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Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | b |
Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated\"",
"sentence": "See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-188, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”)."
} | 8,186,111 | a |
The "contract with voters" cases cited by Scarbrough similarly fail to accord her standing. Each of these cases acknowledged the standing of property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "39 S.W.2d 82, 82-33",
"parenthetical": "treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners' court and \"electorate entitled to vote at said election\" and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners’ court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to “the will of those having to bear the bond burden”); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election); see also Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, “It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 675, 675-76",
"parenthetical": "holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, \"It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.\"",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners’ court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to “the will of those having to bear the bond burden”); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election); see also Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, “It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.”)."
} | 7,321,429 | a |
The "contract with voters" cases cited by Scarbrough similarly fail to accord her standing. Each of these cases acknowledged the standing of property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 675, 675-76",
"parenthetical": "holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, \"It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.\"",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners’ court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to “the will of those having to bear the bond burden”); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election); see also Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, “It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "246 S.W. 80, 80",
"parenthetical": "holding that county commissioners' court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to \"the will of those having to bear the bond burden\"",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners’ court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to “the will of those having to bear the bond burden”); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election); see also Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, “It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.”)."
} | 7,321,429 | b |
The "contract with voters" cases cited by Scarbrough similarly fail to accord her standing. Each of these cases acknowledged the standing of property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 S.W. 374, 374-75",
"parenthetical": "in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners’ court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to “the will of those having to bear the bond burden”); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election); see also Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, “It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "79 S.W.3d 675, 675-76",
"parenthetical": "holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, \"It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.\"",
"sentence": "See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners’ court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to “the will of those having to bear the bond burden”); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by property owners subject to tax for bond issued pursuant to county bond election, affirming injunction against diversion of proceeds of bond sales to construction of bridge at different location than presented in petition for bond election); see also Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding, following sale of general obligation bonds approved by city voters to develop waterway project and initiation of work on project, “It is elementary that the proceeds of bonds voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for which they were voted.”)."
} | 7,321,429 | a |
. Courts have disagreed, however, on the status of inmates working outside the penitentiary for a private employer as part of a work-release program. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoners are employees of private work-release employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5 th Cir. 1990) (prisoners are employees of private work-release employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act); National Welders Supply Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 948 (1964) (board does not regard prisoners as employees under work-release employers); but see Speedrack Products Group, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1997) (board’s determination that completely integrated work-release inmates who share the same wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment are not eligible to vote in represented election was unreasonable); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Opinion No. 86-7, 40 F.E.P. 1892 (April 18, 1986) (prison laborer is not an employee of prison under Title VII); c.f."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1276, 1282",
"parenthetical": "board's determination that completely integrated work-release inmates who share the same wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment are not eligible to vote in represented election was unreasonable",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5 th Cir. 1990) (prisoners are employees of private work-release employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act); National Welders Supply Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 948 (1964) (board does not regard prisoners as employees under work-release employers); but see Speedrack Products Group, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1997) (board’s determination that completely integrated work-release inmates who share the same wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment are not eligible to vote in represented election was unreasonable); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Opinion No. 86-7, 40 F.E.P. 1892 (April 18, 1986) (prison laborer is not an employee of prison under Title VII); c.f."
} | 11,713,698 | a |
. Courts have disagreed, however, on the status of inmates working outside the penitentiary for a private employer as part of a work-release program. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "board does not regard prisoners as employees under work-release employers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5 th Cir. 1990) (prisoners are employees of private work-release employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act); National Welders Supply Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 948 (1964) (board does not regard prisoners as employees under work-release employers); but see Speedrack Products Group, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1997) (board’s determination that completely integrated work-release inmates who share the same wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment are not eligible to vote in represented election was unreasonable); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Opinion No. 86-7, 40 F.E.P. 1892 (April 18, 1986) (prison laborer is not an employee of prison under Title VII); c.f."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1276, 1282",
"parenthetical": "board's determination that completely integrated work-release inmates who share the same wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment are not eligible to vote in represented election was unreasonable",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5 th Cir. 1990) (prisoners are employees of private work-release employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act); National Welders Supply Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 948 (1964) (board does not regard prisoners as employees under work-release employers); but see Speedrack Products Group, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1997) (board’s determination that completely integrated work-release inmates who share the same wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment are not eligible to vote in represented election was unreasonable); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Opinion No. 86-7, 40 F.E.P. 1892 (April 18, 1986) (prison laborer is not an employee of prison under Title VII); c.f."
} | 11,713,698 | a |
Furthermore, the omission of such proximate-cause language is especially suggestive of Congress's intent not to require proximate causation in SS 841(b)(1)(E)(r) because Congress included the language at issue here--viz., "death ... results from the use"--in 2008, after our sister circuits uniformly had held that identical language in SS 841(b)(1)(C) lacked a proximate-cause element. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 F.3d 121, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent's death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 F.3d 968, 972",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | 4,175,661 | b |
Furthermore, the omission of such proximate-cause language is especially suggestive of Congress's intent not to require proximate causation in SS 841(b)(1)(E)(r) because Congress included the language at issue here--viz., "death ... results from the use"--in 2008, after our sister circuits uniformly had held that identical language in SS 841(b)(1)(C) lacked a proximate-cause element. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 881, 892",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 F.3d 121, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent's death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | 4,175,661 | a |
Furthermore, the omission of such proximate-cause language is especially suggestive of Congress's intent not to require proximate causation in SS 841(b)(1)(E)(r) because Congress included the language at issue here--viz., "death ... results from the use"--in 2008, after our sister circuits uniformly had held that identical language in SS 841(b)(1)(C) lacked a proximate-cause element. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 F.3d 121, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent's death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | 4,175,661 | b |
Furthermore, the omission of such proximate-cause language is especially suggestive of Congress's intent not to require proximate causation in SS 841(b)(1)(E)(r) because Congress included the language at issue here--viz., "death ... results from the use"--in 2008, after our sister circuits uniformly had held that identical language in SS 841(b)(1)(C) lacked a proximate-cause element. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "167 F.3d 824, 832",
"parenthetical": "\"Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [SS 841(b",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 F.3d 121, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent's death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”)."
} | 4,175,661 | a |
In situations in which a project is only partially funded by the federal agency, federal courts have in some instances looked to the proportion of federal funding to non-federal funding to determine whether there is a major federal action. If the amount of federal funding is insignificant or only provided with respect to a small segment of the project, the involvement of the federal agency may not constitute a "major federal action." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "509 F.3d 1095, 1101",
"parenthetical": "\"While significant federal funding can turn what would otherwise be a state or local project into a major federal action, consideration must be given to a great disparity in the expenditures forecast for the local and federal portions of the entire program.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir.2007) (“While significant federal funding can turn what would otherwise be a state or local project into a major federal action, consideration must be given to a great disparity in the expenditures forecast for the local and federal portions of the entire program.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ka Makani, 295 F.3d at 960 (same); Sancho v. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1267 (D.Haw.2008) (holding that the contribution by a federal agency of $531 million toward a project did not constitute a major federal action because the funding represented less than 10% of the $5.84 billion project cost); but cf. Sierra Club v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 235 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or.2002) (“Given the overwhelming percentage of federal dollars involved, and the fact that the amount itself, regardless of the percentage it represents, is more than $3 million, the federal funding contribution alone is probably sufficient to ‘federalize’ the project.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Given the overwhelming percentage of federal dollars involved, and the fact that the amount itself, regardless of the percentage it represents, is more than $3 million, the federal funding contribution alone is probably sufficient to 'federalize' the project.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir.2007) (“While significant federal funding can turn what would otherwise be a state or local project into a major federal action, consideration must be given to a great disparity in the expenditures forecast for the local and federal portions of the entire program.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ka Makani, 295 F.3d at 960 (same); Sancho v. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1267 (D.Haw.2008) (holding that the contribution by a federal agency of $531 million toward a project did not constitute a major federal action because the funding represented less than 10% of the $5.84 billion project cost); but cf. Sierra Club v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 235 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or.2002) (“Given the overwhelming percentage of federal dollars involved, and the fact that the amount itself, regardless of the percentage it represents, is more than $3 million, the federal funding contribution alone is probably sufficient to ‘federalize’ the project.”)."
} | 3,836,061 | a |
In situations in which a project is only partially funded by the federal agency, federal courts have in some instances looked to the proportion of federal funding to non-federal funding to determine whether there is a major federal action. If the amount of federal funding is insignificant or only provided with respect to a small segment of the project, the involvement of the federal agency may not constitute a "major federal action." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Given the overwhelming percentage of federal dollars involved, and the fact that the amount itself, regardless of the percentage it represents, is more than $3 million, the federal funding contribution alone is probably sufficient to 'federalize' the project.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir.2007) (“While significant federal funding can turn what would otherwise be a state or local project into a major federal action, consideration must be given to a great disparity in the expenditures forecast for the local and federal portions of the entire program.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ka Makani, 295 F.3d at 960 (same); Sancho v. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1267 (D.Haw.2008) (holding that the contribution by a federal agency of $531 million toward a project did not constitute a major federal action because the funding represented less than 10% of the $5.84 billion project cost); but cf. Sierra Club v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 235 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or.2002) (“Given the overwhelming percentage of federal dollars involved, and the fact that the amount itself, regardless of the percentage it represents, is more than $3 million, the federal funding contribution alone is probably sufficient to ‘federalize’ the project.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "578 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1267",
"parenthetical": "holding that the contribution by a federal agency of $531 million toward a project did not constitute a major federal action because the funding represented less than 10% of the $5.84 billion project cost",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir.2007) (“While significant federal funding can turn what would otherwise be a state or local project into a major federal action, consideration must be given to a great disparity in the expenditures forecast for the local and federal portions of the entire program.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ka Makani, 295 F.3d at 960 (same); Sancho v. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1267 (D.Haw.2008) (holding that the contribution by a federal agency of $531 million toward a project did not constitute a major federal action because the funding represented less than 10% of the $5.84 billion project cost); but cf. Sierra Club v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 235 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or.2002) (“Given the overwhelming percentage of federal dollars involved, and the fact that the amount itself, regardless of the percentage it represents, is more than $3 million, the federal funding contribution alone is probably sufficient to ‘federalize’ the project.”)."
} | 3,836,061 | b |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "808 So.2d 1041, 1098",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | 7,042,652 | a |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | 7,042,652 | a |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | 7,042,652 | a |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | 7,042,652 | b |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "808 So.2d 1041, 1098",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "207 P.3d 683, 687",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | 7,042,652 | b |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "207 P.3d 683, 687",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | 7,042,652 | a |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "207 P.3d 683, 687",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | 7,042,652 | a |
The circuit court agreed with the prosecutor's description. Thus, when Clark failed to comply with the terms of the "good behavior" agreement, his stipulation was "itself a conviction [and] nothing remain[ed] but to give judgment and determine punishment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "207 P.3d 683, 687",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea",
"sentence": "See also Ex parte Howard, 710 So.2d 460, 465 (Ala.1997) (same); see also State v. Alien, 220 Ariz. 430, 207 P.3d 683, 687 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that a defendant’s stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant's stipulation did not establish guilt",
"sentence": "But cf. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041, 1098 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (holding that a defendant’s strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendant’s stipulation did not establish guilt)."
} | 7,042,652 | a |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 354, 361",
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 348, 368-69",
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 354, 361",
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 354, 361",
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 348, 368-69",
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 348, 368-69",
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | a |
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const, amend. Indefinite commitment to MSOP unquestionably constitutes a "significant deprivation of liberty" that infringes upon one's fundamental right to be free from confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (“The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence protects the individual’s fundamental interest in liberty.”). Where the government acts in a systematic way (for example through combined legislative and executive action) to indefinitely confine a class of citizens in detention facilities — such as those of MSOP — the government action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in order to pass constitutional muster."
} | 4,205,007 | b |
P 12. Second, use of the term "willfully" indicates that the charge was brought under subsection (a)(i), that Hawkins "purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly" caused bodily injury to another. The Court has held that terms "willfully" and "knowingly" have substantially the same meaning in criminal statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "977 So.2d 329, 335",
"parenthetical": "\"An act 'willfully' done is an act 'knowingly' and 'intentionally' done.\"",
"sentence": "See also Boyd v. State, 977 So.2d 329, 335 (¶ 22) (Miss.2008) (“An act ‘willfully’ done is an act ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’ done.”); Moore v. State, 676 So.2d 244, 246 (Miss.1996) (“willfully” has the same meaning as “knowingly”). Relying on Ousley, the Court of Appeals held that the terms “wilfully and feloniously” had substantially the same meaning as “purposely or knowingly” when ruling on the sufficiency of a jury instruction for aggravated assault."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "122 So. 732, 732",
"parenthetical": "indictment was sufficient even though it used the words \"willfully, unlawfullyf,] and feloniously\" rather than \"knowingly\" as used in the statute",
"sentence": "Ousley, 122 So. at 732 (indictment was sufficient even though it used the words “willfully, unlawfullyf,] and feloniously” rather than “knowingly” as used in the statute)."
} | 6,926,298 | b |
In this instance, the court may have acted within its discretion in excusing veni-re member number 32 for "good reason," regardless of whether it could have done so pursuant to Article 35.16(a)(ll). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.W.3d 533, 535",
"parenthetical": "\"If a juror cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in a trial, the juror may be excused.\"",
"sentence": "See Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 533; Erazo v. State, 93 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 144 S.W.3d 487 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“If a juror cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in a trial, the juror may be excused.”); see also Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (appellate court must uphold the trial court’s decision to excuse a venire member if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "982 S.W.2d 386, 389",
"parenthetical": "appellate court must uphold the trial court's decision to excuse a venire member if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case",
"sentence": "See Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 533; Erazo v. State, 93 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 144 S.W.3d 487 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“If a juror cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in a trial, the juror may be excused.”); see also Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (appellate court must uphold the trial court’s decision to excuse a venire member if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case)."
} | 6,857,347 | a |
In this instance, the court may have acted within its discretion in excusing veni-re member number 32 for "good reason," regardless of whether it could have done so pursuant to Article 35.16(a)(ll). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "982 S.W.2d 386, 389",
"parenthetical": "appellate court must uphold the trial court's decision to excuse a venire member if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case",
"sentence": "See Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 533; Erazo v. State, 93 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 144 S.W.3d 487 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“If a juror cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in a trial, the juror may be excused.”); see also Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (appellate court must uphold the trial court’s decision to excuse a venire member if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If a juror cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in a trial, the juror may be excused.\"",
"sentence": "See Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 533; Erazo v. State, 93 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 144 S.W.3d 487 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“If a juror cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in a trial, the juror may be excused.”); see also Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (appellate court must uphold the trial court’s decision to excuse a venire member if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case)."
} | 6,857,347 | b |
Trinidad y Garcia fails to make out a claim cognizable on habeas by invoking the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and alleging that, if extradited, he'll face torture at his destination. What's been historically cognizable on habeas review in the extradition context is (1) whether the executive branch has the authority to detain the extraditee in the first place and whether the judicial branch has exercised proper jurisdiction over him, all of which has already been litigated and resolved against Trinidad; (2) whether the executive is operating under a valid treaty authorizing extradition, which isn't disputed here; and (3) whether the extraditee's crime falls into the political offense exception, which Trinidad doesn't allege. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 1009, 1009-10",
"parenthetical": "discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925) (“[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901); Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464 (1890); see also Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 97 (2002) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "268 U.S. 311, 312",
"parenthetical": "\"[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925) (“[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901); Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464 (1890); see also Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 97 (2002) (same)."
} | 3,894,295 | b |
Trinidad y Garcia fails to make out a claim cognizable on habeas by invoking the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and alleging that, if extradited, he'll face torture at his destination. What's been historically cognizable on habeas review in the extradition context is (1) whether the executive branch has the authority to detain the extraditee in the first place and whether the judicial branch has exercised proper jurisdiction over him, all of which has already been litigated and resolved against Trinidad; (2) whether the executive is operating under a valid treaty authorizing extradition, which isn't disputed here; and (3) whether the extraditee's crime falls into the political offense exception, which Trinidad doesn't allege. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925) (“[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901); Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464 (1890); see also Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 97 (2002) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 1009, 1009-10",
"parenthetical": "discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925) (“[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901); Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464 (1890); see also Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 97 (2002) (same)."
} | 3,894,295 | a |
Trinidad y Garcia fails to make out a claim cognizable on habeas by invoking the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and alleging that, if extradited, he'll face torture at his destination. What's been historically cognizable on habeas review in the extradition context is (1) whether the executive branch has the authority to detain the extraditee in the first place and whether the judicial branch has exercised proper jurisdiction over him, all of which has already been litigated and resolved against Trinidad; (2) whether the executive is operating under a valid treaty authorizing extradition, which isn't disputed here; and (3) whether the extraditee's crime falls into the political offense exception, which Trinidad doesn't allege. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925) (“[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901); Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464 (1890); see also Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 97 (2002) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 1009, 1009-10",
"parenthetical": "discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925) (“[In addition to] general principles relating to extradition, ... there are further limits to habeas corpus---- [H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901); Oteiza v. Jacobus, 136 U.S. 330, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464 (1890); see also Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing the limited catego ries of habeas review in the extradition context); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 97 (2002) (same)."
} | 3,894,295 | a |
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled directly on whether a there is a meaningful distinction between "exculpatory Brady" and "impeachment Brady " materials for purposes relating to the timing such information must be disclosed. Several other courts have discussed the issue at hand, which often arises in the context of a potential, if not inherent, conflict between the Government's obligations to disclose under Brady and the Government's right to delay disclosure of certain information pursuant to the Jencks Act. Those cases suggest that the court has some discretion with respect to directing the timing of such disclosure. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure \"at the appropriate\" time, which often is prior to trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "information bearing on a witness' credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | 3,389,374 | a |
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled directly on whether a there is a meaningful distinction between "exculpatory Brady" and "impeachment Brady " materials for purposes relating to the timing such information must be disclosed. Several other courts have discussed the issue at hand, which often arises in the context of a potential, if not inherent, conflict between the Government's obligations to disclose under Brady and the Government's right to delay disclosure of certain information pursuant to the Jencks Act. Those cases suggest that the court has some discretion with respect to directing the timing of such disclosure. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure \"at the appropriate\" time, which often is prior to trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | 3,389,374 | b |
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled directly on whether a there is a meaningful distinction between "exculpatory Brady" and "impeachment Brady " materials for purposes relating to the timing such information must be disclosed. Several other courts have discussed the issue at hand, which often arises in the context of a potential, if not inherent, conflict between the Government's obligations to disclose under Brady and the Government's right to delay disclosure of certain information pursuant to the Jencks Act. Those cases suggest that the court has some discretion with respect to directing the timing of such disclosure. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Government's delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "information bearing on a witness' credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | 3,389,374 | a |
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled directly on whether a there is a meaningful distinction between "exculpatory Brady" and "impeachment Brady " materials for purposes relating to the timing such information must be disclosed. Several other courts have discussed the issue at hand, which often arises in the context of a potential, if not inherent, conflict between the Government's obligations to disclose under Brady and the Government's right to delay disclosure of certain information pursuant to the Jencks Act. Those cases suggest that the court has some discretion with respect to directing the timing of such disclosure. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Government's delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | 3,389,374 | a |
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled directly on whether a there is a meaningful distinction between "exculpatory Brady" and "impeachment Brady " materials for purposes relating to the timing such information must be disclosed. Several other courts have discussed the issue at hand, which often arises in the context of a potential, if not inherent, conflict between the Government's obligations to disclose under Brady and the Government's right to delay disclosure of certain information pursuant to the Jencks Act. Those cases suggest that the court has some discretion with respect to directing the timing of such disclosure. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "information bearing on a witness' credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | 3,389,374 | a |
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled directly on whether a there is a meaningful distinction between "exculpatory Brady" and "impeachment Brady " materials for purposes relating to the timing such information must be disclosed. Several other courts have discussed the issue at hand, which often arises in the context of a potential, if not inherent, conflict between the Government's obligations to disclose under Brady and the Government's right to delay disclosure of certain information pursuant to the Jencks Act. Those cases suggest that the court has some discretion with respect to directing the timing of such disclosure. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence",
"sentence": "United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1979) (the court interpreted Brady to require disclosure “at the appropriate” time, which often is prior to trial); United States v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1989) (the Government’s delay in disclosing Brady material violates due process only if the delay prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1979) (a defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding delayed disclosure of Brady material, as long as disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence); but see United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (impeachment material need not be produced prior to trial); United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (information bearing on a witness’ credibility may be turned over at the same time as [Jencks Act] materials); United States v. Feldman, 731 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (it is sufficient for the Government to disclose Brady impeachment materials along with [Jencks Act] materials)."
} | 3,389,374 | b |
It is clear that Cerasani's reputation is tarnished. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, this Court can, and does, take judicial notice of Cerasani's criminal record. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1384, 1388",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court 'not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings'\"",
"sentence": "See Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 544 n. 8 (2d Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (taking judicial notice of return of indictments); Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 357 n. 1 (2d Cir.1971) (in defamation action, court took judicial notice of court proceedings that led to plaintiffs acquittal of criminal charges referred to in allegedly defamatory publication); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.1992) (“[a] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings’”) (citation omitted); Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir.1990) (court may take judicial notice of convictions and proceedings in other courts); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir.1982) (taking judicial notice of criminal conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in defamation action, court took judicial notice of court proceedings that led to plaintiffs acquittal of criminal charges referred to in allegedly defamatory publication",
"sentence": "See Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 544 n. 8 (2d Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (taking judicial notice of return of indictments); Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 357 n. 1 (2d Cir.1971) (in defamation action, court took judicial notice of court proceedings that led to plaintiffs acquittal of criminal charges referred to in allegedly defamatory publication); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.1992) (“[a] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings’”) (citation omitted); Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir.1990) (court may take judicial notice of convictions and proceedings in other courts); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir.1982) (taking judicial notice of criminal conviction)."
} | 243,048 | b |
It is clear that Cerasani's reputation is tarnished. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, this Court can, and does, take judicial notice of Cerasani's criminal record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in defamation action, court took judicial notice of court proceedings that led to plaintiffs acquittal of criminal charges referred to in allegedly defamatory publication",
"sentence": "See Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 544 n. 8 (2d Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (taking judicial notice of return of indictments); Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 357 n. 1 (2d Cir.1971) (in defamation action, court took judicial notice of court proceedings that led to plaintiffs acquittal of criminal charges referred to in allegedly defamatory publication); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.1992) (“[a] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings’”) (citation omitted); Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir.1990) (court may take judicial notice of convictions and proceedings in other courts); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir.1982) (taking judicial notice of criminal conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 299, 305-06",
"parenthetical": "court may take judicial notice of convictions and proceedings in other courts",
"sentence": "See Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 544 n. 8 (2d Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (taking judicial notice of return of indictments); Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 357 n. 1 (2d Cir.1971) (in defamation action, court took judicial notice of court proceedings that led to plaintiffs acquittal of criminal charges referred to in allegedly defamatory publication); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.1992) (“[a] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings’”) (citation omitted); Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir.1990) (court may take judicial notice of convictions and proceedings in other courts); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir.1982) (taking judicial notice of criminal conviction)."
} | 243,048 | a |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 527, 535",
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 185, 185",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | b |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 185, 185",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 774, 780",
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | a |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 185, 185",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | b |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 1056, 1056",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 527, 535",
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | a |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 774, 780",
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 1056, 1056",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | b |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 1056, 1056",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | b |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 527, 535",
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of terms of art in SS 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | b |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of terms of art in SS 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 774, 780",
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | a |
The requirement of the patent law that an invention or discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the language of 35 U.S.C. SS 101. A patent can be awarded to one who "invents or discovers" something within the enumerated classes of subject matter -- "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter." These terms may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of terms of art in SS 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose",
"sentence": "Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 USPQ at 7 (“[E]very discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.” (emphasis added)); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295-96 & n. 11, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1459-60 & n. 11 (Fed.Cir.1994) (use of terms of art in § 101 is presumed to be in accord with their well-established meaning); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (statutory provisions should be considered in light of the entire statute and purpose)."
} | 10,534,281 | a |
4. Any error resulting from the shackles and prison attire was harmless, because Kalilikane brought the shackles to the jury's attention; the district court instructed the jury to disregard Kalilikane's remarks concerning the shackles; Kalilikane chose to dress in prison attire; and there was overwhelming evidence of Kalilikane's guilt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1180, 1190",
"parenthetical": "The defendant \"must demonstrate actual prejudice to establish a constitutional violation.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.1995) (The defendant “must demonstrate actual prejudice to establish a constitutional violation.”) (citation omitted); see also Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir.2009) (“The law presumes that the jury follows the instructions given.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "562 F.3d 1200, 1209",
"parenthetical": "\"The law presumes that the jury follows the instructions given.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.1995) (The defendant “must demonstrate actual prejudice to establish a constitutional violation.”) (citation omitted); see also Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir.2009) (“The law presumes that the jury follows the instructions given.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,122,310 | a |
Sweeney states that after Brockington left F & W Sweeney discharged the firm in order to continue her attorney-client relationship with Brockington, Hinton, Butters, and Ponsoldt. Because F & W was discharged prior to the realization of the contingency, Sweeney argues that F & W should be relegated to quantum meruit recovery. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "906 F.2d 652, 652",
"parenthetical": "stating that rights under contingency fee contracts are governed by state law",
"sentence": "See also Zaklama, 906 F.2d at 652 (stating that rights under contingency fee contracts are governed by state law)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a discharged firm's recovery is limited to quantum meruit",
"sentence": "Myszka v. Henson & Henson, P.C., 170 Ga.App. 878, 318 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1984) (holding that a discharged firm’s recovery is limited to quantum meruit)."
} | 10,397 | b |
Sweeney states that after Brockington left F & W Sweeney discharged the firm in order to continue her attorney-client relationship with Brockington, Hinton, Butters, and Ponsoldt. Because F & W was discharged prior to the realization of the contingency, Sweeney argues that F & W should be relegated to quantum meruit recovery. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "318 S.E.2d 672, 673",
"parenthetical": "holding that a discharged firm's recovery is limited to quantum meruit",
"sentence": "Myszka v. Henson & Henson, P.C., 170 Ga.App. 878, 318 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1984) (holding that a discharged firm’s recovery is limited to quantum meruit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "906 F.2d 652, 652",
"parenthetical": "stating that rights under contingency fee contracts are governed by state law",
"sentence": "See also Zaklama, 906 F.2d at 652 (stating that rights under contingency fee contracts are governed by state law)."
} | 10,397 | a |
For example, in opinions also cited in Lowenfield, the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits established rules requiring deadlock instructions to direct both the minority and the majority to reconsider their views, to include an explanation that the jury may remain deadlocked and to remind the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard. Since Lowenfield, both of these courts have reversed convictions because the district court failed to address each of the required points. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 193, 197-98",
"parenthetical": "stating three elements that must be present in supplemental charge and affirming district court's order granting defendant a new trial because the court failed to convey adequately the second element of the charge, i.e., that \"a jury has the right to fail to agree\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 222 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Robinson, 953 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir.1992) (considering both the content of the instruction and its probable effect); see also United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 197-98 (1st Cir.1998) (stating three elements that must be present in supplemental charge and affirming district court's order granting defendant a new trial because the court failed to convey adequately the second element of the charge, i.e., that \"a jury has the right to fail to agree”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "953 F.2d 433, 436",
"parenthetical": "considering both the content of the instruction and its probable effect",
"sentence": "See United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 222 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Robinson, 953 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir.1992) (considering both the content of the instruction and its probable effect); see also United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 197-98 (1st Cir.1998) (stating three elements that must be present in supplemental charge and affirming district court's order granting defendant a new trial because the court failed to convey adequately the second element of the charge, i.e., that \"a jury has the right to fail to agree”)."
} | 1,094,449 | b |
The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3",
"sentence": "See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law",
"sentence": "Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law)."
} | 4,197,227 | a |
The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law",
"sentence": "Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3",
"sentence": "See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications."
} | 4,197,227 | b |
The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3",
"sentence": "See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255",
"parenthetical": "rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law",
"sentence": "Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law)."
} | 4,197,227 | a |
The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3",
"sentence": "See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law",
"sentence": "Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law)."
} | 4,197,227 | a |
The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law",
"sentence": "Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3",
"sentence": "See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications."
} | 4,197,227 | b |
The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255",
"parenthetical": "rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law",
"sentence": "Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3",
"sentence": "See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications."
} | 4,197,227 | b |
The government failed to establish that Garcia had any knowledge of the hidden compartment in the Altima. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "554 F.2d 179, 186",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he weakness lies in the circumstance that the evidence shows no contemporaneous knowledge or intent\" during the prior act",
"sentence": "See United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 186 (5th Cir.1977) (stating that “[t]he weakness lies in the circumstance that the evidence shows no contemporaneous knowledge or intent” during the prior act); see also Jimenez, 613 F.2d at 1376 (finding extrinsic evidence of prior possession where defendant denied knowledge of possession should not have been admitted because under the circumstances, “no reasonable jury could have found appellant guilty of the alleged cocaine possession”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 1376, 1376",
"parenthetical": "finding extrinsic evidence of prior possession where defendant denied knowledge of possession should not have been admitted because under the circumstances, \"no reasonable jury could have found appellant guilty of the alleged cocaine possession\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 186 (5th Cir.1977) (stating that “[t]he weakness lies in the circumstance that the evidence shows no contemporaneous knowledge or intent” during the prior act); see also Jimenez, 613 F.2d at 1376 (finding extrinsic evidence of prior possession where defendant denied knowledge of possession should not have been admitted because under the circumstances, “no reasonable jury could have found appellant guilty of the alleged cocaine possession”)."
} | 4,244,901 | a |
A property-rights approach also illuminates this important difference arid provides an analytical framework for harmonizing Booth, Lake, and the facts of this case. Unlike tenants in an apartment building, the residents of a single-family home have "the right of selecting ... guests or visitors" and a "legal right to exclude [people] from [the]' premises at any time and under all circumstances." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "178 S.W.3d 584, 587-88",
"parenthetical": "finding a defendant guilty of trespass when police found him on the front steps of someone else's residence and rejecting the defendant's assertion that he could not be guilty of trespass because the steps were presumptively open to the public",
"sentence": "See Booth, 670 N.W.2d at 212 n. 1. In other words, although Paye did not exercise her right to exclude or impede access, the fact she had that right.makes her front stairs more like the vehicle interior in Lake than the common areas and hallways at issue in Booth. See id.', Lake, 476 N.W.2d at 56; cf. State v. Mondaine, 178 S.W.3d 584, 587-88 (Mo.Ct.App.2005) (finding a defendant guilty of trespass when police found him on the front steps of someone else’s residence and rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he could not be guilty of trespass because the steps were presumptively open to the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 164, 176",
"parenthetical": "characterizing the right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property\"",
"sentence": "Rader v. Davis, 154 Iowa 306, 312-13, 134 N.W. 849, 851 (1912); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332, 344 (1979) (characterizing the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”). This important right to exclude persons from the property is a significant difference separating apartment houses and single-family homes."
} | 6,863,200 | b |
A property-rights approach also illuminates this important difference arid provides an analytical framework for harmonizing Booth, Lake, and the facts of this case. Unlike tenants in an apartment building, the residents of a single-family home have "the right of selecting ... guests or visitors" and a "legal right to exclude [people] from [the]' premises at any time and under all circumstances." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "100 S.Ct. 383, 391",
"parenthetical": "characterizing the right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property\"",
"sentence": "Rader v. Davis, 154 Iowa 306, 312-13, 134 N.W. 849, 851 (1912); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332, 344 (1979) (characterizing the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”). This important right to exclude persons from the property is a significant difference separating apartment houses and single-family homes."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "178 S.W.3d 584, 587-88",
"parenthetical": "finding a defendant guilty of trespass when police found him on the front steps of someone else's residence and rejecting the defendant's assertion that he could not be guilty of trespass because the steps were presumptively open to the public",
"sentence": "See Booth, 670 N.W.2d at 212 n. 1. In other words, although Paye did not exercise her right to exclude or impede access, the fact she had that right.makes her front stairs more like the vehicle interior in Lake than the common areas and hallways at issue in Booth. See id.', Lake, 476 N.W.2d at 56; cf. State v. Mondaine, 178 S.W.3d 584, 587-88 (Mo.Ct.App.2005) (finding a defendant guilty of trespass when police found him on the front steps of someone else’s residence and rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he could not be guilty of trespass because the steps were presumptively open to the public)."
} | 6,863,200 | a |
A property-rights approach also illuminates this important difference arid provides an analytical framework for harmonizing Booth, Lake, and the facts of this case. Unlike tenants in an apartment building, the residents of a single-family home have "the right of selecting ... guests or visitors" and a "legal right to exclude [people] from [the]' premises at any time and under all circumstances." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "178 S.W.3d 584, 587-88",
"parenthetical": "finding a defendant guilty of trespass when police found him on the front steps of someone else's residence and rejecting the defendant's assertion that he could not be guilty of trespass because the steps were presumptively open to the public",
"sentence": "See Booth, 670 N.W.2d at 212 n. 1. In other words, although Paye did not exercise her right to exclude or impede access, the fact she had that right.makes her front stairs more like the vehicle interior in Lake than the common areas and hallways at issue in Booth. See id.', Lake, 476 N.W.2d at 56; cf. State v. Mondaine, 178 S.W.3d 584, 587-88 (Mo.Ct.App.2005) (finding a defendant guilty of trespass when police found him on the front steps of someone else’s residence and rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he could not be guilty of trespass because the steps were presumptively open to the public)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "62 L.Ed.2d 332, 344",
"parenthetical": "characterizing the right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property\"",
"sentence": "Rader v. Davis, 154 Iowa 306, 312-13, 134 N.W. 849, 851 (1912); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332, 344 (1979) (characterizing the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”). This important right to exclude persons from the property is a significant difference separating apartment houses and single-family homes."
} | 6,863,200 | b |
Even assuming that Kamau demonstrated that his group is socially visible, he has not shown that he was persecuted "on account of' his membership in that group. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21",
"parenthetical": "noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "542 F.3d 738, 747",
"parenthetical": "\"These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.\"",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093."
} | 12,406,777 | a |
Even assuming that Kamau demonstrated that his group is socially visible, he has not shown that he was persecuted "on account of' his membership in that group. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "707 F.3d 1093, 1093",
"parenthetical": "\"These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.\"",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21",
"parenthetical": "noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground",
"sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093."
} | 12,406,777 | b |
See Admin. Record at 1198 (Kippley's September 18, 2009 email), 1268 (Rogers's affidavit). Thus, the evidence in this case distinguishes it from cases where a claimant relied on bare assertions, or where the record clearly disproved a claim of eligibility. See, e.g., Atrix Int'l Inc. v. Hartford Life Grp. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 489, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "finding administrator had uncovered \"overwhelming evidence\" that claimant was not working full-time",
"sentence": "Ins. Co., No. 06-4140, 2008 WL 151614, at *9 (D.Minn. Jan. 15, 2008) (affirming administrator’s denial where claimant stated he spent -30 hours per week “thinking and planning” for employer, despite total lack of evidence in support); see Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir.1996) (finding administrator had uncovered “overwhelming evidence” that claimant was not working full-time)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WL 151614, at *9",
"parenthetical": "affirming administrator's denial where claimant stated he spent -30 hours per week \"thinking and planning\" for employer, despite total lack of evidence in support",
"sentence": "Ins. Co., No. 06-4140, 2008 WL 151614, at *9 (D.Minn. Jan. 15, 2008) (affirming administrator’s denial where claimant stated he spent -30 hours per week “thinking and planning” for employer, despite total lack of evidence in support); see Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir.1996) (finding administrator had uncovered “overwhelming evidence” that claimant was not working full-time)."
} | 4,273,433 | b |
The State concedes that the trial court should not have based part of its ruling on allegations from the 2010 petition because it had been dismissed. But the State urges affirmance nonetheless because evidence related to the 2013 petition -- numerous discourteous text messages sent by Mr. Ardis -- independently supports the judgment and sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming a. defendant's convictions for burglary and other crimes despite an error in convicting on a nolle prossed kidnapping charge",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, 90 So.3d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (affirming a. defendant’s convictions for burglary and other crimes despite an error in convicting on a nolle prossed kidnapping charge); but see Freccacreto v. State, 291 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (finding that a guilty judgment on nolle prossed charges violates the state constitution and is fundamental error and remanding for entry of an appropriate sentence on the remaining conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "291 So.2d 630, 631",
"parenthetical": "finding that a guilty judgment on nolle prossed charges violates the state constitution and is fundamental error and remanding for entry of an appropriate sentence on the remaining conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, 90 So.3d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (affirming a. defendant’s convictions for burglary and other crimes despite an error in convicting on a nolle prossed kidnapping charge); but see Freccacreto v. State, 291 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (finding that a guilty judgment on nolle prossed charges violates the state constitution and is fundamental error and remanding for entry of an appropriate sentence on the remaining conviction)."
} | 6,872,780 | a |
. Gibson's counsel objected to the suspicion-less search condition. He did not identify laclc-of-notice as a basis for the objection, but he did not have an opportunity to do so. The government is therefore incorrect that our review should be limited to plain error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "582 F.3d 974, 981-82",
"parenthetical": "reviewing notice challenge for plain error where counsel was permitted to explain objection to condition of supervised release but identified only substantive objections",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir.2009) (”[T]he Rules do not require a defendant to force an objection or exception into the record.”); cf. United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing notice challenge for plain error where counsel was permitted to explain objection to condition of supervised release but identified only substantive objections)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 677, 686",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Rules do not require a defendant to force an objection or exception into the record.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir.2009) (”[T]he Rules do not require a defendant to force an objection or exception into the record.”); cf. United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing notice challenge for plain error where counsel was permitted to explain objection to condition of supervised release but identified only substantive objections)."
} | 4,270,233 | b |
Other jurisdictions have concluded likewise when discussing child support obligations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.E.2d 622, 630",
"parenthetical": "providing \"custodial and noncustodial parents are not 'similarly situated' since, after divorce, the custodial parent's responsibility for the child's support as well as care is general and plenary, while the noncustodial parent's responsibility is usually limited to the requirements of the support order\"",
"sentence": "See Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921, 929 (Alaska 1992) (stating that “the custodial and noncustodial parents are clearly not similarly situated for the purposes of child support”); see also Boris v. Blaisdell, 492 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ill. App. 1986) (providing “custodial and noncustodial parents are not ‘similarly situated’ since, after divorce, the custodial parent’s responsibility for the child’s support as well as care is general and plenary, while the noncustodial parent’s responsibility is usually limited to the requirements of the support order”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "836 P.2d 921, 929",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the custodial and noncustodial parents are clearly not similarly situated for the purposes of child support\"",
"sentence": "See Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921, 929 (Alaska 1992) (stating that “the custodial and noncustodial parents are clearly not similarly situated for the purposes of child support”); see also Boris v. Blaisdell, 492 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ill. App. 1986) (providing “custodial and noncustodial parents are not ‘similarly situated’ since, after divorce, the custodial parent’s responsibility for the child’s support as well as care is general and plenary, while the noncustodial parent’s responsibility is usually limited to the requirements of the support order”)."
} | 9,220,999 | b |
Although the arbitration in this case was conducted pursuant to Islamic law, judicial review of any arbitration award is limited to those matters where jurisdiction is statutorily granted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "216 Minn. 27, 33",
"parenthetical": "\"In the absence of statute ... the decisions of common-law arbitrators are not subject to judicial review and supervision.\"",
"sentence": "Univ. of Minn. v. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn.App.2003) (stating aggrieved school employee who choose to submit matter to arbitration is only entitled to limited judicial review under chapter 572), review denied (Minn. Jun. 17, 2003); see also Park Const. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27, 33, 11 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1943) (“In the absence of statute ... the decisions of common-law arbitrators are not subject to judicial review and supervision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "659 N.W.2d 300, 308",
"parenthetical": "stating aggrieved school employee who choose to submit matter to arbitration is only entitled to limited judicial review under chapter 572",
"sentence": "Univ. of Minn. v. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn.App.2003) (stating aggrieved school employee who choose to submit matter to arbitration is only entitled to limited judicial review under chapter 572), review denied (Minn. Jun. 17, 2003); see also Park Const. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27, 33, 11 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1943) (“In the absence of statute ... the decisions of common-law arbitrators are not subject to judicial review and supervision.”)."
} | 9,247,731 | b |
Although the arbitration in this case was conducted pursuant to Islamic law, judicial review of any arbitration award is limited to those matters where jurisdiction is statutorily granted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "11 N.W.2d 649, 653",
"parenthetical": "\"In the absence of statute ... the decisions of common-law arbitrators are not subject to judicial review and supervision.\"",
"sentence": "Univ. of Minn. v. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn.App.2003) (stating aggrieved school employee who choose to submit matter to arbitration is only entitled to limited judicial review under chapter 572), review denied (Minn. Jun. 17, 2003); see also Park Const. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27, 33, 11 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1943) (“In the absence of statute ... the decisions of common-law arbitrators are not subject to judicial review and supervision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "659 N.W.2d 300, 308",
"parenthetical": "stating aggrieved school employee who choose to submit matter to arbitration is only entitled to limited judicial review under chapter 572",
"sentence": "Univ. of Minn. v. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn.App.2003) (stating aggrieved school employee who choose to submit matter to arbitration is only entitled to limited judicial review under chapter 572), review denied (Minn. Jun. 17, 2003); see also Park Const. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27, 33, 11 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1943) (“In the absence of statute ... the decisions of common-law arbitrators are not subject to judicial review and supervision.”)."
} | 9,247,731 | b |
The record before this court does not establish that, when Vegas filed this action on November 22, 2013, that date was more than six-months from when Vegas knew that the union was not going to arbitrate his grievance. A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense with respect to which a defendant asserting the defense bears the burden of proof. See Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 398, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiffs claims accrued.\"",
"sentence": "Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2007) (“because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations period”); Tovar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir.1993) (“In every civil case, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.”); see also Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiffs claims accrued.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "495 F.3d 1119, 1122",
"parenthetical": "\"because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations period\"",
"sentence": "Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2007) (“because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations period”); Tovar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir.1993) (“In every civil case, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.”); see also Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiffs claims accrued.”)."
} | 4,223,548 | b |
The record before this court does not establish that, when Vegas filed this action on November 22, 2013, that date was more than six-months from when Vegas knew that the union was not going to arbitrate his grievance. A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense with respect to which a defendant asserting the defense bears the burden of proof. See Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 398, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiffs claims accrued.\"",
"sentence": "Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2007) (“because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations period”); Tovar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir.1993) (“In every civil case, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.”); see also Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiffs claims accrued.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 1271, 1284",
"parenthetical": "\"In every civil case, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.\"",
"sentence": "Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2007) (“because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations period”); Tovar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir.1993) (“In every civil case, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to each element of an affirmative defense.”); see also Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiffs claims accrued.”)."
} | 4,223,548 | b |
P 18 Although Solomon asserted this argument for the first time in his motion for reconsideration, we will consider it because the trial court allowed Hatch to respond and held oral argument on the motion before ruling. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 Ariz. 130, 132",
"parenthetical": "considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the \"prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond\"",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | 12,178,939 | a |
P 18 Although Solomon asserted this argument for the first time in his motion for reconsideration, we will consider it because the trial court allowed Hatch to respond and held oral argument on the motion before ruling. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 Ariz. 130, 132",
"parenthetical": "considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "235 P.3d 285, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the \"prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond\"",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | 12,178,939 | a |
P 18 Although Solomon asserted this argument for the first time in his motion for reconsideration, we will consider it because the trial court allowed Hatch to respond and held oral argument on the motion before ruling. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the \"prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond\"",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "822 P.2d 483, 485",
"parenthetical": "considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | 12,178,939 | b |
P 18 Although Solomon asserted this argument for the first time in his motion for reconsideration, we will consider it because the trial court allowed Hatch to respond and held oral argument on the motion before ruling. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "235 P.3d 285, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the \"prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond\"",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "822 P.2d 483, 485",
"parenthetical": "considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits",
"sentence": "See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 170 Ariz. 130, 132, 822 P.2d 483, 485 (App. 1991) (considering an argument raised for the first time on appeal because the trial court presumably considered the argument on its merits); cf. Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 225 Ariz. 132, 137-38, ¶ 18, 235 P.3d 285, 290-91 (App. 2010) (noting that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because the “prevailing party below is routinely deprived of the opportunity to fairly respond”) (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15, 159 P.3d 547, 550 (App. 2006))."
} | 12,178,939 | b |
We have, therefore, held that a settlement for fraud in the sale of securities from 1975 to 1979 "is not the same as the claim that [the defendant] defrauded customers in the sale, purchase, and repurchase of other securities" in later years. Similarly, we have held that suits over later breaches of contract, financial transactions, and ship voyages are not barred by claim preclusion, even if the plaintiffs previously brought suit over earlier instances of this same conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 811, 816",
"parenthetical": "prior action did not preclude later suit regarding breaches of contract that occurred subsequent to the filing of a prior suit",
"sentence": "See Prime Mgmt. Co. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir.1990) (prior action did not preclude later suit regarding breaches of contract that occurred subsequent to the filing of a prior suit); see also Greenberg, 968 F.2d at 168-70 (prior actions regarding earlier financial transactions did not preclude later suit over later financial transactions); Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir.1997) (prior suit regarding pilots’ fees in previous voyages did not preclude a subsequent suit regarding pilots’ rights in ocean voyages occurring after those underlying the first suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 168, 168-70",
"parenthetical": "prior actions regarding earlier financial transactions did not preclude later suit over later financial transactions",
"sentence": "See Prime Mgmt. Co. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir.1990) (prior action did not preclude later suit regarding breaches of contract that occurred subsequent to the filing of a prior suit); see also Greenberg, 968 F.2d at 168-70 (prior actions regarding earlier financial transactions did not preclude later suit over later financial transactions); Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir.1997) (prior suit regarding pilots’ fees in previous voyages did not preclude a subsequent suit regarding pilots’ rights in ocean voyages occurring after those underlying the first suit)."
} | 4,158,655 | a |
We have, therefore, held that a settlement for fraud in the sale of securities from 1975 to 1979 "is not the same as the claim that [the defendant] defrauded customers in the sale, purchase, and repurchase of other securities" in later years. Similarly, we have held that suits over later breaches of contract, financial transactions, and ship voyages are not barred by claim preclusion, even if the plaintiffs previously brought suit over earlier instances of this same conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "107 F.3d 86, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "prior suit regarding pilots' fees in previous voyages did not preclude a subsequent suit regarding pilots' rights in ocean voyages occurring after those underlying the first suit",
"sentence": "See Prime Mgmt. Co. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir.1990) (prior action did not preclude later suit regarding breaches of contract that occurred subsequent to the filing of a prior suit); see also Greenberg, 968 F.2d at 168-70 (prior actions regarding earlier financial transactions did not preclude later suit over later financial transactions); Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir.1997) (prior suit regarding pilots’ fees in previous voyages did not preclude a subsequent suit regarding pilots’ rights in ocean voyages occurring after those underlying the first suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 811, 816",
"parenthetical": "prior action did not preclude later suit regarding breaches of contract that occurred subsequent to the filing of a prior suit",
"sentence": "See Prime Mgmt. Co. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir.1990) (prior action did not preclude later suit regarding breaches of contract that occurred subsequent to the filing of a prior suit); see also Greenberg, 968 F.2d at 168-70 (prior actions regarding earlier financial transactions did not preclude later suit over later financial transactions); Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir.1997) (prior suit regarding pilots’ fees in previous voyages did not preclude a subsequent suit regarding pilots’ rights in ocean voyages occurring after those underlying the first suit)."
} | 4,158,655 | b |
It is uncontroverted that BNSF has sold Kessler's locomotive to a third party and that the purchaser is not before the court. Kessler's request for an injunction against the sale is therefore moot and accordingly beyond our jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 1072, 1077",
"parenthetical": "sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 149, 150",
"parenthetical": "\"an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant\"",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | 4,197,288 | b |
It is uncontroverted that BNSF has sold Kessler's locomotive to a third party and that the purchaser is not before the court. Kessler's request for an injunction against the sale is therefore moot and accordingly beyond our jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant\"",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 1072, 1077",
"parenthetical": "sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | 4,197,288 | a |
It is uncontroverted that BNSF has sold Kessler's locomotive to a third party and that the purchaser is not before the court. Kessler's request for an injunction against the sale is therefore moot and accordingly beyond our jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 1072, 1077",
"parenthetical": "sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant\"",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | 4,197,288 | b |
It is uncontroverted that BNSF has sold Kessler's locomotive to a third party and that the purchaser is not before the court. Kessler's request for an injunction against the sale is therefore moot and accordingly beyond our jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "210 F.2d 730, 731",
"parenthetical": "injunction filed to prevent \"a foreclosure sale of certain real estate\" dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 1072, 1077",
"parenthetical": "sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court",
"sentence": "See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (“an appeal should ... be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bunn v. Werner, 210 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C.Cir. 1954) (injunction filed to prevent “a foreclosure sale of certain real estate” dismissed as moot after foreclosure sale had taken place); cf. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1981) (sale does not moot an appeal where all parties including the purchaser are before the court)."
} | 4,197,288 | a |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "233 U.S. 202, 202",
"parenthetical": "deciding California constitutional provision does not permit \"assertion of an exclusive franchise\" and others may compete",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 Ariz. 114, 114",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | a |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "233 U.S. 202, 202",
"parenthetical": "deciding California constitutional provision does not permit \"assertion of an exclusive franchise\" and others may compete",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "644 P.2d 268, 268",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | a |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 Ariz. 114, 114",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deciding California constitutional provision does not permit \"assertion of an exclusive franchise\" and others may compete",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | b |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deciding California constitutional provision does not permit \"assertion of an exclusive franchise\" and others may compete",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "644 P.2d 268, 268",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | a |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 Ariz. 114, 114",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "92 Ariz. 100, 100",
"parenthetical": "concluding municipality could \"freely compete\" with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | b |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "92 Ariz. 100, 100",
"parenthetical": "concluding municipality could \"freely compete\" with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "644 P.2d 268, 268",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | a |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "373 P.2d 729, 729",
"parenthetical": "concluding municipality could \"freely compete\" with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "132 Ariz. 114, 114",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | a |
P 112 We agree with AECC, however, that the rights conferred by Article 15, Section 7 protect only a public service corporation's right to construct and operate lines to transmit and distribute electricity. Moreover, the provision does not confer any right to exclusively sell electricity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "644 P.2d 268, 268",
"parenthetical": "describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "373 P.2d 729, 729",
"parenthetical": "concluding municipality could \"freely compete\" with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition",
"sentence": "See Russell, 233 U.S. at 202, 34 S.Ct. 517 (deciding California constitutional provision does not permit “assertion of an exclusive franchise” and others may compete); City of Mesa, 92 Ariz. at 100, 373 P.2d at 729 (concluding municipality could “freely compete” with SRP to provide electricity but for legislative prohibition); see also Mountain States, 132 Ariz. at 114, 644 P.2d at 268 (describing regulated monopoly as creation of legislature rather than constitution)."
} | 75,277 | b |
The aim of a compensatory damages award in a section 1983 case is to put the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in if the constitutional tort had not occurred. It therefore follows logically that an employee who has a due process right to a pre-termination hearing and who is discharged without being given one would be entitled to back pay from the date of his discharge to the earliest date the discharge could have taken effect had the proper procedures been followed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 253, 253-54",
"parenthetical": "purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir.1988) (“All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.”) (emphasis in original); but see Simien, 809 F.2d at 258 (no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway",
"sentence": "See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir.1988) (“All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.”) (emphasis in original); but see Simien, 809 F.2d at 258 (no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway)."
} | 10,527,970 | a |
The aim of a compensatory damages award in a section 1983 case is to put the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in if the constitutional tort had not occurred. It therefore follows logically that an employee who has a due process right to a pre-termination hearing and who is discharged without being given one would be entitled to back pay from the date of his discharge to the earliest date the discharge could have taken effect had the proper procedures been followed. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway",
"sentence": "See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir.1988) (“All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.”) (emphasis in original); but see Simien, 809 F.2d at 258 (no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1046, 1046-47",
"parenthetical": "purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir.1988) (“All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.”) (emphasis in original); but see Simien, 809 F.2d at 258 (no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway)."
} | 10,527,970 | b |
The aim of a compensatory damages award in a section 1983 case is to put the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in if the constitutional tort had not occurred. It therefore follows logically that an employee who has a due process right to a pre-termination hearing and who is discharged without being given one would be entitled to back pay from the date of his discharge to the earliest date the discharge could have taken effect had the proper procedures been followed. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway",
"sentence": "See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir.1988) (“All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.”) (emphasis in original); but see Simien, 809 F.2d at 258 (no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "853 F.2d 1399, 1408",
"parenthetical": "\"All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.\"",
"sentence": "See Carey, 435 U.S. at 253-54, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate plaintiff for the injuries caused by the violation of his constitutional rights); Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir.1988) (“All [the employee] lost as a result of the constitutional violation was his salary between the day that [the employer] terminated him and the day on which his dismissal would have taken effect had [the employer] followed the prescribed procedures.”) (emphasis in original); but see Simien, 809 F.2d at 258 (no back pay can be awarded if the employee would have been fired anyway)."
} | 10,527,970 | b |
For the purposes of the instant motion, these complaints constitute protected activity under Title VII because, viewing the evidence in plaintiffs favor, it appears that plaintiff "had a good faith, reasonable belief that he was opposing an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII" when he lodged complaints regarding the purportedly hostile nature of his work environment. In addition, plaintiffs complaints clearly satisfy the "knowledge requirement" of the first prong of the prima facie standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 1170, 1178",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs internal complaints regarding co-workers' offensive comments satisfied the first prong of the prima facie standard",
"sentence": "Gordon v. New York Bd. of Edue., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2000) (“Neither [the Second Circuit] nor any other circuit has ever held that, to satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is necessary than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected activity.”); see also Reed v. AW. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir.1996) (finding that the plaintiffs internal complaints regarding co-workers’ offensive comments satisfied the first prong of the prima facie standard); Campbell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 1421(KMK) (HBP), 2006 WL 839001, at *11 (S.D.N.Y."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 F.3d 111, 116",
"parenthetical": "\"Neither [the Second Circuit] nor any other circuit has ever held that, to satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is necessary than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected activity.\"",
"sentence": "Gordon v. New York Bd. of Edue., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2000) (“Neither [the Second Circuit] nor any other circuit has ever held that, to satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is necessary than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected activity.”); see also Reed v. AW. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir.1996) (finding that the plaintiffs internal complaints regarding co-workers’ offensive comments satisfied the first prong of the prima facie standard); Campbell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 1421(KMK) (HBP), 2006 WL 839001, at *11 (S.D.N.Y."
} | 5,756,741 | b |
The fact that an action is taken with knowledge that it will cause a breach of contract does not suffice to show tor-tious interference with contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "765 N.E.2d 606, 617",
"parenthetical": "\"one does not induce a second party to breach a contract with a third party when one merely enters into an agreement with the second party with knowledge that the second party is unable to perform both contracts\"",
"sentence": "McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 617 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (“one does not induce a second party to breach a contract with a third party when one merely enters into an agreement with the second party with knowledge that the second party is unable to perform both contracts”); see also Indiana Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Cardinal Health Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.App.2002) (“[T]he mere fact that Cardinal hired Dr. Wolfe with knowledge that his employment would violate the Agreement’s non-compete clause does not amount to inducement of breach.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere fact that Cardinal hired Dr. Wolfe with knowledge that his employment would violate the Agreement's non-compete clause does not amount to inducement of breach.\"",
"sentence": "McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 617 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (“one does not induce a second party to breach a contract with a third party when one merely enters into an agreement with the second party with knowledge that the second party is unable to perform both contracts”); see also Indiana Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Cardinal Health Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.App.2002) (“[T]he mere fact that Cardinal hired Dr. Wolfe with knowledge that his employment would violate the Agreement’s non-compete clause does not amount to inducement of breach.”)."
} | 3,387,421 | a |
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