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P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "610 P.2d 1045, 1048",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "635 P.2d 870, 872",
"parenthetical": "\"The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | b |
Indeed, every declaration currently before the Court supports FCPS. In short, Roberts' allegations are the type of fanciful allegations that no reasonable juror could believe. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff’); see also Clinchfield Coal Co., 124 F.3d at 640 (“Fanciful inferences and bald speculations of the sort no rational trier of fact would draw or engage in at trial need not be drawn or engaged in at summary judgment.”); D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998) (to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must offer some hard evidence that its version of the events in question is not wholly fanciful.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 F.3d 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "\"Fanciful inferences and bald speculations of the sort no rational trier of fact would draw or engage in at trial need not be drawn or engaged in at summary judgment.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff’); see also Clinchfield Coal Co., 124 F.3d at 640 (“Fanciful inferences and bald speculations of the sort no rational trier of fact would draw or engage in at trial need not be drawn or engaged in at summary judgment.”); D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998) (to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must offer some hard evidence that its version of the events in question is not wholly fanciful.”)."
} | 3,578,206 | a |
Indeed, every declaration currently before the Court supports FCPS. In short, Roberts' allegations are the type of fanciful allegations that no reasonable juror could believe. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 145, 149",
"parenthetical": "to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party \"must offer some hard evidence that its version of the events in question is not wholly fanciful.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff’); see also Clinchfield Coal Co., 124 F.3d at 640 (“Fanciful inferences and bald speculations of the sort no rational trier of fact would draw or engage in at trial need not be drawn or engaged in at summary judgment.”); D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998) (to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must offer some hard evidence that its version of the events in question is not wholly fanciful.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff’); see also Clinchfield Coal Co., 124 F.3d at 640 (“Fanciful inferences and bald speculations of the sort no rational trier of fact would draw or engage in at trial need not be drawn or engaged in at summary judgment.”); D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998) (to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must offer some hard evidence that its version of the events in question is not wholly fanciful.”)."
} | 3,578,206 | b |
While the court recognizes that a statutory redemption period may extend the Debt- or's right to cure the default under SS 1322(c)(1), West Virginia law does not have such a redemption period, and therefore, the Debtor's right to cure the default ends at the foreclosure sale. See Colon v. Option One Mortg. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 912, 920",
"parenthetical": "stating that a debtor's right to cure a home mortgage after foreclosure survives if the state allows a statutory period of redemption",
"sentence": "Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 920 (7th Cir.2003) (stating that a debtor’s right to cure a home mortgage after foreclosure survives if the state allows a statutory period of redemption); contra, Cain v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A (In re Cain), 423 F.3d 617, 620 (6th Cir.2005) (providing that the Bankruptcy Code precludes a cure of a home mortgage after a foreclosure sale based solely on a mortgagee’s statutory right of redemption). In short, after a foreclosure sale is complete under West Virginia law, a debtor has no right — based solely on state law — to redeem the property and cure the previous default."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "423 F.3d 617, 620",
"parenthetical": "providing that the Bankruptcy Code precludes a cure of a home mortgage after a foreclosure sale based solely on a mortgagee's statutory right of redemption",
"sentence": "Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 920 (7th Cir.2003) (stating that a debtor’s right to cure a home mortgage after foreclosure survives if the state allows a statutory period of redemption); contra, Cain v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A (In re Cain), 423 F.3d 617, 620 (6th Cir.2005) (providing that the Bankruptcy Code precludes a cure of a home mortgage after a foreclosure sale based solely on a mortgagee’s statutory right of redemption). In short, after a foreclosure sale is complete under West Virginia law, a debtor has no right — based solely on state law — to redeem the property and cure the previous default."
} | 5,740,535 | a |
Significant differences in opinion clearly exist amongst the Circuits that now have ruled on the issue of whether double jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture proceeding to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.1995) (same); but see 405, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994) (civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (separate opinion of Sarokin, J.) (civil forfeiture should constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); also compare United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes is punishment for purposes of double jeopardy) with United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.1995) (same); but see 405, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994) (civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (separate opinion of Sarokin, J.) (civil forfeiture should constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); also compare United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes is punishment for purposes of double jeopardy) with United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy)."
} | 7,790,576 | b |
Significant differences in opinion clearly exist amongst the Circuits that now have ruled on the issue of whether double jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture proceeding to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.1995) (same); but see 405, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994) (civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (separate opinion of Sarokin, J.) (civil forfeiture should constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); also compare United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes is punishment for purposes of double jeopardy) with United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.1995) (same); but see 405, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994) (civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (separate opinion of Sarokin, J.) (civil forfeiture should constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); also compare United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes is punishment for purposes of double jeopardy) with United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy)."
} | 7,790,576 | b |
Significant differences in opinion clearly exist amongst the Circuits that now have ruled on the issue of whether double jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture proceeding to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action",
"sentence": "See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.1995) (same); but see 405, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994) (civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (separate opinion of Sarokin, J.) (civil forfeiture should constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); also compare United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes is punishment for purposes of double jeopardy) with United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (double jeopardy does not attach in civil forfeiture to bar subsequent criminal action); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.1995) (same); but see 405, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994) (civil forfeiture constitutes punishment which bars subsequent criminal prosecution as double jeopardy); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (separate opinion of Sarokin, J.) (civil forfeiture should constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); also compare United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes is punishment for purposes of double jeopardy) with United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy)."
} | 7,790,576 | a |
Furthermore, a breach of the duty to assist in this case would not be an error of the sort that should be contemplated in the CUE analysis because the original RO decision in 1972 is not final for purposes of appeal. A claim of CUE is a collateral attack that can only be made on a final RO or Board decision, see id. at 1380-81, and generally, rating decisions by the VA are deemed "final and binding ... as to conclusions based on the evidence on file at the time the VA issues written notification" of a decision, 38 C.F.R. SS 3.104(a). In cases of grave procedural error, however, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has consistently held that RO or Board decisions are not final for purposes of direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 307, 311",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. SS 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run",
"sentence": "See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (holding that where an appellant “never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with ‘the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,’ did not begin to run”); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final); see also Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run). A breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "8 Vet.App. 359, 361",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]\"",
"sentence": "See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (holding that where an appellant “never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with ‘the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,’ did not begin to run”); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final); see also Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run). A breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal."
} | 11,210,542 | b |
Furthermore, a breach of the duty to assist in this case would not be an error of the sort that should be contemplated in the CUE analysis because the original RO decision in 1972 is not final for purposes of appeal. A claim of CUE is a collateral attack that can only be made on a final RO or Board decision, see id. at 1380-81, and generally, rating decisions by the VA are deemed "final and binding ... as to conclusions based on the evidence on file at the time the VA issues written notification" of a decision, 38 C.F.R. SS 3.104(a). In cases of grave procedural error, however, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has consistently held that RO or Board decisions are not final for purposes of direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 307, 311",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. SS 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run",
"sentence": "See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (holding that where an appellant “never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with ‘the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,’ did not begin to run”); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final); see also Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run). A breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 Vet.App. 518, 519",
"parenthetical": "holding that where an appellant \"never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with 'the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,' did not begin to run\"",
"sentence": "See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (holding that where an appellant “never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with ‘the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,’ did not begin to run”); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final); see also Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run). A breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal."
} | 11,210,542 | b |
Furthermore, a breach of the duty to assist in this case would not be an error of the sort that should be contemplated in the CUE analysis because the original RO decision in 1972 is not final for purposes of appeal. A claim of CUE is a collateral attack that can only be made on a final RO or Board decision, see id. at 1380-81, and generally, rating decisions by the VA are deemed "final and binding ... as to conclusions based on the evidence on file at the time the VA issues written notification" of a decision, 38 C.F.R. SS 3.104(a). In cases of grave procedural error, however, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has consistently held that RO or Board decisions are not final for purposes of direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 307, 311",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. SS 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run",
"sentence": "See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (holding that where an appellant “never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with ‘the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,’ did not begin to run”); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final); see also Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run). A breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 662, 666",
"parenthetical": "stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final",
"sentence": "See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (holding that where an appellant “never received notification of any denial ..., the one-year period within which to file an NOD, which commences with ‘the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination,’ did not begin to run”); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (stating that where an appellant and his representative had not properly been furnished with a Statement of the Case, the period in which to appeal the adjudicative determination in question never commenced to run and that determination was not final); see also Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (holding that where the Board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e), the period within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not commence to run). A breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal."
} | 11,210,542 | b |
We reject the state's contention that Jensen's claims do not involve the deprivation of substantial rights protected by the section 2254 habeas corpus mechanism. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 475, 487-489",
"parenthetical": "state prisoners' allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed \"just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction\"",
"sentence": "See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (state prisoners’ allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed “just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 555, 555-558",
"parenthetical": "when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner's interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \"liberty\" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See also Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 555-558, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-2975 (when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner’s interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause)."
} | 1,245,322 | a |
We reject the state's contention that Jensen's claims do not involve the deprivation of substantial rights protected by the section 2254 habeas corpus mechanism. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2974, 2974-2975",
"parenthetical": "when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner's interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \"liberty\" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See also Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 555-558, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-2975 (when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner’s interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 475, 487-489",
"parenthetical": "state prisoners' allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed \"just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction\"",
"sentence": "See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (state prisoners’ allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed “just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction”)."
} | 1,245,322 | b |
We reject the state's contention that Jensen's claims do not involve the deprivation of substantial rights protected by the section 2254 habeas corpus mechanism. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836",
"parenthetical": "state prisoners' allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed \"just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction\"",
"sentence": "See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (state prisoners’ allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed “just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 555, 555-558",
"parenthetical": "when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner's interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \"liberty\" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See also Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 555-558, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-2975 (when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner’s interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause)."
} | 1,245,322 | a |
We reject the state's contention that Jensen's claims do not involve the deprivation of substantial rights protected by the section 2254 habeas corpus mechanism. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836",
"parenthetical": "state prisoners' allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed \"just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction\"",
"sentence": "See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (state prisoners’ allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed “just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2974, 2974-2975",
"parenthetical": "when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner's interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \"liberty\" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See also Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 555-558, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-2975 (when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner’s interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause)."
} | 1,245,322 | a |
We reject the state's contention that Jensen's claims do not involve the deprivation of substantial rights protected by the section 2254 habeas corpus mechanism. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state prisoners' allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed \"just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction\"",
"sentence": "See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (state prisoners’ allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed “just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 555, 555-558",
"parenthetical": "when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner's interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \"liberty\" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See also Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 555-558, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-2975 (when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner’s interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause)."
} | 1,245,322 | a |
We reject the state's contention that Jensen's claims do not involve the deprivation of substantial rights protected by the section 2254 habeas corpus mechanism. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 2974, 2974-2975",
"parenthetical": "when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner's interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \"liberty\" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See also Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 555-558, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-2975 (when a state created a statutory right to good time credit, prisoner’s interest is embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state prisoners' allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed \"just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction\"",
"sentence": "See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835-1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (state prisoners’ allegations that corrections officials acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of good time credits deemed “just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction”)."
} | 1,245,322 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 203, 203-04",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 203, 203-04",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 203, 203-04",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434-35",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434-35",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434-35",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 555, 555",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 555, 555",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 555, 555",
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 F.3d 84, 84",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | a |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 434, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
First, the officers' insistence that Mrs. James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make requests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' \" (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (no seizure when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (no seizure when two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see also Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382))."
} | 3,637,829 | b |
Nevertheless, each inquiry "might be subsidiary to a question embracing both -- Was there a taking?" Id. Thus, plaintiffs' position that the WARA effected a taking in two different ways reflects their advancement of "separate arguments in support of a single claim," rather than separate claims. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "82 Fed.Cl. 211, 211-13",
"parenthetical": "determining that the government effected both physical and regulatory takings of the plaintiffs' property",
"sentence": "Id. at 535, 112 S.Ct. 1522; see also Acceptance Ins. Cos., 583 F.3d at 854 (“A ‘taking’ may occur either by physical invasion or by regulation.” (emphasis added)); cf. Estate of Hage, 82 Fed.Cl. at 211-13 (determining that the government effected both physical and regulatory takings of the plaintiffs’ property)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "583 F.3d 854, 854",
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may occur either by physical invasion or by regulation.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Id. at 535, 112 S.Ct. 1522; see also Acceptance Ins. Cos., 583 F.3d at 854 (“A ‘taking’ may occur either by physical invasion or by regulation.” (emphasis added)); cf. Estate of Hage, 82 Fed.Cl. at 211-13 (determining that the government effected both physical and regulatory takings of the plaintiffs’ property)."
} | 4,090,346 | b |
However, the jury could have fairly concluded the assault on Buford was part of a continuous chain of events that started when appellants were across the street planning to enter the presumably (at 3 a.m.) occupied house. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "699 A.2d 373, 386",
"parenthetical": "reasonable jury could have found that shootings [or a stabbing] were \"a means of facilitating the successful completion of the armed burglary, and that the burglary and the [stabbing] were 'all part of one continuous chain of events' \"",
"sentence": "See Lee v. United States, 699 A.2d 373, 386 (D.C.1997) (reasonable jury could have found that shootings [or a stabbing] were “a means of facilitating the successful completion of the armed burglary, and that the burglary and the [stabbing] were ‘all part of one continuous chain of events’ ”) (citation omitted); see also Price v. United States, 813 A.2d 169, 176-77 (D.C.2002) (evidence sufficient for aiding and abetting where appellant arrived with two companions, who had visible guns, and remained with them as one made threats to kill and the other shot two people)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "813 A.2d 169, 176-77",
"parenthetical": "evidence sufficient for aiding and abetting where appellant arrived with two companions, who had visible guns, and remained with them as one made threats to kill and the other shot two people",
"sentence": "See Lee v. United States, 699 A.2d 373, 386 (D.C.1997) (reasonable jury could have found that shootings [or a stabbing] were “a means of facilitating the successful completion of the armed burglary, and that the burglary and the [stabbing] were ‘all part of one continuous chain of events’ ”) (citation omitted); see also Price v. United States, 813 A.2d 169, 176-77 (D.C.2002) (evidence sufficient for aiding and abetting where appellant arrived with two companions, who had visible guns, and remained with them as one made threats to kill and the other shot two people)."
} | 9,029,059 | a |
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that King failed to show that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to this matter. As an initial point, we note that we previously considered and rejected the merits of King's Batson challenge on direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "546 U.S. 333, 341",
"parenthetical": "concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue",
"sentence": "Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the State’s age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror’s age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "998 So.2d 597, 604-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that the State's age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror's age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification",
"sentence": "Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the State’s age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror’s age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification)."
} | 12,348,475 | a |
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that King failed to show that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to this matter. As an initial point, we note that we previously considered and rejected the merits of King's Batson challenge on direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue",
"sentence": "Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the State’s age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror’s age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "998 So.2d 597, 604-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that the State's age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror's age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification",
"sentence": "Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the State’s age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror’s age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification)."
} | 12,348,475 | a |
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that King failed to show that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to this matter. As an initial point, we note that we previously considered and rejected the merits of King's Batson challenge on direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue",
"sentence": "Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the State’s age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror’s age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "998 So.2d 597, 604-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that the State's age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror's age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification",
"sentence": "Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the State’s age-based justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case, but noting that a juror’s age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification)."
} | 12,348,475 | a |
The Fourth Circuit concluded: "[I]n light of Duncan and its progeny, it is appropriate to focus on the maximum penalty authorized by statute in determining if a crime is 'serious' for involuntary medication purposes. Such an approach respects legislative judgments regarding the severity of the crime . . . while at the same time giving courts an objective standard to apply . . . ." (Citations omitted.) | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the seriousness of the crime and [the defendant's] perceived dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence [that the defendant] faces if convicted\"",
"sentence": "Id.; see also United States v. Green, supra, 532 F.3d 549 (“the maximum statutory penalty is the most objective means of determining the seriousness of a crime and the standard we adopt”); cf. United States v. Gomes, supra, 387 F.3d 160 (“the seriousness of the crime and [the defendant’s] perceived dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence [that the defendant] faces if convicted”); but cf. United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, supra, 513 F.3d 919 (“Although the sentencing guidelines no longer are mandatory, they are the best available predictor of the length of a defendant’s incarceration."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the maximum statutory penalty is the most objective means of determining the seriousness of a crime and the standard we adopt\"",
"sentence": "Id.; see also United States v. Green, supra, 532 F.3d 549 (“the maximum statutory penalty is the most objective means of determining the seriousness of a crime and the standard we adopt”); cf. United States v. Gomes, supra, 387 F.3d 160 (“the seriousness of the crime and [the defendant’s] perceived dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence [that the defendant] faces if convicted”); but cf. United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, supra, 513 F.3d 919 (“Although the sentencing guidelines no longer are mandatory, they are the best available predictor of the length of a defendant’s incarceration."
} | 4,345,051 | b |
Ms. Ramsey first argues that the district court failed to recognize that LCMC's reasons for the termination have shifted over time, which is evidence tending to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "429 F.3d 986, 994",
"parenthetical": "holding that inconsistency in employer's reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext",
"sentence": "See Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that inconsistency in employer’s reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext); see also Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1104 (holding that conflicting and changing evidence concerning the timing and reasons for termination contributes to a showing of pretext). Ms. Ramsey points out that Mr. Mahoney initially told her that her department was being restructured."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 1104, 1104",
"parenthetical": "holding that conflicting and changing evidence concerning the timing and reasons for termination contributes to a showing of pretext",
"sentence": "See Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that inconsistency in employer’s reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext); see also Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1104 (holding that conflicting and changing evidence concerning the timing and reasons for termination contributes to a showing of pretext). Ms. Ramsey points out that Mr. Mahoney initially told her that her department was being restructured."
} | 3,978,612 | a |
Besides, the circumstances of the rape of Makant's daughter differed markedly from the kidnapping, rape and murder in this case. It cannot be said that Makant's behavior in the. jury room rose to the level of juror misconduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "265 Ga. 653, 654",
"parenthetical": "jurors' limited discussion of news story about murder of state's witness did not provide basis for new trial",
"sentence": "See also Oliver v. State, 265 Ga. 653, 654 (3) (461 SE2d 222) (1995) (jurors’ limited discussion of news story about murder of state’s witness did not provide basis for new trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ga. 23, 24",
"parenthetical": "jurors must bring their life experiences to the jury room",
"sentence": "See Hilburn v. Hilburn, 163 Ga. 23, 24 (135 SE 427) (1926) (jurors must bring their life experiences to the jury room)."
} | 74,804 | b |
Besides, the circumstances of the rape of Makant's daughter differed markedly from the kidnapping, rape and murder in this case. It cannot be said that Makant's behavior in the. jury room rose to the level of juror misconduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "265 Ga. 653, 654",
"parenthetical": "jurors' limited discussion of news story about murder of state's witness did not provide basis for new trial",
"sentence": "See also Oliver v. State, 265 Ga. 653, 654 (3) (461 SE2d 222) (1995) (jurors’ limited discussion of news story about murder of state’s witness did not provide basis for new trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jurors must bring their life experiences to the jury room",
"sentence": "See Hilburn v. Hilburn, 163 Ga. 23, 24 (135 SE 427) (1926) (jurors must bring their life experiences to the jury room)."
} | 74,804 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 363, 372",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a jury waiver issue was \"arguably not subject to harmless error analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant's] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant's] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "462 F.Supp. 374, 378",
"parenthetical": "\"Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "571 S.E.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 P.3d 1226, 1233",
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 600, 604",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 363, 372",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a jury waiver issue was \"arguably not subject to harmless error analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant's] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant's] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "462 F.Supp. 374, 378",
"parenthetical": "\"Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "571 S.E.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 P.3d 1226, 1233",
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 363, 372",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a jury waiver issue was \"arguably not subject to harmless error analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant's] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant's] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "462 F.Supp. 374, 378",
"parenthetical": "\"Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "571 S.E.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 P.3d 1226, 1233",
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 P.3d 727, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 363, 372",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a jury waiver issue was \"arguably not subject to harmless error analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant's] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant's] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "462 F.Supp. 374, 378",
"parenthetical": "\"Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "571 S.E.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 P.3d 1226, 1233",
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 363, 372",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a jury waiver issue was \"arguably not subject to harmless error analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant's] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant's] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "462 F.Supp. 374, 378",
"parenthetical": "\"Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "571 S.E.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 P.3d 1226, 1233",
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 363, 372",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a jury waiver issue was \"arguably not subject to harmless error analysis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 F.3d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant's] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant's] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "462 F.Supp. 374, 378",
"parenthetical": "\"Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "571 S.E.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "32 P.3d 1226, 1233",
"parenthetical": "declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | b |
Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 P.3d 726, 736",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court's improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver)."
} | 8,209,671 | a |
See Mendoza v. U.S. Atty. While we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, the petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") SS 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit for filing a direct petition for review in an immigration case is "mandatory and jurisdictional, and is not subject to equitable tolling." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 405, 405-06",
"parenthetical": "holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 1003.2(b",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 386, 405",
"parenthetical": "construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA SS 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1105a(a",
"sentence": "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)). A motion to reopen filed with the BIA does not suspend the finality of the underlying BIA order and does not toll the review period."
} | 5,280,873 | b |
See Mendoza v. U.S. Atty. While we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, the petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") SS 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit for filing a direct petition for review in an immigration case is "mandatory and jurisdictional, and is not subject to equitable tolling." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 1549, 1549",
"parenthetical": "holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 1003.2(b",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 386, 405",
"parenthetical": "construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA SS 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1105a(a",
"sentence": "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)). A motion to reopen filed with the BIA does not suspend the finality of the underlying BIA order and does not toll the review period."
} | 5,280,873 | b |
See Mendoza v. U.S. Atty. While we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, the petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") SS 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit for filing a direct petition for review in an immigration case is "mandatory and jurisdictional, and is not subject to equitable tolling." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549",
"parenthetical": "construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA SS 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1105a(a",
"sentence": "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)). A motion to reopen filed with the BIA does not suspend the finality of the underlying BIA order and does not toll the review period."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 405, 405-06",
"parenthetical": "holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 1003.2(b",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b))."
} | 5,280,873 | a |
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