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With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that "[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications" for equal protection purposes. Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 N.W.2d 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 509, 522",
"parenthetical": "\"[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny)."
} | 8,378,284 | b |
With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that "[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications" for equal protection purposes. Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 N.W.2d 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny)."
} | 8,378,284 | a |
With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that "[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications" for equal protection purposes. Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 N.W.2d 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny)."
} | 8,378,284 | b |
The BIA concluded that Diaz-Jaimes was ineligible to adjust his status because his conviction under Oregon Revised Statute SS 163.415 was a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsequent to the BIA's order, we held that a conviction under a similar California state statute did not categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 F.3d 688, 693",
"parenthetical": "engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude",
"sentence": "See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.2007) (engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061 (crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 1061, 1061",
"parenthetical": "crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury",
"sentence": "See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.2007) (engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061 (crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury)."
} | 3,858,085 | a |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enforce a foreign judgment" if the party did not make a general appearance in the foreign jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "326 S.C. 532, 532-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 S.C. 90, 92",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | 1,258,948 | a |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enforce a foreign judgment" if the party did not make a general appearance in the foreign jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "326 S.C. 532, 532-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 S.E.2d 370, 371",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | 1,258,948 | a |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enforce a foreign judgment" if the party did not make a general appearance in the foreign jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 S.C. 90, 92",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 S.E.2d 596, 596-97",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | 1,258,948 | b |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enforce a foreign judgment" if the party did not make a general appearance in the foreign jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 S.E.2d 596, 596-97",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 S.E.2d 370, 371",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.”); see Alladin Plastics, Inc. v. Wintenna, Inc., 301 S.C. 90, 92, 390 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.”); see also Taylor, 326 S.C. at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 597 (“ ‘A defendant who appears [in the foreign jurisdiction] to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction waives the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.’ ” (quoting Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H."
} | 1,258,948 | a |
Plaintiffs have failed, though, to explain how the training that was conducted was deficient or offered evidence that "the need for more or different training [was] so obvious that a violation of [plaintiffs'] constitutional right to bodily integrity was likely to result from not providing it." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "143 F.3d 1308, 1308",
"parenthetical": "\"Specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.\"",
"sentence": "Schneider, 717 F.3d at 773-74 (internal quotations omitted); see Barney, 143 F.3d at 1308 (“Specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.”); cf. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789 (“We are not persuaded, however, that it was highly predictable or plainly obvious that a forensic chemist would decide to falsify test reports and conceal evidence if she received only nine months of on-the-job training and was not supervised by an individual with a background in forensic science.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 789, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"We are not persuaded, however, that it was highly predictable or plainly obvious that a forensic chemist would decide to falsify test reports and conceal evidence if she received only nine months of on-the-job training and was not supervised by an individual with a background in forensic science.\"",
"sentence": "Schneider, 717 F.3d at 773-74 (internal quotations omitted); see Barney, 143 F.3d at 1308 (“Specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.”); cf. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789 (“We are not persuaded, however, that it was highly predictable or plainly obvious that a forensic chemist would decide to falsify test reports and conceal evidence if she received only nine months of on-the-job training and was not supervised by an individual with a background in forensic science.”)."
} | 4,122,233 | a |
Counsel's failure to follow Dr. Winig's advice to investigate Heishman's mental condition constitutes deficient performance unless it can be justified as a reasonable tactical decision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80",
"parenthetical": "finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because \"when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel\"",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel’s failure to investigate his client’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.”); see also Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (9th Cir.1998) (finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because “when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel”); cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist’s advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1032, 1043",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to investigate his client's mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.\"",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel’s failure to investigate his client’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.”); see also Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (9th Cir.1998) (finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because “when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel”); cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist’s advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation)."
} | 3,784,842 | b |
Counsel's failure to follow Dr. Winig's advice to investigate Heishman's mental condition constitutes deficient performance unless it can be justified as a reasonable tactical decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1037, 1037",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist's advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel’s failure to investigate his client’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.”); see also Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (9th Cir.1998) (finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because “when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel”); cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist’s advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1032, 1043",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to investigate his client's mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.\"",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel’s failure to investigate his client’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.”); see also Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (9th Cir.1998) (finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because “when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel”); cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist’s advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation)."
} | 3,784,842 | b |
Counsel's failure to follow Dr. Winig's advice to investigate Heishman's mental condition constitutes deficient performance unless it can be justified as a reasonable tactical decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1037, 1037",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist's advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel’s failure to investigate his client’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.”); see also Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (9th Cir.1998) (finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because “when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel”); cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist’s advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80",
"parenthetical": "finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because \"when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel\"",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel’s failure to investigate his client’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.”); see also Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80 (9th Cir.1998) (finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because “when testing requested by expert witnesses is not performed, ... a capital defendant has not received effective penalty phase assistance of counsel”); cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist’s advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation)."
} | 3,784,842 | b |
Thus, this claim is also inextricably intertwined with the CBA; the Court must apply or interpret provisions of the CBA to determine whether Defendants acted improperly, without privilege and maliciously. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 F.3d 1532, 1540",
"parenthetical": "tortious-interference claim preempted where assessment of union's actions could only be done by interpreting CBAs, which may have allowed some of union's conduct",
"sentence": "See Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir.2004) (determining whether employer’s pre-termination statements were “improper” and “without privilege” required consideration of CBA; consequently, claim for tortious interference with business relations was preempted by LMRA); Pilkington v. United Airlines, 112 F.3d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir.1997) (tortious-interference claim preempted where assessment of union’s actions could only be done by interpreting CBAs, which may have allowed some of union’s conduct); see also Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1180 (negligence claim preempted because duties underlying claim arose directly from CBA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "626 F.3d 1180, 1180",
"parenthetical": "negligence claim preempted because duties underlying claim arose directly from CBA",
"sentence": "See Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir.2004) (determining whether employer’s pre-termination statements were “improper” and “without privilege” required consideration of CBA; consequently, claim for tortious interference with business relations was preempted by LMRA); Pilkington v. United Airlines, 112 F.3d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir.1997) (tortious-interference claim preempted where assessment of union’s actions could only be done by interpreting CBAs, which may have allowed some of union’s conduct); see also Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1180 (negligence claim preempted because duties underlying claim arose directly from CBA)."
} | 4,025,584 | a |
At trial, Tolan testified he actually spent $7,236 on medical insurance and medical expenses during the period from his discharge to trial. Tolan further indicated the cost of replacing the life insurance benefits previously provided by Levi exceeded $12,000, but Tolan admitted he had not spent that amount on life insurance. The courts have differed on whether an employee should recover for lost insurance benefits when that employee did not obtain substitute coverage or incur any previously covered expenses. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer's insurance plan",
"sentence": "Cf. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 & n. 15 (9th Cir.1986) (in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer’s insurance plan)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "769 F.2d 958, 964-66",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover life insurance premiums that employer would have paid even though employee failed to obtain substitute coverage",
"sentence": "Compare Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964-66 (4th Cir.1985) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover life insurance premiums that employer would have paid even though employee failed to obtain substitute coverage); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (6th Cir.1983) (employee entitled to receive lost health insurance benefits); Foster v. Excelsior Springs City Hosp. & Convalescent Center, 631 F.Supp. 174, 174-75 (W.D.Mo.1986) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover proceeds of life insurance policy even though employee obtained no substitute coverage); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 169, 179 (D.Minn. 1984) (employee can recover lost insurance benefits even though no substitute coverage obtained) with Kossman v. Calumet County, 800 F.2d 697, 703-04 (7th Cir.1986) (employee can recover only those amounts expended for substitute coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer’s insurance plan), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1294, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834, 835-36 (7th Cir.1988); McKelvy v. Metal Container Corp., 674 F.Supp. 827, 832 (M.D.Fla.1987) (same), aff'd in part on other grounds and vacated in part on other grounds, 854 F.2d 448 (11th Cir.1988)."
} | 10,526,215 | b |
At trial, Tolan testified he actually spent $7,236 on medical insurance and medical expenses during the period from his discharge to trial. Tolan further indicated the cost of replacing the life insurance benefits previously provided by Levi exceeded $12,000, but Tolan admitted he had not spent that amount on life insurance. The courts have differed on whether an employee should recover for lost insurance benefits when that employee did not obtain substitute coverage or incur any previously covered expenses. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer's insurance plan",
"sentence": "Cf. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 & n. 15 (9th Cir.1986) (in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer’s insurance plan)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "631 F.Supp. 174, 174-75",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover proceeds of life insurance policy even though employee obtained no substitute coverage",
"sentence": "Compare Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964-66 (4th Cir.1985) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover life insurance premiums that employer would have paid even though employee failed to obtain substitute coverage); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (6th Cir.1983) (employee entitled to receive lost health insurance benefits); Foster v. Excelsior Springs City Hosp. & Convalescent Center, 631 F.Supp. 174, 174-75 (W.D.Mo.1986) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover proceeds of life insurance policy even though employee obtained no substitute coverage); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 169, 179 (D.Minn. 1984) (employee can recover lost insurance benefits even though no substitute coverage obtained) with Kossman v. Calumet County, 800 F.2d 697, 703-04 (7th Cir.1986) (employee can recover only those amounts expended for substitute coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer’s insurance plan), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1294, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834, 835-36 (7th Cir.1988); McKelvy v. Metal Container Corp., 674 F.Supp. 827, 832 (M.D.Fla.1987) (same), aff'd in part on other grounds and vacated in part on other grounds, 854 F.2d 448 (11th Cir.1988)."
} | 10,526,215 | b |
At trial, Tolan testified he actually spent $7,236 on medical insurance and medical expenses during the period from his discharge to trial. Tolan further indicated the cost of replacing the life insurance benefits previously provided by Levi exceeded $12,000, but Tolan admitted he had not spent that amount on life insurance. The courts have differed on whether an employee should recover for lost insurance benefits when that employee did not obtain substitute coverage or incur any previously covered expenses. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer's insurance plan",
"sentence": "Cf. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 & n. 15 (9th Cir.1986) (in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer’s insurance plan)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 F.Supp. 169, 179",
"parenthetical": "employee can recover lost insurance benefits even though no substitute coverage obtained",
"sentence": "Compare Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964-66 (4th Cir.1985) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover life insurance premiums that employer would have paid even though employee failed to obtain substitute coverage); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (6th Cir.1983) (employee entitled to receive lost health insurance benefits); Foster v. Excelsior Springs City Hosp. & Convalescent Center, 631 F.Supp. 174, 174-75 (W.D.Mo.1986) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover proceeds of life insurance policy even though employee obtained no substitute coverage); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 169, 179 (D.Minn. 1984) (employee can recover lost insurance benefits even though no substitute coverage obtained) with Kossman v. Calumet County, 800 F.2d 697, 703-04 (7th Cir.1986) (employee can recover only those amounts expended for substitute coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer’s insurance plan), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1294, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834, 835-36 (7th Cir.1988); McKelvy v. Metal Container Corp., 674 F.Supp. 827, 832 (M.D.Fla.1987) (same), aff'd in part on other grounds and vacated in part on other grounds, 854 F.2d 448 (11th Cir.1988)."
} | 10,526,215 | b |
The Act sets forth a statutory scheme for the licensing of security guards and grants them the power to arrest and detain persons on the premises they have been hired to protect. S.C.Code Ann. SS 40-17-130 (Law.Co-op.1986). If Crooks had arrested plaintiff on Colonial Life's premises in exercise of rights granted him under SS 40-17-130 of the Act, he clearly would have been acting under the color of state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect); see also State v. Brant, 278 S.C. 188, 293 S.E.2d 703 (1982) (“According to this provision [§ 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"According to this provision [SS 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect); see also State v. Brant, 278 S.C. 188, 293 S.E.2d 703 (1982) (“According to this provision [§ 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.” (emphasis added))."
} | 155,293 | a |
The Act sets forth a statutory scheme for the licensing of security guards and grants them the power to arrest and detain persons on the premises they have been hired to protect. S.C.Code Ann. SS 40-17-130 (Law.Co-op.1986). If Crooks had arrested plaintiff on Colonial Life's premises in exercise of rights granted him under SS 40-17-130 of the Act, he clearly would have been acting under the color of state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect); see also State v. Brant, 278 S.C. 188, 293 S.E.2d 703 (1982) (“According to this provision [§ 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"According to this provision [SS 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect); see also State v. Brant, 278 S.C. 188, 293 S.E.2d 703 (1982) (“According to this provision [§ 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.” (emphasis added))."
} | 155,293 | a |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 689, 695",
"parenthetical": "finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "68 S.Ct. 331, 335",
"parenthetical": "finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 F.2d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "finding that the phrase \"current good manufacturing practice,\" as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upheld the FDCA against the defendants' vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the \"provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating conviction of FDCA misbranding provisions on other grounds); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 556, 564 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.”); see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 695, 68 S.Ct. 331, 335, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled \"White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that the phrase “current good manufacturing practice,” as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. 2600 State Drugs, Inc., 235 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1956) (upheld the FDCA against the defendants’ vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the “provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.”); United States v. Forester, 346 F.2d 685, 686 (4th Cir.1965) (per cüriam)(citing 2600 State Drugs, Inc. and affirming a judgment denying a motion to dismiss an information based on unconstitutional vagueness of Section 503(b)(1)(B)); Travia, 180 F.Supp.2d at 122-23 (rejecting the defendant’s void for vagueness challenge to the FDCA and holding that “Congress has provided sufficient notice through these provisions; they are not so vague or standardless that the ordinary public is left uncertain as to what is prohibited”); United States v. Reece, No. CRIM. 12-00146(EEF)(PJH), 2013 WL 5234124, at *7-8 (W.D.La."
} | 4,365,584 | a |
That reading of DeSouza's holding is incorrect. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in proceeding with the defendant's retrial during the pendency of his appeal from the denial of a plea in bar that was found to be frivolous. See id. at 202-203. The court noted in passing that the defendant's "sentence was not imposed until after the remittitur [from the plea appeal] was filed below," id. at 203, hut the court did not hold that the supersedeas from the notice of appeal precluded the trial court from sentencing the defendant. Where a defendant files a notice of appeal challenging the denial of a plea in bar that the trial court finds to he frivolous or dilatory, the defendant may be retried, convicted, and sentenced despite the pendency of the defendant's appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "263 Ga. App. 462, 463-466",
"parenthetical": "deciding a challenge to the denial of a plea in bar that the trial court found to be frivolous in an appeal from the defendant's convictions and sentence",
"sentence": "See also Baker v. State, 263 Ga. App. 462, 463-466 (588 SE2d 288) (2003) (deciding a challenge to the denial of a plea in bar that the trial court found to be frivolous in an appeal from the defendant’s convictions and sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "258 Ga. 764, 766, n. 1",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a merits appeal from a conviction and sentence and an appeal from the earlier denial of a plea in bar could be decided together if the General Assembly required an application to appeal the denial of a plea in bar, which could not happen if the plea in bar appeal prevented the trial court from entering an appealable final judgment sentencing the defendant",
"sentence": "See Strickland v. State, 258 Ga. 764, 766, n. 1 (373 SE2d 736) (1988) (suggesting that a merits appeal from a conviction and sentence and an appeal from the earlier denial of a plea in bar could be decided together if the General Assembly required an application to appeal the denial of a plea in bar, which could not happen if the plea in bar appeal prevented the trial court from entering an appealable final judgment sentencing the defendant)."
} | 4,349,521 | b |
Here, we find no conflict between Pennsylvania and New Jersey law: both rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and require similar elements for defamation. Accordingly, we need not resolve the conflict-of-law issue, and may "refer interchangeably" to Pennsylvania and New Jersey law when reviewing Kerrigan's defamation claim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 808, 813",
"parenthetical": "applying both states' laws where there was a false conflict",
"sentence": "Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir.1994) (applying both states’ laws where there was a false conflict); see also Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (1st Cir.1993) (“We need not resolve the [conflict-of-law] issue ... as the outcome is the same under the substantive law of either jurisdiction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "983 F.2d 1110, 1114-15",
"parenthetical": "\"We need not resolve the [conflict-of-law] issue ... as the outcome is the same under the substantive law of either jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir.1994) (applying both states’ laws where there was a false conflict); see also Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (1st Cir.1993) (“We need not resolve the [conflict-of-law] issue ... as the outcome is the same under the substantive law of either jurisdiction.”)."
} | 3,596,056 | a |
Here, Lumbermens is an Illinois corporation, not a Pennsylvania corporation. Thus, Pennsylvania has no contact with the dispute between Air Products and Lumbermens relevant to its interest in protecting manufacturers from extraordinary liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.1974) (Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery); see Waschel v. King Tour & Travel Srvcs., Inc., 43 Pa D & C 4th 52, 56-57, 1999 WL 1539022 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct 29, 1999) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.1974) (Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery); see Waschel v. King Tour & Travel Srvcs., Inc., 43 Pa D & C 4th 52, 56-57, 1999 WL 1539022 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct 29, 1999) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary)."
} | 9,099,661 | a |
Here, Lumbermens is an Illinois corporation, not a Pennsylvania corporation. Thus, Pennsylvania has no contact with the dispute between Air Products and Lumbermens relevant to its interest in protecting manufacturers from extraordinary liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 A.2d 27, 30-31",
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.1974) (Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery); see Waschel v. King Tour & Travel Srvcs., Inc., 43 Pa D & C 4th 52, 56-57, 1999 WL 1539022 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct 29, 1999) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.1974) (Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery); see Waschel v. King Tour & Travel Srvcs., Inc., 43 Pa D & C 4th 52, 56-57, 1999 WL 1539022 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct 29, 1999) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary)."
} | 9,099,661 | a |
Here, Lumbermens is an Illinois corporation, not a Pennsylvania corporation. Thus, Pennsylvania has no contact with the dispute between Air Products and Lumbermens relevant to its interest in protecting manufacturers from extraordinary liability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.1974) (Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery); see Waschel v. King Tour & Travel Srvcs., Inc., 43 Pa D & C 4th 52, 56-57, 1999 WL 1539022 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct 29, 1999) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 173, 178",
"parenthetical": "Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.1974) (Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery); see Waschel v. King Tour & Travel Srvcs., Inc., 43 Pa D & C 4th 52, 56-57, 1999 WL 1539022 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct 29, 1999) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary)."
} | 9,099,661 | b |
Sebasky also argues the evidence from M.B. was not clear and convincing. However, the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue and the defense did not attempt to rebut M.B.'s testimony. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's admission of other crime evidence despite some uncertainty in the witnesses' identification of the defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Coleman, 373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Minn.1985) (upholding the trial court’s admission of other crime evidence despite some uncertainty in the witnesses’ identification of the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 N.W.2d 593, 602",
"parenthetical": "stating Spreigl evidence was proven by clear and convincing evidence because the defendant's identity was not in doubt and the victim testified about the incident",
"sentence": "See State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 602 (Minn.1993) (stating Spreigl evidence was proven by clear and convincing evidence because the defendant’s identity was not in doubt and the victim testified about the incident); State v. Raidner, 411 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn.1987) (finding Spreigl incidents were proven by clear and convincing evidence because there was eyewitness testimony, no rebuttal, and the identity of the participants was not in doubt). Sebasky’s current assertions that M.B. may have had some unspecified reasons for fabricating the incidents fails to show by itself that the evidence was not clear and convincing."
} | 10,695,609 | b |
Sebasky also argues the evidence from M.B. was not clear and convincing. However, the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue and the defense did not attempt to rebut M.B.'s testimony. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's admission of other crime evidence despite some uncertainty in the witnesses' identification of the defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Coleman, 373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Minn.1985) (upholding the trial court’s admission of other crime evidence despite some uncertainty in the witnesses’ identification of the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 N.W.2d 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "finding Spreigl incidents were proven by clear and convincing evidence because there was eyewitness testimony, no rebuttal, and the identity of the participants was not in doubt",
"sentence": "See State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 602 (Minn.1993) (stating Spreigl evidence was proven by clear and convincing evidence because the defendant’s identity was not in doubt and the victim testified about the incident); State v. Raidner, 411 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn.1987) (finding Spreigl incidents were proven by clear and convincing evidence because there was eyewitness testimony, no rebuttal, and the identity of the participants was not in doubt). Sebasky’s current assertions that M.B. may have had some unspecified reasons for fabricating the incidents fails to show by itself that the evidence was not clear and convincing."
} | 10,695,609 | b |
Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Brown was that the evidence there was deemed too speculative for a jury to find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The present case, on the other hand, is distinguishable because the additional facts supporting the jury's verdict push it well beyond an "objectively unreasonable" outcome that would entitle Davis to habeas relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "539 U.S. 510, 520-21",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a state court's decision must be \"objectively unreasonable\" to merit habeas relief",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 F.3d 707, 709-11",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument)."
} | 3,692,808 | a |
Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Brown was that the evidence there was deemed too speculative for a jury to find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The present case, on the other hand, is distinguishable because the additional facts supporting the jury's verdict push it well beyond an "objectively unreasonable" outcome that would entitle Davis to habeas relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a state court's decision must be \"objectively unreasonable\" to merit habeas relief",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 F.3d 707, 709-11",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument)."
} | 3,692,808 | a |
Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Brown was that the evidence there was deemed too speculative for a jury to find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The present case, on the other hand, is distinguishable because the additional facts supporting the jury's verdict push it well beyond an "objectively unreasonable" outcome that would entitle Davis to habeas relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 F.3d 707, 709-11",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a state court's decision must be \"objectively unreasonable\" to merit habeas relief",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument)."
} | 3,692,808 | b |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1149, 1155",
"parenthetical": "\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 189",
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,027,726 | b |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 189",
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 1012, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,027,726 | a |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1149, 1155",
"parenthetical": "\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,027,726 | a |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 1012, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,027,726 | a |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1149, 1155",
"parenthetical": "\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,027,726 | b |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 1012, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).)” (citations omitted); see also, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.2005) (\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also, Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 4,027,726 | b |
Accordingly, the trial court was not in a position to consider the new sale claim. Likewise, although able appellate counsel did an excellent job arguing the claim on appeal, this theory has not been preserved for consideration by this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs alternative argument that the loan modification was a separate sale under the MMPA not addressed where complaint only alleged that lender's actions occurred \"in connection with the servicing of the ... mortgage\"",
"sentence": "See also Wivell, 773 F.3d at 899 n. 2 (plaintiffs alternative argument that the loan modification was a separate sale under the MMPA not addressed where complaint only alleged that lender’s actions occurred “in connection with the servicing of the ... mortgage”); Groh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 58461 (W.D.Mo.2015) (dismissal of MMPA claim based on lenders’ failure to timely finalize loan modification agreement was upheld where allegations did not relate to any acts or omissions connected with original loan and amended petition did not allege a separate sale)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 S.W.3d 296, 320-21",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not base civil conspiracy claim on two new independent causes of action not pleaded in his petition and only mentioned in his response to defendant's motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S.W.3d 296, 320-21 (Mo.App.E.D.2014) (plaintiff could not base civil conspiracy claim on two new independent causes of action not pleaded in his petition and only mentioned in his response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment)."
} | 6,840,961 | b |
Accordingly, the trial court was not in a position to consider the new sale claim. Likewise, although able appellate counsel did an excellent job arguing the claim on appeal, this theory has not been preserved for consideration by this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissal of MMPA claim based on lenders' failure to timely finalize loan modification agreement was upheld where allegations did not relate to any acts or omissions connected with original loan and amended petition did not allege a separate sale",
"sentence": "See also Wivell, 773 F.3d at 899 n. 2 (plaintiffs alternative argument that the loan modification was a separate sale under the MMPA not addressed where complaint only alleged that lender’s actions occurred “in connection with the servicing of the ... mortgage”); Groh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 58461 (W.D.Mo.2015) (dismissal of MMPA claim based on lenders’ failure to timely finalize loan modification agreement was upheld where allegations did not relate to any acts or omissions connected with original loan and amended petition did not allege a separate sale)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 S.W.3d 296, 320-21",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not base civil conspiracy claim on two new independent causes of action not pleaded in his petition and only mentioned in his response to defendant's motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S.W.3d 296, 320-21 (Mo.App.E.D.2014) (plaintiff could not base civil conspiracy claim on two new independent causes of action not pleaded in his petition and only mentioned in his response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment)."
} | 6,840,961 | b |
Thus, it is very unlikely that Congress intended for vessel owners to be able to cancel out this legislative decision by relying on the similar in rem protection of the 1851 Limitation Act. Permitting Southern Scrap to invoke the Limitation Act in this case would nullify the effect of the new SSSS 414(b) and 415(c), which we have determined impose unlimited personal liability upon a vessel owner for governmental removal costs, when the owner fails to comply with its obligation to remove its sunken vessel from a navigable waterway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 335, 338",
"parenthetical": "explaining that Wreck Act claims arise \"from statutory authority creating an independent statutory duty on the part of the shipowner\" and that to subject such claims to limitation \"would thwart the expressed intent of Congress-removal of sunken vessels that are hazards to navigation\"",
"sentence": "See In re Transporter Marine, Inc., 217 F.3d 335, 338 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that Wreck Act claims arise “from statutory authority creating an independent statutory duty on the part of the shipowner” and that to subject such claims to limitation “would thwart the expressed intent of Congress-removal of sunken vessels that are hazards to navigation”); cf. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 453 (disallowing application of the Limitation Act there because it “would merely reinstate at another level the limitation on a negligent party’s liability that Wyandotte had removed by authorizing an in personam suit”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "557 F.2d 453, 453",
"parenthetical": "disallowing application of the Limitation Act there because it \"would merely reinstate at another level the limitation on a negligent party's liability that Wyandotte had removed by authorizing an in personam suit\"",
"sentence": "See In re Transporter Marine, Inc., 217 F.3d 335, 338 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that Wreck Act claims arise “from statutory authority creating an independent statutory duty on the part of the shipowner” and that to subject such claims to limitation “would thwart the expressed intent of Congress-removal of sunken vessels that are hazards to navigation”); cf. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 453 (disallowing application of the Limitation Act there because it “would merely reinstate at another level the limitation on a negligent party’s liability that Wyandotte had removed by authorizing an in personam suit”)."
} | 3,751,810 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | 4,882,964 | b |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | 4,882,964 | b |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal may not be considered unless fundamental error is shown or the case falls within some other exception to the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. § 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule), citing Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (the Court considered whether Kenner’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error)."
} | 4,882,964 | a |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 734, 735-36",
"parenthetical": "addressing defendant's argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1990) (allowing defendant to challenge state conviction on the grounds that it violated a treaty-hunting right)."
} | 3,817,794 | b |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "addressing defendant's argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1990) (allowing defendant to challenge state conviction on the grounds that it violated a treaty-hunting right)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right)."
} | 3,817,794 | a |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "addressing defendant's argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1990) (allowing defendant to challenge state conviction on the grounds that it violated a treaty-hunting right)."
} | 3,817,794 | b |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant to challenge state conviction on the grounds that it violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1990) (allowing defendant to challenge state conviction on the grounds that it violated a treaty-hunting right)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right)."
} | 3,817,794 | a |
First, "federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates." Thus, prison inmates possess the right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the right to receive publications. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 787, 791",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he blanket prohibition against receipt of the publications by any prisoner carries a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.\"",
"sentence": "Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 550-51, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877-78, 1880-81, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1878-79, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407-11, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1808-10, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 791 (1982) (“[T]he blanket prohibition against receipt of the publications by any prisoner carries a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.”); see also Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir.1987) (in absence of legitimate penological interests, prisoners retain First Amendment right to receive and read publications)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "829 F.2d 608, 610",
"parenthetical": "in absence of legitimate penological interests, prisoners retain First Amendment right to receive and read publications",
"sentence": "Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 550-51, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877-78, 1880-81, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1878-79, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407-11, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1808-10, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 791 (1982) (“[T]he blanket prohibition against receipt of the publications by any prisoner carries a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.”); see also Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir.1987) (in absence of legitimate penological interests, prisoners retain First Amendment right to receive and read publications)."
} | 1,166,030 | a |
P 31. The trial judge made a careful determination in the record by going through all of the evidence presented before directing a verdict in favor of Bar-rentine. First- the judge considered the issue of fraud. In order to establish its claim of fraud, the Estate was required to prove, among other things, that Barrentine falsely represented to Tatum that she would marry him. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 So.2d 762, 764",
"parenthetical": "elements of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence",
"sentence": "See also Martin v. Winfield, 455 So.2d 762, 764 (Miss.1984) (elements of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "733 So.2d 753, 761-62",
"parenthetical": "stating that among the elements of fraud are a representation and its falsity",
"sentence": "See Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 761-62 (Miss.1999) (stating that among the elements of fraud are a representation and its falsity)."
} | 9,472,574 | b |
As to his misearriage-of-justice claim that his appeal waiver was otherwise unlawful, defendant must show that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Defendant's arguments do not support the miscarriage-of-justice exception because his claims only concern the lawfulness of his sentence; he has not asserted any claim regarding the critical issue of whether his appeal waiver was itself unlawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 1136, 1144",
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant's] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005) (“The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n. 12 (discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing “the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary”). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines render an appeal waiver unlawfiil would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. Nor has defendant otherwise shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing \"the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005) (“The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n. 12 (discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing “the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary”). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines render an appeal waiver unlawfiil would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. Nor has defendant otherwise shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
} | 3,988,487 | a |
As to his misearriage-of-justice claim that his appeal waiver was otherwise unlawful, defendant must show that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Defendant's arguments do not support the miscarriage-of-justice exception because his claims only concern the lawfulness of his sentence; he has not asserted any claim regarding the critical issue of whether his appeal waiver was itself unlawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant's] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005) (“The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n. 12 (discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing “the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary”). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines render an appeal waiver unlawfiil would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. Nor has defendant otherwise shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing \"the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005) (“The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n. 12 (discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing “the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary”). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines render an appeal waiver unlawfiil would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. Nor has defendant otherwise shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
} | 3,988,487 | a |
As to his misearriage-of-justice claim that his appeal waiver was otherwise unlawful, defendant must show that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Defendant's arguments do not support the miscarriage-of-justice exception because his claims only concern the lawfulness of his sentence; he has not asserted any claim regarding the critical issue of whether his appeal waiver was itself unlawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant's] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005) (“The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n. 12 (discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing “the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary”). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines render an appeal waiver unlawfiil would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. Nor has defendant otherwise shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing \"the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005) (“The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant’s] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 & n. 12 (discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing “the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary”). Indeed, to hold that alleged errors under the sentencing guidelines render an appeal waiver unlawfiil would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. Nor has defendant otherwise shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
} | 3,988,487 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "618 U.S. 343, 349",
"parenthetical": "access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant's conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | 12,400,974 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant's conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | 12,400,974 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant's conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | 12,400,974 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 U.S. 517, 533, 535",
"parenthetical": "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | 12,400,974 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | 12,400,974 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies); see also Idaho Code § 6-901 (Idaho Tort Claims Act) (2016)."
} | 12,400,974 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 438, 445",
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 U.S. 510, 536",
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 438, 445",
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 U.S. 510, 536",
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers’ First Amendment rights); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives who acted as “an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so” had third-party standing); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers). The ability to ‘ advocate for the interests of physicians arid the patients they serve is not severed by the corporate form, nor does its entity status diminish the reasons which endorse third-party representation of women seeking an abortion. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 293 (3rd Cir.2002) (“So long as the association’s members have or will suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, then associations can advance the third-party claims of their' members without suffering injuries themselves.”)."
} | 4,345,829 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196",
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | b |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688",
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | b |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196",
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | b |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often explained, the legislative purpose was to make elements in former article 42, P.C.1925 (act done by "mistake or accident") applicable to the offense of drunken driving, so that an accused may be charged with certain consequential felony offenses as circumstances demonstrate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688",
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving the constituent elements of article 42; State may elect to prosecute under such theory rather than for mur der); McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190, at 192 (1949) (negligent homicide statute inadequate to meet changing times and new conditions arising from highway traffic; showing accused engaged in drunken driving is necessary preliminary to, though part of, felony offense actually committed through accident or mistake, including unlawful taking of life); Simmons v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943) (one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim); see Greiner v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 249 S.W.2d 601 (1952); see also cases decided under Article 42 prior to enactment of article 802c, e.g., Totten v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196 (1937) (article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated); Jones v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688 (1934) (article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide)."
} | 10,020,493 | a |
As we have determined, James-way was aware of its WARN notice obligations prior to it terminating any of the plaintiffs, and it was capable of providing WARN notice but failed to do so. Further, while Jamesway claims that, "once [it] filed its chapter 11 petition for purposes of liquidation on October 18, [1995] it was [its] understanding that there were no ongoing obligations to give notice under WARN[,]" (Declaration of Carl Muller P 10), it provides no basis for that understanding or whether this understanding of the liquidating fiduciary exception played any part in Jamesways decision to forego providing WARN notice to employees terminated postpetition. "Good faith requires an honest intent to ascertain the requirements of the statute and to act accordingly." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 F.3d 1287, 1287-88",
"parenthetical": "finding that lower court did not err in finding employer did not act in good faith when it was aware of Act's notice requirements, but \"consistently resolved any questionable [notice] issue in its favor.\"",
"sentence": "Aircap, 860 F.Supp. 307, 315-16 (D.S.C.1994); see Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1287-88 (finding that lower court did not err in finding employer did not act in good faith when it was aware of Act’s notice requirements, but “consistently resolved any questionable [notice] issue in its favor.”); Alden, 901 F.Supp. 426, 443 (D.Mass.1995) (finding that employer did not act in good faith when it relied on simplistic legal advise in the face of WARN’s complex statutory requirements); Aircap, 860 F.Supp. 307, (D.S.C.1994) (same); see also Allsteel, Inc., I, 955 F.Supp. 78, 81 (N.D.Ill.1996) (good faith intent to comply with Act requires requisite notice not wait until plant closing or mass layoff is likely but instead employer must give notice when the plant closing or mass layoff is foreseeable). We find that the circumstantial evidence clearly shows that Jamesway was aware of its obligations under the Act yet made no good faith effort to comply with it."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "955 F.Supp. 78, 81",
"parenthetical": "good faith intent to comply with Act requires requisite notice not wait until plant closing or mass layoff is likely but instead employer must give notice when the plant closing or mass layoff is foreseeable",
"sentence": "Aircap, 860 F.Supp. 307, 315-16 (D.S.C.1994); see Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1287-88 (finding that lower court did not err in finding employer did not act in good faith when it was aware of Act’s notice requirements, but “consistently resolved any questionable [notice] issue in its favor.”); Alden, 901 F.Supp. 426, 443 (D.Mass.1995) (finding that employer did not act in good faith when it relied on simplistic legal advise in the face of WARN’s complex statutory requirements); Aircap, 860 F.Supp. 307, (D.S.C.1994) (same); see also Allsteel, Inc., I, 955 F.Supp. 78, 81 (N.D.Ill.1996) (good faith intent to comply with Act requires requisite notice not wait until plant closing or mass layoff is likely but instead employer must give notice when the plant closing or mass layoff is foreseeable). We find that the circumstantial evidence clearly shows that Jamesway was aware of its obligations under the Act yet made no good faith effort to comply with it."
} | 11,666,217 | a |
128 Norris further asserts that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Utah's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment, forbids the "all records" search warrant issued by the magistrate. We decline to address this argument because Norris provides us with no substantive reason for construing Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, which is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, as affording him greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 P.2d 388, 392",
"parenthetical": "refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment); see also State v. Real Property at 688 E. 640 N., 2000 UT 17, ¶5, 994 P.2d 1254 (deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2000 UT 17, ¶5",
"parenthetical": "deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment); see also State v. Real Property at 688 E. 640 N., 2000 UT 17, ¶5, 994 P.2d 1254 (deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis)."
} | 9,411,060 | a |
128 Norris further asserts that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Utah's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment, forbids the "all records" search warrant issued by the magistrate. We decline to address this argument because Norris provides us with no substantive reason for construing Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, which is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, as affording him greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment); see also State v. Real Property at 688 E. 640 N., 2000 UT 17, ¶5, 994 P.2d 1254 (deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 P.2d 388, 392",
"parenthetical": "refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment); see also State v. Real Property at 688 E. 640 N., 2000 UT 17, ¶5, 994 P.2d 1254 (deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis)."
} | 9,411,060 | b |
. M & G also alleged that defendants "spoofed" the sender identification information on the faxes it sent by including a number at the top of the fax that was not the number from which the transmission originated (see proposed Amended Complaint PP 9, 11(4)). However, while such conduct is proscribed by 47 U.S.C. SS 227(d)(1) and could conceivably lend support to M & G's claim that defendants were highly involved in the transmission of the faxes to M & G, the TCPA does not provide for a private cause of action for such conduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the district dismissed allegations of statutory violations for omitting information required by TCPA, 47 U.S.C. SS 227(d",
"sentence": "See Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F.Supp.2d 76, 91 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that \"Congress plainly opted not to permit a private civil action for violations of the fax-sender identification requirements ... [and that t]he fax identification regulations ... were issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 227, and thus there is no private right of action under the TCPA for violation”); Cf., Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that the district dismissed allegations of statutory violations for omitting information required by TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(d))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "425 F.Supp.2d 76, 91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"Congress plainly opted not to permit a private civil action for violations of the fax-sender identification requirements ... [and that t]he fax identification regulations ... were issued pursuant to subsection (d",
"sentence": "See Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F.Supp.2d 76, 91 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that \"Congress plainly opted not to permit a private civil action for violations of the fax-sender identification requirements ... [and that t]he fax identification regulations ... were issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 227, and thus there is no private right of action under the TCPA for violation”); Cf., Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that the district dismissed allegations of statutory violations for omitting information required by TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(d))."
} | 4,262,453 | b |
However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the remedies provisions of the FLSA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") must be interpreted consistently. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.3d 489, 499",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the remedies available under the ADEA and the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act] both track the FLSA, cases interpreting remedies under the statutes should be consistent.\"",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir.2006) (“Because the remedies available under the ADEA and the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act] both track the FLSA, cases interpreting remedies under the statutes should be consistent.”); see also Johnson v. Martin, 473 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir.2006) (applying ADEA precedent to the FLSA to determine whether wages earned after termination offset lost wage damages because “[t]he FLSA and ADEA have the same remedies provisions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "applying ADEA precedent to the FLSA to determine whether wages earned after termination offset lost wage damages because \"[t]he FLSA and ADEA have the same remedies provisions\"",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir.2006) (“Because the remedies available under the ADEA and the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act] both track the FLSA, cases interpreting remedies under the statutes should be consistent.”); see also Johnson v. Martin, 473 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir.2006) (applying ADEA precedent to the FLSA to determine whether wages earned after termination offset lost wage damages because “[t]he FLSA and ADEA have the same remedies provisions”)."
} | 4,272,042 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | b |
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