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We agree with several other circuits which have considered the issue that, with respect to a Class III device that has undergone the PMA process, such claims are preempted because they undoubtedly would add requirements "different from, or in addition to," those set forth in the MDA. "FDA approval of a premarket application shows the FDA has reviewed a device's testing, design specifications, intended use, manufacturing method, performance standard, and labelling, ... and decided the device is safe and effective." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "961 F.2d 1332, 1332-33",
"parenthetical": "indicating that claims for inadequate testing, defective design, and failure to warn were preempted in case involving device not subject to PMA process",
"sentence": "Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2614, 132 L.Ed.2d 857 (1995) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(2), 360e(c)(1)); see also Ministry of Health, Province of Ontario, Can. v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 1426, 1438-39 (C.D.Cal.1994) (stating that “a finding of negligence would mean implicitly finding that the FDA approval was not good enough,” and that a successful strict liability claim would require a court to hold that the product was unsafe and dangerous “in opposition to the contrary determination made by the FDA”); cf. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332-33 (indicating that claims for inadequate testing, defective design, and failure to warn were preempted in case involving device not subject to PMA process)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "858 F.Supp. 1426, 1438-39",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a finding of negligence would mean implicitly finding that the FDA approval was not good enough,\" and that a successful strict liability claim would require a court to hold that the product was unsafe and dangerous \"in opposition to the contrary determination made by the FDA\"",
"sentence": "Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2614, 132 L.Ed.2d 857 (1995) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(2), 360e(c)(1)); see also Ministry of Health, Province of Ontario, Can. v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 1426, 1438-39 (C.D.Cal.1994) (stating that “a finding of negligence would mean implicitly finding that the FDA approval was not good enough,” and that a successful strict liability claim would require a court to hold that the product was unsafe and dangerous “in opposition to the contrary determination made by the FDA”); cf. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332-33 (indicating that claims for inadequate testing, defective design, and failure to warn were preempted in case involving device not subject to PMA process)."
} | 7,416,381 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the retaliation claims because Manning did not sufficiently allege that any defendant retaliated against him for exercising a specific constitutional right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "880 F.2d 1040, 1045-46",
"parenthetical": "finding conclusory allegations insufficient to establish that any individual prison official acted in retaliation for protected conduct",
"sentence": "See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that plaintiff must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right and that the retaliatory action did not advance a legitimate peno-logical goal); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (9th Cir.1989) (finding conclusory allegations insufficient to establish that any individual prison official acted in retaliation for protected conduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "351 F.3d 1283, 1288",
"parenthetical": "explaining that plaintiff must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right and that the retaliatory action did not advance a legitimate peno-logical goal",
"sentence": "See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that plaintiff must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right and that the retaliatory action did not advance a legitimate peno-logical goal); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (9th Cir.1989) (finding conclusory allegations insufficient to establish that any individual prison official acted in retaliation for protected conduct)."
} | 3,844,350 | b |
At the same time, exaggerating the extent of one's pain to obtain narcotic pain medication and seeking it from multiple sources can also be evidence of a strong desire for the narcotics themselves and even addiction. In addition, less than honest efforts to obtain such medications certainly bear on the credibility of the claimant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 1167, 1172",
"parenthetical": "\"Contrary to Ms. Poppa's assertion that the only evidence of drug-seeking behavior is a 'single, isolated remark in the record,' ... there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ's determination that Ms. Poppa's credibility about her pain and limitations was compromised by her drug-seeking behavior.\"",
"sentence": "See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir.2009) (“Contrary to Ms. Poppa’s assertion that the only evidence of drug-seeking behavior is a ‘single, isolated remark in the record,’ ... there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Poppa’s credibility about her pain and limitations was compromised by her drug-seeking behavior.”); see also Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir.1995) (observing that claimant’s “drug-seeking behavior further discredits her allegations of disabling pain”); Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 520 (7th Cir.2009)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 777, 780",
"parenthetical": "observing that claimant's \"drug-seeking behavior further discredits her allegations of disabling pain\"",
"sentence": "See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir.2009) (“Contrary to Ms. Poppa’s assertion that the only evidence of drug-seeking behavior is a ‘single, isolated remark in the record,’ ... there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Poppa’s credibility about her pain and limitations was compromised by her drug-seeking behavior.”); see also Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir.1995) (observing that claimant’s “drug-seeking behavior further discredits her allegations of disabling pain”); Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 520 (7th Cir.2009)."
} | 4,342,598 | a |
Thus, Griffin is not serving a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, and Alleyne does not apply to his case. In any event, AUeyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "442 F.3d 1279, 1281-82",
"parenthetical": "holding the Apprendi rule does not apply retroactively in the context of a SS 2241 petition",
"sentence": "See Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2006) (holding the Apprendi rule does not apply retroactively in the context of a § 2241 petition); see also McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a § 2255 motion); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075-76, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1245, 1258",
"parenthetical": "holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a SS 2255 motion",
"sentence": "See Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2006) (holding the Apprendi rule does not apply retroactively in the context of a § 2241 petition); see also McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a § 2255 motion); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075-76, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)."
} | 4,169,490 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | b |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | b |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Although the United States is not a party to this case and is immune from any lawsuit brought against it by Staff Sergeant Maseth's estate and any contribution action brought against it by KBR, given the facts established by KBR regarding the military's decision-making at the base, the Court cannot preclude KBR from presenting its evidence which attempts to place responsibility on the military for the accident involving Staff Sergeant Maseth. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "United States immune from soldier's claim against United States military for injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Feres doctrine extended to bar third party's claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier's injuries incident to service",
"sentence": "See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (United States immune from soldier’s claim against United States military for injuries incident to service); see also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Feres doctrine extended to bar third party’s claim for contribution or indemnity against United States arising from soldier’s injuries incident to service). Simply put, to permit this case to go forward would place the military and its wartime practices on trial. As a consequence, this case must be dismissed."
} | 3,866,969 | a |
Moreover, DOMA does not preserve the status quo. The passage of DOMA marks a stark departure from tradition and a blatant disregard of the well-accepted concept of federalism in the area of domestic relations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "764 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1189",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]ection three of DOMA was a preemptive strike to bar federal legal recognition of same-sex marriages should certain states decide to allow them, rather than a law that furthered the status quo, which gave the states authority to define marriage for themselves.\"",
"sentence": "See Gill, 699 F.Supp.2d at 392 (finding that DOMA “mark[ed] the first time the federal government has ever attempted to legislatively mandate a uniform federal definition of marriage — or any other core concept of domestic relations, for that matter”); see also Dragovich, 764 F.Supp.2d at 1189 (“[S]ection three of DOMA was a preemptive strike to bar federal legal recognition of same-sex marriages should certain states decide to allow them, rather than a law that furthered the status quo, which gave the states authority to define marriage for themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "699 F.Supp.2d 392, 392",
"parenthetical": "finding that DOMA \"mark[ed] the first time the federal government has ever attempted to legislatively mandate a uniform federal definition of marriage -- or any other core concept of domestic relations, for that matter\"",
"sentence": "See Gill, 699 F.Supp.2d at 392 (finding that DOMA “mark[ed] the first time the federal government has ever attempted to legislatively mandate a uniform federal definition of marriage — or any other core concept of domestic relations, for that matter”); see also Dragovich, 764 F.Supp.2d at 1189 (“[S]ection three of DOMA was a preemptive strike to bar federal legal recognition of same-sex marriages should certain states decide to allow them, rather than a law that furthered the status quo, which gave the states authority to define marriage for themselves.”)."
} | 3,965,944 | b |
Keeping this framework in mind, Defendants' immunity-based affirmative defenses fail for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs are suing the individual Defendants in their official capacities, and therefore they are not entitled to any immunity that the Village does not also possess, meaning they cannot claim qualified or absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 522, 529",
"parenthetical": "\"To the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity, such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state.\"",
"sentence": "Sch. Dist., No. 02-CV-115, 2003 WL 23350123, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003) (“[The defendant] may not claim the defense of qualified immunity because he was sued in his official capacity.”); cf. Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d-Cir.l993) (“To the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity, such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2003 WL 23350123, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant] may not claim the defense of qualified immunity because he was sued in his official capacity.\"",
"sentence": "Sch. Dist., No. 02-CV-115, 2003 WL 23350123, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003) (“[The defendant] may not claim the defense of qualified immunity because he was sued in his official capacity.”); cf. Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d-Cir.l993) (“To the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity, such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state.”)."
} | 4,194,334 | b |
Therefore, the FDA properly applied its regulations and Barr when it concluded that Mylan's approval with a delayed effective date was a "tentative approval." Furthermore, there are clear public health and safety issues in play that require the FDA to give final effective approval before a generic drug can be introduced into the market. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "307 F.Supp.2d 19, 19",
"parenthetical": "adopting the FDA's argument that \"[approvals do not become effective by operation of law because the FDA has an ongoing health and safety responsibility to perform, and an applicant has no vested right to enter the market until the FDA gives its final formal approval\"",
"sentence": "Barr, 238 F.Supp.2d at 246 (“Significant events occurring prior to the effective date can, and often must, delay the effective date of ANDA approvals.”); see also Ranbaxy, 307 F.Supp.2d at 19 (adopting the FDA’s argument that “[approvals do not become effective by operation of law because the FDA has an ongoing health and safety responsibility to perform, and an applicant has no vested right to enter the market until the FDA gives its final formal approval”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 246, 246",
"parenthetical": "\"Significant events occurring prior to the effective date can, and often must, delay the effective date of ANDA approvals.\"",
"sentence": "Barr, 238 F.Supp.2d at 246 (“Significant events occurring prior to the effective date can, and often must, delay the effective date of ANDA approvals.”); see also Ranbaxy, 307 F.Supp.2d at 19 (adopting the FDA’s argument that “[approvals do not become effective by operation of law because the FDA has an ongoing health and safety responsibility to perform, and an applicant has no vested right to enter the market until the FDA gives its final formal approval”)."
} | 9,197,084 | b |
The district court also reduced the fees requested for time spent traveling to 17.5 hours at the hourly rate of $288, as opposed to the requested 35 hours at $375 per hour. Courts often reduce working and non-working travel time. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "526 F.3d 824, 828",
"parenthetical": "noting' that generally \"it is not an abuse of discretion to discount non-working (and even working",
"sentence": "See In re Babckock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (noting' that generally “it is not an abuse of discretion to discount non-working (and even working) travel time”); see also Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the hourly rate billed by 50% for travel time)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 F.3d 453, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the hourly rate billed by 50% for travel time",
"sentence": "See In re Babckock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (noting' that generally “it is not an abuse of discretion to discount non-working (and even working) travel time”); see also Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the hourly rate billed by 50% for travel time)."
} | 4,048,530 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 815, 820",
"parenthetical": "holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant's sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "842 N.E.2d 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that \"probation is derivative of criminal history\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 815, 820",
"parenthetical": "holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant's sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that \"parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 815, 820",
"parenthetical": "holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant's sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "111 P.3d 782, 782",
"parenthetical": "striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that \"parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"Blakely renders [it] impermissible\" for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 815, 820",
"parenthetical": "holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant's sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | 8,404,361 | b |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "842 N.E.2d 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that \"probation is derivative of criminal history\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 138, 142",
"parenthetical": "upholding trial judge's consideration of defendant's probationary status because \"the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | 8,404,361 | b |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 138, 142",
"parenthetical": "upholding trial judge's consideration of defendant's probationary status because \"the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that \"parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 138, 142",
"parenthetical": "upholding trial judge's consideration of defendant's probationary status because \"the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "111 P.3d 782, 782",
"parenthetical": "striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that \"parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"Blakely renders [it] impermissible\" for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 138, 142",
"parenthetical": "upholding trial judge's consideration of defendant's probationary status because \"the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | 8,404,361 | b |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "842 N.E.2d 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that \"probation is derivative of criminal history\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that \"parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "842 N.E.2d 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that \"probation is derivative of criminal history\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "111 P.3d 782, 782",
"parenthetical": "striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that \"parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses\"",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
We note that several courts have come to the same or a similar conclusion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "842 N.E.2d 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that \"probation is derivative of criminal history\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that the prior-conviction exception to Blakely permits a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on the fact that the defendant was on probation and under supervision at the time of the commission of the offense); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s probationary status because “the conviction itself and the type and length of a sentence imposed seem logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception”); cf. Ryle, 842 N.E.2d at 325, 323 n. 5 (holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, but declining to base this holding the theory that “probation is derivative of criminal history”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"Blakely renders [it] impermissible\" for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense",
"sentence": "But see State v. Jenkins, 199 Or.App. 384, 111 P.3d 782, 782 (2005) (striking down sentencing increase where judge found that defendant was on supervision because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense)."
} | 8,404,361 | a |
11 But contrary to the MMA, Congress has classified marijuana as a schedule I controlled substance. By doing so, "the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuang became a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research study." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "545 U.S. 1, 14",
"parenthetical": "state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"); accord Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo.App.2011) (\"Although Colorado's medical marijuana provision may protect claimant from prosecution under Colorado's criminal laws ... the amendment has no bearing on federal laws, under which marijuana remains an illegal substance.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.3d 850, 866",
"parenthetical": "rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"); accord Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo.App.2011) (\"Although Colorado's medical marijuana provision may protect claimant from prosecution under Colorado's criminal laws ... the amendment has no bearing on federal laws, under which marijuana remains an illegal substance.\")."
} | 6,850,817 | a |
11 But contrary to the MMA, Congress has classified marijuana as a schedule I controlled substance. By doing so, "the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuang became a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research study." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.3d 850, 866",
"parenthetical": "rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"); accord Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo.App.2011) (\"Although Colorado's medical marijuana provision may protect claimant from prosecution under Colorado's criminal laws ... the amendment has no bearing on federal laws, under which marijuana remains an illegal substance.\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"); accord Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo.App.2011) (\"Although Colorado's medical marijuana provision may protect claimant from prosecution under Colorado's criminal laws ... the amendment has no bearing on federal laws, under which marijuana remains an illegal substance.\")."
} | 6,850,817 | b |
11 But contrary to the MMA, Congress has classified marijuana as a schedule I controlled substance. By doing so, "the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuang became a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research study." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.3d 850, 866",
"parenthetical": "rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"); accord Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo.App.2011) (\"Although Colorado's medical marijuana provision may protect claimant from prosecution under Colorado's criminal laws ... the amendment has no bearing on federal laws, under which marijuana remains an illegal substance.\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (state law authorizing possession and cultivation of marijuana does not cireamseribe federal law prohibiting use and possession); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting due process liberty interest claim based on phy-gician's advice to use medical marijuana because \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering\"); accord Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo.App.2011) (\"Although Colorado's medical marijuana provision may protect claimant from prosecution under Colorado's criminal laws ... the amendment has no bearing on federal laws, under which marijuana remains an illegal substance.\")."
} | 6,850,817 | b |
However, the appellant in Laird framed the issue not as one of relevance, but as implicating prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court addressed it as such. Id. Of the other jurisdictions that have directly addressed the issues presented, our sister states generally have found such questioning proper, so long as the prosecution does not elicit superfluous facts from prior cases that might confuse the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 So.2d 786, 798",
"parenthetical": "\"We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.\"",
"sentence": "See Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 798 (Fla.2001) (“We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.”); State v. Irish, 807 So.2d 208, 213-14 (La.2002); Albarran v. State, 96 So.3d 131, 172-73 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), cert. quashed, 96 So.3d 216 (2012)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Bennett, 45 Cal.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535, 555-56 (2009) (attorney’s opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination)."
} | 4,280,994 | a |
However, the appellant in Laird framed the issue not as one of relevance, but as implicating prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court addressed it as such. Id. Of the other jurisdictions that have directly addressed the issues presented, our sister states generally have found such questioning proper, so long as the prosecution does not elicit superfluous facts from prior cases that might confuse the jury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Bennett, 45 Cal.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535, 555-56 (2009) (attorney’s opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 So.2d 786, 798",
"parenthetical": "\"We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.\"",
"sentence": "See Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 798 (Fla.2001) (“We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.”); State v. Irish, 807 So.2d 208, 213-14 (La.2002); Albarran v. State, 96 So.3d 131, 172-73 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), cert. quashed, 96 So.3d 216 (2012)."
} | 4,280,994 | b |
However, the appellant in Laird framed the issue not as one of relevance, but as implicating prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court addressed it as such. Id. Of the other jurisdictions that have directly addressed the issues presented, our sister states generally have found such questioning proper, so long as the prosecution does not elicit superfluous facts from prior cases that might confuse the jury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "199 P.3d 535, 555-56",
"parenthetical": "attorney's opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination",
"sentence": "Cf. People v. Bennett, 45 Cal.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535, 555-56 (2009) (attorney’s opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 So.2d 786, 798",
"parenthetical": "\"We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.\"",
"sentence": "See Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 798 (Fla.2001) (“We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.”); State v. Irish, 807 So.2d 208, 213-14 (La.2002); Albarran v. State, 96 So.3d 131, 172-73 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), cert. quashed, 96 So.3d 216 (2012)."
} | 4,280,994 | b |
. We note that the outcome of the first stage will essentially resolve the question of whether plaintiffs can properly rely on the "continuing violation" doctrine and seek relief for alleged acts of discrimination occurring more than 300 days prior to the filing of Thiessen's EEOC charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "232 F.3d 1008, 1015-16",
"parenthetical": "\"The second way to establish a continuing violation is to show a systematic policy or practice ol discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period -- a systemic violation.\"",
"sentence": "See Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir.1993) (indicating plaintiffs can invoke continuing violation doctrine by demonstrating \"the maintenance of a company-wide policy of discrimination both before and during the limitations period”); see also Morgan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir.2000) (“The second way to establish a continuing violation is to show a systematic policy or practice ol discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period — a systemic violation.”); Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 1025, 1028",
"parenthetical": "indicating plaintiffs can invoke continuing violation doctrine by demonstrating \"the maintenance of a company-wide policy of discrimination both before and during the limitations period\"",
"sentence": "See Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir.1993) (indicating plaintiffs can invoke continuing violation doctrine by demonstrating \"the maintenance of a company-wide policy of discrimination both before and during the limitations period”); see also Morgan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir.2000) (“The second way to establish a continuing violation is to show a systematic policy or practice ol discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period — a systemic violation.”); Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur."
} | 11,091,434 | b |
This court presumes that in a case of persecution by a governmental body such as a national police force, the government has the ability to persecute the applicant throughout the country. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 F.Supp. 321, 321",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"a police force controlled by the national government ... would presumably be capable of locating petitioner in other regions of India\" and that \"petitioner's ability to avoid further persecution by relocating inconspicuously may be limited by his manner of religious dress and his inability to speak the languages or dialects of other regions of India\"",
"sentence": "See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.1986) (government persecution not limited to one geographical area); Singh, 801 F.Supp. at 321 (noting that “a police force controlled by the national government ... would presumably be capable of locating petitioner in other regions of India” and that “petitioner’s ability to avoid further persecution by relocating inconspicuously may be limited by his manner of religious dress and his inability to speak the languages or dialects of other regions of India”) (citing Damaize-Job); cf. Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir.1990) (relocation not an option where persecutor is a death squad with “the power to enforce its will”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "912 F.2d 1027, 1030",
"parenthetical": "relocation not an option where persecutor is a death squad with \"the power to enforce its will\"",
"sentence": "See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.1986) (government persecution not limited to one geographical area); Singh, 801 F.Supp. at 321 (noting that “a police force controlled by the national government ... would presumably be capable of locating petitioner in other regions of India” and that “petitioner’s ability to avoid further persecution by relocating inconspicuously may be limited by his manner of religious dress and his inability to speak the languages or dialects of other regions of India”) (citing Damaize-Job); cf. Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir.1990) (relocation not an option where persecutor is a death squad with “the power to enforce its will”)."
} | 7,416,663 | a |
Since there exists no written contract signed by Tudor or its agent, Albrecht's claim for breach of contract is invalid as a matter of law and summary judgment must enter in favor of the defendants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 Mass.App.Ct. 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "whether a sufficient writing exists is a question of law for the court",
"sentence": "See Simon v. Simon, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 705, 709 (1994) (whether a sufficient writing exists is a question of law for the court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "303 Mass. 207, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the statute of frauds is pleaded, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that a sufficient writing exists",
"sentence": "See also Bogash v. Studios, Inc., 303 Mass. 207, 207-08 (1939) (holding that where the statute of frauds is pleaded, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that a sufficient writing exists)."
} | 9,475,620 | a |
The Hude court, interpreting Sec. 110, noted the lack of a bright-line rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | 632,940 | a |
The Hude court, interpreting Sec. 110, noted the lack of a bright-line rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | 632,940 | a |
The Hude court, interpreting Sec. 110, noted the lack of a bright-line rule. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | 632,940 | b |
The Hude court, interpreting Sec. 110, noted the lack of a bright-line rule. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981) (possession of heroin and a gun at precisely the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981) (possession of marijuana and LSD at the same time); but see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 325 Pa.Super. 465, 473 A.2d 161 (1984) (no logical relationship between the contemporaneous crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance)."
} | 632,940 | b |
The Government contends that the DEA agents did have Torres' consent. However, assuming the agents did not have consent, the remainder of the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 46, 49",
"parenthetical": "ultimate inquiry on motion to suppress is not whether underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally seized evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, lawful information in affidavit suffices to show probable cause",
"sentence": "United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1982) (ultimate inquiry on motion to suppress is not whether underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally seized evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, lawful information in affidavit suffices to show probable cause); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980); see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554-56, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1845-46, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see e.g., James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1969) (“when an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information that is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant”); United States v. Epstein, 240 F.Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (Weinfeld, J.) (“[W]hen a warrant issues upon an affidavit containing both proper and improper grounds, and the proper ground — considered alone — are more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, inclusion of the improper grounds does not vitiate the entire affidavit and invalidate the warrant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 1150, 1151",
"parenthetical": "\"when an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information that is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1982) (ultimate inquiry on motion to suppress is not whether underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally seized evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, lawful information in affidavit suffices to show probable cause); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980); see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554-56, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1845-46, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see e.g., James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1969) (“when an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information that is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant”); United States v. Epstein, 240 F.Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (Weinfeld, J.) (“[W]hen a warrant issues upon an affidavit containing both proper and improper grounds, and the proper ground — considered alone — are more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, inclusion of the improper grounds does not vitiate the entire affidavit and invalidate the warrant”)."
} | 3,533,553 | a |
The Government contends that the DEA agents did have Torres' consent. However, assuming the agents did not have consent, the remainder of the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "240 F.Supp. 80, 82",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a warrant issues upon an affidavit containing both proper and improper grounds, and the proper ground -- considered alone -- are more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, inclusion of the improper grounds does not vitiate the entire affidavit and invalidate the warrant\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1982) (ultimate inquiry on motion to suppress is not whether underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally seized evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, lawful information in affidavit suffices to show probable cause); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980); see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554-56, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1845-46, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see e.g., James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1969) (“when an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information that is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant”); United States v. Epstein, 240 F.Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (Weinfeld, J.) (“[W]hen a warrant issues upon an affidavit containing both proper and improper grounds, and the proper ground — considered alone — are more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, inclusion of the improper grounds does not vitiate the entire affidavit and invalidate the warrant”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 46, 49",
"parenthetical": "ultimate inquiry on motion to suppress is not whether underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally seized evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, lawful information in affidavit suffices to show probable cause",
"sentence": "United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1982) (ultimate inquiry on motion to suppress is not whether underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally seized evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, lawful information in affidavit suffices to show probable cause); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980); see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554-56, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1845-46, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see e.g., James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1969) (“when an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information that is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant”); United States v. Epstein, 240 F.Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (Weinfeld, J.) (“[W]hen a warrant issues upon an affidavit containing both proper and improper grounds, and the proper ground — considered alone — are more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, inclusion of the improper grounds does not vitiate the entire affidavit and invalidate the warrant”)."
} | 3,533,553 | b |
Other courts take a different view of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). Unless a corporation can prove that information was unknown or inaccessible, it "cannot later proffer new or different allegations that could have been made at the time of the 30(b)(6) deposition." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]f the designee testifies that [the corporation] does not know the answer. . . [it] will not be allowed effectively to change its answer by introducing evidence during trial\"",
"sentence": "Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (1998) (binding a corporation to 30(b)(6) testimony where it offered an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that contained a different theory of facts); see also Ierardi v. Lorillard, Inc., 1991 WL 158911, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11887 (E.D. Pa.) (Mem.) (\"[i]f the designee testifies that [the corporation] does not know the answer. . . [it] will not be allowed effectively to change its answer by introducing evidence during trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94",
"parenthetical": "binding a corporation to 30(b)(6) testimony where it offered an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that contained a different theory of facts",
"sentence": "Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (1998) (binding a corporation to 30(b)(6) testimony where it offered an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that contained a different theory of facts); see also Ierardi v. Lorillard, Inc., 1991 WL 158911, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11887 (E.D. Pa.) (Mem.) (\"[i]f the designee testifies that [the corporation] does not know the answer. . . [it] will not be allowed effectively to change its answer by introducing evidence during trial”)."
} | 1,349,976 | b |
Other courts take a different view of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). Unless a corporation can prove that information was unknown or inaccessible, it "cannot later proffer new or different allegations that could have been made at the time of the 30(b)(6) deposition." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94",
"parenthetical": "binding a corporation to 30(b)(6) testimony where it offered an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that contained a different theory of facts",
"sentence": "Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (1998) (binding a corporation to 30(b)(6) testimony where it offered an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that contained a different theory of facts); see also Ierardi v. Lorillard, Inc., 1991 WL 158911, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11887 (E.D. Pa.) (Mem.) (\"[i]f the designee testifies that [the corporation] does not know the answer. . . [it] will not be allowed effectively to change its answer by introducing evidence during trial”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]f the designee testifies that [the corporation] does not know the answer. . . [it] will not be allowed effectively to change its answer by introducing evidence during trial\"",
"sentence": "Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (1998) (binding a corporation to 30(b)(6) testimony where it offered an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment that contained a different theory of facts); see also Ierardi v. Lorillard, Inc., 1991 WL 158911, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11887 (E.D. Pa.) (Mem.) (\"[i]f the designee testifies that [the corporation] does not know the answer. . . [it] will not be allowed effectively to change its answer by introducing evidence during trial”)."
} | 1,349,976 | a |
Although the district court allowed this suit to proceed to summary judgment, it needn't have waited that long, for Henderson's claims are so obviously frivolous as to preclude subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "347 F.3d 995, 997",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] frivolous suit does not engage the jurisdiction of the district court.\"",
"sentence": "See Buntrock v. S.E.C., 347 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir.2003) (“[A] frivolous suit does not engage the jurisdiction of the district court.”); Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1994); cf. Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir.2002) (applying the same principle in the context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "302 F.3d 773, 774",
"parenthetical": "applying the same principle in the context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act",
"sentence": "See Buntrock v. S.E.C., 347 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir.2003) (“[A] frivolous suit does not engage the jurisdiction of the district court.”); Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1994); cf. Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir.2002) (applying the same principle in the context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act)."
} | 1,482,353 | a |
While Woods did ask the district court to postpone its ruling until he could depose Flores and the officers, he did not file an affidavit outlining his reasons for needing further discovery as contemplated by Rule 56(f). This alone justifies affirmance of the district court's decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "41 F.3d 296, 302-03",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court was precluded from considering whether the district court had abused its discretion in ruling on defendant's summary judgment motion before allowing plaintiff to conduct requested discovery where the plaintiff had not filed an affidavit pursuant to rule 56(f",
"sentence": "See Wallace v. Tilley, 41 F.3d 296, 302-03 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that the court was precluded from considering whether the district court had abused its discretion in ruling on defendant’s summary judgment motion before allowing plaintiff to conduct requested discovery where the plaintiff had not filed an affidavit pursuant to rule 56(f), and stating that “ ‘when a party does not avail himself of relief under Rule 56(f), it is generally not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule on the motion for summary judgment’ ” (citation omitted)); see also Jones v. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Company of Indianapolis, 42 F.3d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir.1994); Kinney v. Indiana Youth Ctr., 950 F.2d 462, 466 (7th Cir.1991); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339 n. 3 (10th Cir.1996); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 926 (2d Cir.1985) (collecting cases); see also Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.1992) (ruling that unverified statements in an attorney’s memoranda of law alleging a need for a continuance on a motion for summary judgment pending further discovery were insufficient as grounds for a continuance under Rule 56(f), and stating that “[a]dvocacy by counsel does not suffice for evidence or fact in the Rule 56(f) context.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "962 F.2d 1517, 1522",
"parenthetical": "ruling that unverified statements in an attorney's memoranda of law alleging a need for a continuance on a motion for summary judgment pending further discovery were insufficient as grounds for a continuance under Rule 56(f",
"sentence": "See Wallace v. Tilley, 41 F.3d 296, 302-03 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that the court was precluded from considering whether the district court had abused its discretion in ruling on defendant’s summary judgment motion before allowing plaintiff to conduct requested discovery where the plaintiff had not filed an affidavit pursuant to rule 56(f), and stating that “ ‘when a party does not avail himself of relief under Rule 56(f), it is generally not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule on the motion for summary judgment’ ” (citation omitted)); see also Jones v. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Company of Indianapolis, 42 F.3d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir.1994); Kinney v. Indiana Youth Ctr., 950 F.2d 462, 466 (7th Cir.1991); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339 n. 3 (10th Cir.1996); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 926 (2d Cir.1985) (collecting cases); see also Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.1992) (ruling that unverified statements in an attorney’s memoranda of law alleging a need for a continuance on a motion for summary judgment pending further discovery were insufficient as grounds for a continuance under Rule 56(f), and stating that “[a]dvocacy by counsel does not suffice for evidence or fact in the Rule 56(f) context.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 11,151,342 | a |
The administrative defendants have stated that the list has a dollar value of zero. CREW may not agree with this value, but that does not change the fact that CREW has already received that to which it is entitled under the administrative process. The Court will not require the FEC to go through the motions of a process that has already been completed when doing so would yield no new or useful information. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "335 F.Supp.2d 39, 48",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"since the process has progressed as specified in the statute, it seems that [the] plaintifff ] ha[s] received everything [it] is entitled to under the FECA\"",
"sentence": "See Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1074 (D.C.Cir.2001) (stating that informational injury will not be found if plaintiff cannot show that the legal ruling sought “might lead to additional factual information”); see also Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F.Supp.2d 39, 48 (D.D.C.2004) (stating that “since the process has progressed as specified in the statute, it seems that [the] plaintifff ] ha[s] received everything [it] is entitled to under the FECA”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 1070, 1074",
"parenthetical": "stating that informational injury will not be found if plaintiff cannot show that the legal ruling sought \"might lead to additional factual information\"",
"sentence": "See Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1074 (D.C.Cir.2001) (stating that informational injury will not be found if plaintiff cannot show that the legal ruling sought “might lead to additional factual information”); see also Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F.Supp.2d 39, 48 (D.D.C.2004) (stating that “since the process has progressed as specified in the statute, it seems that [the] plaintifff ] ha[s] received everything [it] is entitled to under the FECA”)."
} | 1,611,131 | b |
A court must to exclude hours that reflect "the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to non-professionals or less experienced associates". This proposition, however, presupposes that the attorneys charging maximum rates readily have junior associates and supporting paralegals at his or her disposal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 WL 1167658, *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks",
"sentence": "See Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (D.N.J.1984) (finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office); see also Roldan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., Civ. A. No. 95-6649, 1999 WL 1167658, *4, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19093, at *14_15 (E.D.Pa.1999) (holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office",
"sentence": "See Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (D.N.J.1984) (finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office); see also Roldan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., Civ. A. No. 95-6649, 1999 WL 1167658, *4, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19093, at *14_15 (E.D.Pa.1999) (holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks)."
} | 9,322,913 | b |
A court must to exclude hours that reflect "the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to non-professionals or less experienced associates". This proposition, however, presupposes that the attorneys charging maximum rates readily have junior associates and supporting paralegals at his or her disposal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks",
"sentence": "See Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (D.N.J.1984) (finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office); see also Roldan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., Civ. A. No. 95-6649, 1999 WL 1167658, *4, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19093, at *14_15 (E.D.Pa.1999) (holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office",
"sentence": "See Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (D.N.J.1984) (finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office); see also Roldan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., Civ. A. No. 95-6649, 1999 WL 1167658, *4, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19093, at *14_15 (E.D.Pa.1999) (holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks)."
} | 9,322,913 | b |
To be sure, she should be commended for making several payments in the past. But she did not seriously consider the income contingent plan under the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "debtors did not prove good faith when they did not consider applying for the income contingent plan, even though the court was not certain they were even eligible for the plan",
"sentence": "See Tirch, 409 F.3d at 682-83 (debtor did not illustrate good faith when she did not take advantage of the William D. Ford Income Contingent Repayment plan); see also Alderete, 412 F.3d at 1206 & n. 1 (debtors did not prove good faith when they did not consider applying for the income contingent plan, even though the court was not certain they were even eligible for the plan)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 682, 682-83",
"parenthetical": "debtor did not illustrate good faith when she did not take advantage of the William D. Ford Income Contingent Repayment plan",
"sentence": "See Tirch, 409 F.3d at 682-83 (debtor did not illustrate good faith when she did not take advantage of the William D. Ford Income Contingent Repayment plan); see also Alderete, 412 F.3d at 1206 & n. 1 (debtors did not prove good faith when they did not consider applying for the income contingent plan, even though the court was not certain they were even eligible for the plan)."
} | 881,122 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 365, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 478, 496",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 365, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 365, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 365, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 37, 47, 48",
"parenthetical": "finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 365, 386",
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 887, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 478, 496",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 37, 47, 48",
"parenthetical": "finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 887, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 478, 496",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.\"",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 37, 47, 48",
"parenthetical": "finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | b |
The case law describes two lines of cases. In one line, the record may show counsel's entire performance fell below the constitutional minimum. In the other, the record may indicate that counsel, for the most part, provided adequate performance, yet he or she committed a single, critical error that renders the representation ineffective. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel's \"total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery\" constituted ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 887, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance",
"sentence": "Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (holding that counsel’s “total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” constituted ineffective assistance); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (“[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (finding failure to object to untimely filing that resulted in unlawful mandatory minimum sentence was ineffective assistance); Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that failure to raise issue of inadmissible hearsay constituted deficient performance)."
} | 4,269,078 | a |
As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06",
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | a |
As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06",
"parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle",
"sentence": "Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury)."
} | 1,204,108 | b |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "715 F.2d 498, 501",
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | b |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | b |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | a |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | a |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | b |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | b |
With respect to Lear's psychological records, Driver argues that the prosecution suppressed a psychological report that was prepared for Lear's sentencing on counterfeiting charges, Lear pled guilty and the report was prepared in the Southern District of Indiana, while Driver was prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Without deciding whether the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois possessed, for the purpose of Brady discovery, information included in a presentence report prepared for a United States District Court for another district, we do not believe the report is material. When he recalled Lear to the stand, Driver elicited the contents of the report, that is, that Lear was addicted to cocaine and marijuana. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness's drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir.1982) (nondisclosure of medical reports concerning witness’s drug addiction was not prejudicial because contents of reports were elicited on cross-examination); see also United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501 (11th Cir.) (psychological report was not material because underlying facts were elicited on cross-examination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 507, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 (1983) & 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S.Ct. 1413, 79 L.Ed.2d 739 (1984)."
} | 1,610,204 | a |
Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 713, 713",
"parenthetical": "noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 A.2d 790, 794",
"parenthetical": "stating \"secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits\"",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | 8,979,267 | a |
Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "894 F.2d 1358, 1358-59",
"parenthetical": "holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 713, 713",
"parenthetical": "noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | 8,979,267 | b |
Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 F.Supp. 737, 737-39",
"parenthetical": "dismissing pastor's suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 713, 713",
"parenthetical": "noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | 8,979,267 | b |
Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 A.2d 790, 794",
"parenthetical": "stating \"secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits\"",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | 8,979,267 | a |
Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "894 F.2d 1358, 1358-59",
"parenthetical": "holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | 8,979,267 | a |
Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 F.Supp. 737, 737-39",
"parenthetical": "dismissing pastor's suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution",
"sentence": "See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference, v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating “secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church’s Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor’s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution)."
} | 8,979,267 | a |
In avoiding unwarranted disparities, as in evaluating other key sentencing factors, district courts have enormous discretion. The Supreme Court has consistently instructed us, and we have reminded ourselves, that the appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the district judge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 81, 97",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,877,768 | a |
In avoiding unwarranted disparities, as in evaluating other key sentencing factors, district courts have enormous discretion. The Supreme Court has consistently instructed us, and we have reminded ourselves, that the appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the district judge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,877,768 | b |
In avoiding unwarranted disparities, as in evaluating other key sentencing factors, district courts have enormous discretion. The Supreme Court has consistently instructed us, and we have reminded ourselves, that the appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the district judge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,877,768 | b |
The harm Mr. Ilioi experienced as a child -- including being taunted, ridiculed, and beaten by teachers at grade school for being Pentecostal, and having rocks thrown at him by schoolmates -- does not rise to the level of persecution. Persecution is the "infliction of suffering or harm ... in a way regarded as offensive and requires more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty." Taunts and ridicule do not constitute persecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "573 F.3d 968, 977",
"parenthetical": "\"Verbal taunts, while offensive, fall within the bounds of harassment and discrimination, not persecution.\"",
"sentence": "See Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir.2009) (“Verbal taunts, while offensive, fall within the bounds of harassment and discrimination, not persecution.”); see also Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1124 (finding that multiple beatings by Muslim classmates, two involving serious injury, and repeated confrontations by people demanding money, all on account of Indonesian alien’s Christian religion did not amount to persecution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "503 F.3d 1124, 1124",
"parenthetical": "finding that multiple beatings by Muslim classmates, two involving serious injury, and repeated confrontations by people demanding money, all on account of Indonesian alien's Christian religion did not amount to persecution",
"sentence": "See Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir.2009) (“Verbal taunts, while offensive, fall within the bounds of harassment and discrimination, not persecution.”); see also Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1124 (finding that multiple beatings by Muslim classmates, two involving serious injury, and repeated confrontations by people demanding money, all on account of Indonesian alien’s Christian religion did not amount to persecution)."
} | 4,087,481 | a |
This case, however, is more akin to the physical trait cases. Tattoos which are openly visible on the body are physical traits, as are voice, appearance, and handwriting. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1314, 1815-16",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant need not take the stand to be able to show the jury the tattoos on his hands which were an openly visible physical characteristic",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1815-16 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that a defendant need not take the stand to be able to show the jury the tattoos on his hands which were an openly visible physical characteristic)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "461 F.3d 441, 446-47",
"parenthetical": "holding that a demonstration by the defendant that he could not physically wear the fanny pack as alleged by the police is not testimonial evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, 446-47 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that a demonstration by the defendant that he could not physically wear the fanny pack as alleged by the police is not testimonial evidence)."
} | 5,727,457 | a |
Because the Defendant has failed to make the requisite statistical showing for any of the allegedly underrepresented groups, the Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim fails and the Court need not address the third prong of the Duren test. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "147 F.3d 1273, 1273",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant failed to make out a prima facie test when he could not satisfy the statistical showing required by the second Duren element and declining to analyze the third element",
"sentence": "See Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273 (holding that the defendant failed to make out a prima facie test when he could not satisfy the statistical showing required by the second Duren element and declining to analyze the third element)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "948 F.Supp. 986, 986",
"parenthetical": "stating that even insignificant disparities may rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation if the selection process is not neutral",
"sentence": "But see Haworth, 948 F.Supp. at 986 (stating that even insignificant disparities may rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation if the selection process is not neutral)."
} | 3,791,487 | a |
In this case, the provenance of the wet substance on which Coale slipped remains a total mystery. There is simply no evidence that Metro-North or NHPA put it there. Nor is there such a dearth of alternatives, as there was in Hairston and Corsale, to conclude by way of inference that only Metro-North or NHPA could have been responsible for the spill. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "92 F.3d 702, 709",
"parenthetical": "\"a possessor will be deemed to have had actual notice if it is affirmatively shoum that an agent or employee of the possessor created the dangerous condition\"",
"sentence": "See Holbrook v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 414 F.3d at 745 (declining to find that defendant had created dangerous condition on grounds that defendant was not “clear cause ” of plaintiffs injuries) (emphasis added); see also Scheerer v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 92 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir.1996) (“a possessor will be deemed to have had actual notice if it is affirmatively shoum that an agent or employee of the possessor created the dangerous condition”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 F.3d 745, 745",
"parenthetical": "declining to find that defendant had created dangerous condition on grounds that defendant was not \"clear cause \" of plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See Holbrook v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 414 F.3d at 745 (declining to find that defendant had created dangerous condition on grounds that defendant was not “clear cause ” of plaintiffs injuries) (emphasis added); see also Scheerer v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 92 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir.1996) (“a possessor will be deemed to have had actual notice if it is affirmatively shoum that an agent or employee of the possessor created the dangerous condition”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,327,202 | b |
Prior to the issuance of Johnson, we had held that, although a statistical disparity could be sufficient to make a prima facie inference of bias, such a presumption could be dispelled by other relevant circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 F.3d 1091, 1091",
"parenthetical": "'We sometimes consider whether the context in which a defendant made a Batson objection changes the significance of a statistical pattern in the exercise of peremptory challenges.\"",
"sentence": "See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1091 (‘We sometimes consider whether the context in which a defendant made a Batson objection changes the significance of a statistical pattern in the exercise of peremptory challenges.”); see also Fernandez, 286 F.3d at 1079 (“Under Batson, we must consider ‘all relevant circumstances’ surrounding the challenges.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "286 F.3d 1079, 1079",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Batson, we must consider 'all relevant circumstances' surrounding the challenges.\"",
"sentence": "See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1091 (‘We sometimes consider whether the context in which a defendant made a Batson objection changes the significance of a statistical pattern in the exercise of peremptory challenges.”); see also Fernandez, 286 F.3d at 1079 (“Under Batson, we must consider ‘all relevant circumstances’ surrounding the challenges.”)."
} | 556,383 | a |
The bank draft is affirmative evidence of a conversion in the amount of $60,000, and the record is devoid of any denial by the appellee as to its conversion. Therefore, the $60,000 represents a sum certain, liquidated damage amount. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "216 Ga. App. 143, 144",
"parenthetical": "wherein the amount of damages in a conversion action was evidenced by several deposit slips and undisputed by a defaulting defendant",
"sentence": "See Jennings Enterprises v. Carte, 224 Ga. App. 538, 541 (4) (481 SE2d 541) (1997) (the term “liquidation” means “an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law” (emphasis supplied) and that “[t]he word liquidated,’ as used in the statute[,] means settled, acknowledged, or agreed”); see also Ward v. Dollar, 216 Ga. App. 143, 144 (453 SE2d 142) (1995) (wherein the amount of damages in a conversion action was evidenced by several deposit slips and undisputed by a defaulting defendant); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 831 (397 SE2d 567) (1990) (wherein the amount of damages averred in the ex delicto claim was identical to damages under the ex contractu claim in the same complaint and undisputed by the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "224 Ga. App. 538, 541",
"parenthetical": "the term \"liquidation\" means \"an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See Jennings Enterprises v. Carte, 224 Ga. App. 538, 541 (4) (481 SE2d 541) (1997) (the term “liquidation” means “an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law” (emphasis supplied) and that “[t]he word liquidated,’ as used in the statute[,] means settled, acknowledged, or agreed”); see also Ward v. Dollar, 216 Ga. App. 143, 144 (453 SE2d 142) (1995) (wherein the amount of damages in a conversion action was evidenced by several deposit slips and undisputed by a defaulting defendant); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 831 (397 SE2d 567) (1990) (wherein the amount of damages averred in the ex delicto claim was identical to damages under the ex contractu claim in the same complaint and undisputed by the defendant)."
} | 411,060 | b |
The bank draft is affirmative evidence of a conversion in the amount of $60,000, and the record is devoid of any denial by the appellee as to its conversion. Therefore, the $60,000 represents a sum certain, liquidated damage amount. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "224 Ga. App. 538, 541",
"parenthetical": "the term \"liquidation\" means \"an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law\" (emphasis supplied",
"sentence": "See Jennings Enterprises v. Carte, 224 Ga. App. 538, 541 (4) (481 SE2d 541) (1997) (the term “liquidation” means “an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law” (emphasis supplied) and that “[t]he word liquidated,’ as used in the statute[,] means settled, acknowledged, or agreed”); see also Ward v. Dollar, 216 Ga. App. 143, 144 (453 SE2d 142) (1995) (wherein the amount of damages in a conversion action was evidenced by several deposit slips and undisputed by a defaulting defendant); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 831 (397 SE2d 567) (1990) (wherein the amount of damages averred in the ex delicto claim was identical to damages under the ex contractu claim in the same complaint and undisputed by the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Ga. App. 825, 831",
"parenthetical": "wherein the amount of damages averred in the ex delicto claim was identical to damages under the ex contractu claim in the same complaint and undisputed by the defendant",
"sentence": "See Jennings Enterprises v. Carte, 224 Ga. App. 538, 541 (4) (481 SE2d 541) (1997) (the term “liquidation” means “an amount certain and fixed, either by act and agreement of the parties, or by operation of law” (emphasis supplied) and that “[t]he word liquidated,’ as used in the statute[,] means settled, acknowledged, or agreed”); see also Ward v. Dollar, 216 Ga. App. 143, 144 (453 SE2d 142) (1995) (wherein the amount of damages in a conversion action was evidenced by several deposit slips and undisputed by a defaulting defendant); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 831 (397 SE2d 567) (1990) (wherein the amount of damages averred in the ex delicto claim was identical to damages under the ex contractu claim in the same complaint and undisputed by the defendant)."
} | 411,060 | a |
Our original decision in this case recognized that "a rule of law which has its origins in the common law and which has not been specifically enacted by the legislature may be modified or abolished by the courts when such revision is mandated by changed conditions." Every jurisdiction that has thus far abolished the tort of alienation of a spouse's affections has done so legislatively. However, the mere fact that the legislatures in these other states abolished the cause of action before the question of abolition was properly presented to the respective courts, does not mean that every state court must wait for the legislature to focus its attention on this subject. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 N.W.2d 128, 129, 134",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the question of abolition of the action for alienation of affections is a matter that can be decided by the state courts, and then holding that the action will continue to exist",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Doe,_Mass__, 390 N.E.2d 730, 732-33 (1979) (recognizing that the state courts have the power to abolish the tort of alienation of affections); see also Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129, 134 (Iowa 1978) (recognizing that the question of abolition of the action for alienation of affections is a matter that can be decided by the state courts, and then holding that the action will continue to exist). In the instant case, the question of abolition of the action has been squarely presented to the courts of this state and, since the action was created judicially, the courts have the power to resolve this question."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 N.E.2d 730, 732-33",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the state courts have the power to abolish the tort of alienation of affections",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Doe v. Doe,_Mass__, 390 N.E.2d 730, 732-33 (1979) (recognizing that the state courts have the power to abolish the tort of alienation of affections); see also Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129, 134 (Iowa 1978) (recognizing that the question of abolition of the action for alienation of affections is a matter that can be decided by the state courts, and then holding that the action will continue to exist). In the instant case, the question of abolition of the action has been squarely presented to the courts of this state and, since the action was created judicially, the courts have the power to resolve this question."
} | 1,164,049 | b |
We first examine whether we have jurisdiction over this petition. The amended statute applies to petitioner because she filed her petition after the effective date of the amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1151, 1155",
"parenthetical": "provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1155, 1155",
"parenthetical": "noting the government conceded judicial review was available for \"substantial\" constitutional errors",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | 11,909,598 | a |
We first examine whether we have jurisdiction over this petition. The amended statute applies to petitioner because she filed her petition after the effective date of the amendment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1155, 1155",
"parenthetical": "noting the government conceded judicial review was available for \"substantial\" constitutional errors",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 309, 311",
"parenthetical": "provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | 11,909,598 | b |
We first examine whether we have jurisdiction over this petition. The amended statute applies to petitioner because she filed her petition after the effective date of the amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1155, 1155",
"parenthetical": "noting the government conceded judicial review was available for \"substantial\" constitutional errors",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | 11,909,598 | a |
We first examine whether we have jurisdiction over this petition. The amended statute applies to petitioner because she filed her petition after the effective date of the amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1155, 1155",
"parenthetical": "noting the government conceded judicial review was available for \"substantial\" constitutional errors",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.1997) (provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 govern petitions for review pending on the date of enactment). Despite this constraint on judicial review, the Third Circuit has held that when “constitutional rights applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute.” Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997); cf. Fernandez, 113 F.3d at 1155 (noting the government conceded judicial review was available for “substantial” constitutional errors)."
} | 11,909,598 | a |
Subsets and Splits