10th Cir.1999) (“[W]e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Laird v. Shell Oil Co., 770 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir.1985) (“[W]hen the judgment of a district court is correct, it may be affirmed for reasons not given by the court and not advanced to it.”)."
} | 4,042,664 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "554 S.W.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 245, 245-46",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 245, 245-46",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "223 S.W.3d 408, 415",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 245, 245-46",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "121 S.W.3d 491, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 245, 245-46",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 S.W.3d 883, 888",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "554 S.W.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 S.W.2d 546, 547",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "223 S.W.3d 408, 415",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 S.W.2d 546, 547",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 S.W.2d 546, 547",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "121 S.W.3d 491, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 S.W.2d 546, 547",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 S.W.3d 883, 888",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 S.W.3d 413, 415",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male\" involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male\" make a \"hasty\" departure from high crime area after observing the police",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "554 S.W.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 S.W.3d 413, 415",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male\" involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male\" make a \"hasty\" departure from high crime area after observing the police",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "223 S.W.3d 408, 415",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "121 S.W.3d 491, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 S.W.3d 413, 415",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male\" involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male\" make a \"hasty\" departure from high crime area after observing the police",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 S.W.3d 883, 888",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 S.W.3d 413, 415",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male\" involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male\" make a \"hasty\" departure from high crime area after observing the police",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "554 S.W.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "223 S.W.3d 408, 415",
"parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | 7,301,616 | a |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "121 S.W.3d 491, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
. With the exception of the driver's nervousness, Officer Lewis learned or observed nothing new during the stop that would reason ably lead to any heightened suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 S.W.3d 883, 888",
"parenthetical": "prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Cf. Amorella, 554 S.W.2d at 701 (reasonable suspicion for stop when vehicle observed with its lights on and motor running in department store parking lot in high crime area at 1:30 a.m. with several individuals standing around an open trunk which was immediately closed and the car driven away when the police were spotted); Lopez v. State, 223 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion existed for further detention of defendant stopped in high crime area when officer observed plastic baggie in crease of gas cap compartment); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to questions about ownership of car and intended destination, large amount of detergent in car consistent with efforts to mask the smell of drugs, and smell of burnt marihuana created reasonable suspicion); Freeman v. State, 62 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (prolonged detention of traffic stop reasonable where inconsistent answers by passenger and driver to \"basic questions,\" use of rental car, and smell of marihuana in car detected while officer talked to passenger sufficient for reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99",
"parenthetical": "no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245-46 (no reasonable suspicion to detain when officers concluded out-of-state driver was not intoxicated but they also believed the driver was not on a business trip as represented); White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where vehicle observed driving aimlessly in mall parking lot even though there had been a rash of purse snatchings in the parking lot); State v. Losoya, 128 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (no reasonable suspicion when officers, acting on an anonymous tip of a \"black male” involved in narcotics activity, observed a \"black male” make a \"hasty” departure from high crime area after observing the police); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72, 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (no reasonable suspicion where pickup truck was observed parked behind a shopping center at 2:30 a.m., all the businesses were closed and the shopping center had been burglarized a number of times); Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (no reasonable suspicion where a group of people were gathered in a yard located in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking and defendant was observed walking to and from the group several times)."
} | 7,301,616 | b |
The prerecorded MITS message explicitly advises that "[a]ll call detail and conversation, excluding approved attorney calls, will be recorded," see supra p. 296 (emphasis added), thereby informing the call recipient that the entire "contents" will be intercepted. Consequently, notwithstanding the absence of explicit notice of the lesser intrusion represented by possible monitoring of call content, the recipient is fully informed of the greater intrusion; viz., that the entire conversation, as well as all call "detail," unll be intercepted and recorded. Thus, since the MITS records the entire conversation, any concurrent aural monitoring by authorized DOC officials in no sense exceeds the dimensions of the broad implied consent given to record all call "content," including call "detail." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "11 F.3d 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least \"minimal knowledge\" of scope of interception",
"sentence": "See Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 114, 116-19 (finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions); see also Williams, 11 F.3d at 282 (stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least “minimal knowledge” of scope of interception). Therefore, based on the relevant authoritative decisions, it is at the very least an open question whether the express prior consent provided by MITS-call recipients to the recordation of all call “content” constitutes implied consent to monitoring."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 114, 114, 116-19",
"parenthetical": "finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions",
"sentence": "See Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 114, 116-19 (finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions); see also Williams, 11 F.3d at 282 (stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least “minimal knowledge” of scope of interception). Therefore, based on the relevant authoritative decisions, it is at the very least an open question whether the express prior consent provided by MITS-call recipients to the recordation of all call “content” constitutes implied consent to monitoring."
} | 11,902,545 | b |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "324 F.3d 685, 689",
"parenthetical": "holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 47, 47-48",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, \"undoubtedly\" met the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | b |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 47, 47-48",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, \"undoubtedly\" met the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 442, 446",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | a |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 47, 47-48",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, \"undoubtedly\" met the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "188 F.3d 939, 943",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims \"fall squarely within the scope\" of ERISA",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | a |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, \"undoubtedly\" met the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "324 F.3d 685, 689",
"parenthetical": "holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | a |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, \"undoubtedly\" met the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 442, 446",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | a |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "188 F.3d 939, 943",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims \"fall squarely within the scope\" of ERISA",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, \"undoubtedly\" met the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | b |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs' claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "324 F.3d 685, 689",
"parenthetical": "holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | a |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 442, 446",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs' claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | b |
Reducing the Van Nattas' complaint to its core reveals the fact that all of their state law claims are premised upon alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee-benefit plan. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have previously reiterated, such claims undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under SS 514(a), even if the state statutes at issue do not expressly make reference to ERISA plans. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "188 F.3d 939, 943",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims \"fall squarely within the scope\" of ERISA",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs' claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA",
"sentence": "See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an ERISA plan); Thompson v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits, those claims “fall squarely within the scope” of ERISA); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs state law claims premised on the defendants’ failure to give the plaintiff the benefits under the medical plan he had been promised were preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1985) (citing numerous cases finding claims for recovery of benefits preempted by ERISA), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citing decisions holding claims for recovery of alleged benefits preempted under ERISA), aff'd, 827 F.2d 879 (1987)."
} | 3,425,410 | b |
Whatever thin thread of support a jury might find in the decoy-molecule hypothetical simply cannot bear the weight of the vast scope of these generic claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "holding that the narrow description of the E. coli polA gene did not adequately support a broad claim to the gene from any bacterial source",
"sentence": "See LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (holding that “[a]fter reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand” the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it); Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1345-46 (noting that the “scope of the right to exclude” must not “overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification”); Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171 (“Claiming all DNA[s] that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”); cf. Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1126 (holding that the narrow description of the E. coli polA gene did not adequately support a broad claim to the gene from any bacterial source)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 F.3d 1345, 1345",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[a]fter reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand\" the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it",
"sentence": "See LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (holding that “[a]fter reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand” the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it); Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1345-46 (noting that the “scope of the right to exclude” must not “overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification”); Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171 (“Claiming all DNA[s] that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”); cf. Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1126 (holding that the narrow description of the E. coli polA gene did not adequately support a broad claim to the gene from any bacterial source)."
} | 4,221,514 | b |
Whatever thin thread of support a jury might find in the decoy-molecule hypothetical simply cannot bear the weight of the vast scope of these generic claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "214 F.3d 1345, 1345-46",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"scope of the right to exclude\" must not \"overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification\"",
"sentence": "See LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (holding that “[a]fter reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand” the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it); Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1345-46 (noting that the “scope of the right to exclude” must not “overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification”); Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171 (“Claiming all DNA[s] that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”); cf. Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1126 (holding that the narrow description of the E. coli polA gene did not adequately support a broad claim to the gene from any bacterial source)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "holding that the narrow description of the E. coli polA gene did not adequately support a broad claim to the gene from any bacterial source",
"sentence": "See LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (holding that “[a]fter reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand” the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it); Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1345-46 (noting that the “scope of the right to exclude” must not “overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification”); Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171 (“Claiming all DNA[s] that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”); cf. Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1126 (holding that the narrow description of the E. coli polA gene did not adequately support a broad claim to the gene from any bacterial source)."
} | 4,221,514 | a |
But notice of the settlement agreement without more leaves Corn-erica's right to challenge the district court's damages determination unaffected. The Owner-Operators could bind Comeri-ca only through joining them as a party to the earlier litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 755, 765",
"parenthetical": "\"Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”); see also City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007) (acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment “is entitled to its ‘own day in court’ to challenge actions taken under the judgments”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 282, 286",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment \"is entitled to its 'own day in court' to challenge actions taken under the judgments\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”); see also City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007) (acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment “is entitled to its ‘own day in court’ to challenge actions taken under the judgments”)."
} | 4,071,289 | a |
But notice of the settlement agreement without more leaves Corn-erica's right to challenge the district court's damages determination unaffected. The Owner-Operators could bind Comeri-ca only through joining them as a party to the earlier litigation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 282, 286",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment \"is entitled to its 'own day in court' to challenge actions taken under the judgments\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”); see also City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007) (acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment “is entitled to its ‘own day in court’ to challenge actions taken under the judgments”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”); see also City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007) (acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment “is entitled to its ‘own day in court’ to challenge actions taken under the judgments”)."
} | 4,071,289 | b |
But notice of the settlement agreement without more leaves Corn-erica's right to challenge the district court's damages determination unaffected. The Owner-Operators could bind Comeri-ca only through joining them as a party to the earlier litigation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 282, 286",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment \"is entitled to its 'own day in court' to challenge actions taken under the judgments\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”); see also City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007) (acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment “is entitled to its ‘own day in court’ to challenge actions taken under the judgments”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.\"",
"sentence": "See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (“Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”); see also City of Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007) (acknowledging that a non-party to a consent judgment “is entitled to its ‘own day in court’ to challenge actions taken under the judgments”)."
} | 4,071,289 | b |
Under that analysis, once a plaintiff has produced evidence of pretext, the employer's justification vanishes and the original McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination rises again, automatically overcoming summary judgment. We reject that formalistic approach as not in keeping with either Supreme Court doctrine or common sense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 567, 577",
"parenthetical": "the McDonnell Douglas model \"was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.\"",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 48, 48",
"parenthetical": "stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | 10,541,771 | a |
Under that analysis, once a plaintiff has produced evidence of pretext, the employer's justification vanishes and the original McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination rises again, automatically overcoming summary judgment. We reject that formalistic approach as not in keeping with either Supreme Court doctrine or common sense. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 48, 48",
"parenthetical": "stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949",
"parenthetical": "the McDonnell Douglas model \"was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.\"",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | 10,541,771 | b |
Under that analysis, once a plaintiff has produced evidence of pretext, the employer's justification vanishes and the original McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination rises again, automatically overcoming summary judgment. We reject that formalistic approach as not in keeping with either Supreme Court doctrine or common sense. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 48, 48",
"parenthetical": "stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the McDonnell Douglas model \"was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.\"",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | 10,541,771 | b |
Under that analysis, once a plaintiff has produced evidence of pretext, the employer's justification vanishes and the original McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination rises again, automatically overcoming summary judgment. We reject that formalistic approach as not in keeping with either Supreme Court doctrine or common sense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the McDonnell Douglas model \"was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.\"",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 48, 48",
"parenthetical": "stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination",
"sentence": "See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (the McDonnell Douglas model “was not intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”). Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext may suffice to raise an inference of discrimination, or additional evidence may be required. There is no absolute rule that a discrimination plaintiff must adduce evidence in addition to that comprising the prima facie case and the rebuttal of defendant’s justification in order to prevail either at the summary judgment stage or at trial. See Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n. 3; but see Olivera, 922 F.2d at 48 (stating that in this circuit a plaintiff must adduce additional evidence of discrimination). “Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision was motivated by [discriminatory] animus.”"
} | 10,541,771 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 279, 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.2d 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 646, 646",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 646, 646",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 279, 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 646, 646",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 646, 646",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 646, 646",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 646, 646",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by removal of shoes held \" 'minimally intrusive' \" routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 124, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "border \"patdown\" followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 124, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "border \"patdown\" followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 124, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "border \"patdown\" followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 279, 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 124, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "border \"patdown\" followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 124, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "border \"patdown\" followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 124, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "border \"patdown\" followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp. 878, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp. 878, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 279, 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp. 878, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp. 878, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp. 878, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "501 F.Supp. 878, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 279, 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 509, 512-15",
"parenthetical": "lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 279, 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | a |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
We believe that a close examination of the case law in this Circuit and elsewhere indicates that the search here in question may be characterized correctly as a routine border search not requiring reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to \"strip search\"",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.2d 832, 835",
"parenthetical": "initial patdown followed by search of defendants' luggage and purses held routine border search",
"sentence": "Grotke, supra, 702 F.2d at 51-52 (patdown followed by removal of shoes held “ ‘minimally intrusive’ ” routine border search, quoting Nieves, supra, 609 F.2d at 646); United States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 126-27 (2 Cir.1981) (border “patdown” followed by request that defendant pull down girdle in private room did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion); Luc-Thirion, supra, 501 F.Supp. at 878-79 (removal of jacket and patdown of border entrant did not require reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-15 (1 Cir.1988) (lifting up of skirt by defendant in private room revealing bulge of drugs in girdle, held part of routine border search and did not necessarily require any degree of suspicion); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 835 (8 Cir.1986) (initial patdown followed by search of defendants’ luggage and purses held routine border search); cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279, 281, 284 (10 Cir.) (patdown followed by request that defendant remove boot not equivalent to “strip search”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 [99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256] (1978)."
} | 10,528,758 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 U.S. 473, 473",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 U.S. 473, 473",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 U.S. 473, 473",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 U.S. 473, 473",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 U.S. 473, 473",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 U.S. 473, 473",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | b |
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