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The fact that Summerrain did not personally accept a check from Debtor but instead authorized an employee of Independant Paralegal Associates to do so does not change this conclusion because Summer-rain admits she personally placed the money order, along -with Debtor's filings, in the mail. Moreover, the acts of Independant Paralegal Associates' employees are imputable to the partnership and to Summer-rain, as general partner. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 B.R. 274, 276-77",
"parenthetical": "misleading advice of court clerk cannot extend jurisdiction deadline for filing notice of appeal",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Frontier Airlines, 108 B.R. 274, 276-77 (D.Colo.1989) (misleading advice of court clerk cannot extend jurisdiction deadline for filing notice of appeal); In re Furst, 206 B.R. 979 (10th Cir. BAP 1997) (advising pro se litigant that advice from court clerk is “merely advice and cannot excuse a failure to meet fundamental jurisdictional requirements.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "259 B.R. 384, 384",
"parenthetical": "finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation",
"sentence": "See Gomez, 259 B.R. at 384 (finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.Colo.1991) (recognizing “well-established Colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership.”)- Summer-rain’s argument that she relied on statements of a clerk of the Bankruptcy Court is also misplaced as reliance on statements of court employees cannot justify failure to comply with the clearly written statutory requirements of Section 110."
} | 9,411,841 | b |
The fact that Summerrain did not personally accept a check from Debtor but instead authorized an employee of Independant Paralegal Associates to do so does not change this conclusion because Summer-rain admits she personally placed the money order, along -with Debtor's filings, in the mail. Moreover, the acts of Independant Paralegal Associates' employees are imputable to the partnership and to Summer-rain, as general partner. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "advising pro se litigant that advice from court clerk is \"merely advice and cannot excuse a failure to meet fundamental jurisdictional requirements.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Frontier Airlines, 108 B.R. 274, 276-77 (D.Colo.1989) (misleading advice of court clerk cannot extend jurisdiction deadline for filing notice of appeal); In re Furst, 206 B.R. 979 (10th Cir. BAP 1997) (advising pro se litigant that advice from court clerk is “merely advice and cannot excuse a failure to meet fundamental jurisdictional requirements.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "259 B.R. 384, 384",
"parenthetical": "finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation",
"sentence": "See Gomez, 259 B.R. at 384 (finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.Colo.1991) (recognizing “well-established Colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership.”)- Summer-rain’s argument that she relied on statements of a clerk of the Bankruptcy Court is also misplaced as reliance on statements of court employees cannot justify failure to comply with the clearly written statutory requirements of Section 110."
} | 9,411,841 | b |
The fact that Summerrain did not personally accept a check from Debtor but instead authorized an employee of Independant Paralegal Associates to do so does not change this conclusion because Summer-rain admits she personally placed the money order, along -with Debtor's filings, in the mail. Moreover, the acts of Independant Paralegal Associates' employees are imputable to the partnership and to Summer-rain, as general partner. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 B.R. 274, 276-77",
"parenthetical": "misleading advice of court clerk cannot extend jurisdiction deadline for filing notice of appeal",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Frontier Airlines, 108 B.R. 274, 276-77 (D.Colo.1989) (misleading advice of court clerk cannot extend jurisdiction deadline for filing notice of appeal); In re Furst, 206 B.R. 979 (10th Cir. BAP 1997) (advising pro se litigant that advice from court clerk is “merely advice and cannot excuse a failure to meet fundamental jurisdictional requirements.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"well-established Colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership.\"",
"sentence": "See Gomez, 259 B.R. at 384 (finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.Colo.1991) (recognizing “well-established Colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership.”)- Summer-rain’s argument that she relied on statements of a clerk of the Bankruptcy Court is also misplaced as reliance on statements of court employees cannot justify failure to comply with the clearly written statutory requirements of Section 110."
} | 9,411,841 | b |
The fact that Summerrain did not personally accept a check from Debtor but instead authorized an employee of Independant Paralegal Associates to do so does not change this conclusion because Summer-rain admits she personally placed the money order, along -with Debtor's filings, in the mail. Moreover, the acts of Independant Paralegal Associates' employees are imputable to the partnership and to Summer-rain, as general partner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"well-established Colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership.\"",
"sentence": "See Gomez, 259 B.R. at 384 (finding acts of an employee of corporate petition preparer imputable to corporation); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.Colo.1991) (recognizing “well-established Colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership.”)- Summer-rain’s argument that she relied on statements of a clerk of the Bankruptcy Court is also misplaced as reliance on statements of court employees cannot justify failure to comply with the clearly written statutory requirements of Section 110."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "advising pro se litigant that advice from court clerk is \"merely advice and cannot excuse a failure to meet fundamental jurisdictional requirements.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Frontier Airlines, 108 B.R. 274, 276-77 (D.Colo.1989) (misleading advice of court clerk cannot extend jurisdiction deadline for filing notice of appeal); In re Furst, 206 B.R. 979 (10th Cir. BAP 1997) (advising pro se litigant that advice from court clerk is “merely advice and cannot excuse a failure to meet fundamental jurisdictional requirements.”)."
} | 9,411,841 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 U.S. 551, 557",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "792 N.W.2d 281, 281-86, 287-91",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 S.Ct. 676, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "792 N.W.2d 281, 281-86, 287-91",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "792 N.W.2d 281, 281-86, 287-91",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 L.Ed. 920, 924",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 U.S. 551, 557",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 N.W.2d 577, 579",
"parenthetical": "\"The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 N.W.2d 577, 579",
"parenthetical": "\"The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 S.Ct. 676, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 N.W.2d 577, 579",
"parenthetical": "\"The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 L.Ed. 920, 924",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Iowa 94, 104-05",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 U.S. 551, 557",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Iowa 94, 104-05",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 S.Ct. 676, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Iowa 94, 104-05",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 L.Ed. 920, 924",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 U.S. 551, 557",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "191 N.W. 530, 535-36",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "191 N.W. 530, 535-36",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 S.Ct. 676, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | a |
In the final analysis, our right under principles of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 L.Ed. 920, 924",
"parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.\"",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "191 N.W. 530, 535-36",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents",
"sentence": "See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 281-86, 287-91 (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees based on parole status alone); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (“The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but not binding upon this court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104-05, 191 N.W. 530, 535-36 (1923) (rejecting the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court for seizures of evidence by federal agents); see also Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 679, 84 L.Ed. 920, 924 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state con stitutions.”)- As more fully elucidated by the concurring opinion, state constitutions have been a crucial font of equality, civil rights, and civil liberties from the incipience of our republic."
} | 7,068,387 | b |
The district court properly concluded that Miller failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his Title VII and RA. claims because he failed'to complete the negotiated grievance procedure.. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 768, 768",
"parenthetical": "a federal employee who is a union member and alleges employment discrimination must elect to pursue his claim under either a statutory procedure or a negotiated grievance procedure, but \"he cannot pursue both avenues, and his election is irrevocable\"",
"sentence": "See Vinieratos, 939 F.2d at 767-68 (“Title VII spe cifically requires a federal employee to exhaust his administrative remedies as a precondition to filing suit.”); Boyd, 752 F.2d at 418-14 (the same requirement applies to RA claims); see also Vinieratos, 989 F.2d at 768 (a federal employee who is a union member and alleges employment discrimination must elect to pursue his claim under either a statutory procedure or a negotiated grievance procedure, but “he cannot pursue both avenues, and his election is irrevocable”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 767, 767-68",
"parenthetical": "\"Title VII spe cifically requires a federal employee to exhaust his administrative remedies as a precondition to filing suit.\"",
"sentence": "See Vinieratos, 939 F.2d at 767-68 (“Title VII spe cifically requires a federal employee to exhaust his administrative remedies as a precondition to filing suit.”); Boyd, 752 F.2d at 418-14 (the same requirement applies to RA claims); see also Vinieratos, 989 F.2d at 768 (a federal employee who is a union member and alleges employment discrimination must elect to pursue his claim under either a statutory procedure or a negotiated grievance procedure, but “he cannot pursue both avenues, and his election is irrevocable”)."
} | 4,349,292 | b |
Because the bankruptcy judge in this case neither dismissed the petition nor converted Debtors' petition to a Chapter 7 petition, the district court's order was not final. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 89, 91",
"parenthetical": "denial of confirmation of Chapter 13 plan not \"final\" order",
"sentence": "See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.1982) (denial of confirmation of Chapter 13 plan not “final” order); see also In re Pleasant Woods Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 2 F.3d 837 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal from denial of confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); In re MCorp Financial, Inc., 139 B.R. 820 (S.D.Tex.1992) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing appeal from denial of confirmation of Chapter 11 plan",
"sentence": "See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.1982) (denial of confirmation of Chapter 13 plan not “final” order); see also In re Pleasant Woods Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 2 F.3d 837 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal from denial of confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); In re MCorp Financial, Inc., 139 B.R. 820 (S.D.Tex.1992) (same)."
} | 9,047,058 | a |
Here, the Sheriff has raised the failure-to-exhaust claim for the first time in his motion for summary judgment. As a result, the argument has been waived. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 F.Supp. 659, 666",
"parenthetical": "affirmative defense raised for first time in response to summary judgment motion was waived",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 968 (7th Cir.1997); Baker v. Chicago Fire & Burglary Detection, Inc., 489 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir.1973); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ameri-Tel, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 659, 666 (N.D.Ill.1994) (affirmative defense raised for first time in response to summary judgment motion was waived); see also Simmons v. Ellena, No. 96 C 6797, 2002 WL 31176161, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) (defendants waived failure-to-exhaust argument under PLRA by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 31176161, at *2",
"parenthetical": "defendants waived failure-to-exhaust argument under PLRA by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 968 (7th Cir.1997); Baker v. Chicago Fire & Burglary Detection, Inc., 489 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir.1973); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ameri-Tel, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 659, 666 (N.D.Ill.1994) (affirmative defense raised for first time in response to summary judgment motion was waived); see also Simmons v. Ellena, No. 96 C 6797, 2002 WL 31176161, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) (defendants waived failure-to-exhaust argument under PLRA by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense)."
} | 3,591,898 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp. 851, 851",
"parenthetical": "pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp. 851, 851",
"parenthetical": "pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp. 851, 851",
"parenthetical": "pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp. 851, 851",
"parenthetical": "pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "489 N.E.2d 185, 195",
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "489 N.E.2d 185, 195",
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "489 N.E.2d 185, 195",
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "489 N.E.2d 185, 195",
"parenthetical": "groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "390 N.E.2d 243, 251",
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "390 N.E.2d 243, 251",
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "390 N.E.2d 243, 251",
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "390 N.E.2d 243, 251",
"parenthetical": "breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "480 N.E.2d 658, 660",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "480 N.E.2d 658, 660",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "480 N.E.2d 658, 660",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "480 N.E.2d 658, 660",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504",
"parenthetical": "litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | b |
First, there has been no satisfactory showing that nonpayment was aimed at pressuring QSOR into doing something "in the conduct of any [ongoing] trade or commerce." Mass.Gen.L. ch. Second, although the cases which dot the chapter 93A landscape tend to be fact-specific, even sui gen-eris, we think they are generally supportive of the proposition that a setoff which proved unwarranted could not, in and of itself, be classified as abridging some established concept of mercantile fairness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "340 N.E.2d 484, 485",
"parenthetical": "no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A",
"sentence": "Compare, e.g., Stromberg, 456 F.Supp. at 851 (pressure or coercive threat, causally linking use of legal remedy to course of business dealings, required for chapter 93A violation) (dicta); Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 489 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1986) (groundlessness of claim is not an element of abuse of process); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1979) (breach of contract, standing alone, does not constitute a chapter 93A violation); Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass.App. 439, 480 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1985) (no abuse of process where claim frivolous if brought only to defeat opponent in court); see also Broadway Management Services, Ltd. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.Mass.1987) (litigating with concurrent intent to burden defendant with cost is not abuse of process without collateral motive or design to coerce); Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 340 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1975) (no cause of action absent use of process for ulterior or illegitimate purpose); cf. Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 18 (withholding of monies legally owed to achieve some extortionate goal transgresses chapter 93A)."
} | 11,370,537 | a |
Finally, a portion of the alleged breaching conduct -- defendants' failure to mail payments due under the Agreement to Sea Tow headquarters in New York -- occurred in New York. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.Supp.2d 560, 560",
"parenthetical": "finding venue appropriate in New York where \"New York City was clearly the contractually designated place where performance by the defendants was due\" and the loan agreement at issue \"expressly directed payments from and disbursements to [the defendant] to be made [by plaintiff] in New York City bank accounts\"",
"sentence": "See Concesionaria, 307 F.Supp.2d at 560 (finding venue appropriate in New York where “New York City was clearly the contractually designated place where performance by the defendants was due” and the loan agreement at issue “expressly directed payments from and disbursements to [the defendant] to be made [by plaintiff] in New York City bank accounts”); Saltzman v. La. Auction Exch., Inc., 997 F.Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding venue appropriate in New York where “payment under the terms of [the parties’] agreement was due to plaintiff in New York”); cf. Zumft v. Doney Slate Co., 698 F.Supp. 444, 446 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (finding that the “fact that ... payments were made” to New York under a contract did not, by itself, provide for proper venue in New York)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.Supp. 444, 446",
"parenthetical": "finding that the \"fact that ... payments were made\" to New York under a contract did not, by itself, provide for proper venue in New York",
"sentence": "See Concesionaria, 307 F.Supp.2d at 560 (finding venue appropriate in New York where “New York City was clearly the contractually designated place where performance by the defendants was due” and the loan agreement at issue “expressly directed payments from and disbursements to [the defendant] to be made [by plaintiff] in New York City bank accounts”); Saltzman v. La. Auction Exch., Inc., 997 F.Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding venue appropriate in New York where “payment under the terms of [the parties’] agreement was due to plaintiff in New York”); cf. Zumft v. Doney Slate Co., 698 F.Supp. 444, 446 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (finding that the “fact that ... payments were made” to New York under a contract did not, by itself, provide for proper venue in New York)."
} | 3,839,671 | a |
Finally, a portion of the alleged breaching conduct -- defendants' failure to mail payments due under the Agreement to Sea Tow headquarters in New York -- occurred in New York. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "997 F.Supp. 537, 541",
"parenthetical": "finding venue appropriate in New York where \"payment under the terms of [the parties'] agreement was due to plaintiff in New York\"",
"sentence": "See Concesionaria, 307 F.Supp.2d at 560 (finding venue appropriate in New York where “New York City was clearly the contractually designated place where performance by the defendants was due” and the loan agreement at issue “expressly directed payments from and disbursements to [the defendant] to be made [by plaintiff] in New York City bank accounts”); Saltzman v. La. Auction Exch., Inc., 997 F.Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding venue appropriate in New York where “payment under the terms of [the parties’] agreement was due to plaintiff in New York”); cf. Zumft v. Doney Slate Co., 698 F.Supp. 444, 446 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (finding that the “fact that ... payments were made” to New York under a contract did not, by itself, provide for proper venue in New York)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.Supp. 444, 446",
"parenthetical": "finding that the \"fact that ... payments were made\" to New York under a contract did not, by itself, provide for proper venue in New York",
"sentence": "See Concesionaria, 307 F.Supp.2d at 560 (finding venue appropriate in New York where “New York City was clearly the contractually designated place where performance by the defendants was due” and the loan agreement at issue “expressly directed payments from and disbursements to [the defendant] to be made [by plaintiff] in New York City bank accounts”); Saltzman v. La. Auction Exch., Inc., 997 F.Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding venue appropriate in New York where “payment under the terms of [the parties’] agreement was due to plaintiff in New York”); cf. Zumft v. Doney Slate Co., 698 F.Supp. 444, 446 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (finding that the “fact that ... payments were made” to New York under a contract did not, by itself, provide for proper venue in New York)."
} | 3,839,671 | a |
In short, Burd's defensive theory was the only issue in the case and the evidence relating to it was hotly disputed in each detail. This leads us to conclude that the second Almanza factor likewise weighs in favor of finding egregious harm. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "393 S.W.3d 867, 876",
"parenthetical": "concluding that state of evidence also weighed in favor of finding egregious harm where primary contested issue at trial was whether Villarreal acted in self-defense and conflicting evidence was presented regarding circumstances surrounding the stabbing",
"sentence": "See Al-manza, 686 S.W.2d at 172 (describing fundamental errors as those which “vitally affect [a] defensive theory”); see also Villarreal, 393 S.W.3d 867, 876 (concluding that state of evidence also weighed in favor of finding egregious harm where primary contested issue at trial was whether Villarreal acted in self-defense and conflicting evidence was presented regarding circumstances surrounding the stabbing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "686 S.W.2d 172, 172",
"parenthetical": "describing fundamental errors as those which \"vitally affect [a] defensive theory\"",
"sentence": "See Al-manza, 686 S.W.2d at 172 (describing fundamental errors as those which “vitally affect [a] defensive theory”); see also Villarreal, 393 S.W.3d 867, 876 (concluding that state of evidence also weighed in favor of finding egregious harm where primary contested issue at trial was whether Villarreal acted in self-defense and conflicting evidence was presented regarding circumstances surrounding the stabbing)."
} | 7,091,247 | b |
In many instances, as here, an officer may reasonably conclude, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that illegal drugs discovered in a vehicle in close proximity to a defendant in the vehicle are jointly or constructively possessed by that defendant and the other vehicle occupants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 366, 372",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were \"[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men\" riding in the vehicle and \"[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei'ship of the cocaine\"",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 1009, 1016",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's \"proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative\" (emphases added",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | 3,736,231 | a |
In many instances, as here, an officer may reasonably conclude, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that illegal drugs discovered in a vehicle in close proximity to a defendant in the vehicle are jointly or constructively possessed by that defendant and the other vehicle occupants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were \"[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men\" riding in the vehicle and \"[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei'ship of the cocaine\"",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 1009, 1016",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's \"proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative\" (emphases added",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | 3,736,231 | a |
In many instances, as here, an officer may reasonably conclude, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that illegal drugs discovered in a vehicle in close proximity to a defendant in the vehicle are jointly or constructively possessed by that defendant and the other vehicle occupants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were \"[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men\" riding in the vehicle and \"[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei'ship of the cocaine\"",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 1009, 1016",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's \"proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative\" (emphases added",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | 3,736,231 | a |
In many instances, as here, an officer may reasonably conclude, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that illegal drugs discovered in a vehicle in close proximity to a defendant in the vehicle are jointly or constructively possessed by that defendant and the other vehicle occupants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "204 F.3d 1282, 1292",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the government established \"the necessary nexus\" between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that \"[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred\"",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 1009, 1016",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's \"proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative\" (emphases added",
"sentence": "See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were “[f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine ... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men” riding in the vehicle and “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownei’ship of the cocaine”); United, States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established “the necessary nexus” between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that “[t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred”); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant’s “proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative” (emphases added))."
} | 3,736,231 | a |
Although the Courts recognize a certain degree of judgment and discretion is required for a government employee to transport an individual as part of his or her job, when the actionable conduct occurs during routine driving situations, the driver is not entitled to sovereign immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "84 Va. Cir. 96, 98",
"parenthetical": "holding no immunity to an officer who was transporting an inmate in need of prenatal care because the special security risks inherent in transporting a prisoner did not impact the deputy's operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident",
"sentence": "See Fitzgerald v. Perry, 84 Va. Cir. 96, 98 (Roanoke County 2012) (holding no immunity to an officer who was transporting an inmate in need of prenatal care because the special security risks inherent in transporting a prisoner did not impact the deputy’s operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident); see also Ferro v. Shifflett, 72 Va. Cir. 298, 303 (Prince William Co. 2006) (reiterating the principle that, “while every person driving a car must make myriad decisions, in ordinary driving situations, the duty of care is a ministerial obligation” in holding a social worker who was transporting a minor runaway was not entitled to sovereign immunity)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "72 Va. Cir. 298, 303",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the principle that, \"while every person driving a car must make myriad decisions, in ordinary driving situations, the duty of care is a ministerial obligation\" in holding a social worker who was transporting a minor runaway was not entitled to sovereign immunity",
"sentence": "See Fitzgerald v. Perry, 84 Va. Cir. 96, 98 (Roanoke County 2012) (holding no immunity to an officer who was transporting an inmate in need of prenatal care because the special security risks inherent in transporting a prisoner did not impact the deputy’s operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident); see also Ferro v. Shifflett, 72 Va. Cir. 298, 303 (Prince William Co. 2006) (reiterating the principle that, “while every person driving a car must make myriad decisions, in ordinary driving situations, the duty of care is a ministerial obligation” in holding a social worker who was transporting a minor runaway was not entitled to sovereign immunity)."
} | 4,139,997 | a |
The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for \"[t]ime spent litigating a fee application\"",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court). Section 1988 does not contain a similar limitation."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 F.3d 637, 643",
"parenthetical": "holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court). Section 1988 does not contain a similar limitation."
} | 4,350,027 | a |
The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 F.3d 637, 643",
"parenthetical": "holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court). Section 1988 does not contain a similar limitation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for \"[t]ime spent litigating a fee application\"",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court). Section 1988 does not contain a similar limitation."
} | 4,350,027 | b |
The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 F.2d 1192, 1203",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court). Section 1988 does not contain a similar limitation."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 F.3d 637, 643",
"parenthetical": "holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that fee-cap provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act applies to both merits time before administrative agency and fees for fees time in court). Section 1988 does not contain a similar limitation."
} | 4,350,027 | a |
As plaintiffs have chosen to litigate far from their home forums, any inconvenience they would suffer if compelled to litigate in Wisconsin would likely be less than the inconvenience defendants would experience litigating in California, particularly considering the relative size of the parties' businesses. The court therefore concludes that this factor slightly favors transfer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "966 F.Supp. 727, 728-29",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of transferring a copyright infringement action from the Northern District of Illinois to the Eastern District of Wisconsin, because the plaintiff copyright holder was a large corporation that would not be burdened by litigating in Wisconsin, while the alleged infringer was a \"one-man operation\" that would face a great burden if forced to litigate in Illinois",
"sentence": "See Hernandez v. Graebel Van Lines, 761 F.Supp. 983, 989 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (“[W]here a disparity between the parties exists, such as an individual plaintiff suing a large corporation, the court may also consider the relative means of the parties in determining whether to transfer”); see also Tensor Group, Inc. v. All Press Parts & Equipment, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 727, 728-29 (N.D.Ill.1997) (concluding that the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of transferring a copyright infringement action from the Northern District of Illinois to the Eastern District of Wisconsin, because the plaintiff copyright holder was a large corporation that would not be burdened by litigating in Wisconsin, while the alleged infringer was a “one-man operation” that would face a great burden if forced to litigate in Illinois)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "761 F.Supp. 983, 989",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a disparity between the parties exists, such as an individual plaintiff suing a large corporation, the court may also consider the relative means of the parties in determining whether to transfer\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez v. Graebel Van Lines, 761 F.Supp. 983, 989 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (“[W]here a disparity between the parties exists, such as an individual plaintiff suing a large corporation, the court may also consider the relative means of the parties in determining whether to transfer”); see also Tensor Group, Inc. v. All Press Parts & Equipment, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 727, 728-29 (N.D.Ill.1997) (concluding that the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of transferring a copyright infringement action from the Northern District of Illinois to the Eastern District of Wisconsin, because the plaintiff copyright holder was a large corporation that would not be burdened by litigating in Wisconsin, while the alleged infringer was a “one-man operation” that would face a great burden if forced to litigate in Illinois)."
} | 3,803,654 | b |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 1096, 1101",
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 315-16",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | 10,538,095 | b |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 315-16",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 315-16",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 307, 315-16",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 1096, 1101",
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | 10,538,095 | b |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58",
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 1096, 1101",
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | 10,538,095 | b |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 1096, 1101",
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 266, 269-70",
"parenthetical": "police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a \"custodial relationship\"",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | 10,538,095 | b |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 266, 269-70",
"parenthetical": "police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a \"custodial relationship\"",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 266, 269-70",
"parenthetical": "police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a \"custodial relationship\"",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | 10,538,095 | b |
Finally, insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates may also violate the prisoner's due process rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 266, 269-70",
"parenthetical": "police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a \"custodial relationship\"",
"sentence": "Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (right to personal security protected by substantive due process and not extinguished by imprisonment); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1986) (police have a duty to protect individuals if there is a “custodial relationship”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980) (if prison officials know of pervasive risk of harm to prisoner and fail to protect that prisoner, prisoner has a viable section 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981)."
} | 10,538,095 | a |
Telegroup responds that claims arising from the purchase or sale of a security under SS 510(b) include claims predicated on post-issuance conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities, for purposes of SS 510(b",
"sentence": "See In re Geneva Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.2001) (holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities, for purposes of § 510(b)); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtor’s securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); see also In re Lenco, Inc., 116 B.R. 141 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1990) (holding that claims for ERISA violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtor’s securities)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for ERISA violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtor's securities",
"sentence": "See In re Geneva Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.2001) (holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities, for purposes of § 510(b)); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtor’s securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); see also In re Lenco, Inc., 116 B.R. 141 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1990) (holding that claims for ERISA violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtor’s securities)."
} | 9,395,524 | a |
Telegroup responds that claims arising from the purchase or sale of a security under SS 510(b) include claims predicated on post-issuance conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that claims for ERISA violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtor's securities",
"sentence": "See In re Geneva Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.2001) (holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities, for purposes of § 510(b)); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtor’s securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); see also In re Lenco, Inc., 116 B.R. 141 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1990) (holding that claims for ERISA violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtor’s securities)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "208 B.R. 332, 333-34",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtor's securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities",
"sentence": "See In re Geneva Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.2001) (holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities, for purposes of § 510(b)); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtor’s securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); see also In re Lenco, Inc., 116 B.R. 141 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1990) (holding that claims for ERISA violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtor’s securities)."
} | 9,395,524 | b |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 625, 633",
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "629 F.2d 830, 840",
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 625, 633",
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | b |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 625, 633",
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 625, 633",
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | b |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "629 F.2d 830, 840",
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | b |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "629 F.2d 830, 840",
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | b |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | a |
I am further troubled by my colleagues' willingness to decide this thorny Fourth Amendment question despite the availability of a much more straightforward (and less controversial) means to the same end. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to \"adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance\" at issue in the case because the court did \"not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the Court's \"usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues *unnecessary to the decision of the case before us\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (describing the Court’s “usual custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues •unnecessary to the decision of the case before us”); Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (same); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1980) (declining to “adjudicate the [constitutional question of the] lawfulness of the surveillance” at issue in the case because the court did “not believe it would be appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, even if the surveillance were unlawful and did lead to any trial evidence”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 920, 66 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981)."
} | 9,064,594 | b |
The trial judge's inquiry failed to ask directly whether prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own impartiality before the court even has determined the extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed the local community against the defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "583 F.2d 190, 197",
"parenthetical": "\"The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 1025, 1031",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | 7,415,104 | b |
The trial judge's inquiry failed to ask directly whether prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own impartiality before the court even has determined the extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed the local community against the defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "400 F.2d 627, 639",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror's own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 1025, 1031",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | 7,415,104 | b |
The trial judge's inquiry failed to ask directly whether prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own impartiality before the court even has determined the extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed the local community against the defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "583 F.2d 190, 197",
"parenthetical": "\"The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | 7,415,104 | b |
The trial judge's inquiry failed to ask directly whether prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own impartiality before the court even has determined the extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed the local community against the defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "400 F.2d 627, 639",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror's own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | 7,415,104 | b |
The trial judge's inquiry failed to ask directly whether prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own impartiality before the court even has determined the extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed the local community against the defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "583 F.2d 190, 197",
"parenthetical": "\"The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | 7,415,104 | b |
The trial judge's inquiry failed to ask directly whether prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own impartiality before the court even has determined the extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed the local community against the defendants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "400 F.2d 627, 639",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror's own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.\"",
"sentence": "See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2888, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”); see also United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978) (“The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality.”); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir.1968) (“[Wjhether a juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without something more.”) (emphasis omitted)."
} | 7,415,104 | a |
Although the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the validity of acts in violation of the automatic stay, it does recognize that the stay is intended to provide debtors significant protection. Additionally, courts within this circuit have adopted the majority position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 B.R. 93, 94",
"parenthetical": "\"Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "206 B.R. 421, 423",
"parenthetical": "holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void)."
} | 6,049,703 | a |
Although the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the validity of acts in violation of the automatic stay, it does recognize that the stay is intended to provide debtors significant protection. Additionally, courts within this circuit have adopted the majority position. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 B.R. 450, 453",
"parenthetical": "\"This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "206 B.R. 421, 423",
"parenthetical": "holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void)."
} | 6,049,703 | a |
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