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Finally, plaintiffs have not cited, and the Court has not found, any cases decided after Filarsky in which a prosecutor was denied absolute immunity based on his or her status as a private attorney. By contrast, several cases have extended immunity to private attorneys serving prosecutorial roles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 897441, at *1",
"parenthetical": "private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that \"contract law firm\" and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | 12,270,208 | a |
Finally, plaintiffs have not cited, and the Court has not found, any cases decided after Filarsky in which a prosecutor was denied absolute immunity based on his or her status as a private attorney. By contrast, several cases have extended immunity to private attorneys serving prosecutorial roles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 897441, at *1",
"parenthetical": "private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that \"contract law firm\" and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | 12,270,208 | a |
Finally, plaintiffs have not cited, and the Court has not found, any cases decided after Filarsky in which a prosecutor was denied absolute immunity based on his or her status as a private attorney. By contrast, several cases have extended immunity to private attorneys serving prosecutorial roles. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824",
"parenthetical": "\"Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.\"",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 897441, at *1",
"parenthetical": "private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | 12,270,208 | b |
Finally, plaintiffs have not cited, and the Court has not found, any cases decided after Filarsky in which a prosecutor was denied absolute immunity based on his or her status as a private attorney. By contrast, several cases have extended immunity to private attorneys serving prosecutorial roles. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 897441, at *1",
"parenthetical": "private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "703 F.Supp. 761, 764",
"parenthetical": "absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department",
"sentence": "See Redlich v. Leen, No. 16-CIV-20001, 2016 WL 3670575, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) (private attorney entitled to absolute immunity in “hired role as a prosecutor on behalf of the City of Coral Gables in the traffic court proceeding”); Shimota v. Wegner, No. 15-1590, 2016 WL 1254240, at *14 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Filarsky and holding that private attorney entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to wrongful prosecution); Higdon v. Law Firm of Lautzenheiser Myers & Holdman, No. 1:06-CV-14TS, 2006 WL 897441, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) (private attorneys acting as city prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity); see also pre-Filarsky cases Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting immunity to private attorney representing child welfare agency in dependency hearings); SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 541 F.Supp.2d 405, 414-15 (D. Mass.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that “contract law firm” and its attorney are not entitled to absolute immunity); Niebur v. Town of Cicero, 212 F.Supp.2d 790, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Private attorneys may have prose-cutorial immunity in the proper circumstances.”); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F.Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (absolute immunity for private attorney hired to prosecute administrative dismissal proceeding against officers of the sheriffs department)."
} | 12,270,208 | a |
By contrast, here Plaintiff does not challenge any regulation or policy. Rather, she simply challenges Defendant's refusal to comply with the EEOC's order granting her relief. That order, however, addresses a "mere personal action" and provides merely injunctive relief that is "collateral to ... a money judgment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "794 F.2d 1036, 1036",
"parenthetical": "cases for non-monetary relief are allowed to proceed when \"they involve challenges to the facial validity of military regulations and [are] not tied to discrete personnel matters.\"",
"sentence": "Wilkins, 279 F.3d at 786-87 (explaining the distinction between non-monetary claims subject to the Feres doctrine from the “[b]road-based declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Navy policies affecting the structure of the military chaplaincy” challenged by Wilkins); see also Watson v. Arkansas Nat. Guard, 886 F.2d at 1008-1010; Crawford v. Texas Army Nat. Guard, 794 F.2d at 1036 (cases for non-monetary relief are allowed to proceed when “they involve challenges to the facial validity of military regulations and [are] not tied to discrete personnel matters.”)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 786, 786-87",
"parenthetical": "explaining the distinction between non-monetary claims subject to the Feres doctrine from the \"[b]road-based declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Navy policies affecting the structure of the military chaplaincy\" challenged by Wilkins",
"sentence": "Wilkins, 279 F.3d at 786-87 (explaining the distinction between non-monetary claims subject to the Feres doctrine from the “[b]road-based declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Navy policies affecting the structure of the military chaplaincy” challenged by Wilkins); see also Watson v. Arkansas Nat. Guard, 886 F.2d at 1008-1010; Crawford v. Texas Army Nat. Guard, 794 F.2d at 1036 (cases for non-monetary relief are allowed to proceed when “they involve challenges to the facial validity of military regulations and [are] not tied to discrete personnel matters.”)"
} | 4,258,781 | b |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "897 F.Supp. 381, 384",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 F.2d 548, 548",
"parenthetical": "remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: \"Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.\"",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | 3,838,379 | b |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 F.2d 548, 548",
"parenthetical": "remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: \"Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.\"",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 526, 529",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,838,379 | a |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "685 F.Supp. 683, 686",
"parenthetical": "removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "897 F.Supp. 381, 384",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,838,379 | a |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 526, 529",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "685 F.Supp. 683, 686",
"parenthetical": "removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | 3,838,379 | b |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "897 F.Supp. 381, 384",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "673 F.Supp. 1449, 1449-50",
"parenthetical": "a removing defendant's failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | 3,838,379 | b |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 526, 529",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "673 F.Supp. 1449, 1449-50",
"parenthetical": "a removing defendant's failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | 3,838,379 | b |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "608 F.Supp. 992, 993",
"parenthetical": "where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "897 F.Supp. 381, 384",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,838,379 | a |
In this case, the Younts have raised a timely objection to the facial defect in Cottrell's notice of removal, and therefore this action must be remanded to state court. See P.P. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "608 F.Supp. 992, 993",
"parenthetical": "where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand",
"sentence": "Farmers’ Elevator Co., 395 F.2d at 548 (remand was required because the removal petition failed to allege that other defendant had not been served in state court: “Although this action was removable, the procedure used to effect removal was defective and plaintiff did not waive the defect.”); Production Stamping Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 829 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Wis.1993) (the statutory requirement that the desire of all defendants to join in a removal petition be expressed to the court within thirty days after receipt by a defendant of a copy of an initial pleading containing a removable claim is not jurisdictional and may be waived; however, “the time limitation is mandatory and must be strictly construed.”); Ryals v. Marco Island Partners, 685 F.Supp. 683, 686 (N.D.Ill.1988) (removal was improvident where the removal petition failed to explain why fewer than all defendants sought removal); Fellhauer, 673 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (a removing defendant’s failure to obtain the consent of all defendants to removal was a substantive defect in removal to which a timely objection was raised, requiring remand); Hardesty v. General Foods Corp., 608 F.Supp. 992, 993 (N.D.Ill.1985) (where, on the last day permitted for removal, only two of four co-defendants filed a petition for removal, and there was no affirmative explanation as to the absence of the other co-defendants in the petition, the removal petition was defective and the case required remand)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "583 F.Supp. 526, 529",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defendant did not take the right steps when removing ... and ... a removed matter must be remanded .if there are any defects in the removal procedure.”); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F.Supp. 526, 529 (N.D.Ill.1984) (“A defendant seeking removal must strictly comply with all the statutory requirements, and where there is doubt as to whether the requirements have been satisfied, the case should be remanded.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,838,379 | a |
The rights established under Miranda are triggered only when an individual is in custody and under interrogation. In determining whether an individual is in custody, a necessary inquiry is whether, given the circumstances surrounding a police encounter, "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the [encounter] and leave." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "866 A.2d 67, 73",
"parenthetical": "[Consideration of ... \"inherently subjective and individualized factors is impermissible.\"",
"sentence": "Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1059 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted); Morales v. United States, 866 A.2d 67, 73 (D.C.2005) ([Consideration of ... “inherently subjective and individualized factors is impermissible.”). However, “this inquiry, though necessary, is not sufficient.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "369 F.3d 659, 672",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"a free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned was seized\" and is not disposi-tive as to whether the person was in custody for Miranda purposes",
"sentence": "California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643, 648 (D.C.2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 672 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that “a free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned was seized” and is not disposi-tive as to whether the person was in custody for Miranda purposes)."
} | 7,290,222 | a |
Father's argument that he did later pay some child support through the tax intercept is similarly to no avail, as that payment was both involuntary and subsequent to the statutory period. In addition, he may not rely upon his incarceration as an excuse for failing to contribute any money toward Child's support. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "804 S.W.2d 402, 402",
"parenthetical": "noting that the substantially reduced wages received by an incarcerated parent does not excuse his or her obligation to make monetary contributions toward the child's support",
"sentence": "M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d at 402 (noting that the substantially reduced wages received by an incarcerated parent does not excuse his or her obligation to make monetary contributions toward the child’s support); see In re L.N.D., 219 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Mo.App.2007) (though incarcerated, father was not relieved of his obligation to make a minimal financial contribution for child’s support); In re S.J.G., 871 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo.App.1994) (even a parent who lacks the ability to fully support a child still has a duty to make minimal support contributions for that child)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "219 S.W.3d 820, 828",
"parenthetical": "though incarcerated, father was not relieved of his obligation to make a minimal financial contribution for child's support",
"sentence": "M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d at 402 (noting that the substantially reduced wages received by an incarcerated parent does not excuse his or her obligation to make monetary contributions toward the child’s support); see In re L.N.D., 219 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Mo.App.2007) (though incarcerated, father was not relieved of his obligation to make a minimal financial contribution for child’s support); In re S.J.G., 871 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo.App.1994) (even a parent who lacks the ability to fully support a child still has a duty to make minimal support contributions for that child)."
} | 7,319,103 | a |
Father's argument that he did later pay some child support through the tax intercept is similarly to no avail, as that payment was both involuntary and subsequent to the statutory period. In addition, he may not rely upon his incarceration as an excuse for failing to contribute any money toward Child's support. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 S.W.2d 638, 642",
"parenthetical": "even a parent who lacks the ability to fully support a child still has a duty to make minimal support contributions for that child",
"sentence": "M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d at 402 (noting that the substantially reduced wages received by an incarcerated parent does not excuse his or her obligation to make monetary contributions toward the child’s support); see In re L.N.D., 219 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Mo.App.2007) (though incarcerated, father was not relieved of his obligation to make a minimal financial contribution for child’s support); In re S.J.G., 871 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo.App.1994) (even a parent who lacks the ability to fully support a child still has a duty to make minimal support contributions for that child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "804 S.W.2d 402, 402",
"parenthetical": "noting that the substantially reduced wages received by an incarcerated parent does not excuse his or her obligation to make monetary contributions toward the child's support",
"sentence": "M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d at 402 (noting that the substantially reduced wages received by an incarcerated parent does not excuse his or her obligation to make monetary contributions toward the child’s support); see In re L.N.D., 219 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Mo.App.2007) (though incarcerated, father was not relieved of his obligation to make a minimal financial contribution for child’s support); In re S.J.G., 871 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo.App.1994) (even a parent who lacks the ability to fully support a child still has a duty to make minimal support contributions for that child)."
} | 7,319,103 | b |
But as in Gomez, this argument relies on a propensity inference: that Stacy's history of involvement with methamphetamine manufacturing makes it more likely that he intended to use the pseudoephedrine pills he collected in 2010 through 2012 to make methamphetamine. For that reason, we are persuaded that the court erred by admitting the evidence of Stacy's prior involvement with methamphetamine. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "765 F.3d 720, 726-27",
"parenthetical": "concluding that admission of prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute was error",
"sentence": "See United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 726-27 (7th Cir.2014) (concluding that admission of prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute was error); United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 980 (7th Cir.2013) (same); Miller, 673 F.3d at 699-700 (same); see also Gomez, 763 F.3d at 862-63 (rejecting government’s argument as relying on the theory of “[o]nce a drug dealer, always a drug dealer”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "763 F.3d 862, 862-63",
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument as relying on the theory of \"[o]nce a drug dealer, always a drug dealer\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 726-27 (7th Cir.2014) (concluding that admission of prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute was error); United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 980 (7th Cir.2013) (same); Miller, 673 F.3d at 699-700 (same); see also Gomez, 763 F.3d at 862-63 (rejecting government’s argument as relying on the theory of “[o]nce a drug dealer, always a drug dealer”)."
} | 4,265,582 | a |
Missouri law prohibits as one of several "unlawful uses of weapons" the knowing "[e]xhibit[ion], in the presence of one or more persons, [of] any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner." # Mo.Rev.Stat. SS 570.030.1(4). Violation of this provision constitutes a class D felony punishable by up to four years -in prison. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 617, 617-18",
"parenthetical": "looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a \"felony offense\" under USSG SS 2K2.1(b",
"sentence": "See Littrell, 557 F.3d at 617-18 (looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a “felony offense” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), are “bound by” state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "559 U.S. 133, 138",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e)(1), are \"bound by\" state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes",
"sentence": "See Littrell, 557 F.3d at 617-18 (looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a “felony offense” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), are “bound by” state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes)."
} | 6,055,086 | a |
Missouri law prohibits as one of several "unlawful uses of weapons" the knowing "[e]xhibit[ion], in the presence of one or more persons, [of] any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner." # Mo.Rev.Stat. SS 570.030.1(4). Violation of this provision constitutes a class D felony punishable by up to four years -in prison. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 617, 617-18",
"parenthetical": "looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a \"felony offense\" under USSG SS 2K2.1(b",
"sentence": "See Littrell, 557 F.3d at 617-18 (looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a “felony offense” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), are “bound by” state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e)(1), are \"bound by\" state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes",
"sentence": "See Littrell, 557 F.3d at 617-18 (looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a “felony offense” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), are “bound by” state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes)."
} | 6,055,086 | a |
Missouri law prohibits as one of several "unlawful uses of weapons" the knowing "[e]xhibit[ion], in the presence of one or more persons, [of] any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner." # Mo.Rev.Stat. SS 570.030.1(4). Violation of this provision constitutes a class D felony punishable by up to four years -in prison. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e)(1), are \"bound by\" state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes",
"sentence": "See Littrell, 557 F.3d at 617-18 (looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a “felony offense” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), are “bound by” state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "557 F.3d 617, 617-18",
"parenthetical": "looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a \"felony offense\" under USSG SS 2K2.1(b",
"sentence": "See Littrell, 557 F.3d at 617-18 (looking to state supreme court decisions to determine whether defendant had committed a “felony offense” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (acknowledging that federal courts applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), are “bound by” state-court interpretations of state criminal statutes)."
} | 6,055,086 | b |
Moreover, several bankruptcy courts have ordered total disgorgement in like circumstances. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2010 WL 3522255, at *4-5",
"parenthetical": "failure to research PACER system for prior filings violated SS 707(b",
"sentence": "In re Alessandro, 2010 WL 3522255, at *4-5 (failure to research PACER system for prior filings violated § 707(b)(4)); In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. at 506 (violations of §§ 527-28); cf. In re DeSantis, 395 B.R. at 169-70 (disgorgement of all or a substantial portion of fees would likely follow a withdrawal based upon attorney’s belief that she cannot or should not represent a debtor in a reaffirmation decision)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 B.R. 169, 169-70",
"parenthetical": "disgorgement of all or a substantial portion of fees would likely follow a withdrawal based upon attorney's belief that she cannot or should not represent a debtor in a reaffirmation decision",
"sentence": "In re Alessandro, 2010 WL 3522255, at *4-5 (failure to research PACER system for prior filings violated § 707(b)(4)); In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. at 506 (violations of §§ 527-28); cf. In re DeSantis, 395 B.R. at 169-70 (disgorgement of all or a substantial portion of fees would likely follow a withdrawal based upon attorney’s belief that she cannot or should not represent a debtor in a reaffirmation decision)."
} | 4,179,007 | a |
Moreover, "this duty arises at the point in time when litigation is reasonably anticipated whether the organization is the initiator or the target of litigation." The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger and the Process 3 (public cmt. ed. Aug.2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ eontent/miscFiles/LegaLholds.pdf ("Legal Holds"). However, a future litigant is not required to make such a request, "and a failure to do so does not vitiate the independent obligation of an adverse party to preserve such information" if the adverse party knows or should know of impending litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.R.D. 191, 197",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"defendants each had a duty to preserve the data beginning no later than those dates\" on which plaintiff served the complaint on each defendant",
"sentence": "See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D.S.C. 2008) (stating that “defendants each had a duty to preserve the data beginning no later than those dates” on which plaintiff served the complaint on each defendant); see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D.Colo. 2007) (“In most cases, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.”); Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (“The filing of a complaint may alert a party that certain information is relevant and likely to be sought in discovery.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "244 F.R.D. 614, 621",
"parenthetical": "\"In most cases, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D.S.C. 2008) (stating that “defendants each had a duty to preserve the data beginning no later than those dates” on which plaintiff served the complaint on each defendant); see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D.Colo. 2007) (“In most cases, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.”); Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (“The filing of a complaint may alert a party that certain information is relevant and likely to be sought in discovery.”)."
} | 4,272,365 | a |
Moreover, "this duty arises at the point in time when litigation is reasonably anticipated whether the organization is the initiator or the target of litigation." The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger and the Process 3 (public cmt. ed. Aug.2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ eontent/miscFiles/LegaLholds.pdf ("Legal Holds"). However, a future litigant is not required to make such a request, "and a failure to do so does not vitiate the independent obligation of an adverse party to preserve such information" if the adverse party knows or should know of impending litigation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2006 WL 1308629, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"The filing of a complaint may alert a party that certain information is relevant and likely to be sought in discovery.\"",
"sentence": "See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D.S.C. 2008) (stating that “defendants each had a duty to preserve the data beginning no later than those dates” on which plaintiff served the complaint on each defendant); see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D.Colo. 2007) (“In most cases, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.”); Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (“The filing of a complaint may alert a party that certain information is relevant and likely to be sought in discovery.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.R.D. 191, 197",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"defendants each had a duty to preserve the data beginning no later than those dates\" on which plaintiff served the complaint on each defendant",
"sentence": "See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D.S.C. 2008) (stating that “defendants each had a duty to preserve the data beginning no later than those dates” on which plaintiff served the complaint on each defendant); see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D.Colo. 2007) (“In most cases, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.”); Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (“The filing of a complaint may alert a party that certain information is relevant and likely to be sought in discovery.”)."
} | 4,272,365 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 685, 690",
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 580, 593-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 685, 690",
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 685, 690",
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024",
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 580, 593-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024",
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024",
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 580, 593-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 692, 694",
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 580, 593-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 692, 694",
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 692, 694",
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 580, 593-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027",
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027",
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027",
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 580, 593-96",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | b |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22",
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
It would distort the plain meaning of this language to limit the application of the SS 1105a(a)(3) bar to convictions for aggravated felonies following the enactment of the ADAA. Further, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to make past criminal activity a new ground for deportation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States",
"sentence": "See id. at 32, citing Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1957) (alien convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1936 found deportable under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694, 77 S.Ct. 1025, 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1957) (alien with 1923 narcotics convictions found deportable under 1952 Act); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96, 72 S.Ct. 512, 520-22, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (upholding retroactive application of 1940 statute that made deportable aliens who had joined the communist party at any time after entering the United States)."
} | 11,288,438 | a |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "172 N.Y. 400, 409",
"parenthetical": "measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "254 F.Supp. 986, 988",
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | b |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "254 F.Supp. 986, 988",
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | a |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "254 F.Supp. 986, 988",
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "144 N.Y. 34, 48",
"parenthetical": "party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | a |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "254 F.Supp. 986, 988",
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | b |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "172 N.Y. 400, 409",
"parenthetical": "measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | a |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | a |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "144 N.Y. 34, 48",
"parenthetical": "party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | b |
Thus, Abele Tractor contractually waived the right to the remedy of rescission under New York law. Absent fraud, this contractual provision prevents rescission of the Agreement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted",
"sentence": "See Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir.1994); In re Hale Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir.1938); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prod., Co., 961 F.Supp. 368, 371-73 (D.Conn.1996)(following New York law); Schine v. Schine, 254 F.Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.)(waiver of fraud claim contrary to New York public policy but waiver of other causes of action permitted), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir.1966); see also McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 409, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)(measure of damages set forth in contract is exclusive remedy); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Imp. Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 48, 39 N.E. 7 (1894)(party held to limit of recovery set forth in contract). Accordingly, the Agreement stands and all of its provisions apply."
} | 973,243 | b |
The district court properly determined that Camacho failed to produce any evidence creating an issue of fact pertaining to the alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 1496, 1496",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 294, 303",
"parenthetical": "holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position)."
} | 4,133,855 | b |
The district court properly determined that Camacho failed to produce any evidence creating an issue of fact pertaining to the alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 1496, 1496",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position)."
} | 4,133,855 | b |
The district court properly determined that Camacho failed to produce any evidence creating an issue of fact pertaining to the alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 1496, 1496",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Jacobson, 50 F.3d at 1496 (affirming dismissal as a valid grant of summary judgment where district court considered matters outside the pleadings and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to brief the issues and submit evidence in support of their position)."
} | 4,133,855 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 145, 152",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 400, 409",
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 400, 409",
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | a |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 400, 409",
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 145, 152",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 145, 152",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | a |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | a |
The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense has its sources in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Taylor court \"rejected the defendant's argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (noting that the Taylor court “rejected the defendant’s argument that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,417,924 | a |
Certainly, evidence of actual use is relevant to that inquiry, and may even be dispositive. A finding that the defendant used the firearm for unlawful purposes would disqualify him or her altogether. We observe, however, without deciding the question, that there is authority that such evidence of lawful, non-sporting use may not necessarily preclude a defendant from establishing, in the totality of the circumstances, that he possessed a firearm solely for lawful sporting purposes. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "547 F.3d 718, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"The sale of a single weapon does not inevitably prevent a person from being a collector under SS 2K2.1(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Collins, 313 F.3d at 1256 (holding that two isolated uses of a firearm as collateral to secure vehicle repairs need not preclude eligibility if defendant otherwise demonstrated possession solely for lawful sporting purposes); cf. United States v. Miller, 547 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir.2008) (“The sale of a single weapon does not inevitably prevent a person from being a collector under § 2K2.1(b)(2).”). In addition, evidence that a defendant had used a firearm for lawful sporting purposes would support his claim that he possessed it solely for lawful sporting purposes."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "313 F.3d 1256, 1256",
"parenthetical": "holding that two isolated uses of a firearm as collateral to secure vehicle repairs need not preclude eligibility if defendant otherwise demonstrated possession solely for lawful sporting purposes",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Collins, 313 F.3d at 1256 (holding that two isolated uses of a firearm as collateral to secure vehicle repairs need not preclude eligibility if defendant otherwise demonstrated possession solely for lawful sporting purposes); cf. United States v. Miller, 547 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir.2008) (“The sale of a single weapon does not inevitably prevent a person from being a collector under § 2K2.1(b)(2).”). In addition, evidence that a defendant had used a firearm for lawful sporting purposes would support his claim that he possessed it solely for lawful sporting purposes."
} | 3,514,458 | b |
Our holding does not preclude this court from limiting the scope of the issues for which we remand, and thus limiting the district court's consideration to evidence and arguments relevant to those issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 799, 800",
"parenthetical": "holding that, where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendant's first appeal, the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel, 34 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (holding that, where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendant’s first appeal, the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand); see also Caterino, 29 F.3d at 1394 (holding that the district court’s discretion to consider any issue relevant to sentencing may be limited by the express or implied limits in the remand mandate)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 1394, 1394",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court's discretion to consider any issue relevant to sentencing may be limited by the express or implied limits in the remand mandate",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel, 34 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (holding that, where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendant’s first appeal, the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand); see also Caterino, 29 F.3d at 1394 (holding that the district court’s discretion to consider any issue relevant to sentencing may be limited by the express or implied limits in the remand mandate)."
} | 9,399,562 | a |
. These courts, as did the district court here, have referred to a voluntary resignation as a "waiver" of procedural rights to which the employee would otherwise be entitled under the due process clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 168, 168",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.\"",
"sentence": "See Morrell, 638 F.Supp. at 168 (“[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.”); Schoepf, 606 F.Supp. at 390 (\"[P]laintiff’s resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived.\"); see also Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 (\"[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 F.2d 543, 543",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.\"",
"sentence": "See Morrell, 638 F.Supp. at 168 (“[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.”); Schoepf, 606 F.Supp. at 390 (\"[P]laintiff’s resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived.\"); see also Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 (\"[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.”)."
} | 10,525,741 | a |
. These courts, as did the district court here, have referred to a voluntary resignation as a "waiver" of procedural rights to which the employee would otherwise be entitled under the due process clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "606 F.Supp. 390, 390",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]laintiff's resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See Morrell, 638 F.Supp. at 168 (“[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.”); Schoepf, 606 F.Supp. at 390 (\"[P]laintiff’s resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived.\"); see also Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 (\"[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 F.2d 543, 543",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.\"",
"sentence": "See Morrell, 638 F.Supp. at 168 (“[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.”); Schoepf, 606 F.Supp. at 390 (\"[P]laintiff’s resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived.\"); see also Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 (\"[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.”)."
} | 10,525,741 | a |
These arguments apply with equal force in the present case because Murphy's decision to file a federal court complaint before exhausting his administrative remedies threatens to undermine the hearing process established by the police department for the adjudication of disciplinary complaints. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 567, 572-73",
"parenthetical": "Younger abstention does not apply if administrative proceedings have been completed and the agency's ruling has not been appealed",
"sentence": "See O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 791 (3d Cir.1994) (.Younger abstention applies to final administrative rulings that have not been appealed to state court); Alleghany Corp. v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (8th Cir.1990) (same); but cf. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567, 572-73 (6th Cir.1991) (Younger abstention does not apply if administrative proceedings have been completed and the agency’s ruling has not been appealed); Thomas v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 807 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir.1987) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "32 F.3d 785, 791",
"parenthetical": ".Younger abstention applies to final administrative rulings that have not been appealed to state court",
"sentence": "See O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 791 (3d Cir.1994) (.Younger abstention applies to final administrative rulings that have not been appealed to state court); Alleghany Corp. v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (8th Cir.1990) (same); but cf. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567, 572-73 (6th Cir.1991) (Younger abstention does not apply if administrative proceedings have been completed and the agency’s ruling has not been appealed); Thomas v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 807 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir.1987) (same)."
} | 11,552,095 | b |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Md.App. 317, 333-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge \"accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband's] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 Md.App. 317, 344-46",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | a |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Md.App. 317, 333-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge \"accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband's] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | a |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge \"accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband's] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 Md.App. 317, 344-46",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | a |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge \"accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband's] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | b |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "129 Md.App. 581, 581",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was \"at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,\" where evidence of wife's depression and other \"mental health problems was uncontested\" but where other evidence showed that these conditions \"did not totally bind her to the family home\" and that wife had been financially successful in the past",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 Md.App. 317, 344-46",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | a |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "129 Md.App. 581, 581",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was \"at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,\" where evidence of wife's depression and other \"mental health problems was uncontested\" but where other evidence showed that these conditions \"did not totally bind her to the family home\" and that wife had been financially successful in the past",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | a |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was \"at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,\" where evidence of wife's depression and other \"mental health problems was uncontested\" but where other evidence showed that these conditions \"did not totally bind her to the family home\" and that wife had been financially successful in the past",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 Md.App. 317, 344-46",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | a |
Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not \"stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]\"",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was \"at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,\" where evidence of wife's depression and other \"mental health problems was uncontested\" but where other evidence showed that these conditions \"did not totally bind her to the family home\" and that wife had been financially successful in the past",
"sentence": "See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34, 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46, 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”)."
} | 4,307,694 | b |
P. 25.2(b)(3). Moreover, it is the inclusion of these statements which vests us with jurisdiction over the appeal. Should they be omitted, we are restricted to considering only those points averring jurisdictional defects or impugning the voluntariness of the initial plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15",
"parenthetical": "holding that the rule also applies to those attempting to perfect an appeal after their community supervision is revoked and they are adjudicated guilty",
"sentence": "Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (involving the predecessor to the current rule of appellate procedure); see Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (holding that the rule also applies to those attempting to perfect an appeal after their community supervision is revoked and they are adjudicated guilty)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "935 S.W.2d 131, 134",
"parenthetical": "involving the predecessor to the current rule of appellate procedure",
"sentence": "Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (involving the predecessor to the current rule of appellate procedure); see Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (holding that the rule also applies to those attempting to perfect an appeal after their community supervision is revoked and they are adjudicated guilty)."
} | 11,792,938 | b |
For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi's affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi's counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi's counsel is plainly wrong. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 219, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 56(e)'s requirement ... means that an affidavit's hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that hearsay statement “did not constitute competent evidence” and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 106, 111",
"parenthetical": "bald assertions not based on personal knowledge were properly ignored by district court in granting summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.1997) (bald assertions not based on personal knowledge were properly ignored by district court in granting summary judgment)."
} | 9,177,615 | a |
The State of Florida petitions this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court's order denying the State's motion to place the Respondent, Aaron Maldonado, into custody. Because the trial court has not rendered a written order, we dismiss this petition for lack of certiorari jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "579 So.2d 311, 312",
"parenthetical": "district court of appeal did not have jurisdiction absent signed, written order by trial court and transcript could not substitute for written order",
"sentence": "See Burns v. State, 906 So.2d 351, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[S]ince the trial court has not rendered an order regarding the defendant’s bond, and in fact has not modified the defendant’s pretrial release, we conclude that the certiorari jurisdiction of this court has not been invoked.”); see also Owens v. State, 579 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (district court of appeal did not have jurisdiction absent signed, written order by trial court and transcript could not substitute for written order); Fla. Citrus Comm’n v. Griffin, 249 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (even if order on appeal was dictated into the record, but the trial judge did not render a written order, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "906 So.2d 351, 351",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]ince the trial court has not rendered an order regarding the defendant's bond, and in fact has not modified the defendant's pretrial release, we conclude that the certiorari jurisdiction of this court has not been invoked.\"",
"sentence": "See Burns v. State, 906 So.2d 351, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[S]ince the trial court has not rendered an order regarding the defendant’s bond, and in fact has not modified the defendant’s pretrial release, we conclude that the certiorari jurisdiction of this court has not been invoked.”); see also Owens v. State, 579 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (district court of appeal did not have jurisdiction absent signed, written order by trial court and transcript could not substitute for written order); Fla. Citrus Comm’n v. Griffin, 249 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (even if order on appeal was dictated into the record, but the trial judge did not render a written order, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)."
} | 6,892,302 | b |
The State of Florida petitions this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court's order denying the State's motion to place the Respondent, Aaron Maldonado, into custody. Because the trial court has not rendered a written order, we dismiss this petition for lack of certiorari jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "906 So.2d 351, 351",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]ince the trial court has not rendered an order regarding the defendant's bond, and in fact has not modified the defendant's pretrial release, we conclude that the certiorari jurisdiction of this court has not been invoked.\"",
"sentence": "See Burns v. State, 906 So.2d 351, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[S]ince the trial court has not rendered an order regarding the defendant’s bond, and in fact has not modified the defendant’s pretrial release, we conclude that the certiorari jurisdiction of this court has not been invoked.”); see also Owens v. State, 579 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (district court of appeal did not have jurisdiction absent signed, written order by trial court and transcript could not substitute for written order); Fla. Citrus Comm’n v. Griffin, 249 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (even if order on appeal was dictated into the record, but the trial judge did not render a written order, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 So.2d 42, 43",
"parenthetical": "even if order on appeal was dictated into the record, but the trial judge did not render a written order, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Burns v. State, 906 So.2d 351, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[S]ince the trial court has not rendered an order regarding the defendant’s bond, and in fact has not modified the defendant’s pretrial release, we conclude that the certiorari jurisdiction of this court has not been invoked.”); see also Owens v. State, 579 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (district court of appeal did not have jurisdiction absent signed, written order by trial court and transcript could not substitute for written order); Fla. Citrus Comm’n v. Griffin, 249 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (even if order on appeal was dictated into the record, but the trial judge did not render a written order, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)."
} | 6,892,302 | a |
Some courts have found survivorship benefits are not a property interest. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "584 S.W.2d 900, 900",
"parenthetical": "\"the majority opinion, in refusing to hold that the death benefits are community property, ignores the rule of community property law that spouses share in property earned during marriage\"",
"sentence": "But see Lack, 584 S.W.2d at 900 (\"the majority opinion, in refusing to hold that the death benefits are community property, ignores the rule of community property law that spouses share in property earned during marriage”) (Robertson, J., dissenting)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "584 S.W.2d 899, 899",
"parenthetical": "because of statutory scheme, ex-wife not entitled to pro-rata share of firefighter's statutory death benefit even though pro-rata share would otherwise be community property, citing Lack",
"sentence": "Lack, 584 S.W.2d at 899. Accord Duckett v. Board of Trustees, City of Houston Firemen’s Relief & Retirement Fund, 832 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (because of statutory scheme, ex-wife not entitled to pro-rata share of firefighter’s statutory death benefit even though pro-rata share would otherwise be community property, citing Lack)."
} | 517,996 | b |
Some courts have found survivorship benefits are not a property interest. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "584 S.W.2d 900, 900",
"parenthetical": "\"the majority opinion, in refusing to hold that the death benefits are community property, ignores the rule of community property law that spouses share in property earned during marriage\"",
"sentence": "But see Lack, 584 S.W.2d at 900 (\"the majority opinion, in refusing to hold that the death benefits are community property, ignores the rule of community property law that spouses share in property earned during marriage”) (Robertson, J., dissenting)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "832 S.W.2d 438, 442",
"parenthetical": "because of statutory scheme, ex-wife not entitled to pro-rata share of firefighter's statutory death benefit even though pro-rata share would otherwise be community property, citing Lack",
"sentence": "Lack, 584 S.W.2d at 899. Accord Duckett v. Board of Trustees, City of Houston Firemen’s Relief & Retirement Fund, 832 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (because of statutory scheme, ex-wife not entitled to pro-rata share of firefighter’s statutory death benefit even though pro-rata share would otherwise be community property, citing Lack)."
} | 517,996 | b |
Since the general standards to be employed in discussing Eighth Amendment issues are well understood, I see no reason to repeat them at length here. Turning to the specific issue at hand, it appears to this Court that the Eighth Amendment requires no more than that prison officials provide inmates with a diet which is nutritionally adequate for the maintenance of normal health. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "774 F.2d 1567, 1575",
"parenthetical": "\"The Constitution requires that prisoners be provided 'reasonably adequate food'____ The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.\"",
"sentence": "See also Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.1985) (“The Constitution requires that prisoners be provided ‘reasonably adequate food’____ The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981); Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1983); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1378 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir.1977) (“A well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, is all that is required.”). Where food is prepared and served in a sanitary manner and is nutritionally adequate to maintain normal health, the fact that it is unappetizing will not, standing alone, state a constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "567 F.2d 653, 656, 660",
"parenthetical": "\"deliberate and unnecessary withholding of food essential to normal health can violate the Eighth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 656, 660 (6th Cir.1977) (“deliberate and unnecessary withholding of food essential to normal health can violate the Eighth Amendment”)."
} | 3,962,097 | b |
Since the general standards to be employed in discussing Eighth Amendment issues are well understood, I see no reason to repeat them at length here. Turning to the specific issue at hand, it appears to this Court that the Eighth Amendment requires no more than that prison officials provide inmates with a diet which is nutritionally adequate for the maintenance of normal health. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 373, 380",
"parenthetical": "\"A well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, is all that is required.\"",
"sentence": "See also Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.1985) (“The Constitution requires that prisoners be provided ‘reasonably adequate food’____ The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981); Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1983); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1378 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir.1977) (“A well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, is all that is required.”). Where food is prepared and served in a sanitary manner and is nutritionally adequate to maintain normal health, the fact that it is unappetizing will not, standing alone, state a constitutional claim."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "567 F.2d 653, 656, 660",
"parenthetical": "\"deliberate and unnecessary withholding of food essential to normal health can violate the Eighth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 656, 660 (6th Cir.1977) (“deliberate and unnecessary withholding of food essential to normal health can violate the Eighth Amendment”)."
} | 3,962,097 | b |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, \"no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | b |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153",
"parenthetical": "concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from \"a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,\" prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because \"[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,\" and because \"[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,\" but, rather, \"was a crime in itself'",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | a |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from \"a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,\" prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because \"[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,\" and because \"[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,\" but, rather, \"was a crime in itself'",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | a |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from \"a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,\" prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because \"[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,\" and because \"[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,\" but, rather, \"was a crime in itself'",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | a |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "merger doctrine inapplicable when \"there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | b |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "merger doctrine inapplicable when \"there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | a |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "merger doctrine inapplicable when \"there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | b |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "merger doctrine inapplicable when \"there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | b |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because \"the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | a |
We agree, however, with the state that the lack of such an instruction was harmless under the circumstances because the defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint, thus indicating that the jury believed only the victim's allegations with respect to the defendant's moving her forcibly from the apartment building's vestibule to another area outside and then back inside and up to Sears' apartment, where the defendant then confined her temporarily. Put differently, the jury's verdict, which indicated the jury's disbelief of the victim's allegations of assault; see footnote 7 of this opinion; is a conclusive finding that there was no separate crime underlying the kidnapping charge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because \"the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant's alleged commission of any other crimes commenced\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "47 Va. App. 122, 124",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that \"detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery\" when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable",
"sentence": "See State v. Hampton, supra, 293 Conn. 463 (concluding that defendant’s failure to receive Salamon instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, even though he had been charged with both kidnapping and sexual assault, because “the defendant and [his accomplice] had kidnapped the victim and had driven around . . . with her for well over three hours before the defendant’s alleged commission of any other crimes commenced”); see also People v. Robbins, supra, 131 Mich. App. 433 (trial court properly declined to instruct on incidental rule because, after granting of directed verdict on underlying assault charge, “no one suggested that any underlying lesser or co-equal offense could be found to have been committed, and there was no evidence of any such offense”); People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 148, 153, 603 N.E.2d 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1993) (concluding that second degree kidnapping conviction arising from “a lengthy odyssey on the streets of Brooklyn,” prior to alleged sexual assault, should not have been merged with acquittal for attempted sexual assault because “[t]he abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted,” and because “[t]he restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime . . . [or] simultaneous and inseparable from another crime,” but, rather, “was a crime in itself’); People v. Cruz, 296 App. Div. 2d 22, 26-27, 745 N.Y.S.2d 528 (merger doctrine inapplicable when “there is sufficient evidence of restraint but insufficient evidence of the other charged crime”), appeal denied, 99 N.Y.2d 534, 782 N.E.2d 572, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2002); State v. French, supra, 139 Vt. 321 (incidental rule inapplicable when defendant acquitted of sexual assault because “the kidnapping, if proven in every element, can stand on its own”); Walker v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 122, 124 (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was entitled to reversal of abduction conviction on ground that “detention should be ignored because it was incidental to the claimed robbery” when defendant was acquitted of robbery charge, thereby rendering incidental rule inapplicable)."
} | 4,343,690 | a |
This Court evaluates "whether the allegations of a complaint contain sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy Rule 9(b) on a case-by-case basis." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "847 F.2d 1505, 1512",
"parenthetical": "\"Allegations of date, time or place satisfy the Rule 9(b",
"sentence": "See Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312 & n. 21 (listing some of the types of information that might help a plaintiff plead the submission of a claim with particularity but cautioning that Rule 9(b) “does not mandate all of this information for any of the alleged claims”); see also Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir.1988) (“Allegations of date, time or place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity, but alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing some of the types of information that might help a plaintiff plead the submission of a claim with particularity but cautioning that Rule 9(b",
"sentence": "See Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312 & n. 21 (listing some of the types of information that might help a plaintiff plead the submission of a claim with particularity but cautioning that Rule 9(b) “does not mandate all of this information for any of the alleged claims”); see also Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir.1988) (“Allegations of date, time or place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity, but alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule.”)."
} | 4,338,939 | b |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 1512, 1524",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 935, 943",
"parenthetical": "finding that the district court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 935, 943",
"parenthetical": "finding that the district court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 935, 943",
"parenthetical": "finding that the district court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 935, 943",
"parenthetical": "finding that the district court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | a |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 1512, 1524",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1079, 1081",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1079, 1081",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1079, 1081",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
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