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13,270
Figure 7.
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13,271
The loader checking the sidebar process Figure 8.
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13,272
The malicious loader injecting the backdoor into dllhost.exe Figure 9.
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13,273
Comparison of TClient’s configuration format in 2016 (left, from other researchers) and 2018 (right) TClient will use SSL to connect to Tropic Trooper’s C&C server.
[ { "id": 41350, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 14, "end_offset": 21 }, { "id": 41352, "label": "location", "start_offset": 84, "end_offset": 87 }, { "id": 41354, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 108 }, { "id": 41355, "label": "location", "start_offset": 109, "end_offset": 113 }, { "id": 41356, "label": "location", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 121 } ]
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13,276
TClient is actually one of Tropic Trooper’s other backdoors.
[ { "id": 41362, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 }, { "id": 41363, "label": "location", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 23 } ]
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13,278
TClient uses symmetric encryption to decrypt its configuration with one 16-byte key in 2018.
[ { "id": 41368, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 } ]
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13,279
The image and table below illustrate TClient’s encrypted configuration that we decrypted (via Python code): Figure 10.
[ { "id": 41372, "label": "location", "start_offset": 10, "end_offset": 13 }, { "id": 41373, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 44 } ]
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13,280
Snapshot of code we used to decrypt TClient’s configuration Figure 11.
[ { "id": 41375, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 43 } ]
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13,281
Encrypted backdoor configuration
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Description Decryption Strings
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13,285
Proxy: 0
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13,286
Figure 12.
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13,287
Decrypted backdoor configuration
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13,288
Reverse analysis of TClient allowed us to determine how to decrypt the C&C information.
[ { "id": 41382, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 27 } ]
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13,289
TClient will use custom SSL libraries to connect the C&C server.
[ { "id": 41383, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 }, { "id": 41384, "label": "location", "start_offset": 8, "end_offset": 12 }, { "id": 41385, "label": "location", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 27 } ]
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13,292
Figure 13.
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13,297
The TSSL project has 64-bit version.
[ { "id": 41403, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 27 } ]
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13,304
TClient, for instance, uses DLL hijacking and injection that may not be as noticeable to others.
[ { "id": 41416, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 }, { "id": 41417, "label": "location", "start_offset": 42, "end_offset": 45 }, { "id": 41418, "label": "location", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 64 } ]
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13,309
The vulnerabilities that Tropic Trooper’s campaigns have been patched last January, for instance.
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13,313
Disable or secure the use of system administration tools such as PowerShell and other command-line tools that may be abused.
[ { "id": 41438, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 65, "end_offset": 75 }, { "id": 41439, "label": "location", "start_offset": 76, "end_offset": 79 }, { "id": 41440, "label": "location", "start_offset": 110, "end_offset": 113 } ]
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13,316
Nurture a culture of cybersecurity.
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13,317
Spear-phishing emails, for instance, rely on baiting targets with socially engineered documents.
[ { "id": 41445, "label": "location", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 5 }, { "id": 41446, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 14 } ]
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13,319
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Related Hashes (SHA-256): Detected as CVE-2018-0802.ZTFC: 1d128fd61c2c121d9f2e1628630833172427e5d486cdd4b6d567b7bdac13935e BKDR_TCLT.ZDFB: 01087051f41df7bb030256c97497f69bc5b5551829da81b8db3f46ba622d8a69 BKDR64_TCLT.ZTFB: 6e900e5b6dc4f21a004c5b5908c81f055db0d7026b3c5e105708586f85d3e334 TROJ_SCLT.ZTFB: 49df4fec76a0ffaee5e4d933a734126c1a7b32d1c9cb5ab22a868e8bfc653245 TROJ_TCDROP.ZTFB: b0f120b11f727f197353bc2c98d606ed08a06f14a1c012d3db6fe0a812df528a d65f809f7684b28a6fa2d9397582f350318027999be3acf1241ff44d4df36a3a 85d32cb3ae046a38254b953a00b37bb87047ec435edb0ce359a867447ee30f8b TROJ_TCLT.ZDFB: 02281e26e89b61d84e2df66a0eeb729c5babd94607b1422505cd388843dd5456 fb9c9cbf6925de8c7b6ce8e7a8d5290e628be0b82a58f3e968426c0f734f38f6 URLs related to C&C communication: qpoe[.]com wikaba[.]com tibetnews[.]today dns-stuff[.]com 2waky[.]com Tags Network | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research
[ { "id": 41451, "label": "SHA2", "start_offset": 91, "end_offset": 155 }, { "id": 41452, "label": "MD5", "start_offset": 174, "end_offset": 238 }, { "id": 41453, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 259, "end_offset": 323 }, { "id": 41454, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 342, "end_offset": 406 }, { "id": 41455, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 427, "end_offset": 491 }, { "id": 41456, "label": "SHA2", "start_offset": 492, "end_offset": 556 }, { "id": 41457, "label": "SHA2", "start_offset": 557, "end_offset": 621 }, { "id": 41458, "label": "SHA2", "start_offset": 640, "end_offset": 704 }, { "id": 41459, "label": "SHA2", "start_offset": 705, "end_offset": 769 }, { "id": 41460, "label": "location", "start_offset": 901, "end_offset": 904 } ]
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13,322
The five individuals were reportedly connected to the hacking group known as APT41.
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13,325
Justice officials say that the group's intrusions allowed the hackers to steal source code, customer account data, and personally identifiable information (PII).
[ { "id": 41484, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 80, "end_offset": 86 }, { "id": 41485, "label": "location", "start_offset": 116, "end_offset": 119 } ]
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13,331
This is not the first time that APT41 activities have been scrutinized — the group has been active for some time.
[ { "id": 41494, "label": "location", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 41495, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 33, "end_offset": 38 }, { "id": 41496, "label": "location", "start_offset": 109, "end_offset": 113 } ]
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Just last May, Trend Micro connected the group to ransomware attacks on Taiwanese organizations.
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The attack chain of ransomware incidents in Taiwan
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The ransomware attack chain is outlined in Figure 1; however, we currently do not know the initial arrival vector of this threat into a potential victim's network.
[ { "id": 41510, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 113 } ]
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After logging in to the active directory server, the threat actor modifies the active directory server group policy object — this includes a request that all domain account members create a scheduled task and execute the malware.
[ { "id": 41516, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 190, "end_offset": 204 }, { "id": 41517, "label": "location", "start_offset": 205, "end_offset": 208 } ]
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13,340
In the final step, the other subsidiary active directory servers and all the endpoint machines will download the scheduled task and execute the ransomware. Figure.1 The attacker uses an Active Directory (AD) scheduled task to deploy the ransomware in the customer environment.
[ { "id": 41518, "label": "location", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 70 }, { "id": 41519, "label": "location", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 101 }, { "id": 41520, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 115, "end_offset": 129 }, { "id": 41521, "label": "location", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 133 }, { "id": 41522, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 218, "end_offset": 232 } ]
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13,341
Scheduled tasks play a very important role in this incident.
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13,342
The threat actors use a scheduled task command to spread and infect a victim's environment.
[ { "id": 41523, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 38 }, { "id": 41524, "label": "location", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 60 } ]
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13,343
The screenshot in Figure 2 shows how the threat actor uses SMB and internal IIS Web Service to copy "lc.tmp" (the main ransomware loader in this incident) to other victims' host machines.
[ { "id": 41526, "label": "location", "start_offset": 63, "end_offset": 66 }, { "id": 41527, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 80, "end_offset": 91 }, { "id": 41528, "label": "location", "start_offset": 173, "end_offset": 177 } ]
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13,344
After that, the PowerShell command executes the main ransomware loader.
[ { "id": 41529, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 26 } ]
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13,345
Figure 2.
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How a scheduled task delivers the malware to a victim's environment
[ { "id": 41531, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 20 } ]
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13,350
The loaders decrypted the next-stage payloads, which were either embedded inside itself or stored on the disk as separate files.
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13,351
The next-stage payloads were CobaltStrike in this series of incidents.
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13,353
More than just a single occurrence
[ { "id": 41543, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 10, "end_offset": 14 } ]
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13,359
Possible link to Chinese espionage
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13,360
The C&C server 104[.]233[.]224[.]227 was hosted under a small hosting service with only 64 IPs under it.
[ { "id": 41555, "label": "IPV4", "start_offset": 15, "end_offset": 36 }, { "id": 41556, "label": "location", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 61 } ]
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13,368
To help defend users against APT41 specifically, we have developed an assessment tool that can scan endpoints for file-based indicators collected from global intelligence sources.
[ { "id": 41578, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 29, "end_offset": 34 }, { "id": 41579, "label": "location", "start_offset": 81, "end_offset": 85 }, { "id": 41580, "label": "location", "start_offset": 91, "end_offset": 94 } ]
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Indicators of Compromise SHA 256 Malware Family 2367326f995cb911c72baadc33a3155f8f674600 NTDSDump 75e49120a0238749827196cebb7559a37a2422f8 COLDLOCK 5b9b7fb59f0613c32650e8a3b91067079bcb2fc2 COLDLOCK e7aa8f55148b4548ef1ab9744bc3d0e67588d5b7 COLDLOCK ad6783c349e98c2b4a8ce0b5c9207611309adca7 COBALTSTRIKE 29cc0ff619f54068ce0ab34e8ed3919d13fa5ee9 COLDLOCK 2051f0a253eced030539a10ebc3e6869b727b8a9 COLDLOCK a2046f17ec4f5517636ea331141a4b5423d534f0 COLDLOCK 03589dffe2ab72a0de5e9dce61b07e44a983d857 COBALTSTRIKE 9d6feb6e246557f57d17b8df2b6d07194ad66f66 COLDLOCK 28d172e374eebc29911f2152b470528fc695662e PWDDUMPER 574fb6a497c032f7b9df54bc4669d1eb58d78fb4 ASPSHELL *One of the sources for this table is the original report from the U.S. Justice Department Tags Latest News | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Cyber Crime | Network | Articles, News, Reports
[ { "id": 41581, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 91, "end_offset": 131 }, { "id": 41582, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 132, "end_offset": 140 }, { "id": 41583, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 141, "end_offset": 181 }, { "id": 41584, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 182, "end_offset": 190 }, { "id": 41585, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 191, "end_offset": 231 }, { "id": 41586, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 232, "end_offset": 240 }, { "id": 41587, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 241, "end_offset": 281 }, { "id": 41588, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 282, "end_offset": 290 }, { "id": 41589, "label": "MD5", "start_offset": 291, "end_offset": 331 }, { "id": 41590, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 345, "end_offset": 385 }, { "id": 41591, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 386, "end_offset": 394 }, { "id": 41592, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 395, "end_offset": 435 }, { "id": 41593, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 436, "end_offset": 444 }, { "id": 41594, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 445, "end_offset": 485 }, { "id": 41595, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 486, "end_offset": 494 }, { "id": 41596, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 495, "end_offset": 535 }, { "id": 41597, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 549, "end_offset": 589 }, { "id": 41598, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 590, "end_offset": 598 }, { "id": 41599, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 599, "end_offset": 639 }, { "id": 41600, "label": "SHA1", "start_offset": 650, "end_offset": 690 }, { "id": 41601, "label": "location", "start_offset": 702, "end_offset": 705 }, { "id": 41602, "label": "location", "start_offset": 773, "end_offset": 780 }, { "id": 41603, "label": "location", "start_offset": 816, "end_offset": 819 } ]
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Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.
[ { "id": 41617, "label": "location", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 99 }, { "id": 41618, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 125, "end_offset": 129 } ]
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We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.
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Email:
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Attacker Owned Domains:
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To protect our users, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.
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If the link was not active, the user was redirected directly to a legitimate website.
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13,398
We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021.
[ { "id": 41703, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 46 } ]
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ALIEN lives inside multiple privileged processes and receives commands from PREDATOR over IPC.
[ { "id": 41708, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 5 }, { "id": 41709, "label": "location", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 52 } ]
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We did not capture the subsequent stages, but assess the attackers did not have exploits for the current version of Chrome (91.0.4472) at that time, but instead used n-day exploits targeting Samsung Browser, which was running an older and vulnerable version of Chromium.
[ { "id": 41719, "label": "location", "start_offset": 144, "end_offset": 148 }, { "id": 41721, "label": "location", "start_offset": 236, "end_offset": 239 }, { "id": 41722, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 262, "end_offset": 270 } ]
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Related IOCs
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13,408
We recovered the exploit used to escape the Chrome Sandbox, but not the initial RCE exploit.
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We haven’t retrieved a copy of the exploit.
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Related IOCs
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Related IOCs
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We would also like to thank Project Zero for their technical assistance in helping analyze these bugs.
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We remain committed to updating the community as we uncover these campaigns.
[ { "id": 41782, "label": "location", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 45 }, { "id": 41783, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 52, "end_offset": 59 } ]
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We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.
[ { "id": 41787, "label": "location", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 56 }, { "id": 41788, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 71, "end_offset": 77 }, { "id": 41789, "label": "location", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 81 }, { "id": 41790, "label": "location", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 90 }, { "id": 41791, "label": "location", "start_offset": 115, "end_offset": 120 } ]
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NOTE: On May 20th, we updated our attribution to more precisely describe our findings.
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Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.
[ { "id": 41799, "label": "location", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 100 }, { "id": 41800, "label": "location", "start_offset": 106, "end_offset": 110 }, { "id": 41801, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 114, "end_offset": 122 }, { "id": 41802, "label": "location", "start_offset": 123, "end_offset": 126 } ]
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As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.
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The data is then exfiltrated via email to a compromised email account.
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13,439
Malware samples:
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TAG would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation.
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13,444
Recently observed Turla domains: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to use Gmail accounts to send credential phishing emails to a variety of Google and non-Google accounts.
[ { "id": 41854, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 159, "end_offset": 167 }, { "id": 41856, "label": "location", "start_offset": 198, "end_offset": 201 } ]
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The group's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for these campaigns have shifted slightly from including phishing links directly in the email, to also linking to PDFs and/or DOCs hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive.
[ { "id": 41861, "label": "location", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 35 }, { "id": 41862, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 111, "end_offset": 119 }, { "id": 41864, "label": "location", "start_offset": 208, "end_offset": 211 } ]
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13,447
Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.
[ { "id": 41867, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 63 } ]
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13,448
These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.
[ { "id": 41868, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 14 }, { "id": 41870, "label": "location", "start_offset": 129, "end_offset": 132 }, { "id": 41871, "label": "location", "start_offset": 148, "end_offset": 151 } ]
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13,449
Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing.
[ { "id": 41872, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 18, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 41873, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 47 }, { "id": 41874, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 68 }, { "id": 41876, "label": "location", "start_offset": 142, "end_offset": 145 }, { "id": 41877, "label": "location", "start_offset": 146, "end_offset": 149 }, { "id": 41879, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 210, "end_offset": 218 } ]
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13,450
This campaign, targeting high risk individuals in Ukraine, contained links leading to compromised websites where the first stage phishing page was hosted.
[ { "id": 41880, "label": "location", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 13 }, { "id": 41883, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 129, "end_offset": 137 }, { "id": 41884, "label": "location", "start_offset": 138, "end_offset": 142 } ]
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If the user clicked continue, they would be redirected to an attacker controlled site that collected the users credentials.
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In mid-April, TAG detected a Ghostwriter credential phishing campaign targeting Facebook users.
[ { "id": 41896, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 52, "end_offset": 60 }, { "id": 41897, "label": "location", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 69 } ]
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Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains and emails: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia.
[ { "id": 41902, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 18, "end_offset": 29 }, { "id": 41903, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 49 }, { "id": 41904, "label": "location", "start_offset": 58, "end_offset": 61 }, { "id": 41909, "label": "location", "start_offset": 188, "end_offset": 191 }, { "id": 41912, "label": "location", "start_offset": 239, "end_offset": 242 } ]
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Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.
[ { "id": 41923, "label": "location", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 44 }, { "id": 41924, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 71 } ]
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The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.
[ { "id": 41931, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 41932, "label": "location", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 41933, "label": "location", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 80 }, { "id": 41934, "label": "location", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 97 }, { "id": 41935, "label": "location", "start_offset": 122, "end_offset": 126 }, { "id": 41936, "label": "location", "start_offset": 134, "end_offset": 137 } ]
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While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.
[ { "id": 41942, "label": "location", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 12 }, { "id": 41944, "label": "location", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 64 }, { "id": 41946, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 91, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 41947, "label": "location", "start_offset": 223, "end_offset": 229 } ]
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On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.
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Our team of analysts and security experts is focused on identifying and stopping issues like phishing campaigns, zero-day vulnerabilities and hacking against Google, our products and our users.
[ { "id": 41953, "label": "location", "start_offset": 21, "end_offset": 24 }, { "id": 41954, "label": "location", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 33 }, { "id": 41955, "label": "location", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 41956, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 101 }, { "id": 41958, "label": "location", "start_offset": 138, "end_offset": 141 }, { "id": 41960, "label": "location", "start_offset": 179, "end_offset": 182 } ]
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13,467
Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.
[ { "id": 41962, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 58, "end_offset": 66 }, { "id": 41963, "label": "location", "start_offset": 76, "end_offset": 79 } ]
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Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.
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Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.
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The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.
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Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.
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We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.
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[ { "id": 1101, "from_id": 51544, "to_id": 51545, "type": "targets" } ]
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And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.
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As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.
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The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.
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The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.
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To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.
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APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.
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Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.
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Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.
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In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.
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When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.
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We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.
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We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).
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Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.
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