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We have held that "willful disobedience [of] a single court order may alone justify disbarment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "291 Minn. 488, 495",
"parenthetical": "disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "567 N.W.2d 259, 265",
"parenthetical": "stating that the attorney's \"behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,\" including \"his repeated failure to comply with court orders\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | 7,063,006 | a |
We have held that "willful disobedience [of] a single court order may alone justify disbarment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "242 Minn. 427, 431",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "291 Minn. 488, 495",
"parenthetical": "disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | 7,063,006 | b |
We have held that "willful disobedience [of] a single court order may alone justify disbarment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "291 Minn. 488, 495",
"parenthetical": "disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 N.W.2d 581, 583",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | 7,063,006 | a |
We have held that "willful disobedience [of] a single court order may alone justify disbarment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "567 N.W.2d 259, 265",
"parenthetical": "stating that the attorney's \"behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,\" including \"his repeated failure to comply with court orders\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 N.W.2d 176, 181",
"parenthetical": "disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | 7,063,006 | b |
We have held that "willful disobedience [of] a single court order may alone justify disbarment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "242 Minn. 427, 431",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 N.W.2d 176, 181",
"parenthetical": "disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | 7,063,006 | b |
We have held that "willful disobedience [of] a single court order may alone justify disbarment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 N.W.2d 176, 181",
"parenthetical": "disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 N.W.2d 581, 583",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate",
"sentence": "In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1971) (disbarring an attorney for, among other things, continuing to file lawsuits after a federal court had issued an order prohibiting him from relitigating a particular issue and willfully defying an order from this court forbidding him from engaging in further proceedings in a case before a justice of the peace); see also In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn.1997) (stating that the attorney’s “behavior provided us with at least three separate grounds upon which he could be disbarred,” including “his repeated failure to comply with court orders” (emphasis added)); In re Joyce, 242 Minn. 427, 431, 65 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1954) (holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate). We also have considered an attorney’s failure to comply with a disciplinary order when ordering disbarment."
} | 7,063,006 | a |
The First Circuit recently held that "attendance is an essential function of any job." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under Rehabilitation Act, employee with excessive absences related to claimed disability was not qualified individual",
"sentence": "See also Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir.1995) (under Rehabilitation Act, employee with excessive absences related to claimed disability was not qualified individual)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "520 F.3d 31, 42",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation, as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "Rios-Jimenez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31, 42 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation, as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the Rehabilitation Act)."
} | 5,759,665 | b |
Similarly, several courts have upheld the admissibility of responses to routine questions asked during the booking and processing of arrestees and their belongings either before Miranda warnings had been given or after the suspect had requested a lawyer or indicated an intent to remain silent. The Second Circuit, nonetheless, ruled the response admissible, citing a draft of the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure SS 140.8(5), supra note 2, and stating that in Miranda, "the Supreme Court was concerned with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking and arraignment [such as marital status]." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86",
"parenthetical": "admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule",
"sentence": "Id. at 1112-13. Accord, United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840, 98 S.Ct. 135, 54 L.Ed.2d 104 (1977) (admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91",
"parenthetical": "similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation",
"sentence": "Cf. Cannistraci v. Smith, 470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation)."
} | 1,392,153 | a |
Similarly, several courts have upheld the admissibility of responses to routine questions asked during the booking and processing of arrestees and their belongings either before Miranda warnings had been given or after the suspect had requested a lawyer or indicated an intent to remain silent. The Second Circuit, nonetheless, ruled the response admissible, citing a draft of the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure SS 140.8(5), supra note 2, and stating that in Miranda, "the Supreme Court was concerned with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking and arraignment [such as marital status]." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule",
"sentence": "Id. at 1112-13. Accord, United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840, 98 S.Ct. 135, 54 L.Ed.2d 104 (1977) (admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91",
"parenthetical": "similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation",
"sentence": "Cf. Cannistraci v. Smith, 470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation)."
} | 1,392,153 | a |
Similarly, several courts have upheld the admissibility of responses to routine questions asked during the booking and processing of arrestees and their belongings either before Miranda warnings had been given or after the suspect had requested a lawyer or indicated an intent to remain silent. The Second Circuit, nonetheless, ruled the response admissible, citing a draft of the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure SS 140.8(5), supra note 2, and stating that in Miranda, "the Supreme Court was concerned with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking and arraignment [such as marital status]." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91",
"parenthetical": "similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation",
"sentence": "Cf. Cannistraci v. Smith, 470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule",
"sentence": "Id. at 1112-13. Accord, United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840, 98 S.Ct. 135, 54 L.Ed.2d 104 (1977) (admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule)."
} | 1,392,153 | b |
Similarly, several courts have upheld the admissibility of responses to routine questions asked during the booking and processing of arrestees and their belongings either before Miranda warnings had been given or after the suspect had requested a lawyer or indicated an intent to remain silent. The Second Circuit, nonetheless, ruled the response admissible, citing a draft of the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure SS 140.8(5), supra note 2, and stating that in Miranda, "the Supreme Court was concerned with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking and arraignment [such as marital status]." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91",
"parenthetical": "similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation",
"sentence": "Cf. Cannistraci v. Smith, 470 F.Supp. 586, 589-91 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (similar dialogue in squad car held not to be proscribed interrogation)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule",
"sentence": "Id. at 1112-13. Accord, United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840, 98 S.Ct. 135, 54 L.Ed.2d 104 (1977) (admission of an alias during booking is not within Miranda rule)."
} | 1,392,153 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22",
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22",
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22",
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility\" where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36",
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | a |
. Under these circumstances, we need not reach the question whether or when an entrapment defense may be consistent with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.1993) (\"As we have recently noted, '[w]here a defendant persists in asserting entrapment, she cannot also claim acceptance of responsibility.’ \") (quoting United States v. Simpson, 995 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir.1993)); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1992) (\"finding] that the district court correctly determined that the defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” where he \"attempted to place the blame for his selling drugs upon the government inducement”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1080, 114 S.Ct 901, 127 L.Ed.2d 92 (1994); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.) (\"While it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility, here we cannot hold that the court erred in not allowing the reduction because the claim of entrapment was made by a person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994) (\"not[ing] that the district court could not have found that [the defendant] had not accepted responsibility solely because he presented an entrapment defense at trial”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995)."
} | 3,698,053 | b |
In carving out this exception for a prison cell, the Supreme Court balanced the individual's constitutional right to privacy with the legitimate interests of the prison, and found that the privacy right must always yield in this context. Of course, the existence of this exception does not abrogate the rule that an individual normally possesses an expectation of privacy while incarcerated; instead, this exception emphasizes the need to balance the competing interests of the individual and the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "880 F.2d 1188, 1191",
"parenthetical": "\"[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner's privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved\"",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | 11,851,204 | a |
In carving out this exception for a prison cell, the Supreme Court balanced the individual's constitutional right to privacy with the legitimate interests of the prison, and found that the privacy right must always yield in this context. Of course, the existence of this exception does not abrogate the rule that an individual normally possesses an expectation of privacy while incarcerated; instead, this exception emphasizes the need to balance the competing interests of the individual and the government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 2608, 2608",
"parenthetical": "balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "880 F.2d 1188, 1191",
"parenthetical": "\"[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner's privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved\"",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | 11,851,204 | b |
In carving out this exception for a prison cell, the Supreme Court balanced the individual's constitutional right to privacy with the legitimate interests of the prison, and found that the privacy right must always yield in this context. Of course, the existence of this exception does not abrogate the rule that an individual normally possesses an expectation of privacy while incarcerated; instead, this exception emphasizes the need to balance the competing interests of the individual and the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "942 F.Supp. 499, 502",
"parenthetical": "\"though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates\"",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | 11,851,204 | a |
In carving out this exception for a prison cell, the Supreme Court balanced the individual's constitutional right to privacy with the legitimate interests of the prison, and found that the privacy right must always yield in this context. Of course, the existence of this exception does not abrogate the rule that an individual normally possesses an expectation of privacy while incarcerated; instead, this exception emphasizes the need to balance the competing interests of the individual and the government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "103 S.Ct. 2608, 2608",
"parenthetical": "balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "942 F.Supp. 499, 502",
"parenthetical": "\"though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates\"",
"sentence": "See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1989) (“[although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell ... the prisoner’s privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved”); Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.Kan.1996) (“though inmates have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells ... the traditional Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to personal body searches of inmates”); see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 (balancing an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interests supported by an inventory search)."
} | 11,851,204 | b |
Thus, the district court did not calculate drug quantity in order to apply a mandatory minimum, but only to calculate the Sentencing Guidelines that applied with no mandatory minimum. The latter calculation does not implicate Apprendi. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "133 S.Ct. 2155, 2155",
"parenthetical": "requiring any fact that increases statutory minimum to be submitted to jury",
"sentence": "See United States v. McLeod, 251 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.2001) (“Apprendi is inapplicable to Guidelines calculations that do not result in a sentence on a single count above the statutory maximum for that count.”); cf. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. at 2155 (requiring any fact that increases statutory minimum to be submitted to jury). Accordingly, we identify no Apprendi error here, let alone plain error."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 78, 82",
"parenthetical": "\"Apprendi is inapplicable to Guidelines calculations that do not result in a sentence on a single count above the statutory maximum for that count.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. McLeod, 251 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.2001) (“Apprendi is inapplicable to Guidelines calculations that do not result in a sentence on a single count above the statutory maximum for that count.”); cf. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. at 2155 (requiring any fact that increases statutory minimum to be submitted to jury). Accordingly, we identify no Apprendi error here, let alone plain error."
} | 3,634,418 | b |
Finally, Defendant Hollan points to K.R.S. SS 61.035, which provides that: "Any duty enjoined by law or by the Rules of Civil Procedure upon a ministerial officer, and any act permitted to be done by him, may be performed by his lawful deputy." Although this statute is one of general application in that it does not specifically mention County Clerks or deputy county clerks, Kentucky courts have held that it can apply to deputy county clerks in the performance of some duties. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "383 S.W.2d 374, 376",
"parenthetical": "a deputy county clerk can participate in the public examination of absentee ballot applications by virtue of K.R.S. SS 61.035",
"sentence": "See Halla-ban v. Cranfill, 383 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky. 1964) (a deputy county clerk can participate in the public examination of absentee ballot applications by virtue of K.R.S. § 61.035); see also Asher v. Sizemore, 261 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Ky.1953) (a deputy county clerk can administer an oath in his or her own name pursuant to K.R.S. § 61.035). This statute, however, is not a clear enough expression of the Kentucky General Assembly’s wish to convert the position of deputy county clerk into a political position covered by one of the McCloud categories."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "261 S.W.2d 665, 666",
"parenthetical": "a deputy county clerk can administer an oath in his or her own name pursuant to K.R.S. SS 61.035",
"sentence": "See Halla-ban v. Cranfill, 383 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky. 1964) (a deputy county clerk can participate in the public examination of absentee ballot applications by virtue of K.R.S. § 61.035); see also Asher v. Sizemore, 261 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Ky.1953) (a deputy county clerk can administer an oath in his or her own name pursuant to K.R.S. § 61.035). This statute, however, is not a clear enough expression of the Kentucky General Assembly’s wish to convert the position of deputy county clerk into a political position covered by one of the McCloud categories."
} | 1,618,066 | a |
Second, the Vacating Order is void under Texas Law, and we have said that Rooker-Feldman does not preclude review of void state court judgments. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "263 U.S. 415, 415",
"parenthetical": "finding no federal jurisdiction to review state court judgment where the state court had subject matter over the underlying case, but noting that \"[i]f the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate' and timely appellate proceeding\"",
"sentence": "Tex., 275 Fed.Appx. 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing Shepherd for the proposition that, “[u]nder some circumstances, a federal court may review the state court record to determine if the judgment is void”); cf. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415, 44 S.Ct. 149 (finding no federal jurisdiction to review state court judgment where the state court had subject matter over the underlying case, but noting that “[i]f the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate' and timely appellate proceeding”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 923, 925",
"parenthetical": "observing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely not bar federal court review of void state court judgments, although it would still preclude jurisdiction to review voidable state court judgments",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely not bar federal court review of void state court judgments, although it would still preclude jurisdiction to review voidable state court judgments); see also Truong, 717 F.3d at 383 n.3 (citing Shepherd for the proposition that “Rooker-Feldman prohibits a district court from voiding state foreclosure judgments, notwithstanding claims that the judgments were fraudulently procured” (emphasis added)); Mosley v. Bowie Cty."
} | 12,264,547 | b |
Second, the Vacating Order is void under Texas Law, and we have said that Rooker-Feldman does not preclude review of void state court judgments. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no federal jurisdiction to review state court judgment where the state court had subject matter over the underlying case, but noting that \"[i]f the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate' and timely appellate proceeding\"",
"sentence": "Tex., 275 Fed.Appx. 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing Shepherd for the proposition that, “[u]nder some circumstances, a federal court may review the state court record to determine if the judgment is void”); cf. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415, 44 S.Ct. 149 (finding no federal jurisdiction to review state court judgment where the state court had subject matter over the underlying case, but noting that “[i]f the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate' and timely appellate proceeding”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 923, 925",
"parenthetical": "observing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely not bar federal court review of void state court judgments, although it would still preclude jurisdiction to review voidable state court judgments",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely not bar federal court review of void state court judgments, although it would still preclude jurisdiction to review voidable state court judgments); see also Truong, 717 F.3d at 383 n.3 (citing Shepherd for the proposition that “Rooker-Feldman prohibits a district court from voiding state foreclosure judgments, notwithstanding claims that the judgments were fraudulently procured” (emphasis added)); Mosley v. Bowie Cty."
} | 12,264,547 | b |
Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence existed to support denial of Harry's directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in civil arson case, court affirmed denial of insured's directed verdict motion where insurer presented evidence fire at claimant's home was intentionally set and claimant was experiencing financial difficulty",
"sentence": "See State v. Chisholm, 187 S.C. 275, 197 S.E. 308 (1938) (affirming arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence that included foreclosure proceedings shortly before fire, and changes in insurance coverage by defendant’s mother to include coverage for all personalty); cf. Carter v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 218, 375 S.E. (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1988) (in civil arson case, court affirmed denial of insured’s directed verdict motion where insurer presented evidence fire at claimant’s home was intentionally set and claimant was experiencing financial difficulty)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence that included foreclosure proceedings shortly before fire, and changes in insurance coverage by defendant's mother to include coverage for all personalty",
"sentence": "See State v. Chisholm, 187 S.C. 275, 197 S.E. 308 (1938) (affirming arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence that included foreclosure proceedings shortly before fire, and changes in insurance coverage by defendant’s mother to include coverage for all personalty); cf. Carter v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 218, 375 S.E. (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1988) (in civil arson case, court affirmed denial of insured’s directed verdict motion where insurer presented evidence fire at claimant’s home was intentionally set and claimant was experiencing financial difficulty)."
} | 92,282 | b |
Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence existed to support denial of Harry's directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence that included foreclosure proceedings shortly before fire, and changes in insurance coverage by defendant's mother to include coverage for all personalty",
"sentence": "See State v. Chisholm, 187 S.C. 275, 197 S.E. 308 (1938) (affirming arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence that included foreclosure proceedings shortly before fire, and changes in insurance coverage by defendant’s mother to include coverage for all personalty); cf. Carter v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 218, 375 S.E. (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1988) (in civil arson case, court affirmed denial of insured’s directed verdict motion where insurer presented evidence fire at claimant’s home was intentionally set and claimant was experiencing financial difficulty)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in civil arson case, court affirmed denial of insured's directed verdict motion where insurer presented evidence fire at claimant's home was intentionally set and claimant was experiencing financial difficulty",
"sentence": "See State v. Chisholm, 187 S.C. 275, 197 S.E. 308 (1938) (affirming arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence that included foreclosure proceedings shortly before fire, and changes in insurance coverage by defendant’s mother to include coverage for all personalty); cf. Carter v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 218, 375 S.E. (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1988) (in civil arson case, court affirmed denial of insured’s directed verdict motion where insurer presented evidence fire at claimant’s home was intentionally set and claimant was experiencing financial difficulty)."
} | 92,282 | a |
On the other hand, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has shown evident reluctance to create duties disproportionate to the ability of business to protect against dangers of wrongdoing by third parties. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "640 F.Supp. 119, 119",
"parenthetical": "taxi operator is not liable for criminal attacks on passengers",
"sentence": "See J.A.D.M., 132 D.P.R. at 799, 1993 P.R.Eng. 840023 (noting that imposing liability too easily would mean that “every store or warehouse would have to be policed by the owner”); cf. Jacob, 640 F.Supp. at 119 (taxi operator is not liable for criminal attacks on passengers). Yet, despite these hesitations, the Puerto Rico courts have not suggested that small businesses are automatically exempt from providing reasonable protection against known dangers, whether by warnings, security features or otherwise."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 D.P.R. 799, 799",
"parenthetical": "noting that imposing liability too easily would mean that \"every store or warehouse would have to be policed by the owner\"",
"sentence": "See J.A.D.M., 132 D.P.R. at 799, 1993 P.R.Eng. 840023 (noting that imposing liability too easily would mean that “every store or warehouse would have to be policed by the owner”); cf. Jacob, 640 F.Supp. at 119 (taxi operator is not liable for criminal attacks on passengers). Yet, despite these hesitations, the Puerto Rico courts have not suggested that small businesses are automatically exempt from providing reasonable protection against known dangers, whether by warnings, security features or otherwise."
} | 9,178,222 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | 4,150,900 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | 4,150,900 | a |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | 4,150,900 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | 4,150,900 | a |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | 4,150,900 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | 4,150,900 | a |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | 4,150,900 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | 4,150,900 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | 4,150,900 | a |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | 4,150,900 | b |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | 4,150,900 | a |
South Carolina law recognizes, upon proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.\"",
"sentence": "Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers",
"sentence": "See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (holding, in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds, that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property, both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount, with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 649, 118 S.E.2d 701 (1961) (holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee); Cromer v. Cromer, 293 S.C. 360, 360 S.E.2d 528 (App.1987) (holding, where two brothers were involved in a partnership operating a business in a barn and one brother purchased insurance on the barn, which later burned, that the partner who did not purchase insurance had an equitable lien because the insurance was taken out for the benefit of the partnership and therefore, the insurance company was jointly and severally liable to both brothers)."
} | 4,150,900 | a |
. The time period does not begin to run until the client actually learns of his lawyer's default. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 S.W.2d 438, 438",
"parenthetical": "ruling that clients were damaged when their attorney informed them of his mistake, not necessarily when the mistake was actually made",
"sentence": "See Dixon, 649 S.W.2d at 438 (ruling that clients were damaged when their attorney informed them of his mistake, not necessarily when the mistake was actually made); Nuspl v. Missouri Medical Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 920, 922-3 (Mo.App.1992) (ruling that insured was damaged when insurance coverage was denied, not when the policy was delivered); see also O'Reilly v. Dock, 929 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Mo.App.1996) (distinguishing “layman/expert cases” where plaintiffs are unable to ascertain their injuries without the help of experts from “most cases\" where plaintiffs can ascertain their own injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 S.W.2d 297, 300",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing \"layman/expert cases\" where plaintiffs are unable to ascertain their injuries without the help of experts from \"most cases\" where plaintiffs can ascertain their own injuries",
"sentence": "See Dixon, 649 S.W.2d at 438 (ruling that clients were damaged when their attorney informed them of his mistake, not necessarily when the mistake was actually made); Nuspl v. Missouri Medical Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 920, 922-3 (Mo.App.1992) (ruling that insured was damaged when insurance coverage was denied, not when the policy was delivered); see also O'Reilly v. Dock, 929 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Mo.App.1996) (distinguishing “layman/expert cases” where plaintiffs are unable to ascertain their injuries without the help of experts from “most cases\" where plaintiffs can ascertain their own injuries)."
} | 11,307,680 | a |
. The time period does not begin to run until the client actually learns of his lawyer's default. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "842 S.W.2d 920, 922-3",
"parenthetical": "ruling that insured was damaged when insurance coverage was denied, not when the policy was delivered",
"sentence": "See Dixon, 649 S.W.2d at 438 (ruling that clients were damaged when their attorney informed them of his mistake, not necessarily when the mistake was actually made); Nuspl v. Missouri Medical Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 920, 922-3 (Mo.App.1992) (ruling that insured was damaged when insurance coverage was denied, not when the policy was delivered); see also O'Reilly v. Dock, 929 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Mo.App.1996) (distinguishing “layman/expert cases” where plaintiffs are unable to ascertain their injuries without the help of experts from “most cases\" where plaintiffs can ascertain their own injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 S.W.2d 297, 300",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing \"layman/expert cases\" where plaintiffs are unable to ascertain their injuries without the help of experts from \"most cases\" where plaintiffs can ascertain their own injuries",
"sentence": "See Dixon, 649 S.W.2d at 438 (ruling that clients were damaged when their attorney informed them of his mistake, not necessarily when the mistake was actually made); Nuspl v. Missouri Medical Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 920, 922-3 (Mo.App.1992) (ruling that insured was damaged when insurance coverage was denied, not when the policy was delivered); see also O'Reilly v. Dock, 929 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Mo.App.1996) (distinguishing “layman/expert cases” where plaintiffs are unable to ascertain their injuries without the help of experts from “most cases\" where plaintiffs can ascertain their own injuries)."
} | 11,307,680 | a |
Indeed, had the Defendants miscalculated the duration of Ford's supervised release and requested arrest warrants be issued, but not arrested and detained Ford, Ford's Amended Complaint suggests that he would not have suffered any damage. For these reasons, Ford's damages arise out of his false arrest and/or false imprisonment, not the alleged negligent actions of the USPC and CSOSA Defendants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "947 F.2d 1507, 1507",
"parenthetical": "concluding that plaintiffs claims, though couched in terms of negligence, sounded in defamation and were therefore barred under FTCA",
"sentence": "See Kugel, 947 F.2d at 1507 (concluding that plaintiffs claims, though couched in terms of negligence, sounded in defamation and were therefore barred under FTCA); see also Snow-Erlin, 470 F.3d at 809 (holding that plaintiff could not sidestep the FTCA’s exclusion of false imprisonment claims by suing for the damage of false imprisonment under the label of negligence). Accordingly, the Court finds that Ford’s claims under the FTCA arise out of false arrest and false imprisonment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "470 F.3d 809, 809",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff could not sidestep the FTCA's exclusion of false imprisonment claims by suing for the damage of false imprisonment under the label of negligence",
"sentence": "See Kugel, 947 F.2d at 1507 (concluding that plaintiffs claims, though couched in terms of negligence, sounded in defamation and were therefore barred under FTCA); see also Snow-Erlin, 470 F.3d at 809 (holding that plaintiff could not sidestep the FTCA’s exclusion of false imprisonment claims by suing for the damage of false imprisonment under the label of negligence). Accordingly, the Court finds that Ford’s claims under the FTCA arise out of false arrest and false imprisonment."
} | 4,274,170 | a |
None of this evidence rebuts the fact that since at least 1988, DAD's written policy has been that limited duty assignments are temporary. That the DAD may have been lax in enforcing this policy does not change that fact. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 F.Supp. 999, 999-1000",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs' 16-year light duty assignment did not convert temporary assignment into permanent one",
"sentence": "See Champ, 884 F.Supp. at 999-1000 (plaintiffs’ 16-year light duty assignment did not convert temporary assignment into permanent one); see also Gaither v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md.App. 569, 618 A.2d 244 (1993) (fact that county permitted employee to work light duty for 10 years did not create duty to continue practice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that county permitted employee to work light duty for 10 years did not create duty to continue practice",
"sentence": "See Champ, 884 F.Supp. at 999-1000 (plaintiffs’ 16-year light duty assignment did not convert temporary assignment into permanent one); see also Gaither v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md.App. 569, 618 A.2d 244 (1993) (fact that county permitted employee to work light duty for 10 years did not create duty to continue practice)."
} | 914,400 | a |
None of this evidence rebuts the fact that since at least 1988, DAD's written policy has been that limited duty assignments are temporary. That the DAD may have been lax in enforcing this policy does not change that fact. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 F.Supp. 999, 999-1000",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs' 16-year light duty assignment did not convert temporary assignment into permanent one",
"sentence": "See Champ, 884 F.Supp. at 999-1000 (plaintiffs’ 16-year light duty assignment did not convert temporary assignment into permanent one); see also Gaither v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md.App. 569, 618 A.2d 244 (1993) (fact that county permitted employee to work light duty for 10 years did not create duty to continue practice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that county permitted employee to work light duty for 10 years did not create duty to continue practice",
"sentence": "See Champ, 884 F.Supp. at 999-1000 (plaintiffs’ 16-year light duty assignment did not convert temporary assignment into permanent one); see also Gaither v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md.App. 569, 618 A.2d 244 (1993) (fact that county permitted employee to work light duty for 10 years did not create duty to continue practice)."
} | 914,400 | a |
Where a plaintiff has been engaged in an activity of a civilian nature, the Feres bar has not been applied. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "704 F.2d 1431, 1439",
"parenthetical": "Feres held not to bar claim by officer who had been bartending at on-base officer's club because plaintiff stood \"in exactly the same position as a civilian employee.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir.1983) (Feres held not to bar claim by officer who had been bartending at on-base officer’s club because plaintiff stood “in exactly the same position as a civilian employee.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recovery by serviceman allowed where plaintiff was on base for the purpose of moving from his on-base to his off-base home",
"sentence": "See also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.1980), reh. den., 615 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.1981) (recovery by serviceman allowed where plaintiff was on base for the purpose of moving from his on-base to his off-base home)."
} | 3,795,941 | a |
Where a plaintiff has been engaged in an activity of a civilian nature, the Feres bar has not been applied. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recovery by serviceman allowed where plaintiff was on base for the purpose of moving from his on-base to his off-base home",
"sentence": "See also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.1980), reh. den., 615 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.1981) (recovery by serviceman allowed where plaintiff was on base for the purpose of moving from his on-base to his off-base home)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "704 F.2d 1431, 1439",
"parenthetical": "Feres held not to bar claim by officer who had been bartending at on-base officer's club because plaintiff stood \"in exactly the same position as a civilian employee.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir.1983) (Feres held not to bar claim by officer who had been bartending at on-base officer’s club because plaintiff stood “in exactly the same position as a civilian employee.”)."
} | 3,795,941 | b |
The statute itself does not state what weight to afford prior Supreme Court interpretations of the federal law. However, a general rule of statutory interpretation is that, when Oregon adopts the statute of another jurisdiction, the legislature is presumed also to adopt prior constructions of the statute by the highest court of that jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "261 Or 545, 550",
"parenthetical": "prior constructions are deemed \"highly persuasive\" of legislative intent to adopt",
"sentence": "Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or 545, 550, 495 P2d 273 (1972) (prior constructions are deemed “highly persuasive” of legislative intent to adopt); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad, Gray, 233 Or 578, 585, 379 P2d 880 (1963) (prior constructions establish a “presumption” of legislative adoption)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "297 Or 234, 244",
"parenthetical": "restating the established rule that when the Oregon Supreme Court, as the highest court in the state, interprets a statute, that interpretation becomes \"a part of the statute as if written into it at the time of its enactment\"",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Clevenger, 297 Or 234, 244, 683 P2d 1360 (1984) (restating the established rule that when the Oregon Supreme Court, as the highest court in the state, interprets a statute, that interpretation becomes “a part of the statute as if written into it at the time of its enactment”)."
} | 2,195,787 | a |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 14, 18-23",
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 573, 576-77",
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | 3,642,251 | a |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 14, 18-23",
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "446 U.S. 14, 18-23",
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 573, 576-77",
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74",
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74",
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74",
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 573, 576-77",
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | 3,642,251 | a |
.Our disposition does not require that we decide whether the district court properly implied a Bivens-type action for damages directly from the fifth amendment's takings clause. Resolution of this question would involve an analysis whether (a) the Tucker Act is an equally effective remedy, and (b) Congress intended the Tucker Act to supplant other remedies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal employment relationship \"is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy\"",
"sentence": "See also Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir.1981) (federal employment relationship “is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 73 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "also noting necessity for inquiry into \"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress\"",
"sentence": "See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (also noting necessity for inquiry into “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,642,251 | b |
In addition, even if Plaintiff is right that Amtrak is a private entity for purposes of PRIIA which it argues was intended "to boost the bottom-line of a for-profit corporation," Pl.'s Mot. at 28, that does not change its status for purposes of the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 392, 392",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Congress can determine Amtrak's status for the purpose of \"matters that are within Congress's control,\" like other federal statutes, but not for matters outside its control, like the Constitution",
"sentence": "See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392, 115 S.Ct. 961 (concluding that Congress can determine Amtrak’s status for the purpose of “matters that are within Congress’s control,” like other federal statutes, but not for matters outside its control, like the Constitution); see also Totten, 380 F.3d at 492 (concluding Amtrak is the government for purposes of the False Claims Act because “False Claims Act coverage is ... a matter within Congress’s control”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 492, 492",
"parenthetical": "concluding Amtrak is the government for purposes of the False Claims Act because \"False Claims Act coverage is ... a matter within Congress's control\"",
"sentence": "See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392, 115 S.Ct. 961 (concluding that Congress can determine Amtrak’s status for the purpose of “matters that are within Congress’s control,” like other federal statutes, but not for matters outside its control, like the Constitution); see also Totten, 380 F.3d at 492 (concluding Amtrak is the government for purposes of the False Claims Act because “False Claims Act coverage is ... a matter within Congress’s control”)."
} | 4,009,261 | a |
In addition, even if Plaintiff is right that Amtrak is a private entity for purposes of PRIIA which it argues was intended "to boost the bottom-line of a for-profit corporation," Pl.'s Mot. at 28, that does not change its status for purposes of the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 492, 492",
"parenthetical": "concluding Amtrak is the government for purposes of the False Claims Act because \"False Claims Act coverage is ... a matter within Congress's control\"",
"sentence": "See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392, 115 S.Ct. 961 (concluding that Congress can determine Amtrak’s status for the purpose of “matters that are within Congress’s control,” like other federal statutes, but not for matters outside its control, like the Constitution); see also Totten, 380 F.3d at 492 (concluding Amtrak is the government for purposes of the False Claims Act because “False Claims Act coverage is ... a matter within Congress’s control”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that Congress can determine Amtrak's status for the purpose of \"matters that are within Congress's control,\" like other federal statutes, but not for matters outside its control, like the Constitution",
"sentence": "See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392, 115 S.Ct. 961 (concluding that Congress can determine Amtrak’s status for the purpose of “matters that are within Congress’s control,” like other federal statutes, but not for matters outside its control, like the Constitution); see also Totten, 380 F.3d at 492 (concluding Amtrak is the government for purposes of the False Claims Act because “False Claims Act coverage is ... a matter within Congress’s control”)."
} | 4,009,261 | b |
Byrnes claims that Means harassed him because of his race and disability and Hat-tiesburg failed to adequately redress the harassment, which created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, SS 1981, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 229, 234-36",
"parenthetical": "extending Title VII hostile work environment jurisprudence - to disability-based harassment claims under the ADA",
"sentence": "Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 234-36 (5th Cir. 2001) (extending Title VII hostile work environment jurisprudence - to disability-based harassment claims under the ADA); see also Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the discrimination analysis under both Title VII and § 1981 is the same); Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 506 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that a hostile work environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act changes only the third prong by requiring that the harassment be “based solely on [plaintiffs] disability or disabilities” (quotation marks omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 987, 992",
"parenthetical": "noting that the discrimination analysis under both Title VII and SS 1981 is the same",
"sentence": "Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 234-36 (5th Cir. 2001) (extending Title VII hostile work environment jurisprudence - to disability-based harassment claims under the ADA); see also Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the discrimination analysis under both Title VII and § 1981 is the same); Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 506 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that a hostile work environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act changes only the third prong by requiring that the harassment be “based solely on [plaintiffs] disability or disabilities” (quotation marks omitted))."
} | 12,133,394 | a |
However, there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Attorney error which results in the fifing of an untimely petition is not a circumstance which justifies tolling the limitations period. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189",
"parenthetical": "petitioner's inability to retain counsel in a timely fashion to file habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling",
"sentence": "See Elliott v. DeWitt, 10 Fed.Appx. 311, 312, 2001 WL 523527 (6th Cir.2001) (“attorney’s mistake which results in missing the fifing deadline imposed by the AEDPA is not a basis for equitable tolling”); accord Smaldone v. Senkowski 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2nd Cir.2001); Frye v. Hickman, 258 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir.2001); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3rd Cir.2001); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2000); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000); see also Holloway v. Jones, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (E.D.Mich.2001) (petitioner’s inability to retain counsel in a timely fashion to file habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 Fed.Appx. 311, 312",
"parenthetical": "\"attorney's mistake which results in missing the fifing deadline imposed by the AEDPA is not a basis for equitable tolling\"",
"sentence": "See Elliott v. DeWitt, 10 Fed.Appx. 311, 312, 2001 WL 523527 (6th Cir.2001) (“attorney’s mistake which results in missing the fifing deadline imposed by the AEDPA is not a basis for equitable tolling”); accord Smaldone v. Senkowski 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2nd Cir.2001); Frye v. Hickman, 258 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir.2001); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3rd Cir.2001); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2000); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000); see also Holloway v. Jones, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (E.D.Mich.2001) (petitioner’s inability to retain counsel in a timely fashion to file habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling)."
} | 9,437,412 | b |
However, there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Attorney error which results in the fifing of an untimely petition is not a circumstance which justifies tolling the limitations period. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"attorney's mistake which results in missing the fifing deadline imposed by the AEDPA is not a basis for equitable tolling\"",
"sentence": "See Elliott v. DeWitt, 10 Fed.Appx. 311, 312, 2001 WL 523527 (6th Cir.2001) (“attorney’s mistake which results in missing the fifing deadline imposed by the AEDPA is not a basis for equitable tolling”); accord Smaldone v. Senkowski 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2nd Cir.2001); Frye v. Hickman, 258 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir.2001); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3rd Cir.2001); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2000); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000); see also Holloway v. Jones, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (E.D.Mich.2001) (petitioner’s inability to retain counsel in a timely fashion to file habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189",
"parenthetical": "petitioner's inability to retain counsel in a timely fashion to file habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling",
"sentence": "See Elliott v. DeWitt, 10 Fed.Appx. 311, 312, 2001 WL 523527 (6th Cir.2001) (“attorney’s mistake which results in missing the fifing deadline imposed by the AEDPA is not a basis for equitable tolling”); accord Smaldone v. Senkowski 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2nd Cir.2001); Frye v. Hickman, 258 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir.2001); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3rd Cir.2001); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2000); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000); see also Holloway v. Jones, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (E.D.Mich.2001) (petitioner’s inability to retain counsel in a timely fashion to file habeas petition did not warrant equitable tolling)."
} | 9,437,412 | a |
Furthermore, Cannon's sentence was made conditional on his compliance with the circuit court's order. As we have already stated, looking at the evidence in the record and deferring to the circuit court on matters of credibility, we find Cannon either had the ability to pay the $373,000 to purge his confinement or was unable to pay this fee as a direct consequence of his own actions and behavior from the start of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.C. 454, 454",
"parenthetical": "stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "328 S.C. 104, 104",
"parenthetical": "stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a \"substantial\" lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | 3,861,287 | a |
Furthermore, Cannon's sentence was made conditional on his compliance with the circuit court's order. As we have already stated, looking at the evidence in the record and deferring to the circuit court on matters of credibility, we find Cannon either had the ability to pay the $373,000 to purge his confinement or was unable to pay this fee as a direct consequence of his own actions and behavior from the start of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "492 S.E.2d 90, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a \"substantial\" lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 S.C. 454, 454",
"parenthetical": "stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | 3,861,287 | b |
Furthermore, Cannon's sentence was made conditional on his compliance with the circuit court's order. As we have already stated, looking at the evidence in the record and deferring to the circuit court on matters of credibility, we find Cannon either had the ability to pay the $373,000 to purge his confinement or was unable to pay this fee as a direct consequence of his own actions and behavior from the start of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "652 S.E.2d 760, 760",
"parenthetical": "stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "328 S.C. 104, 104",
"parenthetical": "stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a \"substantial\" lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | 3,861,287 | a |
Furthermore, Cannon's sentence was made conditional on his compliance with the circuit court's order. As we have already stated, looking at the evidence in the record and deferring to the circuit court on matters of credibility, we find Cannon either had the ability to pay the $373,000 to purge his confinement or was unable to pay this fee as a direct consequence of his own actions and behavior from the start of the proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "652 S.E.2d 760, 760",
"parenthetical": "stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "492 S.E.2d 90, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a \"substantial\" lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000",
"sentence": "See Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 (stating contemnor must be without fault in his inability to comply with the court order); cf. Thornton, 328 S.C. at 104, 492 S.E.2d at 90-91 (stating the family court found husband had the ability to pay arrearages of $21,000 and was, therefore, in contempt for failure to pay, despite his claim that he lacked the means to pay because husband had received approximately $350,000 from a recent legal settlement, he had a “substantial” lifestyle, and he owned several properties, including a lien-free Georgetown office valued at $250,000 and a one-half interest in a Colorado vacation home valued at $600,000)."
} | 3,861,287 | a |
After Pioneer, district courts analyzing a movant's claim of excusable neglect must "consider[ ] and balance[ ]" all of the Pioneer factors; "no one factor trumps the others." In addition, the party moving for the extension of time to file a notice of appeal has the burden of proving excusable neglect. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 B.R. 274, 276",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he burden is on the moving party to allege facts establishing excusable neglect\" under former Rule 8002(c)(2",
"sentence": "See In re Douglas, 477 B.R. 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating that “[t]he burden is on the moving party to allege facts establishing excusable neglect” under former Rule 8002(c)(2)); In re Spiegel, Inc., 385 B.R. 35, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[I]n bankruptcy cases, whether or not there is a claim that notice of the entry of judgment was not received, the party seeking the extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal has the burden of establishing excusable neglect.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The burden of proving excusable neglect lies with the late-claimant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 199, 205",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden of proving excusable neglect lies with the late-claimant.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Douglas, 477 B.R. 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating that “[t]he burden is on the moving party to allege facts establishing excusable neglect” under former Rule 8002(c)(2)); In re Spiegel, Inc., 385 B.R. 35, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[I]n bankruptcy cases, whether or not there is a claim that notice of the entry of judgment was not received, the party seeking the extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal has the burden of establishing excusable neglect.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The burden of proving excusable neglect lies with the late-claimant.”)."
} | 4,344,700 | a |
The challenged testimony here concerns acts that are unrelated to, and which occurred eight or more years before, the conduct charged. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony, even with a limiting instruction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "683 F.2d 1215, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that reversal is required only when \"the questioned evidence has no bearing on any of the issues included\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Harvey, 845 F.2d 760, 762 (8th Cir.1988) (finding that admission of testimony regarding uncharged drug and financial activities in tax prosecution ten years later constituted reversible error); see also Marshall, 683 F.2d at 1215 (noting that reversal is required only when “the questioned evidence has no bearing on any of the issues included”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 760, 762",
"parenthetical": "finding that admission of testimony regarding uncharged drug and financial activities in tax prosecution ten years later constituted reversible error",
"sentence": "See United States v. Harvey, 845 F.2d 760, 762 (8th Cir.1988) (finding that admission of testimony regarding uncharged drug and financial activities in tax prosecution ten years later constituted reversible error); see also Marshall, 683 F.2d at 1215 (noting that reversal is required only when “the questioned evidence has no bearing on any of the issues included”) (citations omitted)."
} | 10,528,358 | b |
Therefore, whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection between negligence and injury is dependent upon whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable to the one who was initially negligent. The "intervening cause must be disconnected from the negligence of the first person and must be of itself an efficient, independent, and self-producing cause of the injury." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "650 F.2d 817, 821",
"parenthetical": "noting, under Ohio law, that an intervening cause must produce the result without the cooperation of the original wrong",
"sentence": "Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (1993); Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir.1981) (noting, under Ohio law, that an intervening cause must produce the result without the cooperation of the original wrong)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 S.W.3d 264, 274",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"the intervening cause doctrine is inapplicable where the alleged intervening, superseding cause is the plaintiffs own negligent conduct\"",
"sentence": "See also Potter v. Ford Motor Co., 213 S.W.3d 264, 274 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (observing that “the intervening cause doctrine is inapplicable where the alleged intervening, superseding cause is the plaintiffs own negligent conduct”)."
} | 3,761,971 | a |
In making this determination, the First Circuit observed that the majority of courts considering similar post-petition claims have concluded that they are core. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Mansker, supra, (holding an action for post-petition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding); In re Clarke, supra, (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core); In re Franklin Computer, Corp., supra, (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core); In re All American of Ashburn, Inc., 49 B.R. 926 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1985) (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core); See also In re Epi-Scan, Inc., 71 B.R. 975 (Bankr.N.J.1987) (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core). The court distinguished Mohawk Industries, supra, the case relied upon by the lower courts, because “that case does not in fact present a direct holding to the contrary, for it involved a pre-petition, not a post-petition debt; thus the Mohawk Industries claim did not arise out of the administration of the estate.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Mansker, supra, (holding an action for post-petition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding); In re Clarke, supra, (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core); In re Franklin Computer, Corp., supra, (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core); In re All American of Ashburn, Inc., 49 B.R. 926 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1985) (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core); See also In re Epi-Scan, Inc., 71 B.R. 975 (Bankr.N.J.1987) (holding an action to recover a post-petition account receivable to be core). The court distinguished Mohawk Industries, supra, the case relied upon by the lower courts, because “that case does not in fact present a direct holding to the contrary, for it involved a pre-petition, not a post-petition debt; thus the Mohawk Industries claim did not arise out of the administration of the estate.”"
} | 6,108,905 | b |
Under Nevada's proposed requirement, each time Congress decides to use federal property in a manner that incidentally burdens a State - for example by designating such property for use as a military installation, a prison, a dam, a storage or disposal site, or a conservation area - it must formulate neutral selection criteria and apply those criteria to every piece of federal property in the Nation before selecting a site. Courts presumably would be required to scrutinize the substantive basis of the legislation in question to ensure that the criteria were genuinely neutral and generally applied. This is far more intrusive than any requirement that there be a rational basis for Congress's judgment that a particular regulation respecting a particular property is "needful." The substantive constraint on legislation and the judicial role implicit in Nevada's "equal treatment" requirement are, in our view, totally at odds with the broad interpretation given to Congress's Property Clause powers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 F.3d 1092, 1097",
"parenthetical": "finding no constitutional objection to the specificity of legislation requiring construction of a World War II Memorial on the National Mall",
"sentence": "See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1161-62 (10th Cir.2004) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to legislation prescribing in “minute detail” the management of a single national forest on the grounds that Congress, in exercising its Property Clause powers, “is permitted to be as specific as it deems appropriate” and that “[i]t would be difficult if not impossible to control the use of federal lands without reference to specific actions affecting specific tracts of land”); see also Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding no constitutional objection to the specificity of legislation requiring construction of a World War II Memorial on the National Mall)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 1152, 1161-62",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a constitutional challenge to legislation prescribing in \"minute detail\" the management of a single national forest on the grounds that Congress, in exercising its Property Clause powers, \"is permitted to be as specific as it deems appropriate\" and that \"[i]t would be difficult if not impossible to control the use of federal lands without reference to specific actions affecting specific tracts of land\"",
"sentence": "See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1161-62 (10th Cir.2004) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to legislation prescribing in “minute detail” the management of a single national forest on the grounds that Congress, in exercising its Property Clause powers, “is permitted to be as specific as it deems appropriate” and that “[i]t would be difficult if not impossible to control the use of federal lands without reference to specific actions affecting specific tracts of land”); see also Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding no constitutional objection to the specificity of legislation requiring construction of a World War II Memorial on the National Mall)."
} | 9,237,829 | b |
It also suggests unequal treatment of plaintiff because of his race and, therefore, may constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusal to allow visitors because of prisoner's race violates the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "See: Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660 (3rd Cir.1973) (refusal to allow visitors because of prisoner’s race violates the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "791 F.2d 97, 100",
"parenthetical": "prisoner retains right to be free from terror of instant and unexpected death at whim of allegedly bigoted custodians",
"sentence": "See also: Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir.1986) (prisoner retains right to be free from terror of instant and unexpected death at whim of allegedly bigoted custodians)."
} | 7,865,529 | a |
The judge did not make any attempt to assess the defendant's complaints regarding appointed counsel, despite the defendant's multiple and specific allegations about counsel's actions. We have required, even where an attorney has an impeccable reputation, that specific inquiry be made into the nature of a defendant's precise complaint against counsel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "393 Mass. 801, 804",
"parenthetical": "denial of defendant's motion for removal of counsel proper on day on which trial was scheduled to begin, where judge conducted detailed colloquy, and concluded that \"these motions for a new attorney [were] no more than a delaying tactic\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 804 (1985) (denial of defendant’s motion for removal of counsel proper on day on which trial was scheduled to begin, where judge conducted detailed colloquy, and concluded that “these motions for a new attorney [were] no more than a delaying tactic”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "53 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 562",
"parenthetical": "\"when a defendant alleges that counsel is unprepared, the judge should perform some colloquy to ascertain whether this is a dilatory tactic or whether counsel is truly unprepared\"",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Carsetti, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 562 (2002) (“when a defendant alleges that counsel is unprepared, the judge should perform some colloquy to ascertain whether this is a dilatory tactic or whether counsel is truly unprepared”)."
} | 3,670,373 | a |
But the Texas Supreme Court has never extended the duty to warn or make safe to defendants who did not own, occupy, or control the premises at the time of the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 S.W.3d 420, 426",
"parenthetical": "holding that engineering firm, whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications, had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises",
"sentence": "See Allen Keller Co. v. Foreman, 343 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex.2011) (holding that engineering firm, whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications, had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises); Mathis, 189 S.W.3d at 845 (holding that engineer did not owe duty to keep premises safe and did not owe any duty with respect to hole on premises engineer neither created nor agreed to make safe); see also Martinez, 941 S.W.2d at 911 (holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own, occupy, or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 S.W.2d 911, 911",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own, occupy, or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition",
"sentence": "See Allen Keller Co. v. Foreman, 343 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex.2011) (holding that engineering firm, whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications, had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises); Mathis, 189 S.W.3d at 845 (holding that engineer did not owe duty to keep premises safe and did not owe any duty with respect to hole on premises engineer neither created nor agreed to make safe); see also Martinez, 941 S.W.2d at 911 (holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own, occupy, or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition)."
} | 7,084,865 | a |
But the Texas Supreme Court has never extended the duty to warn or make safe to defendants who did not own, occupy, or control the premises at the time of the plaintiffs injury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "941 S.W.2d 911, 911",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own, occupy, or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition",
"sentence": "See Allen Keller Co. v. Foreman, 343 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex.2011) (holding that engineering firm, whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications, had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises); Mathis, 189 S.W.3d at 845 (holding that engineer did not owe duty to keep premises safe and did not owe any duty with respect to hole on premises engineer neither created nor agreed to make safe); see also Martinez, 941 S.W.2d at 911 (holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own, occupy, or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "189 S.W.3d 845, 845",
"parenthetical": "holding that engineer did not owe duty to keep premises safe and did not owe any duty with respect to hole on premises engineer neither created nor agreed to make safe",
"sentence": "See Allen Keller Co. v. Foreman, 343 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex.2011) (holding that engineering firm, whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications, had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises); Mathis, 189 S.W.3d at 845 (holding that engineer did not owe duty to keep premises safe and did not owe any duty with respect to hole on premises engineer neither created nor agreed to make safe); see also Martinez, 941 S.W.2d at 911 (holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own, occupy, or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition)."
} | 7,084,865 | b |
Courts may dispense with the filing of a postal receipt if a substituted service statute is invoked on the ground that the defendant is evading service. Chapman, 750 So.2d at 143. This does not mean Warner need not bother with certified mail to Wise's address; rather, "[t]he failure to comply with the statutory requirements has been excused when the record shows that the party to be served is deliberately refusing to accept delivery." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing where the trial court denied the motion to quash service though defendant had actual notice based on regular mail",
"sentence": "Woodworth v. Smith, 773 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing where the trial court denied the motion to quash service though defendant had actual notice based on regular mail); see also Jennings v. Montenegro, 792 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (stating that “the failure of delivery of service must be attributable to the defendant”); Wyatt, 649 So.2d at 907 (holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendant’s rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating “UNCLAIMED” and “NOT AT THIS ADDRESS”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the failure of delivery of service must be attributable to the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Woodworth v. Smith, 773 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing where the trial court denied the motion to quash service though defendant had actual notice based on regular mail); see also Jennings v. Montenegro, 792 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (stating that “the failure of delivery of service must be attributable to the defendant”); Wyatt, 649 So.2d at 907 (holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendant’s rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating “UNCLAIMED” and “NOT AT THIS ADDRESS”)."
} | 8,421,806 | a |
The immigration judge (IJ) found that Iskandar was not eligible for asylum because his application was not filed within one year of his arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. SS 1158(a)(2)(B). The IJ further found that -- even crediting Iskandar's testimony -- the harm he feared was neither severe nor likely enough to satisfy the standards for withholding of removal and relief under the CAT. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8)(A) (withholding of removal); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 412, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (withholding appropriate only when there is a “clear probability” that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened upon removal); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18 (regulations governing CAT claims); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003) (for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 407, 412",
"parenthetical": "withholding appropriate only when there is a \"clear probability\" that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened upon removal",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8)(A) (withholding of removal); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 412, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (withholding appropriate only when there is a “clear probability” that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened upon removal); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18 (regulations governing CAT claims); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003) (for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal)."
} | 3,748,528 | b |
The immigration judge (IJ) found that Iskandar was not eligible for asylum because his application was not filed within one year of his arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. SS 1158(a)(2)(B). The IJ further found that -- even crediting Iskandar's testimony -- the harm he feared was neither severe nor likely enough to satisfy the standards for withholding of removal and relief under the CAT. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "withholding appropriate only when there is a \"clear probability\" that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened upon removal",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8)(A) (withholding of removal); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 412, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (withholding appropriate only when there is a “clear probability” that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened upon removal); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18 (regulations governing CAT claims); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003) (for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8)(A) (withholding of removal); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 412, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (withholding appropriate only when there is a “clear probability” that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened upon removal); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18 (regulations governing CAT claims); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003) (for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal)."
} | 3,748,528 | a |
The immigration judge (IJ) found that Iskandar was not eligible for asylum because his application was not filed within one year of his arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. SS 1158(a)(2)(B). The IJ further found that -- even crediting Iskandar's testimony -- the harm he feared was neither severe nor likely enough to satisfy the standards for withholding of removal and relief under the CAT. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8)(A) (withholding of removal); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 412, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (withholding appropriate only when there is a “clear probability” that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened upon removal); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18 (regulations governing CAT claims); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003) (for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "withholding appropriate only when there is a \"clear probability\" that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened upon removal",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8)(A) (withholding of removal); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 412, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (withholding appropriate only when there is a “clear probability” that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened upon removal); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18 (regulations governing CAT claims); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n. 2 (3d Cir.2003) (for CAT claim, alien must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by the government or with its acquiescence upon removal)."
} | 3,748,528 | b |
(Id.). An age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a showing of age discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "349 F.3d 332, 338",
"parenthetical": "an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 308, 313",
"parenthetical": "the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case \"cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.\"",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | 4,193,178 | a |
(Id.). An age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a showing of age discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "349 F.3d 332, 338",
"parenthetical": "an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case \"cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.\"",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | 4,193,178 | a |
(Id.). An age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a showing of age discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "349 F.3d 332, 338",
"parenthetical": "an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case \"cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.\"",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | 4,193,178 | a |
(Id.). An age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a showing of age discrimination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 758, 763",
"parenthetical": "finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "349 F.3d 332, 338",
"parenthetical": "an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | 4,193,178 | b |
(Id.). An age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a showing of age discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "349 F.3d 332, 338",
"parenthetical": "an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "219 F.3d 612, 617",
"parenthetical": "in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | 4,193,178 | a |
(Id.). An age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a showing of age discrimination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 F.3d 457, 459",
"parenthetical": "finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "349 F.3d 332, 338",
"parenthetical": "an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination",
"sentence": "Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir.2003) (an age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination); see also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (the inference of discrimination necessary to sustain an ADEA case “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding that in the absence of other evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff who had been replaced by a worker seven years younger had not made a prima facie showing of age discrimination); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th Cir.2000) (in an ADEA action involving a reduction in force, plaintiff must show, among other things, that other similarly situated employees substantially younger than plaintiff were treated more favorably); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a jury could not reasonably infer age discrimination where an employer, who also was in the protected age group, hired plaintiff when he was forty-eight, fired him when he was fifty-two, and the following year hired four new employees over forty, two of them over fifty)."
} | 4,193,178 | b |
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