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Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "558 U.S. 30, 41",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | b |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "558 U.S. 30, 41",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "558 U.S. 30, 41",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 447, 454",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 U.S. 302, 319",
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 447, 454",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 447, 454",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 447, 454",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 447, 454",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 447, 454",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | b |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 U.S. 302, 319",
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | b |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
A statute may be ambiguous if it is silent on an issue that would be expected to be within its scope. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "968 P.2d 112, 117",
"parenthetical": "\"If explicit statutory provisions are ambiguous or silent regarding the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with the legislature's objectives.\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Colo.1988) (silence of statute as to its applicability to crimes committed prior to but continuing beyond its effective date \"creates an ambiguity with respect to the reach of the statute\"); see also Buckley v. Chilcutt, 968 P.2d 112, 117 (Colo.1998) (\"If explicit statutory provisions are ambiguous or silent regarding the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with the legislature's objectives.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "764 P.2d 1182, 1189",
"parenthetical": "silence of statute as to its applicability to crimes committed prior to but continuing beyond its effective date \"creates an ambiguity with respect to the reach of the statute\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Colo.1988) (silence of statute as to its applicability to crimes committed prior to but continuing beyond its effective date \"creates an ambiguity with respect to the reach of the statute\"); see also Buckley v. Chilcutt, 968 P.2d 112, 117 (Colo.1998) (\"If explicit statutory provisions are ambiguous or silent regarding the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with the legislature's objectives.\")."
} | 8,218,945 | b |
There, the statutory language clearly and unmistakably limits the City's home-rule authority to restrict the rights of other entities to contract for the removal of grease, grit, lint, and sand trap waste. Unlike the language in subsection (h), the language in subsection (f) operates independently of any general grant of authority conferred by the Code and reads similarly to the language construed as unmistakably clear legislative intent in Laredo Merchants. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "7 S.W.3d 109, 122-23",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that silence will not be construed as unmistakably clear legislative intent to limit a home-rule city's authority on an issue",
"sentence": "See Laredo Merchs., 2016 WL 4376627, at *5 (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0961) (“A local government ... may not adopt an ordinance ... to ... prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law[.]”); S. Crushed Concrete, 398 S.W.3d at 679 (holding that a statute stating that “a city ordinance ‘may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under [the Act] or the [C]ommission’s rules or orders’ ” was unmistakably clear); cf. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 122-23 (Tex. 1998) (reasoning that silence will not be construed as unmistakably clear legislative intent to limit a home-rule city’s authority on an issue). In contrast, the language in subsection (h) is not unmistakably clear in this regard and, at best, appears to only define the limitations of the section itself — as opposed to the City’s limitations."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 S.W.3d 679, 679",
"parenthetical": "holding that a statute stating that \"a city ordinance 'may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under [the Act] or the [C]ommission's rules or orders' \" was unmistakably clear",
"sentence": "See Laredo Merchs., 2016 WL 4376627, at *5 (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0961) (“A local government ... may not adopt an ordinance ... to ... prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law[.]”); S. Crushed Concrete, 398 S.W.3d at 679 (holding that a statute stating that “a city ordinance ‘may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under [the Act] or the [C]ommission’s rules or orders’ ” was unmistakably clear); cf. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 122-23 (Tex. 1998) (reasoning that silence will not be construed as unmistakably clear legislative intent to limit a home-rule city’s authority on an issue). In contrast, the language in subsection (h) is not unmistakably clear in this regard and, at best, appears to only define the limitations of the section itself — as opposed to the City’s limitations."
} | 12,277,415 | b |
Although Oregon courts have not expressly addressed whether the Court's holding in Mansell extends to bar a court from considering VA disability benefits received in lieu of military retirement benefits for purposes of awarding spousal support, nearly every state court that has addressed that question has concluded that Mansell affects property division, not spousal support. Hence, those courts have concluded that federal law does not prevent a court from considering a party's VA disability benefits as a source of income for purposes of awarding spousal support. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 302 Ark 157, 159, 787 SW2d 684, 685 (1990) (stating that nothing in federal law relieved former husband, whose income consisted of VA disability payments, from paying spousal support); Riley v. Riley, 82 Md App 400, 410, 571 A2d 1261, 1266 (1990) (VA benefits may be considered as resource for purposes of setting alimony award); Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So 2d 771, 778 (Miss 2001) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va App 472, 485, 375 SE2d 387, 395 (1988) (same); Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis 2d 540, 544-45,463 NW2d 382, 384 (Ct App 1990) (same); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P2d 1257, 1263 n 9 (Alaska 1992) (stating in dicta that a “state court is clearly free to consider post-divorce disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments’’); Davis v. Davis, 777 SW2d 230, 232 (Ky 1989) (noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award); but see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So 2d 105, 109 (Ala 2000) (holding that federal law precludes courts from considering VA disability payments in awarding alimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "302 Ark 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "stating that nothing in federal law relieved former husband, whose income consisted of VA disability payments, from paying spousal support",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 302 Ark 157, 159, 787 SW2d 684, 685 (1990) (stating that nothing in federal law relieved former husband, whose income consisted of VA disability payments, from paying spousal support); Riley v. Riley, 82 Md App 400, 410, 571 A2d 1261, 1266 (1990) (VA benefits may be considered as resource for purposes of setting alimony award); Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So 2d 771, 778 (Miss 2001) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va App 472, 485, 375 SE2d 387, 395 (1988) (same); Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis 2d 540, 544-45,463 NW2d 382, 384 (Ct App 1990) (same); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P2d 1257, 1263 n 9 (Alaska 1992) (stating in dicta that a “state court is clearly free to consider post-divorce disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments’’); Davis v. Davis, 777 SW2d 230, 232 (Ky 1989) (noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award); but see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So 2d 105, 109 (Ala 2000) (holding that federal law precludes courts from considering VA disability payments in awarding alimony)."
} | 4,198,487 | b |
Although Oregon courts have not expressly addressed whether the Court's holding in Mansell extends to bar a court from considering VA disability benefits received in lieu of military retirement benefits for purposes of awarding spousal support, nearly every state court that has addressed that question has concluded that Mansell affects property division, not spousal support. Hence, those courts have concluded that federal law does not prevent a court from considering a party's VA disability benefits as a source of income for purposes of awarding spousal support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that nothing in federal law relieved former husband, whose income consisted of VA disability payments, from paying spousal support",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 302 Ark 157, 159, 787 SW2d 684, 685 (1990) (stating that nothing in federal law relieved former husband, whose income consisted of VA disability payments, from paying spousal support); Riley v. Riley, 82 Md App 400, 410, 571 A2d 1261, 1266 (1990) (VA benefits may be considered as resource for purposes of setting alimony award); Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So 2d 771, 778 (Miss 2001) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va App 472, 485, 375 SE2d 387, 395 (1988) (same); Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis 2d 540, 544-45,463 NW2d 382, 384 (Ct App 1990) (same); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P2d 1257, 1263 n 9 (Alaska 1992) (stating in dicta that a “state court is clearly free to consider post-divorce disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments’’); Davis v. Davis, 777 SW2d 230, 232 (Ky 1989) (noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award); but see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So 2d 105, 109 (Ala 2000) (holding that federal law precludes courts from considering VA disability payments in awarding alimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 302 Ark 157, 159, 787 SW2d 684, 685 (1990) (stating that nothing in federal law relieved former husband, whose income consisted of VA disability payments, from paying spousal support); Riley v. Riley, 82 Md App 400, 410, 571 A2d 1261, 1266 (1990) (VA benefits may be considered as resource for purposes of setting alimony award); Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So 2d 771, 778 (Miss 2001) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va App 472, 485, 375 SE2d 387, 395 (1988) (same); Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis 2d 540, 544-45,463 NW2d 382, 384 (Ct App 1990) (same); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P2d 1257, 1263 n 9 (Alaska 1992) (stating in dicta that a “state court is clearly free to consider post-divorce disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments’’); Davis v. Davis, 777 SW2d 230, 232 (Ky 1989) (noting that, although VA disability benefits were not divisible as property, courts could resolve an inequitable property division with a spousal support award); but see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So 2d 105, 109 (Ala 2000) (holding that federal law precludes courts from considering VA disability payments in awarding alimony)."
} | 4,198,487 | a |
Washington state courts have noted that state law relating to disability discrimination substantially parallels federal law, and courts should look to interpretations of federal anti-discrimination laws, including the ADA, when applying the WLAD. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1196, 1199",
"parenthetical": "holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ADA and the WLAD",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1229 (E.D.Wash.2001); see MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 97 Wash.App. 435, 442, 983 P.2d 1167 (1999) (commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA “have the same purpose” and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance); see also Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ADA and the WLAD)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 Wash.App. 435, 442",
"parenthetical": "commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA \"have the same purpose\" and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1229 (E.D.Wash.2001); see MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 97 Wash.App. 435, 442, 983 P.2d 1167 (1999) (commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA “have the same purpose” and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance); see also Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ADA and the WLAD)."
} | 9,279,668 | b |
Washington state courts have noted that state law relating to disability discrimination substantially parallels federal law, and courts should look to interpretations of federal anti-discrimination laws, including the ADA, when applying the WLAD. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA \"have the same purpose\" and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1229 (E.D.Wash.2001); see MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 97 Wash.App. 435, 442, 983 P.2d 1167 (1999) (commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA “have the same purpose” and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance); see also Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ADA and the WLAD)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1196, 1199",
"parenthetical": "holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ADA and the WLAD",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1229 (E.D.Wash.2001); see MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 97 Wash.App. 435, 442, 983 P.2d 1167 (1999) (commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA “have the same purpose” and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance); see also Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ADA and the WLAD)."
} | 9,279,668 | a |
At least two other factors have been found to be significant in addition to those mentioned above. The first is the importance of the information and documents requested to the conduct of the litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 F.2d 41, 41",
"parenthetical": "\"relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered\"",
"sentence": "See Trade Development Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (“relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered”); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55 (N.D.Ill.1979) (“normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation”); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (“no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced”); but see Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8 (declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party’s case)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party's case",
"sentence": "See Trade Development Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (“relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered”); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55 (N.D.Ill.1979) (“normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation”); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (“no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced”); but see Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8 (declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party’s case)."
} | 7,857,685 | a |
At least two other factors have been found to be significant in addition to those mentioned above. The first is the importance of the information and documents requested to the conduct of the litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55",
"parenthetical": "\"normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "See Trade Development Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (“relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered”); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55 (N.D.Ill.1979) (“normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation”); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (“no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced”); but see Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8 (declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party’s case)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party's case",
"sentence": "See Trade Development Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (“relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered”); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55 (N.D.Ill.1979) (“normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation”); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (“no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced”); but see Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8 (declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party’s case)."
} | 7,857,685 | a |
At least two other factors have been found to be significant in addition to those mentioned above. The first is the importance of the information and documents requested to the conduct of the litigation. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party's case",
"sentence": "See Trade Development Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (“relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered”); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55 (N.D.Ill.1979) (“normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation”); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (“no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced”); but see Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8 (declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party’s case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 1290, 1290",
"parenthetical": "\"no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced\"",
"sentence": "See Trade Development Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (“relative unimportance of the information ... in the present proceeding was entitled to be considered”); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1146, 1154-55 (N.D.Ill.1979) (“normal discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation”); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (“no showing that the documents are cumulative of records already produced”); but see Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8 (declining to consider the importance of the requested documents to the requesting party’s case)."
} | 7,857,685 | b |
Simply because Perez's father was, at one point, a member of the Guatemalan military does not mandate the conclusion that his killers fifteen years later acted based on assumptions about his political opinion. Nor do the threatening notes received by Perez's sister require the conclusion that some political opinion will be imputed to Perez or that he will be targeted as a child of a member of the Guatemalan military, because there is no evidence indicating who wrote the notes or why the author targeted Perez's sister. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "103 F.3d 1482, 1489",
"parenthetical": "\"To establish an imputed political opinion, the applicant must show that his persecutors actually imputed a political opinion to him.\"",
"sentence": "See Singh, 406 F.3d at 196-97 (noting that, in cases concerning imputed political opinion, “[t]he focus is ... on whether this attribution [of political opinion to the applicant for asylum] has in fact occurred.”); see also Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir.1997) (“To establish an imputed political opinion, the applicant must show that his persecutors actually imputed a political opinion to him.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "406 F.3d 196, 196-97",
"parenthetical": "noting that, in cases concerning imputed political opinion, \"[t]he focus is ... on whether this attribution [of political opinion to the applicant for asylum] has in fact occurred.\"",
"sentence": "See Singh, 406 F.3d at 196-97 (noting that, in cases concerning imputed political opinion, “[t]he focus is ... on whether this attribution [of political opinion to the applicant for asylum] has in fact occurred.”); see also Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir.1997) (“To establish an imputed political opinion, the applicant must show that his persecutors actually imputed a political opinion to him.”)."
} | 3,867,402 | b |
(Sipes Dep. at 68-69.) That agreement, as explained above, makes clear that Mr. Hargarten, by himself, lacked authority to provide equity in Defendant to Mr. Sipes. (Form. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority",
"sentence": "Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent's actual authority",
"sentence": "Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority)."
} | 11,110,998 | b |
(Sipes Dep. at 68-69.) That agreement, as explained above, makes clear that Mr. Hargarten, by himself, lacked authority to provide equity in Defendant to Mr. Sipes. (Form. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent's actual authority",
"sentence": "Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "577 P.2d 765, 771",
"parenthetical": "reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority",
"sentence": "Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority)."
} | 11,110,998 | a |
(Sipes Dep. at 68-69.) That agreement, as explained above, makes clear that Mr. Hargarten, by himself, lacked authority to provide equity in Defendant to Mr. Sipes. (Form. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent's actual authority",
"sentence": "Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority",
"sentence": "Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority)."
} | 11,110,998 | a |
. Of the decisions interpreting similar state statutes, only two courts have considered allowing a debtor's future intent to use property as a residence to satisfy the "uses as a residence" requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "192 B.R. 584, 588",
"parenthetical": "denying exemption for debtors who owned undeveloped land -- on which they had made limited preparations for building -- because they had not shown the intent or meaningful ability to occupy the property within the past ten years",
"sentence": "See In re Bennett, 192 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr.D.Me.1996) (denying exemption for debtors who owned undeveloped land — on which they had made limited preparations for building — because they had not shown the intent or meaningful ability to occupy the property within the past ten years); see also In re Cole, 185 B.R. 95, 98 (Bankr.D.Me.1995) (denying exemption when debtor installed a septic system and had neither shown a definable intention to move onto the land nor a plan to acquire or build a physical structure in which to live). In each case however, the courts declined to do so."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "185 B.R. 95, 98",
"parenthetical": "denying exemption when debtor installed a septic system and had neither shown a definable intention to move onto the land nor a plan to acquire or build a physical structure in which to live",
"sentence": "See In re Bennett, 192 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr.D.Me.1996) (denying exemption for debtors who owned undeveloped land — on which they had made limited preparations for building — because they had not shown the intent or meaningful ability to occupy the property within the past ten years); see also In re Cole, 185 B.R. 95, 98 (Bankr.D.Me.1995) (denying exemption when debtor installed a septic system and had neither shown a definable intention to move onto the land nor a plan to acquire or build a physical structure in which to live). In each case however, the courts declined to do so."
} | 8,936,820 | a |
Second Circuit precedent involving individual liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 further supports the conclusion that an individual may not be held liable in her or his personal capacity under the ADA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1295, 1321",
"parenthetical": "holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under Title VII",
"sentence": "See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1321 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under Title VII); see also Lane v. Maryhaven Center of Hope, 944 F.Supp. 158, 162 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (finding as a matter of law that the ADA does not provide for a cause of action against an employer’s individual agents or employees); Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F.Supp. 388, 395 (“[t]he Second Circuit’s reasoning in Tomka is equally applicable to the question of individual liability under the ADA as well”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "944 F.Supp. 158, 162",
"parenthetical": "finding as a matter of law that the ADA does not provide for a cause of action against an employer's individual agents or employees",
"sentence": "See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1321 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under Title VII); see also Lane v. Maryhaven Center of Hope, 944 F.Supp. 158, 162 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (finding as a matter of law that the ADA does not provide for a cause of action against an employer’s individual agents or employees); Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F.Supp. 388, 395 (“[t]he Second Circuit’s reasoning in Tomka is equally applicable to the question of individual liability under the ADA as well”)."
} | 9,060,253 | a |
Second Circuit precedent involving individual liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 further supports the conclusion that an individual may not be held liable in her or his personal capacity under the ADA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 F.Supp. 388, 395",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Second Circuit's reasoning in Tomka is equally applicable to the question of individual liability under the ADA as well\"",
"sentence": "See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1321 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under Title VII); see also Lane v. Maryhaven Center of Hope, 944 F.Supp. 158, 162 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (finding as a matter of law that the ADA does not provide for a cause of action against an employer’s individual agents or employees); Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F.Supp. 388, 395 (“[t]he Second Circuit’s reasoning in Tomka is equally applicable to the question of individual liability under the ADA as well”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1295, 1321",
"parenthetical": "holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under Title VII",
"sentence": "See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1321 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under Title VII); see also Lane v. Maryhaven Center of Hope, 944 F.Supp. 158, 162 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (finding as a matter of law that the ADA does not provide for a cause of action against an employer’s individual agents or employees); Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F.Supp. 388, 395 (“[t]he Second Circuit’s reasoning in Tomka is equally applicable to the question of individual liability under the ADA as well”)."
} | 9,060,253 | b |
Moreover, our review of the record persuades us that the record is not sufficiently developed for us to address the merits of Santiago-Lugo's Sixth Amendment claim at this time. Accordingly, we do not reach it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "958 F.2d 9, 15",
"parenthetical": "\"Time and again we have held that a claim of inadequate representation will not be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised in the district court, unless the critical facts are not in dispute and a sufficiently developed record exists.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir.1992) (“Time and again we have held that a claim of inadequate representation will not be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised in the district court, unless the critical facts are not in dispute and a sufficiently developed record exists.”); see also United States v. Hoyos-Medina, 878 F.2d 21, 22 (1st Cir.1989) (“Fairness to the parties and judicial economy both warrant that, absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court will not consider an ineffective assistance claim where no endeavor was first made to determine the claim at the district court level.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "878 F.2d 21, 22",
"parenthetical": "\"Fairness to the parties and judicial economy both warrant that, absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court will not consider an ineffective assistance claim where no endeavor was first made to determine the claim at the district court level.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir.1992) (“Time and again we have held that a claim of inadequate representation will not be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised in the district court, unless the critical facts are not in dispute and a sufficiently developed record exists.”); see also United States v. Hoyos-Medina, 878 F.2d 21, 22 (1st Cir.1989) (“Fairness to the parties and judicial economy both warrant that, absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court will not consider an ineffective assistance claim where no endeavor was first made to determine the claim at the district court level.”)."
} | 11,592,345 | a |
As other courts have noted, if plan fiduciaries were required to sell employer stock in the event of a decline, plan fiduciaries would be placed in the untenable position of facing litigation in the event that the price of company stock rises after the plans sell off the assets. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "392 F.3d 636, 639-40",
"parenthetical": "allowing a claim for liquidating company stock following a 60% decline to proceed because the stock \"rebounded sharply\" months after the sale",
"sentence": "See Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 256; Moench, 62 F.3d at 571-72 (“[C]ourts must recognize that if the fiduciary, in what it regards as an exercise of caution, does not maintain the investment in the employer’s securities, it may face liability for that caution, particularly if the employer’s securities thrive.”); see also Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 392 F.3d 636, 639-40 (4th Cir.2004) (allowing a claim for liquidating company stock following a 60% decline to proceed because the stock “rebounded sharply” months after the sale)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 571, 571-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ourts must recognize that if the fiduciary, in what it regards as an exercise of caution, does not maintain the investment in the employer's securities, it may face liability for that caution, particularly if the employer's securities thrive.\"",
"sentence": "See Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 256; Moench, 62 F.3d at 571-72 (“[C]ourts must recognize that if the fiduciary, in what it regards as an exercise of caution, does not maintain the investment in the employer’s securities, it may face liability for that caution, particularly if the employer’s securities thrive.”); see also Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 392 F.3d 636, 639-40 (4th Cir.2004) (allowing a claim for liquidating company stock following a 60% decline to proceed because the stock “rebounded sharply” months after the sale)."
} | 4,271,251 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Patterson's RLUIPA claim for monetary relief because such a claim may proceed only for injunctive relief against defen dants acting within their official capacities. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.3d 899, 904",
"parenthetical": "RLUIPA does not contemplate liability of- government employees in individual capacity",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir.2014) (RLUIPA does not contemplate liability of- government employees in individual capacity); see also Holley v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars [the plaintiffs] suit for official-capacity damages under RLUIPA.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "599 F.3d 1108, 1114",
"parenthetical": "\"The Eleventh Amendment bars [the plaintiffs] suit for official-capacity damages under RLUIPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir.2014) (RLUIPA does not contemplate liability of- government employees in individual capacity); see also Holley v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars [the plaintiffs] suit for official-capacity damages under RLUIPA.”)."
} | 4,341,187 | a |
Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision without adding any further explanation, we review the IJ's decision directly. We review de novo the IJ's legal conclusion that the tasks performed by Gao rendered him a "persecutor" under the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 F.3d 161, 165",
"parenthetical": "\"The BIA's application of law to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo.\"",
"sentence": "See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir.2004) (“The BIA’s application of law to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo.”); cf. Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (determination of whether the facts meet the legal definition of persecution “is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo ”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "457 F.3d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "determination of whether the facts meet the legal definition of persecution \"is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo \"",
"sentence": "See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir.2004) (“The BIA’s application of law to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo.”); cf. Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (determination of whether the facts meet the legal definition of persecution “is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo ”)."
} | 3,699,086 | a |
P 16 Initially, we note that R.B.'s mother and brother are both included in the statutory definition of a "victim" under the Victims' Rights Act. SS 24-4.1-302(5). And because the Victims' Rights Act represents a decision on a matter of public policy -- here, that R.B.'s mother and brother have a right to be present during the trial of her accused killer -- the statute controls over CRE 615. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Colo. 367, 372-73",
"parenthetical": "on substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule promulgated by the court",
"sentence": "See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993) (“In drawing the distinction between substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules adopted to permit the courts to function and function efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.”); see also People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 372-73, 585 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978) (on substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule promulgated by the court); Coney, 98 P.3d at 935."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 P.2d 424, 436",
"parenthetical": "\"In drawing the distinction between substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules adopted to permit the courts to function and function efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993) (“In drawing the distinction between substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules adopted to permit the courts to function and function efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.”); see also People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 372-73, 585 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978) (on substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule promulgated by the court); Coney, 98 P.3d at 935."
} | 12,343,026 | b |
P 16 Initially, we note that R.B.'s mother and brother are both included in the statutory definition of a "victim" under the Victims' Rights Act. SS 24-4.1-302(5). And because the Victims' Rights Act represents a decision on a matter of public policy -- here, that R.B.'s mother and brother have a right to be present during the trial of her accused killer -- the statute controls over CRE 615. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 P.2d 424, 436",
"parenthetical": "\"In drawing the distinction between substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules adopted to permit the courts to function and function efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993) (“In drawing the distinction between substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules adopted to permit the courts to function and function efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.”); see also People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 372-73, 585 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978) (on substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule promulgated by the court); Coney, 98 P.3d at 935."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "585 P.2d 275, 278-79",
"parenthetical": "on substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule promulgated by the court",
"sentence": "See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993) (“In drawing the distinction between substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules adopted to permit the courts to function and function efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.”); see also People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 372-73, 585 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978) (on substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule promulgated by the court); Coney, 98 P.3d at 935."
} | 12,343,026 | a |
Second, as noted, the soundness of Ault's focus on mass producers has been questioned, since the logic is premised on the projected behavior of large manufacturers, but the general rule of admissibility is extended to cases involving defendants of all character. Moreover, if the manner or scale of production were the guiding criterion and favored a liberalized rule of admissibility, it would follow that such rule should apply equally to negligence cases involving mass manufacturers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "628 F.2d 858, 858",
"parenthetical": "asserting that an exception for mass producers could \"effectively override Rule 407 since its reasoning that evidence of subsequent precautionary measures is admissible in products liability cases might apply with equal force to a negligence cause of action\"",
"sentence": "See Hyjek, 944 P.2d at 1040 (indicating that the mass producer rationale is based in fallacy, since the argument has equal force in negligence actions); see also Werner, 628 F.2d at 858 (asserting that an exception for mass producers could “effectively override Rule 407 since its reasoning that evidence of subsequent precautionary measures is admissible in products liability cases might apply with equal force to a negligence cause of action”). Few jurisdictions, however, have eliminated the common law rule entirely."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "944 P.2d 1040, 1040",
"parenthetical": "indicating that the mass producer rationale is based in fallacy, since the argument has equal force in negligence actions",
"sentence": "See Hyjek, 944 P.2d at 1040 (indicating that the mass producer rationale is based in fallacy, since the argument has equal force in negligence actions); see also Werner, 628 F.2d at 858 (asserting that an exception for mass producers could “effectively override Rule 407 since its reasoning that evidence of subsequent precautionary measures is admissible in products liability cases might apply with equal force to a negligence cause of action”). Few jurisdictions, however, have eliminated the common law rule entirely."
} | 11,114,252 | b |
Generally, a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest",
"sentence": "Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "642 F.2d 865, 867-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.",
"sentence": "Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.)"
} | 1,730,347 | a |
Generally, a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest",
"sentence": "Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "642 F.2d 865, 867-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.",
"sentence": "Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.)"
} | 1,730,347 | a |
Generally, a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest",
"sentence": "Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "642 F.2d 865, 867-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.",
"sentence": "Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest); See Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state.)"
} | 1,730,347 | a |
In this case, there is relatively little extrinsic evidence. We agree with Mauer that a conclusory sworn statement from a principal of I4NI as to what was "understood" or "wanted" at the time the lease was signed brings little to the table. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "347 N.W.2d 430, 432-33",
"parenthetical": "authorizing consideration of written and oral communications between the parties as an aid to contract interpretation",
"sentence": "See Peak, 799 N.W.2d at 544 (declining to give weight to one party’s undisclosed unilateral intent); cf. Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 430, 432-33 (Iowa 1984) (authorizing consideration of written and oral communications between the parties as an aid to contract interpretation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "799 N.W.2d 544, 544",
"parenthetical": "declining to give weight to one party's undisclosed unilateral intent",
"sentence": "See Peak, 799 N.W.2d at 544 (declining to give weight to one party’s undisclosed unilateral intent); cf. Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 430, 432-33 (Iowa 1984) (authorizing consideration of written and oral communications between the parties as an aid to contract interpretation)."
} | 6,909,375 | b |
Massachusetts case law also evidences a clear preference for a full hearing, on the merits of a comparative negligence claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 Mass. 146, 151",
"parenthetical": "\"only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650",
"parenthetical": "question of contributory negligence \"is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | 7,653,457 | b |
Massachusetts case law also evidences a clear preference for a full hearing, on the merits of a comparative negligence claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650",
"parenthetical": "question of contributory negligence \"is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | 7,653,457 | a |
Massachusetts case law also evidences a clear preference for a full hearing, on the merits of a comparative negligence claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 Mass. 146, 151",
"parenthetical": "\"only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of contributory negligence \"is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | 7,653,457 | b |
Massachusetts case law also evidences a clear preference for a full hearing, on the merits of a comparative negligence claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of contributory negligence \"is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery\"",
"sentence": "Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 650, 482 N.E.2d 519 (1985) (question of contributory negligence “is rarely taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law”); see also Everett v. Bucky Warren Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 289-290, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978); Mirick v. Galligan, 372 Mass. 146, 151, 360 N.E.2d 1045 (1977) (“only in a rare case may a judge rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery”)."
} | 7,653,457 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "509 F.3d 89, 97-101",
"parenthetical": "holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine\" for Fourth Amendment purposes",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "509 F.3d 89, 97-101",
"parenthetical": "holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine\" for Fourth Amendment purposes",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | b |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "509 F.3d 89, 97-101",
"parenthetical": "holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine\" for Fourth Amendment purposes",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | b |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 F.3d 110, 123",
"parenthetical": "\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 F.3d 110, 123",
"parenthetical": "\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 F.3d 110, 123",
"parenthetical": "\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "715 F.2d 43, 47",
"parenthetical": "noting that questions about \"citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada\" are all routine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "715 F.2d 43, 47",
"parenthetical": "noting that questions about \"citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada\" are all routine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
. This conclusion is also supported by our case law relating to whether border searches are "routine" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "715 F.2d 43, 47",
"parenthetical": "noting that questions about \"citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada\" are all routine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97-101 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that border searches where returning attendees of an Islamic conference in Canada were detained for four to six hours, interrogated, patted down, fingerprinted, and photographed were \"routine” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2006) (\"Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights.”); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that questions about “citizenship, the length and purpose of [an applicant's] trip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquired or bought in Canada” are all routine); see also United Stales v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004) (\"We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”)."
} | 5,872,277 | a |
Plaintiff received the benefits reflected on those written statements for more than two years before Defendants notified him that, due to an actuarial miscalculation stumbled upon during an audit: (1) Plaintiffs benefits were overstated, (2) Plaintiffs benefits would be permanently reduced, and (3) Plaintiff would be required to pay back the overstated benefits. These are precisely the extraordinary circumstances that strongly favor the application of estoppel under Bloemker. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 F.3d 439, 439, 444",
"parenthetical": "extraordinary circumstances existed where plaintiff retired in reliance on assurances that he was entitled to certain retirement benefits, and received those benefits for almost two years, before he was informed that his benefits would be reduced and he would be required to pay the overstated difference",
"sentence": "See Bloemker, 605 F.3d at 439, 444 (extraordinary circumstances existed where plaintiff retired in reliance on assurances that he was entitled to certain retirement benefits, and received those benefits for almost two years, before he was informed that his benefits would be reduced and he would be required to pay the overstated difference); see also Pell, 539 F.3d at 304-05 (concluding that a plaintiffs diligence in asking pertinent questions about his benefits in conjunction with an employer’s affirmative misrepresentations constituted extraordinary circumstances)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "539 F.3d 304, 304-05",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a plaintiffs diligence in asking pertinent questions about his benefits in conjunction with an employer's affirmative misrepresentations constituted extraordinary circumstances",
"sentence": "See Bloemker, 605 F.3d at 439, 444 (extraordinary circumstances existed where plaintiff retired in reliance on assurances that he was entitled to certain retirement benefits, and received those benefits for almost two years, before he was informed that his benefits would be reduced and he would be required to pay the overstated difference); see also Pell, 539 F.3d at 304-05 (concluding that a plaintiffs diligence in asking pertinent questions about his benefits in conjunction with an employer’s affirmative misrepresentations constituted extraordinary circumstances)."
} | 4,335,381 | a |
Thus, although the jury may consider the alleged lack of serious injury as evidence that the implemented force was not excessive, and may weigh it against Hodge's testimony, that does not mean that there are no circumstances under which Hodge can prevail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 311, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"While the main purpose of a SS 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.\"",
"sentence": "See Pierre-Antoine, 2006 WL 1292076, at *5 (noting that although the lack of severe injury may be considered by a jury as evidence that force was not excessive, it did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law); see Murray v. Williams, No. 05-CV-9438 (NRB), 2007 WL 430419, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007) (refusing to find that alleged force was de minimis where plaintiff alleged a laceration to his lower lip, a bloody nose, pain and suffering, and mental anguish); see also Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir.1999) (“While the main purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 1292076, at *5",
"parenthetical": "noting that although the lack of severe injury may be considered by a jury as evidence that force was not excessive, it did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law",
"sentence": "See Pierre-Antoine, 2006 WL 1292076, at *5 (noting that although the lack of severe injury may be considered by a jury as evidence that force was not excessive, it did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law); see Murray v. Williams, No. 05-CV-9438 (NRB), 2007 WL 430419, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007) (refusing to find that alleged force was de minimis where plaintiff alleged a laceration to his lower lip, a bloody nose, pain and suffering, and mental anguish); see also Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir.1999) (“While the main purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.”)."
} | 4,146,829 | b |
Thus, although the jury may consider the alleged lack of serious injury as evidence that the implemented force was not excessive, and may weigh it against Hodge's testimony, that does not mean that there are no circumstances under which Hodge can prevail. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 430419, at *7",
"parenthetical": "refusing to find that alleged force was de minimis where plaintiff alleged a laceration to his lower lip, a bloody nose, pain and suffering, and mental anguish",
"sentence": "See Pierre-Antoine, 2006 WL 1292076, at *5 (noting that although the lack of severe injury may be considered by a jury as evidence that force was not excessive, it did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law); see Murray v. Williams, No. 05-CV-9438 (NRB), 2007 WL 430419, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007) (refusing to find that alleged force was de minimis where plaintiff alleged a laceration to his lower lip, a bloody nose, pain and suffering, and mental anguish); see also Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir.1999) (“While the main purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 311, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"While the main purpose of a SS 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.\"",
"sentence": "See Pierre-Antoine, 2006 WL 1292076, at *5 (noting that although the lack of severe injury may be considered by a jury as evidence that force was not excessive, it did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law); see Murray v. Williams, No. 05-CV-9438 (NRB), 2007 WL 430419, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007) (refusing to find that alleged force was de minimis where plaintiff alleged a laceration to his lower lip, a bloody nose, pain and suffering, and mental anguish); see also Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir.1999) (“While the main purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.”)."
} | 4,146,829 | a |
This argument is based on the proposition that jeopardy generally attaches when the district court accepts a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "59 F.3d 568, 572",
"parenthetical": "\"[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court's acceptance of the plea agreement.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 78, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant's guilty plea.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | 9,458,939 | a |
This argument is based on the proposition that jeopardy generally attaches when the district court accepts a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 78, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant's guilty plea.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court's acceptance of the plea agreement.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | 9,458,939 | b |
This argument is based on the proposition that jeopardy generally attaches when the district court accepts a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court's acceptance of the plea agreement.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 78, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant's guilty plea.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | 9,458,939 | a |
This argument is based on the proposition that jeopardy generally attaches when the district court accepts a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 78, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant's guilty plea.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court's acceptance of the plea agreement.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995) (“[J]eopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement upon the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); see also United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1999) (“As a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.”)."
} | 9,458,939 | b |
Certain ly, subpart A targets traditional common-law fugitives, specifically, persons who allegedly committed crimes while in the United States and who, upon learning that their arrest was sought, fled the country. Similarly, the "reenter" provision of sub-part B extends disentitlement authority over another class of persons traditionally recognized as "fugitives," that is, persons who allegedly committed crimes while in the United States but who were outside the country -- for whatever reason -- when they learned that their arrests were sought and who then refused to return to the United States in order to avoid prosecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.2d 796, 796-98",
"parenthetical": "holding that deported Canadian who failed to seek permission from U.S. Consulate to enter United States and answer pending criminal charges was properly deemed a fugitive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d at 464 (“Fleeing from justice is not always a physical act; it may be a state of mind.... Thus, a defendant with notice of criminal charges who actively resists returning from abroad to face those charges is a fugitive from justice .... ”); United States v. $45,940 in United States Currency, 739 F.2d at 796-98 (holding that deported Canadian who failed to seek permission from U.S. Consulate to enter United States and answer pending criminal charges was properly deemed a fugitive); see also Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that no “meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who, already outside, decline to return”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "536 F.2d 478, 483",
"parenthetical": "holding that no \"meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who, already outside, decline to return\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d at 464 (“Fleeing from justice is not always a physical act; it may be a state of mind.... Thus, a defendant with notice of criminal charges who actively resists returning from abroad to face those charges is a fugitive from justice .... ”); United States v. $45,940 in United States Currency, 739 F.2d at 796-98 (holding that deported Canadian who failed to seek permission from U.S. Consulate to enter United States and answer pending criminal charges was properly deemed a fugitive); see also Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that no “meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who, already outside, decline to return”)."
} | 9,243,797 | a |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13",
"parenthetical": "judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,\" but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | b |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67",
"parenthetical": "judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,\" but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | a |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | b |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 S.W.2d 219, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | b |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13",
"parenthetical": "judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,\" but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 S.W.2d 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | b |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67",
"parenthetical": "judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,\" but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 S.W.2d 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | b |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 S.W.2d 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | b |
Under many circumstances, however, a written judgment which does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence is subject to correction via nunc pro tunc motion and order. There is neither need nor constitutional authority to raise an issue of an "inaccurate" or "incorrect" written judgment via habeas corpus. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 S.W.2d 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but \"the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 S.W.2d 219, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings\"",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Patterson, 139 Tex.Crim. 489, 496, 141 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1940) (a mere irregularity in a judgment may be corrected by nunc pro tunc proceeding, but “the matter was not a subject for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Ex parte Beeler, 41 Tex.Crim. 240, 241, 53 S.W. 857, 857 (1899)); see also Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex.Crim. 10, 13, 228 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (1950) (judgment may be held \"void for want of a definite punishment having been in fact assessed,” but if \"a definite punishment was assessed and the entry of a judgment showing otherwise was by a clerical error, the judgment may be corrected by the court ... to make the record speak the truth, by nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment as same was actually rendered in the case when tried”); Ex parte Stansbury, 155 Tex.Crim. 73, 74, 231 S.W.2d 431, 432 (1950) (same); Ex parte Wingfield, 162 Tex.Crim. 112, 113, 282 S.W.2d 219, 219 (1955) (”[i]f the error was in the entry of judgment and not in the pronouncement, the judgment was not void and was subject .to correction by nunc pro tunc proceedings”)."
} | 9,506,100 | a |
As to the second requirement, however, a breach of privilege is usually an insufficient showing of harm, at least under the strict terms of the standard, because the breach is not "a ruinous injury." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "151 S.W.3d 803, 808",
"parenthetical": "noting that a writ is proper to stop the \"breaching [of] a tightly guarded privilege\"",
"sentence": "Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801. The violation of a privilege is such a case. Id. at 802 (stating, regarding a privilege, that “in a certain class of cases, of which this is one, the showing of such grievous injury is not an absolute necessity”); see also Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky.2004) (noting that a writ is proper to stop the “breaching [of] a tightly guarded privilege”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "343 S.W.2d 801, 801",
"parenthetical": "stating, regarding a privilege, that \"in a certain class of cases, of which this is one, the showing of such grievous injury is not an absolute necessity\"",
"sentence": "Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801. The violation of a privilege is such a case. Id. at 802 (stating, regarding a privilege, that “in a certain class of cases, of which this is one, the showing of such grievous injury is not an absolute necessity”); see also Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky.2004) (noting that a writ is proper to stop the “breaching [of] a tightly guarded privilege”)."
} | 7,322,219 | b |
Perez, at 139-40. Thus, in contrast to representation in accordance with governing rules, representation by a law student intern who fails to comply with the conditions placed upon his or her practice does constitute an absolute denial of the right to counsel which requires reversal. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "58 Mich. App. 615, 619",
"parenthetical": "law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "364 So. 2d 83, 84",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | 1,142,073 | b |
Perez, at 139-40. Thus, in contrast to representation in accordance with governing rules, representation by a law student intern who fails to comply with the conditions placed upon his or her practice does constitute an absolute denial of the right to counsel which requires reversal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "364 So. 2d 83, 84",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | 1,142,073 | a |
Perez, at 139-40. Thus, in contrast to representation in accordance with governing rules, representation by a law student intern who fails to comply with the conditions placed upon his or her practice does constitute an absolute denial of the right to counsel which requires reversal. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "58 Mich. App. 615, 619",
"parenthetical": "law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904",
"parenthetical": "failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | 1,142,073 | b |
Perez, at 139-40. Thus, in contrast to representation in accordance with governing rules, representation by a law student intern who fails to comply with the conditions placed upon his or her practice does constitute an absolute denial of the right to counsel which requires reversal. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904",
"parenthetical": "failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | 1,142,073 | b |
Perez, at 139-40. Thus, in contrast to representation in accordance with governing rules, representation by a law student intern who fails to comply with the conditions placed upon his or her practice does constitute an absolute denial of the right to counsel which requires reversal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "58 Mich. App. 615, 619",
"parenthetical": "law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | 1,142,073 | a |
Perez, at 139-40. Thus, in contrast to representation in accordance with governing rules, representation by a law student intern who fails to comply with the conditions placed upon his or her practice does constitute an absolute denial of the right to counsel which requires reversal. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent",
"sentence": "See Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failure to comply with requirements that supervising attorney be present and defendant be informed of student status); In re Moore, 63 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904, 380 N.E.2d 917 (1978) (failure to inform court of student status and failure to obtain defendant's written consent); cf. People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615, 619, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975) (law student representation did not violate right to counsel where defendant was aware of student status, general effective assistance of counsel standards were met, and there was no violation of student practice rules)."
} | 1,142,073 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "opinion of defendant's non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "opinion of defendant's non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "opinion of defendant's non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "opinion of defendant's non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "opinion of defendant's non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "opinion of defendant's non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense's forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense's forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense's forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense's forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense's forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | a |
Several other state courts have found this type of cross-examination improper. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant's expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors' reports on which the defendant's expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense's forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 124 Ariz. 165, 602 P.2d 833 (App.1979) (opinion of defendant’s non-testifying medical expert as to cause of plaintiffs injury could not be used to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical expert given the opinion was not made available until trial and the plaintiffs expert did not consider it in formulating his opinion); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284, 725 A.2d 106 (1999) (trial judge erred in permitting prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s expert pathologist with a hearsay report containing the opinion of defense’s forensic pathologist who did not testify at trial because the testifying expert did not rely on the conclusions of the forensic pathologist in formulating his opinion even though he had reviewed them); Commonwealth v. Fried, 382 Pa.Super. 156, 555 A.2d 119 (1989) (non-testifying expert’s findings made in autopsy report were admissible in cross-examining expert witness who admitted he had relied on these findings, however, the non-testifying expert’s conclusions which differed from those of the expert were inadmissible because the non-testifying expert was not subject to cross-examination); cf. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996) (prosecutor permitted to cross-examine defense’s expert witness with reports containing conclusions of non-testifying expert where non-testifying expert reported these conclusions to defense expert who relied on them in formulating his opinion); but see People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (prosecutor permitted to impeach defendant’s expert witness with reports of non-testifying doc tors’ reports on which the defendant’s expert did not rely in formulating his opinion in that the reports were for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness)."
} | 193,241 | b |
In accord, Fourth Circuit precedent has indicated a narrow, literal view of Teague's first exception. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "961 F.2d 448, 453-54",
"parenthetical": "finding Teague's first exception inapplicable to the case because the conduct proscribed was capital murder, which obviously may be prosecuted",
"sentence": "See Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir.1990) (giving examples such as a state forbidding the sale of contraceptives or forbidding interracial marriages as individual 'conduct beyond the power of laws to regulate); see also Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 453-54 (4th Cir.1992) (finding Teague’s first exception inapplicable to the case because the conduct proscribed was capital murder, which obviously may be prosecuted). Teague’s first exception does not automatically apply if a particular defendant would have a different outcome under the new rule."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "915 F.2d 932, 939",
"parenthetical": "giving examples such as a state forbidding the sale of contraceptives or forbidding interracial marriages as individual 'conduct beyond the power of laws to regulate",
"sentence": "See Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir.1990) (giving examples such as a state forbidding the sale of contraceptives or forbidding interracial marriages as individual 'conduct beyond the power of laws to regulate); see also Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 453-54 (4th Cir.1992) (finding Teague’s first exception inapplicable to the case because the conduct proscribed was capital murder, which obviously may be prosecuted). Teague’s first exception does not automatically apply if a particular defendant would have a different outcome under the new rule."
} | 883,471 | b |
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers believed that such danger existed, or that they entered the second garage bay for that reason. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "370 Mass. 548, 556-558",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, in light of what the police observed and learned immediately on entering the apartment, they were justified in entering the bedroom to search for a person for the safety of themselves and the occupants of the apartment",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 556-558, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976) (concluding that, in light of what the police observed and learned immediately on entering the apartment, they were justified in entering the bedroom to search for a person for the safety of themselves and the occupants of the apartment); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 478 (1980) (finding that a security check was reasonably believed to be necessary by the police to ensure their personal safety)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 Mass. 617, 621",
"parenthetical": "in a murder case, police may conduct a protective sweep of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lewin (No. 1), 407 Mass. 617, 621 (1990) (in a murder case, police may conduct a protective sweep of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises)."
} | 772,064 | a |
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers believed that such danger existed, or that they entered the second garage bay for that reason. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 Mass. 617, 621",
"parenthetical": "in a murder case, police may conduct a protective sweep of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lewin (No. 1), 407 Mass. 617, 621 (1990) (in a murder case, police may conduct a protective sweep of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, in light of what the police observed and learned immediately on entering the apartment, they were justified in entering the bedroom to search for a person for the safety of themselves and the occupants of the apartment",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 556-558, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976) (concluding that, in light of what the police observed and learned immediately on entering the apartment, they were justified in entering the bedroom to search for a person for the safety of themselves and the occupants of the apartment); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 478 (1980) (finding that a security check was reasonably believed to be necessary by the police to ensure their personal safety)."
} | 772,064 | b |
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers believed that such danger existed, or that they entered the second garage bay for that reason. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 Mass. 617, 621",
"parenthetical": "in a murder case, police may conduct a protective sweep of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lewin (No. 1), 407 Mass. 617, 621 (1990) (in a murder case, police may conduct a protective sweep of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "379 Mass. 472, 478",
"parenthetical": "finding that a security check was reasonably believed to be necessary by the police to ensure their personal safety",
"sentence": "Compare Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 556-558, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976) (concluding that, in light of what the police observed and learned immediately on entering the apartment, they were justified in entering the bedroom to search for a person for the safety of themselves and the occupants of the apartment); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 478 (1980) (finding that a security check was reasonably believed to be necessary by the police to ensure their personal safety)."
} | 772,064 | b |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 F.3d 46, 50",
"parenthetical": "no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state's judgment about definition of job position",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "position's exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "566 F.3d 381, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is 'necessary for effective job performance' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "916 F.2d 134, 142",
"parenthetical": "exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "537 F.3d 552, 556-57",
"parenthetical": "inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature's decision to make position nonpolitical",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 418, 423",
"parenthetical": "\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature's decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to 'some deference.' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
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