context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 611, 611-13",
"parenthetical": "stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under \"a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 P.3d 1054, 1058",
"parenthetical": "holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | a |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 611, 611-13",
"parenthetical": "stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under \"a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it is equally well-established that a suspect's mere flight to escape arrest does not violate\" the resisting arrest statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | a |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 A.2d 641, 644",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it is equally well-established that a suspect's mere flight to escape arrest does not violate\" the resisting arrest statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 611, 611-13",
"parenthetical": "stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under \"a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | b |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 611, 611-13",
"parenthetical": "stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under \"a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | 3,997,404 | a |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 611, 611-13",
"parenthetical": "stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under \"a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "928 N.E.2d 317, 320",
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | 3,997,404 | a |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 P.3d 1054, 1058",
"parenthetical": "holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | 3,997,404 | a |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "928 N.E.2d 317, 320",
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 P.3d 1054, 1058",
"parenthetical": "holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | b |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it is equally well-established that a suspect's mere flight to escape arrest does not violate\" the resisting arrest statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | b |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "928 N.E.2d 317, 320",
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it is equally well-established that a suspect's mere flight to escape arrest does not violate\" the resisting arrest statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | b |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 A.2d 641, 644",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it is equally well-established that a suspect's mere flight to escape arrest does not violate\" the resisting arrest statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | b |
Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "928 N.E.2d 317, 320",
"parenthetical": "holding that a fleeing suspect created a \"substantial risk of bodily injury\" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 A.2d 641, 644",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it is equally well-established that a suspect's mere flight to escape arrest does not violate\" the resisting arrest statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute)."
} | 3,997,404 | b |
Because counsel has provided sufficient detail for the time spent, this court can determine the reasonableness of the fee request in much the same way we analyze and evaluate requests for time spent on appeal when counsel requests payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. SS 3006A. Both the EAJA and the CJA application requests incorporate the requirement that the time be reasonably expended. In addition, plaintiff has attached to her brief all the actual documents produced as the result of counsel's labors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "803 F.2d 575, 579-80",
"parenthetical": "appellate court awards EAJA fees for 11.25 hours in district court and 56 hours on appeal as reasonable amounts",
"sentence": "See Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 579-80 (10th Cir.1986) (appellate court awards EAJA fees for 11.25 hours in district court and 56 hours on appeal as reasonable amounts); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir.1986) (awarding attorney fees for four hours of post-trial work, rather than remanding matter to district court); cf. Cooper v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (D.C.Cir.1994) (evaluating reasonableness of fees sought in EAJA application submitted to circuit court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18",
"parenthetical": "evaluating reasonableness of fees sought in EAJA application submitted to circuit court",
"sentence": "See Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 579-80 (10th Cir.1986) (appellate court awards EAJA fees for 11.25 hours in district court and 56 hours on appeal as reasonable amounts); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir.1986) (awarding attorney fees for four hours of post-trial work, rather than remanding matter to district court); cf. Cooper v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (D.C.Cir.1994) (evaluating reasonableness of fees sought in EAJA application submitted to circuit court)."
} | 1,032,944 | a |
Because counsel has provided sufficient detail for the time spent, this court can determine the reasonableness of the fee request in much the same way we analyze and evaluate requests for time spent on appeal when counsel requests payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. SS 3006A. Both the EAJA and the CJA application requests incorporate the requirement that the time be reasonably expended. In addition, plaintiff has attached to her brief all the actual documents produced as the result of counsel's labors. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18",
"parenthetical": "evaluating reasonableness of fees sought in EAJA application submitted to circuit court",
"sentence": "See Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 579-80 (10th Cir.1986) (appellate court awards EAJA fees for 11.25 hours in district court and 56 hours on appeal as reasonable amounts); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir.1986) (awarding attorney fees for four hours of post-trial work, rather than remanding matter to district court); cf. Cooper v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (D.C.Cir.1994) (evaluating reasonableness of fees sought in EAJA application submitted to circuit court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 F.2d 1197, 1205",
"parenthetical": "awarding attorney fees for four hours of post-trial work, rather than remanding matter to district court",
"sentence": "See Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 575, 579-80 (10th Cir.1986) (appellate court awards EAJA fees for 11.25 hours in district court and 56 hours on appeal as reasonable amounts); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir.1986) (awarding attorney fees for four hours of post-trial work, rather than remanding matter to district court); cf. Cooper v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (D.C.Cir.1994) (evaluating reasonableness of fees sought in EAJA application submitted to circuit court)."
} | 1,032,944 | b |
Whether a law falls within the City's police powers does not depend on the lawmakers' subjective intent or the parsing of their proffered or true motives. Rather, the test is whether the law bears a reasonable relationship to the health, safety or welfare of the community, which waste disposal plainly does. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "534 N.Y.S.2d 794, 794",
"parenthetical": "invalidating a town law requiring certain applicants for building permits to pay fees that go toward capital improvements to and expansions of state and local transportation infrastructure, noting that the relationship between the law and the presumed purpose of promoting public safety was \"tenuous\" and that the law was instead \"aimed at raising revenues\"",
"sentence": "See Good Humor Corp., 49 N.E.2d at 155-56 (holding that the “[t]he statement of the purpose of the [law in question] in the committee report is not conclusive” and reiterating that the question is whether the law is “reasonably calculated” to achieve a legitimate police power purpose); cf. Albany Area Builders Ass’n, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (invalidating a town law requiring certain applicants for building permits to pay fees that go toward capital improvements to and expansions of state and local transportation infrastructure, noting that the relationship between the law and the presumed purpose of promoting public safety was “tenuous” and that the law was instead “aimed at raising revenues”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "49 N.E.2d 155, 155-56",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"[t]he statement of the purpose of the [law in question] in the committee report is not conclusive\" and reiterating that the question is whether the law is \"reasonably calculated\" to achieve a legitimate police power purpose",
"sentence": "See Good Humor Corp., 49 N.E.2d at 155-56 (holding that the “[t]he statement of the purpose of the [law in question] in the committee report is not conclusive” and reiterating that the question is whether the law is “reasonably calculated” to achieve a legitimate police power purpose); cf. Albany Area Builders Ass’n, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (invalidating a town law requiring certain applicants for building permits to pay fees that go toward capital improvements to and expansions of state and local transportation infrastructure, noting that the relationship between the law and the presumed purpose of promoting public safety was “tenuous” and that the law was instead “aimed at raising revenues”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
A preliminary injunction is not warranted unless the trial court finds that the moving party has demonstrated each of the Rathke factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "30 P.3d 789, 796",
"parenthetical": "\"sinee all the necessary criteria were not established, entry of the preliminary injunction ... was error\"",
"sentence": "Rathke v. MacFarlane, supra, 648 P.2d at 654 (“If each criterion cannot be met, injunctive relief is not available.”); see also Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 796 (Colo.App.2001)(“sinee all the necessary criteria were not established, entry of the preliminary injunction ... was error”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 P.2d 654, 654",
"parenthetical": "\"If each criterion cannot be met, injunctive relief is not available.\"",
"sentence": "Rathke v. MacFarlane, supra, 648 P.2d at 654 (“If each criterion cannot be met, injunctive relief is not available.”); see also Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 796 (Colo.App.2001)(“sinee all the necessary criteria were not established, entry of the preliminary injunction ... was error”)."
} | 9,225,502 | b |
This is not to say that the statutory cap is completely irrelevant to the constitutionality analysis, at least in light of the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Zhang. That decision suggests that Title VII's statutory cap substitutes for a comparable civil penalty, the third BMW factor, as a yardstick of constitutionality of a punitive damages award in discrimination cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "513 F.3d 164, 164",
"parenthetical": "holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a Title VII case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process",
"sentence": "See Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1045 (using Title VII’s statutory cap as a comparator in a § 1981 discrimination case, because there was no civil penalty for discrimination claims, and the statutory cap represented a legislative judgment similar to a civil penalty); see also Abner, 513 F.3d at 164 (holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a Title VII case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "339 F.3d 1045, 1045",
"parenthetical": "using Title VII's statutory cap as a comparator in a SS 1981 discrimination case, because there was no civil penalty for discrimination claims, and the statutory cap represented a legislative judgment similar to a civil penalty",
"sentence": "See Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1045 (using Title VII’s statutory cap as a comparator in a § 1981 discrimination case, because there was no civil penalty for discrimination claims, and the statutory cap represented a legislative judgment similar to a civil penalty); see also Abner, 513 F.3d at 164 (holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a Title VII case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process)."
} | 4,258,667 | b |
(Doe. 87 at 5 n.2; Doc. 73.) See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 274, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"injury to an organization's members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf'",
"sentence": "Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986) (“injury to an organization’s members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf’); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 1097, 1101",
"parenthetical": "organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on \"whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
(Doe. 87 at 5 n.2; Doc. 73.) See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"injury to an organization's members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf'",
"sentence": "Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986) (“injury to an organization’s members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf’); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 1097, 1101",
"parenthetical": "organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on \"whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
(Doe. 87 at 5 n.2; Doc. 73.) See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 1097, 1101",
"parenthetical": "organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on \"whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"injury to an organization's members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf'",
"sentence": "Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986) (“injury to an organization’s members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in federal court on their behalf’); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
(Doe. 87 at 5 n.2; Doc. 73.) See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 1097, 1101",
"parenthetical": "organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on \"whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 333, 342",
"parenthetical": "\"an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
(Doe. 87 at 5 n.2; Doc. 73.) See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 1097, 1101",
"parenthetical": "organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on \"whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
(Doe. 87 at 5 n.2; Doc. 73.) See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 1097, 1101",
"parenthetical": "organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on \"whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact\"",
"sentence": "Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (“an. association may have standing solely a? the representative of its members”); Colwell v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2004) (organizational standing, in comparison to representational standing by an organization, turns on “whether the organization itself has suffered an injury in fact”) (emphasis added)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "153 Mich. App. 157, 161",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 Ariz. 569, 570",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, \"holds\" placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | 4,791,093 | b |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 Ariz. 569, 570",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, \"holds\" placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 271, 273",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | 4,791,093 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "653 P.2d 26, 27",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, \"holds\" placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "153 Mich. App. 157, 161",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | 4,791,093 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "653 P.2d 26, 27",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, \"holds\" placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 271, 273",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | 4,791,093 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "419 N.W.2d 648, 650",
"parenthetical": "sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "153 Mich. App. 157, 161",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | 4,791,093 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 271, 273",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "419 N.W.2d 648, 650",
"parenthetical": "sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | 4,791,093 | b |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 A.D.2d 549, 550",
"parenthetical": "where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "153 Mich. App. 157, 161",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | 4,791,093 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 271, 273",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 A.D.2d 549, 550",
"parenthetical": "where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | 4,791,093 | b |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480",
"parenthetical": "where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "153 Mich. App. 157, 161",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | 4,791,093 | a |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 271, 273",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480",
"parenthetical": "where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | 4,791,093 | b |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "153 Mich. App. 157, 161",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 A.2d 622, 623",
"parenthetical": "if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | 4,791,093 | b |
Most state courts that have decided this question have applied a similar rule under their presentence credit statutes. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 271, 273",
"parenthetical": "even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a \"hold\" on him",
"sentence": "But see People v. Ranson, 153 Mich. App. 157, 161, 395 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1986) (even though defendant was incarcerated in another state on unrelated charges, he is entitled to credit for time served in that state from the date that Michigan authorities placed a “hold” on him)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 A.2d 622, 623",
"parenthetical": "if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit",
"sentence": "See State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 570, 653 P.2d 26, 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (where defendant was in custody of other states on charges brought in those states, “holds” placed by Arizona were irrelevant under sentence credit statute because defendant was never able to satisfy conditions of release imposed by other states); State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sentence credit is not allowed for time spent in out-of-state incarceration unless such incarceration is solely in connection with the Minne sota offense) (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984)); Keffer v. Reid, 100 A.D.2d 549, 550, 473 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (1984) (where defendant seeks sentence credit for jail time spent in another jurisdiction, he must demonstrate that the custody resulted solely from a New York detainer); and Commonwealth v. Bortner, 230 Pa. Super, 64, 67, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (1974) (if defendant is detained in another state solely by reason of Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of separate charges in the other state, then he is entitled to presentence credit)."
} | 4,791,093 | b |
Despite the broad nature of this example, the Court finds Whitfield also has not met her burden of proving she is substantially limited in the major life activity of work. While the record contains evidence of Whitfield's medical limitations, there exists nothing connecting those limitations to ability to perform other jobs in the community. The general statement in the Interpretive Guidelines about back injuries, in isolation, cannot boost Whitfield over the summary judgment hurdle. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work",
"sentence": "Cf. McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997) (holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir.1994) (same, where plaintiff was restricted in lifting and standing); Corrigan v. Perry, 961 F.Supp. 132 (E.D.Va.1997) (same, where plaintiff suffered lifting restrictions); but see Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir.1996) (finding an issue of fact existed as to disability of employee who injured shoulder, in light of the back injury example in the Interpretive Guidelines)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 908, 911",
"parenthetical": "finding an issue of fact existed as to disability of employee who injured shoulder, in light of the back injury example in the Interpretive Guidelines",
"sentence": "Cf. McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997) (holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir.1994) (same, where plaintiff was restricted in lifting and standing); Corrigan v. Perry, 961 F.Supp. 132 (E.D.Va.1997) (same, where plaintiff suffered lifting restrictions); but see Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir.1996) (finding an issue of fact existed as to disability of employee who injured shoulder, in light of the back injury example in the Interpretive Guidelines)."
} | 288,062 | a |
As its primary basis for upward departure, the district court relied on USSG SS 5K2.14, which states that "if national secu rity, public health, or safety was significantly endangered, the Court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense." That requires a court to look at the offense committed and the dangerousness of the defendant at the time of the crime, not the future dangerousness of the defendant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing upward departure under SS 5K2.14 for endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir.1996) (reviewing upward departure under § 5K2.14 for endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance); United States v. McDowell, 902 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1990) (same, for creating a threat to public safety by running a crack house); but see United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1989) (affirming § 5K2.14 upward departure for recidivist defendant whom judge found “would continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of whatever community he is in”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming SS 5K2.14 upward departure for recidivist defendant whom judge found \"would continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of whatever community he is in\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir.1996) (reviewing upward departure under § 5K2.14 for endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance); United States v. McDowell, 902 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1990) (same, for creating a threat to public safety by running a crack house); but see United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1989) (affirming § 5K2.14 upward departure for recidivist defendant whom judge found “would continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of whatever community he is in”)."
} | 7,653,685 | a |
As its primary basis for upward departure, the district court relied on USSG SS 5K2.14, which states that "if national secu rity, public health, or safety was significantly endangered, the Court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense." That requires a court to look at the offense committed and the dangerousness of the defendant at the time of the crime, not the future dangerousness of the defendant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "same, for creating a threat to public safety by running a crack house",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir.1996) (reviewing upward departure under § 5K2.14 for endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance); United States v. McDowell, 902 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1990) (same, for creating a threat to public safety by running a crack house); but see United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1989) (affirming § 5K2.14 upward departure for recidivist defendant whom judge found “would continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of whatever community he is in”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming SS 5K2.14 upward departure for recidivist defendant whom judge found \"would continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of whatever community he is in\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir.1996) (reviewing upward departure under § 5K2.14 for endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance); United States v. McDowell, 902 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1990) (same, for creating a threat to public safety by running a crack house); but see United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1989) (affirming § 5K2.14 upward departure for recidivist defendant whom judge found “would continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of whatever community he is in”)."
} | 7,653,685 | a |
The issue of waiver is generally one of fact for the jury, in particular where acts and conduct are relied upon as the basis for the waiver. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "250 Iowa 599, 602",
"parenthetical": "question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 N.W.2d 22, 25",
"parenthetical": "fact issue whether commodity account holder's response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | 10,674,297 | a |
The issue of waiver is generally one of fact for the jury, in particular where acts and conduct are relied upon as the basis for the waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "317 N.W.2d 186, 186",
"parenthetical": "fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "250 Iowa 599, 602",
"parenthetical": "question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | 10,674,297 | b |
The issue of waiver is generally one of fact for the jury, in particular where acts and conduct are relied upon as the basis for the waiver. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "94 N.W.2d 750, 753",
"parenthetical": "question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 N.W.2d 22, 25",
"parenthetical": "fact issue whether commodity account holder's response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | 10,674,297 | a |
The issue of waiver is generally one of fact for the jury, in particular where acts and conduct are relied upon as the basis for the waiver. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "94 N.W.2d 750, 753",
"parenthetical": "question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "317 N.W.2d 186, 186",
"parenthetical": "fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | 10,674,297 | a |
The issue of waiver is generally one of fact for the jury, in particular where acts and conduct are relied upon as the basis for the waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 N.W.2d 22, 25",
"parenthetical": "fact issue whether commodity account holder's response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "317 N.W.2d 186, 186",
"parenthetical": "fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver",
"sentence": "Continental Casualty Co., 258 Iowa at 661, 140 N.W.2d at 130; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 602, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1959) (question of fact whether failure to respond to monthly billing statements constituted waiver of right to offset claim against account billed); see Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain and Feed Co., 293 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1980) (fact issue whether commodity account holder’s response to margin calls waived prior breach by broker); Pond v. Anderson, 241 Iowa 1038, 1041, 1044, 44 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (1950) (jury question whether disputed phone conversations constituted waiver); cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fields, 317 N.W.2d at 186 (fact issue where evidence raises question of voluntariness of act purported to constitute waiver)."
} | 10,674,297 | a |
Perhaps for that reason, in recent years courts in other jurisdictions have held that, even prior to the filing of a motion for class certification, an offer of judgment for the full amount of the putative representative's individual claim does not automatically moot the class claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint",
"sentence": "E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2011); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721 (Fla.Ct.App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.2008) (offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action” under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed \"collective action\" under federal Fair Labor Standards Act",
"sentence": "E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2011); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721 (Fla.Ct.App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.2008) (offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action” under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint)."
} | 3,716,956 | b |
Perhaps for that reason, in recent years courts in other jurisdictions have held that, even prior to the filing of a motion for class certification, an offer of judgment for the full amount of the putative representative's individual claim does not automatically moot the class claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint",
"sentence": "E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2011); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721 (Fla.Ct.App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.2008) (offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action” under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed \"collective action\" under federal Fair Labor Standards Act",
"sentence": "E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2011); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721 (Fla.Ct.App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.2008) (offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action” under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint)."
} | 3,716,956 | b |
Perhaps for that reason, in recent years courts in other jurisdictions have held that, even prior to the filing of a motion for class certification, an offer of judgment for the full amount of the putative representative's individual claim does not automatically moot the class claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046",
"parenthetical": "tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint",
"sentence": "E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2011); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721 (Fla.Ct.App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.2008) (offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action” under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed \"collective action\" under federal Fair Labor Standards Act",
"sentence": "E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.2011); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2011); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721 (Fla.Ct.App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.2008) (offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action” under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint)."
} | 3,716,956 | b |
. Our experience is consistent with that of the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "757 P.2d 910, 910",
"parenthetical": "although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\"",
"sentence": "See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Shepherd)', United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir.1978) (\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.”); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1950) (\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent.”); see also Rice I, 757 P.2d at 910 (although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "789 F.2d 956, 958",
"parenthetical": "\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.\"",
"sentence": "See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Shepherd)', United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir.1978) (\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.”); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1950) (\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent.”); see also Rice I, 757 P.2d at 910 (although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\")."
} | 7,645,412 | b |
. Our experience is consistent with that of the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "757 P.2d 910, 910",
"parenthetical": "although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\"",
"sentence": "See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Shepherd)', United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir.1978) (\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.”); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1950) (\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent.”); see also Rice I, 757 P.2d at 910 (although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "576 F.2d 719, 724-25",
"parenthetical": "\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.\"",
"sentence": "See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Shepherd)', United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir.1978) (\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.”); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1950) (\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent.”); see also Rice I, 757 P.2d at 910 (although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\")."
} | 7,645,412 | b |
. Our experience is consistent with that of the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "757 P.2d 910, 910",
"parenthetical": "although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\"",
"sentence": "See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Shepherd)', United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir.1978) (\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.”); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1950) (\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent.”); see also Rice I, 757 P.2d at 910 (although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "182 F.2d 225, 227",
"parenthetical": "\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury's verdict is substantially nonexistent.\"",
"sentence": "See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Shepherd)', United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir.1978) (\"Experience teaches, however, that, the likelihood of ... a change of mind [during polling] is remote.”); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1950) (\"The right of a defendant to poll the jury is of course recognized and long established, but from a practical standpoint, experience of the years has shown that its benefit to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent.”); see also Rice I, 757 P.2d at 910 (although there was a possibility Rice's presence would have caused a juror to change his vote, it wasn't \"reasonably probable\")."
} | 7,645,412 | b |
The prior art need not present the invention in a positive light, so long as all claims are explicitly or inherently contained in the publication. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "713 F.2d 760, 772",
"parenthetical": "\"The law of anticipation does not require that the reference 'teach' what the subject patent teaches.\"",
"sentence": "See Celeritas, 150 F.3d at 1361 (“A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it .... the question of whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.”); see also Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed.Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, SRI Intern, v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“The law of anticipation does not require that the reference ‘teach’ what the subject patent teaches.”); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 334, 345-46 (E.D.Pa.1998); see generally Lance L. Barry, Teaching A Way Is Not Teaching Away, 79 J. Pat. & Trade. Off. Soc’y 867, 869 (1997) (a reference teaches away when “it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 F.3d 1361, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it .... the question of whether a reference 'teaches away' from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See Celeritas, 150 F.3d at 1361 (“A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it .... the question of whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.”); see also Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed.Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, SRI Intern, v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“The law of anticipation does not require that the reference ‘teach’ what the subject patent teaches.”); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 334, 345-46 (E.D.Pa.1998); see generally Lance L. Barry, Teaching A Way Is Not Teaching Away, 79 J. Pat. & Trade. Off. Soc’y 867, 869 (1997) (a reference teaches away when “it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant.”)."
} | 11,470,603 | b |
The prior art need not present the invention in a positive light, so long as all claims are explicitly or inherently contained in the publication. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 F.3d 1361, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it .... the question of whether a reference 'teaches away' from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See Celeritas, 150 F.3d at 1361 (“A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it .... the question of whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.”); see also Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed.Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, SRI Intern, v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“The law of anticipation does not require that the reference ‘teach’ what the subject patent teaches.”); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 334, 345-46 (E.D.Pa.1998); see generally Lance L. Barry, Teaching A Way Is Not Teaching Away, 79 J. Pat. & Trade. Off. Soc’y 867, 869 (1997) (a reference teaches away when “it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The law of anticipation does not require that the reference 'teach' what the subject patent teaches.\"",
"sentence": "See Celeritas, 150 F.3d at 1361 (“A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it .... the question of whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.”); see also Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed.Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, SRI Intern, v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“The law of anticipation does not require that the reference ‘teach’ what the subject patent teaches.”); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 334, 345-46 (E.D.Pa.1998); see generally Lance L. Barry, Teaching A Way Is Not Teaching Away, 79 J. Pat. & Trade. Off. Soc’y 867, 869 (1997) (a reference teaches away when “it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant.”)."
} | 11,470,603 | a |
A judge's state of mind cannot be explored by a litigant, as can a prospective juror's attitudes at voir dire. Therefore, in applying the former standard of "affirmative showing of prejudice," this court has required an actual statement by the challenged judge demonstrating bias. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "411 N.W.2d 882, 890-91",
"parenthetical": "judge's statement that his general impression 12 years before trial was that prosecutors thought defendant was guilty does not establish bias where judge could no longer remember facts of case",
"sentence": "See Yeager, 399 N.W.2d at 652 (litigant failed to show prejudice by not demonstrating challenged judge made a derogatory remark); cf. Nachtsheim v. Wartnick, 411 N.W.2d 882, 890-91 (Minn.App.1987) (judge’s statement that his general impression 12 years before trial was that prosecutors thought defendant was guilty does not establish bias where judge could no longer remember facts of case), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1987)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "399 N.W.2d 652, 652",
"parenthetical": "litigant failed to show prejudice by not demonstrating challenged judge made a derogatory remark",
"sentence": "See Yeager, 399 N.W.2d at 652 (litigant failed to show prejudice by not demonstrating challenged judge made a derogatory remark); cf. Nachtsheim v. Wartnick, 411 N.W.2d 882, 890-91 (Minn.App.1987) (judge’s statement that his general impression 12 years before trial was that prosecutors thought defendant was guilty does not establish bias where judge could no longer remember facts of case), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1987)."
} | 10,614,907 | b |
Reading the record as whole, we hold that substantial evidence amply supports the IJ's adverse credibility finding, and we affirm the denial of relief on that basis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "344 F.3d 272, 276",
"parenthetical": "affirming the denial of asylum and withholding of removal where petitioner had failed to overcome an adverse credibility finding",
"sentence": "See Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam) (affirming the denial of asylum and withholding of removal where petitioner had failed to overcome an adverse credibility finding); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that an adverse credibility finding dooms an asylum claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 169, 185",
"parenthetical": "noting that an adverse credibility finding dooms an asylum claim",
"sentence": "See Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam) (affirming the denial of asylum and withholding of removal where petitioner had failed to overcome an adverse credibility finding); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that an adverse credibility finding dooms an asylum claim)."
} | 1,178,964 | a |
. Although the parties' briefing focuses on the contours of deliberate indifference, the court notes that an actionable Eighth Amendment violation also involves an objective inquiry, namely the seriousness of the inmate's medical need. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "298 F.3d 904, 904",
"parenthetical": "discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim",
"sentence": "McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) (\"A determination of 'deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997); see also Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60",
"parenthetical": "\"A determination of 'deliberate indifference' involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need.\"",
"sentence": "McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) (\"A determination of 'deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997); see also Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim)."
} | 1,259,265 | b |
. Although the parties' briefing focuses on the contours of deliberate indifference, the court notes that an actionable Eighth Amendment violation also involves an objective inquiry, namely the seriousness of the inmate's medical need. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 F.3d 1133, 1136",
"parenthetical": "\"A determination of 'deliberate indifference' involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need.\"",
"sentence": "McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) (\"A determination of 'deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997); see also Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "298 F.3d 904, 904",
"parenthetical": "discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim",
"sentence": "McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) (\"A determination of 'deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997); see also Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim)."
} | 1,259,265 | a |
.Other courts have held that a state conviction that has been vacated because of the constitutional invalidity of a plea should not be counted for purposes of the Guidelines. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129",
"parenthetical": "vacating denial of SS 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged\" and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir.2004) (vacating denial of § 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged” and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points); LaValle, 175 F.3d at 1108 (holding that court should have granted § 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea); United States v. Lopez, No. Crim. 03-302, 2004 WL 2414843, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct 18, 2004) (finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 813, 813-14",
"parenthetical": "affirming allowance of SS 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence",
"sentence": "See also Walker, 198 F.3d at 813-14 (affirming allowance of § 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence); Candelaria, 247 F.Supp.2d at 134 (granting § 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG § 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated)."
} | 9,027,806 | a |
.Other courts have held that a state conviction that has been vacated because of the constitutional invalidity of a plea should not be counted for purposes of the Guidelines. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129",
"parenthetical": "vacating denial of SS 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged\" and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir.2004) (vacating denial of § 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged” and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points); LaValle, 175 F.3d at 1108 (holding that court should have granted § 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea); United States v. Lopez, No. Crim. 03-302, 2004 WL 2414843, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct 18, 2004) (finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.Supp.2d 134, 134",
"parenthetical": "granting SS 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG SS 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated",
"sentence": "See also Walker, 198 F.3d at 813-14 (affirming allowance of § 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence); Candelaria, 247 F.Supp.2d at 134 (granting § 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG § 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated)."
} | 9,027,806 | a |
.Other courts have held that a state conviction that has been vacated because of the constitutional invalidity of a plea should not be counted for purposes of the Guidelines. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 1108, 1108",
"parenthetical": "holding that court should have granted SS 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir.2004) (vacating denial of § 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged” and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points); LaValle, 175 F.3d at 1108 (holding that court should have granted § 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea); United States v. Lopez, No. Crim. 03-302, 2004 WL 2414843, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct 18, 2004) (finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 813, 813-14",
"parenthetical": "affirming allowance of SS 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence",
"sentence": "See also Walker, 198 F.3d at 813-14 (affirming allowance of § 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence); Candelaria, 247 F.Supp.2d at 134 (granting § 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG § 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated)."
} | 9,027,806 | a |
.Other courts have held that a state conviction that has been vacated because of the constitutional invalidity of a plea should not be counted for purposes of the Guidelines. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 1108, 1108",
"parenthetical": "holding that court should have granted SS 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir.2004) (vacating denial of § 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged” and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points); LaValle, 175 F.3d at 1108 (holding that court should have granted § 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea); United States v. Lopez, No. Crim. 03-302, 2004 WL 2414843, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct 18, 2004) (finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.Supp.2d 134, 134",
"parenthetical": "granting SS 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG SS 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated",
"sentence": "See also Walker, 198 F.3d at 813-14 (affirming allowance of § 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence); Candelaria, 247 F.Supp.2d at 134 (granting § 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG § 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated)."
} | 9,027,806 | a |
.Other courts have held that a state conviction that has been vacated because of the constitutional invalidity of a plea should not be counted for purposes of the Guidelines. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 2414843, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir.2004) (vacating denial of § 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged” and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points); LaValle, 175 F.3d at 1108 (holding that court should have granted § 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea); United States v. Lopez, No. Crim. 03-302, 2004 WL 2414843, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct 18, 2004) (finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 813, 813-14",
"parenthetical": "affirming allowance of SS 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence",
"sentence": "See also Walker, 198 F.3d at 813-14 (affirming allowance of § 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence); Candelaria, 247 F.Supp.2d at 134 (granting § 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG § 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated)."
} | 9,027,806 | a |
.Other courts have held that a state conviction that has been vacated because of the constitutional invalidity of a plea should not be counted for purposes of the Guidelines. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 2414843, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 96 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir.2004) (vacating denial of § 2255 petition and remanding for resentenc-ing where state conviction that was set aside after federal sentencing based upon constitutional invalidity of guilty plea was \"expunged” and should not have been included in calculating criminal history points); LaValle, 175 F.3d at 1108 (holding that court should have granted § 2255 petition where state conviction used to enhance federal sentence was vacated based on invalidity of plea); United States v. Lopez, No. Crim. 03-302, 2004 WL 2414843, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct 18, 2004) (finding it impermissible to count state conviction for federal sentencing purposes where guilty plea was withdrawn based on invalidity of plea, finding of guilt was withdrawn, and charge was dismissed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.Supp.2d 134, 134",
"parenthetical": "granting SS 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG SS 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated",
"sentence": "See also Walker, 198 F.3d at 813-14 (affirming allowance of § 2255 motion after defendant successfully attacked prior state conviction used to enhance federal sentence); Candelaria, 247 F.Supp.2d at 134 (granting § 2255 motion after state conviction, which served as a predicate offense for USSG § 4B1.1 purposes, had been vacated)."
} | 9,027,806 | a |
Moreover, the view of this court has long been that Zinermon is best viewed as a case where the state statutory scheme conferred so much discretion on state officials so as to authorize the state officials' actions in deprivation of procedural rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 F.3d 15, 19",
"parenthetical": "in Zinermon \"the procedure was itself authorized by state law\"",
"sentence": "See Herwins v. City of Revere, 163 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1998) (in Zinermon “the procedure was itself authorized by state law”); see also Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 194 n. 4 (1st Cir.2003) (same); O’Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir.2000) (“In Herwins, we viewed Zinermon as a case in which state law did authorize the procedure followed (albeit unconstitutionally), so that the act of the officials could not be described as ‘random and unauthorized’ .... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "210 F.3d 41, 50",
"parenthetical": "\"In Herwins, we viewed Zinermon as a case in which state law did authorize the procedure followed (albeit unconstitutionally",
"sentence": "See Herwins v. City of Revere, 163 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1998) (in Zinermon “the procedure was itself authorized by state law”); see also Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 194 n. 4 (1st Cir.2003) (same); O’Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir.2000) (“In Herwins, we viewed Zinermon as a case in which state law did authorize the procedure followed (albeit unconstitutionally), so that the act of the officials could not be described as ‘random and unauthorized’ .... ”)."
} | 5,865,240 | a |
The statute itself is silent on the type of proof required. It certainly does not require either a "spoken understanding" or any other direct evidence of a violation. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, it has long been established that circumstantial evidence is competent to establish the elements of a crime, including intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Moorman v. State, 157 Fla. 267, 25 So.2d 563, 564 (1946) (“It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.”); see also State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66, 71 (Fla.1983) (“The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.”), cited in Gerren, 604 So.2d at 520. Moreover, Florida courts have regularly reviewed bribery and unlawful compensation cases for the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support the charges, without requiring direct evidence."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "436 So.2d 66, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Moorman v. State, 157 Fla. 267, 25 So.2d 563, 564 (1946) (“It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.”); see also State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66, 71 (Fla.1983) (“The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.”), cited in Gerren, 604 So.2d at 520. Moreover, Florida courts have regularly reviewed bribery and unlawful compensation cases for the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support the charges, without requiring direct evidence."
} | 9,203,057 | a |
The statute itself is silent on the type of proof required. It certainly does not require either a "spoken understanding" or any other direct evidence of a violation. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, it has long been established that circumstantial evidence is competent to establish the elements of a crime, including intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 So.2d 563, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Moorman v. State, 157 Fla. 267, 25 So.2d 563, 564 (1946) (“It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.”); see also State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66, 71 (Fla.1983) (“The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.”), cited in Gerren, 604 So.2d at 520. Moreover, Florida courts have regularly reviewed bribery and unlawful compensation cases for the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support the charges, without requiring direct evidence."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "436 So.2d 66, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Moorman v. State, 157 Fla. 267, 25 So.2d 563, 564 (1946) (“It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.”); see also State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66, 71 (Fla.1983) (“The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.”), cited in Gerren, 604 So.2d at 520. Moreover, Florida courts have regularly reviewed bribery and unlawful compensation cases for the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support the charges, without requiring direct evidence."
} | 9,203,057 | a |
In determining whether a private citizen acted as a government agent, we consider "(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the private actor's purpose was to assist law enforcement efforts rather than to further his own ends." As part of our inquiry, we also consider whether the government "openly encouraged or cooperated in the search." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "765 F.2d 1088, 1090",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of a motion to suppress in part because nothing evidenced that the government openly encouraged or cooperated in the private citizen's search",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of a motion to suppress in part because nothing evidenced that the government openly encouraged or cooperated in the private citizen’s search); see also United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that the “knowledge and acquiescence” criteria “encompass the requirement that the government agent must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1240, 1243",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"knowledge and acquiescence\" criteria \"encompass the requirement that the government agent must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of a motion to suppress in part because nothing evidenced that the government openly encouraged or cooperated in the private citizen’s search); see also United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that the “knowledge and acquiescence” criteria “encompass the requirement that the government agent must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action.”)."
} | 4,351,082 | a |
Caprio, however, must demonstrate that his lack of awareness as to defendant's actual motivation was reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 924, 931",
"parenthetical": "noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when \"facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff'",
"sentence": "See McCants v. Glickman, 180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a “reasonable suspicion” of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975) (noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when “facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff’); cf. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-907 (5th Cir.1992) (denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of “diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40",
"parenthetical": "rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a \"reasonable suspicion\" of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him",
"sentence": "See McCants v. Glickman, 180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a “reasonable suspicion” of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975) (noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when “facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff’); cf. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-907 (5th Cir.1992) (denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of “diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event”)."
} | 4,130,542 | b |
Caprio, however, must demonstrate that his lack of awareness as to defendant's actual motivation was reasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40",
"parenthetical": "rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a \"reasonable suspicion\" of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him",
"sentence": "See McCants v. Glickman, 180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a “reasonable suspicion” of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975) (noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when “facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff’); cf. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-907 (5th Cir.1992) (denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of “diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 904, 906-907",
"parenthetical": "denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of \"diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event\"",
"sentence": "See McCants v. Glickman, 180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a “reasonable suspicion” of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975) (noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when “facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff’); cf. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-907 (5th Cir.1992) (denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of “diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event”)."
} | 4,130,542 | a |
Caprio, however, must demonstrate that his lack of awareness as to defendant's actual motivation was reasonable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 904, 906-907",
"parenthetical": "denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of \"diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event\"",
"sentence": "See McCants v. Glickman, 180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a “reasonable suspicion” of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975) (noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when “facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff’); cf. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-907 (5th Cir.1992) (denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of “diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 924, 931",
"parenthetical": "noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when \"facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff'",
"sentence": "See McCants v. Glickman, 180 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001) (rejecting extension of 45-day deadline where plaintiff had a “reasonable suspicion” of discriminatory motive based on facts known to him); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir.1975) (noting that 90-day requirement to file EEOC charge begins to run when “facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff’); cf. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-907 (5th Cir.1992) (denying equitable tolling of the limitations period because a complainant has a duty of “diligent inquiry ... to proceed with a reasonable investigation in response to an adverse event”)."
} | 4,130,542 | b |
The record before us fails to demonstrate that Fuzer suffered an actual and substantial prejudice because we are aware of no case law, nor has any been provided to us, even suggesting that a felon has a right to serve his federal and state sentences concurrently. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 1408, 1415-16",
"parenthetical": "\"Koller has no right to serve his sentences on these two different convictions, one state and one federal, concurrently, and thus, he suffered no prejudice\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (7th Cir.1992) (“Koller has no right to serve his sentences on these two different convictions, one state and one federal, concurrently, and thus, he suffered no prejudice”); see also Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1354 (noting that defendant offered “no more than bare allegations that the delay deprived him of concurrent sentencing’’); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.1990) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he would have received concurrent federal and state sentences had he been tried sooner as “entirely speculative”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "962 F.2d 1354, 1354",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant offered \"no more than bare allegations that the delay deprived him of concurrent sentencing''",
"sentence": "United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (7th Cir.1992) (“Koller has no right to serve his sentences on these two different convictions, one state and one federal, concurrently, and thus, he suffered no prejudice”); see also Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1354 (noting that defendant offered “no more than bare allegations that the delay deprived him of concurrent sentencing’’); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.1990) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he would have received concurrent federal and state sentences had he been tried sooner as “entirely speculative”)."
} | 10,508,194 | a |
The record before us fails to demonstrate that Fuzer suffered an actual and substantial prejudice because we are aware of no case law, nor has any been provided to us, even suggesting that a felon has a right to serve his federal and state sentences concurrently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "894 F.2d 1043, 1051",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that he would have received concurrent federal and state sentences had he been tried sooner as \"entirely speculative\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (7th Cir.1992) (“Koller has no right to serve his sentences on these two different convictions, one state and one federal, concurrently, and thus, he suffered no prejudice”); see also Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1354 (noting that defendant offered “no more than bare allegations that the delay deprived him of concurrent sentencing’’); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.1990) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he would have received concurrent federal and state sentences had he been tried sooner as “entirely speculative”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 1408, 1415-16",
"parenthetical": "\"Koller has no right to serve his sentences on these two different convictions, one state and one federal, concurrently, and thus, he suffered no prejudice\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (7th Cir.1992) (“Koller has no right to serve his sentences on these two different convictions, one state and one federal, concurrently, and thus, he suffered no prejudice”); see also Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1354 (noting that defendant offered “no more than bare allegations that the delay deprived him of concurrent sentencing’’); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.1990) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he would have received concurrent federal and state sentences had he been tried sooner as “entirely speculative”)."
} | 10,508,194 | b |
We have interpreted this scheme, in a variety of circumstances, as vesting sole authority to make post-dispositional decisions in the director of the agency responsible for supervision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "879 A.2d 1, 11",
"parenthetical": "in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that \"[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment -- and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order -- is a veto power over [the agency]'s decision to release the delinquent juvenile\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "411 A.2d 345, 347",
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.\" \"As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 7,313,028 | a |
We have interpreted this scheme, in a variety of circumstances, as vesting sole authority to make post-dispositional decisions in the director of the agency responsible for supervision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "851 A.2d 503, 512",
"parenthetical": "in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director \"is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "411 A.2d 345, 347",
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.\" \"As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 7,313,028 | a |
We have interpreted this scheme, in a variety of circumstances, as vesting sole authority to make post-dispositional decisions in the director of the agency responsible for supervision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "411 A.2d 345, 347",
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.\" \"As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 A.2d 905, 912",
"parenthetical": "in case of delinquent child committed to agency's custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 7,313,028 | b |
Moreover, of the gang evidence adduced at trial, Detective Caffey's testimony was particularly probative of the conspiracy charge, because it served to clarify certain ambiguities and fill in the gaps left by the other gang evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "661 F.3d 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "gang evidence became relevant upon admission of recordings of defendant discussing such gang and likening himself to its leader",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir.2006) (evidence of defendant’s gang membership was probative, because it helped explain his connection to other individuals and circumstances in which they committed charged offense); Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1284 (evidence of defendant’s membership in gang that used color red as symbol and wrapped weapons in red bandanas was “especially probative” in light of evidence that defendant’s weapon was found wrapped in red bandana); see also Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1126 (gang evidence became relevant upon admission of recordings of defendant discussing such gang and likening himself to its leader)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 F.3d 1249, 1253-54",
"parenthetical": "evidence of defendant's gang membership was probative, because it helped explain his connection to other individuals and circumstances in which they committed charged offense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir.2006) (evidence of defendant’s gang membership was probative, because it helped explain his connection to other individuals and circumstances in which they committed charged offense); Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1284 (evidence of defendant’s membership in gang that used color red as symbol and wrapped weapons in red bandanas was “especially probative” in light of evidence that defendant’s weapon was found wrapped in red bandana); see also Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1126 (gang evidence became relevant upon admission of recordings of defendant discussing such gang and likening himself to its leader)."
} | 4,194,922 | b |
Moreover, of the gang evidence adduced at trial, Detective Caffey's testimony was particularly probative of the conspiracy charge, because it served to clarify certain ambiguities and fill in the gaps left by the other gang evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 F.3d 1284, 1284",
"parenthetical": "evidence of defendant's membership in gang that used color red as symbol and wrapped weapons in red bandanas was \"especially probative\" in light of evidence that defendant's weapon was found wrapped in red bandana",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir.2006) (evidence of defendant’s gang membership was probative, because it helped explain his connection to other individuals and circumstances in which they committed charged offense); Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1284 (evidence of defendant’s membership in gang that used color red as symbol and wrapped weapons in red bandanas was “especially probative” in light of evidence that defendant’s weapon was found wrapped in red bandana); see also Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1126 (gang evidence became relevant upon admission of recordings of defendant discussing such gang and likening himself to its leader)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "661 F.3d 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "gang evidence became relevant upon admission of recordings of defendant discussing such gang and likening himself to its leader",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir.2006) (evidence of defendant’s gang membership was probative, because it helped explain his connection to other individuals and circumstances in which they committed charged offense); Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1284 (evidence of defendant’s membership in gang that used color red as symbol and wrapped weapons in red bandanas was “especially probative” in light of evidence that defendant’s weapon was found wrapped in red bandana); see also Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1126 (gang evidence became relevant upon admission of recordings of defendant discussing such gang and likening himself to its leader)."
} | 4,194,922 | a |
Even if, contrary to the fact, the defendant was prejudiced by the government's change in theory, such prejudice could have been obviated by the defense utilizing the opportunity to recall witnesses and to have the matter adjourned, if necessary, for that purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "92 F.3d 1271, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"The rule is clear that a defendant's failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 337, 337",
"parenthetical": "\"Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.\"",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice)."
} | 3,667,818 | b |
Even if, contrary to the fact, the defendant was prejudiced by the government's change in theory, such prejudice could have been obviated by the defense utilizing the opportunity to recall witnesses and to have the matter adjourned, if necessary, for that purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "844 F.2d 1397, 1403",
"parenthetical": "finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant \"had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure\"",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 337, 337",
"parenthetical": "\"Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.\"",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice)."
} | 3,667,818 | b |
Even if, contrary to the fact, the defendant was prejudiced by the government's change in theory, such prejudice could have been obviated by the defense utilizing the opportunity to recall witnesses and to have the matter adjourned, if necessary, for that purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "729 F.2d 195, 199",
"parenthetical": "reversal not warranted notwithstanding government's failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 337, 337",
"parenthetical": "\"Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.\"",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice)."
} | 3,667,818 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment bars "any State [from] depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. In this conception, due process encompasses certain "fundamental" rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 720, 720",
"parenthetical": "speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 U.S. 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.\"",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | 4,236,847 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment bars "any State [from] depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. In this conception, due process encompasses certain "fundamental" rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 U.S. 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.\"",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | 4,236,847 | a |
The Fourteenth Amendment bars "any State [from] depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. In this conception, due process encompasses certain "fundamental" rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.\"",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 720, 720",
"parenthetical": "speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | 4,236,847 | a |
The Fourteenth Amendment bars "any State [from] depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. In this conception, due process encompasses certain "fundamental" rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.\"",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process",
"sentence": "See Twining, 211 U.S. at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (“[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (speaking of enumerated rights together with implied fundamental rights in the context of substantive due process)."
} | 4,236,847 | a |
Riggins filed a petition for habeas corpus in June 1998, claiming that the state courts' rejections of his ineffectiveness claim were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'^ Although Riggins argues his testimony was credible (and that there was no evidence presented during the state court evidentiary hearing contradicting his testimony), the state trial court was certainly entitled to disbelieve Riggins' self-serving testimony, as both the Supreme Court of Arkansas and the district court noted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 724, 726",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "8 F.3d 1132, 1139",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | 11,145,412 | a |
Riggins filed a petition for habeas corpus in June 1998, claiming that the state courts' rejections of his ineffectiveness claim were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'^ Although Riggins argues his testimony was credible (and that there was no evidence presented during the state court evidentiary hearing contradicting his testimony), the state trial court was certainly entitled to disbelieve Riggins' self-serving testimony, as both the Supreme Court of Arkansas and the district court noted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 724, 726",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | 11,145,412 | a |
Riggins filed a petition for habeas corpus in June 1998, claiming that the state courts' rejections of his ineffectiveness claim were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'^ Although Riggins argues his testimony was credible (and that there was no evidence presented during the state court evidentiary hearing contradicting his testimony), the state trial court was certainly entitled to disbelieve Riggins' self-serving testimony, as both the Supreme Court of Arkansas and the district court noted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 724, 726",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | 11,145,412 | a |
Riggins filed a petition for habeas corpus in June 1998, claiming that the state courts' rejections of his ineffectiveness claim were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'^ Although Riggins argues his testimony was credible (and that there was no evidence presented during the state court evidentiary hearing contradicting his testimony), the state trial court was certainly entitled to disbelieve Riggins' self-serving testimony, as both the Supreme Court of Arkansas and the district court noted. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 724, 726",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.2000) (“[T]he trier of fact is entitled to make the ultimate decision of whether testimony is to be believed.”); cf. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that self-serving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994)."
} | 11,145,412 | b |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "finding prohibition on \"any pornography\" inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite finding the term \"pornography\" susceptible to various meanings, the' court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant's probation # violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | b |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 263-65",
"parenthetical": "finding a condition prohibiting \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,\" as providing inadequate notice to defendant",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite finding the term \"pornography\" susceptible to various meanings, the' court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant's probation # violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | b |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "finding prohibition on \"any pornography\" inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | a |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 263-65",
"parenthetical": "finding a condition prohibiting \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,\" as providing inadequate notice to defendant",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | b |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "325 F.3d 384, 385",
"parenthetical": "finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of \"any 'matter' that is pornographic\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "finding prohibition on \"any pornography\" inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | a |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "325 F.3d 384, 385",
"parenthetical": "finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of \"any 'matter' that is pornographic\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 263-65",
"parenthetical": "finding a condition prohibiting \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,\" as providing inadequate notice to defendant",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | a |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "finding prohibition on \"any pornography\" inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "335 F.3d 692, 695",
"parenthetical": "not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | b |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 263-65",
"parenthetical": "finding a condition prohibiting \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,\" as providing inadequate notice to defendant",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "335 F.3d 692, 695",
"parenthetical": "not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | b |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.3d 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "finding the prohibition of \"any sexually arousing materials\" to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "finding prohibition on \"any pornography\" inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | a |
We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.3d 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "finding the prohibition of \"any sexually arousing materials\" to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 263-65",
"parenthetical": "finding a condition prohibiting \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,\" as providing inadequate notice to defendant",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant)."
} | 8,347,988 | a |
Therefore, as Defendant's subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 F.R.D. 255, 255-56",
"parenthetical": "finding subpoenas to be overbroad because \"compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case\"",
"sentence": "See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “the complete employment file of Plaintiff including employment application, payroll records, medical records, evaluations, correspondence and all other records omitting nothing ” were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone) (emphasis in original); Barrington, 2007 WL 4370647, at *4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “any and all documents, files and records, reflecting or relating to the employment” of each plaintiff were “overly broad on their face”); see also Lewin v. Nackard Bottling Co., No. CV 10-8041-PCT-FJM, 2010 WL 4607402, at *1 (D.Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010) (holding subpoena of entire personnel file from former employers was overbroad); EEOC v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07-1825-IEG(LSP), 2008 WL 4937000, at *1-2 (S.D.Cal."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 4607402, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding subpoena of entire personnel file from former employers was overbroad",
"sentence": "See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “the complete employment file of Plaintiff including employment application, payroll records, medical records, evaluations, correspondence and all other records omitting nothing ” were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone) (emphasis in original); Barrington, 2007 WL 4370647, at *4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “any and all documents, files and records, reflecting or relating to the employment” of each plaintiff were “overly broad on their face”); see also Lewin v. Nackard Bottling Co., No. CV 10-8041-PCT-FJM, 2010 WL 4607402, at *1 (D.Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010) (holding subpoena of entire personnel file from former employers was overbroad); EEOC v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07-1825-IEG(LSP), 2008 WL 4937000, at *1-2 (S.D.Cal."
} | 4,255,582 | a |
Therefore, as Defendant's subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 4607402, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding subpoena of entire personnel file from former employers was overbroad",
"sentence": "See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “the complete employment file of Plaintiff including employment application, payroll records, medical records, evaluations, correspondence and all other records omitting nothing ” were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone) (emphasis in original); Barrington, 2007 WL 4370647, at *4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “any and all documents, files and records, reflecting or relating to the employment” of each plaintiff were “overly broad on their face”); see also Lewin v. Nackard Bottling Co., No. CV 10-8041-PCT-FJM, 2010 WL 4607402, at *1 (D.Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010) (holding subpoena of entire personnel file from former employers was overbroad); EEOC v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07-1825-IEG(LSP), 2008 WL 4937000, at *1-2 (S.D.Cal."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 4370647, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that subpoenas seeking \"any and all documents, files and records, reflecting or relating to the employment\" of each plaintiff were \"overly broad on their face\"",
"sentence": "See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “the complete employment file of Plaintiff including employment application, payroll records, medical records, evaluations, correspondence and all other records omitting nothing ” were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone) (emphasis in original); Barrington, 2007 WL 4370647, at *4 (holding that subpoenas seeking “any and all documents, files and records, reflecting or relating to the employment” of each plaintiff were “overly broad on their face”); see also Lewin v. Nackard Bottling Co., No. CV 10-8041-PCT-FJM, 2010 WL 4607402, at *1 (D.Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010) (holding subpoena of entire personnel file from former employers was overbroad); EEOC v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07-1825-IEG(LSP), 2008 WL 4937000, at *1-2 (S.D.Cal."
} | 4,255,582 | b |
To the extent that Ramirez alleged Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, dismissal was proper because Ramirez failed to allege facts sufficient to show an intent to punish or that the policies were unrelated to a legitimate governmental purpose. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538",
"parenthetical": "setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee's substantive due process claim",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (en bahc) (a pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment claim is “properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a pretrial detainee's Eighth Amendment claim is \"properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (en bahc) (a pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment claim is “properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment”)."
} | 4,343,547 | a |
To the extent that Ramirez alleged Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, dismissal was proper because Ramirez failed to allege facts sufficient to show an intent to punish or that the policies were unrelated to a legitimate governmental purpose. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a pretrial detainee's Eighth Amendment claim is \"properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (en bahc) (a pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment claim is “properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee's substantive due process claim",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (en bahc) (a pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment claim is “properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment”)."
} | 4,343,547 | b |
To the extent that Ramirez alleged Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, dismissal was proper because Ramirez failed to allege facts sufficient to show an intent to punish or that the policies were unrelated to a legitimate governmental purpose. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee's substantive due process claim",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (en bahc) (a pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment claim is “properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a pretrial detainee's Eighth Amendment claim is \"properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (setting forth criteria for evaluating a pretrial detainee’s substantive due process claim); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (en bahc) (a pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment claim is “properly recharacterized ... as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment”)."
} | 4,343,547 | a |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.