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According to the appellants, when the district court granted the forum non conveniens motion, the parties "had exchanged written discovery responses and documents, and were in the midst of supplementing such responses and preparing for depositions." Appellants' Reply Br. at 23. This Court, and others, have upheld forum non conveniens dismissals in cases where more discovery had been conducted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 604, 614",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e hold today that whenever discovery in a case has proceeded substantially so that the parties already have invested much of the time and resources they will expend before trial, the presumption against dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens greatly increases.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 1520; see also Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 614 (3d Cir.1991) (“[W]e hold today that whenever discovery in a case has proceeded substantially so that the parties already have invested much of the time and resources they will expend before trial, the presumption against dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens greatly increases.”); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1335 (9th Cir.1984) (“That trial preparation had progressed nearly to the point of trial certainly was a relevant factor when the district court considered whether trial of the case in Arizona would have been more easy, expeditious and inexpensive than trial in the Philippines.”) (quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); cf. Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc. 981 F.2d 1345, 1357 (1st Cir.1992) (merits activity “never approached the level which was held to preclude dismissal in Lony or to weigh against dismissal Gates”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 1345, 1357",
"parenthetical": "merits activity \"never approached the level which was held to preclude dismissal in Lony or to weigh against dismissal Gates\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 1520; see also Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 614 (3d Cir.1991) (“[W]e hold today that whenever discovery in a case has proceeded substantially so that the parties already have invested much of the time and resources they will expend before trial, the presumption against dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens greatly increases.”); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1335 (9th Cir.1984) (“That trial preparation had progressed nearly to the point of trial certainly was a relevant factor when the district court considered whether trial of the case in Arizona would have been more easy, expeditious and inexpensive than trial in the Philippines.”) (quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); cf. Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc. 981 F.2d 1345, 1357 (1st Cir.1992) (merits activity “never approached the level which was held to preclude dismissal in Lony or to weigh against dismissal Gates”)."
} | 4,047,926 | a |
Because Metz did not assert in either his initial or reconsideration petition before the Board, that his separation was involuntary because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that he waived his ability to challenge the Board's decision based on the voluntariness of his separation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 F.3d 1342, 1354",
"parenthetical": "affirming Court of Federal Claims' determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 F.3d 475, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | 8,452,060 | a |
Because Metz did not assert in either his initial or reconsideration petition before the Board, that his separation was involuntary because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that he waived his ability to challenge the Board's decision based on the voluntariness of his separation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 F.3d 475, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "344 U.S. 33, 37",
"parenthetical": "\"Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | 8,452,060 | b |
Because Metz did not assert in either his initial or reconsideration petition before the Board, that his separation was involuntary because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that he waived his ability to challenge the Board's decision based on the voluntariness of his separation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 F.3d 475, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | 8,452,060 | b |
Because Metz did not assert in either his initial or reconsideration petition before the Board, that his separation was involuntary because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that he waived his ability to challenge the Board's decision based on the voluntariness of his separation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "208 F.3d 475, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Murakami, who had failed to raise an argument before the Board, was precluded from raising that issue for the first time before the Court of Federal Claims); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (“Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir.2000) (“The failure to raise an issue at the administrative level waives the right to appellate review of that issue.”)."
} | 8,452,060 | a |
These arguments have been rejected by the Tennessee Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 S.W.2d 75, 87",
"parenthetical": "cases rejecting attack based upon requirement of unanimity of life-sentence verdict",
"sentence": "See State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 796 (Tenn.1998); State v. Hall, 968 S.W.2d 679, 718 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 87 (Tenn.1994) (cases rejecting attack based upon requirement of unanimity of life-sentence verdict)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "876 S.W.2d 87, 87",
"parenthetical": "cases rejecting claim that jury should be informed of effect of non-unanimous verdict",
"sentence": "See also Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d at 796; Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 87 (cases rejecting claim that jury should be informed of effect of non-unanimous verdict)."
} | 9,434,818 | a |
These arguments have been rejected by the Tennessee Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "877 S.W.2d 722, 735",
"parenthetical": "cases rejecting attack upon requirement of unanimity of finding that aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances",
"sentence": "See also State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 926 (Tenn.1994); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 735 (Tenn.1994) (cases rejecting attack upon requirement of unanimity of finding that aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 S.W.2d 75, 87",
"parenthetical": "cases rejecting attack based upon requirement of unanimity of life-sentence verdict",
"sentence": "See State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 796 (Tenn.1998); State v. Hall, 968 S.W.2d 679, 718 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 87 (Tenn.1994) (cases rejecting attack based upon requirement of unanimity of life-sentence verdict)."
} | 9,434,818 | b |
In fact, it appears to be an inadvertent misstatement. The cases that Kelley cited all hold that, although the trustee need not file a formal avoidance action, the trustee must actually recover the property. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 B.R. 608, 612",
"parenthetical": "noting that the property probably has to be recovered for SS 522(g) to apply but ruling that it applied anyway because neither party brought it up",
"sentence": "Russell v. Kuhnel (In re Kuhnel), 495 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] trustee need not initiate formal adversary proceedings to recover property under § 522(g), so long as the trustee has taken some action resulting in the recon-veyance of the property to the estate.”); Glass v. Hitt (In re Glass), 60 F.3d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); In re Hicks, 342 B.R. 596, 599-601 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.2006) (same); In re Ulrich, 203 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997) (same); cf. In re Trevino, 96 B.R. 608, 612 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (noting that the property probably has to be recovered for § 522(g) to apply but ruling that it applied anyway because neither party brought it up)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 1177, 1181",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] trustee need not initiate formal adversary proceedings to recover property under SS 522(g), so long as the trustee has taken some action resulting in the recon-veyance of the property to the estate.\"",
"sentence": "Russell v. Kuhnel (In re Kuhnel), 495 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] trustee need not initiate formal adversary proceedings to recover property under § 522(g), so long as the trustee has taken some action resulting in the recon-veyance of the property to the estate.”); Glass v. Hitt (In re Glass), 60 F.3d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); In re Hicks, 342 B.R. 596, 599-601 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.2006) (same); In re Ulrich, 203 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997) (same); cf. In re Trevino, 96 B.R. 608, 612 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (noting that the property probably has to be recovered for § 522(g) to apply but ruling that it applied anyway because neither party brought it up)."
} | 12,269,620 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the \"silent witness\" theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | 5,866,618 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | 5,866,618 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the \"silent witness\" theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | 5,866,618 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | 5,866,618 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | 5,866,618 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | 5,866,618 | b |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
A second doctrine for authenticating a videotape is under the "silent witness" theory. This theory applies when no person can verify, by personal observation, that the videotape actually represents what occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible",
"sentence": "See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.Ct.App.1982) (videotape of defendant removing groceries through rear door of store while store personnel were absent was held admissible)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Howell, 16 M.J. 1003 (A.C.M.R.1983) (photos taken at an automatic teller were admissible under the “silent witness” theory since foundational requirement was satisfied circumstantially by evidence which establishes the reliability of the process or system which produces the photograph); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976) (videotape was admissible after a government witness talked about operation of camera even though no witness actually verified the transactions observed within the tape); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983) (testimony regarding installation, activation and view of the camera, use and security of the camera, the testing and removal of film, and testimony as to the chain of custody of film was sufficient foundation to admit film which was taken during commission of the crime)."
} | 5,866,618 | a |
Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 1332, 1333",
"parenthetical": "\"The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | 3,934,508 | a |
Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 436, 439",
"parenthetical": "recognizing a \"First Amendment right to film matters of public interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | 3,934,508 | a |
Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95",
"parenthetical": "finding it \"highly probable\" that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, \"[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | 3,934,508 | b |
Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 F.Supp. 634, 638",
"parenthetical": "holding that police interference with television newsman's filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (holding that police interference with television newsman’s filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1969) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim of suit claiming police interference with news reporters]’] and photographers’ “constitutional right to gather and report news, and to photograph news events” under the First Amendment (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled on other grounds by City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F.Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H.1990) (denying qualified immunity from First Amendment claim to police chief who prevented freelance photographer from taking pictures of car accident)."
} | 3,934,508 | a |
Even where an expert does not directly compare the behavior of the complainant to that typical of sexually abused children, the expert's testimony may be inadmissible where a reasonable jury would think the expert was implicitly vouching for the credibility of the complainant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "39 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 583-584",
"parenthetical": "expert's testimony based on hypothetical questions that mirrored underlying facts of case was \"tantamount to an endorsement of the credibility of the complaining child witness\"",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Perkins, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 583-584 (1995) (expert’s testimony based on hypothetical questions that mirrored underlying facts of case was “tantamount to an endorsement of the credibility of the complaining child witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "409 Mass. 504, 504",
"parenthetical": "\"little doubt\" that expert's comments regarding credibility of \"most\" sexual assault victims would be taken by jury as expert's endorsement of complainant's credibility",
"sentence": "See Montanino, 409 Mass. at 504 (“little doubt” that expert’s comments regarding credibility of “most” sexual assault victims would be taken by jury as expert’s endorsement of complainant’s credibility); Ianello, 401 Mass. at 202 (“While the proposed testimony fell short of rendering an opinion on the credibility of the specific child before the court, we see little difference in the final result”; expert’s opinion “ultimately would have been applied [by the jury] to the child alleging sexual abuse”)."
} | 4,309,064 | b |
Finally, the plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief in this action. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that when declaratory relief is sought, mootness should not preclude review of a statute that will be enforced in the future against the complainants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring the injunction moot, but ruling on the demand for declaratory judgment",
"sentence": "See also McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694 (declaring the injunction moot, but ruling on the demand for declaratory judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring injunctive relief justiciable and apparently abandoning distinction between injunctive and declaratory relief as to mootness",
"sentence": "But see Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2578 (declaring injunctive relief justiciable and apparently abandoning distinction between injunctive and declaratory relief as to mootness). “There is a tendency in declaratory judgment cases to construe the mootness doctrine more narrowly.”"
} | 3,851,488 | a |
Finally, the plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief in this action. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that when declaratory relief is sought, mootness should not preclude review of a statute that will be enforced in the future against the complainants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring the injunction moot, but ruling on the demand for declaratory judgment",
"sentence": "See also McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694 (declaring the injunction moot, but ruling on the demand for declaratory judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring injunctive relief justiciable and apparently abandoning distinction between injunctive and declaratory relief as to mootness",
"sentence": "But see Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2578 (declaring injunctive relief justiciable and apparently abandoning distinction between injunctive and declaratory relief as to mootness). “There is a tendency in declaratory judgment cases to construe the mootness doctrine more narrowly.”"
} | 3,851,488 | a |
Paralegal fees are allowed under the EAJA, when the paralegal performs nonlegal work that a lawyer would have had to perform personally, but for the paralegal. PI. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679",
"parenthetical": "determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "868 F.2d 769, 778",
"parenthetical": "holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | 12,322,582 | b |
Paralegal fees are allowed under the EAJA, when the paralegal performs nonlegal work that a lawyer would have had to perform personally, but for the paralegal. PI. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679",
"parenthetical": "determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | 12,322,582 | a |
Paralegal fees are allowed under the EAJA, when the paralegal performs nonlegal work that a lawyer would have had to perform personally, but for the paralegal. PI. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679",
"parenthetical": "determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | 12,322,582 | a |
Paralegal fees are allowed under the EAJA, when the paralegal performs nonlegal work that a lawyer would have had to perform personally, but for the paralegal. PI. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679",
"parenthetical": "determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit",
"sentence": "Mem. at 10 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 868 F.2d 769, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that paralegal fees may be recovered at a market rate, but only to the extent that a paralegal performs work that would normally be done by an attorney), aff'd sub nom, Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 164, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (affirming the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit); see also WHR Grp., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed.Cl. 673, 679 (2015) (determining that plaintiff could recover paralegal fees at the cost of $146 per hour)."
} | 12,322,582 | b |
Although this Court has not specifically declared the modus operandi of drug trafficking as an appropriate or reliable field for expert opinion, several courts of appeal have consistently admitted such testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 582, 589",
"parenthetical": "ruling that expert testimony about \"tools of the trade\" of drug traffickers, including \"beepers,\" was properly admitted",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22",
"parenthetical": "ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | 9,393,346 | b |
Although this Court has not specifically declared the modus operandi of drug trafficking as an appropriate or reliable field for expert opinion, several courts of appeal have consistently admitted such testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 548, 549-51",
"parenthetical": "concluding that expert testimony that the use of \"beepers\" by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22",
"parenthetical": "ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | 9,393,346 | b |
Although this Court has not specifically declared the modus operandi of drug trafficking as an appropriate or reliable field for expert opinion, several courts of appeal have consistently admitted such testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 582, 589",
"parenthetical": "ruling that expert testimony about \"tools of the trade\" of drug traffickers, including \"beepers,\" was properly admitted",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 738, 741",
"parenthetical": "affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers \"in order to avoid detection\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | 9,393,346 | b |
Although this Court has not specifically declared the modus operandi of drug trafficking as an appropriate or reliable field for expert opinion, several courts of appeal have consistently admitted such testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 738, 741",
"parenthetical": "affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers \"in order to avoid detection\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 548, 549-51",
"parenthetical": "concluding that expert testimony that the use of \"beepers\" by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir.1995) (ruling expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection by police was properly admitted); United States v. Ta- pia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming the admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers employed telephone pagers “in order to avoid detection”); see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir.1994) (ruling that expert testimony about “tools of the trade” of drug traffickers, including “beepers,” was properly admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th Cir.1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of “beepers” by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous and mobile was properly admitted)."
} | 9,393,346 | a |
It must therefore be determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the circumstances established the necessary probable cause for Roe's arrest. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 913, 921",
"parenthetical": "qualified immunity is warranted if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met",
"sentence": "Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (qualified immunity is warranted if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met); see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (“The relevant, disposi-tive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful ... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 202, 202",
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant, disposi-tive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful ... \"",
"sentence": "Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (qualified immunity is warranted if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met); see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (“The relevant, disposi-tive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful ... ”)."
} | 11,357,610 | a |
It must therefore be determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the circumstances established the necessary probable cause for Roe's arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant, disposi-tive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful ... \"",
"sentence": "Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (qualified immunity is warranted if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met); see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (“The relevant, disposi-tive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful ... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 913, 921",
"parenthetical": "qualified immunity is warranted if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met",
"sentence": "Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (qualified immunity is warranted if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met); see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (“The relevant, disposi-tive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful ... ”)."
} | 11,357,610 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "542 S.W.2d 755, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | 11,952,996 | a |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused's car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "505 S.W.2d 204, 206",
"parenthetical": "holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused's car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "542 S.W.2d 755, 758",
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | 11,952,996 | a |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | 11,952,996 | a |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused's car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | 11,952,996 | a |
As the district court pointed out, there was the testimony of several people at trial and there was physical evidence to tie Jackson to the crime. The jury was properly given the task of weighing all the evidence and reaching a verdict. Furthermore, past Arkansas cases do not clearly indicate that the accomplice testimony in this case was insufficiently corroborated so as to preclude the trial court judge from submitting this case to the jury. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "505 S.W.2d 204, 206",
"parenthetical": "holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused's car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car",
"sentence": "But see Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1976) (holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1974) (holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accused’s car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 6 Ark.App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1982) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark.App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693, 695 (1981) (same)."
} | 11,952,996 | b |
And, it is only where, for procedural or other reasons, the state courts deprive the plaintiff of such an opportunity that Younger does not apply. But, that party, already engaged in a state proceeding, cannot ordinarily obtain a hearing in federal court on its federal claim simply because it believes the state will reject the claim on the merits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 198, 198",
"parenthetical": "\" '[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.' \"",
"sentence": "See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "411 U.S. 564, 575-79",
"parenthetical": "Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment",
"sentence": "See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment)."
} | 10,537,373 | a |
And, it is only where, for procedural or other reasons, the state courts deprive the plaintiff of such an opportunity that Younger does not apply. But, that party, already engaged in a state proceeding, cannot ordinarily obtain a hearing in federal court on its federal claim simply because it believes the state will reject the claim on the merits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 198, 198",
"parenthetical": "\" '[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.' \"",
"sentence": "See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98",
"parenthetical": "Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment",
"sentence": "See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment)."
} | 10,537,373 | a |
And, it is only where, for procedural or other reasons, the state courts deprive the plaintiff of such an opportunity that Younger does not apply. But, that party, already engaged in a state proceeding, cannot ordinarily obtain a hearing in federal court on its federal claim simply because it believes the state will reject the claim on the merits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 198, 198",
"parenthetical": "\" '[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.' \"",
"sentence": "See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment",
"sentence": "See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment)."
} | 10,537,373 | a |
Historically, an alleged murder weapon has constituted relevant evidence, even when the connection between the weapon and the crime is extremely thin. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "284 Kan. 172, 176-77",
"parenthetical": "photograph of defendant holding gun \"relevant to establish his possession of a gun resembling the possible murder weapon on the night of [the victim's] murder\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cooper, 252 Kan. 340, 348, 845 P.2d 631 (1993); see Francis, 282 Kan. at 136 (lack of positive identification of alleged murder weapon went to weight not admissibility); see also State v. Scott-Herring, 284 Kan. 172, 176-77, 159 P.3d 1028 (2007) (photograph of defendant holding gun “relevant to establish his possession of a gun resembling the possible murder weapon on the night of [the victim’s] murder”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "282 Kan. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "lack of positive identification of alleged murder weapon went to weight not admissibility",
"sentence": "State v. Cooper, 252 Kan. 340, 348, 845 P.2d 631 (1993); see Francis, 282 Kan. at 136 (lack of positive identification of alleged murder weapon went to weight not admissibility); see also State v. Scott-Herring, 284 Kan. 172, 176-77, 159 P.3d 1028 (2007) (photograph of defendant holding gun “relevant to establish his possession of a gun resembling the possible murder weapon on the night of [the victim’s] murder”)."
} | 12,417,267 | b |
Historically, an alleged murder weapon has constituted relevant evidence, even when the connection between the weapon and the crime is extremely thin. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "photograph of defendant holding gun \"relevant to establish his possession of a gun resembling the possible murder weapon on the night of [the victim's] murder\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cooper, 252 Kan. 340, 348, 845 P.2d 631 (1993); see Francis, 282 Kan. at 136 (lack of positive identification of alleged murder weapon went to weight not admissibility); see also State v. Scott-Herring, 284 Kan. 172, 176-77, 159 P.3d 1028 (2007) (photograph of defendant holding gun “relevant to establish his possession of a gun resembling the possible murder weapon on the night of [the victim’s] murder”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "282 Kan. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "lack of positive identification of alleged murder weapon went to weight not admissibility",
"sentence": "State v. Cooper, 252 Kan. 340, 348, 845 P.2d 631 (1993); see Francis, 282 Kan. at 136 (lack of positive identification of alleged murder weapon went to weight not admissibility); see also State v. Scott-Herring, 284 Kan. 172, 176-77, 159 P.3d 1028 (2007) (photograph of defendant holding gun “relevant to establish his possession of a gun resembling the possible murder weapon on the night of [the victim’s] murder”)."
} | 12,417,267 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the Bankruptcy Court was correct in drawing this conclusion. First, NOVA was found to be legally required to reimburse the Customers, and therefore "there was no consideration to support the purported assignment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 B.R. 972, 972",
"parenthetical": "finding a purported assignment to be invalid for lack of consideration because the bank was already hable \"by virtue of nonbankruptcy law prior to the execution of' the assignments",
"sentence": "In re Mid-Am., 145 B.R. at 972 (finding a purported assignment to be invalid for lack of consideration because the bank was already hable “by virtue of nonbankruptcy law prior to the execution of’ the assignments); see also In re Mel-Hart, 156 B.R. at 607 (“There can be no assignment from employees to [claiming company] because there was no consideration to support the purported assignment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 607, 607",
"parenthetical": "\"There can be no assignment from employees to [claiming company] because there was no consideration to support the purported assignment.\"",
"sentence": "In re Mid-Am., 145 B.R. at 972 (finding a purported assignment to be invalid for lack of consideration because the bank was already hable “by virtue of nonbankruptcy law prior to the execution of’ the assignments); see also In re Mel-Hart, 156 B.R. at 607 (“There can be no assignment from employees to [claiming company] because there was no consideration to support the purported assignment.”)."
} | 9,118,084 | a |
Moreover, we note that Maxwell took the stand to corroborate Jenkins's impeachment testimony that Lavoris Smith had made a prior statement inconsistent with her testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 Kan. 47, 61",
"parenthetical": "\"[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney's testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 61, 622 P.2d 986, 996 (1981) (“[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney’s testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution”), modified on other ground, State v. Hayes, 239 Kan. 443, 720 P.2d 1049 (1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney's active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution's principal witness to the only real factual issue",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Miller, 391 So.2d 1159, 1161-64 (La.1980) (in finding harmless the assistant district attorney’s resumption of his role as co-prosecutor after having testified, the court considered, among other factors, that he was an impeachment witness), with Wal drop v. State, 424 So.2d at 1346, 1351 (reversal warranted where the prosecutor was the prosecution’s principal witness, testifying as to the defendant’s confession and written statement, the latter of which, the court noted, intensified and magnified the oral statement, leaving no doubt of the defendant’s guilt); State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.1971) (reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney’s active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution’s principal witness to the only real factual issue)."
} | 12,346,952 | b |
Moreover, we note that Maxwell took the stand to corroborate Jenkins's impeachment testimony that Lavoris Smith had made a prior statement inconsistent with her testimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney's active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution's principal witness to the only real factual issue",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Miller, 391 So.2d 1159, 1161-64 (La.1980) (in finding harmless the assistant district attorney’s resumption of his role as co-prosecutor after having testified, the court considered, among other factors, that he was an impeachment witness), with Wal drop v. State, 424 So.2d at 1346, 1351 (reversal warranted where the prosecutor was the prosecution’s principal witness, testifying as to the defendant’s confession and written statement, the latter of which, the court noted, intensified and magnified the oral statement, leaving no doubt of the defendant’s guilt); State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.1971) (reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney’s active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution’s principal witness to the only real factual issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 P.2d 986, 996",
"parenthetical": "\"[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney's testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 61, 622 P.2d 986, 996 (1981) (“[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney’s testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution”), modified on other ground, State v. Hayes, 239 Kan. 443, 720 P.2d 1049 (1986)."
} | 12,346,952 | a |
Moreover, we note that Maxwell took the stand to corroborate Jenkins's impeachment testimony that Lavoris Smith had made a prior statement inconsistent with her testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney's testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 61, 622 P.2d 986, 996 (1981) (“[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney’s testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution”), modified on other ground, State v. Hayes, 239 Kan. 443, 720 P.2d 1049 (1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney's active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution's principal witness to the only real factual issue",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Miller, 391 So.2d 1159, 1161-64 (La.1980) (in finding harmless the assistant district attorney’s resumption of his role as co-prosecutor after having testified, the court considered, among other factors, that he was an impeachment witness), with Wal drop v. State, 424 So.2d at 1346, 1351 (reversal warranted where the prosecutor was the prosecution’s principal witness, testifying as to the defendant’s confession and written statement, the latter of which, the court noted, intensified and magnified the oral statement, leaving no doubt of the defendant’s guilt); State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.1971) (reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney’s active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution’s principal witness to the only real factual issue)."
} | 12,346,952 | b |
Moreover, we note that Maxwell took the stand to corroborate Jenkins's impeachment testimony that Lavoris Smith had made a prior statement inconsistent with her testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney's testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 61, 622 P.2d 986, 996 (1981) (“[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney’s testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution”), modified on other ground, State v. Hayes, 239 Kan. 443, 720 P.2d 1049 (1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney's active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution's principal witness to the only real factual issue",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Miller, 391 So.2d 1159, 1161-64 (La.1980) (in finding harmless the assistant district attorney’s resumption of his role as co-prosecutor after having testified, the court considered, among other factors, that he was an impeachment witness), with Wal drop v. State, 424 So.2d at 1346, 1351 (reversal warranted where the prosecutor was the prosecution’s principal witness, testifying as to the defendant’s confession and written statement, the latter of which, the court noted, intensified and magnified the oral statement, leaving no doubt of the defendant’s guilt); State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.1971) (reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney’s active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution’s principal witness to the only real factual issue)."
} | 12,346,952 | b |
FAA air traffic controllers' duties include giving "all the information and warnings specified in [their] manuals, and in certain situations [they] must give warnings beyond the manuals." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 F.3d 399, 406-07",
"parenthetical": "holding that FAA controllers' failure to provide \"accurate and timely information\" about foggy weather conditions when an airplane pilot approached the landing strip caused the spatial disorientation of the pilot, which was the type of harm the controllers should have expected",
"sentence": "See Worthington v. United States, 21 F.3d 399, 406-07 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that FAA controllers’ failure to provide “accurate and timely information” about foggy weather conditions when an airplane pilot approached the landing strip caused the spatial disorientation of the pilot, which was the type of harm the controllers should have expected); see also Ingham, 373 F.2d at 234 (“The issue ... is not whether the government had a duty to [report weather condition] information, but rather what was the scope of that duty.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.2d 234, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"The issue ... is not whether the government had a duty to [report weather condition] information, but rather what was the scope of that duty.\"",
"sentence": "See Worthington v. United States, 21 F.3d 399, 406-07 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that FAA controllers’ failure to provide “accurate and timely information” about foggy weather conditions when an airplane pilot approached the landing strip caused the spatial disorientation of the pilot, which was the type of harm the controllers should have expected); see also Ingham, 373 F.2d at 234 (“The issue ... is not whether the government had a duty to [report weather condition] information, but rather what was the scope of that duty.”)."
} | 3,825,725 | a |
Moreover, Adkins has offered circumstantial evidence to support her claim that she was fired because of her disability -- that PRMC terminated her, knowing she was at the time restricted to light duty, and simultaneously ignored its responsibility to reasonably accommodate her. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Adkins, we conclude that a factfinder may infer that she was terminated because of her disability. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "388 Md. 675, 687",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 288, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | 4,308,530 | b |
Moreover, Adkins has offered circumstantial evidence to support her claim that she was fired because of her disability -- that PRMC terminated her, knowing she was at the time restricted to light duty, and simultaneously ignored its responsibility to reasonably accommodate her. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Adkins, we conclude that a factfinder may infer that she was terminated because of her disability. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 U.S. 288, 288",
"parenthetical": "\"Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | 4,308,530 | a |
Moreover, Adkins has offered circumstantial evidence to support her claim that she was fired because of her disability -- that PRMC terminated her, knowing she was at the time restricted to light duty, and simultaneously ignored its responsibility to reasonably accommodate her. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Adkins, we conclude that a factfinder may infer that she was terminated because of her disability. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "388 Md. 675, 687",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | 4,308,530 | b |
Moreover, Adkins has offered circumstantial evidence to support her claim that she was fired because of her disability -- that PRMC terminated her, knowing she was at the time restricted to light duty, and simultaneously ignored its responsibility to reasonably accommodate her. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Adkins, we conclude that a factfinder may infer that she was terminated because of her disability. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.\"",
"sentence": "See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”)."
} | 4,308,530 | a |
[2] The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "250 F.3d 79, 82",
"parenthetical": "reviewing the denial of a merits hearing under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255 for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir.2001) (reviewing the denial of a merits hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for abuse of discretion); see also Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir.2010) (remanding to the district court to consider a petitioner’s equitable tolling claim and noting that “[t]he decision as to whether an evidentia-ry hearing is warranted is ... consigned to the district court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "593 F.3d 226, 232",
"parenthetical": "remanding to the district court to consider a petitioner's equitable tolling claim and noting that \"[t]he decision as to whether an evidentia-ry hearing is warranted is ... consigned to the district court\"",
"sentence": "See Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir.2001) (reviewing the denial of a merits hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for abuse of discretion); see also Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir.2010) (remanding to the district court to consider a petitioner’s equitable tolling claim and noting that “[t]he decision as to whether an evidentia-ry hearing is warranted is ... consigned to the district court”)."
} | 4,198,921 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | b |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "601 P.2d 207, 211",
"parenthetical": "explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 P.2d 186, 189",
"parenthetical": "finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | b |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 P.2d 973, 976",
"parenthetical": "finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | b |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39",
"parenthetical": "upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | b |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | b |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "601 P.2d 207, 211",
"parenthetical": "explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 P.2d 186, 189",
"parenthetical": "finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | b |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 P.2d 973, 976",
"parenthetical": "finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Many jurisdictions have found that running an NCIC cheek, in addition to a driver's license check, is within the scope of a traffic stop and is permissible so long as it does not unreasonably extend the time of the stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "873 P.2d 1127, 1133",
"parenthetical": "holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39",
"parenthetical": "upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes",
"sentence": "See McRae, supra, 81 F.3d at 1535-36 n. 6 (explaining that during traffic stop, officer may access NCIC records to determine quickly existence of outstanding warrants); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation); see also People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (1979) (explaining that warrant check lawful where it does not prolong traffic stop beyond time necessary to investigate original reason for detention); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (finding that police may check for outstanding warrants, provided that duration of detention is not unreasonably extended); State v. Smith, 73 Or.App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (finding five-minute warrant check during stop lawful but warning that check may become unreasonable if inordinately long); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (upholding stop where warrant check did not last more than a few minutes)."
} | 3,538,702 | a |
Appellant likewise presented no argument or evidence, either in the trial court or on appeal, regarding the racial composition of the entire venire, such that we- can consider whether the State used a disproportionate number of its strikes to challenge African-Americans relative to the number of African-Americans on the veni-re. Appellant also did not rebut the State's observations on the record concerning Prospective Juror No. 36's courtroom demeanor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 S.W.3d 767, 767",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] prospective juror's demeanor may be 'considered proved on the record' if the prosecutor recites his observation of that demeanor for the record and defense counsel fails to 'rebut the observation.' \"",
"sentence": "See Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 680 (Tex. Crim.App.2012) (“We have held that the demeanor of a potential juror is a valid reason to exercise a peremptory strike.”); see also Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 767 (“[A] prospective juror’s demeanor may be ‘considered proved on the record’ if the prosecutor recites his observation of that demeanor for the record and defense counsel fails to ‘rebut the observation.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "365 S.W.3d 673, 680",
"parenthetical": "\"We have held that the demeanor of a potential juror is a valid reason to exercise a peremptory strike.\"",
"sentence": "See Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 680 (Tex. Crim.App.2012) (“We have held that the demeanor of a potential juror is a valid reason to exercise a peremptory strike.”); see also Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 767 (“[A] prospective juror’s demeanor may be ‘considered proved on the record’ if the prosecutor recites his observation of that demeanor for the record and defense counsel fails to ‘rebut the observation.’ ”)."
} | 6,839,919 | b |
Nor can Nevada complain that its lack of representation on the Conference Committee created a defect in the political process. The membership of the Conference Committee was established pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 2, which, in pertinent part, states that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "549 F.2d 120, 123-25",
"parenthetical": "membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy",
"sentence": "Cf. Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123-25 (9th Cir.1977) (membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "699 F.2d 1166, 1172",
"parenthetical": "committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, SS 5, cl. 2",
"sentence": "U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1172 (D.C.Cir.1982) (committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, § 5, cl. 2), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823, 104 S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983). To the extent that Nevada contends it should have had a representative on the committee, that issue is not justiciable."
} | 10,541,080 | b |
Nor can Nevada complain that its lack of representation on the Conference Committee created a defect in the political process. The membership of the Conference Committee was established pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 2, which, in pertinent part, states that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, SS 5, cl. 2",
"sentence": "U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1172 (D.C.Cir.1982) (committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, § 5, cl. 2), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823, 104 S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983). To the extent that Nevada contends it should have had a representative on the committee, that issue is not justiciable."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "549 F.2d 120, 123-25",
"parenthetical": "membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy",
"sentence": "Cf. Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123-25 (9th Cir.1977) (membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy)."
} | 10,541,080 | a |
Nor can Nevada complain that its lack of representation on the Conference Committee created a defect in the political process. The membership of the Conference Committee was established pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 2, which, in pertinent part, states that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "549 F.2d 120, 123-25",
"parenthetical": "membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy",
"sentence": "Cf. Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123-25 (9th Cir.1977) (membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, SS 5, cl. 2",
"sentence": "U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1172 (D.C.Cir.1982) (committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, § 5, cl. 2), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823, 104 S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983). To the extent that Nevada contends it should have had a representative on the committee, that issue is not justiciable."
} | 10,541,080 | b |
Nor can Nevada complain that its lack of representation on the Conference Committee created a defect in the political process. The membership of the Conference Committee was established pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 2, which, in pertinent part, states that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "549 F.2d 120, 123-25",
"parenthetical": "membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy",
"sentence": "Cf. Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123-25 (9th Cir.1977) (membership on state legislative committees is not a justiciable controversy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, SS 5, cl. 2",
"sentence": "U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1172 (D.C.Cir.1982) (committee membership is a power allocated to each House of Congress pursuant to Art. I, § 5, cl. 2), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823, 104 S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983). To the extent that Nevada contends it should have had a representative on the committee, that issue is not justiciable."
} | 10,541,080 | b |
Young's marked lane violation for admittedly "weaving" on the highway provided probable cause to stop him for violating the traffic laws. Further, Trooper Kane had ample reasonable suspicion, based on surveillance by fellow officers observing what they believed to be consistent with drug trafficking and collection of drug proceeds, to stop the truck and investigate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "350 F.3d 231, 240",
"parenthetical": "\"fellow officer rule\" provides that \"knowledge may be imputed from DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1994)(agents may stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity); see also United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 240 (1st Cir.2003) (“fellow officer rule” provides that “knowledge may be imputed from DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 F.3d 1, 6",
"parenthetical": "agents may stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1994)(agents may stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity); see also United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 240 (1st Cir.2003) (“fellow officer rule” provides that “knowledge may be imputed from DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop”)."
} | 4,206,044 | b |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | b |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.]”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)."
} | 5,876,803 | a |
As discussed above, the Texas Legislature has not established a statutory scheme for the presentation and determination of an issue of mental retardation in a capital murder trial. However, in the meantime, this Court has formulated temporary judicial guidelines in addressing Atkins claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "546 U.S. 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in commanding Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mental-retardation claim",
"sentence": "See Schriro, 546 U.S. at 7, 126 S.Ct. 7 (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in commanding Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mental-retardation claim); see also Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (holding that Atkins does not require a jury determination of mental retardation in a post-conviction proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.W.3d 9, 9",
"parenthetical": "holding that Atkins does not require a jury determination of mental retardation in a post-conviction proceeding",
"sentence": "See Schriro, 546 U.S. at 7, 126 S.Ct. 7 (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in commanding Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mental-retardation claim); see also Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (holding that Atkins does not require a jury determination of mental retardation in a post-conviction proceeding)."
} | 8,398,039 | a |
As discussed above, the Texas Legislature has not established a statutory scheme for the presentation and determination of an issue of mental retardation in a capital murder trial. However, in the meantime, this Court has formulated temporary judicial guidelines in addressing Atkins claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in commanding Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mental-retardation claim",
"sentence": "See Schriro, 546 U.S. at 7, 126 S.Ct. 7 (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in commanding Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mental-retardation claim); see also Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (holding that Atkins does not require a jury determination of mental retardation in a post-conviction proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.W.3d 9, 9",
"parenthetical": "holding that Atkins does not require a jury determination of mental retardation in a post-conviction proceeding",
"sentence": "See Schriro, 546 U.S. at 7, 126 S.Ct. 7 (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in commanding Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mental-retardation claim); see also Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (holding that Atkins does not require a jury determination of mental retardation in a post-conviction proceeding)."
} | 8,398,039 | a |
In some cases, the transformative nature of a work overshadows and outweighs its commercial purpose. This is particularly true in the realm of parody, as "a parody's aim is, by nature, to transform an earlier work." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "510 U.S. 579, 579",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"parody has an obvious claim to transformative value\"",
"sentence": "See also, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (recognizing that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 1269, 1269",
"parenthetical": "holding that the transformative nature of The Wind Done Gone, a parody of Gone With the Wind, outweighed its commercial purpose",
"sentence": "Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269. (holding that the transformative nature of The Wind Done Gone, a parody of Gone With the Wind, outweighed its commercial purpose)."
} | 5,169,941 | b |
In some cases, the transformative nature of a work overshadows and outweighs its commercial purpose. This is particularly true in the realm of parody, as "a parody's aim is, by nature, to transform an earlier work." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"parody has an obvious claim to transformative value\"",
"sentence": "See also, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (recognizing that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "268 F.3d 1269, 1269",
"parenthetical": "holding that the transformative nature of The Wind Done Gone, a parody of Gone With the Wind, outweighed its commercial purpose",
"sentence": "Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269. (holding that the transformative nature of The Wind Done Gone, a parody of Gone With the Wind, outweighed its commercial purpose)."
} | 5,169,941 | b |
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