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Congress recently enacted a statute imposing severe criminal penalties on anyone engaged in trading in the stock market who, in the course of that trading, takes "unfair advantage" of other investors who are also trading in the stock market. The statute does not define the term "unfair advantage." There have been no prosecutions under this new statute. The members of an association of law school professors that is dedicated to increasing the clarity of the language used in criminal statutes believe that this statute is unconstitutionally vague. Neither the association nor any of its members is currently engaged in, or intends in the future to engage in, trading in the stock market. The association and its members bring suit against the Attorney General of the United States in a federal district court, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of this statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional. May the federal court determine the merits of this suit? | [
"Yes, because the suit involves a dispute over the constitutionality of a federal statute. ",
"Yes, because the plaintiffs seek real relief of a conclusive nature an injunction against enforcement of this statute. ",
"No, because the plaintiffs do not have an interest in the invalidation of this statute that is adequate to ensure that the suit presents an Article III controversy. ",
"No, because a suit for an injunction against enforcement of a criminal statute may not be brought in federal court at any time prior to a bona fide effort to enforce that statute."
] | 2C
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Rachel, an antique dealer and a skilled calligrapher, crafted a letter on very old paper. She included details that would lead knowledgeable readers to believe the letter had been written by Thomas Jefferson to a friend. Rachel, who had a facsimile of Jefferson's autograph, made the signature and other writing on the letter resemble Jefferson's. She knew that the letter would attract the attention of local collectors. When it did and she was contacted about selling it, she said that it had come into her hands from a foreign collector who wished anonymity, and that she could make no promises about its authenticity. As she had hoped, a collector paid her $5,000 for the letter. Later the collector discovered the letter was not authentic, and handwriting analysis established that Rachel had written the letter. In a jurisdiction that follows the common-law definition of forgery, Rachel has | [
"committed both forgery and false pretenses.",
"committed forgery, because she created a false document with the intent to defraud, but has not committed false pretenses, since she made no representation as to the authenticity of the document. ",
"not committed forgery, because the document had no apparent legal significance, but has committed false pretenses, since she misrepresented the source of the document. ",
"not committed forgery, because the document had no apparent legal significance, and has not committed false pretenses, since she made no representation as to authenticity of the document. "
] | 2C
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Mom rushed her eight-year-old daughter, Child, to the emergency room at Hospital after Child fell off her bicycle and hit her head on a sharp rock. The wound caused by the fall was extensive and bloody. Mom was permitted to remain in the treatment room, and held Child's hand while the emergency room physician cleaned and sutured the wound. During the procedure, Mom said that she was feeling faint and stood up to leave the room. While leaving the room, Mom fainted and, in falling, struck her head on a metal fixture that protruded from the emergency room wall. She sustained a serious injury as a consequence. If Mom sues Hospital to recover damages for her injury, will she prevail? | [
"Yes, because Mom was a public invitee of Hospital's. ",
"Yes, unless the fixture was an obvious, commonly used, and essential part of Hospital's equipment. ",
"No, unless Hospital's personnel failed to take reasonable steps to anticipate and prevent Mom's injury. ",
"No, because Hospital's personnel owed Mom no affirmative duty of care."
] | 2C
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Buyer, Inc., contracted in writing with Shareholder, who owned all of XYZ Corporation's outstanding stock, to purchase all of her stock at a specified price per share. At the time this contract was executed, Buyer's contracting officer said to Shareholder, "Of course, our commitment to buy is conditioned on our obtaining approval of the contract from Conglomerate, Ltd., our parent company." Shareholder replied, "Fine. No problem." Assume that Conglomerate orally approved the contract, but that Shareholder changed her mind and refused to consummate the sale on two grounds: (1) when the agreement was made there was no consideration for her promise to sell; and (2) Conglomerate's approval of the contract was invalid. If Buyer sues Shareholder for breach of contract, is Buyer likely to prevail? | [
"Yes, because Buyer's promise to buy, bargained for and made in exchange for Shareholder's promise to sell, was good consideration even though it was expressly conditioned on an event that was not certain to occur. ",
"Yes, because any possible lack of consideration for Shareholder's promise to sell was expressly waived by Shareholder when the agreement was made. ",
"No, because mutuality of obligation between the parties was lacking when the agreement was made. ",
"No, because the condition of Conglomerate's approval of the contract was an essential part of the agreed exchange and was not in a signed writing. "
] | 0A
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Buyer, Inc., contracted in writing with Shareholder, who owned all of XYZ Corporation's outstanding stock, to purchase all of her stock at a specified price per share. At the time this contract was executed, Buyer's contracting officer said to Shareholder, "Of course, our commitment to buy is conditioned on our obtaining approval of the contract from Conglomerate, Ltd., our parent company." Shareholder replied, "Fine. No problem." Assume the following facts. Shareholder subsequently refused to consummate the sale on the ground that Buyer had neglected to request Conglomerate's approval of the contract, which was true. Conglomerate's chief executive officer, however, is prepared to testify that Conglomerate would have routinely approved the contract if requested to do so. Buyer can also prove that it has made a substantial sale of other assets to finance the stock purchase, although it admittedly had not anticipated any such necessity when it entered into the stock purchase agreement. If Buyer sues Shareholder for breach of contract, is Buyer likely to prevail? | [
"Yes, because the condition of Conglomerate's approval of the contract, being designed to protect only Buyer and Conglomerate, can be and has been waived by those entities. ",
"Yes, because Buyer detrimentally relied on Shareholder's commitment by selling off other assets to finance the stock purchase. ",
"No, because the express condition of Conglomerate's approval had not occurred prior to the lawsuit. ",
"No, because obtaining Conglomerate's approval of the contract was an event within Buyer's control and Buyer's failure to obtain it was itself a material breach of contract."
] | 0A
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Buyer, Inc., contracted in writing with Shareholder, who owned all of XYZ Corporation's outstanding stock, to purchase all of her stock at a specified price per share. At the time this contract was executed, Buyer's contracting officer said to Shareholder, "Of course, our commitment to buy is conditioned on our obtaining approval of the contract from Conglomerate, Ltd., our parent company." Shareholder replied, "Fine. No problem." Assume the following facts. Shareholder is willing and ready to consummate the sale of her stock to Buyer, but the latter refuses to perform on the ground (which is true) that Conglomerate has firmly refused to approve the contract. If Shareholder sues Buyer for breach of contract and seeks to exclude any evidence of the oral condition requiring Conglomerate's approval, the court will probably | [
"admit the evidence as proof of a collateral agreement.",
"admit the evidence as proof of a condition to the existence of an enforceable obligation, and therefore not within the scope of the parol evidence rule. ",
"exclude the evidence on the basis of a finding that the parties' written agreement was a complete integration of their contract.",
"exclude the evidence as contradicting the terms of the parties' written agreement, whether or not the writing was a complete integration of the contract. "
] | 1B
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At Dove's trial for theft, Mr. Wong, called by the prosecutor, testified to the following: 1) that from his apartment window, he saw thieves across the street break the window of a jewelry store, take jewelry, and leave in a car; 2) that Mrs. Wong telephoned the police and relayed to them the license number of the thieves' car as Mr. Wong looked out the window with binoculars and read it to her; 3) that he has no present memory of the number, but that immediately afterward he listened to a playback of the police tape recording giving the license number (which belongs to Dove's car) and verified that she had relayed the number accurately. Playing the tape recording for the jury would be | [
"proper, because it is recorded recollection. ",
"proper, because it is a public record or report. ",
"improper, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"improper, because Mrs. Wong lacked firsthand knowledge of the license number."
] | 0A
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For ten years, Vacationer and Neighbor have owned summer vacation homes on adjoining lots. A stream flows through both lots. As a result of a childhood swimming accident, Vacationer is afraid of water and has never gone close to the stream. Neighbor built a dam on her property that has completely stopped the flow of the stream to Vacationer's property. In a suit by Vacationer against Neighbor, will Vacationer prevail? | [
"Yes, if the damming unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of Vacationer's property. ",
"Yes, if Neighbor intended to affect Vacationer's property. ",
"No, because Vacationer made no use of the stream. ",
"No, if the dam was built in conformity with all applicable laws. "
] | 0A
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Corp, a corporation, owned Blackacre in fee simple, as the real estate records showed. Corp entered into a valid written contract to convey Blackacre to Barbara, an individual. At closing, Barbara paid the price in full and received an instrument in the proper form of a deed, signed by duly authorized corporate officers on behalf of Corp, purporting to convey Blackacre to Barbara. Barbara did not then record the deed or take possession of Blackacre. Next, George (who had no knowledge of the contract or the deed) obtained a substantial money judgment against Corp. Then, Barbara recorded the deed from Corp. Thereafter, George properly filed the judgment against Corp. A statute of the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." Afterward, Barbara entered into a valid written contract to convey Blackacre to Polly. Polly objected to Barbara's title and refused to close. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "Unless the same be recorded according to law, no conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice." Barbara brought an appropriate action to require Polly to complete the purchase contract. The court should decide for | [
"Polly, because George's judgment was obtained before Barbara recorded the deed from Corp. ",
"Polly, because even though Corp's deed to Barbara prevented George's judgment from being a lien on Blackacre, George's filed judgment poses a threat of litigation. ",
"Barbara, because Barbara recorded her deed before George filed his judgment. ",
"Barbara, because Barbara received the deed from Corp before George filed his judgment."
] | 3D
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City enacted an ordinance banning from its public sidewalks all machines dispensing publications consisting wholly of commercial advertisements. The ordinance was enacted because of a concern about the adverse aesthetic effects of litter from publications distributed on the public sidewalks and streets. However, City continued to allow machines dispensing other types of publications on the public sidewalks. As a result of the City ordinance, 30 of the 300 sidewalk machines that were dispensing publications in City were removed. Is this City ordinance constitutional? | [
"Yes, because regulations of commercial speech are subject only to the requirement that they be rationally related to a legitimate state goal, and that requirement is satisfied here. ",
"Yes, because City has a compelling interest in protecting the aesthetics of its sidewalks and streets, and such a ban is necessary to vindicate this interest. ",
"No, because it does not constitute the least restrictive means with which to protect the aesthetics of City's sidewalks and streets. ",
"No, because there is not a reasonable fit between the legitimate interest of City in preserving the aesthetics of its sidewalks and streets and the means it chose to advance that interest. "
] | 3D
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Plaintiff's estate sued Defendant Stores claiming that Guard, one of Defendant's security personnel, wrongfully shot and killed Plaintiff when Plaintiff fled after being accused of shoplifting. Guard was convicted of manslaughter for killing Plaintiff. At his criminal trial Guard, who was no longer working for Defendant, testified that Defendant's security director had instructed him to stop shoplifters "at all costs." Because Guard's criminal conviction is on appeal, he refuses to testify at the civil trial. Plaintiff's estate then offers an authenticated transcript of Guard's criminal trial testimony concerning the instructions of Defendant's security director. This evidence is | [
"admissible as a statement of an agent of a party-opponent.",
"admissible, because the instruction from the security director is not hearsay. ",
"admissible, although hearsay, as former testimony. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception."
] | 3D
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Mrs. Pence sued Duarte for shooting her husband from ambush. Mrs. Pence offers to testify that, the day before her husband was killed, he described to her a chance meeting with Duarte on the street in which Duarte said, "I'm going to blow your head off one of these days." The witness's testimony concerning her husband's statement is | [
"admissible, to show Duarte's state of mind. ",
"admissible, because Duarte's statement is that of a party-opponent. ",
"inadmissible, because it is improper evidence of a prior bad act. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. "
] | 3D
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The state of Brunswick enacted a statute providing for the closure of the official state records of arrest and prosecution of all persons acquitted of a crime by a court or against whom criminal charges were filed and subsequently dropped or dismissed. The purpose of this statute is to protect these persons from further publicity or embarrassment relating to those state proceedings. However, this statute does not prohibit the publication of such information that is in the possession of private persons. A prominent businessman in Neosho City in Brunswick was arrested and charged with rape. Prior to trial, the prosecutor announced that new information indicated that the charges should be dropped. He then dropped the charges without further explanation, and the records relating thereto were closed to the public pursuant to the Brunswick statute. The Neosho City Times conducted an investigation to determine why the businessman was not prosecuted, but was refused access to the closed official state records. In an effort to determine whether the law enforcement agencies involved were properly doing their duty, the Times filed suit against appropriate state officials to force opening of the records and to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds. Which of the following would be most helpful to the state in defending the constitutionality of this statute? | [
"The fact that the statute treats in an identical manner the arrest and prosecution records of all persons who have been acquitted of a crime by a court or against whom criminal charges were filed and subsequently dropped or dismissed.",
"The argument that the rights of the press are no greater than those of citizens generally.",
"The fact that the statute only prohibits public access to these official state records and does not prohibit the publication of information they contain that is in the possession of private persons.",
"The argument that the state may seal official records owned by the state on any basis its legislature chooses."
] | 2C
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Nora, executive director of an equal housing opportunity organization, was the leader of a sit-in at the offices of a real estate management company. The protest was designed to call attention to the company's racially discriminatory rental practices. When police demanded that Nora desist from trespassing on the company's property, she refused and was arrested. In Nora's trial for trespass, the prosecution peremptorily excused all nonwhites from the jury, arguing to the court that even though Nora was white, minority groups would automatically support Nora because of her fight against racism in housing accommodations. If Nora is convicted of trespass by an all-white jury and appeals, claiming a violation of her constitutional rights, the court should | [
"affirm the conviction, because Nora was not a member of the class discriminated against. ",
"affirm the conviction, because peremptory challenge of the nonwhites did not deny Nora the right to an impartial jury. ",
"reverse the conviction, because racially based peremptory challenges violate equal protection of the law. ",
"reverse the conviction, because Nora was denied the right to have her case heard by a fair cross section of the community. "
] | 2C
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Arthur's estate plan included a revocable trust established 35 years ago with ABC Bank as trustee. The principal asset of the trust has always been Blackacre, a very profitable, debt-free office building. The trust instrument instructs the trustee to pay the net income to Arthur for life, and, after the death of Arthur, to pay the net income to his wife, Alice, for life; and, after her death, "to distribute the net trust estate as she may appoint by will, or in default of her exercise of this power of appointment, to my son (her stepson), Charles." Arthur died 30 years ago survived by Alice and Charles. Arthur had not revoked or amended the trust agreement. A few years after Arthur's death, Alice remarried; she then had a child, Marie; was widowed for a second time; and, last year, died. Her will contained only one dispositive provision: "I give my entire estate to my daughter, Marie, and I intentionally make no provision for my stepson, Charles." Marie is now 22 years old. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified by statute in the jurisdiction. There are no other applicable statutes. Charles brought an appropriate action against Marie to determine who was entitled to the net trust estate and thus to Blackacre. If the court rules for Marie, it will be because | [
"Alice's life estate and general power of appointment merge into complete ownership in Alice.",
"the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to general powers of appointment.",
"the jurisdiction deems \"entire estate\" to be a reference to Blackacre or to Alice's general power of appointment. ",
"Alice intended that Charles should not benefit by reason of her death."
] | 2C
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Tenant rented a commercial building from Landlord, and operated a business in it. The building's large front window was smashed by vandals six months before expiration of the Tenant-Landlord lease. Tenant, who was obligated thereunder to effect and pay for repairs in such cases, promptly contracted with Glazier to replace the window for $2,000, due 30 days after satisfactory completion of the work. Landlord was then unaware of the Tenant-Glazier contract. Glazier was aware that the building was under lease, but dealt entirely with Tenant. Sixty days after Glazier's satisfactory completion of the window replacement, and prior to the expiration of Tenant's lease, Tenant, then insolvent, ceased doing business and vacated the building. In so doing, Tenant forfeited under the lease provisions its right to the return of a $2,000 security deposit with Landlord. The deposit had been required, however, for the express purpose (as stated in the lease) of covering any damage to the leased property except ordinary wear and tear. The only such damage occurring during Tenant's occupancy was the smashed window. Glazier's $2,000 bill for the window replacement is wholly unpaid. Assuming that Glazier has no remedy quasi in rem under the relevant state mechanic's lien statute, which of the following would provide Glazier's best chance of an effective remedy in personam against Landlord? | [
"An action in quasi contract for the reasonable value of a benefit unofficiously and non-gratuitously conferred on Landlord.",
"An action based on promissory estoppel.",
"An action based on an implied-in-fact contract.",
"An action as third-party intended beneficiary of the Tenant-Landlord lease."
] | 0A
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Tenant rented a commercial building from Landlord, and operated a business in it. The building's large front window was smashed by vandals six months before expiration of the Tenant-Landlord lease. Tenant, who was obligated thereunder to effect and pay for repairs in such cases, promptly contracted with Glazier to replace the window for $2,000, due 30 days after satisfactory completion of the work. Landlord was then unaware of the Tenant-Glazier contract. Glazier was aware that the building was under lease, but dealt entirely with Tenant. Sixty days after Glazier's satisfactory completion of the window replacement, and prior to the expiration of Tenant's lease, Tenant, then insolvent, ceased doing business and vacated the building. In so doing, Tenant forfeited under the lease provisions its right to the return of a $2,000 security deposit with Landlord. The deposit had been required, however, for the express purpose (as stated in the lease) of covering any damage to the leased property except ordinary wear and tear. The only such damage occurring during Tenant's occupancy was the smashed window. Glazier's $2,000 bill for the window replacement is wholly unpaid. Assume the following facts. Upon vacating the building, Tenant mailed a $1,000 check to Glazier bearing on its face the following conspicuous notation: "This check is in full and final satisfaction of your $2,000 window replacement bill." Without noticing this notation, Glazier cashed the check and now sues Tenant for the $1,000 difference. If Tenant's only defense is accord and satisfaction, is Tenant likely to prevail? | [
"No, because Glazier failed to notice Tenant's notation on the check. ",
"No, because the amount owed by Tenant to Glazier was liquidated and undisputed. ",
"Yes, because by cashing the check Glazier impliedly agreed to accept the $1,000 as full payment of its claim. ",
"Yes, because Glazier failed to write a reservation-of-rights notation on the check before cashing it."
] | 1B
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Defendant is on trial for robbing a bank in State A. She testified that she was in State B at the time of the robbery. Defendant calls her friend, Witness, to testify that two days before the robbery Defendant told him that she was going to spend the next three days in State B. Witness's testimony is | [
"admissible, because the statement falls within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. ",
"admissible, because a statement of plans falls within the hearsay exception for then-existing state of mind. ",
"inadmissible, because it is offered to establish an alibi by Defendant's own statement. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. "
] | 1B
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The legislature of State X is debating reforms in the law governing insanity. Two reforms have been proposed. Proposal A would eliminate the insanity defense altogether. Proposal B would retain the defense but place on the defendant the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Opponents of the reforms argue that the proposals would be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Which of the proposed reforms would be unconstitutional? | [
"Both proposals.",
"Neither proposal.",
"Proposal A only.",
"Proposal B only."
] | 1B
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A federal statute appropriated $7 million for a nationwide essay contest on "How the United States Can Best Stop Drug Abuse." The statute indicates that its purpose is to generate new, practical ideas for eliminating drug abuse in the United States. Contest rules set forth in the statute provide that winning essays are to be selected on the basis of the "originality, aptness, and feasibility of their ideas." The statute expressly authorizes a first prize of $1 million, 50 second prizes of $100,000 each, and 100 third prizes of $10,000 each. It also states that judges for the contest are to be appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate, and that all residents of the United States who are not employees of the federal government are eligible to enter and win the contest. A provision of the statute authorizes any taxpayer of the United States to challenge its constitutionality. In a suit by a federal taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, the court should | [
"refuse to decide its merits, because the suit involves policy questions that are inherently political and, therefore, nonjusticiable. ",
"hold the statute unconstitutional, because it does not provide sufficient guidelines for awarding the prize money appropriated by Congress and, therefore, unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the contest judges. ",
"hold the statute unconstitutional, because its relationship to legitimate purposes of the spending power of Congress is too tenuous and conjectural to satisfy the necessary and proper clause of Article I. ",
"hold the statute constitutional, because it is reasonably related to the general welfare, it states concrete objectives, and it provides adequate criteria for conducting the essay contest and awarding the prize money."
] | 3D
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Fran, who was driving at an excessive speed, applied her brakes to stop at a traffic light. Due to damp, fallen leaves, her car skidded and came to a halt perpendicular to the roadway. Sid, who was also driving at an excessive speed and was immediately behind Fran, saw Fran's car perpendicular to the roadway. Although Sid had sufficient distance to come to a slow, controlled stop, he decided not to slow down but, rather, to swerve to the left in an effort to go around Fran's car. Due to oncoming traffic, the space was insufficient and Sid's car collided with Fran's car, severely injuring Fran. Fran filed a personal injury action against Sid in a jurisdiction in which contributory negligence is a bar to recovery. Will Fran prevail? | [
"Yes, if the jury finds that Sid was more than 50% at fault. ",
"Yes, if the jury finds that Sid had the last clear chance. ",
"No, if the jury finds that Fran's conduct was in any way a legal cause of the accident. ",
"No, if the jury finds that, in speeding, Fran assumed the risk. "
] | 1B
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Sal owned five adjoining rectangular lots, numbered 1 through 5 inclusive, all fronting on Main Street. All of the lots are in a zone limited to one- and two-family residences under the zoning ordinance. Two years ago, Sal conveyed Lots 1, 3, and 5. None of the three deeds contained any restrictions. Each of the new owners built a one-family residence. One year ago, Sal conveyed Lot 2 to Peter. The deed provided that each of Peter and Sal, their respective heirs and assigns, would use Lots 2 and 4 respectively only for one-family residential purposes. The deed was promptly and properly recorded. Peter built a one-family residence on Lot 2. Last month, Sal conveyed Lot 4 to Betty. The deed contained no restrictions. The deed from Sal to Peter was in the title report examined by Betty's lawyer. Betty obtained a building permit and commenced construction of a twofamily residence on Lot 4. Peter, joined by the owners of Lots 1, 3, and 5, brought an appropriate action against Betty to enjoin the proposed use of Lot 4, or, alternatively, damages caused by Betty's breach of covenant. Which is the most appropriate comment concerning the outcome of this action? | [
"All plaintiffs should be awarded their requested judgment for injunction because there was a common development scheme, but award of damages should be denied to all. ",
"Peter should be awarded appropriate remedy, but recovery by the other plaintiffs is doubtful. ",
"Injunction should be denied, but damages should be awarded to all plaintiffs, measured by diminution of market value, if any, suffered as a result of the proximity of Betty's two-family residence. ",
"All plaintiffs should be denied any recovery or relief because the zoning preempts any private scheme of covenants."
] | 1B
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Kelly County, in the state of Green, is located adjacent to the border of the state of Red. The communities located in Kelly County are principally suburbs of Scarletville, a large city located in Red, and therefore there is a large volume of traffic between that city and Kelly County. While most of that traffic is by private passenger automobiles, some of it is by taxicabs and other kinds of commercial vehicles. An ordinance of Kelly County, the stated purpose of which is to reduce traffic congestion, provides that only taxicabs registered in Kelly County may pick up or discharge passengers in the county. The ordinance also provides that only residents of Kelly County may register taxicabs in that county. Which of the following is the proper result in a suit brought by Scarletville taxicab owners challenging the constitutionality of this Kelly County ordinance? | [
"Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the fact that private passenger automobiles contribute more to the traffic congestion problem in Kelly County than do taxicabs indicates that the ordinance is not a reasonable means by which to solve that problem. ",
"Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the ordinance unduly burdens interstate commerce by insulating Kelly County taxicab owners from out-ofstate competition without adequate justification. ",
"Judgment for Kelly County, because the ordinance forbids taxicabs registered in other counties of Green as well as in states other than Green to operate in Kelly County and, therefore, it does not discriminate against interstate commerce. ",
"Judgment for Kelly County, because Scarletville taxicab owners do not constitute a suspect class and the ordinance is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose of reducing traffic congestion. "
] | 1B
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Paul sued Donna for breach of contract. Paul's position was that Joan, whom he understood to be Donna's agent, said: "On behalf of Donna, I accept your offer." Donna asserted that Joan had no actual or apparent authority to accept the offer on Donna's behalf. Paul's testimony concerning Joan's statement is | [
"admissible, provided the court first finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Joan had actual or apparent authority to act for Donna. ",
"admissible, upon or subject to introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding by the jury that Joan had actual or apparent authority to act for Donna. ",
"inadmissible, if Joan does not testify and her absence is not excused. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception."
] | 1B
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A city ordinance requires a taxicab operator's license to operate a taxicab in King City. The ordinance states that the sole criteria for the issuance of such a license are driving ability and knowledge of the geography of King City. An applicant is tested by the city for these qualifications with a detailed questionnaire, written and oral examinations, and a practical behind-the-wheel demonstration. The ordinance does not limit the number of licenses that may be issued. It does, however, allow any citizen to file an objection to the issuance of a particular license, but only on the ground that an applicant does not possess the required qualifications. City licensing officials are also authorized by the ordinance to determine, in their discretion, whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on an objection before issuing a license. Sandy applies for a taxicab operator's license and is found to be fully qualified after completing the usual licensing process. Her name is then posted as a prospective licensee, subject only to the objection process. John, a licensed taxicab driver, files an objection to the issuance of such a license to Sandy solely on the ground that the grant of a license to Sandy would impair the value of John's existing license. John demands a hearing before a license is issued to Sandy so that he may have an opportunity to prove his claim. City licensing officials refuse to hold such a hearing, and they issue a license to Sandy. John petitions for review of this action by city officials in an appropriate court, alleging that the Constitution requires city licensing officials to grant his request for a hearing before issuing a license to Sandy. In this case, the court should rule for | [
"John, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires all persons whose property may be adversely affected by governmental action to be given an opportunity for a hearing before such action occurs. ",
"John, because the determination of whether to hold a hearing may not constitutionally be left to the discretion of the same officials whose action is being challenged. ",
"city officials, because John had the benefit of the licensing ordinance and, therefore, may not now question actions taken under it. ",
"city officials, because the licensing ordinance does not give John any property interest in being free of competition from additional licensees. "
] | 3D
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Homer lived on the second floor of a small convenience store/gas station that he owned. One night he refused to sell Augie a sixpack of beer after hours, saying he could not violate the state laws. Augie became enraged and deliberately drove his car into one of the gasoline pumps, severing it from its base. There was an ensuing explosion causing a ball of fire to go from the underground gasoline tank into the building. As a result, the building burned to the ground and Homer was killed. In a common-law jurisdiction, if Augie is charged with murder and arson, he should be | [
"convicted of both offenses.",
"convicted of involuntary manslaughter and acquitted of arson.",
"convicted of arson and involuntary manslaughter.",
"acquitted of both offenses."
] | 0A
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Bye Bye telegraphed Vendor on June 1, "At what price will you sell 100 of your QTModel garbage-disposal units for delivery around June 10?" Thereafter, the following communications were exchanged: 1. Telegram from Vendor received by Bye Bye on June 2: "You're in luck. We have only 100 QT's, all on clearance at 50% off usual wholesale of $120 per unit, for delivery at our shipping platform on June 12." 2. Letter from Bye Bye received in U.S. mail by Vendor on June 5: "I accept. Would prefer to pay in full 30 days after invoice." 3. Telegram from Vendor received by Bye Bye on June 6: "You must pick up at our platform and pay C.O.D." 4. Letter from Bye Bye received in U.S. mail by Vendor on June 9: "I don't deal with people who can't accommodate our simple requests." 5. Telegram from Bye Bye received by Vendor on June 10, after Vendor had sold and delivered all 100 of the QT's to another buyer earlier that day: "Okay. I'm over a barrel and will pick up the goods on your terms June 12." Bye Bye now sues Vendor for breach of contract. Which of the following arguments will best serve Vendor's defense? | [
"Vendor's telegram received on June 2 was merely a price quotation, not an offer. ",
"Bye Bye's letter received on June 5 was not an acceptance because it varied the terms of Vendor's initial telegram.",
"Bye Bye's use of the mails in response to Vendor's initial telegram was an ineffective method of acceptance.",
"Bye Bye's letter received on June 9 was an unequivocal refusal to perform that excused Vendor even if the parties had previously formed a contract."
] | 3D
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At a party, Diane and Victor agreed to play a game they called "spin the barrel." Victor took an unloaded revolver, placed one bullet in the barrel, and spun the barrel. Victor then pointed the gun at Diane's head and pulled the trigger once. The gun did not fire. Diane then took the gun, pointed it at Victor, spun the barrel, and pulled the trigger once. The gun fired, and Victor fell over dead. A statute in the jurisdiction defines murder in the first degree as an intentional and premeditated killing or one occurring during the commission of a common-law felony, and murder in the second degree as all other murder at common law. Manslaughter is defined as a killing in the heat of passion upon an adequate legal provocation or a killing caused by gross negligence. The most serious crime for which Diane can properly be convicted is | [
"murder in the first degree, because the killing was intentional and premeditated and, in any event, occurred during commission of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon. ",
"murder in the second degree, because Diane's act posed a great threat of serious bodily harm. ",
"manslaughter, because Diane's act was grossly negligent and reckless. ",
"no crime, because Victor and Diane voluntarily agreed to play a game and each assumed the risk of death."
] | 1B
|
|
Abel owned Blackacre in fee simple. Three years ago, Abel and Betty agreed to a monthto-month tenancy with Betty paying Abel rent each month. After six months of Betty's occupancy, Abel suggested to Betty that she could buy Blackacre for a monthly payment of no more than her rent. Abel and Betty orally agreed that Betty would pay $25,000 in cash, the annual real estate taxes, the annual fire insurance premiums, and the costs of maintaining Blackacre, plus the monthly mortgage payments that Abel owed on Blackacre. They further orally agreed that within six years Betty could pay whatever mortgage balances were then due and Abel would give her a warranty deed to the property. Betty's average monthly payments did turn out to be about the same as her monthly rent. Betty fully complied with all of the obligations she had undertaken. She made some structural modifications to Blackacre. Blackacre is now worth 50% more than it was when Abel and Betty made their oral agreement. Betty made her financing arrangements and was ready to complete the purchase of Blackacre, but Abel refused to close. Betty brought an appropriate action for specific performance against Abel to enforce the agreement. The court should rule for | [
"Abel, because the agreements were oral and violated the statute of frauds. ",
"Abel, subject to the return of the $25,000, because the arrangement was still a tenancy. ",
"Betty, because the doctrine of part performance applies. ",
"Betty, because the statute of frauds does not apply to oral purchase and sale agreements between landlords and tenants in possession. "
] | 2C
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|
A statute of State X permits a person's name to appear on the general election ballot as a candidate for statewide public office if the person pays a $100 filing fee and provides proof from the State Elections Board that he or she was nominated in the immediately preceding primary election by one of the state's two major political parties. It also permits the name of an independent candidate or a candidate of a smaller party to appear on the general election ballot if that person pays a filing fee of $1,000, and submits petitions signed by at least 3% of the voters who actually cast ballots for the office of governor in the last State X election. State X maintains that these filing requirements are necessary to limit the size of the election ballot, to eliminate frivolous candidacies, and to help finance the high cost of elections. Historically, very few of State X's voters who are members of racial minority groups have been members of either of the two major political parties. Recently, a new political party has been formed by some of these voters. Which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to the new political party as a basis for attacking the constitutionality of this statute of State X? | [
"The First Amendment.",
"The Thirteenth Amendment.",
"The Fourteenth Amendment.",
"The Fifteenth Amendment."
] | 2C
|
|
Defendant is on trial for the murder of his father. Defendant's defense is that he shot his father accidentally. The prosecutor calls Witness, a police officer, to testify that on two occasions in the year prior to this incident, he had been called to Defendant's home because of complaints of loud arguments between Defendant and his father, and had found it necessary to stop Defendant from beating his father. The evidence is | [
"inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence. ",
"inadmissible, because Witness lacks firsthand knowledge of who started the quarrels. ",
"admissible to show that Defendant killed his father intentionally.",
"admissible to show that Defendant is a violent person."
] | 2C
|
|
Alex and Brenda owned in fee simple Greenacre as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest. Alex and Brenda joined in mortgaging Greenacre to Marge by a properly recorded mortgage that contained a general warranty clause. Alex became disenchanted with land-owning and notified Brenda that he would no longer contribute to the payment of installments due Marge. After the mortgage was in default and Marge made demand for payment of the entire amount of principal and interest due, Brenda tendered to Marge, and Marge deposited, a check for one-half of the amount due Marge. Brenda then demanded a release of Brenda's undivided one-half interest. Marge refused to release any interest in Greenacre. Brenda promptly brought an action against Marge to quiet title to an undivided one-half interest in Greenacre. In such action, Brenda should | [
"lose, because Marge's title had been warranted by an express provision of the mortgage. ",
"lose, because there was no redemption from the mortgage. ",
"win, because Brenda is entitled to marshalling. ",
"win, because the cotenancy of the mortgagors was in common and not joint."
] | 1B
|
|
The police had, over time, accumulated reliable information that Jason operated a large cocainedistribution network, that he and his accomplices often resorted to violence, and that they kept a small arsenal of weapons in his home. One day, the police received reliable information that a large brown suitcase with leather straps containing a supply of cocaine had been delivered to Jason's home and that it would be moved to a distribution point the next morning. The police obtained a valid search warrant to search for and seize the brown suitcase and the cocaine and went to Jason's house. The police knocked on Jason's door and called out, "Police. Open up. We have a search warrant." After a few seconds with no response, the police forced the door open and entered. Hearing noises in the basement, the police ran down there and found Jason with a large brown suitcase with leather straps. They seized the suitcase and put handcuffs on Jason. A search of his person revealed a switchblade knife and a .45-caliber pistol. Jason cursed the police and said, "You never would have caught me with the stuff if it hadn't been for that lousy snitch Harvey!" The police then fanned out through the house, looking in every room and closet. They found no one else, but one officer found an Uzi automatic weapon in a box on a closet shelf in Jason's bedroom. In addition to charges relating to the cocaine in the suitcase, Jason is charged with unlawful possession of weapons. Jason moves pretrial to suppress the use as evidence of the weapons seized by the police and of the statement he made. As to the switchblade knife and the .45-caliber pistol, Jason's motion to suppress should be | [
"granted, because the search and seizure were the result of illegal police conduct in executing the search warrant. ",
"granted, because the police did not inform Jason that he was under arrest and did not read him his Miranda rights. ",
"denied, because the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest. ",
"denied, because the police had reasonable grounds to believe that there were weapons in the house. "
] | 2C
|
|
The police had, over time, accumulated reliable information that Jason operated a large cocainedistribution network, that he and his accomplices often resorted to violence, and that they kept a small arsenal of weapons in his home. One day, the police received reliable information that a large brown suitcase with leather straps containing a supply of cocaine had been delivered to Jason's home and that it would be moved to a distribution point the next morning. The police obtained a valid search warrant to search for and seize the brown suitcase and the cocaine and went to Jason's house. The police knocked on Jason's door and called out, "Police. Open up. We have a search warrant." After a few seconds with no response, the police forced the door open and entered. Hearing noises in the basement, the police ran down there and found Jason with a large brown suitcase with leather straps. They seized the suitcase and put handcuffs on Jason. A search of his person revealed a switchblade knife and a .45-caliber pistol. Jason cursed the police and said, "You never would have caught me with the stuff if it hadn't been for that lousy snitch Harvey!" The police then fanned out through the house, looking in every room and closet. They found no one else, but one officer found an Uzi automatic weapon in a box on a closet shelf in Jason's bedroom. In addition to charges relating to the cocaine in the suitcase, Jason is charged with unlawful possession of weapons. Jason moves pretrial to suppress the use as evidence of the weapons seized by the police and of the statement he made. As to Jason's statement, his motion to suppress should be | [
"granted, because the entry by forcing open the door was not reasonable. ",
"granted, because the police failed to read Jason his Miranda rights. ",
"denied, because the statement was volunteered. ",
"denied, because the statement was the product of a lawful public safety search. "
] | 2C
|
|
The police had, over time, accumulated reliable information that Jason operated a large cocainedistribution network, that he and his accomplices often resorted to violence, and that they kept a small arsenal of weapons in his home. One day, the police received reliable information that a large brown suitcase with leather straps containing a supply of cocaine had been delivered to Jason's home and that it would be moved to a distribution point the next morning. The police obtained a valid search warrant to search for and seize the brown suitcase and the cocaine and went to Jason's house. The police knocked on Jason's door and called out, "Police. Open up. We have a search warrant." After a few seconds with no response, the police forced the door open and entered. Hearing noises in the basement, the police ran down there and found Jason with a large brown suitcase with leather straps. They seized the suitcase and put handcuffs on Jason. A search of his person revealed a switchblade knife and a .45-caliber pistol. Jason cursed the police and said, "You never would have caught me with the stuff if it hadn't been for that lousy snitch Harvey!" The police then fanned out through the house, looking in every room and closet. They found no one else, but one officer found an Uzi automatic weapon in a box on a closet shelf in Jason's bedroom. In addition to charges relating to the cocaine in the suitcase, Jason is charged with unlawful possession of weapons. Jason moves pretrial to suppress the use as evidence of the weapons seized by the police and of the statement he made. As to the Uzi automatic weapon, Jason's motion to suppress should be | [
"granted, because the search exceeded the scope needed to find out if other persons were present. ",
"granted, because once the object of the warrant the brown suitcase had been found and seized, no further search of the house is permitted. ",
"denied, because the police were lawfully in the bedroom and the weapon was immediately identifiable as being subject to seizure. ",
"denied, because the police were lawfully in the house and had probable cause to believe that weapons were in the house."
] | 0A
|
|
Plaintiff is suing Doctor for medical malpractice occasioned by allegedly prescribing an incorrect medication, causing Plaintiff to undergo substantial hospitalization. When Doctor learned of the medication problem, she immediately offered to pay Plaintiff's hospital expenses. At trial, Plaintiff offers evidence of Doctor's offer to pay the costs of his hospitalization. The evidence of Doctor's offer is | [
"admissible as a nonhearsay statement of a party.",
"admissible, although hearsay, as a statement against interest. ",
"inadmissible, because it is an offer to pay medical expenses. ",
"inadmissible, because it is an offer to compromise. "
] | 2C
|
|
Sam and two of his friends were members of a teenage street gang. While they were returning from a dance late one evening, their car collided with a car driven by an elderly woman. After an argument, Sam attacked the elderly woman with his fists and beat her to death. Sam's two friends watched, and when they saw the woman fall to the ground they urged Sam to flee. Sam was eventually apprehended and tried for manslaughter, but the jury could not decide on a verdict. If Sam's companions are subsequently tried as accomplices to manslaughter, they should be | [
"acquitted, because Sam was not convicted of the offense. ",
"acquitted, because they did not assist or encourage Sam to commit the crime. ",
"convicted, because they urged him to flee. ",
"convicted, because they made no effort to intervene. "
] | 1B
|
|
Employer retained Doctor to evaluate medical records of prospective employees. Doctor informed Employer that Applicant, a prospective employee, suffered from AIDS. Employer informed Applicant of this and declined to hire her. Applicant was shocked by this news and suffered a heart attack as a result. Subsequent tests revealed that Applicant in fact did not have AIDS. Doctor had negligently confused Applicant's file with that of another prospective employee. If Applicant sued Doctor for damages, on which of the following causes of action would Applicant recover? I. Invasion of privacy. II. Negligent misrepresentation. III. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. | [
"III only.",
"I and II only.",
"II and III only.",
"I, II, and III."
] | 0A
|
|
Gourmet, a famous chef, entered into a written agreement with his friend Deligor, a well-known interior decorator respected for his unique designs, in which Deligor agreed, for a fixed fee, to design the interior of Gourmet's new restaurant, and, upon Gourmet's approval of the design plan, to decorate and furnish the restaurant accordingly. The agreement was silent as to assignment or delegation by either party. Before beginning the work, Deligor sold his decorating business to Newman under an agreement in which Deligor assigned to Newman, and Newman agreed to complete, the GourmetDeligor contract. Newman, also an experienced decorator of excellent repute, advised Gourmet of the assignment, and supplied him with information confirming both Newman's financial responsibility and past commercial success. Is Gourmet obligated to permit Newman to perform the Gourmet-Deligor agreement? | [
"Yes, because the agreement contained no prohibition against assignment or delegation. ",
"Yes, because Gourmet received adequate assurances of Newman's ability to complete the job. ",
"No, because Deligor's duties were of a personal nature, involving his reputation, taste, and skill. ",
"No, because Deligor's purported delegation to Newman of his obligations to Gourmet effected a novation. "
] | 2C
|
|
Gourmet, a famous chef, entered into a written agreement with his friend Deligor, a well-known interior decorator respected for his unique designs, in which Deligor agreed, for a fixed fee, to design the interior of Gourmet's new restaurant, and, upon Gourmet's approval of the design plan, to decorate and furnish the restaurant accordingly. The agreement was silent as to assignment or delegation by either party. Before beginning the work, Deligor sold his decorating business to Newman under an agreement in which Deligor assigned to Newman, and Newman agreed to complete, the GourmetDeligor contract. Newman, also an experienced decorator of excellent repute, advised Gourmet of the assignment, and supplied him with information confirming both Newman's financial responsibility and past commercial success. If Gourmet allows Newman to perform and approves his design plan, but Newman fails without legal excuse to complete the decorating as agreed, against whom does Gourmet have an enforceable claim for breach of contract? | [
"Deligor only, because Deligor's agreement with Newman did not discharge his duty to Gourmet, and Newman made no express promise to Gourmet. ",
"Newman only, because Deligor's duty to Gourmet was discharged when Deligor obtained a skilled decorator (Newman) to perform the Gourmet-Deligor contract. ",
"Newman only, because Gourmet was an intended beneficiary of the Deligor- Newman agreement, and Deligor's duty to Gourmet was discharged when Gourmet permitted Newman to do the work and approved Newman's design. ",
"Either Deligor, because his agreement with Newman did not discharge his duty to Gourmet; or Newman, because Gourmet was an intended beneficiary of the Deligor-Newman agreement. "
] | 3D
|
|
Plaintiff sued Defendant Auto Manufacturing for his wife's death, claiming that a defective steering mechanism on the family car caused it to veer off the road and hit a tree when his wife was driving. Defendant claims that the steering mechanism was damaged in the collision and offers testimony that the deceased wife was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Testimony concerning the wife's intoxication is | [
"admissible to provide an alternate explanation of the accident's cause.",
"admissible as proper evidence of the wife's character.",
"inadmissible, because it is improper to prove character evidence by specific conduct. ",
"inadmissible, because it is substantially more prejudicial than probative."
] | 0A
|
|
Otis owned in fee simple Lots 1 and 2 in an urban subdivision. The lots were vacant and unproductive. They were held as a speculation that their value would increase. Otis died and, by his duly probated will, devised the residue of his estate (of which Lots 1 and 2 were part) to Lena for life with remainder in fee simple to Rose. Otis's executor distributed the estate under appropriate court order, and notified Lena that future real estate taxes on Lots 1 and 2 were Lena's responsibility to pay. Except for the statutes relating to probate and those relating to real estate taxes, there is no applicable statute. Lena failed to pay the real estate taxes due for Lots 1 and 2. To prevent a tax sale of the fee simple, Rose paid the taxes and demanded that Lena reimburse her for same. When Lena refused, Rose brought an appropriate action against Lena to recover the amount paid. In such action, Rose should recover | [
"the amount paid, because a life tenant has the duty to pay current charges. ",
"the present value of the interest that the amount paid would earn during Lena's lifetime.",
"nothing, because Lena's sole possession gave the right to decide whether or not taxes should be paid. ",
"nothing, because Lena never received any income from the lots. "
] | 3D
|
|
Plaintiff Construction Co. sued Defendant Development Co. for money owed on a costplus contract that required notice of proposed expenditures beyond original estimates. Defendant asserted that it never received the required notice. At trial Plaintiff calls its general manager, Witness, to testify that it is Plaintiff's routine practice to send cost overrun notices as required by the contract. Witness also offers a photocopy of the cost overrun notice letter to Defendant on which Plaintiff is relying, and which he has taken from Plaintiff's regular business files. On the issue of giving notice, the letter copy is | [
"admissible, though hearsay, under the business record exception. ",
"admissible, because of the routine practices of the company. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"inadmissible, because it is not the best evidence of the notice."
] | 1B
|
|
Plaintiff sued Defendant under an age discrimination statute, alleging that Defendant refused to hire Plaintiff because she was over age 65. Defendant's defense was that he refused to employ Plaintiff because he reasonably believed that she would be unable to perform the job. Defendant seeks to testify that Employer, Plaintiff's former employer, advised him not to hire Plaintiff because she was unable to perform productively for more than four hours a day. The testimony of Defendant is | [
"inadmissible, because Defendant's opinion of Plaintiff's abilities is not based on personal knowledge. ",
"inadmissible, because Employer's statement is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"admissible as evidence that Plaintiff would be unable to work longer than four hours per day.",
"admissible as evidence of Defendant's reason for refusing to hire Plaintiff."
] | 3D
|
|
A federal statute provides that the cities in which certain specified airports are located may regulate the rates and services of all limousines that serve those airports, without regard to the origin or destination of the passengers who use the limousines. The cities of Redville and Greenville are located adjacent to each other in different states. The airport serving both of them is located in Redville and is one of those airports specified in the federal statute. The Redville City Council has adopted a rule that requires any limousines serving the airport to charge only the rates authorized by the Redville City Council. Airline Limousine Service has a lucrative business transporting passengers between Greenville and the airport in Redville, at much lower rates than those required by the Redville City Council. It transports passengers in interstate traffic only; it does not provide local service within Redville. The new rule adopted by the Redville City Council will require Airline Limousine Service to charge the same rates as limousines operating only in Redville. Must Airline Limousine Service comply with the new rule of the Redville City Council? | [
"Yes, because the airport is located in Redville and, therefore, its city council has exclusive regulatory authority over all transportation to and from the airport. ",
"Yes, because Congress has authorized this form of regulation by Redville and, therefore, removed any constitutional impediments to it that may have otherwise existed. ",
"No, because the rule would arbitrarily destroy a lucrative existing business and, therefore, would amount to a taking without just compensation. ",
"No, because Airline Limousine Service is engaged in interstate commerce and this rule is an undue burden on that commerce."
] | 1B
|
|
While approaching an intersection with the red light against him, Motorist suffered a heart attack that rendered him unconscious. Motorist's car struck Child, who was crossing the street with the green light in her favor. Under the state motor vehicle code, it is an offense to drive through a red traffic light. Child sued Motorist to recover for her injuries. At trial it was stipulated that (1) immediately prior to suffering the heart attack, Motorist had been driving within the speed limit, had seen the red light, and had begun to slow his car; (2) Motorist had no history of heart disease and no warning of this attack; (3) while Motorist was unconscious, his car ran the red light. On cross motions for directed verdicts on the issue of liability at the conclusion of the proofs, the court should | [
"grant Child's motion, because Motorist ran a red light in violation of the motor vehicle code. ",
"grant Child's motion, because, in the circumstances, reasonable persons would infer that Motorist was negligent. ",
"grant Motorist's motion, because he had no history of heart disease or warning of the heart attack. ",
"deny both motions and submit the case to the jury, to determine whether, in the circumstances, Motorist's conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person. "
] | 2C
|
|
In a jurisdiction without a Dead Man's Statute, Parker's estate sued Davidson claiming that Davidson had borrowed from Parker $10,000, which had not been repaid as of Parker's death. Parker was run over by a truck. At the accident scene, while dying from massive injuries, Parker told Officer Smith to "make sure my estate collects the $10,000 I loaned to Davidson." Smith's testimony about Parker's statement is | [
"inadmissible, because it is more unfairly prejudicial than probative. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"admissible as an excited utterance.",
"admissible as a statement under belief of impending death."
] | 1B
|
|
Landholder was land-rich by inheritance but money-poor, having suffered severe losses on bad investments, but still owned several thousand acres of unencumbered timberland. He had a large family, and his normal, fixed personal expenses were high. Pressed for cash, he advertised a proposed sale of standing timber on a choice 2,000-acre tract. The only response was an offer by Logger, the owner of a large, integrated construction enterprise, after inspection of the advertised tract. Assume the following facts. Logger offered to buy, sever, and remove the standing timber from the advertised tract at a cash price 70% lower than the regionally prevailing price for comparable timber rights. Landholder, by then in desperate financial straits and knowing little about timber values, signed and delivered to Logger a letter accepting the offer. If, before Logger commences performance, Landholder's investment fortunes suddenly improve and he wishes to get out of the timber deal with Logger, which of the following legal concepts affords his best prospect of effective cancellation? | [
"Bad faith.",
"Equitable estoppel.",
"Unconscionability.",
"Duress."
] | 2C
|
|
Landholder was land-rich by inheritance but money-poor, having suffered severe losses on bad investments, but still owned several thousand acres of unencumbered timberland. He had a large family, and his normal, fixed personal expenses were high. Pressed for cash, he advertised a proposed sale of standing timber on a choice 2,000-acre tract. The only response was an offer by Logger, the owner of a large, integrated construction enterprise, after inspection of the advertised tract. Assume the following facts. Logger offered a fair price for the timber rights in question, and Landholder accepted the offer. The 2,000-acre tract was an abundant wild-game habitat and had been used for many years, with Landholder's permission, by area hunters. Logger's performance of the timber contract would destroy this habitat. Without legal excuse and over Landholder's strong objection, Logger repudiated the contract before commencing performance. Landholder could not afford to hire a lawyer and take legal action, and made no attempt to assign any cause of action he might have had against Logger. If Logger is sued for breach of the contract by Landholder's next-door neighbor, whose view of a nearby lake is obscured by the standing timber, the neighbor will probably | [
"lose, as only an incidental beneficiary, if any, of the Logger-Landholder contract. ",
"lose, as a maintainer of nuisance litigation. ",
"prevail, as a third-party intended beneficiary of the Logger-Landholder contract. ",
"prevail, as a surrogate for Landholder in view of his inability to enforce the contract."
] | 0A
|
|
A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is | [
"unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress. ",
"unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II. ",
"constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states. ",
"constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members."
] | 1B
|
|
By a writing, Oner leased his home, Blackacre, to Tenn for a term of three years, ending December 31 of last year, at the rent of $1,000 per month. The lease provided that Tenn could sublet and assign. Tenn lived in Blackacre for one year and paid the rent promptly. After one year, Tenn leased Blackacre to Agrit for one year at a rent of $1,000 per month. Agrit took possession of Blackacre and lived there for six months but, because of her unemployment, paid no rent. After six months, on June 30 Agrit abandoned Blackacre, which remained vacant for the balance of that year. Tenn again took possession of Blackacre at the beginning of the third and final year of the term but paid Oner no rent. At the end of the lease term, Oner brought an appropriate action against both Tenn and Agrit to recover $24,000, the unpaid rent. In such action Oner is entitled to a judgment | [
"against Tenn individually for $24,000, and no judgment against Agrit. ",
"against Tenn individually for $18,000, and against Agrit individually for $6,000. ",
"against Tenn for $12,000, and against Tenn and Agrit jointly and severally for $12,000. ",
"against Tenn individually for $18,000, and against Tenn and Agrit jointly and severally for $6,000. "
] | 0A
|
|
In a trial to a jury, Owner proved that Power Company's negligent maintenance of a transformer caused a fire that destroyed his restaurant. The jury returned a verdict for Owner in the amount of $450,000 for property loss and $500,000 for emotional distress. The trial judge entered judgment in those amounts. Power Company appealed that part of the judgment awarding $500,000 for emotional distress. On appeal, the judgment should be | [
"affirmed, because Power Company negligently caused Owner's emotional distress. ",
"affirmed, because harm arising from emotional distress is as real as harm caused by physical impact. ",
"reversed, because the law does not recognize a claim for emotional distress incident to negligently caused property loss. ",
"reversed, unless the jury found that Owner suffered physical harm as a consequence of the emotional distress caused by his property loss."
] | 2C
|
|
Bill owned in fee simple Lot 1 in a properly approved subdivision, designed and zoned for industrial use. Gail owned the adjoining Lot 2 in the same subdivision. The plat of the subdivision was recorded as authorized by statute. Twelve years ago, Bill erected an industrial building wholly situated on Lot 1 but with one wall along the boundary common with Lot 2. The construction was done as authorized by a building permit, validly obtained under applicable statutes, ordinances, and regulations. Further, the construction was regularly inspected and passed as being in compliance with all building code requirements. Lot 2 remained vacant until six months ago, when Gail began excavation pursuant to a building permit authorizing the erection of an industrial building situated on Lot 2 but with one wall along the boundary common with Lot 1. The excavation caused subsidence of a portion of Lot 1 that resulted in injury to Bill's building. The excavation was not done negligently or with any malicious intent to injure. In the jurisdiction, the time to acquire title by adverse possession or rights by prescription is 10 years. Bill brought an appropriate action against Gail to recover damages resulting from the injuries to the building on Lot 1. In such lawsuit, judgment should be for | [
"Bill, if, but only if, the subsidence would have occurred without the weight of the building on Lot 1. ",
"Bill, because a right for support, appurtenant to Lot 1, had been acquired by adverse possession or prescription. ",
"Gail, because Lots 1 and 2 are urban land, as distinguished from rural land and, therefore, under the circumstances Bill had the duty to protect any improvements on Lot 1. ",
"Gail, because the construction and the use to be made of the building were both authorized by the applicable law. "
] | 0A
|
|
Defendant is charged with murder in connection with a carjacking incident during which Defendant allegedly shot Victim while attempting to steal Victim's car. The prosecutor calls Victim's four-year-old son, whose face was horribly disfigured by the same bullet, to testify that Defendant shot his father and him. The son's testimony should be | [
"admitted, provided the prosecutor first provides evidence that persuades the judge that the son is competent to testify despite his tender age. ",
"admitted, provided there is sufficient basis for believing that the son has personal knowledge and understands his obligation to testify truthfully. ",
"excluded, because it is insufficiently probative in view of the son's tender age. ",
"excluded, because it is more unfairly prejudicial than probative."
] | 1B
|
|
A federal statute provides that the United States Supreme Court has authority to review any case filed in a United States Court of Appeals, even though that case has not yet been decided by the court of appeals. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an agency in the executive branch of the federal government, issued an important environmental rule. Although the rule had not yet been enforced against them, companies that would be adversely affected by the rule filed a petition for review of the rule in a court of appeals, seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid solely because it was beyond the statutory authority of the EPA. The companies made no constitutional claim. A statute specifically provides for direct review of EPA rules by a court of appeals without any initial action in a district court. The companies have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court requesting immediate review of this case by the Supreme Court before the court of appeals has actually decided the case. The EPA acknowledges that the case is important enough to warrant Supreme Court review and that it should be decided promptly, but it asks the Supreme Court to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The best constitutional argument in support of the EPA's request is that | [
"the case is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by Article III, and it is not a proper subject of that court's appellate jurisdiction because it has not yet been decided by any lower court. ",
"the case is appellate in nature, but it is beyond the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, because Article III states that its jurisdiction extends only to cases arising under the Constitution. ",
"Article III precludes federal courts from reviewing the validity of any federal agency rule in any proceeding other than an action to enforce the rule.",
"Article III provides that all federal cases, except those within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, must be initiated by an action in a federal district court."
] | 0A
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Patron ate a spicy dinner at Restaurant on Sunday night. He enjoyed the food and noticed nothing unusual about the dinner. Later that evening, Patron had an upset stomach. He slept well through the night, went to work the next day, and ate three meals. His stomach discomfort persisted, and by Tuesday morning he was too ill to go to work. Eventually, Patron consulted his doctor, who found that Patron was infected with a bacterium that can be contracted from contaminated food. Food can be contaminated when those who prepare it do not adequately wash their hands. Patron sued Restaurant for damages. He introduced testimony from a health department official that various health code violations had been found at Restaurant both before and after Patron's dinner, but that none of Restaurant's employees had signs of bacterial infection when they were tested one month after the incident. Restaurant's best argument in response to Patron's suit would be that | [
"no one else who ate at Restaurant on Sunday complained about stomach discomfort.",
"Restaurant instructs its employees to wash their hands carefully and is not responsible if any employee fails to follow these instructions.",
"Patron has failed to establish that Restaurant's food caused his illness.",
"Patron assumed the risk of an upset stomach by choosing to eat spicy food."
] | 2C
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In a jurisdiction that has abolished the felony-murder rule, but otherwise follows the common law of murder, Sally and Ralph, both armed with automatic weapons, went into a bank to rob it. Ralph ordered all the persons in the bank to lie on the floor. When some were slow to obey, Sally, not intending to hit anyone, fired about 15 rounds into the air. One of these ricocheted off a stone column and struck and killed a customer in the bank. Sally and Ralph were charged with murder of the customer. Which of the following is correct? | [
"Sally can be convicted of murder, because she did the act of killing, but Ralph cannot be convicted of either murder or manslaughter. ",
"Neither can be guilty of murder, but both can be convicted of manslaughter based upon an unintentional homicide. ",
"Sally can be convicted only of manslaughter, but Ralph cannot be convicted of murder or manslaughter. ",
"Both can be convicted of murder."
] | 3D
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In recent years, several large corporations incorporated and headquartered in State A have suddenly been acquired by out-of-state corporations that have moved all of their operations out of State A. Other corporations incorporated and headquartered in State A have successfully resisted such attempts at acquisition by out-of-state corporations, but they have suffered severe economic injury during those acquisition attempts. In an effort to preserve jobs in State A and to protect its domestic corporations against their sudden acquisition by out-of-state purchasers, the legislature of State A enacts a statute governing acquisitions of shares in all corporations incorporated in State A. This statute requires that any acquisition of more than 25% of the voting shares of a corporation incorporated in State A that occurs over a period of less than one year must be approved by the holders of record of a majority of the shares of the corporation as of the day before the commencement of the acquisition of those shares. The statute expressly applies to acquisitions of State A corporations by both in-state and out-of-state entities. Assume that no federal statute applies. Is this statute of State A constitutional? | [
"No, because one of the purposes of the statute is to prevent out-of-state entities from acquiring corporations incorporated and headquartered in State A. ",
"No, because the effect of the statute will necessarily be to hinder the acquisition of State A corporations by other corporations, many of whose shareholders are not residents of State A and, therefore, it will adversely affect the interstate sale of securities. ",
"Yes, because the statute imposes the same burden on both in-state and outof-state entities wishing to acquire a State A corporation, it regulates only the acquisition of State A corporations, and it does not create an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation on this subject by different states. ",
"Yes, because corporations exist only by virtue of state law and, therefore, the negative implications of the commerce clause do not apply to state regulations governing their creation and acquisition."
] | 2C
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A written construction contract began with the following recital: "This Agreement, between Land, Inc. (hereafter called Owner'), and Builder, Inc., and Boss, its President (hereafter called Contractor'), witnesseth:" The signatures to the contract appeared in the following format: LAND, INC. By /s/ Oscar Land President BUILDER, INC. By /s/ George Mason Vice President /s/ Mary Boss, President Mary Boss Builder, Inc., became insolvent and defaulted. Land, Inc., sued Boss individually for the breach, and at the trial Boss proffered evidence from the pre-contract negotiations that only Builder, Inc., was to be legally responsible for performing the contract. If the court finds the contract to be completely integrated, is Boss's proffered evidence admissible? | [
"Yes, because the writing is ambiguous as to whether or not Boss was intended individually to be a contracting party. ",
"Yes, because the evidence would contradict neither the recital nor the form of Boss's signature. ",
"No, because the legal effect of Boss's signature cannot be altered by evidence of prior understandings. ",
"No, because of the application of the \"four corners\" rule, under which the meaning of a completely integrated contract must be ascertained solely from its own terms. "
] | 0A
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When Parents were told that their child, Son, should repeat second grade, they sought to have him evaluated by a psychologist. The psychologist, who charged $300, determined that Son had a learning disability. Based upon the report, the school board placed Son in special classes. At an open meeting of the school board, Parents asked that the $300 they had paid to the psychologist be reimbursed by the school district. A reporter attending the meeting wrote a newspaper article about this request, mentioning Son by name. In a privacy action brought by Son's legal representative against the newspaper, the plaintiff will | [
"recover, because the story is not newsworthy. ",
"recover, because Son is under the age of consent. ",
"not recover, if the story is a fair and accurate report of what transpired at the meeting. ",
"not recover, if Parents knew that the reporter was present."
] | 2C
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On trial for murdering her husband, Defendant testified she acted in self-defense. Defendant calls Expert, a psychologist, to testify that under hypnosis Defendant had described the killing, and that in Expert's opinion Defendant had been in fear for her life at the time of the killing. Is Expert's testimony admissible? | [
"Yes, because Expert was able to ascertain that Defendant was speaking truthfully. ",
"Yes, because it reports a prior consistent statement by a witness (Defendant) subject to examination concerning it. ",
"No, because reliance on information tainted by hypnosis is unconstitutional. ",
"No, because it expresses an opinion concerning Defendant's mental state at the time of the killing. "
] | 3D
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The legislature of State X enacts a statute that it believes reconciles the state's interest in the preservation of human life with a woman's right to reproductive choice. That statute permits a woman to have an abortion on demand during the first trimester of pregnancy but prohibits a woman from having an abortion after that time unless her physician determines that the abortion is necessary to protect the woman's life or health. If challenged on constitutional grounds in an appropriate court, this statute will probably be held | [
"constitutional, because the state has made a rational policy choice that creates an equitable balance between the compelling state interest in protecting fetal life and the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive choice. ",
"constitutional, because recent rulings by the United States Supreme Court indicate that after the first trimester a fetus may be characterized as a person whose right to life is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ",
"unconstitutional, because the state has, without adequate justification, placed an undue burden on the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive choice prior to fetal viability. ",
"unconstitutional, because a statute unqualifiedly permitting abortion at one stage of pregnancy, and denying it at another with only minor exceptions, establishes an arbitrary classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
] | 2C
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Olive owned Blackacre, a single-family residence. Fifteen years ago, Olive conveyed a life estate in Blackacre to Lois. Fourteen years ago, Lois, who had taken possession of Blackacre, leased Blackacre to Trent for a term of 15 years at the monthly rental of $500. Eleven years ago, Lois died intestate leaving Ron as her sole heir. Trent regularly paid rent to Lois and, after Lois's death, to Ron until last month. The period in which to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years. In an appropriate action, Trent, Olive, and Ron each asserted ownership of Blackacre. The court should hold that title in fee simple is in | [
"Olive, because Olive held a reversion and Lois has died. ",
"Ron, because Lois asserted a claim adverse to Olive when Lois executed a lease to Trent. ",
"Ron, because Trent's occupation was attributable to Ron, and Lois died 11 years ago. ",
"Trent, because of Trent's physical occupancy and because Trent's term ended with Lois's death. "
] | 2C
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While browsing in a clothing store, Alice decided to take a purse without paying for it. She placed the purse under her coat and took a couple of steps toward the exit. She then realized that a sensor tag on the purse would set off an alarm. She placed the purse near the counter from which she had removed it. Alice has committed | [
"no crime, because the purse was never removed from the store. ",
"no crime, because she withdrew from her criminal enterprise. ",
"only attempted larceny, because she intended to take the purse out of the store. ",
"larceny, because she took the purse from its original location and concealed it with the intent to steal."
] | 3D
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Adam's car sustained moderate damage in a collision with a car driven by Basher. The accident was caused solely by Basher's negligence. Adam's car was still drivable after the accident. Examining the car the next morning, Adam could see that a rear fender had to be replaced. He also noticed that gasoline had dripped onto the garage floor. The collision had caused a small leak in the gasoline tank. Adam then took the car to Mechanic, who owns and operates a body shop, and arranged with Mechanic to repair the damage. During their discussion Adam neglected to mention the gasoline leakage. Thereafter, while Mechanic was loosening some of the damaged material with a hammer, he caused a spark, igniting vapor and gasoline that had leaked from the fuel tank. Mechanic was severely burned. Mechanic has brought an action to recover damages against Adam and Basher. The jurisdiction has adopted a pure comparative negligence rule in place of the traditional common-law rule of contributory negligence. In this action, will Mechanic obtain a judgment against Basher? | [
"No, unless there is evidence that Basher was aware of the gasoline leak. ",
"No, if Mechanic would not have been harmed had Adam warned him about the gasoline leak. ",
"Yes, unless Mechanic was negligent in not discovering the gasoline leak himself. ",
"Yes, if Mechanic's injury was a proximate consequence of Basher's negligent driving. "
] | 3D
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Adam's car sustained moderate damage in a collision with a car driven by Basher. The accident was caused solely by Basher's negligence. Adam's car was still drivable after the accident. Examining the car the next morning, Adam could see that a rear fender had to be replaced. He also noticed that gasoline had dripped onto the garage floor. The collision had caused a small leak in the gasoline tank. Adam then took the car to Mechanic, who owns and operates a body shop, and arranged with Mechanic to repair the damage. During their discussion Adam neglected to mention the gasoline leakage. Thereafter, while Mechanic was loosening some of the damaged material with a hammer, he caused a spark, igniting vapor and gasoline that had leaked from the fuel tank. Mechanic was severely burned. Mechanic has brought an action to recover damages against Adam and Basher. The jurisdiction has adopted a pure comparative negligence rule in place of the traditional common-law rule of contributory negligence. In this action, will Mechanic obtain a judgment against Adam? | [
"No, because it was Mechanic's job to inspect the vehicle and repair whatever needed repair. ",
"No, unless Adam was aware of the risk that the gasoline leak represented. ",
"Yes, if a reasonable person in Adam's position would have warned Mechanic about the gasoline leak. ",
"Yes, because the car was unreasonably dangerous when Adam delivered it to Mechanic. "
] | 2C
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At 11:00 p.m., John and Marsha were accosted in the entrance to their apartment building by Dirk, who was armed as well as masked. Dirk ordered the couple to take him into their apartment. After they entered the apartment, Dirk forced Marsha to bind and gag her husband John and then to open a safe which contained a diamond necklace. Dirk then tied her up and fled with the necklace. He was apprehended by apartment building security guards. Before the guards could return to the apartment, but after Dirk was arrested, John, straining to free himself, suffered a massive heart attack and died. Dirk is guilty of | [
"burglary, robbery, and murder. ",
"robbery and murder only.",
"burglary and robbery only.",
"robbery only."
] | 0A
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Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries suffered in a car accident allegedly caused by brakes that had been negligently repaired by Defendant. At a settlement conference, Plaintiff exhibited the brake shoe that caused the accident and pointed out the alleged defect to an expert, whom Defendant had brought to the conference. No settlement was reached. At trial, the brake shoe having disappeared, Plaintiff seeks to testify concerning the condition of the shoe. Plaintiff's testimony is | [
"admissible, because Defendant's expert had been able to examine the shoe carefully. ",
"admissible, because Plaintiff had personal knowledge of the shoe's condition. ",
"inadmissible, because the brake shoe was produced and examined as a part of settlement negotiations. ",
"inadmissible, unless Plaintiff establishes that the disappearance was not his fault."
] | 1B
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Fixtures, Inc., in a signed writing, contracted with Apartments for the sale to Apartments of 50 identical sets of specified bathroom fixtures, 25 sets to be delivered on March 1, and the remaining 25 sets on April 1. The agreement did not specify the place of delivery, or the time or place of payment. Which of the following statements is correct? | [
"Fixtures must tender 25 sets to Apartments at Apartments' place of business on March 1, but does not have to turn them over to Apartments until Apartments pays the contract price for the 25 sets. ",
"Fixtures has no duty to deliver the 25 sets on March 1 at Fixtures' place of business unless Apartments tenders the contract price for the 25 sets on that date.",
"Fixtures must deliver 25 sets on March 1, and Apartments must pay the contract price for the 25 sets within a reasonable time after their delivery. ",
"Fixtures must deliver 25 sets on March 1, but Apartments' payment is due only upon the delivery of all 50 sets. "
] | 1B
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Fixtures, Inc., in a signed writing, contracted with Apartments for the sale to Apartments of 50 identical sets of specified bathroom fixtures, 25 sets to be delivered on March 1, and the remaining 25 sets on April 1. The agreement did not specify the place of delivery, or the time or place of payment. Make the following assumptions. On March 1, Fixtures tendered 24 sets to Apartments and explained, "One of the 25 sets was damaged in transit from the manufacturer to us, but we will deliver a replacement within 5 days." Which of the following statements is correct? | [
"Apartments is entitled to accept any number of the 24 sets, reject the rest, and cancel the contract both as to any rejected sets and the lot due on April 1. ",
"Apartments is entitled to accept any number of the 24 sets and to reject the rest, but is not entitled to cancel the contract as to any rejected sets or the lot due on April 1. ",
"Apartments must accept the 24 sets but is entitled to cancel the rest of the contract.",
"Apartments must accept the 24 sets and is not entitled to cancel the rest of the contract."
] | 3D
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Defendant is on trial for nighttime breaking and entering of a warehouse. The warehouse owner had set up a camera to take infrared pictures of any intruders. After an expert establishes the reliability of infrared photography, the prosecutor offers the authenticated infrared picture of the intruder to show the similarities to Defendant. The photograph is | [
"admissible, provided an expert witness points out to the jury the similarities between the person in the photograph and Defendant. ",
"admissible, allowing the jury to compare the person in the photograph and Defendant. ",
"inadmissible, because there was no eyewitness to the scene available to authenticate the photograph. ",
"inadmissible, because infrared photography deprives a defendant of the right to confront witnesses. "
] | 1B
|
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Olivia owned Blackacre, her home. Her daughter, Dawn, lived with her and always referred to Blackacre as "my property." Two years ago, Dawn, for a valuable consideration, executed and delivered to Bruce an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed purporting to convey Blackacre to Bruce in fee simple, reserving to herself an estate for two years in Blackacre. Bruce promptly and properly recorded his deed. One year ago, Olivia died and by will, duly admitted to probate, left her entire estate to Dawn. One month ago, Dawn, for a valuable consideration, executed and delivered to Carl an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed purporting to convey Blackacre to Carl, who promptly and properly recorded the deed. Dawn was then in possession of Blackacre and Carl had no actual knowledge of the deed to Bruce. Immediately thereafter, Dawn gave possession to Carl. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." Last week, Dawn fled the jurisdiction. Upon learning the facts, Carl brought an appropriate action against Bruce to quiet title to Blackacre. If Carl wins, it will be because | [
"Dawn had nothing to convey to Bruce two years ago.",
"Dawn's deed to Bruce was not to take effect until after Dawn's deed to Carl.",
"Carl was first in possession.",
"Dawn's deed to Bruce was not in Carl's chain of title."
] | 3D
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Grace, while baby-sitting one night, noticed that Sam, who lived next door, had left his house but that the door did not close completely behind him. Grace said to Roy, the 11-year-old boy she was baby-sitting with, "Let's play a game. You go next door and see if you can find my portable television set, which I lent to Sam, and bring it over here." Grace knew that Sam had a portable television set and Grace planned to keep the set for herself. Roy thought the set belonged to Grace, went next door, found the television set, and carried it out the front door. At that moment, Sam returned home and discovered Roy in his front yard with the television set. Roy explained the "game" he and Grace were playing. Sam took back his television set and called the police. Grace is | [
"not guilty of larceny or attempted larceny, because Roy did not commit any crime. ",
"not guilty of larceny but guilty of attempted larceny, because she never acquired possession of the television set. ",
"guilty of larceny as an accessory to Roy.",
"guilty of larceny by the use of an innocent agent."
] | 3D
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The warden of State Prison prohibits the photographing of the face of any prisoner without the prisoner's consent. Photographer, a news photographer, wanted to photograph Mobster, a notorious organized crime figure incarcerated at State Prison. To circumvent the warden's prohibition, Photographer flew over the prison exercise yard and photographed Mobster. Prisoner, who was imprisoned for a technical violation of a regulatory statute, happened to be standing next to Mobster when the photograph was taken. When the picture appeared in the press, Prisoner suffered severe emotional distress because he believed that his business associates and friends would think he was consorting with gangsters. Prisoner suffered no physical harm as the result of his emotional distress. Prisoner brought an action against Photographer for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. What is the best argument that Photographer can make in support of a motion for summary judgment? | [
"No reasonable person could conclude that Photographer intended to photograph Prisoner.",
"Prisoner did not suffer any physical injury arising from the emotional distress.",
"As a news photographer, Photographer was privileged to take photographs that others could not. ",
"No reasonable person could conclude that Photographer's conduct was extreme and outrageous as to Prisoner."
] | 3D
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The vaccination of children against childhood contagious diseases (such as measles, diphtheria and whooping cough) has traditionally been a function of private doctors and local and state health departments. Because vaccination rates have declined in recent years, especially in urban areas, the President proposes to appoint a Presidential Advisory Commission on Vaccination which would be charged with conducting a national publicity campaign to encourage vaccination as a public health measure. No federal statute authorizes or prohibits this action by the President. The activities of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Vaccination would be financed entirely from funds appropriated by Congress to the Office of the President for "such other purposes as the President may think appropriate." May the President constitutionally create such a commission for this purpose? | [
"Yes, because the President has plenary authority to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the United States. ",
"Yes, because this action is within the scope of executive authority vested in the President by the Constitution, and no federal statute prohibits it. ",
"No, because the protection of children against common diseases by vaccination is a traditional state function and, therefore, is reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. ",
"No, because Congress has not specifically authorized the creation and support of such a new federal agency. "
] | 1B
|
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Defendant is on trial for extorting $10,000 from Victim. An issue is the identification of the person who made a telephone call to Victim. Victim is prepared to testify that the caller had a distinctive accent like Defendant's, but that he cannot positively identify the voice as Defendant's. Victim recorded the call but has not brought the tape to court, although its existence is known to Defendant. Victim's testimony is | [
"inadmissible, because Victim cannot sufficiently identify the caller. ",
"inadmissible, because the tape recording of the conversation is the best evidence. ",
"admissible, because Defendant waived the \"best evidence\" rule by failing to subpoena the tape. ",
"admissible, because Victim's lack of certainty goes to the weight to be given Victim's testimony, not to its admissibility. "
] | 3D
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Owner owned Greenacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Owner executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Greenacre to Purchaser in fee simple. The instrument recited that the conveyance was in consideration of "$5 cash in hand paid and for other good and valuable consideration." Owner handed the instrument to Purchaser and Purchaser promptly and properly recorded it. Two months later, Owner brought an appropriate action against Purchaser to cancel the instrument and to quiet title. In support, Owner proved that no money in fact had been paid by Purchaser, notwithstanding the recitation, and that no other consideration of any kind had been supplied by Purchaser. In such action, Owner should | [
"lose, because any remedy Owner might have had was lost when the instrument was recorded. ",
"lose, because the validity of conveyance of land does not depend upon consideration being paid, whether recited or not. ",
"prevail, because the recitation of consideration paid may be contradicted by parol evidence. ",
"prevail, because recordation does not make a void instrument effective. "
] | 1B
|
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Vintner is the owner of a large vineyard and offers balloon rides to visitors who wish to tour the grounds from the air. During one of the rides, Vintner was forced to make a crash landing on his own property. Without Vintner's knowledge or consent, Trespasser had entered the vineyard to camp for a couple of days. Trespasser was injured when he was hit by the basket of the descending balloon. If Trespasser sues Vintner to recover damages for his injuries, will Trespasser prevail? | [
"No, unless the crash landing was made necessary by negligence on Vintner's part. ",
"No, unless Vintner could have prevented the injury to Trespasser after becoming aware of Trespasser's presence. ",
"Yes, because even a trespasser may recover for injuries caused by an abnormally dangerous activity. ",
"Yes, if the accident occurred at a place which Vintner knew was frequented by intruders."
] | 1B
|
|
Matt and his friend Fred were watching a football game at Matt's home when they began to argue. Fred became abusive, and Matt asked him to leave. Fred refused, walked into the kitchen, picked up a knife, and said he would cut Matt's heart out. Matt pulled a gun from under the sofa, walked to his front door, opened it, and again told Fred to leave. Fred again refused. Instead, he walked slowly toward Matt, brandishing the knife in a threatening manner. Matt, rather than running out the door himself, shot in Fred's direction, intending only to scare him. However, the bullet struck Fred, killing him instantly. Charged with murder, Matt should be | [
"convicted, because the use of deadly force was unreasonable under the circumstances. ",
"convicted, because he had a clear opportunity and duty to retreat. ",
"acquitted, because he did not intend to kill Fred. ",
"acquitted, because he was acting in self- defense and had no duty to retreat. "
] | 3D
|
|
Central City in the state of Green is a center for businesses that assemble personal computers. Components for these computers are manufactured elsewhere in Green and in other states, then shipped to Central City, where the computers are assembled. An ordinance of Central City imposes a special license tax on all of the many companies engaged in the business of assembling computers in that city. The tax payable by each such company is a percentage of the company's gross receipts. The Green statute that authorizes municipalities to impose this license tax has a "Green content" provision. To comply with this provision of state law, the Central City license tax ordinance provides that the tax paid by any assembler of computers subject to this tax ordinance will be reduced by a percentage equal to the proportion of computer components manufactured in Green. Assembler is a company that assembles computers in Central City and sells them from its offices in Central City to buyers throughout the United States. All of the components of its computers come from outside the state of Green. Therefore, Assembler must pay the Central City license tax in full without receiving any refund. Other Central City computer assemblers use components manufactured in Green in varying proportions and, therefore, are entitled to partial reductions of their Central City license tax payments. Following prescribed procedure, Assembler brings an action in a proper court asking to have Central City's special license tax declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is inconsistent with the negative implications of the commerce clause. In this case, the court should rule | [
"against Assembler, because the tax falls only on companies resident in Central City and, therefore, does not discriminate against or otherwise adversely affect interstate commerce. ",
"against Assembler, because the commerce clause does not interfere with the right of a state to foster and support businesses located within its borders by encouraging its residents to purchase the products of those businesses. ",
"for Assembler, because any tax on a company engaged in interstate commerce, measured in whole or in part by its gross receipts, is a per se violation of the negative implications of the commerce clause. ",
"for Assembler, because the tax improperly discriminates against interstate commerce by treating in-state products more favorably than out-ofstate products."
] | 3D
|
|
Hannah, who was homeless, broke into the basement of a hotel and fell asleep. She was awakened by a security guard, who demanded that she leave. As Hannah was leaving, she cursed the security guard. Angered, the guard began to beat Hannah on her head with his flashlight. After the second blow, Hannah grabbed a fire extinguisher and sprayed the guard in his face, causing him to lose his sight in one eye. The jurisdiction defines aggravated assault as assault with intent to cause serious bodily injury. The most serious crime for which Hannah could properly be convicted is | [
"aggravated assault.",
"burglary.",
"assault.",
"trespass."
] | 3D
|
|
On March 1, Mechanic contracted to repair Textiles' knitting machine and to complete the job by March 6. On March 2, Textiles contracted to manufacture and deliver specified cloth to Knitwear on March 15. Textiles knew that it would have to use the machine then under repair to perform this contract. Because the Knitwear order was for a rush job, Knitwear and Textiles included in their contract a liquidated damages clause, providing that Textiles would pay $5,000 for each day's delay in delivery after March 15. Mechanic was inexcusably five days late in repairing the machine, and, as a result, Textiles was five days late in delivering the cloth to Knitwear. Textiles paid $25,000 to Knitwear as liquidated damages and now sues Mechanic for $25,000. Both Mechanic and Textiles knew when making their contract on March 1 that under ordinary circumstances Textiles would sustain little or no damages of any kind as a result of a five-day delay in the machine repair. Assuming that the $5,000 liquidated damages clause in the Knitwear-Textiles contract is valid, which of the following arguments will serve as Mechanic's best defense to Textiles' action? | [
"Time was not of the essence in the Mechanic-Textiles contract.",
"Mechanic had no reason to foresee on March 1 that Knitwear would suffer consequential damages in the amount of $25,000. ",
"By entering into the Knitwear contract while knowing that its knitting machine was being repaired, Textiles assumed the risk of any delay loss to Knitwear. ",
"In all probability, the liquidated damages paid by Textiles to Knitwear are not the same amount as the actual damages sustained by Knitwear in consequence of Textiles' late delivery of the cloth."
] | 1B
|
|
Plaintiff sued Defendant for personal injuries suffered in a train-automobile collision. Plaintiff called an eyewitness, who testified that the train was going 20 miles per hour. Defendant then offers the testimony of an experienced police accident investigator that, based on his training and experience and on his examination of the physical evidence, it is his opinion that the train was going between 5 and 10 miles per hour. Testimony by the investigator is | [
"improper, because there cannot be both lay and expert opinion on the same issue. ",
"improper, because the investigator is unable to establish the speed with a sufficient degree of scientific certainty. ",
"proper, because a police accident investigator has sufficient expertise to express an opinion on speed. ",
"proper, because Plaintiff first introduced opinion evidence as to speed. "
] | 2C
|
|
Ven owned Goldacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Ven and Pur entered into a written agreement under which Pur agreed to buy Goldacre for $100,000, its fair market value. The agreement contained all the essential terms of a real estate contract to sell and buy, including a date for closing. The required $50,000 down payment was made. The contract provided that in the event of Pur's breach, Ven could retain the $50,000 deposit as liquidated damages. Before the date set for the closing in the contract, Pur died. On the day that Addy was duly qualified as administratrix of the estate of Pur, which was after the closing date, Addy made demand for return of the $50,000 deposit. Ven responded by stating that he took such demand to be a declaration that Addy did not intend to complete the contract and that Ven considered the contract at an end. Ven further asserted that Ven was entitled to retain, as liquidated damages, the $50,000. The reasonable market value of Goldacre had increased to $110,000 at that time. Addy brought an appropriate action against Ven to recover the $50,000. In answer, Ven made no affirmative claim but asserted that he was entitled to retain the $50,000 as liquidated damages as provided in the contract. In such lawsuit, judgment should be for | [
"Addy, because the provision relied upon by Ven is unenforceable. ",
"Addy, because the death of Pur terminated the contract as a matter of law. ",
"Ven, because the court should enforce the express agreement of the contracting parties. ",
"Ven, because the doctrine of equitable conversion prevents termination of the contract upon the death of a party."
] | 0A
|
|
An ordinance of Central City requires every operator of a taxicab in the city to have a license and permits revocation of that license only for "good cause." The Central City taxicab operator's licensing ordinance conditions the issuance of such a license on an agreement by the licensee that the licensee "not display in or on his or her vehicle any bumper sticker or other placard or sign favoring a particular candidate for any elected municipal office." The ordinance also states that it imposes this condition in order to prevent the possible imputation to the city council of the views of its taxicab licensees and that any licensee who violates this condition shall have his or her license revoked. Driver, the holder of a Central City taxicab operator's license, decorates his cab with bumper stickers and other signs favoring specified candidates in a forthcoming election for municipal offices. A proceeding is initiated against him to revoke his taxicab operator's license on the sole basis of that admitted conduct. In this proceeding, does Driver have a meritorious defense based on the United States Constitution? | [
"No, because he accepted the license with knowledge of the condition and, therefore, has no standing to contest it. ",
"No, because a taxicab operator's license is a privilege and not a right and, therefore, is not protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ",
"Yes, because such a proceeding threatens Driver with a taking of property, his license, without just compensation. ",
"Yes, because the condition imposed on taxicab operators' licenses restricts political speech based wholly on its content, without any adequate governmental justification. "
] | 3D
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Pat had been under the care of a cardiologist for three years prior to submitting to an elective operation that was performed by Surgeon. Two days thereafter, Pat suffered a stroke, resulting in a coma, caused by a blood clot that lodged in her brain. When it appeared that she had entered a permanent vegetative state, with no hope of recovery, the artificial life-support system that had been provided was withdrawn, and she died a few hours later. The withdrawal of artificial life support had been requested by her family, and duly approved by a court. Surgeon was not involved in that decision, or in its execution. The administrator of Pat's estate thereafter filed a wrongful death action against Surgeon, claiming that Surgeon was negligent in having failed to consult a cardiologist prior to the operation. At the trial the plaintiff offered evidence that accepted medical practice would require examination of the patient by a cardiologist prior to the type of operation that Surgeon performed. In this action, the plaintiff should | [
"prevail, if Surgeon was negligent in failing to have Pat examined by a cardiologist prior to the operation. ",
"prevail, if the blood clot that caused Pat's death was caused by the operation which Surgeon performed. ",
"not prevail, absent evidence that a cardiologist, had one examined Pat before the operation, would probably have provided advice that would have changed the outcome. ",
"not prevail, because Surgeon had nothing to do with the withdrawal of artificial life support, which was the cause of Pat's death."
] | 2C
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At Devlin's trial for burglary, Jaron supported Devlin's alibi that they were fishing together at the time of the crime. On cross-examination, Jaron was asked whether his statement on a credit card application that he had worked for his present employer for the last five years was false. Jaron denied that the statement was false. The prosecutor then calls Wilcox, the manager of the company for which Jaron works, to testify that although Jaron had been first employed five years earlier and is now employed by the company, there had been a three-year period during which he had not been so employed. The testimony of Wilcox is | [
"admissible, in the judge's discretion, because Jaron's credibility is a fact of major consequence to the case. ",
"admissible, as a matter of right, because Jaron \"opened the door\" by his denial on cross-examination. ",
"inadmissible, because whether Jaron lied in his application is a matter that cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence. ",
"inadmissible, because the misstatement by Jaron could have been caused by misunderstanding of the application form. "
] | 2C
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Owen owned Blackacre in fee simple, as the land records showed, when he contracted to sell Blackacre to Bryer. Two weeks later, Bryer paid the agreed price and received a warranty deed. A week thereafter, when neither the contract nor the deed had been recorded and while Owen remained in possession of Blackacre, Cred properly filed her money judgment against Owen. She knew nothing of Bryer's interest. A statute in the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." Cred brought an appropriate action to enforce her lien against Blackacre in Bryer's hands. If the court decides for Bryer, it will most probably be because | [
"the doctrine of equitable conversion applies.",
"the jurisdiction's recording act does not protect creditors.",
"Owen's possession gave Cred constructive notice of Bryer's interest.",
"Bryer was a purchaser without notice."
] | 1B
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A written construction contract, under which Contractor agreed to build a new house for Owner at a fixed price of $200,000, contained the following provision: Prior to construction or during the course thereof, this contract may be modified by mutual agreement of the parties as to "extras" or other departures from the plans and specifications provided by Owner and attached hereto. Such modifications, however, may be authorized only in writing, signed by both parties. During construction, Contractor incorporated into the structure overhanging gargoyles and other "extras" orally requested by Owner for orally agreed prices in addition to the contract price. Owner subsequently refused to pay anything for such extras, aggregating $30,000 at the agreed prices, solely on the ground that no written, signed authorization for them was ever effected. If Contractor sues Owner on account of the "extras," which, if any, of the following will effectively support Owner's defense? I. The parol evidence rule. II. The preexisting duty rule. III. Failure of an express condition. IV. The statute of frauds. | [
"I and III only.",
"I and IV only.",
"II and IV only.",
"Neither I, II, III, nor IV. "
] | 3D
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Scott held up a drugstore at 10:30 at night, and drove away. His car broke down in an isolated area just outside the small city in which the crime occurred. Scott walked to the nearest house and asked Henry, the homeowner, if he could stay until the next morning, explaining that he had been searching for his sister's home and had run out of gas. Henry agreed to let him sleep on a couch in the basement. During the course of the night, Henry began to doubt the story Scott had told him. Early the next morning, Henry called the police and said he was suspicious and frightened of a stranger whom he had allowed to stay the night. The police went immediately to the house to assist Henry and walked through the open front door. They found Scott and Henry drinking coffee in the kitchen. When they saw Scott, they realized he matched the description of the drugstore robber. They arrested Scott and in his jacket they found drugs taken during the robbery. Scott moves to suppress the evidence of the drugs. If the court finds that the police did not have probable cause to believe Scott was the robber until they saw him inside Henry's house and realized he matched the description, the court should | [
"grant the motion, because, as a guest, Scott has sufficient standing to contest the entry of the house without a warrant. ",
"grant the motion, because, as a guest, Scott has sufficient standing to contest the lack of probable cause at the time of the entry. ",
"deny the motion, because Scott had no ownership or other possessory interest in the premises. ",
"deny the motion, because the police had the permission of the owner to enter the house."
] | 3D
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Susan entered a guilty plea to a charge of embezzlement. Her attorney hired a retired probation officer as a consultant to gather information for the preparation of a sentencing plan for Susan that would avoid jail. For that purpose, the consultant interviewed Susan for three hours. Thereafter, the prosecution undertook an investigation of Susan's possible involvement in other acts of embezzlement. The consultant was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. The consultant refused to answer any questions concerning her conversation with Susan. The prosecution has moved for an order requiring her to answer those questions. The motion should be | [
"denied, on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. ",
"denied, in the absence of probable cause to believe the interview developed evidence relevant to the grand jury's inquiry. ",
"granted, because the consultant is not an attorney. ",
"granted, because exclusionary evidentiary rules do not apply in grand jury proceedings. "
] | 0A
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Agitator, a baseball fan, has a fierce temper and an extremely loud voice. Attending a baseball game in which a number of calls went against the home team, Agitator repeatedly stood up, brandished his fist, and angrily shouted, "Kill the umpires." The fourth time he engaged in this conduct, many other spectators followed Agitator in rising from their seats, brandishing fists, and shouting, "Kill the umpires." The home team lost the game. Although no violence ensued, spectators crowded menacingly around the umpires after the game. As a result, the umpires were able to leave the field and stadium only with the help of a massive police escort. For his conduct, Agitator was charged with inciting to riot and was convicted in a jury trial in state court. He appealed. The state supreme court reversed his conviction. In its opinion, the court discussed in detail decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the First Amendment free speech clause as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. At the end of that discussion, however, the court stated that it "need not resolve how, on the basis of these cases," the United States Supreme Court would decide Agitator's case. "Instead," the court stated, "this court has always given the free-speech guarantee of the state's constitution the broadest possible interpretation. As a result, we hold that in this case, where no riot or other violence actually occurred, the state constitution does not permit this conviction for incitement to riot to stand." The United States Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari to review this decision of the state supreme court. In this case, the United States Supreme Court should | [
"affirm the state supreme court's decision, because Agitator's ballpark shout is commonplace hyperbole that cannot, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be punished. ",
"remand the case to the state supreme court with directions that it resolve the First and Fourteenth Amendment freespeech issue that it discussed in such detail.",
"dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, because the state supreme court's decision rests on an independent and adequate state law ground. ",
"reverse the decision of the state supreme court, because incitement to violent action is not speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
] | 2C
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The day after Seller completed the sale of his house and moved out, one of the slates flew off the roof during a windstorm. The slate struck Pedestrian, who was on the public sidewalk. Pedestrian was seriously injured. The roof is old and has lost several slates in ordinary windstorms on other occasions. If Pedestrian sues Seller to recover damages for his injuries, will Pedestrian prevail? | [
"Yes, because the roof was defective when Seller sold the house. ",
"Yes, if Seller should have been aware of the condition of the roof and should have realized that it was dangerous to persons outside the premises. ",
"No, because Seller was neither the owner nor the occupier of the house when Pedestrian was injured. ",
"No, if Pedestrian knew that in the past slates had blown off the roof during windstorms. "
] | 1B
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On April 1, Owner and Buyer signed a writing in which Owner, "in consideration of $100 to be paid to Owner by Buyer," offered Buyer the right to purchase Greenacre for $100,000 within 30 days. The writing further provided, "This offer will become effective as an option only if and when the $100 consideration is in fact paid." On April 20, Owner, having received no payment or other communication from Buyer, sold and conveyed Greenacre to Citizen for $120,000. On April 21, Owner received a letter from Buyer enclosing a cashier's check for $100 payable to Owner and stating, "I am hereby exercising my option to purchase Greenacre and am prepared to close whenever you're ready." Which of the following, if proved, best supports Buyer's suit against Owner for breach of contract? | [
"Buyer was unaware of the sale to Citizen when Owner received the letter and check from Buyer on April 21.",
"On April 15, Buyer decided to purchase Greenacre, and applied for and obtained a commitment from Bank for a $75,000 loan to help finance the purchase. ",
"When the April 1 writing was signed, Owner said to Buyer, \"Don't worry about the $100; the recital of $100 to be paid' makes this deal binding.\" ",
"Owner and Buyer are both professional dealers in real estate."
] | 0A
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On April 1, Owner and Buyer signed a writing in which Owner, "in consideration of $100 to be paid to Owner by Buyer," offered Buyer the right to purchase Greenacre for $100,000 within 30 days. The writing further provided, "This offer will become effective as an option only if and when the $100 consideration is in fact paid." On April 20, Owner, having received no payment or other communication from Buyer, sold and conveyed Greenacre to Citizen for $120,000. On April 21, Owner received a letter from Buyer enclosing a cashier's check for $100 payable to Owner and stating, "I am hereby exercising my option to purchase Greenacre and am prepared to close whenever you're ready." Assume that, for whatever reason, Buyer prevails in the suit against Owner. Which of the following is Buyer entitled to recover? | [
"Nominal damages only, because the remedy of specific performance was not available to Buyer. ",
"The fair market value, if any, of an assignable option to purchase Greenacre for $100,000. ",
"$20,000, plus the amount, if any, by which the fair market value of Greenacre on the date of Owner's breach exceeded $120,000. ",
"The amount, if any, by which the fair market value of Greenacre on the date of Owner's breach exceeded $100,000."
] | 3D
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Alpha and Beta owned Greenacre, a large farm, in fee simple as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest. For five years Alpha occupied Greenacre and conducted farming operations. Alpha never accounted to Beta for any income but Alpha did pay all real estate taxes when the taxes were due and kept the buildings located on Greenacre insured against loss from fire, storm, and flood. Beta lived in a distant city and was interested only in realizing a profit from the sale of the land when market conditions produced the price Beta wanted. Alpha died intestate survived by Hera, Alpha's sole heir. Thereafter Hera occupied Greenacre but was inexperienced in farming operations. The result was a financial disaster. Hera failed to pay real estate taxes for two years. The appropriate governmental authority held a tax sale to recover the taxes due. At such sale Beta was the only bidder and obtained a conveyance from the appropriate governmental authority upon payment of an amount sufficient to discharge the amounts due for taxes, plus interest and penalties, and the costs of holding the tax sale. The amount paid was one-third of the reasonable market value of Greenacre. Thereafter Beta instituted an appropriate action against Hera to quiet title in and to recover possession of Greenacre. Hera asserted all defenses available to Hera. Except for the statutes related to real estate taxes and tax sales, there is no applicable statute. In this lawsuit, Beta is entitled to a decree quieting title so that Beta is the sole owner in fee simple of Greenacre | [
"because Beta survived Alpha.",
"because Hera defaulted in the obligations undertaken by Alpha.",
"unless Hera pays Beta one-half of the reasonable market value of Greenacre.",
"unless Hera pays Beta one-half of the amount Beta paid for the tax deed."
] | 3D
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Eighteen-year-old Kenneth and his 14year-old girlfriend, Emma, made plans to meet in Kenneth's apartment to have sexual intercourse, and they did so. Emma later told her mother about the incident. Kenneth was charged with statutory rape and conspiracy to commit statutory rape. In the jurisdiction, the age of consent is 15, and the law of conspiracy is the same as at common law. Kenneth was convicted of both charges and given consecutive sentences. On appeal, he contends that his conspiracy conviction should be reversed. That conviction should be | [
"affirmed, because he agreed with Emma to commit the crime. ",
"reversed, because Emma could not be a conspirator to this crime. ",
"reversed, because the crime is one that can only be committed by agreement and thus Wharton's Rule bars conspiracy liability. ",
"reversed, because one cannot conspire with a person too young to consent."
] | 1B
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Sam decided to kill his boss, Anna, after she told him that he would be fired if his work did not improve. Sam knew Anna was scheduled to go on a business trip on Monday morning. On Sunday morning, Sam went to the company parking garage and put a bomb in the company car that Anna usually drove. The bomb was wired to go off when the car engine started. Sam then left town. At 5 a.m. Monday, Sam, after driving all night, was overcome with remorse and had a change of heart. He called the security officer on duty at the company and told him about the bomb. The security officer said he would take care of the matter. An hour later, the officer put a note on Anna's desk telling her of the message. He then looked at the car but could not see any signs of a bomb. He printed a sign saying "DO NOT USE THIS CAR," put it on the windshield, and went to call the police. Before the police arrived, Lois, a company vice president, got into the car and started the engine. The bomb went off, killing her. The jurisdiction defines murder in the first degree as any homicide committed with premeditation and deliberation or any murder in the commission of a common-law felony. Second-degree murder is defined as all other murder at common law. Manslaughter is defined by the common law. Sam is guilty of | [
"murder in the first degree, because, with premeditation and deliberation, he killed whoever would start the car. ",
"murder in the second degree, because he had no intention of killing Lois. ",
"manslaughter, because at the time of the explosion, he had no intent to kill, and the death of Lois was in part the fault of the security officer. ",
"only attempted murder of Anna, because the death of Lois was the result of the security officer's negligence. "
] | 0A
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The state of Green imposes a tax on the "income" of each of its residents. As defined in the taxing statute, "income" includes the fair rental value of the use of any automobile provided by the taxpayer's employer for the taxpayer's personal use. The federal government supplies automobiles to some of its employees who are resident in Green so that they may perform their jobs properly. A federal government employee supplied with an automobile for this purpose may also use it for the employee's own personal business. Assume there is no federal legislation on this subject. May the state of Green collect this tax on the fair rental value of the personal use of the automobiles furnished by the federal government to these employees? | [
"No, because such a tax would be a tax on the United States. ",
"No, because such a tax would be a tax upon activities performed on behalf of the United States, since the automobiles are primarily used by these federal employees in the discharge of their official duties. ",
"Yes, because the tax is imposed on the employees rather than on the United States, and the tax does not discriminate against persons who are employed by the United States. ",
"Yes, because an exemption from such state taxes for federal employees would be a denial to others of the equal protection of the laws."
] | 2C
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Orderly, a male attendant who worked at Hospital, had sexual relations with Patient, a severely retarded person, in her room at Hospital. In a tort action brought on Patient's behalf against Hospital, Patient will | [
"not prevail, if Orderly's actions were outside the scope of his employment. ",
"not prevail, if Patient initiated the relationship with Orderly and encouraged his actions. ",
"prevail, if Orderly was an employee of Hospital. ",
"prevail, if Hospital failed to use reasonable care to protect Patient from such conduct. "
] | 3D
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