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Roman has no right or entitlement to parole under Pennsylvania law. At most and reading the facts he has plead in his favor, Roman -- in deciding to assert his right to remain silent and thereby refusing to participate in the sex offender rehabilitation program -- has forfeited his opportunity for early release on his 1971 murder sentence, the terms of which were imposed following full and fair criminal proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 1226, 1226",
"parenthetical": "describing loss of good-time credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of an \"opportunity\" for early release",
"sentence": "See McKune, 536 U.S. at 53, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226 (describing loss of good-time credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of an “opportunity” for early release); see also Ohio v. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286-88, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (“It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ respondent to speak.... [The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter view compelled.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 286, 286-88",
"parenthetical": "\"It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could 'compel' respondent to speak.... [The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter view compelled.\"",
"sentence": "See McKune, 536 U.S. at 53, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226 (describing loss of good-time credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of an “opportunity” for early release); see also Ohio v. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286-88, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (“It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ respondent to speak.... [The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter view compelled.”)."
} | 3,752,336 | a |
Roman has no right or entitlement to parole under Pennsylvania law. At most and reading the facts he has plead in his favor, Roman -- in deciding to assert his right to remain silent and thereby refusing to participate in the sex offender rehabilitation program -- has forfeited his opportunity for early release on his 1971 murder sentence, the terms of which were imposed following full and fair criminal proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 1226, 1226",
"parenthetical": "describing loss of good-time credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of an \"opportunity\" for early release",
"sentence": "See McKune, 536 U.S. at 53, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226 (describing loss of good-time credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of an “opportunity” for early release); see also Ohio v. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286-88, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (“It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ respondent to speak.... [The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter view compelled.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could 'compel' respondent to speak.... [The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter view compelled.\"",
"sentence": "See McKune, 536 U.S. at 53, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226 (describing loss of good-time credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of an “opportunity” for early release); see also Ohio v. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286-88, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (“It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ respondent to speak.... [The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter view compelled.”)."
} | 3,752,336 | a |
. While James Lattanzio purported to sign the Mutual Release on behalf of Sandra Lattanzio, it is hornbook law that a spouse does not -- by virtue of that status alone -- possess actual authority to legally bind his or her spouse, and the record is devoid of any indication that Sandra Lattanzio had either executed a power of attorney or, through her conduct with the defendants, created an appearance of authority in her husband. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "646 N.W.2d 732, 736",
"parenthetical": "husband's signature releasing claims against homebuilder did not bind non-signing spouse in absence of apparent authority",
"sentence": "Bennett v. Mack’s Supermarkets, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 143, 147 (K.y.1979) (\"There is no longer in this state a presumption of agency between husband and wife in dealing with each other’s property.”); see also Restatement, Agency 2d, § 22(b); Krause v. Reyelts, 646 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D.2002) (husband’s signature releasing claims against homebuilder did not bind non-signing spouse in absence of apparent authority); Poarch v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 799 So.2d 949, 955 (Ala.Civ.App.2000)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "602 S.W.2d 143, 147",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no longer in this state a presumption of agency between husband and wife in dealing with each other's property.\"",
"sentence": "Bennett v. Mack’s Supermarkets, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 143, 147 (K.y.1979) (\"There is no longer in this state a presumption of agency between husband and wife in dealing with each other’s property.”); see also Restatement, Agency 2d, § 22(b); Krause v. Reyelts, 646 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D.2002) (husband’s signature releasing claims against homebuilder did not bind non-signing spouse in absence of apparent authority); Poarch v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 799 So.2d 949, 955 (Ala.Civ.App.2000)."
} | 3,594,629 | b |
William Blackstone long ago recognized this virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that through live testimony, "and this [procedure] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as contrasted with a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in our own judicial system since its inception. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.2d 429, 430",
"parenthetical": "\"[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... \"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "156 U.S. 237, 242-43",
"parenthetical": "\"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,629,657 | b |
William Blackstone long ago recognized this virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that through live testimony, "and this [procedure] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as contrasted with a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in our own judicial system since its inception. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "156 U.S. 237, 242-43",
"parenthetical": "\"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.2d 77, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"The liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,629,657 | a |
William Blackstone long ago recognized this virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that through live testimony, "and this [procedure] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as contrasted with a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in our own judicial system since its inception. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.2d 429, 430",
"parenthetical": "\"[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... \"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,629,657 | b |
William Blackstone long ago recognized this virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that through live testimony, "and this [procedure] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as contrasted with a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in our own judicial system since its inception. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.2d 77, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"The liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,629,657 | a |
William Blackstone long ago recognized this virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that through live testimony, "and this [procedure] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as contrasted with a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in our own judicial system since its inception. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.2d 429, 430",
"parenthetical": "\"[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... \"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,629,657 | b |
William Blackstone long ago recognized this virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that through live testimony, "and this [procedure] only, the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as contrasted with a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in our own judicial system since its inception. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.2d 77, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"The liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.\"",
"sentence": "-S'ee, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depo sitions ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.1951) (“[TJhat part of the evidence which the printed words do not preserve .... is the most telling part, for on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the dominating factors.... ”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (“The liar’s story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted ... by his manner ... which cold print does not preserve.”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 3,629,657 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 213, 214-15",
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 213, 214-15",
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 213, 214-15",
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 487, 489-97",
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 487, 489-97",
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 487, 489-97",
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 326, 326-27",
"parenthetical": "petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 326, 326-27",
"parenthetical": "petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 326, 326-27",
"parenthetical": "petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 285, 287-88",
"parenthetical": "hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 285, 287-88",
"parenthetical": "hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 285, 287-88",
"parenthetical": "hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 397, 397-99",
"parenthetical": "petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed\" what the sentence would be",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 397, 397-99",
"parenthetical": "petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed\" what the sentence would be",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 397, 397-99",
"parenthetical": "petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed\" what the sentence would be",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 U.S. 63, 71-77",
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "495 F.2d 585, 586-88",
"parenthetical": "hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | b |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "495 F.2d 585, 586-88",
"parenthetical": "hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
. In our view the instant case does not fall within that narrow category of situations in which it has been held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in a SS 2255 challenge to a guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "495 F.2d 585, 586-88",
"parenthetical": "hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary dismissal of SS 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing",
"sentence": "See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (petitioner claimed involuntary waiver of counsel and coerced plea, giving detailed factual allegations of coercive police tactics and mental and physical illness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-97, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (hearing required on petitioner's specific and detailed allegations that prosecutor had made ex parte promises to him and told him not to tell his own counsel); compare Nahodil, 36 F.3d at 326-27 (petitioner alleged that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite his repeated objections to doing so, the record of the plea hearing substantiated that he had been reluctant, and he had promptly moved to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing); United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir.1980) (hearing required to de termine whether letters allegedly sent to petitioner by his defense counsel were in fact sent, and whether counsel was justified in failing to timely file Rule 35 motion to correct or reduce sentence); Marzgliano, 588 F.2d at 397-99 (petitioner submitted affidavits indicating that his defense counsel may have led him to believe that counsel had a special relationship with district judge and had \"fixed” what the sentence would be); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (hearing required where no written plea agreement was entered into, and petitioner claimed that his counsel had told him of the terms of an alleged oral agreement with the government in order to induce him to plead guilty); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3d Cir.1972) (petitioner alleged misrepresentation by defense counsel as to a \"proposition” by the government for a light sentence) with Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059 (\"When the pleading proceedings record shows clearly that defendant was questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea [and defendant acknowledged his awareness of the maximum available sentence], there is no need for an evidentiary hearing ... when the only claim is that counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence.”); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-77, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (summary dismissal of § 2254 petition improper where petitioner made specific factual allegations concerning unkept oral plea agreement at a time before plea bargaining was accepted as legitimate, and there was no verbatim record of state court plea or sentencing hearing); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991) (discussing evidentiary hearing issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; collecting cases under both § 2254 and § 2255); Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (same)."
} | 643,562 | a |
As a result, the motion was decided on the basis of an adversarial presentation of the evidence. On this motion, the State was required to meet a higher burden than the probable cause standard. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "151 Vt. 433, 439",
"parenthetical": "\"The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "150 Vt. 453, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | 3,688,491 | a |
As a result, the motion was decided on the basis of an adversarial presentation of the evidence. On this motion, the State was required to meet a higher burden than the probable cause standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 A.2d 253, 254",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "151 Vt. 433, 439",
"parenthetical": "\"The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | 3,688,491 | b |
As a result, the motion was decided on the basis of an adversarial presentation of the evidence. On this motion, the State was required to meet a higher burden than the probable cause standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "150 Vt. 453, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "563 A.2d 258, 262-63",
"parenthetical": "\"The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | 3,688,491 | b |
As a result, the motion was decided on the basis of an adversarial presentation of the evidence. On this motion, the State was required to meet a higher burden than the probable cause standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "554 A.2d 253, 254",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "563 A.2d 258, 262-63",
"parenthetical": "\"The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]\"",
"sentence": "State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455, 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). Defendant could have sought to appeal the motion decision under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1)."
} | 3,688,491 | b |
Before this court can exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the CDA, however, the CDA requires that a contractor's claim first must be submitted in writing to the contracting officer, and the contracting officer must render a final decision on the claim. The CDA does not define "claim," but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that "the definition of the term 'claim' in the FAR governs." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "49 F.3d 1563, 1564",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the Federal Circuit \"has identified three requirements for a valid CDA claim: (1",
"sentence": "Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1563, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1995) (explaining that the Federal Circuit “has identified three requirements for a valid CDA claim: (1) the contractor must submit the demand in writing to the contracting officer, (2) the contractor must submit the demand as a matter of right, and (3) the demand must include a sum.certain”). Therefore, courts look to the FAR, which defines “claim” as a “written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terns, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract.” 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (“Definitions”) (2016); see also Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 656 F.3d at 1312 (explaining that the court should read the definition of “claim” broadly)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "656 F.3d 1312, 1312",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the court should read the definition of \"claim\" broadly",
"sentence": "Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1563, 1564 (Fed.Cir.1995) (explaining that the Federal Circuit “has identified three requirements for a valid CDA claim: (1) the contractor must submit the demand in writing to the contracting officer, (2) the contractor must submit the demand as a matter of right, and (3) the demand must include a sum.certain”). Therefore, courts look to the FAR, which defines “claim” as a “written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terns, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract.” 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (“Definitions”) (2016); see also Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 656 F.3d at 1312 (explaining that the court should read the definition of “claim” broadly)."
} | 4,189,532 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "360 Md. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "stating, in a legal malpractice case, that \"before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "360 Md. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "stating, in a legal malpractice case, that \"before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "360 Md. 96, 96",
"parenthetical": "stating, in a legal malpractice case, that \"before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating, in a legal malpractice case, that \"before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating, in a legal malpractice case, that \"before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating, in a legal malpractice case, that \"before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 Md. 107, 120-21",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 Md. 107, 120-21",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 Md. 107, 120-21",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "305 Md. 31, 52",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person's cause of action accrues \"either 1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "305 Md. 31, 52",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person's cause of action accrues \"either 1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "305 Md. 31, 52",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person's cause of action accrues \"either 1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person's cause of action accrues \"either 1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person's cause of action accrues \"either 1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person's cause of action accrues \"either 1",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Md. 70, 83",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, \"in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Md. 70, 83",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, \"in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Md. 70, 83",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, \"in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, \"in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, \"in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that, \"in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Md.App. 197, 197",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that Trimper \"indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Md.App. 197, 197",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that Trimper \"indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Md.App. 197, 197",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that Trimper \"indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suggesting that Trimper \"indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suggesting that Trimper \"indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suggesting that Trimper \"indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, \"[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, \"[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, \"[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, \"[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, \"[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | a |
Numerous Maryland appellate cases are consistent with Pennwalt, and have recognized that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and its probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff's negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, \"[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 96, 756 A.2d 963 (stating, in a legal malpractice case, that “before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury”) (emphasis added); United Parcel Service, Inc., 336 Md. at 579, 650 A.2d 226 (quoting Hecht, and recognizing that a claim accrues when the plaintiff “ ‘knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing.... ’ ”); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) (recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury); Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (recognizing, in a latent disease case, that an injured person’s cause of action accrues “either 1) when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury, or 2) at death, whichever first occurs”) (emphasis added); Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (concluding that, “in situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”) (emphasis added); Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197, 873 A.2d 463 (suggesting that Trimper “indicates that the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would disclose is probably not sufficient if it would only show injury”); Young v. Medlantic Laboratory P’ship, 125 Md.App. 299, 305-06, 312, 725 A.2d 572 (recognizing that, “[u]nder the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues (thereby triggering the limitations period) when the patient discovers, or should have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action”) and concluding “that the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations,” because “reasonable minds could differ over whether appellant should have further investigated into the matter sooner or more completely; whether she failed to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable person in her circumstance would have exercised; or whether any reasonable exercise of diligence under the circumstances would have led to an earlier discovery of appellee’s breach of duty”), cert. denied, 354 Md. 572, 731 A.2d 970 (1999); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (concluding, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the plaintiff’s negli gence claim accrued when plaintiff knew of both the existence of the harm its cause)."
} | 8,969,695 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employee's failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | 3,665,402 | a |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | 3,665,402 | a |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employee's failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | 3,665,402 | a |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | 3,665,402 | a |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an employee's private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government's ability to pursue judicial relief independently",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
Now that the question has been squarely presented, we join the fifth circuit in concluding that the resolution of personal employment litigation does not preclude a qui tam action, in which the relator acts as a representative of the public. The special status of the United States counsels against reflexive transfer of rules of preclusion from private to public litigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "employee's failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement",
"sentence": "Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (an employee’s private disposition, via arbitration, of a claim against an employer does not diminish the federal government’s ability to pursue judicial relief independently); EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.2006) (employee’s failure to make a timely charge of discrimination does not prevent EEOC from suing to vindicate interest in law enforcement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (non-mutual issue preclusion does not apply to suits involving the United States)."
} | 3,665,402 | b |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | 8,971,278 | a |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "142 A. 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | 8,971,278 | b |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | 8,971,278 | b |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "281 A.2d 273, 275",
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | 8,971,278 | a |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "181 A. 257, 260",
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | 8,971,278 | b |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "181 A. 257, 260",
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "142 A. 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | 8,971,278 | a |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "181 A. 257, 260",
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | 8,971,278 | b |
A support order issued pendente lite in a New Jersey divorce proceeding does not survive the death of the payee. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "181 A. 257, 260",
"parenthetical": "\"The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.\"",
"sentence": "Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N.J. Misc. 33, 181 A. 257, 260 (1935) (“The termination of the suit rendered the order for maintenance therein prospectively inoperative, so that no installments accrued thereon after such termination.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "281 A.2d 273, 275",
"parenthetical": "\"The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision -- and none such exists",
"sentence": "See also Sutphen v. Sutphen, 103 N.J. Eq. 203, 142 A. 817, 817 (N.J.Ch.1928) (“The right to alimony, if it exists, is a purely personal right, at least prior to decree or determination.... It follows that by her death pending suit the cause of action abates and (in the absence of statutory provision — and none such exists), cannot be revived by or in favor of her personal representative or legatee.”) overruled in part by Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (1971)."
} | 8,971,278 | a |
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