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Assuming Ms. Perez's affidavit is accurate, she and Juror 79 saw each other in a store sometime around 2006, long before the jury was seated in this case. (R. 979, Salazar's Mot. for New Trial, Ms. Perez's Aff. PP 6-8.) The jury foreperson testified that Juror 79 reported recognizing one or more family members on the train or at a store during trial, but there is no evidence that they spoke to each other or interacted in any way. (5/30/08 Tr. at 31-33.) This type of random, innocuous contact is not the type of extraneous influence, such as the attempted bribery of a juror or direct threats made to a juror, requiring a hearing under Remmer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "263 F.3d 723, 723",
"parenthetical": "no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was \"not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer\"",
"sentence": "See Whitehead, 263 F.3d at 723 (no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was “not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer”); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir.1985) (no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous); see also Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 160 n. 6 (4th Cir1998) (limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced “competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced \"competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.\"",
"sentence": "See Whitehead, 263 F.3d at 723 (no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was “not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer”); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir.1985) (no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous); see also Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 160 n. 6 (4th Cir1998) (limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced “competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.”)."
} | 3,773,425 | a |
Assuming Ms. Perez's affidavit is accurate, she and Juror 79 saw each other in a store sometime around 2006, long before the jury was seated in this case. (R. 979, Salazar's Mot. for New Trial, Ms. Perez's Aff. PP 6-8.) The jury foreperson testified that Juror 79 reported recognizing one or more family members on the train or at a store during trial, but there is no evidence that they spoke to each other or interacted in any way. (5/30/08 Tr. at 31-33.) This type of random, innocuous contact is not the type of extraneous influence, such as the attempted bribery of a juror or direct threats made to a juror, requiring a hearing under Remmer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "758 F.2d 199, 202-03",
"parenthetical": "no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous",
"sentence": "See Whitehead, 263 F.3d at 723 (no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was “not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer”); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir.1985) (no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous); see also Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 160 n. 6 (4th Cir1998) (limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced “competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced \"competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.\"",
"sentence": "See Whitehead, 263 F.3d at 723 (no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was “not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer”); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir.1985) (no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous); see also Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 160 n. 6 (4th Cir1998) (limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced “competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.”)."
} | 3,773,425 | a |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 P.3d 59, 64",
"parenthetical": "finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor's oral statements in opening to which there was no objection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring \"Defendant's Story Is a Lie\" and asserting that \"People Lie When They Are Guilty\" and gave an \"immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down\" and an adequate curative instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing convictions based on the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a \"mug shot\" of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that \"the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring \"Defendant's Story Is a Lie\" and asserting that \"People Lie When They Are Guilty\" and gave an \"immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down\" and an adequate curative instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring \"Defendant's Story Is a Lie\" and asserting that \"People Lie When They Are Guilty\" and gave an \"immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down\" and an adequate curative instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "286 P.3d 673, 678",
"parenthetical": "reversing convictions based on the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a \"mug shot\" of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that \"the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring \"Defendant's Story Is a Lie\" and asserting that \"People Lie When They Are Guilty\" and gave an \"immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down\" and an adequate curative instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 P.3d 59, 64",
"parenthetical": "finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor's oral statements in opening to which there was no objection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring \"Defendant's Story Is a Lie\" and asserting that \"People Lie When They Are Guilty\" and gave an \"immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down\" and an adequate curative instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing convictions based on the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a \"mug shot\" of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that \"the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring \"Defendant's Story Is a Lie\" and asserting that \"People Lie When They Are Guilty\" and gave an \"immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down\" and an adequate curative instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "286 P.3d 673, 678",
"parenthetical": "reversing convictions based on the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a \"mug shot\" of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that \"the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 P.3d 59, 64",
"parenthetical": "finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor's oral statements in opening to which there was no objection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing convictions based on the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a \"mug shot\" of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that \"the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Egregious misconduct may or may not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the convictions, depending on the efficacy of the action taken by the judge to eradicate the apparent prejudice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 P.3d 59, 64",
"parenthetical": "finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor's oral statements in opening to which there was no objection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "286 P.3d 673, 678",
"parenthetical": "reversing convictions based on the prosecutor's use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a \"mug shot\" of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that \"the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dolphy v. State, 288 Ga. 705, 707 S.E.2d 56, 57-58 (2011) (where the trial court sustained the defense objection to PowerPoint slides declaring “Defendant’s Story Is a Lie” and asserting that “People Lie When They Are Guilty” and gave an “immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be taken down” and an adequate curative instruction); cf. State v. Sucharew, 205 Am. 16, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ct.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to use a PowerPoint that consisted of pictures provided in discovery and later admitted into evidence at trial and descriptive text echoing the prosecutor’s oral statements in opening to which there was no objection); but cf. In the Matter of Personal Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 286 P.3d 673, 678 (2012) (reversing convictions based on the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint in summation that included a “mug shot” of the defendant with accompanying text declaring him guilty on the ground that “the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
It is worth noting that a violation of M.G.L.A. 265 SS 19(b) exposes an offender to a potential life sentence. Also, the purpose of both the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania statutes is the same, to protect citizens from serious injury or the threat thereof and to deter violent conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "831 A.2d 666, 666",
"parenthetical": "federal offense of armed bank robbery substantially equivalent to Pennsylvania's robbery statute where \"The conduct prohibited by both statutes, the resort to such force and intimidation to accomplish the individual's purpose of taking, is the same.\"",
"sentence": "See also Taylor, 831 A.2d at 666 (federal offense of armed bank robbery substantially equivalent to Pennsylvania’s robbery statute where “The conduct prohibited by both statutes, the resort to such force and intimidation to accomplish the individual’s purpose of taking, is the same.”) (citation and footnote omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "856 A.2d 1278, 1278",
"parenthetical": "finding New York's and Pennsylvania's robbery statutes substantially equivalent where \"a review of the statutes reveals that both offenses prohibit the same conduct, i.e., employing intimidation through threat of bodily harm to facilitate a theft, and both statutes advance the public's interest in protecting citizens from serious injury or the threat thereof'",
"sentence": "See Ward, 856 A.2d at 1278 (finding New York’s and Pennsylvania’s robbery statutes substantially equivalent where “a review of the statutes reveals that both offenses prohibit the same conduct, i.e., employing intimidation through threat of bodily harm to facilitate a theft, and both statutes advance the public’s interest in protecting citizens from serious injury or the threat thereof’)."
} | 7,276,095 | b |
Without busying myself here elaborating on the materiality of the purported testimony, it is sufficient to note that a military lawyer formerly assigned to represent Ross has averred that during his representation of Ross in military court-mar tial proceedings, apparently grounded in the same facts as the present indictment, he obtained exculpatory statements from Thomas, Boyd, and Rose. This showing is sufficient to warrant the depositions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "693 F.2d 919, 924",
"parenthetical": "defendant must show proposed testimony \"sufficiently favorable\" to warrant Rule 15(a",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir.1982) (defendant must show proposed testimony “sufficiently favorable” to warrant Rule 15(a) deposition)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relevant, potentially exculpating testimony may be preserved by Rule 15(a",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilson, 601 F.2d 95 (3rd Cir.1979) (relevant, potentially exculpating testimony may be preserved by Rule 15(a) deposition)."
} | 7,855,536 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 173, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 305, 314-15",
"parenthetical": "court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 305, 314-15",
"parenthetical": "court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2291, 2291",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | 3,826,611 | a |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 173, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804",
"parenthetical": "court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2291, 2291",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804",
"parenthetical": "court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 173, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | 3,826,611 | a |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2291, 2291",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 173, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 531, 544",
"parenthetical": "criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2291, 2291",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 531, 544",
"parenthetical": "criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 173, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403",
"parenthetical": "criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2291, 2291",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403",
"parenthetical": "criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 173, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | 3,826,611 | a |
Though contracts for construction of the outfall tunnel had been entered by that time and construction had begun, the 1993 BA satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of SS 7(c). To recommend that this Court terminate the outfall tunnel project simply for an alleged violation of procedure, despite no evidence of a likely threat to endangered species, strikes this Court as an exaltation of form over substance. It also appears to be at odds with caselaw. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2291, 2291",
"parenthetical": "court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA",
"sentence": "But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-74, 98 S.Ct. at 2291 (court required to issue injunction to prevent start-up of dam where dam would cause extinction of endangered species and violate letter and purpose of ESA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated",
"sentence": "See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (court not required to issue injunction to stop technical violations of Federal Water Pollution Control Act where discharge of military ordnance not polluting waters and, therefore, not in tension with purpose of statute). Cf Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (criticizing court for giving too much weight to procedural violation of Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and not enough to purpose of statute which had not been violated)."
} | 3,826,611 | b |
The record indicates that Doe's supervisor and the deciding official lost confidence in Doe's honesty and integrity, questioned his judgment and ability to perform his duties, and found Doe's misconduct serious because they believed it violated Ohio state law. Because it seems probable that Doe was disciplined at least in part because the deciding official mistakenly believed that his misconduct was in violation of the law, it is necessary to know what conclusion the decision makers would have reached, and what penalty they would have imposed, if the possibility that the conduct was criminal was removed from consideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where there are several charges leading to a penalty, and not all the charges are sustained, it is necessary to consider what penalty would have been appropriate in light of the dropped charges",
"sentence": "See Hayes, 727 F.2d at 1539 (“it is not our duty to find nexus but rather to decide ... whether the [MSPB] affirmance of the agency conclusion on the nexus issue meets the statutory criteria for our affirmance.”); see also Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246 (Fed.Cir.1999) (where there are several charges leading to a penalty, and not all the charges are sustained, it is necessary to consider what penalty would have been appropriate in light of the dropped charges)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "727 F.2d 1539, 1539",
"parenthetical": "\"it is not our duty to find nexus but rather to decide ... whether the [MSPB] affirmance of the agency conclusion on the nexus issue meets the statutory criteria for our affirmance.\"",
"sentence": "See Hayes, 727 F.2d at 1539 (“it is not our duty to find nexus but rather to decide ... whether the [MSPB] affirmance of the agency conclusion on the nexus issue meets the statutory criteria for our affirmance.”); see also Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246 (Fed.Cir.1999) (where there are several charges leading to a penalty, and not all the charges are sustained, it is necessary to consider what penalty would have been appropriate in light of the dropped charges)."
} | 3,642,306 | b |
(Id. at 36-51, Page ID # 14940-55.) Indeed, evidence at trial showed that all three contractors, to varying degrees, considered Dimora to be a Mend. Still, the evidence demonstrated that it was not Mendship alone that motivated the exchange of things of value for political favors. The testimony of Valentin, Randazzo, and Zavarella, together with Dimora's "as needed" official actions, supported the jury's determination that- Dimora illegally received things of value in exchange for official acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 211, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them -- -whether primary or secondary -- be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 100, 113",
"parenthetical": "on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that \"defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County\" was appropriate in light of the defendant's argument that he was motivated by friendship",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | 3,869,836 | a |
(Id. at 36-51, Page ID # 14940-55.) Indeed, evidence at trial showed that all three contractors, to varying degrees, considered Dimora to be a Mend. Still, the evidence demonstrated that it was not Mendship alone that motivated the exchange of things of value for political favors. The testimony of Valentin, Randazzo, and Zavarella, together with Dimora's "as needed" official actions, supported the jury's determination that- Dimora illegally received things of value in exchange for official acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them -- -whether primary or secondary -- be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 100, 113",
"parenthetical": "on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that \"defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County\" was appropriate in light of the defendant's argument that he was motivated by friendship",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | 3,869,836 | a |
(Id. at 36-51, Page ID # 14940-55.) Indeed, evidence at trial showed that all three contractors, to varying degrees, considered Dimora to be a Mend. Still, the evidence demonstrated that it was not Mendship alone that motivated the exchange of things of value for political favors. The testimony of Valentin, Randazzo, and Zavarella, together with Dimora's "as needed" official actions, supported the jury's determination that- Dimora illegally received things of value in exchange for official acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them -- -whether primary or secondary -- be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 100, 113",
"parenthetical": "on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that \"defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County\" was appropriate in light of the defendant's argument that he was motivated by friendship",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | 3,869,836 | a |
(Id. at 36-51, Page ID # 14940-55.) Indeed, evidence at trial showed that all three contractors, to varying degrees, considered Dimora to be a Mend. Still, the evidence demonstrated that it was not Mendship alone that motivated the exchange of things of value for political favors. The testimony of Valentin, Randazzo, and Zavarella, together with Dimora's "as needed" official actions, supported the jury's determination that- Dimora illegally received things of value in exchange for official acts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 100, 113",
"parenthetical": "on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that \"defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County\" was appropriate in light of the defendant's argument that he was motivated by friendship",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 F.3d 46, 71",
"parenthetical": "A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, \"i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.\"",
"sentence": "See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974) (“A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — -whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law.”); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 71 (1st Cir.1998) (A defendant may be prosecuted for fraud if he has a dual intent, “i.e., if he is found to have intended both a lawful and an unlawful purpose .to some degree.”); see also United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir.1993) (on bribery and extortion counts, jury charge stating that “defendant accepted or solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or transaction of [the] County” was appropriate in light of the defendant’s argument that he was motivated by friendship)."
} | 3,869,836 | b |
The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate Cortez's due process right to counsel in denying Cortez's request for a second continuance for failure to show good cause, or in granting the motion to withdraw, where he had more than a year to find representation after his prior counsel withdrew. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 F.3d 1094, 1099-1100",
"parenthetical": "listing factors to be considered when deciding what constitutes a reasonable time to obtain counsel",
"sentence": "See Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1012; Burnt v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing factors to be considered when deciding what constitutes a reasonable time to obtain counsel); see also Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to obtain counsel after two continuances over four months simply meant alien was “unable to secure counsel at his own expense”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1463, 1470",
"parenthetical": "failure to obtain counsel after two continuances over four months simply meant alien was \"unable to secure counsel at his own expense\"",
"sentence": "See Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1012; Burnt v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing factors to be considered when deciding what constitutes a reasonable time to obtain counsel); see also Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to obtain counsel after two continuances over four months simply meant alien was “unable to secure counsel at his own expense”)."
} | 12,143,486 | a |
Section 161.001(1)(E) of the Family Code provides that parental rights may be terminated if the parent has "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "727 S.W.2d 531, 533",
"parenthetical": "stating that although endangerment requires more than threat of metaphysical injury or possible ill effects of less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that parent's conduct be directed at child or that child actually suffers injury",
"sentence": "J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (holding that father’s history of domestic violence toward mother, admitted marijuana use, and previous incarceration on criminal charges that were later dismissed constituted legally sufficient evidence of endangerment); see Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987) (stating that although endangerment requires more than threat of metaphysical injury or possible ill effects of less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that parent’s conduct be directed at child or that child actually suffers injury); Robinson v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 89 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (stating that “to endanger” means to expose child to loss or injury or to jeopardize child’s emotional or physical health); In re M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (holding that courts may look to parental conduct both before and after child’s birth to determine whether termination is appropriate, that parent’s conduct need not be directed at child, and that danger to child’s well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "283 S.W.3d 345, 345",
"parenthetical": "holding that father's history of domestic violence toward mother, admitted marijuana use, and previous incarceration on criminal charges that were later dismissed constituted legally sufficient evidence of endangerment",
"sentence": "J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (holding that father’s history of domestic violence toward mother, admitted marijuana use, and previous incarceration on criminal charges that were later dismissed constituted legally sufficient evidence of endangerment); see Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987) (stating that although endangerment requires more than threat of metaphysical injury or possible ill effects of less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that parent’s conduct be directed at child or that child actually suffers injury); Robinson v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 89 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (stating that “to endanger” means to expose child to loss or injury or to jeopardize child’s emotional or physical health); In re M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (holding that courts may look to parental conduct both before and after child’s birth to determine whether termination is appropriate, that parent’s conduct need not be directed at child, and that danger to child’s well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone)."
} | 7,091,012 | b |
As we just explained, by the time Agent Reynolds encountered Thompson, he clearly had reason to believe that Thompson was participating in a drug trafficking operation. Based on that belief, it was reasonable for Agent Reynolds to suspect that Thompson was armed because guns are known tools of the drug trade, as our cases have recognized. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "722 F.3d 901, 909",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.”); see also United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the “inherent danger in stopping those suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are known tools of the trade.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "403 F.3d 496, 507",
"parenthetical": "recognizing the \"inherent danger in stopping those suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are known tools of the trade.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.”); see also United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the “inherent danger in stopping those suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are known tools of the trade.”)."
} | 12,138,346 | a |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 362, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | a |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 362, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "447 U.S. 134, 151",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | a |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 362, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | a |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 362, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | b |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | a |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "447 U.S. 134, 151",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | b |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | b |
. At oral argument, the Secretary indicated that although a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands taken into trust, a state may seek to enforce its laws -- to the extent they are not preempted by federal law -- on trust lands either by agreement with the tribe or by seeking a determination in federal court that the State's interests with respect to enforcing a particular regulation outweigh the interests of the tribe and the federal government in fostering tribal self-government. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.\"",
"sentence": "See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (\"When ... state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.”); see also id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state officers may execute on tribal lands process related to off-reservation violations of state law); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (explaining that the state could require Indian tribes to collect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians). That issue is beyond the scope of this opinion."
} | 3,615,977 | b |
A court may give an initial aggressor instruction if the evidence will support a reasonable inference that the defendant initiated the physical conflict by using or threatening the imminent use of unlawful physical foree. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 P.3d 1108, 1113",
"parenthetical": "\"A defendant must initiate the physical conflict to be the initial aggressor.\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo.App.2003) (\"A defendant must initiate the physical conflict to be the initial aggressor.\"); cf. People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9, 16 (Colo.1984) (\"The Colorado law of self-defense requires that there be some evidence showing that the victim, as the initial aggressor, used or threatened the imminent use of unlawful physical foree against the defendant.\")."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "675 P.2d 9, 16",
"parenthetical": "\"The Colorado law of self-defense requires that there be some evidence showing that the victim, as the initial aggressor, used or threatened the imminent use of unlawful physical foree against the defendant.\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo.App.2003) (\"A defendant must initiate the physical conflict to be the initial aggressor.\"); cf. People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9, 16 (Colo.1984) (\"The Colorado law of self-defense requires that there be some evidence showing that the victim, as the initial aggressor, used or threatened the imminent use of unlawful physical foree against the defendant.\")."
} | 6,994,095 | a |
We find no error in the trial court's determination that Gaskin has not suffered prejudice from counsel's alleged deficient performance. As the trial court noted, because Dr. Krop testified at the eviden-tiary hearing that his diagnosis of Gaskin would have changed little if counsel had given him Gaskin's school records, Gaskin has not met his burden of showing that but for counsel's alleged deficiency, the result of the penalty phase would have been different. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "692 So.2d 874, 877",
"parenthetical": "holding that because the psychologists testified that their opinions would remain unchanged even considering the additional information, there was not a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been different",
"sentence": "See Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 877 (Fla.1997) (holding that because the psychologists testified that their opinions would remain unchanged even considering the additional information, there was not a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been different); see also Brown v. State, 755 So.2d 616, 636 (Fla.2000) (holding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "755 So.2d 616, 636",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony",
"sentence": "See Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 877 (Fla.1997) (holding that because the psychologists testified that their opinions would remain unchanged even considering the additional information, there was not a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been different); see also Brown v. State, 755 So.2d 616, 636 (Fla.2000) (holding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony)."
} | 11,458,802 | a |
This Court has often invalidated procedural practices which infringe on a defendant's right to be treated in a manner that comports with principles of fundamental fairness, even though no constitutional violation has occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 53, 53",
"parenthetical": "holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence",
"sentence": "See also State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 53 (holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 N.J. 309, 313",
"parenthetical": "declining to hold that double jeopardy bars retrial of speeding offense but finding that retrial was barred by considerations of fundamental fairness",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Czachor, supra, 82 N.J. at 402; State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 313 (1978) (declining to hold that double jeopardy bars retrial of speeding offense but finding that retrial was barred by considerations of fundamental fairness); State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 519 (1975) (prohibiting multiple prosecution for acts arising out of same arrest under court’s supervisory power to ensure fairness in the administration of justice, although rejecting constitutional attack); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182 (1971) (as a matter of policy, not due process, defendant who appeals from conviction entered in municipal court and receives trial de novo in county court may not receive harsher sentence on retrial). We find such considerations of fairness clearly no less compelling in a capital case."
} | 1,379,619 | b |
This Court has often invalidated procedural practices which infringe on a defendant's right to be treated in a manner that comports with principles of fundamental fairness, even though no constitutional violation has occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 53, 53",
"parenthetical": "holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence",
"sentence": "See also State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 53 (holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 N.J. 510, 519",
"parenthetical": "prohibiting multiple prosecution for acts arising out of same arrest under court's supervisory power to ensure fairness in the administration of justice, although rejecting constitutional attack",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Czachor, supra, 82 N.J. at 402; State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 313 (1978) (declining to hold that double jeopardy bars retrial of speeding offense but finding that retrial was barred by considerations of fundamental fairness); State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 519 (1975) (prohibiting multiple prosecution for acts arising out of same arrest under court’s supervisory power to ensure fairness in the administration of justice, although rejecting constitutional attack); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182 (1971) (as a matter of policy, not due process, defendant who appeals from conviction entered in municipal court and receives trial de novo in county court may not receive harsher sentence on retrial). We find such considerations of fairness clearly no less compelling in a capital case."
} | 1,379,619 | b |
This Court has often invalidated procedural practices which infringe on a defendant's right to be treated in a manner that comports with principles of fundamental fairness, even though no constitutional violation has occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 53, 53",
"parenthetical": "holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence",
"sentence": "See also State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 53 (holding that failure to charge that jury must find aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt violates fundamental fairness and requires reversal of death sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "as a matter of policy, not due process, defendant who appeals from conviction entered in municipal court and receives trial de novo in county court may not receive harsher sentence on retrial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Czachor, supra, 82 N.J. at 402; State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 313 (1978) (declining to hold that double jeopardy bars retrial of speeding offense but finding that retrial was barred by considerations of fundamental fairness); State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 519 (1975) (prohibiting multiple prosecution for acts arising out of same arrest under court’s supervisory power to ensure fairness in the administration of justice, although rejecting constitutional attack); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182 (1971) (as a matter of policy, not due process, defendant who appeals from conviction entered in municipal court and receives trial de novo in county court may not receive harsher sentence on retrial). We find such considerations of fairness clearly no less compelling in a capital case."
} | 1,379,619 | b |
His eonclusory allegation without "specific, detailed facts" is not sufficient to demonstrate past persecution. Moreover, Yasmeen relied solely on Mirza's claims of persecution and did not provide any evidence that she had personally been harmed or detained in Pakistan; therefore, she cannot demonstrate past persecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[TJhere are no derivative beneficiaries for an application for withholding of removal.\"",
"sentence": "See Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681 n.15 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[TJhere are no derivative beneficiaries for an application for withholding of removal.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Majd, 446 F.3d at 595 (stating that an applicant cannot base her fear of persecution solely on general conditions of violence and civil unrest)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 F.3d 595, 595",
"parenthetical": "stating that an applicant cannot base her fear of persecution solely on general conditions of violence and civil unrest",
"sentence": "See Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681 n.15 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[TJhere are no derivative beneficiaries for an application for withholding of removal.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Majd, 446 F.3d at 595 (stating that an applicant cannot base her fear of persecution solely on general conditions of violence and civil unrest)."
} | 12,387,935 | a |
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h), determination of any scope of the project issue is the province of the judge, not the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 762, 809",
"parenthetical": "stating that the judge decides \"whether the evidence warrants application\" of the scope of the project rule and \"whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 19, 19-20",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the 'scope-of-the-project' issue as a preliminary matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | 3,779,621 | b |
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h), determination of any scope of the project issue is the province of the judge, not the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 809, 809",
"parenthetical": "stating that the judge decides \"whether the evidence warrants application\" of the scope of the project rule and \"whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 19, 19-20",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the 'scope-of-the-project' issue as a preliminary matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | 3,779,621 | b |
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h), determination of any scope of the project issue is the province of the judge, not the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the 'scope-of-the-project' issue as a preliminary matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 762, 809",
"parenthetical": "stating that the judge decides \"whether the evidence warrants application\" of the scope of the project rule and \"whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | 3,779,621 | a |
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h), determination of any scope of the project issue is the province of the judge, not the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 809, 809",
"parenthetical": "stating that the judge decides \"whether the evidence warrants application\" of the scope of the project rule and \"whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the 'scope-of-the-project' issue as a preliminary matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803 (“[I]t is for the judge to tell the jury the criteria it must follow in determining what amount will constitute just compensation, and that in order to do so he must decide the ‘scope-of-the-project’ issue as a preliminary matter.”); see also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 809 (5th Cir.1979) (stating that the judge decides “whether the evidence warrants application” of the scope of the project rule and “whether or not any change in value attributable to the project should be included or disregarded”). Once the judge decides the scope of the project rule applies and sets the criteria for its application, it is for the jury to decide whether there in fact has been any increase or decrease in value due to the project, and by how much, on the basis of the evidence presented it. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 809."
} | 3,779,621 | b |
While we generally review eviden-tiary issues for abuse of discretion, there is an on-going dispute in this circuit concerning the proper standard of review of Rule 404(b) evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "667 F.3d 689, 703",
"parenthetical": "noting the \"longstanding intra-circuit conflict regarding the appropriate standard of review for evidentiary decisions under Rule 404(b",
"sentence": "See United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 703 (6th Cir.2012) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting the “longstanding intra-circuit conflict regarding the appropriate standard of review for evidentiary decisions under Rule 404(b)”); see also United States v. Chalmers, 554 Fed.Appx. 440, 449 (6th Cir.2014) (noting the “disagreement in this circuit as to the standard of review for evidentiary questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 Fed.Appx. 440, 449",
"parenthetical": "noting the \"disagreement in this circuit as to the standard of review for evidentiary questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b",
"sentence": "See United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 703 (6th Cir.2012) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting the “longstanding intra-circuit conflict regarding the appropriate standard of review for evidentiary decisions under Rule 404(b)”); see also United States v. Chalmers, 554 Fed.Appx. 440, 449 (6th Cir.2014) (noting the “disagreement in this circuit as to the standard of review for evidentiary questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)”)."
} | 4,011,613 | a |
"[SJubstantive due process ensures that [a state proceeding which results in a deprivation of property] is not arbitrary and capricious." Although the First Circuit routinely has rejected substantive due process claims in the zoning and land-use contexts, it has "left the door slightly ajar for federal relief in truly horrendous situations." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding \"vague\" complaints of \"a pattern of selective and excessive enforcement of municipal regulations\" were not conscience-shocking",
"sentence": "Nestor Colon Medina, 964 F.2d at 45; accord Licari, 22 F.3d at 350; Collier v. Town of Harvard, No. 95-cv-11652, 1997 WL 33781338, at *5 (D.Mass. Mar. 28, 1997); see Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43 (noting “even abridgments of state law [in the land-use context] committed in bad faith do not necessarily amount to constitutional deprivation of due process,” but acknowledging that there could exist a “type of egregious official behavior which could conceivably work a breach of the due process clause”); cf. Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634 (1st Cir.2013) (finding “vague” complaints of “a pattern of selective and excessive enforcement of municipal regulations” were not conscience-shocking)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "811 F.2d 43, 43",
"parenthetical": "noting \"even abridgments of state law [in the land-use context] committed in bad faith do not necessarily amount to constitutional deprivation of due process,\" but acknowledging that there could exist a \"type of egregious official behavior which could conceivably work a breach of the due process clause\"",
"sentence": "Nestor Colon Medina, 964 F.2d at 45; accord Licari, 22 F.3d at 350; Collier v. Town of Harvard, No. 95-cv-11652, 1997 WL 33781338, at *5 (D.Mass. Mar. 28, 1997); see Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43 (noting “even abridgments of state law [in the land-use context] committed in bad faith do not necessarily amount to constitutional deprivation of due process,” but acknowledging that there could exist a “type of egregious official behavior which could conceivably work a breach of the due process clause”); cf. Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634 (1st Cir.2013) (finding “vague” complaints of “a pattern of selective and excessive enforcement of municipal regulations” were not conscience-shocking)."
} | 4,235,541 | b |
Specifical-' ly, Sewell contends that the statute did not apply because he did not possess the required mental state and he went to trial solely to preserve a legal challenge to the district court's pre-trial exclusion of evidence regarding his intoxication. Both of these arguments concern Sewell's denial of an essential factual element of guilt by contending that he was too high on crack cocaine to form the necessary criminal intent, and there is some controversy whether the sentencing reduction is available in these circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "140 F.3d 367, 381",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant's defense that he lacked specific intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 381 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant’s defense that he lacked specific intent)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "173 F.3d 798, 806",
"parenthetical": "upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant \"contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea\" and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906, 120 S.Ct. 250, 145 L.Ed.2d 210 (1999) (upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant “contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea” and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir.1990) (same)."
} | 11,088,070 | a |
Specifical-' ly, Sewell contends that the statute did not apply because he did not possess the required mental state and he went to trial solely to preserve a legal challenge to the district court's pre-trial exclusion of evidence regarding his intoxication. Both of these arguments concern Sewell's denial of an essential factual element of guilt by contending that he was too high on crack cocaine to form the necessary criminal intent, and there is some controversy whether the sentencing reduction is available in these circumstances. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "140 F.3d 367, 381",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant's defense that he lacked specific intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 381 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant’s defense that he lacked specific intent)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant \"contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea\" and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906, 120 S.Ct. 250, 145 L.Ed.2d 210 (1999) (upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant “contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea” and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir.1990) (same)."
} | 11,088,070 | a |
Specifical-' ly, Sewell contends that the statute did not apply because he did not possess the required mental state and he went to trial solely to preserve a legal challenge to the district court's pre-trial exclusion of evidence regarding his intoxication. Both of these arguments concern Sewell's denial of an essential factual element of guilt by contending that he was too high on crack cocaine to form the necessary criminal intent, and there is some controversy whether the sentencing reduction is available in these circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant \"contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea\" and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906, 120 S.Ct. 250, 145 L.Ed.2d 210 (1999) (upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant “contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea” and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir.1990) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "140 F.3d 367, 381",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant's defense that he lacked specific intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 381 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant’s defense that he lacked specific intent)."
} | 11,088,070 | b |
Specifical-' ly, Sewell contends that the statute did not apply because he did not possess the required mental state and he went to trial solely to preserve a legal challenge to the district court's pre-trial exclusion of evidence regarding his intoxication. Both of these arguments concern Sewell's denial of an essential factual element of guilt by contending that he was too high on crack cocaine to form the necessary criminal intent, and there is some controversy whether the sentencing reduction is available in these circumstances. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant \"contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea\" and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906, 120 S.Ct. 250, 145 L.Ed.2d 210 (1999) (upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant “contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea” and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir.1990) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "140 F.3d 367, 381",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant's defense that he lacked specific intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 381 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant’s defense that he lacked specific intent)."
} | 11,088,070 | b |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 58, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 651, 663",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 651, 663",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 651, 663",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 58, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 58, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
(See Second Am. Compl. PP 12, 41.) Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”)."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
This civil trademark infringement action involves issues that are far more banal than the subject matters of the criminal trials in which pretrial publicity has presented serious constitutional problems. And, as we have long held, pretrial publicity is less likely to threaten the fairness of trial in a large metropolitan area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "561 U.S. 358, 382",
"parenthetical": "\"Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.\"",
"sentence": "See Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295 (concluding that although double murder trial “may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82; Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 295, 295",
"parenthetical": "concluding that although double murder trial \"may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant's right to a fair trial\"",
"sentence": "See Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295 (concluding that although double murder trial “may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82; Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.”)."
} | 12,265,250 | b |
This civil trademark infringement action involves issues that are far more banal than the subject matters of the criminal trials in which pretrial publicity has presented serious constitutional problems. And, as we have long held, pretrial publicity is less likely to threaten the fairness of trial in a large metropolitan area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.\"",
"sentence": "See Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295 (concluding that although double murder trial “may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82; Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 295, 295",
"parenthetical": "concluding that although double murder trial \"may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant's right to a fair trial\"",
"sentence": "See Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295 (concluding that although double murder trial “may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82; Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.”)."
} | 12,265,250 | b |
This civil trademark infringement action involves issues that are far more banal than the subject matters of the criminal trials in which pretrial publicity has presented serious constitutional problems. And, as we have long held, pretrial publicity is less likely to threaten the fairness of trial in a large metropolitan area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 295, 295",
"parenthetical": "concluding that although double murder trial \"may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant's right to a fair trial\"",
"sentence": "See Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295 (concluding that although double murder trial “may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82; Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.\"",
"sentence": "See Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295 (concluding that although double murder trial “may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, San Mateo County is the type of populous, heterogeneous metropolitan area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82; Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain.”)."
} | 12,265,250 | a |
Neither the quantity of narcotics nor possession of a firearms is an element of the offense for which Defendant was convicted. While the sentencing guidelines account for these factors in calculating the offense level, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is no right to jury trial on sentencing factors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 93, 93",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration",
"sentence": "McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420 (no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "180 U.S. 311, 313",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor",
"sentence": "See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor)."
} | 36,444 | a |
Neither the quantity of narcotics nor possession of a firearms is an element of the offense for which Defendant was convicted. While the sentencing guidelines account for these factors in calculating the offense level, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is no right to jury trial on sentencing factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "21 S.Ct. 389, 390",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor",
"sentence": "See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 93, 93",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration",
"sentence": "McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420 (no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration)."
} | 36,444 | b |
Neither the quantity of narcotics nor possession of a firearms is an element of the offense for which Defendant was convicted. While the sentencing guidelines account for these factors in calculating the offense level, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is no right to jury trial on sentencing factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor",
"sentence": "See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 93, 93",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration",
"sentence": "McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420 (no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration)."
} | 36,444 | b |
Neither the quantity of narcotics nor possession of a firearms is an element of the offense for which Defendant was convicted. While the sentencing guidelines account for these factors in calculating the offense level, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is no right to jury trial on sentencing factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "180 U.S. 311, 313",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor",
"sentence": "See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 2420, 2420",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration",
"sentence": "McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420 (no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration)."
} | 36,444 | b |
Neither the quantity of narcotics nor possession of a firearms is an element of the offense for which Defendant was convicted. While the sentencing guidelines account for these factors in calculating the offense level, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is no right to jury trial on sentencing factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "21 S.Ct. 389, 390",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor",
"sentence": "See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 2420, 2420",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration",
"sentence": "McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420 (no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration)."
} | 36,444 | b |
Neither the quantity of narcotics nor possession of a firearms is an element of the offense for which Defendant was convicted. While the sentencing guidelines account for these factors in calculating the offense level, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is no right to jury trial on sentencing factors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 2420, 2420",
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration",
"sentence": "McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 2420 (no right to jury trial on weapon possession which state treated as sentencing consideration)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor",
"sentence": "See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (no right to jury trial on habitual offender status which state treated as sentencing factor)."
} | 36,444 | a |
In Hider I we rejected Hider's challenge to the unannounced entry into his studio, holding that there is no "knock and announce" requirement in Maine and "no prohibition against forcible entry if the circumstances warrant it." The court in Wilson held that the common law "knock and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "625 A.2d 299, 300",
"parenthetical": "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. State, 625 A.2d 299, 300 (Me. 1993) (new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced); see also State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801 (Me.1983) (modifications of search and seizure rules are applied to pending cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "457 A.2d 798, 801",
"parenthetical": "modifications of search and seizure rules are applied to pending cases",
"sentence": "See Thompson v. State, 625 A.2d 299, 300 (Me. 1993) (new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced); see also State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801 (Me.1983) (modifications of search and seizure rules are applied to pending cases)."
} | 11,709,027 | a |
The Second Circuit has interpreted Brown as precluding state law employment discrimination claims against other federal employers. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 F.3d 101, 104-05",
"parenthetical": "Employee's claims under Human Rights Laws of State and City of New York barred because Title VII provided the sole remedy for federal employees asserting employment discrimination claims",
"sentence": "Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir.1998) (Employee’s claims under Human Rights Laws of State and City of New York barred because Title VII provided the sole remedy for federal employees asserting employment discrimination claims); Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 255 n. 4 (2d Cir.1994) (§ 1983 claim against a municipal government permitted to survive with observation that “[i]t is equally clear that federal employees are restricted to Title VII when complaining of employment discrimination.”); see also DiPompo v. West Point Military Academy, 708 F.Supp. 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (relying on Brown, court concluded that Title VII preempts all other statutory remedies for employment discrimination for federal employees and dismissed claims arising under various other federal and state statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 540, 544",
"parenthetical": "relying on Brown, court concluded that Title VII preempts all other statutory remedies for employment discrimination for federal employees and dismissed claims arising under various other federal and state statutes",
"sentence": "Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir.1998) (Employee’s claims under Human Rights Laws of State and City of New York barred because Title VII provided the sole remedy for federal employees asserting employment discrimination claims); Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 255 n. 4 (2d Cir.1994) (§ 1983 claim against a municipal government permitted to survive with observation that “[i]t is equally clear that federal employees are restricted to Title VII when complaining of employment discrimination.”); see also DiPompo v. West Point Military Academy, 708 F.Supp. 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (relying on Brown, court concluded that Title VII preempts all other statutory remedies for employment discrimination for federal employees and dismissed claims arising under various other federal and state statutes)."
} | 11,516,553 | a |
The Second Circuit has interpreted Brown as precluding state law employment discrimination claims against other federal employers. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "SS 1983 claim against a municipal government permitted to survive with observation that \"[i]t is equally clear that federal employees are restricted to Title VII when complaining of employment discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir.1998) (Employee’s claims under Human Rights Laws of State and City of New York barred because Title VII provided the sole remedy for federal employees asserting employment discrimination claims); Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 255 n. 4 (2d Cir.1994) (§ 1983 claim against a municipal government permitted to survive with observation that “[i]t is equally clear that federal employees are restricted to Title VII when complaining of employment discrimination.”); see also DiPompo v. West Point Military Academy, 708 F.Supp. 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (relying on Brown, court concluded that Title VII preempts all other statutory remedies for employment discrimination for federal employees and dismissed claims arising under various other federal and state statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 540, 544",
"parenthetical": "relying on Brown, court concluded that Title VII preempts all other statutory remedies for employment discrimination for federal employees and dismissed claims arising under various other federal and state statutes",
"sentence": "Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir.1998) (Employee’s claims under Human Rights Laws of State and City of New York barred because Title VII provided the sole remedy for federal employees asserting employment discrimination claims); Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 255 n. 4 (2d Cir.1994) (§ 1983 claim against a municipal government permitted to survive with observation that “[i]t is equally clear that federal employees are restricted to Title VII when complaining of employment discrimination.”); see also DiPompo v. West Point Military Academy, 708 F.Supp. 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (relying on Brown, court concluded that Title VII preempts all other statutory remedies for employment discrimination for federal employees and dismissed claims arising under various other federal and state statutes)."
} | 11,516,553 | a |
Thus providing for relief on this basis does not frustrate the preservation of error rule. In addition, this court is not willing or able to deny postconviction relief from ineffective counsel to avoid offending the preservation of error rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve an issue for appeal",
"sentence": "See Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2063 (the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel exists and is needed to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial); see also, Menendez v. State, 562 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve an issue for appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2063, 2063",
"parenthetical": "the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel exists and is needed to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial",
"sentence": "See Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2063 (the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel exists and is needed to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial); see also, Menendez v. State, 562 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve an issue for appeal)."
} | 7,507,560 | b |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 236",
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | b |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 236",
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | a |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 236",
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | b |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | b |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | b |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | b |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | a |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | a |
Further, because Marshall has failed to identify a knowing violation of clearly established due process rights, as defined by Indiana law or the Seventh Circuit, the individual Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity against Marshall's due process claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was \"clearly established\" under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful",
"sentence": "See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 236, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless: their conduct violated a constitutional right, and the law to this effect was “clearly established” under then-existing law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226, 238-39, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the Saucier test is not mandatory, particularly at the pleading stage, where facts must first be developed to determine whether a constitutional right was violate)."
} | 4,344,780 | b |
The protected statement was made eleven months before the first lockout and the initiation of the Internal Affairs investigations. Although an inference from temporal proximity would have been stronger had the gap in time been smaller, an eleven-month gap in time is within the range that has been found to support an inference that an employment decision was retaliatory. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "265 F.3d 752, 752",
"parenthetical": "finding that, where there was a two-year gap between protected speech and an adverse action, the proximity in time did not in itself give rise to an inference of retaliation",
"sentence": "But see Keyser, 265 F.3d at 752 (finding that, where there was a two-year gap between protected speech and an adverse action, the proximity in time did not in itself give rise to an inference of retaliation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "58 F.3d 1554, 1566",
"parenthetical": "noting that undue focus on timing distorts the sufficiency of evidence analysis, which is a \"fact-bound, common-sense inquiry\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1212(finding retaliation where an employer terminated an employee three years after the employee began openly criticizing the department); see also Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1566 (11th Cir.1995) (noting that undue focus on timing distorts the sufficiency of evidence analysis, which is a “fact-bound, common-sense inquiry”)."
} | 9,513,624 | b |
[See AR 115-116, 142], Plaintiffs uncontroverted testimony was that he either obtained those jobs with the assistance of relatives or actually worked for relatives. Thus, the record as a whole does not support defendant's contention that plaintiffs work history is materially inconsistent with an IQ signifying mild mental retardation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1185, 1185",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant's ability \"to maintain a job for most of his adult life\" called his mental retardation into doubt",
"sentence": "See Christner, 498 F.3d at 794 (holding that the claimant’s intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose “work history was limited primarily to working for his father”); Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (holding that the claimant’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant’s ability “to maintain a job for most of his adult life” called his mental retardation into doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 F.3d 794, 794",
"parenthetical": "holding that the claimant's intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ",
"sentence": "See Christner, 498 F.3d at 794 (holding that the claimant’s intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose “work history was limited primarily to working for his father”); Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (holding that the claimant’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant’s ability “to maintain a job for most of his adult life” called his mental retardation into doubt)."
} | 4,023,836 | b |
[See AR 115-116, 142], Plaintiffs uncontroverted testimony was that he either obtained those jobs with the assistance of relatives or actually worked for relatives. Thus, the record as a whole does not support defendant's contention that plaintiffs work history is materially inconsistent with an IQ signifying mild mental retardation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "230 F.3d 1063, 1065",
"parenthetical": "holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose \"work history was limited primarily to working for his father\"",
"sentence": "See Christner, 498 F.3d at 794 (holding that the claimant’s intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose “work history was limited primarily to working for his father”); Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (holding that the claimant’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant’s ability “to maintain a job for most of his adult life” called his mental retardation into doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1185, 1185",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant's ability \"to maintain a job for most of his adult life\" called his mental retardation into doubt",
"sentence": "See Christner, 498 F.3d at 794 (holding that the claimant’s intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose “work history was limited primarily to working for his father”); Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (holding that the claimant’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant’s ability “to maintain a job for most of his adult life” called his mental retardation into doubt)."
} | 4,023,836 | a |
[See AR 115-116, 142], Plaintiffs uncontroverted testimony was that he either obtained those jobs with the assistance of relatives or actually worked for relatives. Thus, the record as a whole does not support defendant's contention that plaintiffs work history is materially inconsistent with an IQ signifying mild mental retardation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "948 F.2d 270, 270",
"parenthetical": "holding that the claimant's ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68",
"sentence": "See Christner, 498 F.3d at 794 (holding that the claimant’s intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose “work history was limited primarily to working for his father”); Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (holding that the claimant’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant’s ability “to maintain a job for most of his adult life” called his mental retardation into doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1185, 1185",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant's ability \"to maintain a job for most of his adult life\" called his mental retardation into doubt",
"sentence": "See Christner, 498 F.3d at 794 (holding that the claimant’s intermittent work history as a tree trimmer supported his IQ); Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the ALJ erred in rejecting the IQ of a claimant whose “work history was limited primarily to working for his father”); Brown, 948 F.2d at 270 (holding that the claimant’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year, the claimant’s ability “to maintain a job for most of his adult life” called his mental retardation into doubt)."
} | 4,023,836 | a |
The Court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's orders has been appealed. Accordingly, the Court will not reconsider the issue regarding Appellant's rights, if any, to a portion of the $2 million, as this issue was previously raised by Appellant, considered and ruled upon by the Court, and is currently under review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 553, 554-55",
"parenthetical": "noting that a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court establishes the law of the case and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case, in the trial court, or on a later appeal in the appellate court",
"sentence": "See Schwartz v. NMS Industries, Inc., 575 F.2d 553, 554-55 (5th Cir.1978) (noting that a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court establishes the law of the case and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case, in the trial court, or on a later appeal in the appellate court); see also LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1996) (when there are multiple appeals taken in the course of a single piece of litigation, law of the case doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal should not be revisited on subsequent trips to the appellate court) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "87 F.3d 1389, 1393",
"parenthetical": "when there are multiple appeals taken in the course of a single piece of litigation, law of the case doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal should not be revisited on subsequent trips to the appellate court",
"sentence": "See Schwartz v. NMS Industries, Inc., 575 F.2d 553, 554-55 (5th Cir.1978) (noting that a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court establishes the law of the case and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case, in the trial court, or on a later appeal in the appellate court); see also LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1996) (when there are multiple appeals taken in the course of a single piece of litigation, law of the case doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal should not be revisited on subsequent trips to the appellate court) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 5,454,725 | a |
Detective McGrew concluded, based on his experience, that this activity fit the modus operandi of a child molester and it was likely that Flake would also possess child pornography in his home. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 630, 635",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is well established that a location can be searched for evidence of a crime even if there is no probable cause to arrest the person at that location.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 635 (9th Cir.2000) (“[i]t is well established that a location can be searched for evidence of a crime even if there is no probable cause to arrest the person at that location.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1338, 1345",
"parenthetical": "\"if the government presents expert opinion about the behavior of a particular class of persons, for the opinion to have any relevance, the affidavit must lay a foundation which shows that the person subject to the search is a member of the class\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir.1991) (“if the government presents expert opinion about the behavior of a particular class of persons, for the opinion to have any relevance, the affidavit must lay a foundation which shows that the person subject to the search is a member of the class”); United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1995) (“[Wjhen interpreting seemingly innocent conduct, the court issuing the warrant is entitled to rely on the training and experience of police officers.”)."
} | 431,663 | b |
Detective McGrew concluded, based on his experience, that this activity fit the modus operandi of a child molester and it was likely that Flake would also possess child pornography in his home. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 F.3d 1414, 1418",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhen interpreting seemingly innocent conduct, the court issuing the warrant is entitled to rely on the training and experience of police officers.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir.1991) (“if the government presents expert opinion about the behavior of a particular class of persons, for the opinion to have any relevance, the affidavit must lay a foundation which shows that the person subject to the search is a member of the class”); United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1995) (“[Wjhen interpreting seemingly innocent conduct, the court issuing the warrant is entitled to rely on the training and experience of police officers.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 630, 635",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is well established that a location can be searched for evidence of a crime even if there is no probable cause to arrest the person at that location.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 635 (9th Cir.2000) (“[i]t is well established that a location can be searched for evidence of a crime even if there is no probable cause to arrest the person at that location.”)."
} | 431,663 | a |
P23 The court's order in the foreclosure action that the price Purchasers paid for the home was "grossly inadequate" and "shocked the Court's [conscience]" was not appealed and has become final. On that basis alone, the superior court in this case could have correctly concluded that as a matter of law, Purchasers failed to "pay value" for the home, within the meaning of Exclusion 5. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 Ariz. 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "purchaser must pay \"a present equivalent\" for purposes of recording statute",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 214, 214, ¶ 38",
"parenthetical": "trustee s sale may be set aside if price is \"grossly inadequate\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | 5,545,453 | a |
P23 The court's order in the foreclosure action that the price Purchasers paid for the home was "grossly inadequate" and "shocked the Court's [conscience]" was not appealed and has become final. On that basis alone, the superior court in this case could have correctly concluded that as a matter of law, Purchasers failed to "pay value" for the home, within the meaning of Exclusion 5. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 Ariz. 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "purchaser must pay \"a present equivalent\" for purposes of recording statute",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 P.3d 783, 783",
"parenthetical": "trustee s sale may be set aside if price is \"grossly inadequate\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | 5,545,453 | a |
P23 The court's order in the foreclosure action that the price Purchasers paid for the home was "grossly inadequate" and "shocked the Court's [conscience]" was not appealed and has become final. On that basis alone, the superior court in this case could have correctly concluded that as a matter of law, Purchasers failed to "pay value" for the home, within the meaning of Exclusion 5. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 Ariz. 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "purchaser must pay \"a present equivalent\" for purposes of recording statute",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "119 Ariz. 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "foreclosure sale may be set aside if price \"is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | 5,545,453 | a |
P23 The court's order in the foreclosure action that the price Purchasers paid for the home was "grossly inadequate" and "shocked the Court's [conscience]" was not appealed and has become final. On that basis alone, the superior court in this case could have correctly concluded that as a matter of law, Purchasers failed to "pay value" for the home, within the meaning of Exclusion 5. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "580 P.2d 763, 763",
"parenthetical": "foreclosure sale may be set aside if price \"is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 Ariz. 99, 99",
"parenthetical": "purchaser must pay \"a present equivalent\" for purposes of recording statute",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | 5,545,453 | b |
P23 The court's order in the foreclosure action that the price Purchasers paid for the home was "grossly inadequate" and "shocked the Court's [conscience]" was not appealed and has become final. On that basis alone, the superior court in this case could have correctly concluded that as a matter of law, Purchasers failed to "pay value" for the home, within the meaning of Exclusion 5. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 214, 214, ¶ 38",
"parenthetical": "trustee s sale may be set aside if price is \"grossly inadequate\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "267 P.2d 735, 735",
"parenthetical": "purchaser must pay \"a present equivalent\" for purposes of recording statute",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | 5,545,453 | b |
P23 The court's order in the foreclosure action that the price Purchasers paid for the home was "grossly inadequate" and "shocked the Court's [conscience]" was not appealed and has become final. On that basis alone, the superior court in this case could have correctly concluded that as a matter of law, Purchasers failed to "pay value" for the home, within the meaning of Exclusion 5. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 P.3d 783, 783",
"parenthetical": "trustee s sale may be set aside if price is \"grossly inadequate\"",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "267 P.2d 735, 735",
"parenthetical": "purchaser must pay \"a present equivalent\" for purposes of recording statute",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 77 Ariz. at 99, 267 P.2d at 735 (purchaser must pay “a present equivalent” for purposes of recording statute); West, 299 F.Supp. at 668 (one who pays a “grossly inadequate” price for real property is not a bona fide purchaser); see also Krohn, 203 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 38, 52 P.3d at 783 (trustee s sale may be set aside if price is “grossly inadequate”); Homecraft, 119 Ariz. at 302, 580 P.2d at 763 (foreclosure sale may be set aside if price “is so gross as to be proof of fraud or shock the conscience of the court”)."
} | 5,545,453 | b |
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