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As the Sixth Circuit has noted, "From a litigant's perspective, it is a difficult, if not impossible endeavor, to estimate how long a reviewing court will take to decide a particular motion." Taylor made his inquiry to the Appellate Division slightly more than three months after the end of the limitations period. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "305 F.3d 496, 496",
"parenthetical": "five and one-half month interval between limitations period and discovery of state court ruling does not show lack of diligence",
"sentence": "See Miller, 305 F.3d at 496 (five and one-half month interval between limitations period and discovery of state court ruling does not show lack of diligence); Phillips, 216 F.3d at 511 (four month interval); cf. Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1287-88 (11th Cir.2002) (letter of inquiry filed sixteen months after filing of state court application does not satisfy diligence)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "297 F.3d 1278, 1287-88",
"parenthetical": "letter of inquiry filed sixteen months after filing of state court application does not satisfy diligence",
"sentence": "See Miller, 305 F.3d at 496 (five and one-half month interval between limitations period and discovery of state court ruling does not show lack of diligence); Phillips, 216 F.3d at 511 (four month interval); cf. Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1287-88 (11th Cir.2002) (letter of inquiry filed sixteen months after filing of state court application does not satisfy diligence)."
} | 3,644,497 | a |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "870 F.Supp. 612, 622",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | 7,792,350 | b |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | 7,792,350 | b |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "851 F.Supp. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "holding that no SS 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | 7,792,350 | a |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "856 F.Supp. 227, 236",
"parenthetical": "stating that existence of SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | 7,792,350 | a |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that existence of SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | 7,792,350 | b |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that existence of SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | 7,792,350 | a |
April 10, 1996), the court held that without clear direction from the Third. Circuit, the Albright decision provided insufficient guidance for the court to conclude that a SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim no longer existed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright",
"sentence": "See also Haddock v. Christos, 866 F.Supp. 170, 173 n. 9 (M.D.Pa.1994) (presuming that elements identified by Third Circuit in Lee for malicious prosecution claim survived Albright); Ferraira v. Mobil Oil Carp., 1994 WL 470280 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that existence of SS 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue",
"sentence": "But see Pansy v. Preate, 870 F.Supp. 612, 622 (M.D.Pa.1994) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim on Albright grounds and because of existence of probable cause), aff'd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Patterson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 851 F.Supp. 194, 201 (E.D.Pa.1994) (holding that no § 1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after Albright); Smith v. Holtz, 856 F.Supp. 227, 236 (M.D.Pa.1994) (stating that existence of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was unresolved issue), aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996)."
} | 7,792,350 | a |
The zone of interests requirement thus was either inapposite or satisfied. See infra note 14. Nor was there any independent need for the brokers to establish third party standing since the legal right they asserted -- the right not to be injured by unauthorized agency action -- was their own. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "litigant held not to have third party standing permitted to challenge as ultra vires copyright of government-commissioned television series",
"sentence": "See Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that helium producers had standing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing regulation requiring government contractors to purchase their helium needs from the Secretary — a regulation claimed, and held, to be in excess of statutory authority); cf. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.Cir.1981) (litigant held not to have third party standing permitted to challenge as ultra vires copyright of government-commissioned television series)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that helium producers had standing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing regulation requiring government contractors to purchase their helium needs from the Secretary -- a regulation claimed, and held, to be in excess of statutory authority",
"sentence": "See Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that helium producers had standing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing regulation requiring government contractors to purchase their helium needs from the Secretary — a regulation claimed, and held, to be in excess of statutory authority); cf. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.Cir.1981) (litigant held not to have third party standing permitted to challenge as ultra vires copyright of government-commissioned television series)."
} | 4,329,724 | b |
Although Juror 36 was candid about her personal concerns, we conclude that she unequivocally and repeatedly indicated that she would endeavor to be a fair and impartial juror. Her responses are distinguishable from those cases in which this Court has found error in the denial of cause challenges to jurors who repeatedly expressed a lack of impartiality or inability to follow the law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "189 So.3d 296, 301",
"parenthetical": "holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendant's right to silence should have been dismissed for cause",
"sentence": "See Matarranz, 133 So.3d at 477-81, 485-88 (juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary); Kop-sho, 959 So.2d at 170-72 (juror believed that defendant should testify on his own behalf and expressed disagreement with the right to silence); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 890-93 (Fla. 2001) (finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant’s failure to testify indicated guilt); see also Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendant’s right to silence should have been dismissed for cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 So.3d 477, 477-81, 485-88",
"parenthetical": "juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary",
"sentence": "See Matarranz, 133 So.3d at 477-81, 485-88 (juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary); Kop-sho, 959 So.2d at 170-72 (juror believed that defendant should testify on his own behalf and expressed disagreement with the right to silence); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 890-93 (Fla. 2001) (finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant’s failure to testify indicated guilt); see also Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendant’s right to silence should have been dismissed for cause)."
} | 12,352,404 | b |
Although Juror 36 was candid about her personal concerns, we conclude that she unequivocally and repeatedly indicated that she would endeavor to be a fair and impartial juror. Her responses are distinguishable from those cases in which this Court has found error in the denial of cause challenges to jurors who repeatedly expressed a lack of impartiality or inability to follow the law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 So.2d 877, 890-93",
"parenthetical": "finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant's failure to testify indicated guilt",
"sentence": "See Matarranz, 133 So.3d at 477-81, 485-88 (juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary); Kop-sho, 959 So.2d at 170-72 (juror believed that defendant should testify on his own behalf and expressed disagreement with the right to silence); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 890-93 (Fla. 2001) (finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant’s failure to testify indicated guilt); see also Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendant’s right to silence should have been dismissed for cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "189 So.3d 296, 301",
"parenthetical": "holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendant's right to silence should have been dismissed for cause",
"sentence": "See Matarranz, 133 So.3d at 477-81, 485-88 (juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary); Kop-sho, 959 So.2d at 170-72 (juror believed that defendant should testify on his own behalf and expressed disagreement with the right to silence); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 890-93 (Fla. 2001) (finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant’s failure to testify indicated guilt); see also Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendant’s right to silence should have been dismissed for cause)."
} | 12,352,404 | a |
The majority also cites cases from other jurisdictions concerning air guns, but these do little to support the conclusion that it is common knowledge that air guns are designed for violence to humans. In cases cited by the majority wherein the definition of deadly weapon applied by the courts actually did include a requirement that the item was designed, made or adapted to cause death or serious injury and the factor was determinative, those cases are not persuasive in that one court never discussed the application of this standard, and the others provided only a cursory analysis of the issue. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 So. 2d 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim's point of view and air gun used to threaten",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 So. 2d 1175, 1178",
"parenthetical": "concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything \" 'manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,' \" because it can cause serious injury to eye",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | 3,666,911 | b |
The majority also cites cases from other jurisdictions concerning air guns, but these do little to support the conclusion that it is common knowledge that air guns are designed for violence to humans. In cases cited by the majority wherein the definition of deadly weapon applied by the courts actually did include a requirement that the item was designed, made or adapted to cause death or serious injury and the factor was determinative, those cases are not persuasive in that one court never discussed the application of this standard, and the others provided only a cursory analysis of the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "198 Ariz. 242, 243",
"parenthetical": "because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when \"deadly weapon\" defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including \"firearm,\" which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes SS 13-105 [17] as \"any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases\"",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 So. 2d 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim's point of view and air gun used to threaten",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | 3,666,911 | a |
The majority also cites cases from other jurisdictions concerning air guns, but these do little to support the conclusion that it is common knowledge that air guns are designed for violence to humans. In cases cited by the majority wherein the definition of deadly weapon applied by the courts actually did include a requirement that the item was designed, made or adapted to cause death or serious injury and the factor was determinative, those cases are not persuasive in that one court never discussed the application of this standard, and the others provided only a cursory analysis of the issue. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 So. 2d 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim's point of view and air gun used to threaten",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when \"deadly weapon\" defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including \"firearm,\" which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes SS 13-105 [17] as \"any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases\"",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | 3,666,911 | b |
The majority also cites cases from other jurisdictions concerning air guns, but these do little to support the conclusion that it is common knowledge that air guns are designed for violence to humans. In cases cited by the majority wherein the definition of deadly weapon applied by the courts actually did include a requirement that the item was designed, made or adapted to cause death or serious injury and the factor was determinative, those cases are not persuasive in that one court never discussed the application of this standard, and the others provided only a cursory analysis of the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96",
"parenthetical": "because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 So. 2d 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim's point of view and air gun used to threaten",
"sentence": "See McCaskill v. State, 648 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (concluding that BB gun could be deadly weapon, defined by statute, to include anything “ ‘manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ ” because it can cause serious injury to eye); State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243, 8 P.3d 1156 (App. 1999) (because pellet gun uses carbon dioxide cartridges to propel pellets and jury had opportunity to view pellet gun during its deliberations, evidence sufficient to establish air gun was deadly weapon when “deadly weapon” defined to include anything designed for lethal use, including “firearm,” which was defined by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-105 [17] as “any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases”); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (because air gun designed to fire .22 caliber projectile was capable of causing death of human being if fired at close range and gun was pointed at close range during robbery, it was found to be deadly weapon capable of causing serious injury and designed for that purpose); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So. 2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. App. 1997) (unclear whether air gun was found to be deadly weapon or dangerous instrument when conviction was affirmed after court assessed likelihood of injury from reasonable victim’s point of view and air gun used to threaten)."
} | 3,666,911 | a |
. After Buckley, the court has considered various mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sanction where an attorney has improperly dealt with client funds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 A.2d 206, 211-12",
"parenthetical": "alteration of credit card receipts submitted to law firm for reimbursement in violation of DR 1-102(A",
"sentence": "See In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206, 211-12 (D.C.1989) (alteration of credit card receipts submitted to law firm for reimbursement in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), 30-day suspension)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "549 A.2d 700, 716",
"parenthetical": "commingling and misappropriation through simple negligence in violation of DR 9-103(A",
"sentence": "See also In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700, 716 (D.C.1988) (commingling and misappropriation through simple negligence in violation of DR 9-103(A), six-month suspension)."
} | 7,347,654 | a |
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion and remands Mr. Hegarty's claim to the administrator for further proceedings. See Pannebecker v. Liberty Life Assur. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 F.3d 648, 650",
"parenthetical": "approving remand where initial denial was an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir.2008) (explaining that “[wjhere an administrator’s initial denial of benefits is premised on a failure to apply plan provisions properly, we remand to the administrator to apply the terms correctly in the first instance”); see also Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.2006) (approving remand where initial denial was an abuse of discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "542 F.3d 1213, 1221",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[wjhere an administrator's initial denial of benefits is premised on a failure to apply plan provisions properly, we remand to the administrator to apply the terms correctly in the first instance\"",
"sentence": "Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir.2008) (explaining that “[wjhere an administrator’s initial denial of benefits is premised on a failure to apply plan provisions properly, we remand to the administrator to apply the terms correctly in the first instance”); see also Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.2006) (approving remand where initial denial was an abuse of discretion)."
} | 4,366,246 | b |
The homeowners contend that the above homestead exemption protects them from a forced sale of their homestead, and therefore, the trial court properly granted their motion for summary judgment as to FM's claim for specific performance. The homeowners are, however, incorrect, and the trial court's order constitutes a clear departure from the essential requirements of law, resulting in material injury that cannot be remedied on direct appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "980 So.2d 580, 586",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a partial summary judgment eliminating a plaintiffs claim for specific performance of a land sale contract permits the. landowner to freely dispose of the land prior to appellate review, thereby potentially leaving the plaintiff with no adequate remedy on appeal because, due to the uniqueness of all land, monetary damages are an inadequate remedy",
"sentence": "See Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 117 So.3d 400, 406 (Fla.2013) (providing, that a jurisdictional requirement of certiorari review is that the order to be reviewed must give rise to material injury that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal); Sorena v. Gerald J. Tobin, P.A., 47 So.3d 875, 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); see also Bermont Lakes, LLC v. Rooney, 980 So.2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (concluding that a partial summary judgment eliminating a plaintiffs claim for specific performance of a land sale contract permits the. landowner to freely dispose of the land prior to appellate review, thereby potentially leaving the plaintiff with no adequate remedy on appeal because, due to the uniqueness of all land, monetary damages are an inadequate remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 So.3d 400, 406",
"parenthetical": "providing, that a jurisdictional requirement of certiorari review is that the order to be reviewed must give rise to material injury that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal",
"sentence": "See Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 117 So.3d 400, 406 (Fla.2013) (providing, that a jurisdictional requirement of certiorari review is that the order to be reviewed must give rise to material injury that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal); Sorena v. Gerald J. Tobin, P.A., 47 So.3d 875, 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); see also Bermont Lakes, LLC v. Rooney, 980 So.2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (concluding that a partial summary judgment eliminating a plaintiffs claim for specific performance of a land sale contract permits the. landowner to freely dispose of the land prior to appellate review, thereby potentially leaving the plaintiff with no adequate remedy on appeal because, due to the uniqueness of all land, monetary damages are an inadequate remedy)."
} | 6,789,512 | b |
"[I]n Oregon a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "305 Or 621, 629-30",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he assessment of credibility is for the trier of fact\" and an \"opinion that a person is not deceptive, could not lie without being tripped up, and would not betray a friend\" is tantamount to an opinion on credibility and inadmissible",
"sentence": "State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427, 438, 657 P2d 1215 (1983); see State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621, 629-30, 756 P2d 620 (1988) (“[t]he assessment of credibility is for the trier of fact” and an “opinion that a person is not deceptive, could not lie without being tripped up, and would not betray a friend” is tantamount to an opinion on credibility and inadmissible); see also State v. Keller, 315 Or 273, 285, 844 P2d 195 (1993) (“[A] witness may not testify about the credibility of another witness.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "315 Or 273, 285",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] witness may not testify about the credibility of another witness.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427, 438, 657 P2d 1215 (1983); see State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621, 629-30, 756 P2d 620 (1988) (“[t]he assessment of credibility is for the trier of fact” and an “opinion that a person is not deceptive, could not lie without being tripped up, and would not betray a friend” is tantamount to an opinion on credibility and inadmissible); see also State v. Keller, 315 Or 273, 285, 844 P2d 195 (1993) (“[A] witness may not testify about the credibility of another witness.”)."
} | 4,216,298 | a |
Moreover, because the district court did not calculate the applicable Guidelines range, it could not adequately explain "the extent of [any] deviation" from that range. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "552 U.S. 50, 50",
"parenthetical": "finding it \"uncontroversial that a major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one\"",
"sentence": "Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586 (finding it “uncontroversial that a major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”); see also United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.2011) (“The extent [of a variance] necessarily is different when the range is different, so a one-size-fits-all explanation ordinarily does not suffice.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "631 F.3d 1028, 1031",
"parenthetical": "\"The extent [of a variance] necessarily is different when the range is different, so a one-size-fits-all explanation ordinarily does not suffice.\"",
"sentence": "Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586 (finding it “uncontroversial that a major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”); see also United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.2011) (“The extent [of a variance] necessarily is different when the range is different, so a one-size-fits-all explanation ordinarily does not suffice.”)."
} | 4,137,263 | a |
Moreover, because the district court did not calculate the applicable Guidelines range, it could not adequately explain "the extent of [any] deviation" from that range. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "631 F.3d 1028, 1031",
"parenthetical": "\"The extent [of a variance] necessarily is different when the range is different, so a one-size-fits-all explanation ordinarily does not suffice.\"",
"sentence": "Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586 (finding it “uncontroversial that a major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”); see also United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.2011) (“The extent [of a variance] necessarily is different when the range is different, so a one-size-fits-all explanation ordinarily does not suffice.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding it \"uncontroversial that a major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one\"",
"sentence": "Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586 (finding it “uncontroversial that a major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”); see also United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.2011) (“The extent [of a variance] necessarily is different when the range is different, so a one-size-fits-all explanation ordinarily does not suffice.”)."
} | 4,137,263 | b |
In this circuit, however, there is a definite standard regarding the forced, warrantless removal of a person from his own home for "community caretaking" reasons. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "586 F.2d 1288, 1290",
"parenthetical": "routine community caretaking functions of police include \"responding to calls to assist persons in need of immediate aid\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Nord, 586 F.2d 1288, 1290 (8th Cir.1978) (routine community caretaking functions of police include “responding to calls to assist persons in need of immediate aid”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "153 F.3d 591, 596",
"parenthetical": "holding that police officers acting at the request of a social worker were entitled to qualified immunity when they removed a frail, elderly woman from her home because they had sufficient information to lead them to reasonably believe that the woman was in need of immediate aid",
"sentence": "See Collins v. Bellinghausen, 153 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that police officers acting at the request of a social worker were entitled to qualified immunity when they removed a frail, elderly woman from her home because they had sufficient information to lead them to reasonably believe that the woman was in need of immediate aid)."
} | 5,542,827 | b |
Furthermore, as the trial court observed in its memorandum of decision, the Wilsons and the Keatings, who reside at 8 and 12 Runkenhage Road, respectively, "have deeded access [rights] over the right-of-way" for purposes of ingress to and egress from their landlocked properties. In light of this fact, the court reasonably could have concluded that the Herbericks were not troubled by the plaintiffs use of the right-of-way for the same purposes or, if they were, that they had decided to acquiesce to such use in the interest of neighborhood harmony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "passive acquiescence should not be confused with permission for purposes of determining existence of prescriptive easement",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Phillips v. Bonadies, supra, 105 Conn. 726 (passive acquiescence should not be confused with permission for purposes of determining existence of prescriptive easement); see also Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, supra, 78 Conn. App. 708-709 (evidence supported finding that owner had passively acquiesced in plaintiffs use of property and therefore that use was adverse); 25 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Easements and Licenses § 54 (2004) (“[t]he foundation of a right by prescription is acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied on to establish the easement by prescription”). In any event, in view of the trial court’s extensive factual findings, all of which are amply supported by the record, the defendant cannot prevail on her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support that court’s determination that the plaintiff had obtained a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way for the purposes of ingress to and egress from her home.*"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence supported finding that owner had passively acquiesced in plaintiffs use of property and therefore that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Phillips v. Bonadies, supra, 105 Conn. 726 (passive acquiescence should not be confused with permission for purposes of determining existence of prescriptive easement); see also Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, supra, 78 Conn. App. 708-709 (evidence supported finding that owner had passively acquiesced in plaintiffs use of property and therefore that use was adverse); 25 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Easements and Licenses § 54 (2004) (“[t]he foundation of a right by prescription is acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied on to establish the easement by prescription”). In any event, in view of the trial court’s extensive factual findings, all of which are amply supported by the record, the defendant cannot prevail on her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support that court’s determination that the plaintiff had obtained a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way for the purposes of ingress to and egress from her home.*"
} | 5,767,752 | a |
Other courts have not limited reimbursement to the court-appointed counsel CJA rates. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37",
"parenthetical": "ordering reimbursement for \"the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F.Supp. 63, 67 (W.D.Tex.1995) (finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 3006A(d)(l)”); Coniam, 574 F.Supp. at 618 (“There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... ”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 621, 621",
"parenthetical": "ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. SS 3006A(d",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F.Supp. 63, 67 (W.D.Tex.1995) (finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 3006A(d)(l)”); Coniam, 574 F.Supp. at 618 (“There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... ”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2))."
} | 3,703,657 | a |
Other courts have not limited reimbursement to the court-appointed counsel CJA rates. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 621, 621",
"parenthetical": "ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. SS 3006A(d",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F.Supp. 63, 67 (W.D.Tex.1995) (finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 3006A(d)(l)”); Coniam, 574 F.Supp. at 618 (“There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... ”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "879 F.Supp. 63, 67",
"parenthetical": "finding the court \"is not limited by the hourly rates stated in SS 3006A(d",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F.Supp. 63, 67 (W.D.Tex.1995) (finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 3006A(d)(l)”); Coniam, 574 F.Supp. at 618 (“There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... ”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2))."
} | 3,703,657 | b |
Other courts have not limited reimbursement to the court-appointed counsel CJA rates. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 621, 621",
"parenthetical": "ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. SS 3006A(d",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F.Supp. 63, 67 (W.D.Tex.1995) (finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 3006A(d)(l)”); Coniam, 574 F.Supp. at 618 (“There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... ”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 F.Supp. 618, 618",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 400 F.Supp.2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F.Supp. 63, 67 (W.D.Tex.1995) (finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 3006A(d)(l)”); Coniam, 574 F.Supp. at 618 (“There is no explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel attorney rates.... ”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2))."
} | 3,703,657 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 144, 175",
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 144, 175",
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 144, 175",
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 568, 581",
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 144, 175",
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 144, 175",
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 144, 175",
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 568, 581",
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 568, 581",
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | b |
There is always the possibility that settlement or some external event will render a case moot, but that hardly renders the litigation nonjusticiable before that event occurs. If the government's view were correct, then no agency action could ever be reviewed so long as Congress might intervene by passing new legislation that might overrule the final agency determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court's decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding case ripe for review even though provision at issue would not take effect until three and a half years after the Court’s decision during which time Congress could have repealed the provision); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred, the claims in the case were still ripe for review); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated)."
} | 11,677,626 | a |
A confirmed plan "has no preclusive effect on issues that must be brought by an adversary proceeding, or were not sufficiently evidenced in a plan to provide adequate notice to the creditor." Id These limitations on the application of res judicata "are particularly apropos when secured claims are involved" because "liens ordinarily pass through bankruptcy unaffected, regardless whether the creditor holding the lien ignores the bankruptcy case, or files an unsecured claim when it meant to file a secured claim, or files an untimely claim after the bar date has passed." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in general, liens, including federal tax liens, pass through bankruptcy unaffected",
"sentence": "In re Brawders, 503 F.3d at 867, citing, Bisch v. United States (In re Bisch), 159 B.R. 546, 550 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) (federal tax lien on real property remained valid even though the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim in the debtors’ chapter 13 case); see also, In re Warner, 146 B.R. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (in general, liens, including federal tax liens, pass through bankruptcy unaffected)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "503 F.3d 867, 867",
"parenthetical": "federal tax lien on real property remained valid even though the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim in the debtors' chapter 13 case",
"sentence": "In re Brawders, 503 F.3d at 867, citing, Bisch v. United States (In re Bisch), 159 B.R. 546, 550 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) (federal tax lien on real property remained valid even though the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim in the debtors’ chapter 13 case); see also, In re Warner, 146 B.R. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (in general, liens, including federal tax liens, pass through bankruptcy unaffected)."
} | 12,269,402 | b |
A confirmed plan "has no preclusive effect on issues that must be brought by an adversary proceeding, or were not sufficiently evidenced in a plan to provide adequate notice to the creditor." Id These limitations on the application of res judicata "are particularly apropos when secured claims are involved" because "liens ordinarily pass through bankruptcy unaffected, regardless whether the creditor holding the lien ignores the bankruptcy case, or files an unsecured claim when it meant to file a secured claim, or files an untimely claim after the bar date has passed." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "159 B.R. 546, 550",
"parenthetical": "federal tax lien on real property remained valid even though the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim in the debtors' chapter 13 case",
"sentence": "In re Brawders, 503 F.3d at 867, citing, Bisch v. United States (In re Bisch), 159 B.R. 546, 550 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) (federal tax lien on real property remained valid even though the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim in the debtors’ chapter 13 case); see also, In re Warner, 146 B.R. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (in general, liens, including federal tax liens, pass through bankruptcy unaffected)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in general, liens, including federal tax liens, pass through bankruptcy unaffected",
"sentence": "In re Brawders, 503 F.3d at 867, citing, Bisch v. United States (In re Bisch), 159 B.R. 546, 550 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) (federal tax lien on real property remained valid even though the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim in the debtors’ chapter 13 case); see also, In re Warner, 146 B.R. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (in general, liens, including federal tax liens, pass through bankruptcy unaffected)."
} | 12,269,402 | a |
Reilly is the Administrator of the EPA, working out of Washington, D.C. As Administrator, Reilly supervises the activities of each of the EPA regional offices, including that of Region V located in Chicago, Illinois. By reason of his ultimate authority over the actions taken out of Region V, Reilly should have reasonably foreseen being subjected to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless \"found\" in Delaware \"by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.\"",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 669, 676",
"parenthetical": "In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | 7,412,754 | b |
Reilly is the Administrator of the EPA, working out of Washington, D.C. As Administrator, Reilly supervises the activities of each of the EPA regional offices, including that of Region V located in Chicago, Illinois. By reason of his ultimate authority over the actions taken out of Region V, Reilly should have reasonably foreseen being subjected to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless \"found\" in Delaware \"by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.\"",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | 7,412,754 | a |
Reilly is the Administrator of the EPA, working out of Washington, D.C. As Administrator, Reilly supervises the activities of each of the EPA regional offices, including that of Region V located in Chicago, Illinois. By reason of his ultimate authority over the actions taken out of Region V, Reilly should have reasonably foreseen being subjected to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless \"found\" in Delaware \"by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.\"",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | 7,412,754 | a |
Reilly is the Administrator of the EPA, working out of Washington, D.C. As Administrator, Reilly supervises the activities of each of the EPA regional offices, including that of Region V located in Chicago, Illinois. By reason of his ultimate authority over the actions taken out of Region V, Reilly should have reasonably foreseen being subjected to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "656 F.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless \"found\" in Delaware \"by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.\"",
"sentence": "See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.1978) (In an action for inappropriate medical care, the court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Assistant Surgeon General of the United States because the former bore responsibility for the management of the federal prison system and the later was re sponsible for monitoring the medical services within the prison.), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); cf. The Superior Oil Co. v. Andrus, 656 F.2d 33, 41 (3d Cir.1981) (For purposes of laying venue, government defendants not personally present in Delaware are nonetheless “found” in Delaware “by reason of their ultimate responsibility for the services rendered there.”)."
} | 7,412,754 | a |
We are not persuaded, however, that the trial court was restricted from decreasing maintenance from that originally awarded after consideration of the parties' current circumstances. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a new child support order is to be made, both parties must be allowed to show their current circumstances",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Jones, 627 P.2d 248 (Colo.1981)(the propriety of an award of maintenance depends upon the inadequacy of the property and earning capacity possessed by the party seeking the award); cf. In re Marriage of Foss, 30 P.3d 860 (Colo.App.2001)(where a new child support order is to be made, both parties must be allowed to show their current circumstances)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the propriety of an award of maintenance depends upon the inadequacy of the property and earning capacity possessed by the party seeking the award",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Jones, 627 P.2d 248 (Colo.1981)(the propriety of an award of maintenance depends upon the inadequacy of the property and earning capacity possessed by the party seeking the award); cf. In re Marriage of Foss, 30 P.3d 860 (Colo.App.2001)(where a new child support order is to be made, both parties must be allowed to show their current circumstances)."
} | 9,025,877 | b |
However, an express agreement is not required. An implied agreement may support a common law marriage where one party intends present marriage and the conduct of the other party reflects the- same intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 Iowa 1287, 1289-90",
"parenthetical": "agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See State v. Grimes, 215 Iowa 1287, 1289-90, 247 N.W. 664, 665 (1933) (agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "247 Iowa 979, 980",
"parenthetical": "cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married",
"sentence": "Id.; Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 247 Iowa 979, 980, 77 N.W.2d 479, 480 (1956) (cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married), The present-intent-to-be-married requirement precludes a common law marriage based on an intent to be married at some future time."
} | 9,227,672 | b |
However, an express agreement is not required. An implied agreement may support a common law marriage where one party intends present marriage and the conduct of the other party reflects the- same intent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "247 N.W. 664, 665",
"parenthetical": "agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See State v. Grimes, 215 Iowa 1287, 1289-90, 247 N.W. 664, 665 (1933) (agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "247 Iowa 979, 980",
"parenthetical": "cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married",
"sentence": "Id.; Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 247 Iowa 979, 980, 77 N.W.2d 479, 480 (1956) (cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married), The present-intent-to-be-married requirement precludes a common law marriage based on an intent to be married at some future time."
} | 9,227,672 | b |
However, an express agreement is not required. An implied agreement may support a common law marriage where one party intends present marriage and the conduct of the other party reflects the- same intent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "77 N.W.2d 479, 480",
"parenthetical": "cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married",
"sentence": "Id.; Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 247 Iowa 979, 980, 77 N.W.2d 479, 480 (1956) (cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married), The present-intent-to-be-married requirement precludes a common law marriage based on an intent to be married at some future time."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 Iowa 1287, 1289-90",
"parenthetical": "agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See State v. Grimes, 215 Iowa 1287, 1289-90, 247 N.W. 664, 665 (1933) (agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship)."
} | 9,227,672 | a |
However, an express agreement is not required. An implied agreement may support a common law marriage where one party intends present marriage and the conduct of the other party reflects the- same intent. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "77 N.W.2d 479, 480",
"parenthetical": "cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married",
"sentence": "Id.; Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 247 Iowa 979, 980, 77 N.W.2d 479, 480 (1956) (cohabitation, as well as conduct and general community reputation, can be used to strengthen proof of present intent and agreement to be married), The present-intent-to-be-married requirement precludes a common law marriage based on an intent to be married at some future time."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "247 N.W. 664, 665",
"parenthetical": "agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship",
"sentence": "See State v. Grimes, 215 Iowa 1287, 1289-90, 247 N.W. 664, 665 (1933) (agreement to live as husband and wife until lawfully married does not establish present intent to enter into marriage relationship)."
} | 9,227,672 | a |
. Plaintiff intertwines her discussion of issue preclusion and claim preclusion. It is clear that Defendant's Motion is based upon claim preclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "653 N.W.2d 345, 348",
"parenthetical": "\"The doctrine of res judicata embraces the concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Weishaar v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 582 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Iowa 1998) (explaining that claim preclusion means that \"further litigation on the claim is prohibited” and issue preclusion means that “further litigation on a specific issue is barred”); see also Colvin v. Story County Bd. of Review, 653 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Iowa 2002) (\"The doctrine of res judicata embraces the concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "582 N.W.2d 177, 180",
"parenthetical": "explaining that claim preclusion means that \"further litigation on the claim is prohibited\" and issue preclusion means that \"further litigation on a specific issue is barred\"",
"sentence": "See Weishaar v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 582 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Iowa 1998) (explaining that claim preclusion means that \"further litigation on the claim is prohibited” and issue preclusion means that “further litigation on a specific issue is barred”); see also Colvin v. Story County Bd. of Review, 653 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Iowa 2002) (\"The doctrine of res judicata embraces the concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.”)."
} | 8,449,157 | b |
Like the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, however, I find the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Calderon unpersuasive. As these courts of appeals explained, Hohn is undoubtedly distinguishable on the ground that it was limited to the question of whether an application for a certificate of appealability constitutes an appealable ease, a question entirely different from when a case is deemed "filed" under AED-PA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 506, 506",
"parenthetical": "the Ninth Circuit's rebanee on Hohn in deciding whether a motion for appointment of counsel is a \"case pending\" under AEDPA is \"inapt\"",
"sentence": "See also Gosier, 175 F.3d at 506 (the Ninth Circuit’s rebanee on Hohn in deciding whether a motion for appointment of counsel is a “case pending” under AEDPA is “inapt”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 1163, 1163",
"parenthetical": "Hohn is \"limited to the determination that the rejection by the district court of the preliminary motion constitutes an appealable case\"",
"sentence": "See Moore, 195 F.3d at 1163 (Hohn is “limited to the determination that the rejection by the district court of the preliminary motion constitutes an appealable case”); Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d at 1040 (“Hohn and Ex Parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA ... or ... a motion for the appointment of counsel ... would constitute an appealable case”)."
} | 9,403,678 | b |
Like the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, however, I find the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Calderon unpersuasive. As these courts of appeals explained, Hohn is undoubtedly distinguishable on the ground that it was limited to the question of whether an application for a certificate of appealability constitutes an appealable ease, a question entirely different from when a case is deemed "filed" under AED-PA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 506, 506",
"parenthetical": "the Ninth Circuit's rebanee on Hohn in deciding whether a motion for appointment of counsel is a \"case pending\" under AEDPA is \"inapt\"",
"sentence": "See also Gosier, 175 F.3d at 506 (the Ninth Circuit’s rebanee on Hohn in deciding whether a motion for appointment of counsel is a “case pending” under AEDPA is “inapt”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "167 F.3d 1040, 1040",
"parenthetical": "\"Hohn and Ex Parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA ... or ... a motion for the appointment of counsel ... would constitute an appealable case\"",
"sentence": "See Moore, 195 F.3d at 1163 (Hohn is “limited to the determination that the rejection by the district court of the preliminary motion constitutes an appealable case”); Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d at 1040 (“Hohn and Ex Parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA ... or ... a motion for the appointment of counsel ... would constitute an appealable case”)."
} | 9,403,678 | b |
While plaintiff states that "[t]he notice of termination dated January 18, 2006, was in violation of public policy," she has not pled a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Am. Compl. at P 36. Even assuming that she had, this claim would fail as plaintiff did not identify a particular Virginia statute which Voorthuis Opticians violated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, [the plaintiff] does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that [the employer] violated.\"",
"sentence": "See Chrysler Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996) (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, [the plaintiff] does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that [the employer] violated.”); see also Leverton v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 486, 490 (E.D.Va.1998) (\"a claim for wrongful discharge under Bowman cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute establishing a public policy which was violated by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "991 F.Supp. 486, 490",
"parenthetical": "\"a claim for wrongful discharge under Bowman cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute establishing a public policy which was violated by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff\"",
"sentence": "See Chrysler Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996) (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, [the plaintiff] does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that [the employer] violated.”); see also Leverton v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 486, 490 (E.D.Va.1998) (\"a claim for wrongful discharge under Bowman cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute establishing a public policy which was violated by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff”)."
} | 4,012,460 | a |
While plaintiff states that "[t]he notice of termination dated January 18, 2006, was in violation of public policy," she has not pled a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Am. Compl. at P 36. Even assuming that she had, this claim would fail as plaintiff did not identify a particular Virginia statute which Voorthuis Opticians violated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 S.E.2d 806, 809",
"parenthetical": "\"Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, [the plaintiff] does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that [the employer] violated.\"",
"sentence": "See Chrysler Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996) (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, [the plaintiff] does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that [the employer] violated.”); see also Leverton v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 486, 490 (E.D.Va.1998) (\"a claim for wrongful discharge under Bowman cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute establishing a public policy which was violated by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "991 F.Supp. 486, 490",
"parenthetical": "\"a claim for wrongful discharge under Bowman cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute establishing a public policy which was violated by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff\"",
"sentence": "See Chrysler Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996) (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, [the plaintiff] does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy that [the employer] violated.”); see also Leverton v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 486, 490 (E.D.Va.1998) (\"a claim for wrongful discharge under Bowman cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute establishing a public policy which was violated by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff”)."
} | 4,012,460 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35",
"parenthetical": "holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department's longstanding interpretation of Act's requirements",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 580, 580-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | b |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 580, 580-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department's longstanding interpretation of Act's requirements",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 580, 580-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department's longstanding interpretation of Act's requirements",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 580, 580-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "335 U.S. 1, 16",
"parenthetical": "holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted \"settled judicial construction\" of the 1893 Act",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted \"settled judicial construction\" of the 1893 Act",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 580, 580-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | b |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 580, 580-81",
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted \"settled judicial construction\" of the 1893 Act",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35",
"parenthetical": "holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department's longstanding interpretation of Act's requirements",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | b |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department's longstanding interpretation of Act's requirements",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | b |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department's longstanding interpretation of Act's requirements",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "335 U.S. 1, 16",
"parenthetical": "holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted \"settled judicial construction\" of the 1893 Act",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted \"settled judicial construction\" of the 1893 Act",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
We have difficulty accepting that proposition because Congress, in replacing SS 10927(a)(3) with SS 13906(a)(3), was not faced with a binding construction by a court or agency finding that SS 10927(a)(3) required, any motor carriers to have cargo liability insurance. Such an authoritative interpretation by a court or' agency has been required in cases in which these rules of statutory construction relied on by the district court have been used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Congress' incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted \"settled judicial construction\" of the 1893 Act",
"sentence": "See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866 (holding that Congress’ incorporation of jury provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act necessarily ratified and adopted longstanding judicial construction of those provisions); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 134-35, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (holding when Congress re-enacted the Voting Rights Act, it necessarily adopted Justice Department’s longstanding interpretation of Act’s requirements); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (holding that when Congress included provisions of Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, it necessarily adopted “settled judicial construction” of the 1893 Act)."
} | 556,309 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 1256, 1263",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 402, 410-11",
"parenthetical": "\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines\"",
"sentence": "Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) (\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 1256, 1263",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 854, 856",
"parenthetical": "exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1992) (exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 402, 410-11",
"parenthetical": "\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines\"",
"sentence": "Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) (\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | 10,515,800 | b |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 854, 856",
"parenthetical": "exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1992) (exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | 10,515,800 | b |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 402, 410-11",
"parenthetical": "\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines\"",
"sentence": "Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) (\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 854, 856",
"parenthetical": "exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1992) (exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 402, 410-11",
"parenthetical": "\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines\"",
"sentence": "Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) (\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 63, 68",
"parenthetical": "under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | 10,515,800 | b |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 63, 68",
"parenthetical": "under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 854, 856",
"parenthetical": "exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1992) (exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 402, 410-11",
"parenthetical": "\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines\"",
"sentence": "Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) (\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 854, 856",
"parenthetical": "exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1992) (exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 402, 410-11",
"parenthetical": "\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines\"",
"sentence": "Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) (\"exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | 10,515,800 | b |
. Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (\"Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 854, 856",
"parenthetical": "exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1992) (exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation hearings absent a showing of harassment)."
} | 10,515,800 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 133, 148",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 164, 187-188",
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 164, 187-188",
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 164, 187-188",
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 133, 148",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 133, 148",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating a plaintiff \"might seek to demonstrate that respondent's claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 248, 259",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 133, 148",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 248, 259",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 248, 259",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 133, 148",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 133, 148",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
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