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It is, as indicated, certainly arguable that these varying ascriptions of the language used and meaning intended by the defendants are insufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find, as Stone had the burden to prove, that defendants misrepresented to him their power to expel him summarily. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078",
"parenthetical": "\"Neither plaintiff's rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 252, 252",
"parenthetical": "\"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | 10,525,741 | b |
It is, as indicated, certainly arguable that these varying ascriptions of the language used and meaning intended by the defendants are insufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find, as Stone had the burden to prove, that defendants misrepresented to him their power to expel him summarily. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 252, 252",
"parenthetical": "\"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Neither plaintiff's rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | 10,525,741 | a |
It is, as indicated, certainly arguable that these varying ascriptions of the language used and meaning intended by the defendants are insufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find, as Stone had the burden to prove, that defendants misrepresented to him their power to expel him summarily. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 2512, 2512",
"parenthetical": "\"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078",
"parenthetical": "\"Neither plaintiff's rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | 10,525,741 | a |
It is, as indicated, certainly arguable that these varying ascriptions of the language used and meaning intended by the defendants are insufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find, as Stone had the burden to prove, that defendants misrepresented to him their power to expel him summarily. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Neither plaintiff's rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 2512, 2512",
"parenthetical": "\"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976)."
} | 10,525,741 | b |
This circuit has consistently held that in order for SS 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a dangerous weapon was present when the crimes ioere committed, and that it was not clearly improbable that the weapon had some nexus with the criminal activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 F.3d 673, 674",
"parenthetical": "holding enhancement not appropriate because firearms were seized from defendant's home thirty-seven days after last known drug sale occurred",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shields, 44 F.3d 673, 674 (8th Cir.1995) (holding enhancement not appropriate because firearms were seized from defendant’s home thirty-seven days after last known drug sale occurred)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 729, 731-33",
"parenthetical": "holding enhancement not appropriate because of two and one-half month lapse between the criminal activity and the discovery of the weapons, and no evidence that weapons were present when defendant committed charged offense",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Bost, 968 F.2d 729, 731-33 (8th Cir.1992) (holding enhancement not appropriate because of two and one-half month lapse between the criminal activity and the discovery of the weapons, and no evidence that weapons were present when defendant committed charged offense)."
} | 11,432,703 | a |
The resolution of Defendant Debtors' trademark infringement claim will require significant consideration of non-Title 11 federal law, satisfying SS 157(d). If left with the bankruptcy court, the complaint's trademark infringement claim will require that court to determine the validity and scope of alleged marks under the Lanham Act. (Doc. 13 at 4.) Resolution of this'claim will thus require significant consideration, interpretation, and application of the Lan-ham Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 B.R. 262, 268",
"parenthetical": "observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark's abandonment \"would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference\" under SS 157(d",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "676 F.3d 144, 152-53",
"parenthetical": "laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating \"at least nine factors\" relevant to one part of that test",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | 4,221,139 | a |
The resolution of Defendant Debtors' trademark infringement claim will require significant consideration of non-Title 11 federal law, satisfying SS 157(d). If left with the bankruptcy court, the complaint's trademark infringement claim will require that court to determine the validity and scope of alleged marks under the Lanham Act. (Doc. 13 at 4.) Resolution of this'claim will thus require significant consideration, interpretation, and application of the Lan-ham Act. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2002 WL 243779, at *3",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law\" and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 B.R. 262, 268",
"parenthetical": "observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark's abandonment \"would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference\" under SS 157(d",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | 4,221,139 | b |
The resolution of Defendant Debtors' trademark infringement claim will require significant consideration of non-Title 11 federal law, satisfying SS 157(d). If left with the bankruptcy court, the complaint's trademark infringement claim will require that court to determine the validity and scope of alleged marks under the Lanham Act. (Doc. 13 at 4.) Resolution of this'claim will thus require significant consideration, interpretation, and application of the Lan-ham Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "676 F.3d 144, 152-53",
"parenthetical": "laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating \"at least nine factors\" relevant to one part of that test",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 B.R. 728, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | 4,221,139 | b |
The resolution of Defendant Debtors' trademark infringement claim will require significant consideration of non-Title 11 federal law, satisfying SS 157(d). If left with the bankruptcy court, the complaint's trademark infringement claim will require that court to determine the validity and scope of alleged marks under the Lanham Act. (Doc. 13 at 4.) Resolution of this'claim will thus require significant consideration, interpretation, and application of the Lan-ham Act. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2002 WL 243779, at *3",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law\" and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 B.R. 728, 731",
"parenthetical": "holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | 4,221,139 | b |
The resolution of Defendant Debtors' trademark infringement claim will require significant consideration of non-Title 11 federal law, satisfying SS 157(d). If left with the bankruptcy court, the complaint's trademark infringement claim will require that court to determine the validity and scope of alleged marks under the Lanham Act. (Doc. 13 at 4.) Resolution of this'claim will thus require significant consideration, interpretation, and application of the Lan-ham Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "676 F.3d 144, 152-53",
"parenthetical": "laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating \"at least nine factors\" relevant to one part of that test",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2002 WL 243779, at *3",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law\" and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory",
"sentence": "See In re Petition of Wuthrich, 337 B.R. 262, 268 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2006) (observing, in dicta, that a Lanham Act claim and dispute over trademark’s abandonment “would likely be subject to mandatory withdraw of the reference” under § 157(d)); In re McCrory Corp., 160 B.R. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding that § 157(d) required withdrawing reference where bankruptcy court faced Lanham Act claim, partly involving the issue of “secondary meaning,” because “[interpreting Lanham Act provisions to a given set of facts is, generally, neither simple nor straightforward”); Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D.Kan.1986) (holding that trademark infringement claim based on unauthorized use of mark entailed material and substan tial consideration of non-Title 11 law); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating “at least nine factors” relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that “whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law” and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory)."
} | 4,221,139 | a |
Granting qualified immunity in such instances would thwart SS 1983's purpose of preventing the abuse of official authority. Indeed, one of the primary concerns of those common law courts that refused to recognize cooperation with law enforcement as a defense in false arrest actions was that private defendants should not be shielded from liability for their assistance in patent abuses of police authority. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "3 So. 441, 441",
"parenthetical": "'When [the officer's] general power is known, his call will justify the citizen in yielding obedience, unless [the private citizen] has notice of the want of authority in the particular case in which assistance is required.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "But see Watson, 3 So. at 441 (‘When [the officer’s] general power is known, his call will justify the citizen in yielding obedience, unless [the private citizen] has notice of the want of authority in the particular case in which assistance is required.” (emphasis added)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 139 cmt. d (1965) (stating that “the [private] actor is privileged to rely upon the officer’s request and assist him unless the facts are such that the actor knows or is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer’s suspicion is unreasonable”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1815 WL 992, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"Suppose the officer in this case had proceeded, without necessity or provocation, to beat and wound the plaintiff or his family, it is very clear that these two defendants would not be justified in aiding him in such wanton abuse.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Oystead v. Shed, 12 Mass.-, 1815 WL 992, at *5 (“Suppose the officer in this case had proceeded, without necessity or provocation, to beat and wound the plaintiff or his family, it is very clear that these two defendants would not be justified in aiding him in such wanton abuse.”)."
} | 11,181,124 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the decision to deviate from the general rule is a matter "left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases." Moreover, the Supreme Court has long recognized that we should not decide constitutional questions when their resolution is unnecessary to the outcome of the case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "271 F.3d 670, 687",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where possible, a court should rule on a narrow ground in order to avoid a constitutional question.\"",
"sentence": "See also Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 687 (2002) (noting that “where possible, a court should rule on a narrow ground in order to avoid a constitutional question.”)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 625, 633",
"parenthetical": "noting the \"custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case before us.\"",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (noting the “custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case before us.”)."
} | 9,365,056 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the decision to deviate from the general rule is a matter "left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases." Moreover, the Supreme Court has long recognized that we should not decide constitutional questions when their resolution is unnecessary to the outcome of the case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "271 F.3d 670, 687",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where possible, a court should rule on a narrow ground in order to avoid a constitutional question.\"",
"sentence": "See also Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 687 (2002) (noting that “where possible, a court should rule on a narrow ground in order to avoid a constitutional question.”)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the \"custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case before us.\"",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (noting the “custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case before us.”)."
} | 9,365,056 | b |
The Supreme Court has held that the decision to deviate from the general rule is a matter "left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases." Moreover, the Supreme Court has long recognized that we should not decide constitutional questions when their resolution is unnecessary to the outcome of the case. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the \"custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case before us.\"",
"sentence": "Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (noting the “custom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case before us.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "271 F.3d 670, 687",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where possible, a court should rule on a narrow ground in order to avoid a constitutional question.\"",
"sentence": "See also Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 687 (2002) (noting that “where possible, a court should rule on a narrow ground in order to avoid a constitutional question.”)"
} | 9,365,056 | a |
P 5 An easement is a right that one party has to use the land of another for a specific purpose. However, a party may not acquire a prescriptive easement over a public highway. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24",
"parenthetical": "we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 Ariz.App. 597, 600",
"parenthetical": "generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | 5,754,894 | b |
P 5 An easement is a right that one party has to use the land of another for a specific purpose. However, a party may not acquire a prescriptive easement over a public highway. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 P.3d 250, 250",
"parenthetical": "we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 Ariz.App. 597, 600",
"parenthetical": "generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | 5,754,894 | b |
P 5 An easement is a right that one party has to use the land of another for a specific purpose. However, a party may not acquire a prescriptive easement over a public highway. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24",
"parenthetical": "we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 P.2d 726, 729",
"parenthetical": "generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | 5,754,894 | b |
P 5 An easement is a right that one party has to use the land of another for a specific purpose. However, a party may not acquire a prescriptive easement over a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 P.2d 726, 729",
"parenthetical": "generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 P.3d 250, 250",
"parenthetical": "we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably",
"sentence": "See Cracchiolo v. State, 6 Ariz.App. 597, 600, 435 P.2d 726, 729 (1967) (generally no easement can be acquired over property owned by state, particularly if held for public use); Calhoun v. Moore, 69 Ariz. 402, 405, 214 P.2d 799, 801 (1950) (no adverse possession of state land); Edwards v. Sheets, 66 Ariz. 213, 217-18, 185 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (1947) (same); see also Spaulding, 218 Ariz. 196, ¶ 24, 181 P.3d at 250 (we apply principles relating to adverse possession and prescriptive easements interchangeably)."
} | 5,754,894 | a |
However, he never discussed the claims themselves. Given this cursory treatment, we cannot consider the claims as part of this appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "898 P.2d 929, 934",
"parenthetical": "issue on appeal from administrative agency waived or abandoned when inadequately briefed before superior court",
"sentence": "See Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n. 3 (Alaska 1991) (\"where an argument is given only cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be considered on appeal\"); see also Nenana City School District v. Coghill, 898 P.2d 929, 934 (Alaska 1995) (issue on appeal from administrative agency waived or abandoned when inadequately briefed before superior court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"where an argument is given only cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be considered on appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n. 3 (Alaska 1991) (\"where an argument is given only cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be considered on appeal\"); see also Nenana City School District v. Coghill, 898 P.2d 929, 934 (Alaska 1995) (issue on appeal from administrative agency waived or abandoned when inadequately briefed before superior court)."
} | 11,113,247 | b |
Moreover, as we have shown, Lopez ultimately was not prejudiced. Thus exercise of the court's supervisory powers to dismiss the indictment is not warranted, even if we could certify Lopez's request to file a successive habeas petition, and even assuming the district court could invoke such powers which are "not typically considered to be an independent basis for post-conviction review." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "580 F.2d 365, 367",
"parenthetical": "concluding district court did not err in denying motion to dismiss the indictment where defendant showed no prejudice",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1107, 1110 (9th Cir.2004) (“Because no government misconduct prejudiced [defendant], dismissal of the indictment is not warranted.”); see also United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir.1978) (concluding district court did not err in denying motion to dismiss the indictment where defendant showed no prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "372 F.3d 1097, 1107, 1110",
"parenthetical": "\"Because no government misconduct prejudiced [defendant], dismissal of the indictment is not warranted.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1107, 1110 (9th Cir.2004) (“Because no government misconduct prejudiced [defendant], dismissal of the indictment is not warranted.”); see also United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir.1978) (concluding district court did not err in denying motion to dismiss the indictment where defendant showed no prejudice)."
} | 4,066,236 | b |
. While not at issue in this case, mortgages frequently encumber mineral rights and the like. Under Connecticut law, such rights are clearly an integral part of the fee ownership of the land, until and unless they are severed from the surface estate. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "149 B.R. 441, 445",
"parenthetical": "a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of SS 1322(b",
"sentence": "See Miller v. State of Connecticut, 121 Conn. 43, 47, 183 A. 17 (1936) (the owner of land may convey the surface or soil in fee and reserve an estate in minerals or a right to mine them; may convey a fee estate in minerals only; or may grant or lease the right to'mine minerals while retaining the fee in minerals); City of New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 173, 58 A. 753 (1904) (the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor’s property once removed); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, 129 (1874) (\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....”); cf. Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank of Arkansas (In re Hernandez), 149 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1993) (a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of § 1322(b)(2))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 Conn. 168, 173",
"parenthetical": "the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor's property once removed",
"sentence": "See Miller v. State of Connecticut, 121 Conn. 43, 47, 183 A. 17 (1936) (the owner of land may convey the surface or soil in fee and reserve an estate in minerals or a right to mine them; may convey a fee estate in minerals only; or may grant or lease the right to'mine minerals while retaining the fee in minerals); City of New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 173, 58 A. 753 (1904) (the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor’s property once removed); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, 129 (1874) (\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....”); cf. Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank of Arkansas (In re Hernandez), 149 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1993) (a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of § 1322(b)(2))."
} | 6,528,499 | b |
. While not at issue in this case, mortgages frequently encumber mineral rights and the like. Under Connecticut law, such rights are clearly an integral part of the fee ownership of the land, until and unless they are severed from the surface estate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor's property once removed",
"sentence": "See Miller v. State of Connecticut, 121 Conn. 43, 47, 183 A. 17 (1936) (the owner of land may convey the surface or soil in fee and reserve an estate in minerals or a right to mine them; may convey a fee estate in minerals only; or may grant or lease the right to'mine minerals while retaining the fee in minerals); City of New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 173, 58 A. 753 (1904) (the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor’s property once removed); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, 129 (1874) (\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....”); cf. Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank of Arkansas (In re Hernandez), 149 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1993) (a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of § 1322(b)(2))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "149 B.R. 441, 445",
"parenthetical": "a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of SS 1322(b",
"sentence": "See Miller v. State of Connecticut, 121 Conn. 43, 47, 183 A. 17 (1936) (the owner of land may convey the surface or soil in fee and reserve an estate in minerals or a right to mine them; may convey a fee estate in minerals only; or may grant or lease the right to'mine minerals while retaining the fee in minerals); City of New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 173, 58 A. 753 (1904) (the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor’s property once removed); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, 129 (1874) (\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....”); cf. Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank of Arkansas (In re Hernandez), 149 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1993) (a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of § 1322(b)(2))."
} | 6,528,499 | a |
. While not at issue in this case, mortgages frequently encumber mineral rights and the like. Under Connecticut law, such rights are clearly an integral part of the fee ownership of the land, until and unless they are severed from the surface estate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "41 Conn. 112, 129",
"parenthetical": "\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. State of Connecticut, 121 Conn. 43, 47, 183 A. 17 (1936) (the owner of land may convey the surface or soil in fee and reserve an estate in minerals or a right to mine them; may convey a fee estate in minerals only; or may grant or lease the right to'mine minerals while retaining the fee in minerals); City of New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 173, 58 A. 753 (1904) (the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor’s property once removed); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, 129 (1874) (\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....”); cf. Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank of Arkansas (In re Hernandez), 149 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1993) (a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of § 1322(b)(2))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "149 B.R. 441, 445",
"parenthetical": "a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of SS 1322(b",
"sentence": "See Miller v. State of Connecticut, 121 Conn. 43, 47, 183 A. 17 (1936) (the owner of land may convey the surface or soil in fee and reserve an estate in minerals or a right to mine them; may convey a fee estate in minerals only; or may grant or lease the right to'mine minerals while retaining the fee in minerals); City of New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 173, 58 A. 753 (1904) (the owner of the fee may reserve mining rights from a conveyance of the fee, in which event the fee to minerals is conveyed, and the grantor retains only the privilege to enter on the land and remove minerals which become the grantor’s property once removed); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, 129 (1874) (\"Mineral and ore rights, when severed from the land and owned by tenants in common, are real estate....”); cf. Hernandez v. Union Nat'l Bank of Arkansas (In re Hernandez), 149 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1993) (a security interest in oil, gas and mineral rights did not remove the mortgage from the protection of § 1322(b)(2))."
} | 6,528,499 | a |
See generally Compl.; Pis.' Mot. Although the court may award damages based solely on an estimate, it cannot do so in this case because it lacks the necessary information to verify the plaintiffs' claim for unpaid contributions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "267 F.R.D. 430, 434",
"parenthetical": "approving the plaintiffs' calculation of damages as reasonable because the plaintiffs estimated the unpaid contributions due each month based on an average of the three previous months for which reports were submitted",
"sentence": "See Combs, 105 F.R.D. at 474 (stating that if monetary damages are based on an estimate, the court must conduct a factual evaluation before entering default judgment); cf. Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. LaSalle Glass & Mirror Co., 267 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D.D.C.2010) (approving the plaintiffs’ calculation of damages as reasonable because the plaintiffs estimated the unpaid contributions due each month based on an average of the three previous months for which reports were submitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 F.R.D. 474, 474",
"parenthetical": "stating that if monetary damages are based on an estimate, the court must conduct a factual evaluation before entering default judgment",
"sentence": "See Combs, 105 F.R.D. at 474 (stating that if monetary damages are based on an estimate, the court must conduct a factual evaluation before entering default judgment); cf. Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. LaSalle Glass & Mirror Co., 267 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D.D.C.2010) (approving the plaintiffs’ calculation of damages as reasonable because the plaintiffs estimated the unpaid contributions due each month based on an average of the three previous months for which reports were submitted)."
} | 4,082,384 | b |
Thus, the touchstone of the relation back doctrine is fairness; does the substituted or additional party have fair notice of the cause of action, within the prescribed statutory period, such that the party's rights will not be prejudiced? In construing this rule, as with all rules of procedure, we are governed by the "general philosophy of the pleading rules": the rules should be liberally construed to insure that no plaintiff is deprived of his day in court solely because of the intricacies and technical limitations of pleading. Rather, our policy remains that decisions should be rendered on the merits of the case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "346 U.S. 945, 946",
"parenthetical": "the \"principal function of procedural rules should be to serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 15-146; Merrill v. Faltin, 430 P.2d 913, 915 (Alaska 1967) (“the purpose of pleading under our civil rules [is] to facilitate a proper decision on the merits of the controversy”); see also Alaska R.Civ.P. 1 (“These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”); Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, comments of Justice Black, 346 U.S. 945, 946 (1954) (the “principal function of procedural rules should be to serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 P.2d 913, 915",
"parenthetical": "\"the purpose of pleading under our civil rules [is] to facilitate a proper decision on the merits of the controversy\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 15-146; Merrill v. Faltin, 430 P.2d 913, 915 (Alaska 1967) (“the purpose of pleading under our civil rules [is] to facilitate a proper decision on the merits of the controversy”); see also Alaska R.Civ.P. 1 (“These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”); Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, comments of Justice Black, 346 U.S. 945, 946 (1954) (the “principal function of procedural rules should be to serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts”)."
} | 10,380,023 | b |
Where, as here, the evidence points to no clear conclusion on appellant's alleged participation, we will not infer it. Rather, the case must be remanded to allow the trial judge to make appropriate findings that are susceptible to appellate review should the appellant again seek review in this court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "242 F.3d 410, 410",
"parenthetical": "remanding case for district court to determine applicability of sentencing enhancement because \"on the record before us we cannot conclude with confidence that it employed the correct legal standard in applying the ... enhancement\"",
"sentence": "See McCoy, 242 F.3d at 410 (remanding case for district court to determine applicability of sentencing enhancement because “on the record before us we cannot conclude with confidence that it employed the correct legal standard in applying the ... enhancement”); cf. United States v. Hutchinson, 268 F.3d 1117, 1118 (D.C.Cir.2001) (remanding case for further factfinding, because the trial judge had failed to make findings of fact essential to decide the issue on review)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 1117, 1118",
"parenthetical": "remanding case for further factfinding, because the trial judge had failed to make findings of fact essential to decide the issue on review",
"sentence": "See McCoy, 242 F.3d at 410 (remanding case for district court to determine applicability of sentencing enhancement because “on the record before us we cannot conclude with confidence that it employed the correct legal standard in applying the ... enhancement”); cf. United States v. Hutchinson, 268 F.3d 1117, 1118 (D.C.Cir.2001) (remanding case for further factfinding, because the trial judge had failed to make findings of fact essential to decide the issue on review)."
} | 4,011,937 | a |
In fact, we determine this claim to be nothing more than an attempt to re-litigate the issue of the existence of exculpatory evidence under the guise of a new claim. This issue is not available for re-litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "521 N.E.2d 947, 949",
"parenthetical": "both of which hold that petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is an attempt to circumvent post-conviction rules in order to present issues which have been waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ind.1989); Lane v. State, 521 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind.1988) (both of which hold that petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is an attempt to circumvent post-conviction rules in order to present issues which have been waived)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "668 N.E.2d 691, 699",
"parenthetical": "\"the principle of res judi-cata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute.\"",
"sentence": "See Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind.1997); Scott v. Scott, 668 N.E.2d 691, 699 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (“the principle of res judi-cata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute.\")."
} | 11,830,193 | b |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 412, 422",
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 1210, 1216",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act\" in a private cause of action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants."
} | 4,255,907 | b |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 1210, 1216",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act\" in a private cause of action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants."
} | 4,255,907 | b |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 1210, 1216",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act\" in a private cause of action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants."
} | 4,255,907 | b |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Congress' silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to \"a public official sued in her individual capacity\" by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 3601 et seq.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 412, 422",
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Congress' silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to \"a public official sued in her individual capacity\" by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 3601 et seq.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Congress' silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to \"a public official sued in her individual capacity\" by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 3601 et seq.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223",
"parenthetical": "\"In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,\" namely \"penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 412, 422",
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223",
"parenthetical": "\"In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,\" namely \"penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | b |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223",
"parenthetical": "\"In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,\" namely \"penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | b |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,\" namely \"penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 412, 422",
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,\" namely \"penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,\" namely \"penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "penalties are \"intended to punish culpable individuals,\" not \"to extract compensation or restore the status quo\"",
"sentence": "See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”)."
} | 4,255,907 | a |
It is the treatment provisions of the statutory scheme that purportedly distinguish Minnesota's sex offender commitment law from criminal punishment. Therefore, individuals must be committed for the purpose of receiving treatment-- not as retribution for their past criminal acts, however heinous, for which they have already served and completed their sentences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "534 U.S. 412, 412",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing \"a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons\" and finding such a distinction \"necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence -- functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 373, 373",
"parenthetical": "\"If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
It is the treatment provisions of the statutory scheme that purportedly distinguish Minnesota's sex offender commitment law from criminal punishment. Therefore, individuals must be committed for the purpose of receiving treatment-- not as retribution for their past criminal acts, however heinous, for which they have already served and completed their sentences. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "534 U.S. 412, 412",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing \"a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons\" and finding such a distinction \"necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence -- functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
It is the treatment provisions of the statutory scheme that purportedly distinguish Minnesota's sex offender commitment law from criminal punishment. Therefore, individuals must be committed for the purpose of receiving treatment-- not as retribution for their past criminal acts, however heinous, for which they have already served and completed their sentences. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "521 U.S. 373, 373",
"parenthetical": "\"If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing \"a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons\" and finding such a distinction \"necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence -- functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
It is the treatment provisions of the statutory scheme that purportedly distinguish Minnesota's sex offender commitment law from criminal punishment. Therefore, individuals must be committed for the purpose of receiving treatment-- not as retribution for their past criminal acts, however heinous, for which they have already served and completed their sentences. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing \"a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons\" and finding such a distinction \"necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence -- functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment\"",
"sentence": "See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
Finally, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the anti-suit injunction because allowing Golden Rule to proceed would deprive Harper of his choice of forum. It is a fundamental principal of Texas jurisprudence that a plaintiff should be allowed to choose his or her forum. Generally, when Texas appellate courts have struck down an anti-suit injunction, a declaratory judgment action was filed in Texas before another suit was filed in a sister state. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "819 S.W.2d 609, 609",
"parenthetical": "dissolving temporary injunction where Texas action asserting defensive claims of fraudulent inducement was filed prior to bank's debt collection action in New York",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 162 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in California); Total Minatome, 851 S.W.2d at 338 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in Montana); see also Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305 (Payne sued and received judgment in Canadian suit; later, Payne brought a similar suit in Texas and then Gannon brought a declaratory judgment action in Canada; the supreme court dissolved the Texas trial court’s anti-suit injunction in part because the prior litigation occurred in Canada); Manufacturers Hanover, 819 S.W.2d at 609 (dissolving temporary injunction where Texas action asserting defensive claims of fraudulent inducement was filed prior to bank’s debt collection action in New York)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "719 S.W.2d 162, 162",
"parenthetical": "declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in California",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 162 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in California); Total Minatome, 851 S.W.2d at 338 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in Montana); see also Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305 (Payne sued and received judgment in Canadian suit; later, Payne brought a similar suit in Texas and then Gannon brought a declaratory judgment action in Canada; the supreme court dissolved the Texas trial court’s anti-suit injunction in part because the prior litigation occurred in Canada); Manufacturers Hanover, 819 S.W.2d at 609 (dissolving temporary injunction where Texas action asserting defensive claims of fraudulent inducement was filed prior to bank’s debt collection action in New York)."
} | 10,020,718 | b |
Finally, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the anti-suit injunction because allowing Golden Rule to proceed would deprive Harper of his choice of forum. It is a fundamental principal of Texas jurisprudence that a plaintiff should be allowed to choose his or her forum. Generally, when Texas appellate courts have struck down an anti-suit injunction, a declaratory judgment action was filed in Texas before another suit was filed in a sister state. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "851 S.W.2d 338, 338",
"parenthetical": "declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in Montana",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 162 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in California); Total Minatome, 851 S.W.2d at 338 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in Montana); see also Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305 (Payne sued and received judgment in Canadian suit; later, Payne brought a similar suit in Texas and then Gannon brought a declaratory judgment action in Canada; the supreme court dissolved the Texas trial court’s anti-suit injunction in part because the prior litigation occurred in Canada); Manufacturers Hanover, 819 S.W.2d at 609 (dissolving temporary injunction where Texas action asserting defensive claims of fraudulent inducement was filed prior to bank’s debt collection action in New York)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "819 S.W.2d 609, 609",
"parenthetical": "dissolving temporary injunction where Texas action asserting defensive claims of fraudulent inducement was filed prior to bank's debt collection action in New York",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 162 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in California); Total Minatome, 851 S.W.2d at 338 (declaratory action filed in Texas prior to suit in Montana); see also Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305 (Payne sued and received judgment in Canadian suit; later, Payne brought a similar suit in Texas and then Gannon brought a declaratory judgment action in Canada; the supreme court dissolved the Texas trial court’s anti-suit injunction in part because the prior litigation occurred in Canada); Manufacturers Hanover, 819 S.W.2d at 609 (dissolving temporary injunction where Texas action asserting defensive claims of fraudulent inducement was filed prior to bank’s debt collection action in New York)."
} | 10,020,718 | a |
The factors considered by the Giovannetti court in determining whether an appellate court should undertake a harmless error analysis in situations where the government fails to raise it are: (1) the length and complexity of the record, (2) the certainty of the harmlessness finding, and (3) whether a reversal will result in protracted, costly and futile proceedings in district court. The panel's opinion, however, cautioned that when an appellate court conducts a review of the record on its own initiative, it should err on the side of the criminal defendant. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "949 F.2d 532, 543",
"parenthetical": "raising harmless error analysis sua sponte where harmfulness of error was obvious",
"sentence": "Id. at 1348. See also United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 543 (1st Cir.1991) (raising harmless error analysis sua sponte where harmfulness of error was obvious); United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 228-29 n. 5 (7th Cir.1991) (court addresses unbriefed harmless error claim based on the “certainty of harmlessness”); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1992) (appellate courts ordinarily have the discretion to address legal questions that are not timely raised)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92",
"parenthetical": "appellate courts ordinarily have the discretion to address legal questions that are not timely raised",
"sentence": "Id. at 1348. See also United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 543 (1st Cir.1991) (raising harmless error analysis sua sponte where harmfulness of error was obvious); United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 228-29 n. 5 (7th Cir.1991) (court addresses unbriefed harmless error claim based on the “certainty of harmlessness”); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1992) (appellate courts ordinarily have the discretion to address legal questions that are not timely raised)."
} | 10,528,033 | a |
The factors considered by the Giovannetti court in determining whether an appellate court should undertake a harmless error analysis in situations where the government fails to raise it are: (1) the length and complexity of the record, (2) the certainty of the harmlessness finding, and (3) whether a reversal will result in protracted, costly and futile proceedings in district court. The panel's opinion, however, cautioned that when an appellate court conducts a review of the record on its own initiative, it should err on the side of the criminal defendant. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92",
"parenthetical": "appellate courts ordinarily have the discretion to address legal questions that are not timely raised",
"sentence": "Id. at 1348. See also United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 543 (1st Cir.1991) (raising harmless error analysis sua sponte where harmfulness of error was obvious); United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 228-29 n. 5 (7th Cir.1991) (court addresses unbriefed harmless error claim based on the “certainty of harmlessness”); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1992) (appellate courts ordinarily have the discretion to address legal questions that are not timely raised)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court addresses unbriefed harmless error claim based on the \"certainty of harmlessness\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 1348. See also United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 543 (1st Cir.1991) (raising harmless error analysis sua sponte where harmfulness of error was obvious); United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 228-29 n. 5 (7th Cir.1991) (court addresses unbriefed harmless error claim based on the “certainty of harmlessness”); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1992) (appellate courts ordinarily have the discretion to address legal questions that are not timely raised)."
} | 10,528,033 | b |
But even if Zambrana and Ervin had preserved their challenges as to how the district court "informed its discretion," the arguments would have failed. Because their substantive arguments in support of their motions for new trial are meritless, any purported procedural deficiency in the manner in which the district court weighed the evidence would have been harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 F.3d 897, 901-02",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court's failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement); see also Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that “any error the district court may have committed” at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged shortcomings); Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing on issue of removal was harmless where evidence clearly supported removal: “In our view, to reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing (on nothing), as the State requests, would be a colossal waste of time and resources”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "525 F.3d 742, 764",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"any error the district court may have committed\" at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged shortcomings",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement); see also Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that “any error the district court may have committed” at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged shortcomings); Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing on issue of removal was harmless where evidence clearly supported removal: “In our view, to reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing (on nothing), as the State requests, would be a colossal waste of time and resources”)."
} | 4,235,885 | a |
But even if Zambrana and Ervin had preserved their challenges as to how the district court "informed its discretion," the arguments would have failed. Because their substantive arguments in support of their motions for new trial are meritless, any purported procedural deficiency in the manner in which the district court weighed the evidence would have been harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 F.3d 897, 901-02",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court's failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement); see also Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that “any error the district court may have committed” at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged shortcomings); Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing on issue of removal was harmless where evidence clearly supported removal: “In our view, to reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing (on nothing), as the State requests, would be a colossal waste of time and resources”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26",
"parenthetical": "stating that district court's failure to hold evidentiary hearing on issue of removal was harmless where evidence clearly supported removal: \"In our view, to reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing (on nothing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether defendant breached plea agreement was harmless when it was clear defendant breached agreement); see also Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that “any error the district court may have committed” at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged shortcomings); Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that district court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing on issue of removal was harmless where evidence clearly supported removal: “In our view, to reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing (on nothing), as the State requests, would be a colossal waste of time and resources”)."
} | 4,235,885 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "885 F.2d 250, 252",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of \"any and all vehicles found parked on the premises\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "885 F.2d 250, 252",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of \"any and all vehicles found parked on the premises\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of \"all vehicles ... on the property\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of \"all vehicles ... on the property\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "560 So.2d 1303, 1304",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and \"any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "560 So.2d 1303, 1304",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and \"any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "547 So.2d 323, 324",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of \"all vehicles\" on the premises",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "547 So.2d 323, 324",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of \"all vehicles\" on the premises",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "402 So.2d 1216, 1218",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and \"any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "402 So.2d 1216, 1218",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and \"any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing police to search \"all automobiles\" located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing police to search \"all automobiles\" located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing police to search \"all automobiles\" located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22",
"parenthetical": "upheld a warrant authorizing police to search \"all automobiles\" located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132",
"parenthetical": "upheld warrant authorizing search of \"all automobiles\" on a used car lot",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132",
"parenthetical": "upheld warrant authorizing search of \"all automobiles\" on a used car lot",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "275 S.W.2d 110, 111",
"parenthetical": "upheld warrant authorizing search of \"all automobiles\" on a used car lot",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "336 So.2d 199, 202",
"parenthetical": "warrant authorizing the search of \"any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home\" did not particularly describe the place to be searched",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | 11,948,097 | a |
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an "all vehicle" type description. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "788 S.W.2d 572, 576",
"parenthetical": "concluded that an \"all vehicles\" description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement",
"sentence": "But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "275 S.W.2d 110, 111",
"parenthetical": "upheld warrant authorizing search of \"all automobiles\" on a used car lot",
"sentence": "United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot)."
} | 11,948,097 | b |
As cognizable ATS claims are based on binding international law norms, they necessarily involve claims where there is a great deal of international consensus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 250, 250",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under section 1350\"",
"sentence": "See Doe I, 395 F.3d at 959 (noting that “[b]e-cause jus cogens violations are, by definition, internationally denounced, there is a high degree of international consensus against them”); Liu Qi at 1296 (same); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250 (noting that “it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under section 1350”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 959, 959",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[b]e-cause jus cogens violations are, by definition, internationally denounced, there is a high degree of international consensus against them\"",
"sentence": "See Doe I, 395 F.3d at 959 (noting that “[b]e-cause jus cogens violations are, by definition, internationally denounced, there is a high degree of international consensus against them”); Liu Qi at 1296 (same); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250 (noting that “it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under section 1350”)."
} | 8,939,734 | b |
Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre-2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment -- which is what the de-tainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. SS 287.7(d)-- falls well on the arrest side of the divide. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 F.2d 217, 222",
"parenthetical": "whether an immigration stop of \"several minutes\" could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a \"difficult ]\" question, but upholding the stop as it was \"minutes rather than hours\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 696, 709",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that the Supreme Court had \"never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here\" based solely on reasonable suspicion, and \"cannot do so on the facts presented by this case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | 4,278,569 | b |
Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre-2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment -- which is what the de-tainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. SS 287.7(d)-- falls well on the arrest side of the divide. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that the Supreme Court had \"never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here\" based solely on reasonable suspicion, and \"cannot do so on the facts presented by this case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 F.2d 217, 222",
"parenthetical": "whether an immigration stop of \"several minutes\" could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a \"difficult ]\" question, but upholding the stop as it was \"minutes rather than hours\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | 4,278,569 | a |
Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre-2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment -- which is what the de-tainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. SS 287.7(d)-- falls well on the arrest side of the divide. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that the Supreme Court had \"never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here\" based solely on reasonable suspicion, and \"cannot do so on the facts presented by this case\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 F.2d 217, 222",
"parenthetical": "whether an immigration stop of \"several minutes\" could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a \"difficult ]\" question, but upholding the stop as it was \"minutes rather than hours\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | 4,278,569 | a |
Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre-2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment -- which is what the de-tainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. SS 287.7(d)-- falls well on the arrest side of the divide. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 F.2d 217, 222",
"parenthetical": "whether an immigration stop of \"several minutes\" could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a \"difficult ]\" question, but upholding the stop as it was \"minutes rather than hours\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 1135, 1148",
"parenthetical": "explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”)."
} | 4,278,569 | b |
Thus, the majority has given priority over all other considerations to an officer's perception of personal safety, as Judge Ferren points out in his separate opinion, in a context where the officer had "no discernible basis whatsoever ... for seizing any passenger of the car." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "589 A.2d 895, 897",
"parenthetical": "\"The central inquiry in every Terry stop controversy is whether, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the police officer could reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot\"",
"sentence": "Post at 110. But, in Terry, supra, the Court specifically rejected “inarticulate hunches” and “simple good faith” of the officer as sufficient bases for “intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,” observing that “[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80; see Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 897 (D.C.1991) (“The central inquiry in every Terry stop controversy is whether, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the police officer could reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot”) citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Under the en banc majority's new analysis, for certain citizens in certain parts of the District of Columbia, associational and locational taints will suffice; protection under the Fourth Amendment will be at the police officer’s discretion."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting associational and locational taints as sufficient justification for a Terry stop",
"sentence": "But see Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312 (D.C.1989) (en banc) (rejecting associational and locational taints as sufficient justification for a Terry stop)."
} | 7,350,340 | a |
Thus, the majority has given priority over all other considerations to an officer's perception of personal safety, as Judge Ferren points out in his separate opinion, in a context where the officer had "no discernible basis whatsoever ... for seizing any passenger of the car." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting associational and locational taints as sufficient justification for a Terry stop",
"sentence": "But see Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312 (D.C.1989) (en banc) (rejecting associational and locational taints as sufficient justification for a Terry stop)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 30, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"The central inquiry in every Terry stop controversy is whether, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the police officer could reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot\"",
"sentence": "Post at 110. But, in Terry, supra, the Court specifically rejected “inarticulate hunches” and “simple good faith” of the officer as sufficient bases for “intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,” observing that “[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80; see Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 897 (D.C.1991) (“The central inquiry in every Terry stop controversy is whether, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the police officer could reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot”) citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Under the en banc majority's new analysis, for certain citizens in certain parts of the District of Columbia, associational and locational taints will suffice; protection under the Fourth Amendment will be at the police officer’s discretion."
} | 7,350,340 | b |
Thus, the majority has given priority over all other considerations to an officer's perception of personal safety, as Judge Ferren points out in his separate opinion, in a context where the officer had "no discernible basis whatsoever ... for seizing any passenger of the car." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting associational and locational taints as sufficient justification for a Terry stop",
"sentence": "But see Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312 (D.C.1989) (en banc) (rejecting associational and locational taints as sufficient justification for a Terry stop)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "88 S.Ct. 1884, 1884",
"parenthetical": "\"The central inquiry in every Terry stop controversy is whether, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the police officer could reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot\"",
"sentence": "Post at 110. But, in Terry, supra, the Court specifically rejected “inarticulate hunches” and “simple good faith” of the officer as sufficient bases for “intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,” observing that “[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80; see Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 897 (D.C.1991) (“The central inquiry in every Terry stop controversy is whether, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the police officer could reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot”) citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Under the en banc majority's new analysis, for certain citizens in certain parts of the District of Columbia, associational and locational taints will suffice; protection under the Fourth Amendment will be at the police officer’s discretion."
} | 7,350,340 | b |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 Ariz. 198, 198, ¶ 28",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "110 Ariz. 32, 35-36",
"parenthetical": "applying Arizona's constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge's comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | a |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 Ariz. 198, 198, ¶ 28",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32",
"parenthetical": "applying Arizona's constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge's comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | a |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 Ariz. 198, 198, ¶ 28",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on \"lying in wait\" and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | a |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on \"lying in wait\" and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 Ariz. 198, 198, ¶ 28",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | b |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 P.3d 424, 424",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "110 Ariz. 32, 35-36",
"parenthetical": "applying Arizona's constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge's comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | a |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32",
"parenthetical": "applying Arizona's constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge's comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 P.3d 424, 424",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | b |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 P.3d 424, 424",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on \"lying in wait\" and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | a |
Consistent with Singleton, there is a significant body of cases from the Arizona Supreme Court leading to the conclusion that almost any error falls within Article 6, Section 27 and therefore must be analyzed for prejudice to see whether substantial justice has been done. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on \"lying in wait\" and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 P.3d 424, 424",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error\" and that \"the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard\"",
"sentence": "Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 198, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d at 424 (noting that “most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error” and that “the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona harmless error statute obligate us to review trial error in criminal cases under a harmless error standard”); see e.g., State v. Diaz, 110 Ariz. 32, 35-36, 514 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1973) (applying Arizona’s constitutional prejudice test and holding that the trial judge’s comment on the evidence in violation of Article 6, Section 27 was not prejudicial, requiring reversal); Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 450, 254 P. 467, 475 (1927) (finding the fact that the defendant was absent from a portion of trial without having waived his right to be present “did not constitute reversible error unless his rights were prejudiced thereby,” and holding that notwithstanding the “error,” “there [was] nothing from which prejudice [could] be inferred”). But see State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 445 P.2d 831 (1968) (finding error to be prejudicial and thus reversible under Article 6, Section 27, of the Arizona Constitution, when the trial court gave an instruction on “lying in wait” and there was no factual evidence supporting the instruction)."
} | 4,047,030 | b |
In a similar context, the Ninth Circuit has found the reference to the polygraph test of another suspect to constitute harmless error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Moss, 180 W.Va. 363, 376 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 496, 505",
"parenthetical": "finding that district court's refusal to strike references to polygraph examination was not prejudicial because it did not materially affect verdict",
"sentence": "See United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 505 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that district court’s refusal to strike references to polygraph examination was not prejudicial because it did not materially affect verdict); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir.1986) (testimony that defendant had failed two polygraphs submitted to explain police’s failure to conduct more complete investigation)."
} | 1,014,203 | b |
In a similar context, the Ninth Circuit has found the reference to the polygraph test of another suspect to constitute harmless error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Moss, 180 W.Va. 363, 376 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 496, 505",
"parenthetical": "finding that district court's refusal to strike references to polygraph examination was not prejudicial because it did not materially affect verdict",
"sentence": "See United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 505 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that district court’s refusal to strike references to polygraph examination was not prejudicial because it did not materially affect verdict); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir.1986) (testimony that defendant had failed two polygraphs submitted to explain police’s failure to conduct more complete investigation)."
} | 1,014,203 | b |
In a similar context, the Ninth Circuit has found the reference to the polygraph test of another suspect to constitute harmless error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 1410, 1417",
"parenthetical": "testimony that defendant had failed two polygraphs submitted to explain police's failure to conduct more complete investigation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 505 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that district court’s refusal to strike references to polygraph examination was not prejudicial because it did not materially affect verdict); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir.1986) (testimony that defendant had failed two polygraphs submitted to explain police’s failure to conduct more complete investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Moss, 180 W.Va. 363, 376 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation)."
} | 1,014,203 | a |
In a similar context, the Ninth Circuit has found the reference to the polygraph test of another suspect to constitute harmless error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 1410, 1417",
"parenthetical": "testimony that defendant had failed two polygraphs submitted to explain police's failure to conduct more complete investigation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 505 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that district court’s refusal to strike references to polygraph examination was not prejudicial because it did not materially affect verdict); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir.1986) (testimony that defendant had failed two polygraphs submitted to explain police’s failure to conduct more complete investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation",
"sentence": "But see State v. Moss, 180 W.Va. 363, 376 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (holding that admission of testimony that State had dismissed indictment against earlier suspect because he successfully passed polygraph was reversible error when prosecutor repeatedly referred to polygraph on direct and in summation)."
} | 1,014,203 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Weldon's excessive force claim because it would not have been clear to every reasonable officer that the conduct violated a clearly established right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "810 F.3d 609, 614",
"parenthetical": "police officer entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right",
"sentence": "See Sjurset v. Button, 810 F.3d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 2015) (police officer entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (conclusory allega tions unsupported by factual data are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "261 F.3d 912, 922",
"parenthetical": "conclusory allega tions unsupported by factual data are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion",
"sentence": "See Sjurset v. Button, 810 F.3d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 2015) (police officer entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (conclusory allega tions unsupported by factual data are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion)."
} | 12,404,311 | a |
This is particularly so given that the motion was served during the end-of-year period when many people are occupied with holidays, vacations, and family events and little business is transacted. On these facts, the minimal notice belatedly supplied by way of the motion to transfer did not give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to take appropriate action before the deadline for objecting to dischargeability passed and before Smith was discharged. See Mfrs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "289 B.R. 619, 623-24",
"parenthetical": "notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "961 F.2d 848, 851",
"parenthetical": "in most cases, at least thirty days' notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy SS 523(a",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | 4,123,924 | b |
This is particularly so given that the motion was served during the end-of-year period when many people are occupied with holidays, vacations, and family events and little business is transacted. On these facts, the minimal notice belatedly supplied by way of the motion to transfer did not give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to take appropriate action before the deadline for objecting to dischargeability passed and before Smith was discharged. See Mfrs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "254 B.R. 866, 874-75",
"parenthetical": "notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "961 F.2d 848, 851",
"parenthetical": "in most cases, at least thirty days' notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy SS 523(a",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | 4,123,924 | b |
This is particularly so given that the motion was served during the end-of-year period when many people are occupied with holidays, vacations, and family events and little business is transacted. On these facts, the minimal notice belatedly supplied by way of the motion to transfer did not give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to take appropriate action before the deadline for objecting to dischargeability passed and before Smith was discharged. See Mfrs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "289 B.R. 619, 623-24",
"parenthetical": "notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "149 B.R. 511, 515-17",
"parenthetical": "knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | 4,123,924 | b |
This is particularly so given that the motion was served during the end-of-year period when many people are occupied with holidays, vacations, and family events and little business is transacted. On these facts, the minimal notice belatedly supplied by way of the motion to transfer did not give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to take appropriate action before the deadline for objecting to dischargeability passed and before Smith was discharged. See Mfrs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "254 B.R. 866, 874-75",
"parenthetical": "notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "149 B.R. 511, 515-17",
"parenthetical": "knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient",
"sentence": "Hanover v. Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1992) (in most cases, at least thirty days’ notice to creditor is necessary and sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B); notice supplied seven days prior to bar date is insufficient); Sophir Co. v. Heiney (In re Heiney), 194 B.R. 898, 902-03 (D.Colo.1996) (notice received eighteen days prior to bar date insufficient); In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 515-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (knowledge of bankruptcy acquired by unrepresented creditor twenty days prior to bar date insufficient); cf. Muse v. Muse (In re Muse), 289 B.R. 619, 623-24 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2003) (notice provided seventy-seven days prior to deadline for nondischargeability complaint sufficient); Herman v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 254 B.R. 866, 874-75 (Bankr.D.Md.2000) (notice received twenty-six days pri- or to bar date sufficient); Marino, 195 B.R. at 895-97 (two months’ notice was adequate); but see also Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781-82 (5th Cir.1990) (eighteen days’ notice sufficient)."
} | 4,123,924 | b |
Regardless of whether these allegations constitute motive, the other indicators of scienter are, in this court's view, sufficient to withstand the German Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' allegations go beyond mere accounting irregularities to assert systemic failures resulting from unsound credit policies, which ultimately led to Spiegel's bankruptcy. "To the outsider looking in, it is surely strongly inferential that every officer or director of [Spiegel] either had the knowledge of such deep financial difficulties or, if not, that his failure to have such knowledge equated to reckless disregard." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying motion to dismiss allegations against senior officers and directors accused of failing to disclose the \"basic deterioration of LINC's corporate health\"",
"sentence": "See Dardick, 149 F.Supp.2d at 988-89 and n. 2 (denying motion to dismiss allegations against senior officers and directors accused of failing to disclose the “basic deterioration of LINC’s corporate health”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is entirely clear ... that the PSLRA abolishes the use of the group pleading doctrine to allege defendant's scienter\"",
"sentence": "But see Tel-labs, 262 F.Supp.2d at 946 n. 7 (“[i]t is entirely clear ... that the PSLRA abolishes the use of the group pleading doctrine to allege defendant’s scienter”); Chu II, 100 F.Supp.2d at 837 (“pleading scienter based exclusively on a defendant’s corporate position is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”)."
} | 8,941,107 | a |
Regardless of whether these allegations constitute motive, the other indicators of scienter are, in this court's view, sufficient to withstand the German Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' allegations go beyond mere accounting irregularities to assert systemic failures resulting from unsound credit policies, which ultimately led to Spiegel's bankruptcy. "To the outsider looking in, it is surely strongly inferential that every officer or director of [Spiegel] either had the knowledge of such deep financial difficulties or, if not, that his failure to have such knowledge equated to reckless disregard." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying motion to dismiss allegations against senior officers and directors accused of failing to disclose the \"basic deterioration of LINC's corporate health\"",
"sentence": "See Dardick, 149 F.Supp.2d at 988-89 and n. 2 (denying motion to dismiss allegations against senior officers and directors accused of failing to disclose the “basic deterioration of LINC’s corporate health”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "100 F.Supp.2d 837, 837",
"parenthetical": "\"pleading scienter based exclusively on a defendant's corporate position is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss\"",
"sentence": "But see Tel-labs, 262 F.Supp.2d at 946 n. 7 (“[i]t is entirely clear ... that the PSLRA abolishes the use of the group pleading doctrine to allege defendant’s scienter”); Chu II, 100 F.Supp.2d at 837 (“pleading scienter based exclusively on a defendant’s corporate position is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”)."
} | 8,941,107 | a |
Purging of personnel records is necessary to "preclude[ ] further retaliatory conduct by preventing any reliance on discriminatory evaluations and records." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 F.3d 848, 863, 864",
"parenthetical": "\"By refusing to expunge discriminatory or retaliatory discipline from a successful plaintiffs personnel file, a court may force the plaintiff to bear the brunt of h[er] employer's unlawful conduct for the rest of h[er] working career, which certainly contravenes the goal of making a plaintiff whole through equitable remedies.\"",
"sentence": "McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 873 F.Supp. 872, 880 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (After jury verdict finding that plaintiff was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination, ordering defendant to “remove from its personnel files and any all reprimands, evaluations and other items of [discriminatory and retaliatory nature] dated from [the date upon which the plaintiff complained of discrimination].”); see also Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 863, 864 (7th Cir., 2001) (“By refusing to expunge discriminatory or retaliatory discipline from a successful plaintiffs personnel file, a court may force the plaintiff to bear the brunt of h[er] employer’s unlawful conduct for the rest of h[er] working career, which certainly contravenes the goal of making a plaintiff whole through equitable remedies.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.Supp. 872, 880",
"parenthetical": "After jury verdict finding that plaintiff was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination, ordering defendant to \"remove from its personnel files and any all reprimands, evaluations and other items of [discriminatory and retaliatory nature] dated from [the date upon which the plaintiff complained of discrimination].\"",
"sentence": "McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 873 F.Supp. 872, 880 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (After jury verdict finding that plaintiff was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination, ordering defendant to “remove from its personnel files and any all reprimands, evaluations and other items of [discriminatory and retaliatory nature] dated from [the date upon which the plaintiff complained of discrimination].”); see also Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 863, 864 (7th Cir., 2001) (“By refusing to expunge discriminatory or retaliatory discipline from a successful plaintiffs personnel file, a court may force the plaintiff to bear the brunt of h[er] employer’s unlawful conduct for the rest of h[er] working career, which certainly contravenes the goal of making a plaintiff whole through equitable remedies.”)."
} | 9,168,654 | b |
Under the CSA, marijuana is defined to include all Cannabis sativa L. plants, regardless of THC concentration. We also noted that "[t]he language of the CSA unambiguously bans the growing of marijuana, regardless of its use," id. at 1072, and we concluded that "[bjecause the CSA does not distinguish between marijuana and hemp in its regulation, and because farming hemp requires growing the entire marijuana plant which at some point contains psychoactive levels of THC, the CSA regulates the farming of hemp," id. at 1073. Considering the legislative history of the CSA, we found "no evidence that Congress intended otherwise" than to ban the growth of all varieties of the Cannabis sativa L. plant absent compliance with the registration requirements of the CSA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 610, 616",
"parenthetical": "observing that male marijuana plants, which may have lower THC concentrations than female plants, are still marijuana plants for sentencing purposes",
"sentence": "Id. at 1072; see also N.H. Hemp Council, 203 F.3d at 6-8 (concluding that cannabis cultivated for industrial use and possessing a low THC concentration is nevertheless marijuana under the CSA and is subject to regulation by the DEA); cf. United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 616 (8th Cir.1992) (observing that male marijuana plants, which may have lower THC concentrations than female plants, are still marijuana plants for sentencing purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 F.3d 6, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "concluding that cannabis cultivated for industrial use and possessing a low THC concentration is nevertheless marijuana under the CSA and is subject to regulation by the DEA",
"sentence": "Id. at 1072; see also N.H. Hemp Council, 203 F.3d at 6-8 (concluding that cannabis cultivated for industrial use and possessing a low THC concentration is nevertheless marijuana under the CSA and is subject to regulation by the DEA); cf. United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 616 (8th Cir.1992) (observing that male marijuana plants, which may have lower THC concentrations than female plants, are still marijuana plants for sentencing purposes)."
} | 3,500,219 | b |
Persecution "does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional.... Persecution must be extreme conduct to qualify for ... protection." Temporary detainment, some physical abuse not requiring medical attention, and being fired from one's job -- as Petitioner has alleged -- does not rise to this level of "extreme conduct" required to show persecution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 221, 233",
"parenthetical": "beatings that did not require medical treat ment not considered past persecution in asylum case",
"sentence": "See Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 114 (5th Cir.2006) (asylum applicant could not show that arrest and one-month detention rose to level of past persecution); Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir.1996) (asylum applicant could not show that two arrests, two detentions, and beatings not characterized as severe rose to level of past persecution); see also Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir.2004) (beatings that did not require medical treat ment not considered past persecution in asylum case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 F.3d 109, 114",
"parenthetical": "asylum applicant could not show that arrest and one-month detention rose to level of past persecution",
"sentence": "See Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 114 (5th Cir.2006) (asylum applicant could not show that arrest and one-month detention rose to level of past persecution); Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir.1996) (asylum applicant could not show that two arrests, two detentions, and beatings not characterized as severe rose to level of past persecution); see also Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir.2004) (beatings that did not require medical treat ment not considered past persecution in asylum case)."
} | 3,973,553 | b |
Persecution "does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional.... Persecution must be extreme conduct to qualify for ... protection." Temporary detainment, some physical abuse not requiring medical attention, and being fired from one's job -- as Petitioner has alleged -- does not rise to this level of "extreme conduct" required to show persecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "73 F.3d 579, 584",
"parenthetical": "asylum applicant could not show that two arrests, two detentions, and beatings not characterized as severe rose to level of past persecution",
"sentence": "See Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 114 (5th Cir.2006) (asylum applicant could not show that arrest and one-month detention rose to level of past persecution); Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir.1996) (asylum applicant could not show that two arrests, two detentions, and beatings not characterized as severe rose to level of past persecution); see also Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir.2004) (beatings that did not require medical treat ment not considered past persecution in asylum case)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 221, 233",
"parenthetical": "beatings that did not require medical treat ment not considered past persecution in asylum case",
"sentence": "See Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 114 (5th Cir.2006) (asylum applicant could not show that arrest and one-month detention rose to level of past persecution); Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir.1996) (asylum applicant could not show that two arrests, two detentions, and beatings not characterized as severe rose to level of past persecution); see also Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir.2004) (beatings that did not require medical treat ment not considered past persecution in asylum case)."
} | 3,973,553 | a |
The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 U.S. 330, 336",
"parenthetical": "for federal gift tax purposes the use of money \"is itself a legally protectible property interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax purposes the use of money “is itself a legally protectible property interest”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest",
"sentence": "See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest). We conclude, however, that the use of investors’ money to perpetuate a Ponzi scheme is not the type of “property” and hence “value” Congress had in mind when it passed section 548(a)(2)."
} | 6,542,005 | a |
The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "192 A.2d 351, 354",
"parenthetical": "implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest",
"sentence": "See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest). We conclude, however, that the use of investors’ money to perpetuate a Ponzi scheme is not the type of “property” and hence “value” Congress had in mind when it passed section 548(a)(2)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 U.S. 330, 336",
"parenthetical": "for federal gift tax purposes the use of money \"is itself a legally protectible property interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax purposes the use of money “is itself a legally protectible property interest”)."
} | 6,542,005 | b |
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