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Considering QRS's new theories at this point would effectively amend the Complaint after the close of discovery and initiation of summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, this Court finds that QRS's amended Complaint did not provide IPC with fair notice and will not consider QRS's new theories. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 F.2d 1079, 1081",
"parenthetical": "finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See id. at 968-969; id. at 969 (holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants “no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiffs] opposition to summary judgment”); Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to raise a claim in its complaint); Rothman v. Dist. Dir. of IRS, 483 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.1973) (finding that the trial court was correct in refusing to consider an issue that was never raised until the plaintiff filed his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment); but see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1524 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]hen a party raises a claim in materials filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should treat the filing as a request to amend the pleadings and should consider whether the evidence presented creates a triable issue of material fact.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910-11 (9th Cir.1994) (same)."
} | 3,957,448 | b |
I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "79 Hawai'i 165, 174",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs \"were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | 12,264,367 | a |
I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "880 P.2d 217, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs \"were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | 12,264,367 | a |
I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs \"were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | 12,264,367 | b |
I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs \"were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | 12,264,367 | b |
I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs \"were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | 12,264,367 | b |
I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 705, 709",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs \"were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”"
} | 12,264,367 | b |
As a transaction for the sale of goods, CFCU correctly contends the SCUCC applied to the sale of the vehicle. However, in my view, CFCU's cause of action does not arise from a breach of the sales contract under the SCUCC; rather, it is a debt collection action on the security interest, not arising under the SCUCC. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle",
"sentence": "See BancOhio Nat’l Bank v. Freeland, 13 Ohio App.3d 245, 468 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1984) (finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle); see also Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 123 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1289-90 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(35) (Supp. 2015) (“ ‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal property or fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "123 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1289-90",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2",
"sentence": "See BancOhio Nat’l Bank v. Freeland, 13 Ohio App.3d 245, 468 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1984) (finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle); see also Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 123 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1289-90 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(35) (Supp. 2015) (“ ‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal property or fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”)."
} | 6,775,089 | a |
As a transaction for the sale of goods, CFCU correctly contends the SCUCC applied to the sale of the vehicle. However, in my view, CFCU's cause of action does not arise from a breach of the sales contract under the SCUCC; rather, it is a debt collection action on the security interest, not arising under the SCUCC. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "468 N.E.2d 941, 944",
"parenthetical": "finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle",
"sentence": "See BancOhio Nat’l Bank v. Freeland, 13 Ohio App.3d 245, 468 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1984) (finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle); see also Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 123 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1289-90 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(35) (Supp. 2015) (“ ‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal property or fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "123 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1289-90",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2",
"sentence": "See BancOhio Nat’l Bank v. Freeland, 13 Ohio App.3d 245, 468 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1984) (finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle); see also Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 123 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1289-90 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(35) (Supp. 2015) (“ ‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal property or fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”)."
} | 6,775,089 | a |
The distinction that appellees draw between the "constitutional nexus" and the "unitary business principle" is relevant where there is some question as to whether any part of a unitary business has a sufficient nexus with the taxing state. But where, as here, a parent company undoubtedly has a requisite nexus, the only question is whether the subsidiary partakes in the parent's unitary business; if so, it inherits the parent's nexus, and the tests are effectively merged. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "553 U.S. 25, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.\"",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 Md. 104, 104",
"parenthetical": "in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus\" are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | 3,672,325 | a |
The distinction that appellees draw between the "constitutional nexus" and the "unitary business principle" is relevant where there is some question as to whether any part of a unitary business has a sufficient nexus with the taxing state. But where, as here, a parent company undoubtedly has a requisite nexus, the only question is whether the subsidiary partakes in the parent's unitary business; if so, it inherits the parent's nexus, and the tests are effectively merged. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus\" are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "553 U.S. 25, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.\"",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | 3,672,325 | b |
The distinction that appellees draw between the "constitutional nexus" and the "unitary business principle" is relevant where there is some question as to whether any part of a unitary business has a sufficient nexus with the taxing state. But where, as here, a parent company undoubtedly has a requisite nexus, the only question is whether the subsidiary partakes in the parent's unitary business; if so, it inherits the parent's nexus, and the tests are effectively merged. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.\"",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 Md. 104, 104",
"parenthetical": "in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus\" are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | 3,672,325 | a |
The distinction that appellees draw between the "constitutional nexus" and the "unitary business principle" is relevant where there is some question as to whether any part of a unitary business has a sufficient nexus with the taxing state. But where, as here, a parent company undoubtedly has a requisite nexus, the only question is whether the subsidiary partakes in the parent's unitary business; if so, it inherits the parent's nexus, and the tests are effectively merged. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus\" are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.\"",
"sentence": "MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 25, 128 S.Ct. 1498 (\"Where, as here, there is no dispute that the [parent] taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax____To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle.”); see SYL, 375 Md. at 104, 825 A.2d 399 (in a parent-subsidiary case, the \"three key elements necessary for constitutional nexus” are that the parent is engaged in business in Maryland, the parent is unitary with the subsidiary, and the apportionment formula is fair)."
} | 3,672,325 | b |
Section 192(a) prohibits "unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive" practices or devices. Section 192(b) prohibits "undue or unreasonable" preferences, advantages, or disadvantages. Neither section contains language limiting its application to only those acts or devices, which have an adverse effect on competition, such as "restraining commerce." Under well-settled principles, courts must refrain from reading additional terms, such as those that would require an adverse effect on competition, into these sections. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 538, 538",
"parenthetical": "holding that if the text evinces \"a plain, nonabsurd meaning\" then the court should not \"read an absent word into the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 23, 29",
"parenthetical": "holding that courts \"ordinarily\" should \"resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | 3,507,859 | a |
Section 192(a) prohibits "unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive" practices or devices. Section 192(b) prohibits "undue or unreasonable" preferences, advantages, or disadvantages. Neither section contains language limiting its application to only those acts or devices, which have an adverse effect on competition, such as "restraining commerce." Under well-settled principles, courts must refrain from reading additional terms, such as those that would require an adverse effect on competition, into these sections. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that courts \"ordinarily\" should \"resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 538, 538",
"parenthetical": "holding that if the text evinces \"a plain, nonabsurd meaning\" then the court should not \"read an absent word into the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | 3,507,859 | b |
Section 192(a) prohibits "unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive" practices or devices. Section 192(b) prohibits "undue or unreasonable" preferences, advantages, or disadvantages. Neither section contains language limiting its application to only those acts or devices, which have an adverse effect on competition, such as "restraining commerce." Under well-settled principles, courts must refrain from reading additional terms, such as those that would require an adverse effect on competition, into these sections. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that courts \"ordinarily\" should \"resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 538, 538",
"parenthetical": "holding that if the text evinces \"a plain, nonabsurd meaning\" then the court should not \"read an absent word into the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | 3,507,859 | b |
Section 192(a) prohibits "unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive" practices or devices. Section 192(b) prohibits "undue or unreasonable" preferences, advantages, or disadvantages. Neither section contains language limiting its application to only those acts or devices, which have an adverse effect on competition, such as "restraining commerce." Under well-settled principles, courts must refrain from reading additional terms, such as those that would require an adverse effect on competition, into these sections. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that if the text evinces \"a plain, nonabsurd meaning\" then the court should not \"read an absent word into the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 23, 29",
"parenthetical": "holding that courts \"ordinarily\" should \"resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | 3,507,859 | a |
Section 192(a) prohibits "unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive" practices or devices. Section 192(b) prohibits "undue or unreasonable" preferences, advantages, or disadvantages. Neither section contains language limiting its application to only those acts or devices, which have an adverse effect on competition, such as "restraining commerce." Under well-settled principles, courts must refrain from reading additional terms, such as those that would require an adverse effect on competition, into these sections. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that if the text evinces \"a plain, nonabsurd meaning\" then the court should not \"read an absent word into the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that courts \"ordinarily\" should \"resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | 3,507,859 | a |
Section 192(a) prohibits "unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive" practices or devices. Section 192(b) prohibits "undue or unreasonable" preferences, advantages, or disadvantages. Neither section contains language limiting its application to only those acts or devices, which have an adverse effect on competition, such as "restraining commerce." Under well-settled principles, courts must refrain from reading additional terms, such as those that would require an adverse effect on competition, into these sections. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that if the text evinces \"a plain, nonabsurd meaning\" then the court should not \"read an absent word into the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that courts \"ordinarily\" should \"resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face\"",
"sentence": "See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (holding that if the text evinces “a plain, nonabsurd meaning” then the court should not “read an absent word into the statute”); see also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (holding that courts “ordinarily” should “resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”)."
} | 3,507,859 | a |
As articulated in the written Plan document, the Committee has the sole discretionary authority to administer the Plan as outlined in the written Plan document. For example, pursuant to the written Plan document, the Committee has the sole discretionary authority to adopt rules and procedures necessary to effectuate the efficient administration of the Plan. Second, the written Plan document bestows the Committee with the discretion to determine which employees are eligible for coverage under the policy and also to dictate the benefits an employee could obtain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 F.3d 257, 257",
"parenthetical": "indicating that a plan qualifies as an ERISA plan where the employer has a need to create an administrative system in order to determine the employee's eligibility for and level of benefits",
"sentence": "See Kulinski, 21 F.3d at 257 (indicating that a plan qualifies as an ERISA plan where the employer has a need to create an administrative system in order to determine the employee’s eligibility for and level of benefits); see also Wickman v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st Cir.1990) (considering, inter alia, employer’s role in devising eligibility requirements when determining if benefit plan was governed by ERISA). In addition, under the terms of the written Plan document in this case, the Committee is responsible for paying premiums or other charges due on account of any Plan benefits and paying benefits on behalf of the employees."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "908 F.2d 1077, 1083",
"parenthetical": "considering, inter alia, employer's role in devising eligibility requirements when determining if benefit plan was governed by ERISA",
"sentence": "See Kulinski, 21 F.3d at 257 (indicating that a plan qualifies as an ERISA plan where the employer has a need to create an administrative system in order to determine the employee’s eligibility for and level of benefits); see also Wickman v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st Cir.1990) (considering, inter alia, employer’s role in devising eligibility requirements when determining if benefit plan was governed by ERISA). In addition, under the terms of the written Plan document in this case, the Committee is responsible for paying premiums or other charges due on account of any Plan benefits and paying benefits on behalf of the employees."
} | 3,425,410 | a |
. Indeed, the Board rejected Mr. Washington's statement because it was, in the Board's view, uncorroborated and because he was not competent as a layperson to render a medical opinion, not because he lacked credibility. Contrary to the Board's assertions, there is no requirement that Mr. Washington's statement be corroborated, and service connection may be shown through lay evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 147, 148",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"VA regulations do not provide that service connection can only be shown through medical records, but rather allow for proof through lay evidence\" and that lay evidence may serve to place evidence in equipoise",
"sentence": "See Rowell v. Principi, 4 Vet.App. 9, 19 (1993) (Board must explain why lay evidence alone is insufficient to establish entitlement to benefits; holding lay evidence alone may be sufficient to establish benefits); Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 147, 148 (1992) (holding that \"VA regulations do not provide that service connection can only be shown through medical records, but rather allow for proof through lay evidence” and that lay evidence may serve to place evidence in equipoise); Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 24, 25-26 (1991) (Board cannot ignore appellant’s testimony simply because appellant is an interested party; lay evidence alone may be sufficient to establish benefits); see also Layno, 6 Vet.App. at 469 (lay testimony regarding observations of symptoms “may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection, and it is error for the Board to require medical evidence to support that lay evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "6 Vet.App. 469, 469",
"parenthetical": "lay testimony regarding observations of symptoms \"may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection, and it is error for the Board to require medical evidence to support that lay evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Rowell v. Principi, 4 Vet.App. 9, 19 (1993) (Board must explain why lay evidence alone is insufficient to establish entitlement to benefits; holding lay evidence alone may be sufficient to establish benefits); Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 147, 148 (1992) (holding that \"VA regulations do not provide that service connection can only be shown through medical records, but rather allow for proof through lay evidence” and that lay evidence may serve to place evidence in equipoise); Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 24, 25-26 (1991) (Board cannot ignore appellant’s testimony simply because appellant is an interested party; lay evidence alone may be sufficient to establish benefits); see also Layno, 6 Vet.App. at 469 (lay testimony regarding observations of symptoms “may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection, and it is error for the Board to require medical evidence to support that lay evidence”)."
} | 3,003,455 | a |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 F.3d 38, 47",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.\"",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | b |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.\"",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | b |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.\"",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | b |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.\"",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | b |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "694 F.2d 1068, 1070",
"parenthetical": "listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | b |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | a |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | a |
Similarly, directors called, were called, or came into the office daily "regarding business matters of the company." Owens's testimony, however, does not reasonably suggest that SDC's directors performed traditional employee duties -- maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm's legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office",
"sentence": "See Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no indication that any of the non-officer board members performed any traditional employee duties, such as maintaining records or managing the office.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass’n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.1982) (listing the traditional employee duties as maintaining records, preparing financial statements, and managing the office), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 104 S.Ct. 80, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (same); cf. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d at 1539 (finding that a director did perform traditional employee duties when he was chosen from people in senior management positions, oversaw the firm’s legal affairs, and was responsible for keeping corporate records)."
} | 11,577,860 | b |
Affording proper deference to the issuing magistrate judge's determination, we conclude the search warrant affidavit asserted sufficient facts to establish probable cause that evidence of criminal activity would be found in defendant's residence. Given the evidence in the affidavit that (1) the defendant's property and residence bordered the marijuana patch, (2) the defendant was identified as the individual in the field cultivating and caring for the patch, and (3) the final harvesting of the field had been completed immediately pri- or to the search warrant application, the issuing magistrate judge reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had recently harvested a large quantity of marijuana plants and that the most likely place to store these plants and the implements used in the harvesting would be at his residence adjacent to the patch. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "798 F.2d 380, 382",
"parenthetical": "\"It is reasonable to assume that certain types of evidence would be kept at a defendant's residence and an affidavit need not contain personal observations that a defendant did keep such evidence at his residence.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir.1986) (“It is reasonable to assume that certain types of evidence would be kept at a defendant’s residence and an affidavit need not contain personal observations that a defendant did keep such evidence at his residence.”); see also Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1205 (holding that issuing judge “may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1205, 1205",
"parenthetical": "holding that issuing judge \"may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir.1986) (“It is reasonable to assume that certain types of evidence would be kept at a defendant’s residence and an affidavit need not contain personal observations that a defendant did keep such evidence at his residence.”); see also Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1205 (holding that issuing judge “may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application.”)."
} | 113,645 | a |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 298, 313-14",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | b |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2000 WL 191828, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were \"severe, long term, or permanent\"",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 298, 313-14",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | b |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1997 WL 94688, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 298, 313-14",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | b |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 80, 81",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | a |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 80, 81",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2000 WL 191828, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were \"severe, long term, or permanent\"",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | a |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 80, 81",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1997 WL 94688, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | a |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 35, 37",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because \"[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing\"",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | b |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 35, 37",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because \"[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing\"",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2000 WL 191828, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were \"severe, long term, or permanent\"",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | a |
Analysis of the substantially limiting effect of a breathing impairment focuses on the severity and the frequency of the impairment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 35, 37",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because \"[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing\"",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1997 WL 94688, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball",
"sentence": "See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313-14 (2nd Cir.1999) (finding plaintiffs breathing problems due to secondhand smoke exposure at work not substantially limited because plaintiff engaged in substantial physical activity outside work without breathing problems); Zirpel v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir.1997) (finding plaintiffs panic attacks, although they hampered breathing did not substantially limit breathing because the attacks were infrequent and very manageable); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because “[s]everal instances of shortness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level of substantially limiting the major life activity of breathing”); see also White v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 852 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited because plaintiff only had difficulty breathing when exposed to certain irritants and that exposure resulted only in brief symptoms); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.10, 2000) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited as there was no medical evidence that plaintiffs breathing problems were “severe, long term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1997) (finding plaintiffs breathing not substantially limited where plaintiffs asthma caused him difficulty but did not prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or playing baseball)."
} | 9,179,710 | a |
We believe that the circumstances here are analogous to those in Wright. In essence, Hay's appeal, although largely fact-based, presents the legal question of whether Hay's conduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable official would have known. We therefore believe it appropriate to decide this appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 138, 141",
"parenthetical": "whether defendants' actions violated plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights is \"essentially a legal question\"",
"sentence": "See also Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.1989) (appellate review includes prima facie legal and factual issues); Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir.1988) (whether defendants’ actions violated plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights is “essentially a legal question”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "472 U.S. 528, 528",
"parenthetical": "\"To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues will entail consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff's claim for relief\"",
"sentence": "Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (“To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues will entail consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for relief”)."
} | 1,801,833 | b |
We believe that the circumstances here are analogous to those in Wright. In essence, Hay's appeal, although largely fact-based, presents the legal question of whether Hay's conduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable official would have known. We therefore believe it appropriate to decide this appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 138, 141",
"parenthetical": "whether defendants' actions violated plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights is \"essentially a legal question\"",
"sentence": "See also Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.1989) (appellate review includes prima facie legal and factual issues); Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir.1988) (whether defendants’ actions violated plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights is “essentially a legal question”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2816, 2816",
"parenthetical": "\"To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues will entail consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff's claim for relief\"",
"sentence": "Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (“To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues will entail consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for relief”)."
} | 1,801,833 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26",
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 M.J. 406, 420",
"parenthetical": "declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 M.J. 406, 420",
"parenthetical": "declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 M.J. 406, 420",
"parenthetical": "declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 M.J. 406, 420",
"parenthetical": "declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | 7,264,119 | a |
15 Errors in an affidavit do not require suppression when the magistrate has a substantial basis to determine that the erroneous facts are merely typographical errors and the facts otherwise support a determination of probable cause. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "175 S.W.2d 368, 369",
"parenthetical": "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit",
"sentence": "But see Stroud v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 694, 175 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1948) (holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontra-dicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, 973-74 (2006) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 A.2d 237, 240-41",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Valle-Flores, 2005 UT App 290, ¶¶ 2-5, 117 P.3d 1069 (holding that a warrant to search 626 Pueblo Street was supported by probable cause despite the supporting affidavit's reference to both 624 Pueblo Street and 626 Pueblo Street); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ¶¶ 24-26, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the \"minor inconsistency\" did \"not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination\"); United States v. Snyder, 471 Fed.Appx. 884, 885 (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 Queen City Avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 Queen City Avenue); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (declining to invalidate a warrant based on an affidavit in which a serivener's error changed a username from \"Reddel\" (ending with a numeral) to \"REDDEL\" because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was otherwise \"clear that they were searching\" for the former); see also State v. Rosario, 238 Conn. 380, 680 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1996) (concluding that an affidavit's misstatement of the year did not undermine probable cause where other information in the affidavit indicated the correct year); State v. White, 368 So.2d 1000, 1002 (La.1979) (same); State v. Marquardt, 48 Or.App. 515, 603 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1979) (same); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seisure § 8.7), at 496 (5th ed. 2012) (\"[Rleference to a year other than the current year will not invalidate the warrant if the circumstances fairly indicate that the intended reference was to the current year.\")."
} | 7,264,119 | b |
Defense counsel's request for a downward variance constituted a clear violation of that agreement. Swisshelm thus received the benefit of the plea agreement -- the government's forbearance from seeking an above-Guidelines sentence -- but deprived the government of its corresponding bargained-for benefit -- Swisshelm's forbearance from seeking a below-Guidelines sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 345, 345",
"parenthetical": "\"By fashioning a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines based on the ... violation of ... the plea agreement, the district court denied the Government the benefit of its bargain.\"",
"sentence": "See Bowe, 257 F.3d at 345 (“By fashioning a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines based on the ... violation of ... the plea agreement, the district court denied the Government the benefit of its bargain.”); Alexander, 869 F.2d at 95 (reasoning that although the Supreme Court’s holding in Santobello was partly based on defendant’s constitutional rights, “it also relies on the fundamental principle that one party cannot be held to a bargain that the other party has breached”)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because these [constitutional] concerns do not abound when the defendant breach-' es an agreement, the reasoning in these cases [in which the government breached] is inapposite\"",
"sentence": "Contra Bradstreet, 207 F.3d at 80 n.3 (“Because these [constitutional] concerns do not abound when the defendant breach-' es an agreement, the reasoning in these cases [in which the government breached] is inapposite”). Swisshelm argues that the breach was only technical and not material because it did not affect the district court’s judgment, but on this record we conclude that the breach was material, prejudicial, and not harmless."
} | 12,277,912 | a |
Defense counsel's request for a downward variance constituted a clear violation of that agreement. Swisshelm thus received the benefit of the plea agreement -- the government's forbearance from seeking an above-Guidelines sentence -- but deprived the government of its corresponding bargained-for benefit -- Swisshelm's forbearance from seeking a below-Guidelines sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 F.2d 95, 95",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that although the Supreme Court's holding in Santobello was partly based on defendant's constitutional rights, \"it also relies on the fundamental principle that one party cannot be held to a bargain that the other party has breached\"",
"sentence": "See Bowe, 257 F.3d at 345 (“By fashioning a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines based on the ... violation of ... the plea agreement, the district court denied the Government the benefit of its bargain.”); Alexander, 869 F.2d at 95 (reasoning that although the Supreme Court’s holding in Santobello was partly based on defendant’s constitutional rights, “it also relies on the fundamental principle that one party cannot be held to a bargain that the other party has breached”)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because these [constitutional] concerns do not abound when the defendant breach-' es an agreement, the reasoning in these cases [in which the government breached] is inapposite\"",
"sentence": "Contra Bradstreet, 207 F.3d at 80 n.3 (“Because these [constitutional] concerns do not abound when the defendant breach-' es an agreement, the reasoning in these cases [in which the government breached] is inapposite”). Swisshelm argues that the breach was only technical and not material because it did not affect the district court’s judgment, but on this record we conclude that the breach was material, prejudicial, and not harmless."
} | 12,277,912 | a |
Appellant's failure to raise these claims on direct appeal did not prevent him from doing so in the instant 3.850 motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "580 So.2d 638, 640",
"parenthetical": "although contention that defendant did not qualify as a habitual offender could have been raised on direct appeal, defendant could raise this claim in a subsequent 3.850 proceeding, because the rule expressly provides that a motion to vacate a sentence which exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time",
"sentence": "See Debose v. State, 580 So.2d 638, 640 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (although contention that defendant did not qualify as a habitual offender could have been raised on direct appeal, defendant could raise this claim in a subsequent 3.850 proceeding, because the rule expressly provides that a motion to vacate a sentence which exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "579 So.2d 810, 811",
"parenthetical": "a challenge to an illegal sentence may be brought at any time",
"sentence": "See also Ospina v. State, 579 So.2d 810, 811 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (a challenge to an illegal sentence may be brought at any time)."
} | 7,474,391 | a |
In this case, no analysis of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and acquisition of the certificate was used to substantiate the conclusion that the time lapse was unreasonable as a matter of law. We conclude that the district court should have examined such circumstances as the nature of the instrument, trade usage and custom, the use of the certificate as collateral for an obligation of somewhat indefinite duration, statements made by Candy or INA to plain tiff about the certificate, the fact that the instrument bore interest only until October 1976, and INA's retention of the document as late as June 1978 with no apparent concern for whether interest accrued. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"maturity\" of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | 1,123,853 | a |
In this case, no analysis of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and acquisition of the certificate was used to substantiate the conclusion that the time lapse was unreasonable as a matter of law. We conclude that the district court should have examined such circumstances as the nature of the instrument, trade usage and custom, the use of the certificate as collateral for an obligation of somewhat indefinite duration, statements made by Candy or INA to plain tiff about the certificate, the fact that the instrument bore interest only until October 1976, and INA's retention of the document as late as June 1978 with no apparent concern for whether interest accrued. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "116 S.E. 380, 382",
"parenthetical": "certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"maturity\" of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | 1,123,853 | b |
In this case, no analysis of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and acquisition of the certificate was used to substantiate the conclusion that the time lapse was unreasonable as a matter of law. We conclude that the district court should have examined such circumstances as the nature of the instrument, trade usage and custom, the use of the certificate as collateral for an obligation of somewhat indefinite duration, statements made by Candy or INA to plain tiff about the certificate, the fact that the instrument bore interest only until October 1976, and INA's retention of the document as late as June 1978 with no apparent concern for whether interest accrued. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"maturity\" of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | 1,123,853 | b |
In this case, no analysis of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and acquisition of the certificate was used to substantiate the conclusion that the time lapse was unreasonable as a matter of law. We conclude that the district court should have examined such circumstances as the nature of the instrument, trade usage and custom, the use of the certificate as collateral for an obligation of somewhat indefinite duration, statements made by Candy or INA to plain tiff about the certificate, the fact that the instrument bore interest only until October 1976, and INA's retention of the document as late as June 1978 with no apparent concern for whether interest accrued. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"maturity\" of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "116 S.E. 380, 382",
"parenthetical": "certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue",
"sentence": "See Jennings v. Imperial Bank, 87 Cal.App.3d 896, 152 Cal.Rptr. 15 (1978) (“maturity” of certificate of deposit relates only to the question of interest); Easley, 138 Tenn. at 371, 198 S.W. at 67; §§ 1-204(2), 3-503(2); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1966); see also National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380, 382 (1923) (certified check held pending performance of contract and negotiated immediately after performance was not negotiated an unreasonable length of time after issue)."
} | 1,123,853 | a |
Courts of Appeals have generally distinguished between the general pointing or waving about of a weapon, which amounts to "brandishing," and the pointing of a weapon at a specific victim or group of victims to force them to comply with the robber's demands. In essence, "brandishing" constitutes an implicit threat that force might be used, while a weapon is "otherwise used" when the threat becomes more explicit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 702, 705-06",
"parenthetical": "gun was \"otherwise used\" to force victims to move, despite lack of evidence regarding physical contact with victims or use of verbal threats",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 705-06 (10th Cir.1997) (gun was “otherwise used” to force victims to move, despite lack of evidence regarding physical contact with victims or use of verbal threats); United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952 (8th Cir.1994) (knife was “otherwise used” to force victim to move); United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir.1991) (knife was “otherwise used” when intentionally held to victim’s throat as robber made verbal threats); United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1997) (gun was “otherwise used” when pointed at victims during bank robbery to ensure their compliance)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pointing firearms at customers during bank robbery, ordering them to floor, and threatening to kill them if they did not comply amounted to \"brandishing\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir.1994) (pointing firearms at customers during bank robbery, ordering them to floor, and threatening to kill them if they did not comply amounted to “brandishing”)."
} | 1,753,271 | a |
Courts of Appeals have generally distinguished between the general pointing or waving about of a weapon, which amounts to "brandishing," and the pointing of a weapon at a specific victim or group of victims to force them to comply with the robber's demands. In essence, "brandishing" constitutes an implicit threat that force might be used, while a weapon is "otherwise used" when the threat becomes more explicit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "929 F.2d 1126, 1130",
"parenthetical": "knife was \"otherwise used\" when intentionally held to victim's throat as robber made verbal threats",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 705-06 (10th Cir.1997) (gun was “otherwise used” to force victims to move, despite lack of evidence regarding physical contact with victims or use of verbal threats); United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952 (8th Cir.1994) (knife was “otherwise used” to force victim to move); United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir.1991) (knife was “otherwise used” when intentionally held to victim’s throat as robber made verbal threats); United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1997) (gun was “otherwise used” when pointed at victims during bank robbery to ensure their compliance)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pointing firearms at customers during bank robbery, ordering them to floor, and threatening to kill them if they did not comply amounted to \"brandishing\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir.1994) (pointing firearms at customers during bank robbery, ordering them to floor, and threatening to kill them if they did not comply amounted to “brandishing”)."
} | 1,753,271 | a |
Courts of Appeals have generally distinguished between the general pointing or waving about of a weapon, which amounts to "brandishing," and the pointing of a weapon at a specific victim or group of victims to force them to comply with the robber's demands. In essence, "brandishing" constitutes an implicit threat that force might be used, while a weapon is "otherwise used" when the threat becomes more explicit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "126 F.3d 666, 669",
"parenthetical": "gun was \"otherwise used\" when pointed at victims during bank robbery to ensure their compliance",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 705-06 (10th Cir.1997) (gun was “otherwise used” to force victims to move, despite lack of evidence regarding physical contact with victims or use of verbal threats); United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952 (8th Cir.1994) (knife was “otherwise used” to force victim to move); United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir.1991) (knife was “otherwise used” when intentionally held to victim’s throat as robber made verbal threats); United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1997) (gun was “otherwise used” when pointed at victims during bank robbery to ensure their compliance)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pointing firearms at customers during bank robbery, ordering them to floor, and threatening to kill them if they did not comply amounted to \"brandishing\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir.1994) (pointing firearms at customers during bank robbery, ordering them to floor, and threatening to kill them if they did not comply amounted to “brandishing”)."
} | 1,753,271 | a |
The statements that the Rieger Note-holders characterize as "statements of existing fact", Rieger Noteholders Consolidated Response to Motion to Dismiss at 19 -- that "Livent remains a viable company financially and is operationally and creatively very strong," and "[t]he company now has greater potential than ever before" -- are statements "about the state of a company whose truth or falsity [are] discernible only after [they are] made [and] necessarily refer[] only to future performance." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2000 WL 489713, *4",
"parenthetical": "state-ments that company \"is poised to become,\" \"has the inside track,\" and that its \"revenue and earnings potential is clearly huge\" are forward looking",
"sentence": "Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 805 (11th Cir.1999)(statements that “fundamental business and its underlying strategies remain intact” and “IVAK is certainly well positioned” are forward looking); see also Fellman v. Electro Optical Sys. Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6403, 2000 WL 489713, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.25, 2000)(state-ments that company “is poised to become,” “has the inside track,” and that its “revenue and earnings potential is clearly huge” are forward looking)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "182 F.3d 799, 805",
"parenthetical": "statements that \"fundamental business and its underlying strategies remain intact\" and \"IVAK is certainly well positioned\" are forward looking",
"sentence": "Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 805 (11th Cir.1999)(statements that “fundamental business and its underlying strategies remain intact” and “IVAK is certainly well positioned” are forward looking); see also Fellman v. Electro Optical Sys. Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6403, 2000 WL 489713, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.25, 2000)(state-ments that company “is poised to become,” “has the inside track,” and that its “revenue and earnings potential is clearly huge” are forward looking)."
} | 11,078,204 | b |
See, e.g., Michigan Chemical Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Additionally, this construction avoids the necessity of disregarding the first paragraph of the definition that refers to "... multiple, ... sporadic or related acts of sexual abuse or molestation," which the Court has found plainly covers both related and unrelated acts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "735 So.2d 530, 535",
"parenthetical": "holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions",
"sentence": "See City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000) (stating that pursuant to Florida contract law “any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor up upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement”); See also Sugar Cane Growers Coop, of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions); Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (stating that “[a]ll the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the deemer clauses and the definition of “sexual abuse occurrence” address unrelated issues and therefore, all of Gordon’s acts of sexual abuse or molestation of A.N. and J.J., related or not, comprise one “sexual abuse occurrence” within the meaning of the TIG policy."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 So.2d 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "stating that pursuant to Florida contract law \"any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor up upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement\"",
"sentence": "See City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000) (stating that pursuant to Florida contract law “any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor up upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement”); See also Sugar Cane Growers Coop, of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions); Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (stating that “[a]ll the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the deemer clauses and the definition of “sexual abuse occurrence” address unrelated issues and therefore, all of Gordon’s acts of sexual abuse or molestation of A.N. and J.J., related or not, comprise one “sexual abuse occurrence” within the meaning of the TIG policy."
} | 1,611,197 | b |
See, e.g., Michigan Chemical Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Additionally, this construction avoids the necessity of disregarding the first paragraph of the definition that refers to "... multiple, ... sporadic or related acts of sexual abuse or molestation," which the Court has found plainly covers both related and unrelated acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 So.2d 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "stating that pursuant to Florida contract law \"any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor up upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement\"",
"sentence": "See City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000) (stating that pursuant to Florida contract law “any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor up upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement”); See also Sugar Cane Growers Coop, of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions); Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (stating that “[a]ll the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the deemer clauses and the definition of “sexual abuse occurrence” address unrelated issues and therefore, all of Gordon’s acts of sexual abuse or molestation of A.N. and J.J., related or not, comprise one “sexual abuse occurrence” within the meaning of the TIG policy."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "154 So.2d 313, 315",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]ll the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each\"",
"sentence": "See City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000) (stating that pursuant to Florida contract law “any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor up upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement”); See also Sugar Cane Growers Coop, of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions); Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (stating that “[a]ll the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the deemer clauses and the definition of “sexual abuse occurrence” address unrelated issues and therefore, all of Gordon’s acts of sexual abuse or molestation of A.N. and J.J., related or not, comprise one “sexual abuse occurrence” within the meaning of the TIG policy."
} | 1,611,197 | a |
. We note that several federal appellate courts have assumed that Batson has applicability to racial or ethnic groups other than black Americans. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "822 F.2d 214, 227",
"parenthetical": "under the Sixth Amendment, whites are a cognizable group for Batson analysis",
"sentence": "Cf. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227 (2d Cir.1987) (under the Sixth Amendment, whites are a cognizable group for Batson analysis), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 12, 1987) (No. 87-6031)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "832 F.2d 1175, 1180",
"parenthetical": "applying Batson to a challenge that Hispanic-Americans were improperly excluded from jury service",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir.1987) (applying Batson to a challenge that Hispanic-Americans were improperly excluded from jury service); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir.1987) (applying Batson to a challenge that Native Americans were improperly excluded from jury service)."
} | 10,526,534 | b |
. We note that several federal appellate courts have assumed that Batson has applicability to racial or ethnic groups other than black Americans. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "822 F.2d 214, 227",
"parenthetical": "under the Sixth Amendment, whites are a cognizable group for Batson analysis",
"sentence": "Cf. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227 (2d Cir.1987) (under the Sixth Amendment, whites are a cognizable group for Batson analysis), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 12, 1987) (No. 87-6031)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14",
"parenthetical": "applying Batson to a challenge that Native Americans were improperly excluded from jury service",
"sentence": "See e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir.1987) (applying Batson to a challenge that Hispanic-Americans were improperly excluded from jury service); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir.1987) (applying Batson to a challenge that Native Americans were improperly excluded from jury service)."
} | 10,526,534 | b |
In this instance, analysis under two of three Lopez categories (one and three) is appropriate. Lopez category two does not apply because section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is not a regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of persons or things in interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "130 F.3d 1046, 1046",
"parenthetical": "rejecting notion that endangered species of fly found only in California was \"thing in interstate commerce,\" in action challenging constitutionality of \"taking\" provision of ESA",
"sentence": "National Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046 (rejecting notion that endangered species of fly found only in California was “thing in interstate commerce,” in action challenging constitutionality of “taking” provision of ESA). Although Edwards species are captured, shipped to and traded among various museums and zoos, this is not sufficient to make the them instrumentalities or things in interstate commerce."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 559, 559",
"parenthetical": "rejecting application of Lopez prong two to Gun-Free School Zones Act, despite the fact that the regulated guns likely traveled through interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (rejecting application of Lopez prong two to Gun-Free School Zones Act, despite the fact that the regulated guns likely traveled through interstate commerce)."
} | 9,322,770 | a |
In this instance, analysis under two of three Lopez categories (one and three) is appropriate. Lopez category two does not apply because section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is not a regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of persons or things in interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting application of Lopez prong two to Gun-Free School Zones Act, despite the fact that the regulated guns likely traveled through interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (rejecting application of Lopez prong two to Gun-Free School Zones Act, despite the fact that the regulated guns likely traveled through interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "130 F.3d 1046, 1046",
"parenthetical": "rejecting notion that endangered species of fly found only in California was \"thing in interstate commerce,\" in action challenging constitutionality of \"taking\" provision of ESA",
"sentence": "National Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046 (rejecting notion that endangered species of fly found only in California was “thing in interstate commerce,” in action challenging constitutionality of “taking” provision of ESA). Although Edwards species are captured, shipped to and traded among various museums and zoos, this is not sufficient to make the them instrumentalities or things in interstate commerce."
} | 9,322,770 | b |
While we are convinced that a utility board's right to substantive, municipal immunity is a question of whether "(1) the entity is created directly by the [municipality], so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the [municipality], or (2) the entity is administered by individuals who are controlled by public officials and responsible to such officials or [who are controlled by and responsible to] the general public," C. Keating and J. Perkowitz-Solheim, McQuillin's Law of Municipal Corporations SS 53.05b (3d ed,, 1984 & 1991 Cum.Supp.), we do not find it necessary to address this issue in this case. Because Hilliard sued the Utility Board for negligence not involving a negligent inspection, he has effectively circumvented any available substantive immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "asserting that SS 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring SS 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | 7,515,112 | a |
While we are convinced that a utility board's right to substantive, municipal immunity is a question of whether "(1) the entity is created directly by the [municipality], so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the [municipality], or (2) the entity is administered by individuals who are controlled by public officials and responsible to such officials or [who are controlled by and responsible to] the general public," C. Keating and J. Perkowitz-Solheim, McQuillin's Law of Municipal Corporations SS 53.05b (3d ed,, 1984 & 1991 Cum.Supp.), we do not find it necessary to address this issue in this case. Because Hilliard sued the Utility Board for negligence not involving a negligent inspection, he has effectively circumvented any available substantive immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring SS 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "asserting that SS 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | 7,515,112 | b |
While we are convinced that a utility board's right to substantive, municipal immunity is a question of whether "(1) the entity is created directly by the [municipality], so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the [municipality], or (2) the entity is administered by individuals who are controlled by public officials and responsible to such officials or [who are controlled by and responsible to] the general public," C. Keating and J. Perkowitz-Solheim, McQuillin's Law of Municipal Corporations SS 53.05b (3d ed,, 1984 & 1991 Cum.Supp.), we do not find it necessary to address this issue in this case. Because Hilliard sued the Utility Board for negligence not involving a negligent inspection, he has effectively circumvented any available substantive immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "asserting that SS 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring SS 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | 7,515,112 | a |
While we are convinced that a utility board's right to substantive, municipal immunity is a question of whether "(1) the entity is created directly by the [municipality], so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the [municipality], or (2) the entity is administered by individuals who are controlled by public officials and responsible to such officials or [who are controlled by and responsible to] the general public," C. Keating and J. Perkowitz-Solheim, McQuillin's Law of Municipal Corporations SS 53.05b (3d ed,, 1984 & 1991 Cum.Supp.), we do not find it necessary to address this issue in this case. Because Hilliard sued the Utility Board for negligence not involving a negligent inspection, he has effectively circumvented any available substantive immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring SS 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "asserting that SS 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed",
"sentence": "See, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 151 So.2d 240 (1963) (asserting that § 11-47-190 allows suits against a municipality only for negligence of an agent, employee, or officer acting within the line and scope of his duty, or for the municipality's failure to remedy a defect in its streets, alleyways, or buildings after notice of such defect or a reasonable time for such notice to be imputed); see also, Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975) (largely abrogating substantive, municipal immunity, and declaring § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to be the policy of this state regarding municipal immunity); and Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So.2d 385 (Ala.1982) (declaring that negligent inspections are not covered by the negligence exception to municipal immunity stated in § 11-47-190), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.2d 889 (Ala.1991) (following Rich in holding that the City enjoyed substantive immunity for an alleged negligent inspection)."
} | 7,515,112 | b |
(Dkt. No. 345, Ex. 1 at APP00007; Dkt. No. 349, Ex. 42 at APP00963.). The parties do not insinuate that the language set forth above is ambiguous. Therefore, because the provision is not ambiguous, the Court will employ the plain meaning of its terms. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2008 WL 2405975, *1",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that exclusionary language is unambiguous and both phrases -- \"profit or advantage\" and \"legally entitled\" -- have been applied by courts without explanation or difficulty",
"sentence": "See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir.1998) (when exclusion is susceptible to one interpreta tion, courts employ the exclusion as written); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 4:07-CV-1958, 2008 WL 2405975, *1 (S.D.Tex. June 11, 2008) (reasoning that exclusionary language is unambiguous and both phrases — “profit or advantage” and “legally entitled” — have been applied by courts without explanation or difficulty)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 363, 369",
"parenthetical": "when exclusion is susceptible to one interpreta tion, courts employ the exclusion as written",
"sentence": "See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir.1998) (when exclusion is susceptible to one interpreta tion, courts employ the exclusion as written); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 4:07-CV-1958, 2008 WL 2405975, *1 (S.D.Tex. June 11, 2008) (reasoning that exclusionary language is unambiguous and both phrases — “profit or advantage” and “legally entitled” — have been applied by courts without explanation or difficulty)."
} | 4,325,583 | b |
Most courts construing IIRIRA have held that SS 1252(g) completely divests a district court of statutory jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General arising out of deportation proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1210, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to decide the instant action [arising from the 'decision or action' of the Attorney General to execute a removal order].\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1997), (“IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to decide the instant action [arising from the ‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General to execute a removal order].”), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3264 (1997) (No. 97-52); Safarian v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. at 1105 (“Generally, § 1252 has been held to divest the district court completely of all jurisdiction to review alien’s claims.”) (citing cases); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997) (“IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.”), cert. denied sub nom. Katsoulis v. INS, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "970 F.Supp. 130, 157",
"parenthetical": "holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing SS 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine",
"sentence": "But see Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing § 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.1997) (“[T]he vague and uncertain language of Section 306(a)(2) of the IIRIRA (“except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear ...”) does not eliminate the recognized jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas corpus claims of any person in custody, including deportable aliens.”)."
} | 1,570,855 | a |
Most courts construing IIRIRA have held that SS 1252(g) completely divests a district court of statutory jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General arising out of deportation proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "968 F.Supp. 1105, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"Generally, SS 1252 has been held to divest the district court completely of all jurisdiction to review alien's claims.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1997), (“IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to decide the instant action [arising from the ‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General to execute a removal order].”), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3264 (1997) (No. 97-52); Safarian v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. at 1105 (“Generally, § 1252 has been held to divest the district court completely of all jurisdiction to review alien’s claims.”) (citing cases); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997) (“IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.”), cert. denied sub nom. Katsoulis v. INS, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "970 F.Supp. 130, 157",
"parenthetical": "holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing SS 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine",
"sentence": "But see Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing § 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.1997) (“[T]he vague and uncertain language of Section 306(a)(2) of the IIRIRA (“except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear ...”) does not eliminate the recognized jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas corpus claims of any person in custody, including deportable aliens.”)."
} | 1,570,855 | a |
Most courts construing IIRIRA have held that SS 1252(g) completely divests a district court of statutory jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General arising out of deportation proceedings. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "970 F.Supp. 130, 157",
"parenthetical": "holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing SS 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine",
"sentence": "But see Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing § 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.1997) (“[T]he vague and uncertain language of Section 306(a)(2) of the IIRIRA (“except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear ...”) does not eliminate the recognized jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas corpus claims of any person in custody, including deportable aliens.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 F.3d 1185, 1195",
"parenthetical": "\"IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under SS 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1997), (“IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to decide the instant action [arising from the ‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General to execute a removal order].”), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3264 (1997) (No. 97-52); Safarian v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. at 1105 (“Generally, § 1252 has been held to divest the district court completely of all jurisdiction to review alien’s claims.”) (citing cases); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997) (“IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.”), cert. denied sub nom. Katsoulis v. INS, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997)."
} | 1,570,855 | b |
Most courts construing IIRIRA have held that SS 1252(g) completely divests a district court of statutory jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General arising out of deportation proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under SS 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1997), (“IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to decide the instant action [arising from the ‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General to execute a removal order].”), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3264 (1997) (No. 97-52); Safarian v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. at 1105 (“Generally, § 1252 has been held to divest the district court completely of all jurisdiction to review alien’s claims.”) (citing cases); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997) (“IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.”), cert. denied sub nom. Katsoulis v. INS, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "970 F.Supp. 130, 157",
"parenthetical": "holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing SS 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine",
"sentence": "But see Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing § 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.1997) (“[T]he vague and uncertain language of Section 306(a)(2) of the IIRIRA (“except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear ...”) does not eliminate the recognized jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas corpus claims of any person in custody, including deportable aliens.”)."
} | 1,570,855 | a |
Most courts construing IIRIRA have held that SS 1252(g) completely divests a district court of statutory jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General arising out of deportation proceedings. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "970 F.Supp. 130, 157",
"parenthetical": "holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing SS 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine",
"sentence": "But see Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (holding that IIRIRA does not remove statutory habeas jurisdiction because it does not contain express language repealing § 2241 and because to do so would violate the separation of powers doctrine); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.1997) (“[T]he vague and uncertain language of Section 306(a)(2) of the IIRIRA (“except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear ...”) does not eliminate the recognized jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas corpus claims of any person in custody, including deportable aliens.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under SS 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1997), (“IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to decide the instant action [arising from the ‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General to execute a removal order].”), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3264 (1997) (No. 97-52); Safarian v. Reno, 968 F.Supp. at 1105 (“Generally, § 1252 has been held to divest the district court completely of all jurisdiction to review alien’s claims.”) (citing cases); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997) (“IIR[IR]A abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ, unaided by statute.”), cert. denied sub nom. Katsoulis v. INS, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997)."
} | 1,570,855 | b |
Accordingly, because the Board erred by failing to provide Mrs. Reliford with the opportunity to waive substitution and prejudiced her by failing to adjudicate her accrued-benefits claim against the proper factual background, the Board decision on appeal will be set aside and remanded for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford's claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband's death. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 Vet.App. 384, 394",
"parenthetical": "holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board's adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance",
"sentence": "See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, “the Board has incorrectly applied the law”); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board’s adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance); cf. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06 (2005) (holding that the “existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board” and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "11 Vet.App. 369, 374",
"parenthetical": "holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, \"the Board has incorrectly applied the law\"",
"sentence": "See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, “the Board has incorrectly applied the law”); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board’s adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance); cf. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06 (2005) (holding that the “existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board” and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor)."
} | 4,046,606 | b |
Accordingly, because the Board erred by failing to provide Mrs. Reliford with the opportunity to waive substitution and prejudiced her by failing to adjudicate her accrued-benefits claim against the proper factual background, the Board decision on appeal will be set aside and remanded for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford's claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband's death. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board\" and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor",
"sentence": "See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, “the Board has incorrectly applied the law”); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board’s adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance); cf. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06 (2005) (holding that the “existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board” and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "11 Vet.App. 369, 374",
"parenthetical": "holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, \"the Board has incorrectly applied the law\"",
"sentence": "See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, “the Board has incorrectly applied the law”); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board’s adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance); cf. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06 (2005) (holding that the “existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board” and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor)."
} | 4,046,606 | b |
Accordingly, because the Board erred by failing to provide Mrs. Reliford with the opportunity to waive substitution and prejudiced her by failing to adjudicate her accrued-benefits claim against the proper factual background, the Board decision on appeal will be set aside and remanded for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford's claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband's death. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board\" and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor",
"sentence": "See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, “the Board has incorrectly applied the law”); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board’s adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance); cf. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06 (2005) (holding that the “existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board” and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 Vet.App. 384, 394",
"parenthetical": "holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board's adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance",
"sentence": "See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where, inter alia, “the Board has incorrectly applied the law”); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (holding the Board must either obtain a waiver or determine whether a claimant will be prejudiced by the Board’s adjudication of a question or issue in an appeal not otherwise decided by the RO, otherwise it must remand for the RO to decide' the question in the first instance); cf. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405-06 (2005) (holding that the “existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the Board” and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evi-dentiary factual basis therefor)."
} | 4,046,606 | b |
In order to qualify as third-party beneficiaries to a government contract, the parties must show that the United States waived its defense of sovereign immunity. The court's Tucker Act jurisdiction extends only to plaintiffs in privity of contract with the Government. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "331 F.3d 899, 899",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the Tucker Act, there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the United States\"",
"sentence": "Chancellor Manor, 331 F.3d at 899 (holding that “for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the Tucker Act, there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the United States”); see Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed.Cir.1994) (holding that “[a]bsent privity between [plaintiffs] and the government, there is no ease”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 1204, 1210",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[a]bsent privity between [plaintiffs] and the government, there is no ease\"",
"sentence": "Chancellor Manor, 331 F.3d at 899 (holding that “for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the Tucker Act, there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the United States”); see Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed.Cir.1994) (holding that “[a]bsent privity between [plaintiffs] and the government, there is no ease”)."
} | 2,993,046 | a |
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