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See Mendoza v. U.S. Atty. While we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, the petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") SS 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit for filing a direct petition for review in an immigration case is "mandatory and jurisdictional, and is not subject to equitable tolling." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 1549, 1549",
"parenthetical": "holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 1003.2(b",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549",
"parenthetical": "construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA SS 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1105a(a",
"sentence": "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)). A motion to reopen filed with the BIA does not suspend the finality of the underlying BIA order and does not toll the review period."
} | 5,280,873 | b |
See Mendoza v. U.S. Atty. While we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, the petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") SS 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit for filing a direct petition for review in an immigration case is "mandatory and jurisdictional, and is not subject to equitable tolling." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 405, 405-06",
"parenthetical": "holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 1003.2(b",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA SS 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1105a(a",
"sentence": "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)). A motion to reopen filed with the BIA does not suspend the finality of the underlying BIA order and does not toll the review period."
} | 5,280,873 | b |
See Mendoza v. U.S. Atty. While we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, the petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") SS 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit for filing a direct petition for review in an immigration case is "mandatory and jurisdictional, and is not subject to equitable tolling." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA SS 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. SS 1105a(a",
"sentence": "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1549, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (construing the former 90-day period for filing a petition for review under INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)). A motion to reopen filed with the BIA does not suspend the finality of the underlying BIA order and does not toll the review period."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 1549, 1549",
"parenthetical": "holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 1003.2(b",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (holding that the finality of a BIA order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b))."
} | 5,280,873 | a |
There is no disagreement that the defendant was stopped, detained, and searched. The warrant having been invalid, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 Mass. 788, 791-92",
"parenthetical": "generally, \"preliminary questions of fact [in criminal cases] need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence\"",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974) (“where, as here, the search is without a warrant the burden of establishing its reasonableness is on the Commonwealth’’); see Care and Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 791-92 (1993) (generally, “preliminary questions of fact [in criminal cases] need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 Mass. 51, 57",
"parenthetical": "\"where, as here, the search is without a warrant the burden of establishing its reasonableness is on the Commonwealth''",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974) (“where, as here, the search is without a warrant the burden of establishing its reasonableness is on the Commonwealth’’); see Care and Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 791-92 (1993) (generally, “preliminary questions of fact [in criminal cases] need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence”)."
} | 4,360,395 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 106, 106-107, 114",
"parenthetical": "\"The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 106, 106-107, 114",
"parenthetical": "\"The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 819, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | 5,613,585 | a |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 819, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | 5,613,585 | a |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.\"",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | 5,613,585 | a |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 384, 394-395",
"parenthetical": "holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | 5,613,585 | a |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 384, 394-395",
"parenthetical": "holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | 5,613,585 | a |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | 5,613,585 | a |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
Defendants constitutionally may allow the Praying Parents to enjoy the same access to school property and school resources as other non-religious groups are allowed. Thus, if non-religious groups are allowed to meet on school property, have access to teachers' mailboxes, send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day",
"sentence": "Cf. Good News Club, 583 U.S. at 117 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (distinguishing Schempp which found an Establishment Clause violation where challenged activity occurred during the school day)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint",
"sentence": "See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116 F.Supp.2d at 908. But Lakeview administrators cannot constitutionally favor the Praying Parents over non-religious groups or give the Praying Parents -special privileges that other groups do not receive, such as permitting meetings on school property during school hours and providing a link on Lakeview’s website."
} | 5,613,585 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Gonzalez's retaliation and failure-to-protect claims because Gonzalez failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 825, 847",
"parenthetical": "a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he \"knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety\"",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | 12,394,536 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Gonzalez's retaliation and failure-to-protect claims because Gonzalez failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he \"knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety\"",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | 12,394,536 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Gonzalez's retaliation and failure-to-protect claims because Gonzalez failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he \"knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety\"",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | 12,394,536 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the \"assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 354, 360",
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 354, 360",
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 354, 360",
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.\"",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 1388, 1396",
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 1388, 1396",
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 1388, 1396",
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 322, 329-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36",
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | a |
Both the Supreme Court and this court have, prior to Lopez, concluded that congressional efforts at protecting endangered and migratory species are constitutional under the Commerce Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting \"broad sweep of the Commerce Clause\" and declining to reconsider Leslie I",
"sentence": "See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 n. 19, 100 S.Ct. 318, 325 n. 19, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (discussing Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act and noting that the “assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant Commerce Clause)."
} | 956 | b |
Even when state officials fail to offer an authoritative interpretation of a state statute, a federal court considering a pre-enforcement challenge sometimes will presume a narrowing construction to which the law is fairly susceptible. In this case, however, we discern no plausible narrowing construction---and the Attorney General has pointed to none. Because construing the statute to exempt the Association's planned activity requires discarding wholesale the prohibition on commercial solicitation, the only practical way for the Attorney General to assuage a reasonable fear of prosecution would be to disclaim, in categorical terms, any intent to enforce the prohibition on commercial solicitation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 F.3d 994, 1000",
"parenthetical": "\"Because it is clear to whom these provisions of the Act would be applied were they to be applied at all, the imminent threat of such prosecutions can be deemed speculative only if it is likely that the government may simply decline to enforce these provisions at all.\"",
"sentence": "See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“Because it is clear to whom these provisions of the Act would be applied were they to be applied at all, the imminent threat of such prosecutions can be deemed speculative only if it is likely that the government may simply decline to enforce these provisions at all.”); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1502 (10th Cir.1995) (permitting case to proceed because state had “not affirmatively disavowed any intention of bringing criminal prosecution” under the challenged statute); see also Hallandale Prof. Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 (11th Cir.1991) (finding a justiciable controversy when “[a]ll that remained between the plaintiff and the impending harm was the defendant’s discretionary decision—which could be changed—to withhold prosecution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 756, 760",
"parenthetical": "finding a justiciable controversy when \"[a]ll that remained between the plaintiff and the impending harm was the defendant's discretionary decision--which could be changed--to withhold prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“Because it is clear to whom these provisions of the Act would be applied were they to be applied at all, the imminent threat of such prosecutions can be deemed speculative only if it is likely that the government may simply decline to enforce these provisions at all.”); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1502 (10th Cir.1995) (permitting case to proceed because state had “not affirmatively disavowed any intention of bringing criminal prosecution” under the challenged statute); see also Hallandale Prof. Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 (11th Cir.1991) (finding a justiciable controversy when “[a]ll that remained between the plaintiff and the impending harm was the defendant’s discretionary decision—which could be changed—to withhold prosecution”)."
} | 1,753,234 | a |
Even when state officials fail to offer an authoritative interpretation of a state statute, a federal court considering a pre-enforcement challenge sometimes will presume a narrowing construction to which the law is fairly susceptible. In this case, however, we discern no plausible narrowing construction---and the Attorney General has pointed to none. Because construing the statute to exempt the Association's planned activity requires discarding wholesale the prohibition on commercial solicitation, the only practical way for the Attorney General to assuage a reasonable fear of prosecution would be to disclaim, in categorical terms, any intent to enforce the prohibition on commercial solicitation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 756, 760",
"parenthetical": "finding a justiciable controversy when \"[a]ll that remained between the plaintiff and the impending harm was the defendant's discretionary decision--which could be changed--to withhold prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“Because it is clear to whom these provisions of the Act would be applied were they to be applied at all, the imminent threat of such prosecutions can be deemed speculative only if it is likely that the government may simply decline to enforce these provisions at all.”); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1502 (10th Cir.1995) (permitting case to proceed because state had “not affirmatively disavowed any intention of bringing criminal prosecution” under the challenged statute); see also Hallandale Prof. Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 (11th Cir.1991) (finding a justiciable controversy when “[a]ll that remained between the plaintiff and the impending harm was the defendant’s discretionary decision—which could be changed—to withhold prosecution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 F.3d 1495, 1502",
"parenthetical": "permitting case to proceed because state had \"not affirmatively disavowed any intention of bringing criminal prosecution\" under the challenged statute",
"sentence": "See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“Because it is clear to whom these provisions of the Act would be applied were they to be applied at all, the imminent threat of such prosecutions can be deemed speculative only if it is likely that the government may simply decline to enforce these provisions at all.”); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1502 (10th Cir.1995) (permitting case to proceed because state had “not affirmatively disavowed any intention of bringing criminal prosecution” under the challenged statute); see also Hallandale Prof. Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 (11th Cir.1991) (finding a justiciable controversy when “[a]ll that remained between the plaintiff and the impending harm was the defendant’s discretionary decision—which could be changed—to withhold prosecution”)."
} | 1,753,234 | b |
Applying Chilicky, we have held that where Congress has provided some mechanism for relief that it considers adequate to remedy constitutional violations, Bivens claims are precluded. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 193, 198",
"parenthetical": "denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment",
"sentence": "Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1995) (denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment); Bricker v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1993) (denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate); Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery); see also Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 311, 312",
"parenthetical": "administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim",
"sentence": "Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1995) (denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment); Bricker v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1993) (denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate); Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery); see also Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim)."
} | 336,500 | a |
Applying Chilicky, we have held that where Congress has provided some mechanism for relief that it considers adequate to remedy constitutional violations, Bivens claims are precluded. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 311, 312",
"parenthetical": "administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim",
"sentence": "Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1995) (denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment); Bricker v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1993) (denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate); Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery); see also Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 871, 878",
"parenthetical": "denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate",
"sentence": "Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1995) (denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment); Bricker v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1993) (denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate); Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery); see also Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim)."
} | 336,500 | b |
Applying Chilicky, we have held that where Congress has provided some mechanism for relief that it considers adequate to remedy constitutional violations, Bivens claims are precluded. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 311, 312",
"parenthetical": "administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim",
"sentence": "Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1995) (denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment); Bricker v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1993) (denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate); Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery); see also Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "925 F.2d 311, 313",
"parenthetical": "denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery",
"sentence": "Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1995) (denying Bivens claim to civilian employee of the Navy because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimina tion in federal employment); Bricker v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1993) (denying a Bivens claim to an employee at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation because administrative procedures included a grievance procedure with arbitration as a final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate); Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1991) (denying a Bivens claim to a VA physician because he was subject to the regulations of the Department of Medicine and Surgery); see also Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (administrative remedies available under the Civil Service Reform Act to a probationary employee, although discretionary, were adequate to preclude a Bivens claim)."
} | 336,500 | b |
Although parents may pursue their claims while the child's claim is barred due to minority, the claims of the parents are not derivative of their child's claim and may be barred while the child's is still assertable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents' action, the child could bring action after majority was reached",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | 3,633,797 | b |
Although parents may pursue their claims while the child's claim is barred due to minority, the claims of the parents are not derivative of their child's claim and may be barred while the child's is still assertable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents' action, the child could bring action after majority was reached",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | 3,633,797 | b |
Although parents may pursue their claims while the child's claim is barred due to minority, the claims of the parents are not derivative of their child's claim and may be barred while the child's is still assertable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents' action, the child could bring action after majority was reached",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "561 A.2d 1261, 1262",
"parenthetical": "holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | 3,633,797 | b |
Although parents may pursue their claims while the child's claim is barred due to minority, the claims of the parents are not derivative of their child's claim and may be barred while the child's is still assertable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents' action, the child could bring action after majority was reached",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "561 A.2d 1261, 1262",
"parenthetical": "holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 88, 89 (citing Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989) (holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims)); see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (holding that, although the statute of limitations ran on the parents’ action, the child could bring action after majority was reached)."
} | 3,633,797 | b |
The court's discussion, quoted above, reveals that the court concluded that Mother failed to provide the Children with a safe environment, and that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 A.2d 505, 512",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parent's love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination",
"sentence": "Id. at 6. The court found that although the Children have a bond with Mother, the bond is not necessarily meaningful or healthy. Id. at 7. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 268 (2018) (stating that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift); see also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa.Super.2007) (holding that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination). The court also noted that the Children are no longer in harnfs way, which is allowing them “to grow and develop.”"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift",
"sentence": "Id. at 6. The court found that although the Children have a bond with Mother, the bond is not necessarily meaningful or healthy. Id. at 7. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 268 (2018) (stating that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift); see also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa.Super.2007) (holding that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination). The court also noted that the Children are no longer in harnfs way, which is allowing them “to grow and develop.”"
} | 6,893,463 | b |
The court's discussion, quoted above, reveals that the court concluded that Mother failed to provide the Children with a safe environment, and that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "71 A.3d 251, 268",
"parenthetical": "stating that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift",
"sentence": "Id. at 6. The court found that although the Children have a bond with Mother, the bond is not necessarily meaningful or healthy. Id. at 7. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 268 (2018) (stating that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift); see also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa.Super.2007) (holding that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination). The court also noted that the Children are no longer in harnfs way, which is allowing them “to grow and develop.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 A.2d 505, 512",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parent's love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination",
"sentence": "Id. at 6. The court found that although the Children have a bond with Mother, the bond is not necessarily meaningful or healthy. Id. at 7. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 268 (2018) (stating that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift); see also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa.Super.2007) (holding that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not preclude a termination). The court also noted that the Children are no longer in harnfs way, which is allowing them “to grow and develop.”"
} | 6,893,463 | a |
. Although the DiSabatino court did not discuss the language of the release in its opinion, the defendant in that case argued that the release barred the plaintiff's action and the court ruled that the action could proceed. Other courts have suggested that the scope of the release might be irrelevant to the plaintiff's remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "188 A.2d 33, 33",
"parenthetical": "when a plaintiff seeks to stand by a fraudulently-induced settlement agreement and sue for fraud, \"it is of no importance ... what claims the release purported to discharge.\"",
"sentence": "See Bilotti, 188 A.2d at 33 (when a plaintiff seeks to stand by a fraudulently-induced settlement agreement and sue for fraud, “it is of no importance ... what claims the release purported to discharge.”); cf. Ware, 311 P.2d at 320 (defrauded tort plaintiff may \"waive his right to rescind and sue to recover any damages suffered by reason of the fraud”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "311 P.2d 320, 320",
"parenthetical": "defrauded tort plaintiff may \"waive his right to rescind and sue to recover any damages suffered by reason of the fraud\"",
"sentence": "See Bilotti, 188 A.2d at 33 (when a plaintiff seeks to stand by a fraudulently-induced settlement agreement and sue for fraud, “it is of no importance ... what claims the release purported to discharge.”); cf. Ware, 311 P.2d at 320 (defrauded tort plaintiff may \"waive his right to rescind and sue to recover any damages suffered by reason of the fraud”)."
} | 1,397,256 | a |
Some decisions have concluded that the juror misconduct was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal of the conviction. Others have not. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Alabama Supreme Court, in reversing this Court's holding, stated that the extraneous information introduced by the juror's improper viewing of the crime scene was beneficial to the defense and, therefore, did not warrant the granting of a new trial",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d 472 (Ala.1997) (the Alabama Supreme Court, in reversing this Court’s holding, stated that the extraneous information introduced by the juror’s improper viewing of the crime scene was beneficial to the defense and, therefore, did not warrant the granting of a new trial); see also Knight v. State, [710 So.2d 511 (Ala.Cr.App.1997)] (defendant failed to present any evidence to support his contention that he was prejudiced by a juror’s independent experiment and the subsequent extraneous information because the investigation tended to bolster his theory of defense, rather than prejudice it); Reed v. State, [547 So.2d 594 (Ala.Crim.App.1988)]."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant failed to present any evidence to support his contention that he was prejudiced by a juror's independent experiment and the subsequent extraneous information because the investigation tended to bolster his theory of defense, rather than prejudice it",
"sentence": "See Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d 472 (Ala.1997) (the Alabama Supreme Court, in reversing this Court’s holding, stated that the extraneous information introduced by the juror’s improper viewing of the crime scene was beneficial to the defense and, therefore, did not warrant the granting of a new trial); see also Knight v. State, [710 So.2d 511 (Ala.Cr.App.1997)] (defendant failed to present any evidence to support his contention that he was prejudiced by a juror’s independent experiment and the subsequent extraneous information because the investigation tended to bolster his theory of defense, rather than prejudice it); Reed v. State, [547 So.2d 594 (Ala.Crim.App.1988)]."
} | 9,473,541 | a |
That practice has now been defined, in a number of recent decisions within this circuit, as requiring a contingency enhancement of 100 percent for the class of cases relevant here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.Supp. 1, 6, 9",
"parenthetical": "awarding enhancement of 100 percent and finding \"that the attorney market in the District of Columbia requires contingency enhancements of 100% to 200%\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. Kennickell, 710 F.Supp. 1, 6, 9 (D.D.C.1989) (awarding enhancement of 100 percent and finding “that the attorney market in the District of Columbia requires contingency enhancements of 100% to 200%”); Palmer v. Shultz, 679 F.Supp. at 74 (“at least 100 percent” for fully contingent cases); Broderick v. Ruder, Civ. No. 86-1834, Mem. Op. at 4 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 1989) (awarding 100 percent enhancement); see also McKenzie, 875 F.2d at 336 (upholding a 50 percent enhancement, which plaintiff had not appealed, as permissible but describing it as “below the Title VII contingency enhancements typically awarded in this circuit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 F.2d 336, 336",
"parenthetical": "upholding a 50 percent enhancement, which plaintiff had not appealed, as permissible but describing it as \"below the Title VII contingency enhancements typically awarded in this circuit\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. Kennickell, 710 F.Supp. 1, 6, 9 (D.D.C.1989) (awarding enhancement of 100 percent and finding “that the attorney market in the District of Columbia requires contingency enhancements of 100% to 200%”); Palmer v. Shultz, 679 F.Supp. at 74 (“at least 100 percent” for fully contingent cases); Broderick v. Ruder, Civ. No. 86-1834, Mem. Op. at 4 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 1989) (awarding 100 percent enhancement); see also McKenzie, 875 F.2d at 336 (upholding a 50 percent enhancement, which plaintiff had not appealed, as permissible but describing it as “below the Title VII contingency enhancements typically awarded in this circuit”)."
} | 1,812,430 | a |
However, Rule 23(c)(4) is not a stand-alone clause. It does not permit plaintiffs to ignore the requirements of 23(a) or (b). Plaintiffs cannot sever issues in an attempt to circumvent Rule 23(b) requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 2363135, at *1",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification is allowed only if the Rule 23(b) requirements are first met as to the claim and the court has done a searching analysis of plaintiffs' cause of action as a whole...\"",
"sentence": "See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 462 (E.D.La.2006) (disallowing “creative use of bifurcation” to sever individual causation and damages issues because the “cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3)”); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol Litig., No. CIV A 05-4182, 2007 WL 2363135, at *1 (E.D.La. Aug. 16, 2007) (“Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification is allowed only if the Rule 23(b) requirements are first met as to the claim and the court has done a searching analysis of plaintiffs’ cause of action as a whole...”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "239 F.R.D. 450, 462",
"parenthetical": "disallowing \"creative use of bifurcation\" to sever individual causation and damages issues because the \"cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b",
"sentence": "See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 462 (E.D.La.2006) (disallowing “creative use of bifurcation” to sever individual causation and damages issues because the “cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3)”); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol Litig., No. CIV A 05-4182, 2007 WL 2363135, at *1 (E.D.La. Aug. 16, 2007) (“Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification is allowed only if the Rule 23(b) requirements are first met as to the claim and the court has done a searching analysis of plaintiffs’ cause of action as a whole...”)."
} | 4,349,933 | b |
Plaintiffs also allege that the USFS violated prior agreements by not seeking plaintiffs' comments and by ignoring plaintiffs' input before undertaking the activities that allegedly damaged the cultural value of the affected areas. These general factual allegations, if sufficient to state a claim, are sufficient to show injury-in-fact. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 168, 168",
"parenthetical": "\"on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim\" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | 4,114,781 | b |
Plaintiffs also allege that the USFS violated prior agreements by not seeking plaintiffs' comments and by ignoring plaintiffs' input before undertaking the activities that allegedly damaged the cultural value of the affected areas. These general factual allegations, if sufficient to state a claim, are sufficient to show injury-in-fact. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim\" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | 4,114,781 | b |
Plaintiffs also allege that the USFS violated prior agreements by not seeking plaintiffs' comments and by ignoring plaintiffs' input before undertaking the activities that allegedly damaged the cultural value of the affected areas. These general factual allegations, if sufficient to state a claim, are sufficient to show injury-in-fact. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 561, 561",
"parenthetical": "\"on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim\" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | 4,114,781 | b |
Plaintiffs also allege that the USFS violated prior agreements by not seeking plaintiffs' comments and by ignoring plaintiffs' input before undertaking the activities that allegedly damaged the cultural value of the affected areas. These general factual allegations, if sufficient to state a claim, are sufficient to show injury-in-fact. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim\" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151",
"parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future",
"sentence": "See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (“on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130)); see also Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Fry, 310 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1151 (D.Mont.2004) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future)."
} | 4,114,781 | a |
A number of courts have declined to grant stay relief to one claimant where, as here, the available insurance coverage was inadequate to compensate other similarly situated claimants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 325, 330",
"parenthetical": "in many cases, \"[allowing one claimant to collect the policy proceeds in a state court judgment would deplete the insurance pool to the detriment of all remaining creditors\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325, 330 (8th Cir.1988) (in many cases, “[allowing one claimant to collect the policy proceeds in a state court judgment would deplete the insurance pool to the detriment of all remaining creditors”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 B.R. 406, 410",
"parenthetical": "stay motion denied because insurance was not adequate to pay all claims",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Gatke Corp., 117 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1990) (stay motion denied because insurance was not adequate to pay all claims); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 185 (5th Cir.1984) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to keep stay in place because “intact insurance coverage [i]s a bulwark against erosion of the estate”)."
} | 4,169,178 | b |
A number of courts have declined to grant stay relief to one claimant where, as here, the available insurance coverage was inadequate to compensate other similarly situated claimants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "730 F.2d 176, 185",
"parenthetical": "affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to keep stay in place because \"intact insurance coverage [i]s a bulwark against erosion of the estate\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Matter of Gatke Corp., 117 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1990) (stay motion denied because insurance was not adequate to pay all claims); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 185 (5th Cir.1984) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to keep stay in place because “intact insurance coverage [i]s a bulwark against erosion of the estate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 325, 330",
"parenthetical": "in many cases, \"[allowing one claimant to collect the policy proceeds in a state court judgment would deplete the insurance pool to the detriment of all remaining creditors\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325, 330 (8th Cir.1988) (in many cases, “[allowing one claimant to collect the policy proceeds in a state court judgment would deplete the insurance pool to the detriment of all remaining creditors”)."
} | 4,169,178 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2",
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | b |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2",
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | b |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the parties to the arbitration were Columbia and the Union. Because Katir was not a party to the arbitration, she lacks standing to petition to vacate the Award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. SS 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award",
"sentence": "Lofton v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.1984); U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 564 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (postal service employee whose discharge was the subject of the arbitration lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 11 to seek modification of the arbitration award because the union and the Postal Service were the sole parties to the arbitration); seeAcuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 404 F.2d 169, 171, n. 2 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762 (1969) (employees whose grievances were denied lacked standing under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to seek to vacate the arbitration award because the union and the company, not the employees, were parties to the arbitration); cf. Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F.Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (company which was not a party to the arbitration lacked standing to move to vacate the award)."
} | 3,871,566 | a |
With respect to the severity of the comment, the Court has difficulty concluding that Kidder's statement, while crude and demeaning, rose to the level of severity for which Title VII provides redress. Accordingly, this factor also weighs against Penn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 F.3d 315, 315",
"parenthetical": "explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said \"wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth\" to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | 4,093,843 | b |
With respect to the severity of the comment, the Court has difficulty concluding that Kidder's statement, while crude and demeaning, rose to the level of severity for which Title VII provides redress. Accordingly, this factor also weighs against Penn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 745, 754",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace\"",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said \"wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth\" to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | 4,093,843 | b |
With respect to the severity of the comment, the Court has difficulty concluding that Kidder's statement, while crude and demeaning, rose to the level of severity for which Title VII provides redress. Accordingly, this factor also weighs against Penn. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said \"wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth\" to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 F.3d 315, 315",
"parenthetical": "explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | 4,093,843 | a |
With respect to the severity of the comment, the Court has difficulty concluding that Kidder's statement, while crude and demeaning, rose to the level of severity for which Title VII provides redress. Accordingly, this factor also weighs against Penn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 745, 754",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace\"",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said \"wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth\" to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe",
"sentence": "See Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 589, 595-96, 599-600, 2013 WL 6729525, at *5, 9 (W.D.Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (concluding that a co-workers comment to plaintiffs boyfriend that he should go up to where plaintiff was working if he wanted to receive oral sex and another occasion in which the coworker repeatedly said “wiener in your mouth, wiener in your mouth” to plaintiff and her boyfriend were not sufficiently severe); see also Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that isolated incidents (unless extremely seri ous) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas 6 Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.1996) (observing that “Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace”)."
} | 4,093,843 | b |
In support, Dunn claimed that the information, police reports, and testimony from trial transcripts would establish that all of his charges occurred during a single criminal episode. He pointed out that he previously raised this claim, only to have it denied by the post-conviction court based on the erroneous finding that such a claim must be raised pursuant to rule 3.850, and that consideration under rule 3.850 would be impossible due to the two-year time bar. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution\" of Hale issue",
"sentence": "See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that “a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution” of Hale issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a",
"sentence": "See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that “a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3.850 is the appropriate method for resolution” of Hale issue)."
} | 7,021,316 | b |
Even assuming that Petitioner's trial counsel engaged in conduct that was deficient under Padilla such that the trial court's conclusion that Petitioner failed to satisfy the first Strickland prong was contrary to, or reflected an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, Petitioner's claim nonetheless fails because he has not demonstrated prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 697, 697",
"parenthetical": "holding that, \"[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed\"",
"sentence": "See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed”). “To determine whether the decision to proceed to trial rather than plead guilty would have been rational, courts first look to the weight of the evidence against the petitioner.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 1645055, at *4",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the Second Circuit has often rejected ineffectiveness claims by determining that, in view of the strength of the prosecution's case, the defendant is unable to establish prejudice\"",
"sentence": "Francis, 2013 WL 673868, at *4; see also Boakye v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 8217(RWS), 2010 WL 1645055, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010) (noting that “the Second Circuit has often rejected ineffectiveness claims by determining that, in view of the strength of the prosecution’s case, the defendant is unable to establish prejudice”)."
} | 4,310,743 | a |
Even assuming that Petitioner's trial counsel engaged in conduct that was deficient under Padilla such that the trial court's conclusion that Petitioner failed to satisfy the first Strickland prong was contrary to, or reflected an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, Petitioner's claim nonetheless fails because he has not demonstrated prejudice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 1645055, at *4",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the Second Circuit has often rejected ineffectiveness claims by determining that, in view of the strength of the prosecution's case, the defendant is unable to establish prejudice\"",
"sentence": "Francis, 2013 WL 673868, at *4; see also Boakye v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 8217(RWS), 2010 WL 1645055, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010) (noting that “the Second Circuit has often rejected ineffectiveness claims by determining that, in view of the strength of the prosecution’s case, the defendant is unable to establish prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, \"[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed\"",
"sentence": "See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed”). “To determine whether the decision to proceed to trial rather than plead guilty would have been rational, courts first look to the weight of the evidence against the petitioner.”"
} | 4,310,743 | b |
The Second Circuit has stated that an allegedly counterfeit mark must be compared with the registered mark as it appears on actual merchandise to an average purchaser. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "718 F.2d 524, 533",
"parenthetical": "interpreting the federal customs law that prohibits importation of counterfeit merchandise and tracks the \"substantially indistinguishable\" definition of counterfeit in 15 U.S.C. SS 1127",
"sentence": "See Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 533 (2d Cir.1983) (interpreting the federal customs law that prohibits importation of counterfeit merchandise and tracks the “substantially indistinguishable” definition of counterfeit in 15 U.S.C. § 1127); see also GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2629(DLC), 2002 WL 1933729, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.21, 2002) (“There is nothing in the [Lanham] Act, however, which states that to determine whether a defendant is engaged in counterfeiting, one compares plaintiffs and defendant’s marks in the abstract, without considering how they appear to consumers in the marketplace.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 1933729, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"There is nothing in the [Lanham] Act, however, which states that to determine whether a defendant is engaged in counterfeiting, one compares plaintiffs and defendant's marks in the abstract, without considering how they appear to consumers in the marketplace.\"",
"sentence": "See Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 533 (2d Cir.1983) (interpreting the federal customs law that prohibits importation of counterfeit merchandise and tracks the “substantially indistinguishable” definition of counterfeit in 15 U.S.C. § 1127); see also GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2629(DLC), 2002 WL 1933729, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.21, 2002) (“There is nothing in the [Lanham] Act, however, which states that to determine whether a defendant is engaged in counterfeiting, one compares plaintiffs and defendant’s marks in the abstract, without considering how they appear to consumers in the marketplace.”)."
} | 4,083,838 | a |
Applying Heller to the facts of this case, we conclude that the pipe bombs at issue were not protected by the Second Amendment. Unlike the handguns in Heller, pipe bombs are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 S.Ct. 2817, 2817-18, 2821-22",
"parenthetical": "striking down the handgun ban because it \"amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society\" for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which \"has been central to the Second Amendment right\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, “unlike firearms which may be used for sports, recreation or for collection, pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose”) (citing United States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that, after Heller, the defendant’s possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were “not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1369, 173 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18, 2821-22 (striking down the handgun ban because it “amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which “has been central to the Second Amendment right”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that, after Heller, the defendant's possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were \"not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, “unlike firearms which may be used for sports, recreation or for collection, pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose”) (citing United States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that, after Heller, the defendant’s possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were “not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1369, 173 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18, 2821-22 (striking down the handgun ban because it “amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which “has been central to the Second Amendment right”)."
} | 3,671,617 | b |
Applying Heller to the facts of this case, we conclude that the pipe bombs at issue were not protected by the Second Amendment. Unlike the handguns in Heller, pipe bombs are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, after Heller, the defendant's possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were \"not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, “unlike firearms which may be used for sports, recreation or for collection, pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose”) (citing United States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that, after Heller, the defendant’s possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were “not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1369, 173 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18, 2821-22 (striking down the handgun ban because it “amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which “has been central to the Second Amendment right”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 S.Ct. 2817, 2817-18, 2821-22",
"parenthetical": "striking down the handgun ban because it \"amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society\" for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which \"has been central to the Second Amendment right\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, “unlike firearms which may be used for sports, recreation or for collection, pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose”) (citing United States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that, after Heller, the defendant’s possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were “not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1369, 173 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18, 2821-22 (striking down the handgun ban because it “amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which “has been central to the Second Amendment right”)."
} | 3,671,617 | a |
Applying Heller to the facts of this case, we conclude that the pipe bombs at issue were not protected by the Second Amendment. Unlike the handguns in Heller, pipe bombs are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, after Heller, the defendant's possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were \"not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, “unlike firearms which may be used for sports, recreation or for collection, pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose”) (citing United States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that, after Heller, the defendant’s possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were “not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1369, 173 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18, 2821-22 (striking down the handgun ban because it “amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which “has been central to the Second Amendment right”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 S.Ct. 2817, 2817-18, 2821-22",
"parenthetical": "striking down the handgun ban because it \"amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society\" for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which \"has been central to the Second Amendment right\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dempsey, 957 F.2d 831, 834 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, “unlike firearms which may be used for sports, recreation or for collection, pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose”) (citing United States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870, 873-74 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that, after Heller, the defendant’s possession of a machine gun and an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Second Amendment because those weapons were “not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore [fell] within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1369, 173 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18, 2821-22 (striking down the handgun ban because it “amounted] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home, which “has been central to the Second Amendment right”)."
} | 3,671,617 | a |
As noted, defendant's argument before the trial court was that the state had failed to satisfy the requirements of the exception. That did not preserve an argument that the case he had acknowledged as providing the relevant analysis was wrongly decided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "282 Or App 414, 419",
"parenthetical": "argument not preserved when \"neither the state nor the trial court had any reason to believe that [the] defendant was\" making that argument, \"the state had no opportunity\" to respond to it, \"and the trial court had no reason to rule on that issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Lockridge, 282 Or App 414, 419, 386 P3d 96 (2016) (argument not preserved when “neither the state nor the trial court had any reason to believe that [the] defendant was” making that argument, “the state had no opportunity” to respond to it, “and the trial court had no reason to rule on that issue”); see also State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 440, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (holding that the appellant failed to preserve a claim of error that was based on an argument that precedent was wrongly decided, where in the trial court, the appellant had conceded that the precedent was controlling)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "330 Or 431, 440",
"parenthetical": "holding that the appellant failed to preserve a claim of error that was based on an argument that precedent was wrongly decided, where in the trial court, the appellant had conceded that the precedent was controlling",
"sentence": "See State v. Lockridge, 282 Or App 414, 419, 386 P3d 96 (2016) (argument not preserved when “neither the state nor the trial court had any reason to believe that [the] defendant was” making that argument, “the state had no opportunity” to respond to it, “and the trial court had no reason to rule on that issue”); see also State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 440, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (holding that the appellant failed to preserve a claim of error that was based on an argument that precedent was wrongly decided, where in the trial court, the appellant had conceded that the precedent was controlling)."
} | 12,414,463 | a |
WCI claims that the district court's Case Management Order expressly limited discovery to the primary liability issues, namely CERCLA, the Spill Act, and breach of contract, and expressly stayed discovery on its state common law claims until after resolution of the threshold liability issues. While WCI raises a colorable claim, we nonetheless decline review of this issue, as WCI's claim is raised for the first time on appeal and is not preserved for appellate review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1145, 1149",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that while \"summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery,\" it is the non-movant's responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery, by filing an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f",
"sentence": "See Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.1995) (stating that this Court generally will not review a post-judgment claim asserting a need for discovery where the non-movant failed to advance such claim before the district court); see also Vance ex rel. v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that while “summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery,” it is the non-movant’s responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery, by filing an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 1190, 1195",
"parenthetical": "stating that this Court generally will not review a post-judgment claim asserting a need for discovery where the non-movant failed to advance such claim before the district court",
"sentence": "See Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.1995) (stating that this Court generally will not review a post-judgment claim asserting a need for discovery where the non-movant failed to advance such claim before the district court); see also Vance ex rel. v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that while “summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery,” it is the non-movant’s responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery, by filing an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery)."
} | 844,362 | b |
Unlike statutory deadlines that Congress intended to limit a court's jurisdiction, "[cjlaim-processing rules are court-promulgated rules, adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business." Although they may not deprive, a court of jurisdiction to hear a case, such rules may still be "inflexible," and may require a court's strict compliance where the issue of timeliness has been properly raised. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 F.3d 193, 196",
"parenthetical": "assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness",
"sentence": "Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005); United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness). Nonetheless, “failure to object to untimely submissions” may result in “forfeiture of the objection .... ” Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18, 126 S.Ct. 403; see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 1140, 1147",
"parenthetical": "\"A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.\"",
"sentence": "Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005); United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness). Nonetheless, “failure to object to untimely submissions” may result in “forfeiture of the objection .... ” Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18, 126 S.Ct. 403; see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.”)."
} | 7,307,963 | a |
Unlike statutory deadlines that Congress intended to limit a court's jurisdiction, "[cjlaim-processing rules are court-promulgated rules, adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business." Although they may not deprive, a court of jurisdiction to hear a case, such rules may still be "inflexible," and may require a court's strict compliance where the issue of timeliness has been properly raised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 1140, 1147",
"parenthetical": "\"A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.\"",
"sentence": "Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005); United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness). Nonetheless, “failure to object to untimely submissions” may result in “forfeiture of the objection .... ” Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18, 126 S.Ct. 403; see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "546 U.S. 18, 18",
"parenthetical": "assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness",
"sentence": "Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005); United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness). Nonetheless, “failure to object to untimely submissions” may result in “forfeiture of the objection .... ” Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18, 126 S.Ct. 403; see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.”)."
} | 7,307,963 | b |
Unlike statutory deadlines that Congress intended to limit a court's jurisdiction, "[cjlaim-processing rules are court-promulgated rules, adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business." Although they may not deprive, a court of jurisdiction to hear a case, such rules may still be "inflexible," and may require a court's strict compliance where the issue of timeliness has been properly raised. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness",
"sentence": "Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005); United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness). Nonetheless, “failure to object to untimely submissions” may result in “forfeiture of the objection .... ” Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18, 126 S.Ct. 403; see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 1140, 1147",
"parenthetical": "\"A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.\"",
"sentence": "Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005); United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (assuming that rule governing timeliness of appeals is a claim-processing rule, appeal still must be dismissed because government properly objected to untimeliness). Nonetheless, “failure to object to untimely submissions” may result in “forfeiture of the objection .... ” Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18, 126 S.Ct. 403; see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“A party indisputably forfeits a timeliness objection based on a claim-processing rule if he raises the issue after the court has issued a merits decision.”)."
} | 7,307,963 | a |
When the Bank refused Bradshaw's request to pay the taxes, Bradshaw could have resigned his position with HBP or refused to sign any checks and shut down the business. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "711 F.2d 734, 734",
"parenthetical": "the fact that a corporate officer might have been fired if he had disobeyed the CEO's orders to not pay withholding taxes did not make him any less responsible for payment of the taxes",
"sentence": "See Howard, 711 F.2d at 734 (the fact that a corporate officer might have been fired if he had disobeyed the CEO’s orders to not pay withholding taxes did not make him any less responsible for payment of the taxes); Hochstein, 900 F.2d at 549 (even though controller of corporation might have been fired for paying withholding taxes, “these adverse consequences simply are no excuse for failing to collect and pay” them); cf. Raba, 977 F.2d at 945 (declining to hold that lack of check-signing authority is dispositive of lack of responsibility, noting that to so hold would “open the door to a host of evasive tactics[,] [o]fficers with otherwise unfettered authority simply would deprive themselves of permission to sign corporate cheeks in order to avoid the designation of ‘responsible person.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 945, 945",
"parenthetical": "declining to hold that lack of check-signing authority is dispositive of lack of responsibility, noting that to so hold would \"open the door to a host of evasive tactics[,] [o]fficers with otherwise unfettered authority simply would deprive themselves of permission to sign corporate cheeks in order to avoid the designation of 'responsible person.' \"",
"sentence": "See Howard, 711 F.2d at 734 (the fact that a corporate officer might have been fired if he had disobeyed the CEO’s orders to not pay withholding taxes did not make him any less responsible for payment of the taxes); Hochstein, 900 F.2d at 549 (even though controller of corporation might have been fired for paying withholding taxes, “these adverse consequences simply are no excuse for failing to collect and pay” them); cf. Raba, 977 F.2d at 945 (declining to hold that lack of check-signing authority is dispositive of lack of responsibility, noting that to so hold would “open the door to a host of evasive tactics[,] [o]fficers with otherwise unfettered authority simply would deprive themselves of permission to sign corporate cheeks in order to avoid the designation of ‘responsible person.’ ”)."
} | 11,647,769 | a |
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