context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Although the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the validity of acts in violation of the automatic stay, it does recognize that the stay is intended to provide debtors significant protection. Additionally, courts within this circuit have adopted the majority position. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "206 B.R. 421, 423",
"parenthetical": "holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 B.R. 763, 765",
"parenthetical": "\"Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a debt from the debtor, which are taken after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, are void ab initio and of no legal effect.”) (citation omitted); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) (“This court will adhere to the general rule that violations of the stay are void.”); In re Burns, 112 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1990) (“Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.”); but see Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell (In re Boswell), 206 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1997) (holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void)."
} | 6,049,703 | b |
The argument is made that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling concerns since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court is unwilling to read the preemption provision so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow construction of preemption provisions such as that at issue here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622",
"parenthetical": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product); Wright v. Dow Chem. Co., 845 F.Supp. 503 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question); cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants’ testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "5 F.3d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product); Wright v. Dow Chem. Co., 845 F.Supp. 503 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question); cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants’ testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion)."
} | 3,891,987 | b |
The argument is made that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling concerns since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court is unwilling to read the preemption provision so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow construction of preemption provisions such as that at issue here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447",
"parenthetical": "FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs' claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product); Wright v. Dow Chem. Co., 845 F.Supp. 503 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question); cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants’ testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622",
"parenthetical": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product); Wright v. Dow Chem. Co., 845 F.Supp. 503 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question); cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants’ testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion)."
} | 3,891,987 | a |
The argument is made that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling concerns since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court is unwilling to read the preemption provision so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow construction of preemption provisions such as that at issue here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622",
"parenthetical": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product); Wright v. Dow Chem. Co., 845 F.Supp. 503 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question); cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants’ testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs’ claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product); Wright v. Dow Chem. Co., 845 F.Supp. 503 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question); cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants’ testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion)."
} | 3,891,987 | b |
Such a statement generally arises after the informant has been caught in the act. In this case, however, the confidential informant did not make a statement against his penal interest, as was the case in Read, upon which the state relies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 575, 575-76, 583",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant); see also Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.2001) (informant identified the defendant as his supplier of drugs); State v. Grossi, 588 A.2d 607, 608 (R.I.1991) (informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant); State v. Germano, 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I.1989) (informant admitted to purchasing cocaine from the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 A.2d 686, 686-87, 689",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant); see also Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.2001) (informant identified the defendant as his supplier of drugs); State v. Grossi, 588 A.2d 607, 608 (R.I.1991) (informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant); State v. Germano, 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I.1989) (informant admitted to purchasing cocaine from the defendant)."
} | 6,800,472 | b |
Such a statement generally arises after the informant has been caught in the act. In this case, however, the confidential informant did not make a statement against his penal interest, as was the case in Read, upon which the state relies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant); see also Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.2001) (informant identified the defendant as his supplier of drugs); State v. Grossi, 588 A.2d 607, 608 (R.I.1991) (informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant); State v. Germano, 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I.1989) (informant admitted to purchasing cocaine from the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 A.2d 686, 686-87, 689",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant); see also Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.2001) (informant identified the defendant as his supplier of drugs); State v. Grossi, 588 A.2d 607, 608 (R.I.1991) (informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant); State v. Germano, 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I.1989) (informant admitted to purchasing cocaine from the defendant)."
} | 6,800,472 | b |
Such a statement generally arises after the informant has been caught in the act. In this case, however, the confidential informant did not make a statement against his penal interest, as was the case in Read, upon which the state relies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 A.2d 686, 686-87, 689",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant); see also Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.2001) (informant identified the defendant as his supplier of drugs); State v. Grossi, 588 A.2d 607, 608 (R.I.1991) (informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant); State v. Germano, 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I.1989) (informant admitted to purchasing cocaine from the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "588 A.2d 607, 608",
"parenthetical": "informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant); see also Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.2001) (informant identified the defendant as his supplier of drugs); State v. Grossi, 588 A.2d 607, 608 (R.I.1991) (informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant); State v. Germano, 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I.1989) (informant admitted to purchasing cocaine from the defendant)."
} | 6,800,472 | a |
The District Court likewise did not err in dismissing Express' Rule 60 motion. It is well established that Rule 60 is not a proper vehicle for extending the time to file an appeal that has been rendered untimely by the expiration of the thirty-day time window provided by Rule 4(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 U.S. 206, 206-07",
"parenthetical": "District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206-07, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "721 F.2d 91, 96",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this question have uniformly held that the albeit harsh time constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir.1983) (“[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this question have uniformly held that the albeit harsh time constraints of Rule 4(a) must control and that Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a means of avoiding dismissal for want of a timely appeal.”)."
} | 4,166,296 | b |
The District Court likewise did not err in dismissing Express' Rule 60 motion. It is well established that Rule 60 is not a proper vehicle for extending the time to file an appeal that has been rendered untimely by the expiration of the thirty-day time window provided by Rule 4(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206-07, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "721 F.2d 91, 96",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this question have uniformly held that the albeit harsh time constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir.1983) (“[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this question have uniformly held that the albeit harsh time constraints of Rule 4(a) must control and that Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a means of avoiding dismissal for want of a timely appeal.”)."
} | 4,166,296 | b |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 F.2d 1341, 1350",
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | 10,525,011 | a |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | 10,525,011 | a |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | 10,525,011 | b |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity); see also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1975) (rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are “an integral part of the legislative machinery” and decisions pursuant thereto are protected), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051, 96 S.Ct. 780, 46 L.Ed.2d 640 (1976)."
} | 10,525,011 | b |
The district court dismissed Pappas' complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas argues the district court failed to identify any Oklahoma state law that would bar his claim, but the court was under no obligation to do so. As the party averring jurisdiction, Pappas -- the FTCA plaintiff -- bears the burden of proof to establish' that ' the court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction based upon analogous Oklahoma private liability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 656, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 375, 377",
"parenthetical": "holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and \"the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”)."
} | 4,353,880 | a |
The district court dismissed Pappas' complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas argues the district court failed to identify any Oklahoma state law that would bar his claim, but the court was under no obligation to do so. As the party averring jurisdiction, Pappas -- the FTCA plaintiff -- bears the burden of proof to establish' that ' the court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction based upon analogous Oklahoma private liability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 656, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and \"the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”)."
} | 4,353,880 | a |
The district court dismissed Pappas' complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas argues the district court failed to identify any Oklahoma state law that would bar his claim, but the court was under no obligation to do so. As the party averring jurisdiction, Pappas -- the FTCA plaintiff -- bears the burden of proof to establish' that ' the court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction based upon analogous Oklahoma private liability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 656, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and \"the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”)."
} | 4,353,880 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71",
"parenthetical": "holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71",
"parenthetical": "holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633",
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633",
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 5512340, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 5512340, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 F.Supp. 356, 366",
"parenthetical": "holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 F.Supp. 356, 366",
"parenthetical": "holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "628 F.Supp. 92, 93",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "628 F.Supp. 92, 93",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.W.Va.2012) (holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions), aff'd, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir.2013); Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2518-JAR, 2012 WL 5512340, at *1 (D.Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment); Flamand v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 366 (D.P.R.1994) (holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing); S. Indus. Realty, Inc. v. Noe, 628 F.Supp. 92, 93 (D.P.R.1986) (“[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC’s cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.”), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Mich.1980) (“[T]he Court has reached the conclusion that the determination of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment requires an evidentiary hearing to adduce evidence in support of the ... defense relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2003 WL 25932294, at *1",
"parenthetical": "con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding); Anderson v. Beardsley (In re Beardsley), 118 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1990) (“The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... ”)."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2003 WL 25932294, at *1",
"parenthetical": "con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding); Anderson v. Beardsley (In re Beardsley), 118 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1990) (“The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... ”)."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "118 B.R. 120, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... \"",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding); Anderson v. Beardsley (In re Beardsley), 118 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1990) (“The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... ”)."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "118 B.R. 120, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... \"",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding); Anderson v. Beardsley (In re Beardsley), 118 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1990) (“The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... ”)."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment)."
} | 4,221,088 | b |
This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. These decisions are consistent with holdings of circuit courts that changes in roads on R.S. 2477 rights of way across federal lands are subject to regulation by the relevant federal land management agencies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1513, 1518",
"parenthetical": "holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether the trails in question are public highways under R.S.[ ] 2477, they are nonetheless subject to the Forest Service regulations”); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that proposed improvements to an R.S. 2477 route in a National Preserve is subject to regulation by the National Park Service); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 F.3d 1522, 1538",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"regardless whether the trails in question are public highways under R.S.[ ] 2477, they are nonetheless subject to the Forest Service regulations\"",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether the trails in question are public highways under R.S.[ ] 2477, they are nonetheless subject to the Forest Service regulations”); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that proposed improvements to an R.S. 2477 route in a National Preserve is subject to regulation by the National Park Service); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit)."
} | 1,550,565 | b |
This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. These decisions are consistent with holdings of circuit courts that changes in roads on R.S. 2477 rights of way across federal lands are subject to regulation by the relevant federal land management agencies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 638, 642",
"parenthetical": "holding that proposed improvements to an R.S. 2477 route in a National Preserve is subject to regulation by the National Park Service",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether the trails in question are public highways under R.S.[ ] 2477, they are nonetheless subject to the Forest Service regulations”); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that proposed improvements to an R.S. 2477 route in a National Preserve is subject to regulation by the National Park Service); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1513, 1518",
"parenthetical": "holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether the trails in question are public highways under R.S.[ ] 2477, they are nonetheless subject to the Forest Service regulations”); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that proposed improvements to an R.S. 2477 route in a National Preserve is subject to regulation by the National Park Service); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit)."
} | 1,550,565 | a |
If either of these two factors are found, "a substantial increase may be appropriate." The offense level involved here, see U.S.S.G. SS 2B1.2 ("Receiving, Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property"), does not reflect the risk of personal injury. That factor, therefore, along with the nature of the determination of "the extent to which death or serious injury was intended or knowingly risked," vests a great deal of discretion in the district court in this case. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16",
"parenthetical": "pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant's conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-year departure sentence under § 5K2.1 not excessive for death of kidnapping victim, who panicked and jumped out of kidnapper’s car); United States v. Salazar-Villarreal, 872 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir.1989) (upward departure under § 5K2.1 justified on the basis of “reckless flight” of defendant transporting illegal aliens “and the resulting death and injury which [flight] caused”); cf. United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir.1986) (pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant’s conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "30-year departure sentence under SS 5K2.1 not excessive for death of kidnapping victim, who panicked and jumped out of kidnapper's car",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-year departure sentence under § 5K2.1 not excessive for death of kidnapping victim, who panicked and jumped out of kidnapper’s car); United States v. Salazar-Villarreal, 872 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir.1989) (upward departure under § 5K2.1 justified on the basis of “reckless flight” of defendant transporting illegal aliens “and the resulting death and injury which [flight] caused”); cf. United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir.1986) (pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant’s conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause)."
} | 10,522,661 | b |
If either of these two factors are found, "a substantial increase may be appropriate." The offense level involved here, see U.S.S.G. SS 2B1.2 ("Receiving, Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property"), does not reflect the risk of personal injury. That factor, therefore, along with the nature of the determination of "the extent to which death or serious injury was intended or knowingly risked," vests a great deal of discretion in the district court in this case. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16",
"parenthetical": "pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant's conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-year departure sentence under § 5K2.1 not excessive for death of kidnapping victim, who panicked and jumped out of kidnapper’s car); United States v. Salazar-Villarreal, 872 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir.1989) (upward departure under § 5K2.1 justified on the basis of “reckless flight” of defendant transporting illegal aliens “and the resulting death and injury which [flight] caused”); cf. United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir.1986) (pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant’s conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 121, 122",
"parenthetical": "upward departure under SS 5K2.1 justified on the basis of \"reckless flight\" of defendant transporting illegal aliens \"and the resulting death and injury which [flight] caused\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-year departure sentence under § 5K2.1 not excessive for death of kidnapping victim, who panicked and jumped out of kidnapper’s car); United States v. Salazar-Villarreal, 872 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir.1989) (upward departure under § 5K2.1 justified on the basis of “reckless flight” of defendant transporting illegal aliens “and the resulting death and injury which [flight] caused”); cf. United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir.1986) (pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant’s conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause)."
} | 10,522,661 | b |
As we have explained, we can discern no reason on the current record to support counsel's decision not to call Samee and Robinson as witnesses to testify at trial. Nevertheless, because a determination of whether to grant Branch's petition turns on the reasons why his counsel did not call Samee and Robinson to testify and those reasons have not been developed in the record, an evidentiary hearing is required here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "428 F.3d 501, 501",
"parenthetical": "\"Of course, overcoming the strategic presumption does not, in itself, entitle Thomas to relief. It merely gives him the opportunity to show that counsel's conduct fell below objective standards of attorney conduct.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir.1987) (remanding for evi-dentiary hearing because the record did not reflect whether trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to present certain evidence); see also Thomas, 428 F.3d at 501 (“Of course, overcoming the strategic presumption does not, in itself, entitle Thomas to relief. It merely gives him the opportunity to show that counsel’s conduct fell below objective standards of attorney conduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 664, 672",
"parenthetical": "remanding for evi-dentiary hearing because the record did not reflect whether trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to present certain evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir.1987) (remanding for evi-dentiary hearing because the record did not reflect whether trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to present certain evidence); see also Thomas, 428 F.3d at 501 (“Of course, overcoming the strategic presumption does not, in itself, entitle Thomas to relief. It merely gives him the opportunity to show that counsel’s conduct fell below objective standards of attorney conduct.”)."
} | 4,159,698 | b |
This Court's precedent clearly prohibits lack of remorse as evidence of an aggravating factor. However, this Court has permitted evidence of lack of remorse to rebut proposed mitigation, such as remorse and rehabilitation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 So.2d 970, 978",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that lack of remorse is admissible to rebut evidence of remorse or other mitigation such as rehabilitation\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 978 (Fla.2001) (holding “that lack of remorse is admissible to rebut evidence of remorse or other mitigation such as rehabilitation”); cf. Derrick v. State, 581 So.2d 31, 36 (Fla.1991) (finding that although lack of remorse is permitted to rebut evidence of remorse or rehabilitation, the trial court erred in permitting the State to present evidence of lack of remorse before the defense presented any testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "581 So.2d 31, 36",
"parenthetical": "finding that although lack of remorse is permitted to rebut evidence of remorse or rehabilitation, the trial court erred in permitting the State to present evidence of lack of remorse before the defense presented any testimony",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 978 (Fla.2001) (holding “that lack of remorse is admissible to rebut evidence of remorse or other mitigation such as rehabilitation”); cf. Derrick v. State, 581 So.2d 31, 36 (Fla.1991) (finding that although lack of remorse is permitted to rebut evidence of remorse or rehabilitation, the trial court erred in permitting the State to present evidence of lack of remorse before the defense presented any testimony)."
} | 8,343,685 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2082, 2082",
"parenthetical": "\"Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 810, 810, 813",
"parenthetical": "\"Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 U.S. 128, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were \"a mere pretext for a narcotics search\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were \"a mere pretext for a narcotics search\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automobile, the subjective motivations of the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were \"a mere pretext for a narcotics search\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.”); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); see also United States v. Grier, 127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (5th Cir.2005) (indicating that an officer’s subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when “there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation”)."
} | 4,211,380 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished “by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 624, 624",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid). More benign purposes, however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”"
} | 7,414,567 | b |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 624, 624",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid). More benign purposes, however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished “by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy”)."
} | 7,414,567 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 624, 624",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid). More benign purposes, however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished “by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy”)."
} | 7,414,567 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished “by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2535, 2535",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid). More benign purposes, however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”"
} | 7,414,567 | b |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2535, 2535",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid). More benign purposes, however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished “by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy”)."
} | 7,414,567 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2535, 2535",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid). More benign purposes, however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished “by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy”)."
} | 7,414,567 | a |
Moreover, I believe that this suspicion reasonably warranted the three-minute time intrusion imposed on appellant while Officer Beauchamp investigated further by conducting an open-air canine search of the exterior of the rental car. Therefore, I would hold that appellant's continued detention did not cross the sometimes fine Fourth Amendment line between law enforcement officers' possession of articu-lable facts justifying continuation of a traffic stop detention for further investir gation and law enforcement officers' continuation of a traffic stop detention in a "fishing expedition" effort to obtain articu-lable facts or probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 200, 200-01",
"parenthetical": "holding that officers' third pat-down search of appellant almost thir ty-five minutes into traffic stop violated Fourth Amendment",
"sentence": "Compare Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 (recognizing that officers’ continued detention of appellant because he did not look like someone on a business trip was not based on articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); see also Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200-01 (holding that officers’ third pat-down search of appellant almost thir ty-five minutes into traffic stop violated Fourth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 245, 245",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that officers' continued detention of appellant because he did not look like someone on a business trip was not based on articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity",
"sentence": "Compare Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 (recognizing that officers’ continued detention of appellant because he did not look like someone on a business trip was not based on articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); see also Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200-01 (holding that officers’ third pat-down search of appellant almost thir ty-five minutes into traffic stop violated Fourth Amendment)."
} | 9,461,053 | b |
Wahl cannot use a request for evidentiary hearing to overcome deficiencies in his pleadings. An evidentiary hearing on a motion to set aside a default judgment is not a matter of right, but requires first that- the- motion meet the pleading requirements of Rule 74.05(c). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "802 S.W.2d 531, 532",
"parenthetical": "defaulting party entitled to a hearing where she filed an affidavit, a proposed answer with her motion to set aside, and requested an evidentiary hearing",
"sentence": "See id. at 26; Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank v. Krider, 802 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Mo.App.W.D.1991) (defaulting party entitled to a hearing where she filed an affidavit, a proposed answer with her motion to set aside, and requested an evidentiary hearing); but see, McClelland v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 490, 493-94 (Mo.App.S.D.1990) (no evidentiary hearing necessary because inclusion of an unverified police report with motion, while sufficient to raise inference that loss was caused by arson, it was insufficient to support alleged meritorious defense that the arson was caused by insured)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "790 S.W.2d 490, 493-94",
"parenthetical": "no evidentiary hearing necessary because inclusion of an unverified police report with motion, while sufficient to raise inference that loss was caused by arson, it was insufficient to support alleged meritorious defense that the arson was caused by insured",
"sentence": "See id. at 26; Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank v. Krider, 802 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Mo.App.W.D.1991) (defaulting party entitled to a hearing where she filed an affidavit, a proposed answer with her motion to set aside, and requested an evidentiary hearing); but see, McClelland v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 490, 493-94 (Mo.App.S.D.1990) (no evidentiary hearing necessary because inclusion of an unverified police report with motion, while sufficient to raise inference that loss was caused by arson, it was insufficient to support alleged meritorious defense that the arson was caused by insured)."
} | 12,176,493 | a |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to the contract language",
"sentence": "See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 833 (rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant’s employment status” and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship” in addition to the contract language)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51",
"parenthetical": "permitting consideration of contractual documents that were \"central to [plaintiff's] claims\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (permitting consideration of contractual documents that were \"central to [plaintiff’s] claims”); In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 862 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2012) (reviewing membership bylaws where \"plaintiffs’ claim revolve[d] around whether payment of [a] special assessment was required for membership”); Strumsky v. Washington Post Co., 842 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 (D.D.C.2012) reconsideration denied, 922 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C.2013) (reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff’s entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive”). The Court also notes that even valid, integrated contractual agreements do not conclusively answer the employee/independent contractor question — as Spirides itself held."
} | 4,126,771 | b |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "862 F.Supp.2d 1, 8",
"parenthetical": "reviewing membership bylaws where \"plaintiffs' claim revolve[d] around whether payment of [a] special assessment was required for membership\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (permitting consideration of contractual documents that were \"central to [plaintiff’s] claims”); In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 862 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2012) (reviewing membership bylaws where \"plaintiffs’ claim revolve[d] around whether payment of [a] special assessment was required for membership”); Strumsky v. Washington Post Co., 842 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 (D.D.C.2012) reconsideration denied, 922 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C.2013) (reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff’s entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive”). The Court also notes that even valid, integrated contractual agreements do not conclusively answer the employee/independent contractor question — as Spirides itself held."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to the contract language",
"sentence": "See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 833 (rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant’s employment status” and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship” in addition to the contract language)."
} | 4,126,771 | a |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "842 F.Supp.2d 215, 218",
"parenthetical": "reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff's entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (permitting consideration of contractual documents that were \"central to [plaintiff’s] claims”); In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 862 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2012) (reviewing membership bylaws where \"plaintiffs’ claim revolve[d] around whether payment of [a] special assessment was required for membership”); Strumsky v. Washington Post Co., 842 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 (D.D.C.2012) reconsideration denied, 922 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C.2013) (reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff’s entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive”). The Court also notes that even valid, integrated contractual agreements do not conclusively answer the employee/independent contractor question — as Spirides itself held."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to the contract language",
"sentence": "See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 833 (rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant’s employment status” and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship” in addition to the contract language)."
} | 4,126,771 | a |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to the contract language",
"sentence": "See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 833 (rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant’s employment status” and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship” in addition to the contract language)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff's entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (permitting consideration of contractual documents that were \"central to [plaintiff’s] claims”); In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 862 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2012) (reviewing membership bylaws where \"plaintiffs’ claim revolve[d] around whether payment of [a] special assessment was required for membership”); Strumsky v. Washington Post Co., 842 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 (D.D.C.2012) reconsideration denied, 922 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C.2013) (reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff’s entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive”). The Court also notes that even valid, integrated contractual agreements do not conclusively answer the employee/independent contractor question — as Spirides itself held."
} | 4,126,771 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Kan. 670, 680",
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | 4,254,696 | a |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | 4,254,696 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | 4,254,696 | a |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Kan. 670, 680",
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | 4,254,696 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | 4,254,696 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed or amended only by charter ordinance or by enactments of the legislature applicable to all cities." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Co./KC, 277 Kan. 516, 85 P.3d 1237 (2004) (legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions); see also Kansas City Renaissance Festival Corp. v. City of Bonner Springs, 269 Kan. 670, 680, 8 P.3d 701 (2000) (noting legislature amended Local Retailers’ Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649). We recognized in Kline, that “[s]ince the adoption of Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, the State can preempt a city’s authority only by making the provisions of [an act] uniformly applicable to all cities.”"
} | 4,254,696 | b |
The plain language of the immunity provision indicates that its purpose is to grant persons who comment about a judicial officer absolute protection from civil or criminal liability, even .when criticism leveled against a judge is a false statement of fact that damages the judge's reputation. Thus, the provision would set forth a new common law defamation standard when the subject of a critical comment is a judicial officer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "882 P.2d 1293, 1299",
"parenthetical": "the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern",
"sentence": "See Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Colo.1994) (the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern); see also In re Proposed Petition “Petition Procedures”, 900 P.2d 104, 109 (Colo.1995) (proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive “fundamental rights” unrelated to these procedural changes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 P.2d 104, 109",
"parenthetical": "proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive \"fundamental rights\" unrelated to these procedural changes",
"sentence": "See Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Colo.1994) (the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern); see also In re Proposed Petition “Petition Procedures”, 900 P.2d 104, 109 (Colo.1995) (proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive “fundamental rights” unrelated to these procedural changes)."
} | 11,715,205 | a |
To the extent that Wade attempts to challenge summary judgment on his claims for supervisory SS 1983 liability and negligence, Wade waived the right to appeal these issues by failing to file timely objections to the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation regarding summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to object to determinations reviewed de novo is a factor to be weighed in favor of finding waiver on appeal",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to object to determinations reviewed de novo is a factor to be weighed in favor of finding waiver on appeal); cf. also McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir.1980) (appellant who failed to object to magistrate judge’s findings and did not raise the issue until reply waived the issue on appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "628 F.2d 1185, 1187",
"parenthetical": "appellant who failed to object to magistrate judge's findings and did not raise the issue until reply waived the issue on appeal",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to object to determinations reviewed de novo is a factor to be weighed in favor of finding waiver on appeal); cf. also McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir.1980) (appellant who failed to object to magistrate judge’s findings and did not raise the issue until reply waived the issue on appeal)."
} | 3,478,886 | a |
It follows a fortiori from United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail. In United Haulers, we explained that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1796, 1796",
"parenthetical": "\"Laws favoring local government ... may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism\"",
"sentence": "See id., at 343,127 S.Ct., at 1796 (“Laws favoring local government ... may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism”); see also id., at 344, 127 S.Ct., at 1796 (noting that “[w]e should be particularly hesitant to interfere ... under the guise of the Commerce Clause” where a local government engages in a traditional government function)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1796, 1796",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[w]e should be particularly hesitant to interfere ... under the guise of the Commerce Clause\" where a local government engages in a traditional government function",
"sentence": "See id., at 343,127 S.Ct., at 1796 (“Laws favoring local government ... may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism”); see also id., at 344, 127 S.Ct., at 1796 (noting that “[w]e should be particularly hesitant to interfere ... under the guise of the Commerce Clause” where a local government engages in a traditional government function)."
} | 3,616,500 | a |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 623, 627",
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | 8,577,610 | a |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 623, 627",
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judiciary well qualified in the law of the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly constituted provision held to serve compelling state interest); Kraft v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 432, 568 P.2d 828 (1977) (city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices)."
} | 8,577,610 | a |
Applying this principle, courts have "held that information which is to be communicated to the public or others is not privileged." Similarly, "[documents which merely communicate information obtained from independent sources are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "816 F.2d 403, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"business documents sent to corporate officers and employees, as well as the corporation's attorneys, do not become privileged automatically\"",
"sentence": "See also Simon, supra, 816 F.2d at 403 (“business documents sent to corporate officers and employees, as well as the corporation’s attorneys, do not become privileged automatically”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "91 F.R.D. 5, 5",
"parenthetical": "\"Funneling papers past corporate counsel will not shield the communications from disclosure\"",
"sentence": "Sneider, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 5 (“Funneling papers past corporate counsel will not shield the communications from disclosure”)."
} | 7,792,760 | b |
Second, Agent Knoll's testimony about the "in furtherance of' element of the alien smuggling statute was permissible under Rule 702(a). Although Agent Knoll's testimony could be read to suggest that any movement away from the border "furthers" an alien's illegal presence in the country, his commentary was neither an incorrect statement of the law nor so likely to cause confusion to justify excluding it under Rule 702(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 F.3d 1285, 1289",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] factfinder may consider any and all relevant evidence bearing on the 'in furtherance of element (time, place, distance, reason for trip, overall impact of trip, defendant's role in organizing and/or carrying out the trip",
"sentence": "See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.1999) (“[A] factfinder may consider any and all relevant evidence bearing on the ‘in furtherance of element (time, place, distance, reason for trip, overall impact of trip, defendant’s role in organizing and/or carrying out the trip).” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Hernandez, 327 F.3d 1110, 1113-14 (10th Cir.2003) (reversing judgment of acquittal on “in furtherance of’ element where evidence showed defendant drove semi-truck, in which checkpoint officials discovered several undocumented aliens, from the border town of El Paso to the permanent checkpoint north of Las Cruces)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1110, 1113-14",
"parenthetical": "reversing judgment of acquittal on \"in furtherance of' element where evidence showed defendant drove semi-truck, in which checkpoint officials discovered several undocumented aliens, from the border town of El Paso to the permanent checkpoint north of Las Cruces",
"sentence": "See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.1999) (“[A] factfinder may consider any and all relevant evidence bearing on the ‘in furtherance of element (time, place, distance, reason for trip, overall impact of trip, defendant’s role in organizing and/or carrying out the trip).” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Hernandez, 327 F.3d 1110, 1113-14 (10th Cir.2003) (reversing judgment of acquittal on “in furtherance of’ element where evidence showed defendant drove semi-truck, in which checkpoint officials discovered several undocumented aliens, from the border town of El Paso to the permanent checkpoint north of Las Cruces)."
} | 4,151,056 | a |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member of the Wargo family must at minimum play an active role in the farming operation taking place on its land. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 B.R. 971, 976",
"parenthetical": "corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered \"engaged in farming\" only if family members of debtor \"take an active role in the operation\"",
"sentence": "See In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987) (corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered “engaged in farming” only if family members of debtor “take an active role in the operation”); In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 B.R. 280, 285 (Bankr.D.Or.1987) (though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "57 B.R. 648, 656",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr.D.N.D.1986) (corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is “derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others”). As the District Court observed, the conversations just described do not distinguish the role played by the Wargo family in the production of crops on debtor’s acreage from that of an absentee landlord doing business in the corporate form who simply owns land and leases it to a tenant farmer from year to year. In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., 86 B.R. at 151. The “conduct” element of § 101(17)(B) serves to exclude from Chapter 12 eligibility those corporations which bear so attenuated a connection with the farming operation itself."
} | 10,537,714 | a |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member of the Wargo family must at minimum play an active role in the farming operation taking place on its land. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 151, 151",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr.D.N.D.1986) (corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is “derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others”). As the District Court observed, the conversations just described do not distinguish the role played by the Wargo family in the production of crops on debtor’s acreage from that of an absentee landlord doing business in the corporate form who simply owns land and leases it to a tenant farmer from year to year. In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., 86 B.R. at 151. The “conduct” element of § 101(17)(B) serves to exclude from Chapter 12 eligibility those corporations which bear so attenuated a connection with the farming operation itself."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 B.R. 971, 976",
"parenthetical": "corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered \"engaged in farming\" only if family members of debtor \"take an active role in the operation\"",
"sentence": "See In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987) (corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered “engaged in farming” only if family members of debtor “take an active role in the operation”); In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 B.R. 280, 285 (Bankr.D.Or.1987) (though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition)."
} | 10,537,714 | b |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member of the Wargo family must at minimum play an active role in the farming operation taking place on its land. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 B.R. 280, 285",
"parenthetical": "though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition",
"sentence": "See In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987) (corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered “engaged in farming” only if family members of debtor “take an active role in the operation”); In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 B.R. 280, 285 (Bankr.D.Or.1987) (though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "57 B.R. 648, 656",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr.D.N.D.1986) (corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is “derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others”). As the District Court observed, the conversations just described do not distinguish the role played by the Wargo family in the production of crops on debtor’s acreage from that of an absentee landlord doing business in the corporate form who simply owns land and leases it to a tenant farmer from year to year. In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., 86 B.R. at 151. The “conduct” element of § 101(17)(B) serves to exclude from Chapter 12 eligibility those corporations which bear so attenuated a connection with the farming operation itself."
} | 10,537,714 | a |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member of the Wargo family must at minimum play an active role in the farming operation taking place on its land. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 B.R. 280, 285",
"parenthetical": "though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition",
"sentence": "See In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987) (corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered “engaged in farming” only if family members of debtor “take an active role in the operation”); In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 B.R. 280, 285 (Bankr.D.Or.1987) (though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 151, 151",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr.D.N.D.1986) (corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is “derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others”). As the District Court observed, the conversations just described do not distinguish the role played by the Wargo family in the production of crops on debtor’s acreage from that of an absentee landlord doing business in the corporate form who simply owns land and leases it to a tenant farmer from year to year. In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., 86 B.R. at 151. The “conduct” element of § 101(17)(B) serves to exclude from Chapter 12 eligibility those corporations which bear so attenuated a connection with the farming operation itself."
} | 10,537,714 | a |
Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford's Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated by law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 162, 167-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (holding that “a defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 So.2d 629, 639",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific\"",
"sentence": "See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639 (Fla.1997) (stating that “the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific”)."
} | 9,334,986 | a |
Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford's Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated by law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (holding that “a defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 So.2d 629, 639",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific\"",
"sentence": "See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639 (Fla.1997) (stating that “the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific”)."
} | 9,334,986 | a |
Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford's Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated by law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (holding that “a defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 So.2d 629, 639",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific\"",
"sentence": "See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639 (Fla.1997) (stating that “the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific”)."
} | 9,334,986 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 663, 667",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendants are \"estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate's ability to utilize grievance procedures\"",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 656, 656",
"parenthetical": "vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | 2,922,427 | b |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 656, 656",
"parenthetical": "vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "318 F.3d 523, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate's allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | 2,922,427 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 656, 656",
"parenthetical": "vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 736, 740",
"parenthetical": "explaining that grievance process \"is not an 'available' remedy under SS 1997e(a",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | 2,922,427 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners' grievances",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 663, 667",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendants are \"estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate's ability to utilize grievance procedures\"",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | 2,922,427 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "318 F.3d 523, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate's allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners' grievances",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | 2,922,427 | b |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners' grievances",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 736, 740",
"parenthetical": "explaining that grievance process \"is not an 'available' remedy under SS 1997e(a",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners’ grievances); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defendants are “estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (explaining that grievance process “is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)” if prison officials prevent its use)."
} | 2,922,427 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117",
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | 11,530,070 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | 11,530,070 | b |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | 11,530,070 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | 11,530,070 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.”); see also Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 290, 300 (1991) (“Generally, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for giving an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the judge, nor is it intended to allow a party to make arguments already presented to, and rejected by, the court.”); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) (“A party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.”), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1310, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992)."
} | 11,530,070 | b |
If the Court does not have jurisdiction, it does not have the power to decide defendant's motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 187, 194",
"parenthetical": "\"Because a holding that the district court lacked removal jurisdiclion would end our inquiry, we first address the district court's denial of [plaintiff's] motion to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir.2005) (\"Because a holding that the district court lacked removal jurisdiclion would end our inquiry, we first address the district court’s denial of [plaintiff's] motion to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction.”); see also Cotter v. Milly LLC, No. 09 Civ. 04639(PGG), 2010 WL 286614, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (\"Because the issue of proper removal involves this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it must be decided prior to [defendant’s] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 286614, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the issue of proper removal involves this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, it must be decided prior to [defendant's] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).\"",
"sentence": "See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir.2005) (\"Because a holding that the district court lacked removal jurisdiclion would end our inquiry, we first address the district court’s denial of [plaintiff's] motion to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction.”); see also Cotter v. Milly LLC, No. 09 Civ. 04639(PGG), 2010 WL 286614, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (\"Because the issue of proper removal involves this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it must be decided prior to [defendant’s] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”)."
} | 4,268,785 | a |
Subsets and Splits