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As a result, "[i]t is the law of New York that claims for gross negligence are not precluded by waivers of subrogation provisions." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2002 WL 123506, at *4-5",
"parenthetical": "dismissing subrogee's negligence claim due to waiver of subrogation clause but finding that gross negligence claim possible if intentional wrongdoing occurred",
"sentence": "See Travelers, 204 F.Supp.2d at 644 (citing Federal Ins. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 243 A.D.2d 605, 663 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (2d Dep’t 1997) and Gold Connection Discount Jewelers, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 212 A.D.2d 577, 622 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (2d Dep’t 1995)); Charter Oak, 2002 WL 123506, at *4-5 (dismissing subrogee’s negligence claim due to waiver of subrogation clause but finding that gross negligence claim possible if intentional wrongdoing occurred); see also Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Southwest Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016 n. 8 (9th Cir.1999) (“Like the exculpatory clauses, [waiver of subrogation clauses] are limitation provisions, which are not effective as to gross negligence or misconduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Like the exculpatory clauses, [waiver of subrogation clauses] are limitation provisions, which are not effective as to gross negligence or misconduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Travelers, 204 F.Supp.2d at 644 (citing Federal Ins. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 243 A.D.2d 605, 663 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (2d Dep’t 1997) and Gold Connection Discount Jewelers, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 212 A.D.2d 577, 622 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (2d Dep’t 1995)); Charter Oak, 2002 WL 123506, at *4-5 (dismissing subrogee’s negligence claim due to waiver of subrogation clause but finding that gross negligence claim possible if intentional wrongdoing occurred); see also Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Southwest Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016 n. 8 (9th Cir.1999) (“Like the exculpatory clauses, [waiver of subrogation clauses] are limitation provisions, which are not effective as to gross negligence or misconduct.”)."
} | 9,096,388 | a |
Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). American and English authorities construing the bankruptcy laws also support the proposition that the words "in contemplation of' may be understood to require an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 U.S. 151, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an act was done \"in contemplation of bankruptcy\" if it was done \"in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | 3,882,789 | b |
Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). American and English authorities construing the bankruptcy laws also support the proposition that the words "in contemplation of' may be understood to require an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an act was done \"in contemplation of bankruptcy\" if it was done \"in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | 3,882,789 | a |
Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). American and English authorities construing the bankruptcy laws also support the proposition that the words "in contemplation of' may be understood to require an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an act was done \"in contemplation of bankruptcy\" if it was done \"in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | 3,882,789 | b |
Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). American and English authorities construing the bankruptcy laws also support the proposition that the words "in contemplation of' may be understood to require an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "19 F. Cas. 50, 53",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an act was done \"in contemplation of bankruptcy\" if it was done \"in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 U.S. 151, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | 3,882,789 | a |
Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). American and English authorities construing the bankruptcy laws also support the proposition that the words "in contemplation of' may be understood to require an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "19 F. Cas. 50, 53",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an act was done \"in contemplation of bankruptcy\" if it was done \"in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | 3,882,789 | b |
Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). American and English authorities construing the bankruptcy laws also support the proposition that the words "in contemplation of' may be understood to require an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "19 F. Cas. 50, 53",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an act was done \"in contemplation of bankruptcy\" if it was done \"in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.\"",
"sentence": "In re Pearce, 21 Vt. 611, 19 F. Cas. 50, 53 (D.Vt.1843) (No. 10873) (concluding that an act was done “in contemplation of bankruptcy” if it was done “in anticipation of breaking or failing in his business, of committing an act of bankruptcy, or of being declared bankrupt at his own instance, on the ground of inability to pay his debts, and intending to defeat the general distribution of effects, which takes place under a proceeding in bankruptcy.”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Brundrett, 5 Barn. & Ad. 289, 296, 110 Eng. Rep. 798, 801 (K.B.1833) (Parke, J.) (interpreting “in contemplation of bankruptcy” to mean that “the payment or delivery must be with intent to defeat the general distribution of effects which takes place under a commission of bankruptcy.”); Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 539, 545-46, 128 Eng. Rep. 800, 802-03 (C.P.1814) (Gibbs, C.J.) (An act made in contemplation of bankruptcy “must be intended in fraud of the bankrupt laws.”); cf. Buckingham v. McLean, 54 U.S. 151, 167, 13 How. 151, 14 L.Ed. 91 (1851) (“To give to these words, contemplation of bankruptcy, a broad scope, and somewhat loose meaning, would not be in furtherance of the general purpose with which they were introduced.”); id. at 169 (relying on English bankruptcy decisions as instructive authority on meaning of the former Bankrupt Act)."
} | 3,882,789 | a |
Application of the exclusionary rule is generally reserved for cases in which the conduct of the police was in violation of a person's constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 806, 815",
"parenthetical": "court declined to apply exclusionary rule because police acted reasonably, notwithstanding that stop violated police regulations",
"sentence": "See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (court declined to apply exclusionary rule because police acted reasonably, notwithstanding that stop violated police regulations)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "413 Mass. 73, 77",
"parenthetical": "\"Generally, evidence seized in violation of the law will be suppressed only if the violation is substantial or rises to the level of a Federal or State constitutional violation\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 413 Mass. 73, 77 (1992) (“Generally, evidence seized in violation of the law will be suppressed only if the violation is substantial or rises to the level of a Federal or State constitutional violation”)."
} | 12,461,246 | a |
As an initial matter, the panel correctly determined, unlike other courts, that the "regulated activity" under the ESA is Cave Species takes, not the appellants' planned commercial development of the land. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the reg ulated activity was not the ESA take but rather the \"construction of a commercial housing development\"",
"sentence": "GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633-34 (recognizing that “looking beyond the regulated activity ... would ‘effectually obliterate’ the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause”) (citing Jones and Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37, 57 S.Ct. 615); Ho, 311 F.3d at 602 (recognizing that the regulated activity at issue was asbestos removal, rather than the plaintiffs commercial enterprise); but see Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C.Cir.2003) (finding that the reg ulated activity was not the ESA take but rather the “construction of a commercial housing development”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "326 F.3d 633, 633-34",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"looking beyond the regulated activity ... would 'effectually obliterate' the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentence": "GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633-34 (recognizing that “looking beyond the regulated activity ... would ‘effectually obliterate’ the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause”) (citing Jones and Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37, 57 S.Ct. 615); Ho, 311 F.3d at 602 (recognizing that the regulated activity at issue was asbestos removal, rather than the plaintiffs commercial enterprise); but see Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C.Cir.2003) (finding that the reg ulated activity was not the ESA take but rather the “construction of a commercial housing development”)."
} | 9,264,609 | b |
As an initial matter, the panel correctly determined, unlike other courts, that the "regulated activity" under the ESA is Cave Species takes, not the appellants' planned commercial development of the land. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 602, 602",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the regulated activity at issue was asbestos removal, rather than the plaintiffs commercial enterprise",
"sentence": "GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633-34 (recognizing that “looking beyond the regulated activity ... would ‘effectually obliterate’ the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause”) (citing Jones and Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37, 57 S.Ct. 615); Ho, 311 F.3d at 602 (recognizing that the regulated activity at issue was asbestos removal, rather than the plaintiffs commercial enterprise); but see Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C.Cir.2003) (finding that the reg ulated activity was not the ESA take but rather the “construction of a commercial housing development”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the reg ulated activity was not the ESA take but rather the \"construction of a commercial housing development\"",
"sentence": "GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633-34 (recognizing that “looking beyond the regulated activity ... would ‘effectually obliterate’ the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause”) (citing Jones and Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37, 57 S.Ct. 615); Ho, 311 F.3d at 602 (recognizing that the regulated activity at issue was asbestos removal, rather than the plaintiffs commercial enterprise); but see Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C.Cir.2003) (finding that the reg ulated activity was not the ESA take but rather the “construction of a commercial housing development”)."
} | 9,264,609 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 58, 64, 71",
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 58, 64, 71",
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 58, 64, 71",
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | b |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | b |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | b |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | b |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not \"persons\" suable under SS 1983",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | b |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state immunity from suit extends to \"governmental entities that are considered arms of the State\"",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state immunity from suit extends to \"governmental entities that are considered arms of the State\"",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | a |
As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged SS 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under SS 1983 for their suit against federal agents",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state immunity from suit extends to \"governmental entities that are considered arms of the State\"",
"sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state, and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages, are not “persons” suable under § 1983); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state immunity from suit extends to “governmental entities that are considered arms of the State”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that plaintiffs had no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for their suit against federal agents)."
} | 9,398,762 | b |
Consequently, there is no occasion for us to comment upon them. It is settled in this circuit that, when the district court tentatively denies a pretrial motion in limine, or temporizes on it, the party objecting to the preliminary in limine determination must renew his objection during the trial, and the failure to do so forfeits any objection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "818 F.2d 105, 105",
"parenthetical": "holding that to raise and preserve for review a claim of improperly constructing the Rule 403 balance, a party ordinarily cannot rely on the denial of a motion in limine but must object to the admission of the controversial evidence in the actual trial setting",
"sentence": "See Griffin, 818 F.2d at 105 (holding that to raise and preserve for review a claim of improperly constructing the Rule 403 balance, a party ordinarily cannot rely on the denial of a motion in limine but must object to the admission of the controversial evidence in the actual trial setting); see also United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir.1994) (concluding that when a pretrial motion in limine is granted and the court “clearly invites the adversely affected party to offer the evidence at sidebar for the purpose of reassessing the scope and effect of the order in the setting of the actual trial, the exclusion of evidence pursuant to that order may be challenged on appeal only if the party unsuccessfully attempts to offer such evidence in accordance with the terms specified in the order”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 154, 166",
"parenthetical": "concluding that when a pretrial motion in limine is granted and the court \"clearly invites the adversely affected party to offer the evidence at sidebar for the purpose of reassessing the scope and effect of the order in the setting of the actual trial, the exclusion of evidence pursuant to that order may be challenged on appeal only if the party unsuccessfully attempts to offer such evidence in accordance with the terms specified in the order\"",
"sentence": "See Griffin, 818 F.2d at 105 (holding that to raise and preserve for review a claim of improperly constructing the Rule 403 balance, a party ordinarily cannot rely on the denial of a motion in limine but must object to the admission of the controversial evidence in the actual trial setting); see also United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir.1994) (concluding that when a pretrial motion in limine is granted and the court “clearly invites the adversely affected party to offer the evidence at sidebar for the purpose of reassessing the scope and effect of the order in the setting of the actual trial, the exclusion of evidence pursuant to that order may be challenged on appeal only if the party unsuccessfully attempts to offer such evidence in accordance with the terms specified in the order”)."
} | 11,889,862 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "388 U.S. 218, 237",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 469",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 468",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "388 U.S. 218, 237",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 469",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024",
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "388 U.S. 218, 237",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 469",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (defendant must know of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to validly waive it)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "388 U.S. 218, 237",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "388 U.S. 218, 237",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "388 U.S. 218, 237",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937",
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of right to counsel's presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 469",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 469",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | 10,509,679 | b |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 469",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625",
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 218, 249",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059",
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
To decide the appropriate analytical framework for examining the validity of Robinson's, waiver, we have examined case law regarding the waiver of constitutional rights and the waiver of statutory rights. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (waiver of right to counsel’s presence during a lineup must be knowing and voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be knowing and voluntary)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent",
"sentence": "But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a defendant who consents to a search while not in custody validly waives his constitutional rights even if he did not know he had a right to withhold his consent)."
} | 10,509,679 | a |
. A number of cases argue, to the contrary, that such information would be highly relevant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 F.2d 511, 511",
"parenthetical": "considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given",
"sentence": "See Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. at 782-784 (considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation); see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given); cf. Matter of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.1989) (magistrate’s refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused’s conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "617 F.Supp. 782, 782-784",
"parenthetical": "considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation",
"sentence": "See Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. at 782-784 (considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation); see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given); cf. Matter of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.1989) (magistrate’s refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused’s conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee)."
} | 7,387,125 | b |
. A number of cases argue, to the contrary, that such information would be highly relevant. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "888 F.2d 204, 206",
"parenthetical": "magistrate's refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused's conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee",
"sentence": "See Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. at 782-784 (considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation); see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given); cf. Matter of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.1989) (magistrate’s refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused’s conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "617 F.Supp. 782, 782-784",
"parenthetical": "considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation",
"sentence": "See Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. at 782-784 (considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation); see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given); cf. Matter of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.1989) (magistrate’s refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused’s conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee)."
} | 7,387,125 | b |
. A number of cases argue, to the contrary, that such information would be highly relevant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 F.2d 511, 511",
"parenthetical": "considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given",
"sentence": "See Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. at 782-784 (considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation); see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given); cf. Matter of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.1989) (magistrate’s refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused’s conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "888 F.2d 204, 206",
"parenthetical": "magistrate's refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused's conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee",
"sentence": "See Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.Supp. at 782-784 (considering circumstances of confession in evaluating reliability of statement and its recantation); see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 511 (considering as relevant to probable cause determination conditions under which confessional statement was given); cf. Matter of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.1989) (magistrate’s refusal to review translated judicial decision rendered in requesting country which purportedly reversed accused’s conviction of certain offenses in Italy did not violate due process where no evidence was produced that suggested ruling was relevant to extraditee's case, and appellate decision neither named extraditee nor concerned the extradition charges pending against extraditee)."
} | 7,387,125 | a |
When the Back Pay Act applies, it provides this court with the statutory authority to award attorney fees. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 1356, 1358, 1362",
"parenthetical": "providing \"a mechanism by which [a party] can now apply to this court for attorney fees that are authorized by the Back Pay Act\" because \"Congress wanted a party ... to have an opportunity to apply for fees not only before the agency but also on judicial appeal,\" and granting the party \"20 days within which to submit an attorney fee request under the Back Pay Act\"",
"sentence": "See Ramos v. Dep’t of Justice, 552 F.3d 1356, 1358, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2009) (providing “a mechanism by which [a party] can now apply to this court for attorney fees that are authorized by the Back Pay Act” because “Congress wanted a party ... to have an opportunity to apply for fees not only before the agency but also on judicial appeal,” and granting the party “20 days within which to submit an attorney fee request under the Back Pay Act”); see also Olsen, 735 F.2d at 563 (“[T]he language of the Back Pay Act ‘is sufficiently broad to include attorney’s fees for services rendered in administrative or judicial appeals____(ellipsis in original) (quoting Hoska v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 694 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C.Cir.1982)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "735 F.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he language of the Back Pay Act 'is sufficiently broad to include attorney's fees for services rendered in administrative or judicial appeals____(ellipsis in original",
"sentence": "See Ramos v. Dep’t of Justice, 552 F.3d 1356, 1358, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2009) (providing “a mechanism by which [a party] can now apply to this court for attorney fees that are authorized by the Back Pay Act” because “Congress wanted a party ... to have an opportunity to apply for fees not only before the agency but also on judicial appeal,” and granting the party “20 days within which to submit an attorney fee request under the Back Pay Act”); see also Olsen, 735 F.2d at 563 (“[T]he language of the Back Pay Act ‘is sufficiently broad to include attorney’s fees for services rendered in administrative or judicial appeals____(ellipsis in original) (quoting Hoska v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 694 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C.Cir.1982)))."
} | 4,070,716 | a |
Although nothing in the record suggests that Calmes was a motorist and needed his license to leave the location, nonetheless, upon being asked if he was armed, a reasonable person in Calmes's position would not feel free simply to terminate the encounter, leave his license with the police, and walk away. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 N.E.2d 564, 567",
"parenthetical": "\"A reasonable person when faced with a police officer pulling up to him in a marked vehicle and calling for him to come over to the car would not assume that he can just turn and walk away.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Crump, 62 F.Supp.2d 560, 564 (D.Conn.1999) (holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a Terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a “pat-down”); see also Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“A reasonable person when faced with a police officer pulling up to him in a marked vehicle and calling for him to come over to the car would not assume that he can just turn and walk away.”), trans. denied."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 F.Supp.2d 560, 564",
"parenthetical": "holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a Terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a \"pat-down\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Crump, 62 F.Supp.2d 560, 564 (D.Conn.1999) (holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a Terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a “pat-down”); see also Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“A reasonable person when faced with a police officer pulling up to him in a marked vehicle and calling for him to come over to the car would not assume that he can just turn and walk away.”), trans. denied."
} | 8,201,421 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Gray because Vallejo failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Gray was deliberately indifferent to Vallejo's serious medical needs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "726 F.3d 1062, 1074",
"parenthetical": "explaining that plaintiffs alleging deliberate indifference in SS 1983 actions \"must ... demonstrate that the defendants' actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries\"",
"sentence": "See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health); see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that plaintiffs alleging deliberate indifference in § 1983 actions “must ... demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1057, 1057",
"parenthetical": "a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate's health",
"sentence": "See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health); see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that plaintiffs alleging deliberate indifference in § 1983 actions “must ... demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries”)."
} | 12,392,310 | b |
The police, in short, were not obliged to take the risk that a person potentially subject to arrest for felony theft had on his person the means -- a weapon -- of preventing his apprehension for a serious crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 So.2d 225, 231-32",
"parenthetical": "concluding that police reasonably believed a suspect may be armed during a traffic stop for driving with an expired inspection sticker because the suspect \"was pacing back and forth\" and \"failed to produce a driver's license or identification\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Cowart, 862 So.2d 225, 231-32 (La.Ct.App.2003) (concluding that police reasonably believed a suspect may be armed during a traffic stop for driving with an expired inspection sticker because the suspect “was pacing back and forth” and “failed to produce a driver’s license or identification”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.3d 743, 743",
"parenthetical": "finding frisk of driver permissible where police knew the driver was not the owner of an out-of-area car -- he was a male, while the car registrant was a female -- and he had no driver's license, meaning that the officer \"had no way to determine the identity of the person with whom he was dealing and whether [the person] was a criminal and might be dangerous.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Murphy, 261 F.3d at 743 (finding frisk of driver permissible where police knew the driver was not the owner of an out-of-area car — he was a male, while the car registrant was a female — and he had no driver’s license, meaning that the officer “had no way to determine the identity of the person with whom he was dealing and whether [the person] was a criminal and might be dangerous.”); Powell, 649 A.2d at 1090-91 n. 5 (Farrell, J., concurring) (distinguishing the lead opinion in Powell, where the police had observed only an “ambiguous movement” and nervousness on the part of a person stopped for a traffic violation, from a hypothetical case where the person was suspected of a more serious offense, in that his actions “bespoke someone, for example, engaged in possession of a stolen vehicle”)."
} | 7,268,183 | b |
The police, in short, were not obliged to take the risk that a person potentially subject to arrest for felony theft had on his person the means -- a weapon -- of preventing his apprehension for a serious crime. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 So.2d 225, 231-32",
"parenthetical": "concluding that police reasonably believed a suspect may be armed during a traffic stop for driving with an expired inspection sticker because the suspect \"was pacing back and forth\" and \"failed to produce a driver's license or identification\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Cowart, 862 So.2d 225, 231-32 (La.Ct.App.2003) (concluding that police reasonably believed a suspect may be armed during a traffic stop for driving with an expired inspection sticker because the suspect “was pacing back and forth” and “failed to produce a driver’s license or identification”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing the lead opinion in Powell, where the police had observed only an \"ambiguous movement\" and nervousness on the part of a person stopped for a traffic violation, from a hypothetical case where the person was suspected of a more serious offense, in that his actions \"bespoke someone, for example, engaged in possession of a stolen vehicle\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Murphy, 261 F.3d at 743 (finding frisk of driver permissible where police knew the driver was not the owner of an out-of-area car — he was a male, while the car registrant was a female — and he had no driver’s license, meaning that the officer “had no way to determine the identity of the person with whom he was dealing and whether [the person] was a criminal and might be dangerous.”); Powell, 649 A.2d at 1090-91 n. 5 (Farrell, J., concurring) (distinguishing the lead opinion in Powell, where the police had observed only an “ambiguous movement” and nervousness on the part of a person stopped for a traffic violation, from a hypothetical case where the person was suspected of a more serious offense, in that his actions “bespoke someone, for example, engaged in possession of a stolen vehicle”)."
} | 7,268,183 | b |
Given this basic precept, some courts have concluded that, if the court plans to rely upon facts not described in a presentence report, the defendant must be given prehear-ing notice of those facts and an opportunity to contest them. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court properly recessed sentencing hearing and ordered investigation when defendant volunteered additional facts at hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.1993)(“The defendant has a right to know what evidence will be used against him at the sentencing hearing.”); see also People v. Quarles, 182 Colo. 321, 512 P.2d 1240 (1973)(court properly recessed sentencing hearing and ordered investigation when defendant volunteered additional facts at hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 F.2d 386, 389",
"parenthetical": "\"The defendant has a right to know what evidence will be used against him at the sentencing hearing.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.1993)(“The defendant has a right to know what evidence will be used against him at the sentencing hearing.”); see also People v. Quarles, 182 Colo. 321, 512 P.2d 1240 (1973)(court properly recessed sentencing hearing and ordered investigation when defendant volunteered additional facts at hearing)."
} | 9,187,405 | b |
Given this basic precept, some courts have concluded that, if the court plans to rely upon facts not described in a presentence report, the defendant must be given prehear-ing notice of those facts and an opportunity to contest them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 F.2d 386, 389",
"parenthetical": "\"The defendant has a right to know what evidence will be used against him at the sentencing hearing.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.1993)(“The defendant has a right to know what evidence will be used against him at the sentencing hearing.”); see also People v. Quarles, 182 Colo. 321, 512 P.2d 1240 (1973)(court properly recessed sentencing hearing and ordered investigation when defendant volunteered additional facts at hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court properly recessed sentencing hearing and ordered investigation when defendant volunteered additional facts at hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.1993)(“The defendant has a right to know what evidence will be used against him at the sentencing hearing.”); see also People v. Quarles, 182 Colo. 321, 512 P.2d 1240 (1973)(court properly recessed sentencing hearing and ordered investigation when defendant volunteered additional facts at hearing)."
} | 9,187,405 | a |
Before addressing Appellant's ineffective assistance arguments, we note that this case presents a number of complex issues concerning the applicability of Colorado's procedural bar to these claims. We need not and do not address these issues, however, because the case may be more easily and succinctly affirmed on the merits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 491, 496",
"parenthetical": "addressing a 28 U.S.C. SS 2255 petition and declining to address the procedural bar issue because the claim would fail on the merits in any event",
"sentence": "See Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir.1991) (“In the present case, it is in the interest of judicial economy for this court to hear this cause in spite of the unresolved issues of exhaustion and procedural default.”); cf. United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir.1994) (addressing a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition and declining to address the procedural bar issue because the claim would fail on the merits in any event)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 F.2d 817, 820",
"parenthetical": "\"In the present case, it is in the interest of judicial economy for this court to hear this cause in spite of the unresolved issues of exhaustion and procedural default.\"",
"sentence": "See Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir.1991) (“In the present case, it is in the interest of judicial economy for this court to hear this cause in spite of the unresolved issues of exhaustion and procedural default.”); cf. United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir.1994) (addressing a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition and declining to address the procedural bar issue because the claim would fail on the merits in any event)."
} | 11,220,174 | b |
To establish purposeful availment, a plaintiff must show that "(1) it felt the injurious effects of a defendant's tortious act in the forum, and (2) that the defendant's act was calculated to cause injury to the plaintiff there." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.3d 1235, 1241",
"parenthetical": "\"Posting allegedly defamatory comments or information on an internet site does not, without more, subject the poster to personal jurisdiction wherever the posting could be read (and the subject of the posting may reside",
"sentence": "Swiss Am Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d at 632-33; see Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995) (if defendant’s contact with jurisdiction was “voluntary” and was of such a nature so as to make state’s exercise of jurisdiction “foreseeable,” plaintiff has established purposeful availment); see also Noonan, 902 F.Sup. at 305 (defamatory “effect” within state by itself is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over foreign defendant, defendant must also have intended their tortious act to be felt in forum state); Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Posting allegedly defamatory comments or information on an internet site does not, without more, subject the poster to personal jurisdiction wherever the posting could be read (and the subject of the posting may reside) . . . [I]n considering what ‘more’ could create personal jurisdiction for such activities, courts look to indications that a defendant deliberately directed its message at an audience in the forum state and intended harm to the plaintiff occurring primarily or particularly in the forum state”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1381, 1391",
"parenthetical": "if defendant's contact with jurisdiction was \"voluntary\" and was of such a nature so as to make state's exercise of jurisdiction \"foreseeable,\" plaintiff has established purposeful availment",
"sentence": "Swiss Am Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d at 632-33; see Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995) (if defendant’s contact with jurisdiction was “voluntary” and was of such a nature so as to make state’s exercise of jurisdiction “foreseeable,” plaintiff has established purposeful availment); see also Noonan, 902 F.Sup. at 305 (defamatory “effect” within state by itself is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over foreign defendant, defendant must also have intended their tortious act to be felt in forum state); Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Posting allegedly defamatory comments or information on an internet site does not, without more, subject the poster to personal jurisdiction wherever the posting could be read (and the subject of the posting may reside) . . . [I]n considering what ‘more’ could create personal jurisdiction for such activities, courts look to indications that a defendant deliberately directed its message at an audience in the forum state and intended harm to the plaintiff occurring primarily or particularly in the forum state”)."
} | 4,359,086 | b |
Thus, while fair use may often be called "an equitable rule of reason," its origins are remarkably utilitarian. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "510 U.S. 578, 578",
"parenthetical": "stating that fair use factors should be \"weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright\"",
"sentence": "Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (stating that fair use factors should be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”). At the same time, fair use may shield those types of uses that are truly de minimis, having little or no impact on the market for or value of the original work."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm from the use of the work---- Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex.\"",
"sentence": "See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51 & n. 34, 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984) (“In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm from the use of the work---- Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex.”) (quoting Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958))."
} | 3,675,260 | a |
Thus, while fair use may often be called "an equitable rule of reason," its origins are remarkably utilitarian. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm from the use of the work---- Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex.\"",
"sentence": "See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51 & n. 34, 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984) (“In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm from the use of the work---- Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex.”) (quoting Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that fair use factors should be \"weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright\"",
"sentence": "Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (stating that fair use factors should be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”). At the same time, fair use may shield those types of uses that are truly de minimis, having little or no impact on the market for or value of the original work."
} | 3,675,260 | b |
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the principles of accessory liability pursuant to SS 53a-8. Specifically, he contends that the trial court's inclusion of language pertaining to theories of joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy in its jury instructions was improper because it had allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty as an accessory without finding that he had the intent required for commission of the substantive offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 Conn. 518, 536",
"parenthetical": "inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 Conn. 598, 611-19",
"parenthetical": "accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | 5,730,490 | a |
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the principles of accessory liability pursuant to SS 53a-8. Specifically, he contends that the trial court's inclusion of language pertaining to theories of joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy in its jury instructions was improper because it had allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty as an accessory without finding that he had the intent required for commission of the substantive offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 Conn. 518, 536",
"parenthetical": "inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | 5,730,490 | a |
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the principles of accessory liability pursuant to SS 53a-8. Specifically, he contends that the trial court's inclusion of language pertaining to theories of joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy in its jury instructions was improper because it had allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty as an accessory without finding that he had the intent required for commission of the substantive offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 Conn. 598, 611-19",
"parenthetical": "accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | 5,730,490 | b |
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the principles of accessory liability pursuant to SS 53a-8. Specifically, he contends that the trial court's inclusion of language pertaining to theories of joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy in its jury instructions was improper because it had allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty as an accessory without finding that he had the intent required for commission of the substantive offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory",
"sentence": "See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability)."
} | 5,730,490 | b |
Furthermore, a finding of a cause of action for those individuals who fall outside of the coverage of the Human Relations Act is entirely consonant with the conclusions reached by courts which have recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based upon a violation of public policy expressed in a state constitution, even when the state legislature has enacted an anti-discrimination statute which limits the size of the employer covered by the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding Maryland's common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | 4,195,396 | a |
Furthermore, a finding of a cause of action for those individuals who fall outside of the coverage of the Human Relations Act is entirely consonant with the conclusions reached by courts which have recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based upon a violation of public policy expressed in a state constitution, even when the state legislature has enacted an anti-discrimination statute which limits the size of the employer covered by the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding Maryland's common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | 4,195,396 | a |
Furthermore, a finding of a cause of action for those individuals who fall outside of the coverage of the Human Relations Act is entirely consonant with the conclusions reached by courts which have recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based upon a violation of public policy expressed in a state constitution, even when the state legislature has enacted an anti-discrimination statute which limits the size of the employer covered by the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding Maryland's common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | 4,195,396 | a |
Furthermore, a finding of a cause of action for those individuals who fall outside of the coverage of the Human Relations Act is entirely consonant with the conclusions reached by courts which have recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based upon a violation of public policy expressed in a state constitution, even when the state legislature has enacted an anti-discrimination statute which limits the size of the employer covered by the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding Maryland's common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) (upholding Maryland’s common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee based on sex discrimination against an employer with less than 15 employees where public policy against sex discrimination was evidenced by constitutional amendment, statutes, and executive order); accord Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008) (concluding employee may bring claim for sex discrimination under state equal rights act where employer was not covered by Massachusetts’ state employment discrimination law); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources); Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997) (determining common law claim for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination in light of West Virginia’s public policy found in state human relations act); Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000) (finding claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Washington’s public policy against gender discrimination based upon statutes and judicial decisions); but see Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C.App. 297, 618 S.E.2d 776 (2005) (concluding no claim of wrongful discharge for age discrimination in North Carolina relying on legislative prerogative but in absence of constitutional basis for public policy); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000) (same)."
} | 4,195,396 | a |
In this case, respondent's access to a lawyer is the result of the State's decision, not the command of the United States Constitution."). Under Arizona law, a defendant is only entitled to counsel through the disposition of his or her first post-conviction petition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 752, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "\"Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (“Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.”); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.1990) (“Because [the petitioner] has no constitutional right to counsel in his earlier habeas proceedings, no error by his habeas counsel could constitute a sixth amendment violation or, therefore, cause.... ” (citation omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel's obligations are at an end.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (“After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel’s obligations are at an end.”). Because Cook had no constitutional right to counsel at the motion for rehearing stage, any errors by his counsel could not constitute cause to excuse the default."
} | 4,128,313 | b |
In this case, respondent's access to a lawyer is the result of the State's decision, not the command of the United States Constitution."). Under Arizona law, a defendant is only entitled to counsel through the disposition of his or her first post-conviction petition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (“Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.”); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.1990) (“Because [the petitioner] has no constitutional right to counsel in his earlier habeas proceedings, no error by his habeas counsel could constitute a sixth amendment violation or, therefore, cause.... ” (citation omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel's obligations are at an end.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (“After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel’s obligations are at an end.”). Because Cook had no constitutional right to counsel at the motion for rehearing stage, any errors by his counsel could not constitute cause to excuse the default."
} | 4,128,313 | b |
In this case, respondent's access to a lawyer is the result of the State's decision, not the command of the United States Constitution."). Under Arizona law, a defendant is only entitled to counsel through the disposition of his or her first post-conviction petition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 752, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "\"Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (“Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.”); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.1990) (“Because [the petitioner] has no constitutional right to counsel in his earlier habeas proceedings, no error by his habeas counsel could constitute a sixth amendment violation or, therefore, cause.... ” (citation omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "910 P.2d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "\"After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel's obligations are at an end.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (“After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel’s obligations are at an end.”). Because Cook had no constitutional right to counsel at the motion for rehearing stage, any errors by his counsel could not constitute cause to excuse the default."
} | 4,128,313 | b |
In this case, respondent's access to a lawyer is the result of the State's decision, not the command of the United States Constitution."). Under Arizona law, a defendant is only entitled to counsel through the disposition of his or her first post-conviction petition. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "910 P.2d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "\"After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel's obligations are at an end.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (“After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel’s obligations are at an end.”). Because Cook had no constitutional right to counsel at the motion for rehearing stage, any errors by his counsel could not constitute cause to excuse the default."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (“Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in [state post-conviction] proceedings.”); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.1990) (“Because [the petitioner] has no constitutional right to counsel in his earlier habeas proceedings, no error by his habeas counsel could constitute a sixth amendment violation or, therefore, cause.... ” (citation omitted))."
} | 4,128,313 | a |
. Plaintiffs should be mindful that any amended allegations must comply with Twombly's requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 F.3d 234, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"[Twombly'] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.\"",
"sentence": "See 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”) (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (“[Twombly'] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.”) (internal quotation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1965, 1965",
"parenthetical": "\"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\"",
"sentence": "See 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”) (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (“[Twombly'] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.”) (internal quotation omitted)."
} | 5,897,451 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "148 N.J. 389, 389",
"parenthetical": "evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 N.J. 112, 130-31",
"parenthetical": "upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State's theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State's theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "47 N.J. 379, 391",
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
Subsets and Splits