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When the Bank refused Bradshaw's request to pay the taxes, Bradshaw could have resigned his position with HBP or refused to sign any checks and shut down the business. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 549, 549",
"parenthetical": "even though controller of corporation might have been fired for paying withholding taxes, \"these adverse consequences simply are no excuse for failing to collect and pay\" them",
"sentence": "See Howard, 711 F.2d at 734 (the fact that a corporate officer might have been fired if he had disobeyed the CEO’s orders to not pay withholding taxes did not make him any less responsible for payment of the taxes); Hochstein, 900 F.2d at 549 (even though controller of corporation might have been fired for paying withholding taxes, “these adverse consequences simply are no excuse for failing to collect and pay” them); cf. Raba, 977 F.2d at 945 (declining to hold that lack of check-signing authority is dispositive of lack of responsibility, noting that to so hold would “open the door to a host of evasive tactics[,] [o]fficers with otherwise unfettered authority simply would deprive themselves of permission to sign corporate cheeks in order to avoid the designation of ‘responsible person.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 945, 945",
"parenthetical": "declining to hold that lack of check-signing authority is dispositive of lack of responsibility, noting that to so hold would \"open the door to a host of evasive tactics[,] [o]fficers with otherwise unfettered authority simply would deprive themselves of permission to sign corporate cheeks in order to avoid the designation of 'responsible person.' \"",
"sentence": "See Howard, 711 F.2d at 734 (the fact that a corporate officer might have been fired if he had disobeyed the CEO’s orders to not pay withholding taxes did not make him any less responsible for payment of the taxes); Hochstein, 900 F.2d at 549 (even though controller of corporation might have been fired for paying withholding taxes, “these adverse consequences simply are no excuse for failing to collect and pay” them); cf. Raba, 977 F.2d at 945 (declining to hold that lack of check-signing authority is dispositive of lack of responsibility, noting that to so hold would “open the door to a host of evasive tactics[,] [o]fficers with otherwise unfettered authority simply would deprive themselves of permission to sign corporate cheeks in order to avoid the designation of ‘responsible person.’ ”)."
} | 11,647,769 | a |
An accused's right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental, and the charging authority has a duty under the Sixth Amendment to provide a prompt trial. However, the right to speedy trial does not attach where an arrest warrant has been issued but no other action taken. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "144 Vt. 436, 442",
"parenthetical": "time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Snide, 144 Vt. 436, 442, 479 A.2d 139, 143 (1984) (time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation) (dictum)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 783, 788-89",
"parenthetical": "cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977) (cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)."
} | 4,782,032 | b |
An accused's right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental, and the charging authority has a duty under the Sixth Amendment to provide a prompt trial. However, the right to speedy trial does not attach where an arrest warrant has been issued but no other action taken. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 783, 788-89",
"parenthetical": "cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977) (cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "479 A.2d 139, 143",
"parenthetical": "time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Snide, 144 Vt. 436, 442, 479 A.2d 139, 143 (1984) (time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation) (dictum)."
} | 4,782,032 | a |
An accused's right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental, and the charging authority has a duty under the Sixth Amendment to provide a prompt trial. However, the right to speedy trial does not attach where an arrest warrant has been issued but no other action taken. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977) (cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "144 Vt. 436, 442",
"parenthetical": "time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Snide, 144 Vt. 436, 442, 479 A.2d 139, 143 (1984) (time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation) (dictum)."
} | 4,782,032 | a |
An accused's right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental, and the charging authority has a duty under the Sixth Amendment to provide a prompt trial. However, the right to speedy trial does not attach where an arrest warrant has been issued but no other action taken. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977) (cannot dismiss indictment for undue delay where defendant was not yet arrested); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "479 A.2d 139, 143",
"parenthetical": "time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Snide, 144 Vt. 436, 442, 479 A.2d 139, 143 (1984) (time for computing speedy trial violation begins to run at date of citation) (dictum)."
} | 4,782,032 | a |
It cannot be disputed that Count One's language sets out the generic elements of burglary. Indeed, we have considered several cases in which defendants pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to charging papers materially indistinguishable from those used to charge Velasco-Medina, and in each case we held that their convictions fit Taylor's generic definition. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "235 F.3d 1170, 1170",
"parenthetical": "noting that document charging that Franklin \"did willfully and unlawfully enter ... with the intent to commit larceny\" satisfied Taylor",
"sentence": "See also Franklin, 235 F.3d at 1170 (noting that document charging that Franklin “did willfully and unlawfully enter ... with the intent to commit larceny” satisfied Taylor)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "5 F.3d 1322, 1325",
"parenthetical": "holding that Information charging burglary did not satisfy Taylor because of failure to allege \"unlawful or unprivileged\" entry",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that Information charging burglary did not satisfy Taylor because of failure to allege “unlawful or unprivileged” entry)."
} | 11,391,422 | a |
Ms. Nichols's extensive history as a marijuana smoker, including a number of prior experiences smoking marijuana with Ms. Durham, coupled with her consumption of the residue in question, rendered her testimony comparable to testimony which has been found to support a drug identification in other cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 612, 615",
"parenthetical": "finding evidence sufficient to support drug identification based, in particular, on the identification of the substance as marijuana by two witnesses -- each with five to ten years experience smoking marijuana -- who had observed that the substance in question \"looked, smelled, and smoked like marijuana\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1456 (11th Cir.1984) (“The uncorroborated testimony of a person who observed a defendant in possession of a controlled substance is sufficient if the person is familiar with the substance at issue.”), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Chestang, 849 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir.1988); State v. Neal, 624 S.W.2d 182 (Mo.App.1981); see also United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (finding evidence sufficient to support drug identification based, in particular, on the identification of the substance as marijuana by two witnesses — each with five to ten years experience smoking marijuana — who had observed that the substance in question “looked, smelled, and smoked like marijuana”); People v. Partin, 254 Cal.App.2d 89, 62 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1967); cf. People v. McLean, 56 Cal.2d 660, 16 Cal.Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403 (1961)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 1447, 1456",
"parenthetical": "\"The uncorroborated testimony of a person who observed a defendant in possession of a controlled substance is sufficient if the person is familiar with the substance at issue.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1456 (11th Cir.1984) (“The uncorroborated testimony of a person who observed a defendant in possession of a controlled substance is sufficient if the person is familiar with the substance at issue.”), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Chestang, 849 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir.1988); State v. Neal, 624 S.W.2d 182 (Mo.App.1981); see also United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (finding evidence sufficient to support drug identification based, in particular, on the identification of the substance as marijuana by two witnesses — each with five to ten years experience smoking marijuana — who had observed that the substance in question “looked, smelled, and smoked like marijuana”); People v. Partin, 254 Cal.App.2d 89, 62 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1967); cf. People v. McLean, 56 Cal.2d 660, 16 Cal.Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403 (1961)."
} | 3,729,128 | b |
Ms. Nichols's extensive history as a marijuana smoker, including a number of prior experiences smoking marijuana with Ms. Durham, coupled with her consumption of the residue in question, rendered her testimony comparable to testimony which has been found to support a drug identification in other cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 612, 615",
"parenthetical": "finding evidence sufficient to support drug identification based, in particular, on the identification of the substance as marijuana by two witnesses -- each with five to ten years experience smoking marijuana -- who had observed that the substance in question \"looked, smelled, and smoked like marijuana\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1456 (11th Cir.1984) (“The uncorroborated testimony of a person who observed a defendant in possession of a controlled substance is sufficient if the person is familiar with the substance at issue.”), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Chestang, 849 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir.1988); State v. Neal, 624 S.W.2d 182 (Mo.App.1981); see also United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (finding evidence sufficient to support drug identification based, in particular, on the identification of the substance as marijuana by two witnesses — each with five to ten years experience smoking marijuana — who had observed that the substance in question “looked, smelled, and smoked like marijuana”); People v. Partin, 254 Cal.App.2d 89, 62 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1967); cf. People v. McLean, 56 Cal.2d 660, 16 Cal.Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403 (1961)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 528, 531",
"parenthetical": "\"The uncorroborated testimony of a person who observed a defendant in possession of a controlled substance is sufficient if the person is familiar with the substance at issue.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1456 (11th Cir.1984) (“The uncorroborated testimony of a person who observed a defendant in possession of a controlled substance is sufficient if the person is familiar with the substance at issue.”), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Chestang, 849 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir.1988); State v. Neal, 624 S.W.2d 182 (Mo.App.1981); see also United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (finding evidence sufficient to support drug identification based, in particular, on the identification of the substance as marijuana by two witnesses — each with five to ten years experience smoking marijuana — who had observed that the substance in question “looked, smelled, and smoked like marijuana”); People v. Partin, 254 Cal.App.2d 89, 62 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1967); cf. People v. McLean, 56 Cal.2d 660, 16 Cal.Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403 (1961)."
} | 3,729,128 | b |
Mote stands for the proposition the campus as a whole, including classrooms, facilities, and buildings, must be open to the entire public for the outdoor areas to constitute a traditional public forum, even when the public has unfettered access to such outdoor areas. I emphatically disagree with Mote for the reasons described in this concurrence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 260, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.\"",
"sentence": "See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n. 6 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "410 F.3d 766, 766",
"parenthetical": "noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora",
"sentence": "See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n. 6 (same)."
} | 5,323,458 | a |
Mote stands for the proposition the campus as a whole, including classrooms, facilities, and buildings, must be open to the entire public for the outdoor areas to constitute a traditional public forum, even when the public has unfettered access to such outdoor areas. I emphatically disagree with Mote for the reasons described in this concurrence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "410 F.3d 766, 766",
"parenthetical": "noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora",
"sentence": "See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n. 6 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.\"",
"sentence": "See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n. 6 (same)."
} | 5,323,458 | b |
Mote stands for the proposition the campus as a whole, including classrooms, facilities, and buildings, must be open to the entire public for the outdoor areas to constitute a traditional public forum, even when the public has unfettered access to such outdoor areas. I emphatically disagree with Mote for the reasons described in this concurrence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.\"",
"sentence": "See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n. 6 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "410 F.3d 766, 766",
"parenthetical": "noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora",
"sentence": "See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“[High] school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n. 6 (same)."
} | 5,323,458 | a |
For this reason, the party moving for class certification bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requirements set forth in RCFC 23. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 156, 177-78",
"parenthetical": "in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: \"whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.\"",
"sentence": "Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615 (2006) (“The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: “whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615",
"parenthetical": "\"The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615 (2006) (“The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: “whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.”)."
} | 4,283,404 | b |
For this reason, the party moving for class certification bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requirements set forth in RCFC 23. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615",
"parenthetical": "\"The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615 (2006) (“The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: “whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: \"whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.\"",
"sentence": "Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615 (2006) (“The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: “whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.”)."
} | 4,283,404 | a |
For this reason, the party moving for class certification bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requirements set forth in RCFC 23. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: \"whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.\"",
"sentence": "Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615 (2006) (“The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: “whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615",
"parenthetical": "\"The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609, 615 (2006) (“The party moving for class certification bears the burden of satisfying the requirements set forth in RCFC 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (in determining whether the requirements of class certification are met, the trial court must not inquire: “whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rule are met.”)."
} | 4,283,404 | b |
Here, it appears that the parties may have two different and competing interpretations of the relevant portions of the Agreement. Regardless, the Court need not consider this issue at this time, because the Court finds that ASI has failed to clearly demonstrate irreparable injury, and this alone precludes the issuance of a preliminary injunction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "765 F.3d 219, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing of irreparable harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, even if the other three elements are found.\"",
"sentence": "See Ferring Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d at 219 (“Absent a showing of irreparable harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, even if the other three elements are found.”); see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990) (placing particular emphasis on “likelihood of success on the merits” and “irreparable harm” as necessary “prerequisites” to obtaining a preliminary injunction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "903 F.2d 186, 197-98",
"parenthetical": "placing particular emphasis on \"likelihood of success on the merits\" and \"irreparable harm\" as necessary \"prerequisites\" to obtaining a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "See Ferring Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d at 219 (“Absent a showing of irreparable harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, even if the other three elements are found.”); see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990) (placing particular emphasis on “likelihood of success on the merits” and “irreparable harm” as necessary “prerequisites” to obtaining a preliminary injunction)."
} | 12,268,373 | a |
We will reverse the district court because of an erroneous jury instruction only if we are left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations. Pursuant to the law of this Circuit, exclusive control over the object is not required in order to establish constructive possession. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "705 F.2d 432, 433",
"parenthetical": "holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others",
"sentence": "See United States v. Knight, 705 F.2d 432, 433 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others); see also United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir.1998) (constructive possession defined as defendant’s ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or dominion or control over the premises or the vehicle in which the object is concealed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 906, 909",
"parenthetical": "constructive possession defined as defendant's ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or dominion or control over the premises or the vehicle in which the object is concealed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Knight, 705 F.2d 432, 433 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others); see also United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir.1998) (constructive possession defined as defendant’s ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or dominion or control over the premises or the vehicle in which the object is concealed)."
} | 1,112,850 | a |
The Motion for Judgment makes it clear that the allegations of slander, for which the Plaintiff wishes to hold the Defendant liable, are, in all instances, based upon statements made by agents of the Defendant. For the corporate defendant in the instant case to be liable, those statements must have been made by the agents within the scope of their agency. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "150 Va. 101, 107",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .\"",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 Va. 863, 875-76",
"parenthetical": "court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | 3,934,773 | b |
The Motion for Judgment makes it clear that the allegations of slander, for which the Plaintiff wishes to hold the Defendant liable, are, in all instances, based upon statements made by agents of the Defendant. For the corporate defendant in the instant case to be liable, those statements must have been made by the agents within the scope of their agency. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 Va. 863, 875-76",
"parenthetical": "court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 S.E. 387, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .\"",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | 3,934,773 | a |
The Motion for Judgment makes it clear that the allegations of slander, for which the Plaintiff wishes to hold the Defendant liable, are, in all instances, based upon statements made by agents of the Defendant. For the corporate defendant in the instant case to be liable, those statements must have been made by the agents within the scope of their agency. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "150 Va. 101, 107",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .\"",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "159 S.E. 87, 92",
"parenthetical": "court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | 3,934,773 | b |
The Motion for Judgment makes it clear that the allegations of slander, for which the Plaintiff wishes to hold the Defendant liable, are, in all instances, based upon statements made by agents of the Defendant. For the corporate defendant in the instant case to be liable, those statements must have been made by the agents within the scope of their agency. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "159 S.E. 87, 92",
"parenthetical": "court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 S.E. 387, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .\"",
"sentence": "See Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 875-76, 159 S.E. 87, 92 (1931) (court noted, in libel case, that master liable for negligent acts of servants while acting within the scope of their employment); cf. Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 107, 142 S.E. 387, 388 (1928) (“[A] corporation, as any other master, is liable in damages under the statute for insulting words uttered by its agent while engaged in the ordinary course of his employment... .”)."
} | 3,934,773 | a |
In the Ninth Circuit, appeal waivers do not apply to constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying Bibler to plea agreement waiving right to bring SS 2255 motion",
"sentence": "United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.2007) (appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence which is illegal because it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution); see also United States v. Snider, No. 3:07-CR-124-SI, 180 F.Supp.3d 780, 792-93 2016 WL 1453878, at *9 (D.Or. Apr. 13, 2016) (applying Bibler to plea agreement waiving right to bring § 2255 motion), appeal filed, No. 16-35316 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 621, 624",
"parenthetical": "appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence which is illegal because it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution",
"sentence": "United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.2007) (appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence which is illegal because it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution); see also United States v. Snider, No. 3:07-CR-124-SI, 180 F.Supp.3d 780, 792-93 2016 WL 1453878, at *9 (D.Or. Apr. 13, 2016) (applying Bibler to plea agreement waiving right to bring § 2255 motion), appeal filed, No. 16-35316 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016)."
} | 12,175,152 | b |
In the Ninth Circuit, appeal waivers do not apply to constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 621, 624",
"parenthetical": "appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence which is illegal because it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution",
"sentence": "United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.2007) (appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence which is illegal because it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution); see also United States v. Snider, No. 3:07-CR-124-SI, 180 F.Supp.3d 780, 792-93 2016 WL 1453878, at *9 (D.Or. Apr. 13, 2016) (applying Bibler to plea agreement waiving right to bring § 2255 motion), appeal filed, No. 16-35316 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2016 WL 1453878, at *9",
"parenthetical": "applying Bibler to plea agreement waiving right to bring SS 2255 motion",
"sentence": "United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.2007) (appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence which is illegal because it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution); see also United States v. Snider, No. 3:07-CR-124-SI, 180 F.Supp.3d 780, 792-93 2016 WL 1453878, at *9 (D.Or. Apr. 13, 2016) (applying Bibler to plea agreement waiving right to bring § 2255 motion), appeal filed, No. 16-35316 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016)."
} | 12,175,152 | a |
There is no dispute that counsel filed the notice and claim of charging lien before the original final judgment was entered. Thus, counsel perfected his charging lien by providing timely notice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 So.2d 559, 561",
"parenthetical": "\"In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.\"",
"sentence": "See Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1986) (“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.”); see also Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983) (“[T]here are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.”); Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that to be “timely” the notice of a charging lien must be filed “before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment”). Notwithstanding a lack of express reservation of jurisdiction over the charging lien, the trial court is not foreclosed from considering the charging lien in this action because the issue of attorney’s fees and costs has not been finalized and the trial court reserved jurisdiction for that purpose."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "428 So.2d 1383, 1385",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]here are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.\"",
"sentence": "See Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1986) (“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.”); see also Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983) (“[T]here are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.”); Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that to be “timely” the notice of a charging lien must be filed “before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment”). Notwithstanding a lack of express reservation of jurisdiction over the charging lien, the trial court is not foreclosed from considering the charging lien in this action because the issue of attorney’s fees and costs has not been finalized and the trial court reserved jurisdiction for that purpose."
} | 6,998,139 | a |
There is no dispute that counsel filed the notice and claim of charging lien before the original final judgment was entered. Thus, counsel perfected his charging lien by providing timely notice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "614 So.2d 574, 580",
"parenthetical": "holding that to be \"timely\" the notice of a charging lien must be filed \"before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1986) (“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.”); see also Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983) (“[T]here are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.”); Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that to be “timely” the notice of a charging lien must be filed “before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment”). Notwithstanding a lack of express reservation of jurisdiction over the charging lien, the trial court is not foreclosed from considering the charging lien in this action because the issue of attorney’s fees and costs has not been finalized and the trial court reserved jurisdiction for that purpose."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 So.2d 559, 561",
"parenthetical": "\"In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.\"",
"sentence": "See Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1986) (“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.”); see also Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983) (“[T]here are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.”); Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that to be “timely” the notice of a charging lien must be filed “before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment”). Notwithstanding a lack of express reservation of jurisdiction over the charging lien, the trial court is not foreclosed from considering the charging lien in this action because the issue of attorney’s fees and costs has not been finalized and the trial court reserved jurisdiction for that purpose."
} | 6,998,139 | b |
Given our conclusion that the expert's testimony was not relevant under CRE 401, we necessarily reject defendant's argument that it was admissible as res gestae evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 P.3d 371, 378",
"parenthetical": "to be admissible under CRE 702, expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable",
"sentence": "See People v. Skufca, 176 P.3d 83, 86 (Colo.2008) (“[t]o be admissible, res gestae evidence must also be relevant under CRE 401”); see also People v. Ramirez, 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo.2007) (to be admissible under CRE 702, expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 P.3d 83, 86",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]o be admissible, res gestae evidence must also be relevant under CRE 401\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Skufca, 176 P.3d 83, 86 (Colo.2008) (“[t]o be admissible, res gestae evidence must also be relevant under CRE 401”); see also People v. Ramirez, 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo.2007) (to be admissible under CRE 702, expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable)."
} | 6,992,245 | b |
13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure SS 3612 (2d ed.1984). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "848 F.Supp. 317, 318",
"parenthetical": "favoring ties that \"could not be easily undone\" over more easily established ties",
"sentence": "Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 12 (“[D]omicile need not be determined by mere numerical comparison of the number of factors that may appear to favor each side of the issue.”); see also Leon v. Caribbean Hosp. Corp., 848 F.Supp. 317, 318 (D.P.R.1994) (favoring ties that “could not be easily undone” over more easily established ties)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "946 F.2d 12, 12",
"parenthetical": "\"[D]omicile need not be determined by mere numerical comparison of the number of factors that may appear to favor each side of the issue.\"",
"sentence": "Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 12 (“[D]omicile need not be determined by mere numerical comparison of the number of factors that may appear to favor each side of the issue.”); see also Leon v. Caribbean Hosp. Corp., 848 F.Supp. 317, 318 (D.P.R.1994) (favoring ties that “could not be easily undone” over more easily established ties)."
} | 9,272,553 | b |
Blakely concerns aside, this aggravator is properly used to enhance a sentence only when the court explains with specific facts why treatment is needed beyond that provided by the presumptive sentence." Appellant's Br. at 13. We find Gutermuth's non -Blakely argument dispositive and conclude that this aggravating circumstance is improper given the lack of such an explanation in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "834 N.E.2d 713, 719",
"parenthetical": "\"This factor may be used to enhance a sentence above the presumptive only if the trial court provides a specific or individualized reason as to why the defendant requires correctional treatment in excess of the presumptive term.\"",
"sentence": "See Hope v. State, 834 N.E.2d 713, 719 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“This factor may be used to enhance a sentence above the presumptive only if the trial court provides a specific or individualized reason as to why the defendant requires correctional treatment in excess of the presumptive term.”); see also Sheron v. State, 682 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (“As a matter of jurisprudence, courts will not decide constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other grounds.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "682 N.E.2d 552, 553",
"parenthetical": "\"As a matter of jurisprudence, courts will not decide constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other grounds.\"",
"sentence": "See Hope v. State, 834 N.E.2d 713, 719 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“This factor may be used to enhance a sentence above the presumptive only if the trial court provides a specific or individualized reason as to why the defendant requires correctional treatment in excess of the presumptive term.”); see also Sheron v. State, 682 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (“As a matter of jurisprudence, courts will not decide constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other grounds.”)."
} | 8,411,140 | a |
Gordon, Barry R. Sude, Ruth Ann Overbeek & Charles Hendricks, A Brief History of the American University Experiment Station and U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School. American University (Office of History Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, June 1994) at 36. Thus, the Army had already made a decision to warn. Its failure to effectuate that decision properly was not itself the product of a policy decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning",
"sentence": "See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 (when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 452, 452",
"parenthetical": "when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns",
"sentence": "See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 (when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning)."
} | 395,820 | b |
Gordon, Barry R. Sude, Ruth Ann Overbeek & Charles Hendricks, A Brief History of the American University Experiment Station and U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School. American University (Office of History Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, June 1994) at 36. Thus, the Army had already made a decision to warn. Its failure to effectuate that decision properly was not itself the product of a policy decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 452, 452",
"parenthetical": "when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns",
"sentence": "See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 (when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning",
"sentence": "See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 (when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning)."
} | 395,820 | a |
Gordon, Barry R. Sude, Ruth Ann Overbeek & Charles Hendricks, A Brief History of the American University Experiment Station and U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School. American University (Office of History Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, June 1994) at 36. Thus, the Army had already made a decision to warn. Its failure to effectuate that decision properly was not itself the product of a policy decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning",
"sentence": "See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 (when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 452, 452",
"parenthetical": "when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns",
"sentence": "See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 (when Park Service already posted signs in an effort to warn, the placement of additional or different signs does not implicate economic, social, or political concerns); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (Coast Guard, having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to repair light or give warning that it was not functioning)."
} | 395,820 | b |
When the office administrator's corroborated statement is considered for its non-hearsay purpose, this case squarely falls into the third category in which we have found tolling appropriate because the EEOC misled Alvarado about when he had to file suit (assuming, as we have, that the first letter triggered the limitations period). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 F.3d 874, 881",
"parenthetical": "providing that EEOC's misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | 4,010,622 | a |
When the office administrator's corroborated statement is considered for its non-hearsay purpose, this case squarely falls into the third category in which we have found tolling appropriate because the EEOC misled Alvarado about when he had to file suit (assuming, as we have, that the first letter triggered the limitations period). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 222, 227",
"parenthetical": "tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 F.3d 874, 881",
"parenthetical": "providing that EEOC's misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | 4,010,622 | b |
When the office administrator's corroborated statement is considered for its non-hearsay purpose, this case squarely falls into the third category in which we have found tolling appropriate because the EEOC misled Alvarado about when he had to file suit (assuming, as we have, that the first letter triggered the limitations period). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "556 F.2d 346, 351",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"equitable considerations\" allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was \"patently misleading\"",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | 4,010,622 | b |
When the office administrator's corroborated statement is considered for its non-hearsay purpose, this case squarely falls into the third category in which we have found tolling appropriate because the EEOC misled Alvarado about when he had to file suit (assuming, as we have, that the first letter triggered the limitations period). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 222, 227",
"parenthetical": "tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "556 F.2d 346, 351",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"equitable considerations\" allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was \"patently misleading\"",
"sentence": "See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir.2003) (providing that EEOC’s misleading plaintiff about his rights is potential basis for equitable tolling); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “equitable considerations” allowed plaintiff to pursue untimely action because EEOC letter indicating only that conciliation efforts had failed but not that EEOC had decided not to sue was “patently misleading”); see also Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir.1998) (equitably tolling plaintiffs case when EEOC misled plaintiff into believing she had filed a charge but had mistakenly instructed her to fill out an intake questionnaire and also calculated the expiration of the 300-day filing period based on an incorrect date); Browning v. AT & T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227 (11th Cir.1997) (tolling statute of limitations when an EEOC investigator told plaintiff that incorrect statute of limitations applied)."
} | 4,010,622 | b |
Federal prisoners who are injured by fellow inmates by reason of the negligence of federal employees can sue for their injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "374 U.S. 150, 150",
"parenthetical": "holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding",
"sentence": "See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners’ bodies “harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis”). However, plaintiff does not allege negligence."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "580 F.2d 72, 73, 77",
"parenthetical": "holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners' bodies \"harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners’ bodies “harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis”). However, plaintiff does not allege negligence."
} | 8,454,383 | a |
Federal prisoners who are injured by fellow inmates by reason of the negligence of federal employees can sue for their injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding",
"sentence": "See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners’ bodies “harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis”). However, plaintiff does not allege negligence."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "580 F.2d 72, 73, 77",
"parenthetical": "holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners' bodies \"harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners’ bodies “harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis”). However, plaintiff does not allege negligence."
} | 8,454,383 | a |
Federal prisoners who are injured by fellow inmates by reason of the negligence of federal employees can sue for their injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding",
"sentence": "See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners’ bodies “harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis”). However, plaintiff does not allege negligence."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "580 F.2d 72, 73, 77",
"parenthetical": "holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners' bodies \"harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (holding the United States liable under the FTCA for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners’ bodies “harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into full-fledged cases of tuberculosis”). However, plaintiff does not allege negligence."
} | 8,454,383 | a |
Hotline next contends that the state did not incur any reimbursable attorney's fees because its lawyers already were on the government payroll as salaried employees. But salaried government lawyers, like in-house and non-profit counsel, do incur expenses if the time and resources they devote to one case are not available for other work. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "76 F.3d 114, 115-16",
"parenthetical": "affirming award under ERISA fee-shifting statute to prevailing pension fund for its staff attorneys' representation",
"sentence": "See Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir.1985) (affirming fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to state’s attorneys for their representation of “prevailing defendants”); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1092-93 (3d Cir.1988) (affirming fee award under Fed. R.Civ.P. 11 to government for time of assistant U.S. attorney in defending a frivolous lawsuit); see also Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Cartage Co., 76 F.3d 114, 115-16 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming award under ERISA fee-shifting statute to prevailing pension fund for its staff attorneys’ representation); see also Softsolutions v. Brigham, Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106 n. 5 (Utah 2000) (collecting federal and state cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 1207, 1213",
"parenthetical": "affirming fee award under 42 U.S.C. SS 1988 to state's attorneys for their representation of \"prevailing defendants\"",
"sentence": "See Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir.1985) (affirming fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to state’s attorneys for their representation of “prevailing defendants”); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1092-93 (3d Cir.1988) (affirming fee award under Fed. R.Civ.P. 11 to government for time of assistant U.S. attorney in defending a frivolous lawsuit); see also Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Cartage Co., 76 F.3d 114, 115-16 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming award under ERISA fee-shifting statute to prevailing pension fund for its staff attorneys’ representation); see also Softsolutions v. Brigham, Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106 n. 5 (Utah 2000) (collecting federal and state cases)."
} | 11,163,333 | b |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 242, 252",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, \"the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | a |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, \"the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | b |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, \"the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | b |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "186 F.3d 1301, 1315",
"parenthetical": "concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee's argument",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | a |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee's argument",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | a |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee's argument",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | a |
Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,\" and that \"the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee's argument",
"sentence": "See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument)."
} | 6,056,650 | a |
Public interest factors include judicial economy, the interest in having "localized controversies decided at home," and the interest in having issues of foreign law decided by a foreign tribunal. This Court has explained, "[T]here is little sense to allowing a U.S. citizen to haul a group of foreign defendants into a U.S. court on transactions having little or nothing to do with this country where there is an available foreign forum significantly better suited to handling the litigation in a prompt, efficient and effective manner." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "135 F.Supp.2d 448, 448",
"parenthetical": "dismissing fraud claims against French bank in favor of London, where fraudulent activity was centered",
"sentence": "Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d at 448 (dismissing fraud claims against French bank in favor of London, where fraudulent activity was centered)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1993 WL 227663, at *4",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims of New York plaintiff against Greek bank, even though plaintiff alleged he was defrauded in New . York, because actions by Greek bank took place in Greece",
"sentence": "See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *4 (dismissing claims of New York plaintiff against Greek bank, even though plaintiff alleged he was defrauded in New . York, because actions by Greek bank took place in Greece)."
} | 3,693,227 | a |
It is unclear what precisely plaintiff is alleging, but in any event this "claim" is not properly before the court. A plaintiff cannot keep his ease alive through bait-and-switch, luring the defendant into moving for summary judgment on one claim, only then to assert an entirely different claim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756",
"parenthetical": "declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim not pleaded in the \"petition\" (i.e. the complaint) was \"not properly before the court\" on a motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | 5,758,707 | b |
It is unclear what precisely plaintiff is alleging, but in any event this "claim" is not properly before the court. A plaintiff cannot keep his ease alive through bait-and-switch, luring the defendant into moving for summary judgment on one claim, only then to assert an entirely different claim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim not pleaded in the \"petition\" (i.e. the complaint) was \"not properly before the court\" on a motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | 5,758,707 | b |
It is unclear what precisely plaintiff is alleging, but in any event this "claim" is not properly before the court. A plaintiff cannot keep his ease alive through bait-and-switch, luring the defendant into moving for summary judgment on one claim, only then to assert an entirely different claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 266, 276",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim not pleaded in the \"petition\" (i.e. the complaint) was \"not properly before the court\" on a motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756",
"parenthetical": "declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | 5,758,707 | a |
It is unclear what precisely plaintiff is alleging, but in any event this "claim" is not properly before the court. A plaintiff cannot keep his ease alive through bait-and-switch, luring the defendant into moving for summary judgment on one claim, only then to assert an entirely different claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 266, 276",
"parenthetical": "holding that a claim not pleaded in the \"petition\" (i.e. the complaint) was \"not properly before the court\" on a motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim",
"sentence": "See Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266, 276 (1967) (holding that a claim not pleaded in the “petition” (i.e. the complaint) was “not properly before the court” on a motion for summary judgment); cf. Redland Co., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) by asserting a new claim)."
} | 5,758,707 | a |
There was also evidence that the pharmacist, in accordance with the defendant's instructions in the note, waited several minutes and surveyed the front of the store before alerting authorities of the robbery. The Court of Appeals determined that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the totality of the circumstances that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2009 WL 3068259, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"A victim's belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Leftwich, No. 23383, 2009 WL 3068259, at *3 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. Sept. 25, 2009) (“A victim’s belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would \"blow [her] head off' if she did not comply",
"sentence": "Id. at *7. See also State v. Jeffers, 143 Ohio App.3d 91, 757 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.2001) (sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would “blow [her] head off’ if she did not comply); State v. Greathouse, No. 21536, 2007 WL 1297181, at *4 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. May 4, 2007) (sufficient evidence supported firearm specification even though victim never saw a gun, where defendant told victim that he had a gun and that he would kill her and dump her body if she did not comply); State v. Haskins, No. E-01-016, 2003 WL 99572, at *7 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2003) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated robbery conviction where defendant threatened “Are you going to give me the money or do I have to pull this pistol out of my pocket?” and attendant believed defendant in fact had a gun and responded by immediately by putting up her hands even though no weapon was actually seen or found); State v. Green, 117 Ohio App.3d 644, 651-652, 691 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.1996) (sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to “blow the heads off’ victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed)."
} | 3,687,925 | b |
There was also evidence that the pharmacist, in accordance with the defendant's instructions in the note, waited several minutes and surveyed the front of the store before alerting authorities of the robbery. The Court of Appeals determined that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the totality of the circumstances that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2009 WL 3068259, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"A victim's belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Leftwich, No. 23383, 2009 WL 3068259, at *3 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. Sept. 25, 2009) (“A victim’s belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would \"blow [her] head off' if she did not comply",
"sentence": "Id. at *7. See also State v. Jeffers, 143 Ohio App.3d 91, 757 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.2001) (sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would “blow [her] head off’ if she did not comply); State v. Greathouse, No. 21536, 2007 WL 1297181, at *4 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. May 4, 2007) (sufficient evidence supported firearm specification even though victim never saw a gun, where defendant told victim that he had a gun and that he would kill her and dump her body if she did not comply); State v. Haskins, No. E-01-016, 2003 WL 99572, at *7 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2003) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated robbery conviction where defendant threatened “Are you going to give me the money or do I have to pull this pistol out of my pocket?” and attendant believed defendant in fact had a gun and responded by immediately by putting up her hands even though no weapon was actually seen or found); State v. Green, 117 Ohio App.3d 644, 651-652, 691 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.1996) (sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to “blow the heads off’ victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed)."
} | 3,687,925 | b |
There was also evidence that the pharmacist, in accordance with the defendant's instructions in the note, waited several minutes and surveyed the front of the store before alerting authorities of the robbery. The Court of Appeals determined that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the totality of the circumstances that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2009 WL 3068259, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"A victim's belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Leftwich, No. 23383, 2009 WL 3068259, at *3 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. Sept. 25, 2009) (“A victim’s belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1297181, at *4",
"parenthetical": "sufficient evidence supported firearm specification even though victim never saw a gun, where defendant told victim that he had a gun and that he would kill her and dump her body if she did not comply",
"sentence": "Id. at *7. See also State v. Jeffers, 143 Ohio App.3d 91, 757 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.2001) (sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would “blow [her] head off’ if she did not comply); State v. Greathouse, No. 21536, 2007 WL 1297181, at *4 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. May 4, 2007) (sufficient evidence supported firearm specification even though victim never saw a gun, where defendant told victim that he had a gun and that he would kill her and dump her body if she did not comply); State v. Haskins, No. E-01-016, 2003 WL 99572, at *7 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2003) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated robbery conviction where defendant threatened “Are you going to give me the money or do I have to pull this pistol out of my pocket?” and attendant believed defendant in fact had a gun and responded by immediately by putting up her hands even though no weapon was actually seen or found); State v. Green, 117 Ohio App.3d 644, 651-652, 691 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.1996) (sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to “blow the heads off’ victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed)."
} | 3,687,925 | b |
There was also evidence that the pharmacist, in accordance with the defendant's instructions in the note, waited several minutes and surveyed the front of the store before alerting authorities of the robbery. The Court of Appeals determined that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the totality of the circumstances that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "117 Ohio App.3d 644, 651-652",
"parenthetical": "sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to \"blow the heads off' victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed",
"sentence": "Id. at *7. See also State v. Jeffers, 143 Ohio App.3d 91, 757 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.2001) (sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would “blow [her] head off’ if she did not comply); State v. Greathouse, No. 21536, 2007 WL 1297181, at *4 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. May 4, 2007) (sufficient evidence supported firearm specification even though victim never saw a gun, where defendant told victim that he had a gun and that he would kill her and dump her body if she did not comply); State v. Haskins, No. E-01-016, 2003 WL 99572, at *7 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2003) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated robbery conviction where defendant threatened “Are you going to give me the money or do I have to pull this pistol out of my pocket?” and attendant believed defendant in fact had a gun and responded by immediately by putting up her hands even though no weapon was actually seen or found); State v. Green, 117 Ohio App.3d 644, 651-652, 691 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.1996) (sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to “blow the heads off’ victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2009 WL 3068259, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"A victim's belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Leftwich, No. 23383, 2009 WL 3068259, at *3 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. Sept. 25, 2009) (“A victim’s belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.”)."
} | 3,687,925 | a |
There was also evidence that the pharmacist, in accordance with the defendant's instructions in the note, waited several minutes and surveyed the front of the store before alerting authorities of the robbery. The Court of Appeals determined that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the totality of the circumstances that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2009 WL 3068259, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"A victim's belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Leftwich, No. 23383, 2009 WL 3068259, at *3 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. Sept. 25, 2009) (“A victim’s belief that a defendant had a gun, together with the intent on the part of the defendant to create and use that belief for his own criminal purposes, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "691 N.E.2d 316, 321",
"parenthetical": "sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to \"blow the heads off' victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed",
"sentence": "Id. at *7. See also State v. Jeffers, 143 Ohio App.3d 91, 757 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.2001) (sufficient evidence existed to support firearm specification where robbery defendant kept hand in pocket and told convenience store that he would “blow [her] head off’ if she did not comply); State v. Greathouse, No. 21536, 2007 WL 1297181, at *4 (Ohio App. 2nd Dist. May 4, 2007) (sufficient evidence supported firearm specification even though victim never saw a gun, where defendant told victim that he had a gun and that he would kill her and dump her body if she did not comply); State v. Haskins, No. E-01-016, 2003 WL 99572, at *7 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2003) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated robbery conviction where defendant threatened “Are you going to give me the money or do I have to pull this pistol out of my pocket?” and attendant believed defendant in fact had a gun and responded by immediately by putting up her hands even though no weapon was actually seen or found); State v. Green, 117 Ohio App.3d 644, 651-652, 691 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ohio App. 1st Dist.1996) (sufficient evidence of deadly weapon where defendant verbally threatened to “blow the heads off’ victims while having large envelope wrapped around hand, and victims surrendered money based on belief defendant was armed)."
} | 3,687,925 | b |
Based on this sentiment, a number of courts have found constitutional violations in the use of peace bonds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "303 So. 2d 144, 144",
"parenthetical": "impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws",
"sentence": "See id. at 644, 303 So. 2d at 144 (impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws); Kolvek v. Napple, 158 W. Va. 568, 575, 212 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1975) (same; unconstitutional as applied to indigent defendants); Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Haw. 40, 44, 487 P.2d 283, 285 (1971) (denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 35, 38-41",
"parenthetical": "over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 38-41, 305 A.2d 346, 348-49 (1973) (over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required)."
} | 4,794,144 | a |
Based on this sentiment, a number of courts have found constitutional violations in the use of peace bonds. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "305 A.2d 346, 348-49",
"parenthetical": "over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 38-41, 305 A.2d 346, 348-49 (1973) (over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "303 So. 2d 144, 144",
"parenthetical": "impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws",
"sentence": "See id. at 644, 303 So. 2d at 144 (impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws); Kolvek v. Napple, 158 W. Va. 568, 575, 212 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1975) (same; unconstitutional as applied to indigent defendants); Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Haw. 40, 44, 487 P.2d 283, 285 (1971) (denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,794,144 | b |
Based on this sentiment, a number of courts have found constitutional violations in the use of peace bonds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 Haw. 40, 44",
"parenthetical": "denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See id. at 644, 303 So. 2d at 144 (impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws); Kolvek v. Napple, 158 W. Va. 568, 575, 212 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1975) (same; unconstitutional as applied to indigent defendants); Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Haw. 40, 44, 487 P.2d 283, 285 (1971) (denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 35, 38-41",
"parenthetical": "over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 38-41, 305 A.2d 346, 348-49 (1973) (over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required)."
} | 4,794,144 | a |
Based on this sentiment, a number of courts have found constitutional violations in the use of peace bonds. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "305 A.2d 346, 348-49",
"parenthetical": "over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 38-41, 305 A.2d 346, 348-49 (1973) (over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 Haw. 40, 44",
"parenthetical": "denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See id. at 644, 303 So. 2d at 144 (impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws); Kolvek v. Napple, 158 W. Va. 568, 575, 212 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1975) (same; unconstitutional as applied to indigent defendants); Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Haw. 40, 44, 487 P.2d 283, 285 (1971) (denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,794,144 | b |
Based on this sentiment, a number of courts have found constitutional violations in the use of peace bonds. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "452 Pa. 35, 38-41",
"parenthetical": "over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 38-41, 305 A.2d 346, 348-49 (1973) (over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "487 P.2d 283, 285",
"parenthetical": "denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See id. at 644, 303 So. 2d at 144 (impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws); Kolvek v. Napple, 158 W. Va. 568, 575, 212 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1975) (same; unconstitutional as applied to indigent defendants); Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Haw. 40, 44, 487 P.2d 283, 285 (1971) (denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 4,794,144 | b |
Based on this sentiment, a number of courts have found constitutional violations in the use of peace bonds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "487 P.2d 283, 285",
"parenthetical": "denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See id. at 644, 303 So. 2d at 144 (impermissible discrimination based on wealth, violation of equal protection of laws); Kolvek v. Napple, 158 W. Va. 568, 575, 212 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1975) (same; unconstitutional as applied to indigent defendants); Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Haw. 40, 44, 487 P.2d 283, 285 (1971) (denial of due process of law unless bond imposition is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "305 A.2d 346, 348-49",
"parenthetical": "over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35, 38-41, 305 A.2d 346, 348-49 (1973) (over two strong dissents, held that neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required)."
} | 4,794,144 | a |
Given these safeguards, there is very little risk that Plaintiff would suffer unnecessary pain in the event execution team members fail to properly prepare the pentobarbital syringes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "631 F.3d 1141, 1141",
"parenthetical": "stating that Arizona protocol's safeguards are adequate under Baze standard",
"sentence": "See Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2465, 179 L.Ed.2d. 1227 (2011) (rejecting claim of substantial risk of pain from administration of allegedly incorrect, diluted or adulterated anesthetic in light of consciousness check prior to administration of other two drugs); see also Dickens, 631 F.3d at 1141 (stating that Arizona protocol’s safeguards are adequate under Baze standard)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "637 F.3d 1002, 1007-08",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim of substantial risk of pain from administration of allegedly incorrect, diluted or adulterated anesthetic in light of consciousness check prior to administration of other two drugs",
"sentence": "See Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2465, 179 L.Ed.2d. 1227 (2011) (rejecting claim of substantial risk of pain from administration of allegedly incorrect, diluted or adulterated anesthetic in light of consciousness check prior to administration of other two drugs); see also Dickens, 631 F.3d at 1141 (stating that Arizona protocol’s safeguards are adequate under Baze standard)."
} | 4,183,824 | b |
Given these safeguards, there is very little risk that Plaintiff would suffer unnecessary pain in the event execution team members fail to properly prepare the pentobarbital syringes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim of substantial risk of pain from administration of allegedly incorrect, diluted or adulterated anesthetic in light of consciousness check prior to administration of other two drugs",
"sentence": "See Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2465, 179 L.Ed.2d. 1227 (2011) (rejecting claim of substantial risk of pain from administration of allegedly incorrect, diluted or adulterated anesthetic in light of consciousness check prior to administration of other two drugs); see also Dickens, 631 F.3d at 1141 (stating that Arizona protocol’s safeguards are adequate under Baze standard)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "631 F.3d 1141, 1141",
"parenthetical": "stating that Arizona protocol's safeguards are adequate under Baze standard",
"sentence": "See Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2465, 179 L.Ed.2d. 1227 (2011) (rejecting claim of substantial risk of pain from administration of allegedly incorrect, diluted or adulterated anesthetic in light of consciousness check prior to administration of other two drugs); see also Dickens, 631 F.3d at 1141 (stating that Arizona protocol’s safeguards are adequate under Baze standard)."
} | 4,183,824 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1206, 1216",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for '[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]' describefd] with particularity the items to be seized\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 463, 479-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "778 F.2d 609, 613-14",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, \"United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds\" and \"all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit\" and \" 'all property' constituting evidence of loansharking\" was sufficiently particular",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 463, 479-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 463, 479-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32",
"parenthetical": "finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 463, 479-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 999, 1001",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"general warrant\" argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items \"and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]\" and finding that \"[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1206, 1216",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for '[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]' describefd] with particularity the items to be seized\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "778 F.2d 609, 613-14",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, \"United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds\" and \"all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit\" and \" 'all property' constituting evidence of loansharking\" was sufficiently particular",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32",
"parenthetical": "finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 999, 1001",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"general warrant\" argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items \"and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]\" and finding that \"[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1206, 1216",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for '[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]' describefd] with particularity the items to be seized\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "778 F.2d 609, 613-14",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, \"United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds\" and \"all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit\" and \" 'all property' constituting evidence of loansharking\" was sufficiently particular",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32",
"parenthetical": "finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.2d 999, 1001",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"general warrant\" argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items \"and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]\" and finding that \"[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the inclusion of the phrase \"together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown\" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was \"clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]\"",
"sentence": "See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
The Santiagos attempt to distinguish Hobbs Trailers by arguing that their constitutional claims are defensive only. The federal courts considering this argument after Priester have rejected it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "560 Fed.Appx. 279, 279",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that declaratory-judgment action was \"defense\" to foreclosure and as such not constrained by statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Moran, 560 Fed.Appx. at 279 (rejecting argument that declaratory-judgment action was “defense” to foreclosure and as such not constrained by statute of limitations); see also Ausmus v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Nat’l Ass’n, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-148, 2013 WL 3938515, at *3 (S.D.Tex. July 29, 2013) (mem. op.); and Sigaran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. H-12-3588, 2013 WL 2368336, at *8 (S.D.Tex. May 29, 2013), aff'd, 560 Fed.Appx. 410 (5th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (both rejecting contention that constitutional claims were not barred because limitation statutes do not apply to defenses). In Ausmus, the court explained, “the argument that a violation of Section 50(a)(6) can serve as a defense to foreclosure rests on the view that an unconstitutional home equity loan is void.... Priester rejected that position, concluding that such a loan is merely voidable, and that the effort to invalidate it must be made within the four-year limitations” period."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2013 WL 2368336, at *8",
"parenthetical": "both rejecting contention that constitutional claims were not barred because limitation statutes do not apply to defenses",
"sentence": "Moran, 560 Fed.Appx. at 279 (rejecting argument that declaratory-judgment action was “defense” to foreclosure and as such not constrained by statute of limitations); see also Ausmus v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Nat’l Ass’n, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-148, 2013 WL 3938515, at *3 (S.D.Tex. July 29, 2013) (mem. op.); and Sigaran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. H-12-3588, 2013 WL 2368336, at *8 (S.D.Tex. May 29, 2013), aff'd, 560 Fed.Appx. 410 (5th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (both rejecting contention that constitutional claims were not barred because limitation statutes do not apply to defenses). In Ausmus, the court explained, “the argument that a violation of Section 50(a)(6) can serve as a defense to foreclosure rests on the view that an unconstitutional home equity loan is void.... Priester rejected that position, concluding that such a loan is merely voidable, and that the effort to invalidate it must be made within the four-year limitations” period."
} | 6,908,629 | a |
The Santiagos attempt to distinguish Hobbs Trailers by arguing that their constitutional claims are defensive only. The federal courts considering this argument after Priester have rejected it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "560 Fed.Appx. 279, 279",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that declaratory-judgment action was \"defense\" to foreclosure and as such not constrained by statute of limitations",
"sentence": "Moran, 560 Fed.Appx. at 279 (rejecting argument that declaratory-judgment action was “defense” to foreclosure and as such not constrained by statute of limitations); see also Ausmus v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Nat’l Ass’n, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-148, 2013 WL 3938515, at *3 (S.D.Tex. July 29, 2013) (mem. op.); and Sigaran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. H-12-3588, 2013 WL 2368336, at *8 (S.D.Tex. May 29, 2013), aff'd, 560 Fed.Appx. 410 (5th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (both rejecting contention that constitutional claims were not barred because limitation statutes do not apply to defenses). In Ausmus, the court explained, “the argument that a violation of Section 50(a)(6) can serve as a defense to foreclosure rests on the view that an unconstitutional home equity loan is void.... Priester rejected that position, concluding that such a loan is merely voidable, and that the effort to invalidate it must be made within the four-year limitations” period."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "both rejecting contention that constitutional claims were not barred because limitation statutes do not apply to defenses",
"sentence": "Moran, 560 Fed.Appx. at 279 (rejecting argument that declaratory-judgment action was “defense” to foreclosure and as such not constrained by statute of limitations); see also Ausmus v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Nat’l Ass’n, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-148, 2013 WL 3938515, at *3 (S.D.Tex. July 29, 2013) (mem. op.); and Sigaran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. H-12-3588, 2013 WL 2368336, at *8 (S.D.Tex. May 29, 2013), aff'd, 560 Fed.Appx. 410 (5th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (both rejecting contention that constitutional claims were not barred because limitation statutes do not apply to defenses). In Ausmus, the court explained, “the argument that a violation of Section 50(a)(6) can serve as a defense to foreclosure rests on the view that an unconstitutional home equity loan is void.... Priester rejected that position, concluding that such a loan is merely voidable, and that the effort to invalidate it must be made within the four-year limitations” period."
} | 6,908,629 | a |
Although she argued in her brief before the BIA that the IJ created an unnecessarily hostile environment, she never referred to a violation of her due process rights or alluded to the hearing being fundamentally unfair or precluding judicial review. See A.R. at 23-24. Because Gomez failed to raise her due process challenge in her BIA appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 383, 389",
"parenthetical": "noting that the BIA should be given the first opportunity to correct any procedural errors committed during the petitioner's hearing",
"sentence": "See Rodriguez, 9 F.3d at 414 (“Because [the petitioner] failed to raise this issue before the BIA, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and we have no jurisdiction to consider these grounds.”); see also Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir.2001) (noting that the BIA should be given the first opportunity to correct any procedural errors committed during the petitioner’s hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 F.3d 414, 414",
"parenthetical": "\"Because [the petitioner] failed to raise this issue before the BIA, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and we have no jurisdiction to consider these grounds.\"",
"sentence": "See Rodriguez, 9 F.3d at 414 (“Because [the petitioner] failed to raise this issue before the BIA, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and we have no jurisdiction to consider these grounds.”); see also Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir.2001) (noting that the BIA should be given the first opportunity to correct any procedural errors committed during the petitioner’s hearing)."
} | 59,409 | b |
(Tr. at 33-39, 98-101, 128-29.) As this Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of the three officers in this case, their specific recollections trump ADA Coyne's bare assumption that the criminal file jacket accurately represents her conversation with Officer Fogarty. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147",
"parenthetical": "holding that police officer's sworn affidavit that Miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendant's post-arrest statement in the absence of properly-supported statement by defendant to the contrary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Martinez, 634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(holding that police officer’s sworn affidavit that Miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendant’s post-arrest statement in the absence of properly-supported statement by defendant to the contrary); see also United States v. Patterson, No. 02 Cr. 283(WHP), 2002 WL 31890950, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002) (“[Defendant’s] lack of a present recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, coupled with [the agent’s] specific recollection ... that [defendant] was read his Miranda rights by [another agent], is sufficient for this Court to conclude that [defendant] properly received his Miranda warnings.”); Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 927 F.Supp. 741, 745 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(when presented with defendant’s “specific recollection” and “plaintiffs lack of recollection of what he said at the first meeting,” reasonable jury “could only” accept defendant’s account of the meeting)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 31890950, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"[Defendant's] lack of a present recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, coupled with [the agent's] specific recollection ... that [defendant] was read his Miranda rights by [another agent], is sufficient for this Court to conclude that [defendant] properly received his Miranda warnings.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Martinez, 634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(holding that police officer’s sworn affidavit that Miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendant’s post-arrest statement in the absence of properly-supported statement by defendant to the contrary); see also United States v. Patterson, No. 02 Cr. 283(WHP), 2002 WL 31890950, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002) (“[Defendant’s] lack of a present recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, coupled with [the agent’s] specific recollection ... that [defendant] was read his Miranda rights by [another agent], is sufficient for this Court to conclude that [defendant] properly received his Miranda warnings.”); Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 927 F.Supp. 741, 745 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(when presented with defendant’s “specific recollection” and “plaintiffs lack of recollection of what he said at the first meeting,” reasonable jury “could only” accept defendant’s account of the meeting)."
} | 9,085,036 | a |
(Tr. at 33-39, 98-101, 128-29.) As this Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of the three officers in this case, their specific recollections trump ADA Coyne's bare assumption that the criminal file jacket accurately represents her conversation with Officer Fogarty. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when presented with defendant's \"specific recollection\" and \"plaintiffs lack of recollection of what he said at the first meeting,\" reasonable jury \"could only\" accept defendant's account of the meeting",
"sentence": "See United States v. Martinez, 634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(holding that police officer’s sworn affidavit that Miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendant’s post-arrest statement in the absence of properly-supported statement by defendant to the contrary); see also United States v. Patterson, No. 02 Cr. 283(WHP), 2002 WL 31890950, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002) (“[Defendant’s] lack of a present recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, coupled with [the agent’s] specific recollection ... that [defendant] was read his Miranda rights by [another agent], is sufficient for this Court to conclude that [defendant] properly received his Miranda warnings.”); Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 927 F.Supp. 741, 745 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(when presented with defendant’s “specific recollection” and “plaintiffs lack of recollection of what he said at the first meeting,” reasonable jury “could only” accept defendant’s account of the meeting)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147",
"parenthetical": "holding that police officer's sworn affidavit that Miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendant's post-arrest statement in the absence of properly-supported statement by defendant to the contrary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Martinez, 634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(holding that police officer’s sworn affidavit that Miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendant’s post-arrest statement in the absence of properly-supported statement by defendant to the contrary); see also United States v. Patterson, No. 02 Cr. 283(WHP), 2002 WL 31890950, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002) (“[Defendant’s] lack of a present recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, coupled with [the agent’s] specific recollection ... that [defendant] was read his Miranda rights by [another agent], is sufficient for this Court to conclude that [defendant] properly received his Miranda warnings.”); Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 927 F.Supp. 741, 745 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(when presented with defendant’s “specific recollection” and “plaintiffs lack of recollection of what he said at the first meeting,” reasonable jury “could only” accept defendant’s account of the meeting)."
} | 9,085,036 | b |
Both Esther and Ben Jarvison are subject to Navajo Nation laws regarding marriage and domestic relations. Because domestic relations are considered by the Tribe as being at the core of Navajo sovereignty, In re Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6113 (Navajo 1989), we conclude that Navajo law is the appropriate law under which to evaluate the validity of the marriage. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that tribal Indians domiciled within the territorial limits of an Indian nation in Indian Territory and who consummated a marriage or divorce in accordance with recognized tribal custom before such customs had been superceded by other law, were bound by the legal effect given to such customs",
"sentence": "See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245; Marris v. Sockey, 170 F.2d 599 (10th Cir.1948) (holding that tribal Indians domiciled within the territorial limits of an Indian nation in Indian Territory and who consummated a marriage or divorce in accordance with recognized tribal custom before such customs had been superceded by other law, were bound by the legal effect given to such customs); see also Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 679 (D.N.M.2003) (determining validity of a Navajo couple’s marriage by examining required elements of common law marriage under Navajo law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining validity of a Navajo couple's marriage by examining required elements of common law marriage under Navajo law",
"sentence": "See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245; Marris v. Sockey, 170 F.2d 599 (10th Cir.1948) (holding that tribal Indians domiciled within the territorial limits of an Indian nation in Indian Territory and who consummated a marriage or divorce in accordance with recognized tribal custom before such customs had been superceded by other law, were bound by the legal effect given to such customs); see also Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 679 (D.N.M.2003) (determining validity of a Navajo couple’s marriage by examining required elements of common law marriage under Navajo law)."
} | 7,347,961 | a |
In the instant case, no comparable special sovereignty interests are at stake. A state's interest in administering a welfare program at least partially funded by the federal government is not such a core sovereign interest as to preclude the application of Ex parte Young. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "160 F.3d 612, 612-13",
"parenthetical": "holding state's property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a \"special sovereignty interest\"",
"sentence": "See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 720 (11th Cir.1998) (asserting, without addressing special sovereignty interest’ requirement, that case in which developmentally disabled individuals brought § 1983 action against officials for failure to furnish Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness “fit neatly within the Ex parte Young exception”); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 616-17 & n. 13 (7th Cir.1997) (finding no important sovereignty interests such as those at issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe in suit brought by infants with disabilities against state officials alleging that state did not comply with early intervention requirements of IDEA and seeking to enforce compliance with the federal program under which the officials had accepted funds); cf. Elephant Butte, 160 F.3d at 612-13 (holding state’s property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a “special sovereignty interest”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 709, 720",
"parenthetical": "asserting, without addressing special sovereignty interest' requirement, that case in which developmentally disabled individuals brought SS 1983 action against officials for failure to furnish Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness \"fit neatly within the Ex parte Young exception\"",
"sentence": "See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 720 (11th Cir.1998) (asserting, without addressing special sovereignty interest’ requirement, that case in which developmentally disabled individuals brought § 1983 action against officials for failure to furnish Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness “fit neatly within the Ex parte Young exception”); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 616-17 & n. 13 (7th Cir.1997) (finding no important sovereignty interests such as those at issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe in suit brought by infants with disabilities against state officials alleging that state did not comply with early intervention requirements of IDEA and seeking to enforce compliance with the federal program under which the officials had accepted funds); cf. Elephant Butte, 160 F.3d at 612-13 (holding state’s property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a “special sovereignty interest”)."
} | 857,766 | b |
In the instant case, no comparable special sovereignty interests are at stake. A state's interest in administering a welfare program at least partially funded by the federal government is not such a core sovereign interest as to preclude the application of Ex parte Young. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no important sovereignty interests such as those at issue in Coeur d'Alene Tribe in suit brought by infants with disabilities against state officials alleging that state did not comply with early intervention requirements of IDEA and seeking to enforce compliance with the federal program under which the officials had accepted funds",
"sentence": "See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 720 (11th Cir.1998) (asserting, without addressing special sovereignty interest’ requirement, that case in which developmentally disabled individuals brought § 1983 action against officials for failure to furnish Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness “fit neatly within the Ex parte Young exception”); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 616-17 & n. 13 (7th Cir.1997) (finding no important sovereignty interests such as those at issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe in suit brought by infants with disabilities against state officials alleging that state did not comply with early intervention requirements of IDEA and seeking to enforce compliance with the federal program under which the officials had accepted funds); cf. Elephant Butte, 160 F.3d at 612-13 (holding state’s property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a “special sovereignty interest”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "160 F.3d 612, 612-13",
"parenthetical": "holding state's property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a \"special sovereignty interest\"",
"sentence": "See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 720 (11th Cir.1998) (asserting, without addressing special sovereignty interest’ requirement, that case in which developmentally disabled individuals brought § 1983 action against officials for failure to furnish Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness “fit neatly within the Ex parte Young exception”); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 616-17 & n. 13 (7th Cir.1997) (finding no important sovereignty interests such as those at issue in Coeur d’Alene Tribe in suit brought by infants with disabilities against state officials alleging that state did not comply with early intervention requirements of IDEA and seeking to enforce compliance with the federal program under which the officials had accepted funds); cf. Elephant Butte, 160 F.3d at 612-13 (holding state’s property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a “special sovereignty interest”)."
} | 857,766 | a |
District Judge Sotomayor (as she was then) reached a similar conclusion in Papeskov v. Brown, and this Court agreed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "410 F.Supp.2d 175, 179",
"parenthetical": "dismissing SS 1983 action brought by former inmate who successfully challenged conviction for, inter alia, rape and sodomy, later pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, and filed suit upon release",
"sentence": "No. 97 Civ. 5351(SS), 1998 WL 299892, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1998), summarily aff'd, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir.1999) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who was charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon and pled guilty to harassment); see also Stein v. Cnty. of Westchester, N.Y., 410 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who successfully challenged conviction for, inter alia, rape and sodomy, later pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, and filed suit upon release)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "1998 WL 299892, at *5",
"parenthetical": "dismissing SS 1983 action brought by former inmate who was charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon and pled guilty to harassment",
"sentence": "No. 97 Civ. 5351(SS), 1998 WL 299892, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1998), summarily aff'd, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir.1999) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who was charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon and pled guilty to harassment); see also Stein v. Cnty. of Westchester, N.Y., 410 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who successfully challenged conviction for, inter alia, rape and sodomy, later pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, and filed suit upon release)."
} | 6,047,287 | b |
District Judge Sotomayor (as she was then) reached a similar conclusion in Papeskov v. Brown, and this Court agreed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "410 F.Supp.2d 175, 179",
"parenthetical": "dismissing SS 1983 action brought by former inmate who successfully challenged conviction for, inter alia, rape and sodomy, later pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, and filed suit upon release",
"sentence": "No. 97 Civ. 5351(SS), 1998 WL 299892, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1998), summarily aff'd, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir.1999) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who was charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon and pled guilty to harassment); see also Stein v. Cnty. of Westchester, N.Y., 410 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who successfully challenged conviction for, inter alia, rape and sodomy, later pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, and filed suit upon release)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing SS 1983 action brought by former inmate who was charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon and pled guilty to harassment",
"sentence": "No. 97 Civ. 5351(SS), 1998 WL 299892, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1998), summarily aff'd, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir.1999) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who was charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon and pled guilty to harassment); see also Stein v. Cnty. of Westchester, N.Y., 410 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (dismissing § 1983 action brought by former inmate who successfully challenged conviction for, inter alia, rape and sodomy, later pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child, and filed suit upon release)."
} | 6,047,287 | b |
In rejecting Scheuring's LHWCA claim, the district court analogized the ramp to a dock or pier. Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., No. CV 03-06613-RZ, slip op. at 9 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2004). In opposition, the plaintiff asks us to view the ramp as a gangway. This distinction is critical since a gangway constitutes an appliance of a vessel but a dock or pier does not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "404 U.S. 202, 207",
"parenthetical": "holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 866, 870",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway\"",
"sentence": "See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”)."
} | 3,761,709 | a |
In rejecting Scheuring's LHWCA claim, the district court analogized the ramp to a dock or pier. Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., No. CV 03-06613-RZ, slip op. at 9 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2004). In opposition, the plaintiff asks us to view the ramp as a gangway. This distinction is critical since a gangway constitutes an appliance of a vessel but a dock or pier does not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 866, 870",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway\"",
"sentence": "See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”)."
} | 3,761,709 | a |
In rejecting Scheuring's LHWCA claim, the district court analogized the ramp to a dock or pier. Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., No. CV 03-06613-RZ, slip op. at 9 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2004). In opposition, the plaintiff asks us to view the ramp as a gangway. This distinction is critical since a gangway constitutes an appliance of a vessel but a dock or pier does not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 866, 870",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway\"",
"sentence": "See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that “the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway”)."
} | 3,761,709 | a |
The right to equal protection under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantees that people who are similarly situated are treated alike; thus to establish a denial of equal protection, a defendant must first show that similarly situated people have been treated differently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 1, 10",
"parenthetical": "stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but \"simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn.2011) (stating that “we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn.2011) (stating that “we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”)."
} | 6,968,268 | b |
The right to equal protection under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantees that people who are similarly situated are treated alike; thus to establish a denial of equal protection, a defendant must first show that similarly situated people have been treated differently. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn.2011) (stating that “we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331",
"parenthetical": "stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but \"simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn.2011) (stating that “we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”)."
} | 6,968,268 | a |
The right to equal protection under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantees that people who are similarly situated are treated alike; thus to establish a denial of equal protection, a defendant must first show that similarly situated people have been treated differently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but \"simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn.2011) (stating that “we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn.2011) (stating that “we have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to those whom they contend are being treated differently”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (stating that the guarantee of equal protection does not forbid classifications, but “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”)."
} | 6,968,268 | b |
Thus, whatever Second Amendment right Bruley may have to possess a firearm in his apartment, it cannot be stretched to create a wrongful discharge cause of action under Florida law against a private employer which fires an employee for carrying a firearm on company property. Moreover, there is no state action involved. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "576 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1295",
"parenthetical": "\"the constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only ... governments ..., not private actors\"",
"sentence": "See Florida Retail Federation, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d at 1295 (“the constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only ... governments ..., not private actors”) (emphasis in original); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (requiring state action for claimed Fourteenth Amendment violations); O’Dell v. Doychak, No. 606-CV-677-ORL-19KRS, 2006 WL 4509634, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 20, 2006) (requiring state action for claimed due process and basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla.1983) (requiring state action for claimed basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2006 WL 4509634, at *3",
"parenthetical": "requiring state action for claimed due process and basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution",
"sentence": "See Florida Retail Federation, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d at 1295 (“the constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only ... governments ..., not private actors”) (emphasis in original); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (requiring state action for claimed Fourteenth Amendment violations); O’Dell v. Doychak, No. 606-CV-677-ORL-19KRS, 2006 WL 4509634, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 20, 2006) (requiring state action for claimed due process and basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla.1983) (requiring state action for claimed basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution)."
} | 3,699,156 | a |
Thus, whatever Second Amendment right Bruley may have to possess a firearm in his apartment, it cannot be stretched to create a wrongful discharge cause of action under Florida law against a private employer which fires an employee for carrying a firearm on company property. Moreover, there is no state action involved. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "432 So.2d 567, 569",
"parenthetical": "requiring state action for claimed basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution",
"sentence": "See Florida Retail Federation, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d at 1295 (“the constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only ... governments ..., not private actors”) (emphasis in original); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (requiring state action for claimed Fourteenth Amendment violations); O’Dell v. Doychak, No. 606-CV-677-ORL-19KRS, 2006 WL 4509634, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 20, 2006) (requiring state action for claimed due process and basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla.1983) (requiring state action for claimed basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "576 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1295",
"parenthetical": "\"the constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only ... governments ..., not private actors\"",
"sentence": "See Florida Retail Federation, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d at 1295 (“the constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only ... governments ..., not private actors”) (emphasis in original); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (requiring state action for claimed Fourteenth Amendment violations); O’Dell v. Doychak, No. 606-CV-677-ORL-19KRS, 2006 WL 4509634, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 20, 2006) (requiring state action for claimed due process and basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla.1983) (requiring state action for claimed basic rights violations under the Florida Constitution)."
} | 3,699,156 | b |
The IHRA also explicitly prohibits retaliation against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination, or who have filed a charge or complaint under the IHRA. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6-101(A). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim is preempted by the IHRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2008 WL 686256, at *7",
"parenthetical": "\"Both state and federal courts dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, Illinois common law claims of retaliatory discharge for opposition to an allegedly unlawful employment practice.\"",
"sentence": "See Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 313 (7th Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim based on alleged marital status discrimination because such discrimination was encompassed by the IHRA and therefore plaintiffs claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission); see also Hill v. Vill. of Franklin Park, No. 07-4335, 2008 WL 686256, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 11, 2008) (“Both state and federal courts dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, Illinois common law claims of retaliatory discharge for opposition to an allegedly unlawful employment practice.”); Smith v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 98-1691, 1999 WL 33883, at *3 (N.D.Ill.1999) (finding that plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge, where plaintiff had complained of discriminatory treatment and harassment, was preempted by the IHRA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "37 F.3d 310, 313",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim based on alleged marital status discrimination because such discrimination was encompassed by the IHRA and therefore plaintiffs claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission",
"sentence": "See Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 313 (7th Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim based on alleged marital status discrimination because such discrimination was encompassed by the IHRA and therefore plaintiffs claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission); see also Hill v. Vill. of Franklin Park, No. 07-4335, 2008 WL 686256, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 11, 2008) (“Both state and federal courts dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, Illinois common law claims of retaliatory discharge for opposition to an allegedly unlawful employment practice.”); Smith v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 98-1691, 1999 WL 33883, at *3 (N.D.Ill.1999) (finding that plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge, where plaintiff had complained of discriminatory treatment and harassment, was preempted by the IHRA)."
} | 3,560,669 | b |
The IHRA also explicitly prohibits retaliation against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination, or who have filed a charge or complaint under the IHRA. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6-101(A). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim is preempted by the IHRA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "37 F.3d 310, 313",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim based on alleged marital status discrimination because such discrimination was encompassed by the IHRA and therefore plaintiffs claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission",
"sentence": "See Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 313 (7th Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim based on alleged marital status discrimination because such discrimination was encompassed by the IHRA and therefore plaintiffs claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission); see also Hill v. Vill. of Franklin Park, No. 07-4335, 2008 WL 686256, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 11, 2008) (“Both state and federal courts dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, Illinois common law claims of retaliatory discharge for opposition to an allegedly unlawful employment practice.”); Smith v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 98-1691, 1999 WL 33883, at *3 (N.D.Ill.1999) (finding that plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge, where plaintiff had complained of discriminatory treatment and harassment, was preempted by the IHRA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 WL 33883, at *3",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge, where plaintiff had complained of discriminatory treatment and harassment, was preempted by the IHRA",
"sentence": "See Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 313 (7th Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim based on alleged marital status discrimination because such discrimination was encompassed by the IHRA and therefore plaintiffs claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission); see also Hill v. Vill. of Franklin Park, No. 07-4335, 2008 WL 686256, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 11, 2008) (“Both state and federal courts dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, Illinois common law claims of retaliatory discharge for opposition to an allegedly unlawful employment practice.”); Smith v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 98-1691, 1999 WL 33883, at *3 (N.D.Ill.1999) (finding that plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge, where plaintiff had complained of discriminatory treatment and harassment, was preempted by the IHRA)."
} | 3,560,669 | a |
Promoting the efficient allocation of prison resources has been recognized as a legitimate governmental interest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison's policy of providing Muslim inmates vegetarian meals, rather than Halal meals with meat in conformance with the Muslim inmates' religious beliefs, was rationally related to legitimate peno-logical interests in, among other things, simplified food service and staying within the prison's budget",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir.2003) (prison’s policy of providing Muslim inmates vegetarian meals, rather than Halal meals with meat in conformance with the Muslim inmates’ religious beliefs, was rationally related to legitimate peno-logical interests in, among other things, simplified food service and staying within the prison’s budget)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing prison's legitimate penological interest in efficient and economical operations in the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation",
"sentence": "See also Orafan v. Goord, 411 F.Supp.2d 153 (N.D.N.Y.2006) (recognizing prison’s legitimate penological interest in efficient and economical operations in the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation); Breakiron v. Neal, 166 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D.Tex.2001) (County’s act of deducting payments from prisoner’s inmate trust account for medical services rendered was rationally related to county’s legitimate interest in the efficient use of prison resources for purposes of Equal Protection Claim)."
} | 2,670,456 | a |
Promoting the efficient allocation of prison resources has been recognized as a legitimate governmental interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "County's act of deducting payments from prisoner's inmate trust account for medical services rendered was rationally related to county's legitimate interest in the efficient use of prison resources for purposes of Equal Protection Claim",
"sentence": "See also Orafan v. Goord, 411 F.Supp.2d 153 (N.D.N.Y.2006) (recognizing prison’s legitimate penological interest in efficient and economical operations in the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation); Breakiron v. Neal, 166 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D.Tex.2001) (County’s act of deducting payments from prisoner’s inmate trust account for medical services rendered was rationally related to county’s legitimate interest in the efficient use of prison resources for purposes of Equal Protection Claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prison's policy of providing Muslim inmates vegetarian meals, rather than Halal meals with meat in conformance with the Muslim inmates' religious beliefs, was rationally related to legitimate peno-logical interests in, among other things, simplified food service and staying within the prison's budget",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir.2003) (prison’s policy of providing Muslim inmates vegetarian meals, rather than Halal meals with meat in conformance with the Muslim inmates’ religious beliefs, was rationally related to legitimate peno-logical interests in, among other things, simplified food service and staying within the prison’s budget)."
} | 2,670,456 | b |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 U.S. 302, 319",
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "558 U.S. 30, 41",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | b |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "558 U.S. 30, 41",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | a |
Such findings would have served as com pelling mitigating evidence. Although counsel consulted with Wearry and interviewed his family, he failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into his mental health and childhood, which may have persuaded jurors to spare his life. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Evidence about defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "558 U.S. 30, 41",
"parenthetical": "finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury's appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 454, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (finding that evidence of poor mental health or mental impairment, in addition to other mitigating evidence, could influence a jury’s appraisal of ^defendant's moral culpability); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“[Evidence about defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief ... that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to ... emotional or mental problems ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)."
} | 6,879,472 | b |
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