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These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | 4,091,740 | b |
Here, the proposed expert is to testify about GPS coordinates and analysis. Under the caselaw, this subject matter does not require scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 F.3d 588, 612-13",
"parenthetical": "explaining that issues surrounding GPS and its accuracy are not so scientific that an expert is necessary",
"sentence": "United States v. Thompson, 393 Fed.Appx. 852, 858, 859 (3d Cir.2010) (holding that the trial court properly allowed lay witness testimony concerning the operation of a GPS device, including authentication of the GPS’s data); see also United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 612-13 (1st Cir.2012) (explaining that issues surrounding GPS and its accuracy are not so scientific that an expert is necessary)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "393 Fed.Appx. 852, 858, 859",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court properly allowed lay witness testimony concerning the operation of a GPS device, including authentication of the GPS's data",
"sentence": "United States v. Thompson, 393 Fed.Appx. 852, 858, 859 (3d Cir.2010) (holding that the trial court properly allowed lay witness testimony concerning the operation of a GPS device, including authentication of the GPS’s data); see also United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 612-13 (1st Cir.2012) (explaining that issues surrounding GPS and its accuracy are not so scientific that an expert is necessary)."
} | 4,341,182 | b |
The district court made no such finding, relying exclusively on the remand itself. If indeed the narrowing is due to plaintiffs' litigation (either because it led the Board to cut down U.S. Lines's request, or because the remand induced U.S. Lines to trim its sails), this could represent the sort of benefit the appellees sought in bringing suit, the kind of "distinct external effect" on the real world that can render appellees partially prevailing parties. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1104, 1110",
"parenthetical": "injunction issued preventing the razing of building until after election",
"sentence": "Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C.Cir.1986) (injunction issued preventing the razing of building until after election); see also Texas State Teachers, 109 S.Ct. at 1494 (material alteration of school policy regarding the rights of teachers to communicate with each other on certain issues)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 1494, 1494",
"parenthetical": "material alteration of school policy regarding the rights of teachers to communicate with each other on certain issues",
"sentence": "Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1110 (D.C.Cir.1986) (injunction issued preventing the razing of building until after election); see also Texas State Teachers, 109 S.Ct. at 1494 (material alteration of school policy regarding the rights of teachers to communicate with each other on certain issues)."
} | 3,482,118 | a |
It is undisputed that Enockson called an ambulance for Tagstrom immediately upon seeing the accident and that the ambulance arrived within six minutes or less. Although Enokson stayed with Pottebaum after calling the ambulances, other officers involved in the chase were on the scene quickly and watched over Tagstrom. Given these facts, there can be no question that Enockson did not intentionally deny or delay medical treatment for Tagstrom. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 337, 340",
"parenthetical": "no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner's complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "475 U.S. 312, 319",
"parenthetical": "deliberate indifference is characterized by \"obduracy and wantonness\" in the denial of necessary treatment",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | 10,529,307 | a |
It is undisputed that Enockson called an ambulance for Tagstrom immediately upon seeing the accident and that the ambulance arrived within six minutes or less. Although Enokson stayed with Pottebaum after calling the ambulances, other officers involved in the chase were on the scene quickly and watched over Tagstrom. Given these facts, there can be no question that Enockson did not intentionally deny or delay medical treatment for Tagstrom. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 337, 340",
"parenthetical": "no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner's complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084",
"parenthetical": "deliberate indifference is characterized by \"obduracy and wantonness\" in the denial of necessary treatment",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | 10,529,307 | a |
It is undisputed that Enockson called an ambulance for Tagstrom immediately upon seeing the accident and that the ambulance arrived within six minutes or less. Although Enokson stayed with Pottebaum after calling the ambulances, other officers involved in the chase were on the scene quickly and watched over Tagstrom. Given these facts, there can be no question that Enockson did not intentionally deny or delay medical treatment for Tagstrom. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deliberate indifference is characterized by \"obduracy and wantonness\" in the denial of necessary treatment",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 337, 340",
"parenthetical": "no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner's complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | 10,529,307 | b |
It is undisputed that Enockson called an ambulance for Tagstrom immediately upon seeing the accident and that the ambulance arrived within six minutes or less. Although Enokson stayed with Pottebaum after calling the ambulances, other officers involved in the chase were on the scene quickly and watched over Tagstrom. Given these facts, there can be no question that Enockson did not intentionally deny or delay medical treatment for Tagstrom. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 337, 340",
"parenthetical": "no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner's complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "628 F.2d 1065, 1068",
"parenthetical": "question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days",
"sentence": "Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1981) (no deliberate indifference when, in response to prisoner’s complaint, prisoner was checked by paramedic and sent to hospital within one and a half hours); cf., e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1985) (deliberate indifference is characterized by “obduracy and wantonness” in the denial of necessary treatment); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (question of fact raised when plaintiff alleged he was deliberately denied medical treatment for three days)."
} | 10,529,307 | a |
Thus, under plain language of Rule 32(c)(1), Nap-pi was entitled to an opportunity to comment on the information in the report during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, given that the Rule is intended to promote "focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues," it follows that the Rule requires that counsel for the defendant and the government be provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the information at issue. Thus, we hold that where, as here, counsel are faced with having to review and address the contents of an additional document on which the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a meaningful opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to counsel for the defendant and the government within a sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at sentencing and, depending on the document, prepare a response or contest it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "171 F.3d 389, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 8, 18",
"parenthetical": "stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant's testimony at the sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | 11,124,802 | a |
Thus, under plain language of Rule 32(c)(1), Nap-pi was entitled to an opportunity to comment on the information in the report during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, given that the Rule is intended to promote "focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues," it follows that the Rule requires that counsel for the defendant and the government be provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the information at issue. Thus, we hold that where, as here, counsel are faced with having to review and address the contents of an additional document on which the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a meaningful opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to counsel for the defendant and the government within a sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at sentencing and, depending on the document, prepare a response or contest it. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 8, 18",
"parenthetical": "stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant's testimony at the sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1065, 1072",
"parenthetical": "vacating sentence where victim's letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that \"[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | 11,124,802 | b |
Thus, under plain language of Rule 32(c)(1), Nap-pi was entitled to an opportunity to comment on the information in the report during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, given that the Rule is intended to promote "focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues," it follows that the Rule requires that counsel for the defendant and the government be provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the information at issue. Thus, we hold that where, as here, counsel are faced with having to review and address the contents of an additional document on which the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a meaningful opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to counsel for the defendant and the government within a sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at sentencing and, depending on the document, prepare a response or contest it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 1267, 1278",
"parenthetical": "commenting that district court \"should endeavor to insulate themselves\" from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it \"makes them known to the parties\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 8, 18",
"parenthetical": "stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant's testimony at the sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | 11,124,802 | a |
Thus, under plain language of Rule 32(c)(1), Nap-pi was entitled to an opportunity to comment on the information in the report during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, given that the Rule is intended to promote "focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues," it follows that the Rule requires that counsel for the defendant and the government be provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the information at issue. Thus, we hold that where, as here, counsel are faced with having to review and address the contents of an additional document on which the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a meaningful opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to counsel for the defendant and the government within a sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at sentencing and, depending on the document, prepare a response or contest it. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 63, 63",
"parenthetical": "exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either \"make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 8, 18",
"parenthetical": "stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant's testimony at the sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing)."
} | 11,124,802 | a |
P23 We have since clarified that jurisdiction is comprised of only two components: jurisdiction over the person and subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction" refers to a court's ability to entertain a type of case, not to its authority to enter an order in a particular case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "171 Wn.2d 726, 730",
"parenthetical": "\"[e]ither a court has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not\"",
"sentence": "See ZDI Gaming, Inc., 173 Wn.2d at 618 (“ ‘[i]f the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994))); Schneider, 173 Wn.2d at 360 (stating the legislature limited the superior courts’ authority, not jurisdiction, to modify another state’s child support order by adopting the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26.21A RCW); see also Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 726, 730, 254 P.3d 818 (2011) (“[e]ither a court has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "173 Wn.2d 360, 360",
"parenthetical": "stating the legislature limited the superior courts' authority, not jurisdiction, to modify another state's child support order by adopting the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26.21A RCW",
"sentence": "See ZDI Gaming, Inc., 173 Wn.2d at 618 (“ ‘[i]f the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994))); Schneider, 173 Wn.2d at 360 (stating the legislature limited the superior courts’ authority, not jurisdiction, to modify another state’s child support order by adopting the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26.21A RCW); see also Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 726, 730, 254 P.3d 818 (2011) (“[e]ither a court has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not”)."
} | 4,033,310 | b |
P23 We have since clarified that jurisdiction is comprised of only two components: jurisdiction over the person and subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction" refers to a court's ability to entertain a type of case, not to its authority to enter an order in a particular case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[e]ither a court has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not\"",
"sentence": "See ZDI Gaming, Inc., 173 Wn.2d at 618 (“ ‘[i]f the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994))); Schneider, 173 Wn.2d at 360 (stating the legislature limited the superior courts’ authority, not jurisdiction, to modify another state’s child support order by adopting the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26.21A RCW); see also Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 726, 730, 254 P.3d 818 (2011) (“[e]ither a court has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "173 Wn.2d 360, 360",
"parenthetical": "stating the legislature limited the superior courts' authority, not jurisdiction, to modify another state's child support order by adopting the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26.21A RCW",
"sentence": "See ZDI Gaming, Inc., 173 Wn.2d at 618 (“ ‘[i]f the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994))); Schneider, 173 Wn.2d at 360 (stating the legislature limited the superior courts’ authority, not jurisdiction, to modify another state’s child support order by adopting the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26.21A RCW); see also Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 726, 730, 254 P.3d 818 (2011) (“[e]ither a court has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not”)."
} | 4,033,310 | b |
Accordingly, an injury results from a state's failure to maintain a public highway when the dangerous condition of the highway causing the injury is allowed to develop subsequent to the initial design and construction of the highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "842 P.2d 225, 225",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiffs injuries were a result of the state's failure to maintain and therefore finding a waiver of immunity under the CGIA where the state allowed a right-of-way fence adjacent to highway to fall into a state of disrepair thereby enabling a cow to run onto the highway and injure the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Moldovan, 842 P.2d at 225 (holding that the plaintiffs injuries were a result of the state's failure to maintain and therefore finding a waiver of immunity under the CGIA where the state allowed a right-of-way fence adjacent to highway to fall into a state of disrepair thereby enabling a cow to run onto the highway and injure the plaintiff); cf., e.g, Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 25 P.3d 1266, 1268 (Colo.App.2000) (\"[The failure to keep a facility free of obstacles even if such obstacles were not part of the original design-may lead to liability on the part of a governmental entity.\")."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "25 P.3d 1266, 1268",
"parenthetical": "\"[The failure to keep a facility free of obstacles even if such obstacles were not part of the original design-may lead to liability on the part of a governmental entity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Moldovan, 842 P.2d at 225 (holding that the plaintiffs injuries were a result of the state's failure to maintain and therefore finding a waiver of immunity under the CGIA where the state allowed a right-of-way fence adjacent to highway to fall into a state of disrepair thereby enabling a cow to run onto the highway and injure the plaintiff); cf., e.g, Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 25 P.3d 1266, 1268 (Colo.App.2000) (\"[The failure to keep a facility free of obstacles even if such obstacles were not part of the original design-may lead to liability on the part of a governmental entity.\")."
} | 9,456,365 | a |
Consistent with this interpretation, the Fourth Circuit has held that "federal law requires a court to substitute assets for the unavailable tainted property," implicitly recognizing that Section 853(p) is incorporated into the civil forfeiture context through Section 2461. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "626 F.3d 169, 169",
"parenthetical": "stating there is \"no meaningful difference between the propriety of an in personam money judgment arising directly under 21 U.S.C. SS 853 ... and the propriety of an in personam money judgment under 21 U.S.C. SS 853 by way of 28 U.S.C. SS 2461(c",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under § 981, the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to §§ 2461(c) and 853(p)); cf. Kalish, 626 F.3d at 169 (stating there is “no meaningful difference between the propriety of an in personam money judgment arising directly under 21 U.S.C. § 853 ... and the propriety of an in personam money judgment under 21 U.S.C. § 853 by way of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).”); Capoccia, 402 Fed.Appx. at 641 (holding that since “the reference in § 2461(c) to the “procedures” of § 853 includes the latter statute’s implicit authorization of in personam money judgments, we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 F.3d 310, 314",
"parenthetical": "holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under SS 981, the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to SSSS 2461(c",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under § 981, the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to §§ 2461(c) and 853(p)); cf. Kalish, 626 F.3d at 169 (stating there is “no meaningful difference between the propriety of an in personam money judgment arising directly under 21 U.S.C. § 853 ... and the propriety of an in personam money judgment under 21 U.S.C. § 853 by way of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).”); Capoccia, 402 Fed.Appx. at 641 (holding that since “the reference in § 2461(c) to the “procedures” of § 853 includes the latter statute’s implicit authorization of in personam money judgments, we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets.”)."
} | 4,237,349 | b |
As we have emphasized, Kimler does not address his argument to a single one of the dozens of exhibits introduced in this case, along with testimony, showing actual interstate trafficking in the proscribed images over the internet. Kimler also does not argue that such actual interstate activity is not in interstate commerce, nor could he. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 F.3d 223, 239",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | 1,533,933 | a |
As we have emphasized, Kimler does not address his argument to a single one of the dozens of exhibits introduced in this case, along with testimony, showing actual interstate trafficking in the proscribed images over the internet. Kimler also does not argue that such actual interstate activity is not in interstate commerce, nor could he. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | 1,533,933 | a |
As we have emphasized, Kimler does not address his argument to a single one of the dozens of exhibits introduced in this case, along with testimony, showing actual interstate trafficking in the proscribed images over the internet. Kimler also does not argue that such actual interstate activity is not in interstate commerce, nor could he. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | 1,533,933 | b |
As we have emphasized, Kimler does not address his argument to a single one of the dozens of exhibits introduced in this case, along with testimony, showing actual interstate trafficking in the proscribed images over the internet. Kimler also does not argue that such actual interstate activity is not in interstate commerce, nor could he. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | 1,533,933 | a |
As we have emphasized, Kimler does not address his argument to a single one of the dozens of exhibits introduced in this case, along with testimony, showing actual interstate trafficking in the proscribed images over the internet. Kimler also does not argue that such actual interstate activity is not in interstate commerce, nor could he. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "258 F.3d 675, 679-83",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir.) (holding that “transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002); United States v. Schaffner, 258 F.3d 675, 679-83 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of transport of child pornography across states lines establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that Congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in Utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to Virginia over ordinary telephone lines)."
} | 1,533,933 | b |
After considering the relevant factors for each witness, the Court finds that each of the witness's statement is independently reliable for purposes of determining probable cause. The Court further notes that any one of the three witnesses' identification of Respondent would generally be sufficient to establish probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 F.Supp.2d 773, 773",
"parenthetical": "\"In the domestic law enforcement context, an ordinary citizen's eyewitness account of criminal activity and identification of a perpetrator is normally regarded as sufficient to supply probable cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 (relying on deposition of victim identifying petitioner after being shown a single photograph of petitioner in upholding finding of probable cause); see also Cervantes Valles, 268 F.Supp.2d at 773 (“In the domestic law enforcement context, an ordinary citizen’s eyewitness account of criminal activity and identification of a perpetrator is normally regarded as sufficient to supply probable cause.”) (citing Burbridge, 252 F.3d at 778)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "623 F.2d 1102, 1102",
"parenthetical": "relying on deposition of victim identifying petitioner after being shown a single photograph of petitioner in upholding finding of probable cause",
"sentence": "See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 (relying on deposition of victim identifying petitioner after being shown a single photograph of petitioner in upholding finding of probable cause); see also Cervantes Valles, 268 F.Supp.2d at 773 (“In the domestic law enforcement context, an ordinary citizen’s eyewitness account of criminal activity and identification of a perpetrator is normally regarded as sufficient to supply probable cause.”) (citing Burbridge, 252 F.3d at 778)."
} | 3,970,558 | b |
. Defendants' claims that they were stupid or duped are not new to this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1251, 1251",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant \"not the unwilling dupe he would have us believe\"",
"sentence": "See also Dozal-Bencomo, 952 F.2d at 1251 (stating defendant \"not the unwilling dupe he would have us believe”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "980 F.2d 1074, 1085-86",
"parenthetical": "finding no impropriety in prosecutor's statement that defendants tried to \"dupe\" hospital staff",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1085-86 (7th Cir.1992) (finding no impropriety in prosecutor's statement that defendants tried to \"dupe” hospital staff); United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir.1991) (rejecting defendant’s claim that she was too unsophisticated to have requisite intent to defraud government); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir.1989) (noting defendant's claim at sentencing hearing that court consider defendant's totally unsophisticated behavior)."
} | 10,533,647 | b |
. Defendants' claims that they were stupid or duped are not new to this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1251, 1251",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant \"not the unwilling dupe he would have us believe\"",
"sentence": "See also Dozal-Bencomo, 952 F.2d at 1251 (stating defendant \"not the unwilling dupe he would have us believe”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 999, 1004-05",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that she was too unsophisticated to have requisite intent to defraud government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1085-86 (7th Cir.1992) (finding no impropriety in prosecutor's statement that defendants tried to \"dupe” hospital staff); United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir.1991) (rejecting defendant’s claim that she was too unsophisticated to have requisite intent to defraud government); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir.1989) (noting defendant's claim at sentencing hearing that court consider defendant's totally unsophisticated behavior)."
} | 10,533,647 | b |
. Defendants' claims that they were stupid or duped are not new to this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1251, 1251",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant \"not the unwilling dupe he would have us believe\"",
"sentence": "See also Dozal-Bencomo, 952 F.2d at 1251 (stating defendant \"not the unwilling dupe he would have us believe”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 333, 334",
"parenthetical": "noting defendant's claim at sentencing hearing that court consider defendant's totally unsophisticated behavior",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1085-86 (7th Cir.1992) (finding no impropriety in prosecutor's statement that defendants tried to \"dupe” hospital staff); United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir.1991) (rejecting defendant’s claim that she was too unsophisticated to have requisite intent to defraud government); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir.1989) (noting defendant's claim at sentencing hearing that court consider defendant's totally unsophisticated behavior)."
} | 10,533,647 | b |
Alvarado suggests that this court should take judicial notice of the recent progress she has made as is reflected in several reports that she has proffered to us. We note that the reports were not referred to, much less offered or admitted into evidence, in the Family Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 A.2d 794, 795",
"parenthetical": "\"[o]ne of our most settled doctrines in this jurisdiction is that a matter not raised before the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Chase v. Bouchard, 671 A.2d 794, 795 (R.I.1996) (“[o]ne of our most settled doctrines in this jurisdiction is that a matter not raised before the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal”). In any event these reports do not present either factual findings or legal rulings that could be judicially noticed."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 A.2d 368, 370",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he general rule that allows a court to take judicial notice of its own records may not be expanded to allow the court to take judicial notice of every document, paper, or report that at some time has been placed in a court file\"",
"sentence": "See In re McKayla C., 618 A.2d 1264, 1265 (R.I. 1998); see also In re Michael A., 552 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I.1989) (“[t]he general rule that allows a court to take judicial notice of its own records may not be expanded to allow the court to take judicial notice of every document, paper, or report that at some time has been placed in a court file”)."
} | 11,924,862 | a |
Under the circumstances, the transcript of the prior testimony is admissible under the Rule because the witness was "unavailable" and the other conditions were complied with. At the first trial she had been subject to cross examination by the defendant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 479, 482",
"parenthetical": "transcript of witness testimony at prior trial held admissible where Government was unable to obtain service of subpoena",
"sentence": "See United States v. Curry, 471 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 2150, 36 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973) (witness unavailable to testify at trial); United States v. Hayes, 535 F.2d 479, 482 (8th Cir. 1976) (transcript of witness testimony at prior trial held admissible where Government was unable to obtain service of subpoena); United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 129 (2d Cir. 1974) (sick witness held unavailable; unavailability is for trial judge’s determination in first instance and appellate court would not quickly overturn his ruling); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 551 (3rd Cir. 1967) (government must make bona fide effort to secure attendance of witness). We also note that the testimony in the transcript was cumulative of George Jackson’s testimony."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "378 F.2d 540, 551",
"parenthetical": "government must make bona fide effort to secure attendance of witness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Curry, 471 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 2150, 36 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973) (witness unavailable to testify at trial); United States v. Hayes, 535 F.2d 479, 482 (8th Cir. 1976) (transcript of witness testimony at prior trial held admissible where Government was unable to obtain service of subpoena); United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 129 (2d Cir. 1974) (sick witness held unavailable; unavailability is for trial judge’s determination in first instance and appellate court would not quickly overturn his ruling); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 551 (3rd Cir. 1967) (government must make bona fide effort to secure attendance of witness). We also note that the testimony in the transcript was cumulative of George Jackson’s testimony."
} | 1,421,583 | a |
They both admitted in their signed stipulation of facts to having had "the intent to promote the carrying on of the conspiracy." Given their admissions of guilt to all of the elements in the charge and in their stipulation of facts, their post-plea claims of factual insufficiency and innocence are unavailing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "103 F.3d 686, 686",
"parenthetical": "\"post-plea regrets\" are not a fair and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (defendant’s admissions at plea hearing provided “abundant evidence” in support of guilty plea); United States v. Peebles, 80 F.3d 278, 279 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (defendant’s claims of innocence are unavailing given ad missions to the contrary in plea agreement, stipulation, and at change-of-plea hearing); see also Stuttley, 103 F.3d at 686 (“post-plea regrets” are not a fair and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "80 F.3d 263, 267",
"parenthetical": "defendant's admissions at plea hearing provided \"abundant evidence\" in support of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (defendant’s admissions at plea hearing provided “abundant evidence” in support of guilty plea); United States v. Peebles, 80 F.3d 278, 279 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (defendant’s claims of innocence are unavailing given ad missions to the contrary in plea agreement, stipulation, and at change-of-plea hearing); see also Stuttley, 103 F.3d at 686 (“post-plea regrets” are not a fair and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea)."
} | 11,913,335 | b |
They both admitted in their signed stipulation of facts to having had "the intent to promote the carrying on of the conspiracy." Given their admissions of guilt to all of the elements in the charge and in their stipulation of facts, their post-plea claims of factual insufficiency and innocence are unavailing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "103 F.3d 686, 686",
"parenthetical": "\"post-plea regrets\" are not a fair and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (defendant’s admissions at plea hearing provided “abundant evidence” in support of guilty plea); United States v. Peebles, 80 F.3d 278, 279 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (defendant’s claims of innocence are unavailing given ad missions to the contrary in plea agreement, stipulation, and at change-of-plea hearing); see also Stuttley, 103 F.3d at 686 (“post-plea regrets” are not a fair and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "80 F.3d 278, 279",
"parenthetical": "defendant's claims of innocence are unavailing given ad missions to the contrary in plea agreement, stipulation, and at change-of-plea hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (defendant’s admissions at plea hearing provided “abundant evidence” in support of guilty plea); United States v. Peebles, 80 F.3d 278, 279 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (defendant’s claims of innocence are unavailing given ad missions to the contrary in plea agreement, stipulation, and at change-of-plea hearing); see also Stuttley, 103 F.3d at 686 (“post-plea regrets” are not a fair and just reason to warrant withdrawal of guilty plea)."
} | 11,913,335 | b |
They do not discuss the validity of Derian's camber and toe measurements at all. Derian himself provides no information concerning his methods or whether they are generally approved in his field; he merely states the conclusions he reached using those methods. This failure to state whether his methodology is generally accepted in the field, and defendants' proffer of evidence questioning its validity, provides some basis for excluding his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "600 F.3d 813, 818",
"parenthetical": "\"The methodology underlying the tests Ezra conducted to determine whether the GL1800 met his standard also gives us pause. Ezra tested a single, used 2006 GL1800, ridden by a single test rider, and extrapolated his conclusions to the fleet of GL1800s produced from 2001 to 2008\"",
"sentence": "See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1998) (excluding an expert’s testimony because he did not “demonstrate that he fol lowed a scientific method embraced by at least some other experts in the field”); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634-JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, *7 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 20, 2011) (identifying a variety of concerns with the reliability of an expert opinion, including “the fact that Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Fowler’s approach is an accepted method for analyzing defects such as those at issue here, nor do they offer evidence with respect to the reliability of the tests that Fowler performed”); see also American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.2010) (“The methodology underlying the tests Ezra conducted to determine whether the GL1800 met his standard also gives us pause. Ezra tested a single, used 2006 GL1800, ridden by a single test rider, and extrapolated his conclusions to the fleet of GL1800s produced from 2001 to 2008”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 F.3d 1418, 1423",
"parenthetical": "excluding an expert's testimony because he did not \"demonstrate that he fol lowed a scientific method embraced by at least some other experts in the field\"",
"sentence": "See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1998) (excluding an expert’s testimony because he did not “demonstrate that he fol lowed a scientific method embraced by at least some other experts in the field”); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634-JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, *7 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 20, 2011) (identifying a variety of concerns with the reliability of an expert opinion, including “the fact that Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Fowler’s approach is an accepted method for analyzing defects such as those at issue here, nor do they offer evidence with respect to the reliability of the tests that Fowler performed”); see also American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.2010) (“The methodology underlying the tests Ezra conducted to determine whether the GL1800 met his standard also gives us pause. Ezra tested a single, used 2006 GL1800, ridden by a single test rider, and extrapolated his conclusions to the fleet of GL1800s produced from 2001 to 2008”)."
} | 4,249,204 | b |
They do not discuss the validity of Derian's camber and toe measurements at all. Derian himself provides no information concerning his methods or whether they are generally approved in his field; he merely states the conclusions he reached using those methods. This failure to state whether his methodology is generally accepted in the field, and defendants' proffer of evidence questioning its validity, provides some basis for excluding his testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "600 F.3d 813, 818",
"parenthetical": "\"The methodology underlying the tests Ezra conducted to determine whether the GL1800 met his standard also gives us pause. Ezra tested a single, used 2006 GL1800, ridden by a single test rider, and extrapolated his conclusions to the fleet of GL1800s produced from 2001 to 2008\"",
"sentence": "See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1998) (excluding an expert’s testimony because he did not “demonstrate that he fol lowed a scientific method embraced by at least some other experts in the field”); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634-JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, *7 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 20, 2011) (identifying a variety of concerns with the reliability of an expert opinion, including “the fact that Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Fowler’s approach is an accepted method for analyzing defects such as those at issue here, nor do they offer evidence with respect to the reliability of the tests that Fowler performed”); see also American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.2010) (“The methodology underlying the tests Ezra conducted to determine whether the GL1800 met his standard also gives us pause. Ezra tested a single, used 2006 GL1800, ridden by a single test rider, and extrapolated his conclusions to the fleet of GL1800s produced from 2001 to 2008”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 1496114, *7",
"parenthetical": "identifying a variety of concerns with the reliability of an expert opinion, including \"the fact that Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Fowler's approach is an accepted method for analyzing defects such as those at issue here, nor do they offer evidence with respect to the reliability of the tests that Fowler performed\"",
"sentence": "See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1998) (excluding an expert’s testimony because he did not “demonstrate that he fol lowed a scientific method embraced by at least some other experts in the field”); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634-JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, *7 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 20, 2011) (identifying a variety of concerns with the reliability of an expert opinion, including “the fact that Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Fowler’s approach is an accepted method for analyzing defects such as those at issue here, nor do they offer evidence with respect to the reliability of the tests that Fowler performed”); see also American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.2010) (“The methodology underlying the tests Ezra conducted to determine whether the GL1800 met his standard also gives us pause. Ezra tested a single, used 2006 GL1800, ridden by a single test rider, and extrapolated his conclusions to the fleet of GL1800s produced from 2001 to 2008”)."
} | 4,249,204 | b |
The Supreme Court has not decided whether Younger abstention applies when the relief sought in federal court is damages for alleged police misconduct when effecting an arrest in an underlying state criminal case. The circuit courts of appeals are divided on this issue, but the Eleventh Circuit has indicated its approval of applying the Younger doctrine to damages actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is doubtful that federal district courts may dismiss claims for damages under abstention principles.\"",
"sentence": "See Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal of § 1988 action, but ordering district court to abstain from resolving the merits of petitioner’s claims until state court conviction is reviewed by the Georgia Court of Appeals); see also Pompey v. Broward County, 95 F.3d 1543, 1552 n. 12 (11th Cir.1996) (dictum) (“It is doubtful that federal district courts may dismiss claims for damages under abstention principles.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "758 F.2d 1405, 1406",
"parenthetical": "reversing dismissal of SS 1988 action, but ordering district court to abstain from resolving the merits of petitioner's claims until state court conviction is reviewed by the Georgia Court of Appeals",
"sentence": "See Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal of § 1988 action, but ordering district court to abstain from resolving the merits of petitioner’s claims until state court conviction is reviewed by the Georgia Court of Appeals); see also Pompey v. Broward County, 95 F.3d 1543, 1552 n. 12 (11th Cir.1996) (dictum) (“It is doubtful that federal district courts may dismiss claims for damages under abstention principles.”)."
} | 8,956,200 | b |
The school committee correctly points out that the results obtained by a claimant may affect the determination of attorney's fees; however, it incorrectly applies this principle to the facts of this case in requesting a downward adjustment of the lodestar. Salem v. Massachusetts Commn. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "82 F.3d 1179, 1191",
"parenthetical": "court may adjust the lodestar by \"award[ing] only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained\"",
"sentence": "See Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Authy., 82 F.3d 1179, 1191 (1st Cir. 1996) (court may adjust the lodestar by “award[ing] only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a critical factor in determining reasonableness of fee award is degree of success obtained",
"sentence": "Against Discrimination, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 648 n.29, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (a critical factor in determining reasonableness of fee award is degree of success obtained)."
} | 1,582,832 | b |
The school committee correctly points out that the results obtained by a claimant may affect the determination of attorney's fees; however, it incorrectly applies this principle to the facts of this case in requesting a downward adjustment of the lodestar. Salem v. Massachusetts Commn. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "461 U.S. 424, 436",
"parenthetical": "a critical factor in determining reasonableness of fee award is degree of success obtained",
"sentence": "Against Discrimination, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 648 n.29, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (a critical factor in determining reasonableness of fee award is degree of success obtained)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "82 F.3d 1179, 1191",
"parenthetical": "court may adjust the lodestar by \"award[ing] only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained\"",
"sentence": "See Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Authy., 82 F.3d 1179, 1191 (1st Cir. 1996) (court may adjust the lodestar by “award[ing] only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained”)."
} | 1,582,832 | a |
As noted earlier, decisions from three state supreme courts support Varner's interpretation of Crane. See supra at 766-67. The standard of review in habeas corpus cases, however, is whether the state court's application of the federal law was objectively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 893, 896-97",
"parenthetical": "under the \"unreasonable application of' clause, the court should \"defer to a reasonable, if incorrect, state court decision\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”); see also Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 896-97 (7th Cir.2000) (under the “unreasonable application of’ clause, the court should “defer to a reasonable, if incorrect, state court decision”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 410, 410",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”); see also Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 896-97 (7th Cir.2000) (under the “unreasonable application of’ clause, the court should “defer to a reasonable, if incorrect, state court decision”)."
} | 9,015,735 | b |
As noted earlier, decisions from three state supreme courts support Varner's interpretation of Crane. See supra at 766-67. The standard of review in habeas corpus cases, however, is whether the state court's application of the federal law was objectively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”); see also Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 896-97 (7th Cir.2000) (under the “unreasonable application of’ clause, the court should “defer to a reasonable, if incorrect, state court decision”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 893, 896-97",
"parenthetical": "under the \"unreasonable application of' clause, the court should \"defer to a reasonable, if incorrect, state court decision\"",
"sentence": "Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”); see also Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 896-97 (7th Cir.2000) (under the “unreasonable application of’ clause, the court should “defer to a reasonable, if incorrect, state court decision”)."
} | 9,015,735 | a |
Although plaintiffs state in their Notice of Motion that they seek "attorney's fees" no reference to attorney's fees is made in their itemized list of expenditures. They list only costs for mailing, Federal Express, messenger service, transcripts, copies of exhibits and a deposition. Costs under Rule 68 generally do not include attorneys fees. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 1147, 1157",
"parenthetical": "In appropriate cases costs may be deemed to include prevailing party's attorneys fees in a civil rights action for purposes of Rule 68.",
"sentence": "Y.1985); Coleman v. McLaren, 92 F.R.D. 754, 757 (N.D.Ill.1981); but see Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F.Supp. 1147, 1157 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (In appropriate cases costs may be deemed to include prevailing party’s attorneys fees in a civil rights action for purposes of Rule 68.)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "715 F.2d 1088, 1095",
"parenthetical": "attorneys fees included in costs only where authorized by substantive statute at issue in the litigation",
"sentence": "See Fulps v. Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1095 (6th Cir.1983) (attorneys fees included in costs only where authorized by substantive statute at issue in the litigation); Quintel Corp. N. V. v. Citibank N.A., 606 F.Supp. 898, 915-16 (S.D.N."
} | 4,009,649 | b |
Mere verbal remonstrances or disagreements with an officer, standing alone, would not generally be considered an obstruction or a hindrance to the performance of his duty to the point of rendering the speaker guilty of criminal conduct. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who made no threat of violence or physical advance on officer did not obstruct officer",
"sentence": "Moccia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (Ga.Ct.App.1985) (defendant who made no threat of violence or physical advance on officer did not obstruct officer); see also English v. State, 293 So.2d 105 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974) (business owner who stood in front of officers in* his own place of business and asked them to conduct investigation outside did not resist or obstruct officers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "business owner who stood in front of officers in* his own place of business and asked them to conduct investigation outside did not resist or obstruct officers",
"sentence": "Moccia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (Ga.Ct.App.1985) (defendant who made no threat of violence or physical advance on officer did not obstruct officer); see also English v. State, 293 So.2d 105 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974) (business owner who stood in front of officers in* his own place of business and asked them to conduct investigation outside did not resist or obstruct officers)."
} | 10,661,552 | a |
Mere verbal remonstrances or disagreements with an officer, standing alone, would not generally be considered an obstruction or a hindrance to the performance of his duty to the point of rendering the speaker guilty of criminal conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "business owner who stood in front of officers in* his own place of business and asked them to conduct investigation outside did not resist or obstruct officers",
"sentence": "Moccia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (Ga.Ct.App.1985) (defendant who made no threat of violence or physical advance on officer did not obstruct officer); see also English v. State, 293 So.2d 105 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974) (business owner who stood in front of officers in* his own place of business and asked them to conduct investigation outside did not resist or obstruct officers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant who made no threat of violence or physical advance on officer did not obstruct officer",
"sentence": "Moccia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (Ga.Ct.App.1985) (defendant who made no threat of violence or physical advance on officer did not obstruct officer); see also English v. State, 293 So.2d 105 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974) (business owner who stood in front of officers in* his own place of business and asked them to conduct investigation outside did not resist or obstruct officers)."
} | 10,661,552 | b |
. The fact that these attorneys, and in particular Mr. Rees, represent the United States does not preclude the application of Rule 11. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 816, 818-19",
"parenthetical": "the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity",
"sentence": "Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order",
"sentence": "Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order)."
} | 7,412,874 | a |
. The fact that these attorneys, and in particular Mr. Rees, represent the United States does not preclude the application of Rule 11. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order",
"sentence": "Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "28 U.S.C. SS 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions",
"sentence": "Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order)."
} | 7,412,874 | b |
. The fact that these attorneys, and in particular Mr. Rees, represent the United States does not preclude the application of Rule 11. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 1246, 1251",
"parenthetical": "the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant",
"sentence": "Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order",
"sentence": "Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. § 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (holding the Director of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order)."
} | 7,412,874 | a |
A court's failure to perform this balancing test may be harmless if the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the defendant violated the terms of his supervised release. If admission of hearsay evidence violates due process, "the defendant bears the burden of showing that the court explicitly relied on the information;" the defendant must show "(1) that the challenged evidence is materially false or unreliable, and (2) that it actually served as the basis for the sentence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "26 F.3d 113, 113",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release",
"sentence": "See United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 847 (11th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted) (discussing the admissibility of hearsay testimony in the context of a probation revocation hearing); see also Frazier, 26 F.3d at 113 (holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "931 F.2d 842, 847",
"parenthetical": "discussing the admissibility of hearsay testimony in the context of a probation revocation hearing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 847 (11th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted) (discussing the admissibility of hearsay testimony in the context of a probation revocation hearing); see also Frazier, 26 F.3d at 113 (holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release)."
} | 4,159,464 | b |
We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Davis entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 702, 704",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 699, 703",
"parenthetical": "defendant's statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | 12,400,677 | a |
We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Davis entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 702, 704",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | 12,400,677 | a |
We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Davis entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 702, 704",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | 12,400,677 | b |
We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable, because our review of the record demonstrates that Davis entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the argument falls within the scope of the waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 702, 704",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity). Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver."
} | 12,400,677 | a |
. The VA contends that Plaintiffs waived their remaining equal-protection claim because (1) they did not reallege on appeal that the FVEC does not satisfy rational basis review, and (2) they contend for the first time on appeal that the FVEC fails to satisfy strict scrutiny because it classifies the veterans on the basis of national origin. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "394 F.3d 1238, 1238",
"parenthetical": "waiver applies to issues not raised by an appellant in the opening brief",
"sentence": "See Kama, 394 F.3d at 1238 (waiver applies to issues not raised by an appellant in the opening brief); see also O'Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1063 n. 3 (waiver applies to issues not raised before the district court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver applies to issues not raised before the district court",
"sentence": "See Kama, 394 F.3d at 1238 (waiver applies to issues not raised by an appellant in the opening brief); see also O'Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1063 n. 3 (waiver applies to issues not raised before the district court)."
} | 3,662,442 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "480 F.2d 286, 290",
"parenthetical": "holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48",
"parenthetical": "noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "480 F.2d 286, 290",
"parenthetical": "holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48",
"parenthetical": "noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "480 F.2d 286, 290",
"parenthetical": "holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48",
"parenthetical": "noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"It is well settled that 'a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce' is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "480 F.2d 286, 290",
"parenthetical": "holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | b |
. Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 F.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48",
"parenthetical": "noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce\"",
"sentence": "Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.”); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that tavern that , purchased beer from out-of-state vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992), quotinq United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that \"It is well settled that ‘a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on'interstate commerce’ is all that need be shown to establish federal jurisdiction over extortionate crimes affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that de minimus impact on interstate commerce is enough to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Meat Inspection Act); YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (10th Cir.1990) citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that National Labor Relations Board has broad statutory jurisdiction in cases in which \"an employer has more than a de mini-mus impact on the flow of interstate commerce”)."
} | 11,555,415 | a |
Defendants' focus on formal technicalities does little to undermine the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint. Even post-Twombly, federal pleading requires plaintiffs to set forth only their "claims for relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "556 U.S. 662, 678",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era\"",
"sentence": "See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2008); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring claim from facts alleged); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs “need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,” only “a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing”); cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (recognizing that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 399, 407",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,\" only \"a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing\"",
"sentence": "See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2008); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring claim from facts alleged); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs “need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,” only “a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing”); cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (recognizing that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”)."
} | 4,209,585 | b |
Defendants' focus on formal technicalities does little to undermine the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint. Even post-Twombly, federal pleading requires plaintiffs to set forth only their "claims for relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 399, 407",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,\" only \"a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing\"",
"sentence": "See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2008); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring claim from facts alleged); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs “need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,” only “a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing”); cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (recognizing that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era\"",
"sentence": "See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2008); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring claim from facts alleged); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs “need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,” only “a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing”); cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (recognizing that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”)."
} | 4,209,585 | a |
Defendants' focus on formal technicalities does little to undermine the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint. Even post-Twombly, federal pleading requires plaintiffs to set forth only their "claims for relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 399, 407",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,\" only \"a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing\"",
"sentence": "See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2008); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring claim from facts alleged); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs “need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,” only “a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing”); cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (recognizing that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era\"",
"sentence": "See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2008); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (inferring claim from facts alleged); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs “need not use particular words to plead in the alternative,” only “a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing”); cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (recognizing that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”)."
} | 4,209,585 | a |
The undisputed familiarity of Eastern Union with the WESTERN UNION mark and its well-known affiliation with money transfer services, imitation of the WESTERN UNION mark, and repeated refusals to discontinue use of a mimetic mark established that Eastern Union intended to capitalize on the reputation and infringe on the market created by Western Union. Although Western Union did not present evidence of actual customer confusion, the district court correctly concluded that proof of actual confusion was not required when the overwhelming evidence regarding the remaining factors supported a judgment in favor of Western Union. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 1282, 1302",
"parenthetical": "refusing to reverse a finding of a likelihood of confusion between marks \"based merely on the absence of evidence of actual confusion\"",
"sentence": "See Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir.1999) (refusing to reverse a finding of a likelihood of confusion between marks “based merely on the absence of evidence of actual confusion”); see also Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1340 (evi dence of actual confusion “is not a prerequisite, and thus it is up to individual courts to assess this factor in light of the particular facts of each case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "192 F.3d 1340, 1340",
"parenthetical": "evi dence of actual confusion \"is not a prerequisite, and thus it is up to individual courts to assess this factor in light of the particular facts of each case\"",
"sentence": "See Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir.1999) (refusing to reverse a finding of a likelihood of confusion between marks “based merely on the absence of evidence of actual confusion”); see also Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1340 (evi dence of actual confusion “is not a prerequisite, and thus it is up to individual courts to assess this factor in light of the particular facts of each case”)."
} | 3,892,257 | a |
Oregon law defines "income" for purposes of support payments, as, among other things, "any program or contract to provide substitute wages during times of unemployment or disability." ORS 25.010(7)(f); see also OAR 137-050-0340 (for purposes of support, "gross income includes income from any source including, but not limited to * * * disability insurance benefits" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we have considered veterans' disability benefits in awarding spousal support, even where the recipient has waived military retirement pay to receive those benefits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "151 Or App 649, 654",
"parenthetical": "considering as income husband's disability benefits resulting from his waiver of his military pension",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Murphy and Murphy, 151 Or App 649, 654, 950 P2d 377 (1997) (considering as income husband’s disability benefits resulting from his waiver of his military pension); see also Weakley and Weakley, 177 Or App 363, 365, 33 P3d 1045 (2001) (including husband’s veterans’ disability benefits as income for purposes of awarding spousal support)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "177 Or App 363, 365",
"parenthetical": "including husband's veterans' disability benefits as income for purposes of awarding spousal support",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Murphy and Murphy, 151 Or App 649, 654, 950 P2d 377 (1997) (considering as income husband’s disability benefits resulting from his waiver of his military pension); see also Weakley and Weakley, 177 Or App 363, 365, 33 P3d 1045 (2001) (including husband’s veterans’ disability benefits as income for purposes of awarding spousal support)."
} | 4,198,487 | a |
In his appeal to this Court, Jiang asserts generally that he testified in an "honest, tru[th] -- telling manner" and that he practices Falun Gong in the United States now. The IJ did not err in basing his adverse credibility determination, in part, on Jiang's failure to provide corroborative evidence of his practice of Falun Gong in the United States. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 F.3d 144, 164",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the identification and availability requirements articulated in Diallo only pertain \"when the IJ or BIA cites inadequate corroboration as a basis for denying [relief] to an applicant who is otherwise credible\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that while “it is inappropriate to base a credibility determination solely on the failure to produce corroborative evidence!,][t]he presence or absence of corroboration may properly be considered in determining credibility” (emphasis added)); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 164 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that the identification and availability requirements articulated in Diallo only pertain “when the IJ or BIA cites inadequate corroboration as a basis for denying [relief] to an applicant who is otherwise credible” (alterations in original)). Since Jiang fails to challenge any of the IJ’s other findings, those findings stand."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 F.3d 279, 287",
"parenthetical": "stating that while \"it is inappropriate to base a credibility determination solely on the failure to produce corroborative evidence!,][t]he presence or absence of corroboration may properly be considered in determining credibility\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that while “it is inappropriate to base a credibility determination solely on the failure to produce corroborative evidence!,][t]he presence or absence of corroboration may properly be considered in determining credibility” (emphasis added)); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 164 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that the identification and availability requirements articulated in Diallo only pertain “when the IJ or BIA cites inadequate corroboration as a basis for denying [relief] to an applicant who is otherwise credible” (alterations in original)). Since Jiang fails to challenge any of the IJ’s other findings, those findings stand."
} | 3,806,560 | b |
We are left then with the sworn statements of the one building manager, Sam Lamaj, and the Plumlee employee Richard Webb. A review of the relevant cases indicates that the conduct which has been deemed intentionally deceptive has been supported by evidence which is not provided here, and itself appeared more egregious. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 299, 299",
"parenthetical": "unwilling to extend the presumption of consumer confusion where evidence of deceptive intent in a false advertising claim was indirect and controverted",
"sentence": "See, e.g., PPX Enterprises, 818 F.2d at 273 (allowing recovery of damages despite lack evidence of actual customer confusion where the products were “patently fraudulent, and the advertising accompanying those products was the vehicle employed to perpetrate the fraud”); cf. Johnson & Johnson*Merck, 960 F.2d at 299 (unwilling to extend the presumption of consumer confusion where evidence of deceptive intent in a false advertising claim was indirect and controverted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "818 F.2d 273, 273",
"parenthetical": "allowing recovery of damages despite lack evidence of actual customer confusion where the products were \"patently fraudulent, and the advertising accompanying those products was the vehicle employed to perpetrate the fraud\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., PPX Enterprises, 818 F.2d at 273 (allowing recovery of damages despite lack evidence of actual customer confusion where the products were “patently fraudulent, and the advertising accompanying those products was the vehicle employed to perpetrate the fraud”); cf. Johnson & Johnson*Merck, 960 F.2d at 299 (unwilling to extend the presumption of consumer confusion where evidence of deceptive intent in a false advertising claim was indirect and controverted)."
} | 7,836,387 | b |
Although, in 1999, Sterenbuch was not able to prove the exact amount of damages for the first injury, in terms of lost contingent fees, he could have provided a reasonable estimate of his damages by presenting expert testimony establishing what likely would have transpired (and how much he likely would have recovered) had Goss and Smith not interfered with his relationship with his clients. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 P.2d 940, 943, 945",
"parenthetical": "\"[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty,\" ie., by a preponderance of evidence, \"uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery\": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice",
"sentence": "See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945 (Colo.1985) (\"[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty,\" ie., by a preponderance of evidence, \"uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery\": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice); cf. Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 845 A.2d 602, 613 (2004) (in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages \"through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired\") (quoting Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417, 427 (1980))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages \"through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired\"",
"sentence": "See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945 (Colo.1985) (\"[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty,\" ie., by a preponderance of evidence, \"uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery\": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice); cf. Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 845 A.2d 602, 613 (2004) (in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages \"through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired\") (quoting Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417, 427 (1980))."
} | 6,985,458 | a |
Although, in 1999, Sterenbuch was not able to prove the exact amount of damages for the first injury, in terms of lost contingent fees, he could have provided a reasonable estimate of his damages by presenting expert testimony establishing what likely would have transpired (and how much he likely would have recovered) had Goss and Smith not interfered with his relationship with his clients. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 P.2d 940, 943, 945",
"parenthetical": "\"[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty,\" ie., by a preponderance of evidence, \"uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery\": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice",
"sentence": "See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945 (Colo.1985) (\"[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty,\" ie., by a preponderance of evidence, \"uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery\": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice); cf. Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 845 A.2d 602, 613 (2004) (in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages \"through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired\") (quoting Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417, 427 (1980))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "845 A.2d 602, 613",
"parenthetical": "in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages \"through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired\"",
"sentence": "See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945 (Colo.1985) (\"[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty,\" ie., by a preponderance of evidence, \"uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery\": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice); cf. Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 845 A.2d 602, 613 (2004) (in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages \"through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired\") (quoting Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417, 427 (1980))."
} | 6,985,458 | a |
* Disparity: The district court failed to consider that the sentence it imposed, which constituted a 49% reduction from the Guidelines minimum, would create significant disparity between Trina and other defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of similar offenses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 378, 378",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court's failure to give consideration to the sentencing disparity that would result was another reason the defendant's sentence was unreasonable",
"sentence": "See Guidry, 462 F.3d at 378 (holding that the district court’s failure to give consideration to the sentencing disparity that would result was another reason the defendant’s sentence was unreasonable); cf. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2464-65 (“[I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 2464, 2464-65",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "See Guidry, 462 F.3d at 378 (holding that the district court’s failure to give consideration to the sentencing disparity that would result was another reason the defendant’s sentence was unreasonable); cf. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2464-65 (“[I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”)."
} | 3,657,660 | a |
The adequacy of an agency's search for responsive records is measured by "the reasonableness of the, effort in light of the specific request." An agency is not obligated to search every record system. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "684 F.2d 121, 128",
"parenthetical": "holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist",
"sentence": "See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 952-53 (D.C.Cir.1986) (noting a search is not presumed unreasonable simply because it fails to produce all relevant material); see also Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C.Cir.1982) (holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "790 F.2d 942, 952-53",
"parenthetical": "noting a search is not presumed unreasonable simply because it fails to produce all relevant material",
"sentence": "See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 952-53 (D.C.Cir.1986) (noting a search is not presumed unreasonable simply because it fails to produce all relevant material); see also Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C.Cir.1982) (holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist)."
} | 12,122,302 | b |
Similarly, a citation issued by an officer in lieu of a custodial arrest is not a "formal accusation." Just as a warrantless custodial arrest does not, alone, commence a prosecution, a citation issued in lieu of an arrest is not the result of an independent probable cause determination and, therefore, does not mark the beginning of the prosecution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 S.W.3d 912, 912",
"parenthetical": "noting that Rule 5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires those defendants arrested without a warrant be taken before a magistrate for the lodging of \" 'formal' \" charges by the filing of the affidavit of complaint and issuance of a warrant",
"sentence": "See State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tenn.1981) (holding in the case of a warrantless arrest that without a “followup” determination of probable cause either through the issuance of a warrant or a binding over to the grand jury “the criminal prosecution terminates”); see also Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d at 912 (noting that Rule 5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires those defendants arrested without a warrant be taken before a magistrate for the lodging of “ ‘formal’ ” charges by the filing of the affidavit of complaint and issuance of a warrant). Indeed, the Advisory Commission Comments to Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure note clearly that, even in cases of warrantless arrest, the arrest warrant issued upon the affidavit of complaint rather than the affidavit of complaint itself “still serves as the official charging instrument, issued after a judicial finding of probable cause, and gives notice of the charge which must be answered.” Tenn. R.Crim."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "614 S.W.2d 791, 795",
"parenthetical": "holding in the case of a warrantless arrest that without a \"followup\" determination of probable cause either through the issuance of a warrant or a binding over to the grand jury \"the criminal prosecution terminates\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tenn.1981) (holding in the case of a warrantless arrest that without a “followup” determination of probable cause either through the issuance of a warrant or a binding over to the grand jury “the criminal prosecution terminates”); see also Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d at 912 (noting that Rule 5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires those defendants arrested without a warrant be taken before a magistrate for the lodging of “ ‘formal’ ” charges by the filing of the affidavit of complaint and issuance of a warrant). Indeed, the Advisory Commission Comments to Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure note clearly that, even in cases of warrantless arrest, the arrest warrant issued upon the affidavit of complaint rather than the affidavit of complaint itself “still serves as the official charging instrument, issued after a judicial finding of probable cause, and gives notice of the charge which must be answered.” Tenn. R.Crim."
} | 7,327,832 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under a \"reasonable witness\" standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements-- and the doctor elicited the statements-- primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | 8,174,990 | a |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under a \"reasonable witness\" standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements-- and the doctor elicited the statements-- primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | 8,174,990 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under a \"reasonable witness\" standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements-- and the doctor elicited the statements-- primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | 8,174,990 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under a \"reasonable witness\" standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements-- and the doctor elicited the statements-- primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | 8,174,990 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a child's statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because \"from the perspective of an objective witness in the child's position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | 8,174,990 | a |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a child's statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because \"from the perspective of an objective witness in the child's position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | 8,174,990 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | 8,174,990 | a |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | 8,174,990 | a |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | 8,174,990 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | 8,174,990 | b |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | 8,174,990 | a |
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that statements made during such a medical interview are nontestimonial in nature because the primary purpose of the interview is for the care and treatment of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004) (under a “reasonable witness” standard, the statements a sexual-assault victim made to the emergency-room physician were nontestimonial because the victim made the statements— and the doctor elicited the statements— primarily for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.2006) (a child’s statements to a doctor following a sexual assault were deemed nontestimonial because “from the perspective of an objective witness in the child’s position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis”); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of a medical diagnosis or treatment are presumptively nontestimonial); and State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statements by a rape victim to emergency room nurse specializing in treating sexual-assault victims were deemed nontestimonial because to a reasonable person, the statements would appear to serve a primarily health-care-related function)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sexual assault nurse examiner and \"self-described\" forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim's visit",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (sexual assault nurse examiner and “self-described” forensic interviewer was acting as an agent of police when she interviewed molestation victim referred to her by police and police supervised the victim’s visit)."
} | 8,174,990 | a |
Notwithstanding the "circular" definition of the term, certain courts have found it "'extremely broad,' in that it clearly includes anything which may be considered a settlement payment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1237, 1237",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"a natural reading suggests ... this definition is 'extremely broad' \"",
"sentence": "Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1237 (noting that “a natural reading suggests ... this definition is ‘extremely broad’ ”); see also Resorts Int’l, 181 F.3d at 515 (concluding that “the term ‘settlement payment’ is a broad one that includes almost all securities transactions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 515, 515",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"the term 'settlement payment' is a broad one that includes almost all securities transactions\"",
"sentence": "Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1237 (noting that “a natural reading suggests ... this definition is ‘extremely broad’ ”); see also Resorts Int’l, 181 F.3d at 515 (concluding that “the term ‘settlement payment’ is a broad one that includes almost all securities transactions”)."
} | 8,979,026 | a |
Notwithstanding the "circular" definition of the term, certain courts have found it "'extremely broad,' in that it clearly includes anything which may be considered a settlement payment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1237, 1237",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"a natural reading suggests ... this definition is 'extremely broad' \"",
"sentence": "Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1237 (noting that “a natural reading suggests ... this definition is ‘extremely broad’ ”); see also Resorts Int’l, 181 F.3d at 515 (concluding that “the term ‘settlement payment’ is a broad one that includes almost all securities transactions”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "321 B.R. 539, 539",
"parenthetical": "noting that while the \"rhetoric of decisions\" references this definition as being broad, \"reality is different\"",
"sentence": "But see, Grafton, 321 B.R. at 539 (noting that while the “rhetoric of decisions” references this definition as being broad, “reality is different”)."
} | 8,979,026 | a |
Notwithstanding the "circular" definition of the term, certain courts have found it "'extremely broad,' in that it clearly includes anything which may be considered a settlement payment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 515, 515",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"the term 'settlement payment' is a broad one that includes almost all securities transactions\"",
"sentence": "Kaiser II, 952 F.2d at 1237 (noting that “a natural reading suggests ... this definition is ‘extremely broad’ ”); see also Resorts Int’l, 181 F.3d at 515 (concluding that “the term ‘settlement payment’ is a broad one that includes almost all securities transactions”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "321 B.R. 539, 539",
"parenthetical": "noting that while the \"rhetoric of decisions\" references this definition as being broad, \"reality is different\"",
"sentence": "But see, Grafton, 321 B.R. at 539 (noting that while the “rhetoric of decisions” references this definition as being broad, “reality is different”)."
} | 8,979,026 | a |
Under. Scott, the Sixth Amendment protects an uncounseled misdemeanor defendant not from a judgment of conviction but from the imposition of certain types of sentences. The appropriate remedy for a Scott violation, therefore, is vacatur of the invalid portion of the sentence, and not reversal of the conviction itself. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "948 F.2d 648, 654",
"parenthetical": "striking down portion of sentence imposed on uncounseled misdemeanor defendant that involved suspended term of imprisonment but affirming conviction and portion of sentence involving a fine",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 654 (10th Cir.1991) (striking down portion of sentence imposed on uncounseled misdemeanor defendant that involved suspended term of imprisonment but affirming conviction and portion of sentence involving a fine); United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1976) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "910 F.2d 216, 218",
"parenthetical": "\"If an uncounseled defendant is sentenced to prison, the conviction itself is unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.1990) (“If an uncounseled defendant is sentenced to prison, the conviction itself is unconstitutional.”) (dictum)."
} | 11,335,159 | a |
In Baucum we did not apply the Blackledge/Menna exception because Baucum challenged a sentencing statute. But subsequent cases have made clear that Drew waived his constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(8) because he failed to raise his challenge below. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "96 F.3d 1477, 1482",
"parenthetical": "'We do not reach David's Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g",
"sentence": "See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru’s facial constitutional challenge to the ‘school-yard statute,’ ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by” Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1996) (‘We do not reach David’s Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1471, 1476",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru's facial constitutional challenge to the 'school-yard statute,' ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by\" Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru’s facial constitutional challenge to the ‘school-yard statute,’ ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by” Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1996) (‘We do not reach David’s Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower court.”)."
} | 4,231,216 | b |
In Baucum we did not apply the Blackledge/Menna exception because Baucum challenged a sentencing statute. But subsequent cases have made clear that Drew waived his constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(8) because he failed to raise his challenge below. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "96 F.3d 1477, 1482",
"parenthetical": "'We do not reach David's Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g",
"sentence": "See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru’s facial constitutional challenge to the ‘school-yard statute,’ ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by” Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1996) (‘We do not reach David’s Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru's facial constitutional challenge to the 'school-yard statute,' ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by\" Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru’s facial constitutional challenge to the ‘school-yard statute,’ ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by” Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1996) (‘We do not reach David’s Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower court.”)."
} | 4,231,216 | b |
Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "766 P.2d 1074, 1080",
"parenthetical": "grant of attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims",
"sentence": "See id. at 566 n. 10 (reasonable fee excludes amounts attributable to issues or claims on which party otherwise entitled to fee was unsuccessful); Stacey Proper ties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiff’s attempt to accelerate a promissory note), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "766 P.2d 1080, 1085",
"parenthetical": "defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiff's attempt to accelerate a promissory note",
"sentence": "See id. at 566 n. 10 (reasonable fee excludes amounts attributable to issues or claims on which party otherwise entitled to fee was unsuccessful); Stacey Proper ties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiff’s attempt to accelerate a promissory note), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims)."
} | 10,381,303 | b |
Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "766 P.2d 1074, 1080",
"parenthetical": "grant of attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims",
"sentence": "See id. at 566 n. 10 (reasonable fee excludes amounts attributable to issues or claims on which party otherwise entitled to fee was unsuccessful); Stacey Proper ties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiff’s attempt to accelerate a promissory note), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiff's attempt to accelerate a promissory note",
"sentence": "See id. at 566 n. 10 (reasonable fee excludes amounts attributable to issues or claims on which party otherwise entitled to fee was unsuccessful); Stacey Proper ties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (defendant was entitled to attorney fees for the counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his successful defense of plaintiff’s attempt to accelerate a promissory note), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims)."
} | 10,381,303 | b |
"[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense",
"sentence": "Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense)."
} | 1,854,747 | b |
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