mrmoor/cyber-threat-intelligence · Datasets at Hugging Face

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13,487	Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.	[ { "id": 51560, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 11 }, { "id": 51561, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 55 } ]	[]	[]
13,488	These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.	[]	[]	[]
13,489	We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.	[ { "id": 51562, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 54 }, { "id": 51563, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 62 } ]	[]	[]
13,490	Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.	[]	[]	[]
13,491	We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.	[]	[]	[]
13,492	Cybercriminals have different motivations: for example, some malicious actors have disruptive political attacks as their objective, while others might be more inclined towards cyberespionage and gathering information on their victims.	[]	[]	[]
13,493	Of course, financial gain remains a powerful cybercrime motivation — perhaps even the most common one.	[]	[]	[]
13,494	Some malicious actors, such as ransomware operators, earn directly from their cyberattacks.	[]	[]	[]
13,495	Others, however, prefer to act as “cybermercenaries,” selling their services to anyone willing to pay.	[]	[]	[]
13,496	One of the most prolific cybermercenaries is Void Balaur, a Russian-speaking threat actor group that has launched attacks against different sectors and industries all over the world.	[ { "id": 51564, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 45, "end_offset": 56 } ]	[]	[]
13,497	Although Void Balaur offers a wide range of services, the group’s bread and butter is cyberespionage and information theft, selling highly sensitive information on individuals in underground forums and websites such as Probiv.	[ { "id": 51565, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 20 } ]	[]	[]
13,498	The group primarily targets email accounts and mailboxes.	[]	[]	[]
13,499	While it offers standard mailbox copies that was likely stolen with the help of credential phishing, Void Balaur also offers copies of mailboxes that have not been interacted with — for a higher price.	[ { "id": 51567, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 112 }, { "id": 51568, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 80, "end_offset": 99 } ]	[ { "id": 1104, "from_id": 51567, "to_id": 51568, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,500	This option is particularly interesting since it would be extremely difficult under normal circumstances to gather the contents of a mailbox without any user interaction, which points to possibilities such as insider assistance or even the compromise of the email provider’s systems.	[]	[]	[]
13,501	Figure 1.	[]	[]	[]
13,502	Countries in which Void Balaur email targets were located In addition, Void Balaur also offers their customers access to a large amount of private data, which includes information such as flight and travel data (passports and ticket purchases); criminal records; financial records and credit histories; pension funds; and even printouts of SMS messages.	[ { "id": 51569, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 19, "end_offset": 30 }, { "id": 51570, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 76, "end_offset": 87 } ]	[]	[]
13,503	It’s easy to see why the services of a cybermercenary like Void Balaur is in demand — these types of information can be very useful for a group or an individual who wants to launch an attack on specific targets.	[ { "id": 51571, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 70 } ]	[]	[]
13,504	Void Balaur’s high-profile targets	[ { "id": 51572, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 12 } ]	[]	[]
13,505	What makes Void Balaur’s attacks particularly noteworthy is the often-lofty status of its targets.	[ { "id": 51573, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 23 } ]	[]	[]
13,506	While the threat actor has been known to offer its services to a more general audience — as seen in its online advertisements in the underground — research from groups such as eQualit.ie and Amnesty International show that Void Balaur is likely also involved in attacks against higher profile victims, ranging from human rights activists and journalists to politicians and even presidential candidates.	[ { "id": 51574, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 176, "end_offset": 186 }, { "id": 51575, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 191, "end_offset": 213 }, { "id": 51576, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 223, "end_offset": 234 } ]	[]	[]
13,507	One of the group’s more notable campaigns involved attacks that targeted the private email addresses of government officials and politicians in an Eastern European country in September 2021.	[ { "id": 51578, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 175, "end_offset": 189 }, { "id": 51577, "label": "location", "start_offset": 147, "end_offset": 163 } ]	[]	[]
13,508	Living up to its cybermercenary label, Void Balaur does not limit itself to the geopolitical scene.	[ { "id": 51579, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 51 } ]	[]	[]
13,509	Organizations that have access to a large amount of private information are also frequent victims of the group.	[]	[]	[]
13,510	These targets belong to different industries such as the telecommunications, retail, financial, medical, and even the biotech sectors.	[]	[]	[]
13,511	Organizational leaders and employees that are heavily involved with the company’s core business are among the threat actor’s favored targets, since these individuals will likely have access to the kind of information the group seeks.	[]	[]	[]
13,512	Curtailing cybermercenary attacks	[]	[]	[]
13,513	Given what we’ve seen of cybermercenaries like Void Balaur, it is likely that these groups have access to a large number of tools and infrastructure that allows them to launch attacks even against prominent individuals and organizations.	[ { "id": 51580, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 58 } ]	[]	[]
13,514	However, this does not mean that practicing and implementing the right security safeguards will not help in defending against cybermercenary attacks.	[]	[]	[]
13,515	The following security best practices can help both individuals and organizations thwart cybermercenary attacks (and cyberattacks in general): Employ the services of a reputable provider that places high priority on security.	[]	[]	[]
13,516	Consider using dedicated two-factor authentication apps or devices such as Yubikey instead of relying on SMS.	[]	[]	[]
13,517	Use encryption systems for communication, especially when it involves sensitive information.	[]	[]	[]
13,518	Encrypt the drives of all computers and other machines that are used to store sensitive information.	[]	[]	[]
13,519	Practice good security hygiene by deleting old emails and messages to minimize the chances of an attacker gaining access to private information.	[]	[]	[]
13,520	Learn more about the activities and targets of Void Balaur in our research paper, Void Balaur: Tracking a Cybermercenary’s Activities.	[ { "id": 42161, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 58 } ]	[]	[]
13,521	Tags APT & Targeted Attacks \| Cyber Crime \| Research \| Articles, News, Reports	[]	[]	[]
13,522	The US Department of Energy (DOE) recently launched the Operational Technology (OT) Defender Fellowship.	[ { "id": 51581, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 33 } ]	[]	[]
13,524	In collaboration with DOE's Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' (FDD) Center for Cyber and Technology Innovation (CTTI), the OT Defender Fellowship hopes to expand the knowledge of primary US front-line critical infrastructure defenders.	[ { "id": 51583, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 29, "end_offset": 59 }, { "id": 51584, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 51585, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 113, "end_offset": 156 }, { "id": 51587, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 168, "end_offset": 190 } ]	[]	[]
13,526	Sharing cybersecurity knowledge to the private sector	[]	[]	[]
13,528	It will enable the program participants to engage with various cyber and national experts across the US government.	[]	[]	[]
13,529	The program aims to also equip them with a better understanding of the strategies and tactics of the country's adversaries and how the US government cyber operations defend the nation.	[ { "id": 51590, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 135, "end_offset": 149 } ]	[]	[]
13,530	The Fellowship aligns with the bipartisan recommendations of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC).	[ { "id": 51592, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 90, "end_offset": 126 } ]	[]	[]
13,531	King also explains that the CSC report supports operationalizing cybersecurity partnership with the private sector and remolding how the government works with the private sector.	[ { "id": 51593, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 31 }, { "id": 51594, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 4 } ]	[]	[]
13,532	King added that this DOE initiative will better protect the US from cyberattacks.	[ { "id": 51595, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 4 }, { "id": 51596, "label": "location", "start_offset": 60, "end_offset": 62 } ]	[]	[]
13,533	Tom Fanning, Chairman, President & CEO of Southern Company, says that national security greatly depends on the collaboration between private sector and the government.	[ { "id": 51597, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 11 } ]	[]	[]
13,535	They must also be nominated by their organization's leadership and commit to the requirements imposed by the program.	[]	[]	[]
13,536	The participant must also be a US citizen and currently hold or be able to attain federal security clearance at the Secret or higher level, or be in a role that justifies application for Department of Homeland Security-sponsored private sector clearance.	[]	[]	[]
13,537	For more information about the OT Defender Fellowship, visit https://inl.gov/otdefender/ Tags Latest News \| ICS OT \| APT & Targeted Attacks \| IoT \| Articles, News, Reports	[ { "id": 42228, "label": "URL", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 88 } ]	[]	[]
13,538	Since 2019, we have been tracking a threat campaign we dubbed as “Water Pamola.”	[ { "id": 51599, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 51600, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 78 } ]	[]	[]
13,539	The campaign initially compromised e-commerce online shops in Japan, Australia, and European countries via spam emails with malicious attachments.	[ { "id": 51605, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 118 }, { "id": 51606, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 12 }, { "id": 51607, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 51601, "label": "location", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 51602, "label": "location", "start_offset": 69, "end_offset": 78 }, { "id": 51603, "label": "location", "start_offset": 84, "end_offset": 92 } ]	[ { "id": 1105, "from_id": 51606, "to_id": 51607, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1106, "from_id": 51607, "to_id": 51601, "type": "located-at" }, { "id": 1107, "from_id": 51607, "to_id": 51602, "type": "located-at" }, { "id": 1108, "from_id": 51607, "to_id": 51603, "type": "located-at" }, { "id": 1110, "from_id": 51606, "to_id": 51605, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,540	However, since early 2020, we’ve noticed some changes to Water Pamola’s activity.	[ { "id": 51609, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 69 }, { "id": 51610, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 15, "end_offset": 25 } ]	[]	[]
13,541	Victims are now mainly located only in Japan.	[ { "id": 51611, "label": "location", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 44 }, { "id": 51612, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 } ]	[ { "id": 1111, "from_id": 51612, "to_id": 51611, "type": "located-at" } ]	[]
13,542	Recent telemetry data indicates that the attacks are not being launched via spam anymore.	[ { "id": 51613, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 76, "end_offset": 80 } ]	[]	[]
13,543	Instead, malicious scripts are being executed when the administrators look into customer orders in their online shop’s administration panel.	[ { "id": 51614, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 69 }, { "id": 51615, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 105, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 51616, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 26 } ]	[ { "id": 1112, "from_id": 51616, "to_id": 51615, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1113, "from_id": 51614, "to_id": 51615, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,544	Figure 1.	[]	[]	[]
13,545	The Water Pamola attack chain After further searching, we noticed that an online store administrator asked about a strange online order that contains JavaScript code inserted into the field where the customer’s address or company name would normally be located.	[ { "id": 51617, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 16 }, { "id": 51618, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 79, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 51620, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 155, "end_offset": 179 } ]	[ { "id": 1114, "from_id": 51617, "to_id": 51620, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,546	This script is likely activated by exploiting a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the said store’s administration portal.	[ { "id": 51622, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 130 }, { "id": 51623, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 11 }, { "id": 51621, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 74 } ]	[ { "id": 1115, "from_id": 51623, "to_id": 51622, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1116, "from_id": 51623, "to_id": 51621, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,547	Figure 2.	[]	[]	[]
13,548	The question asked on a forum showing the payload related to Water Pamola.	[ { "id": 51624, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 73 } ]	[]	[]
13,549	The above is a screenshot of the text in a forum, which is translated by Google Translate as Problem, there is an order that seems to be a mischievous order.	[ { "id": 51625, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 94 } ]	[]	[]
13,550	The following characters are included in the address and company name.	[]	[]	[]
13,551	The script connects to the Water Pamola’s server and downloads additional payloads.	[ { "id": 51627, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 51626, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 48 } ]	[ { "id": 1117, "from_id": 51627, "to_id": 51626, "type": "beacons-to" } ]	[]
13,552	Taken together, this led us to believe that Water Pamola places orders with this embedded XSS script across many targeted online shops.	[ { "id": 51628, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 44, "end_offset": 56 }, { "id": 42261, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 90, "end_offset": 93 } ]	[ { "id": 1118, "from_id": 51628, "to_id": 42261, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,553	If they are vulnerable to this XSS attack, these will be loaded when the victim (i.e., an administrator at the targeted merchant) opens the order within their management panel.	[ { "id": 51629, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 34 }, { "id": 51630, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 159, "end_offset": 175 } ]	[]	[]
13,554	We have collected many attack scripts they delivered to different targets.	[]	[]	[]
13,555	The malicious behavior performed by the scripts includes page grabbing, credential phishing, web shell infection, and malware delivery.	[ { "id": 51631, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 70 }, { "id": 51634, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 134 }, { "id": 51632, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 91 }, { "id": 51633, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 112 } ]	[]	[]
13,556	This campaign appears to be financially motivated.	[]	[]	[]
13,557	In at least one instance, a site that Water Pamola attacked later disclosed that they had suffered a data breach.	[ { "id": 51635, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 38, "end_offset": 50 } ]	[]	[]
13,558	Their server was illegally accessed and personal information, which included names, credit card numbers, card expiration dates, and credit card security codes, were potentially leaked.	[ { "id": 51636, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 12 } ]	[]	[]
13,559	This breach might be associated with Water Pamola, and it hints that this campaign’s overall goal is to steal the credit card data (similar to Magecart campaigns).	[ { "id": 51637, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 49 } ]	[]	[]
13,560	Analysis of the XSS attack	[ { "id": 42282, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 19 } ]	[]	[]
13,561	As previously mentioned, Water Pamola sent online shopping orders appended with a malicious XSS script to attack e-commerce administrators.	[ { "id": 51638, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 37 }, { "id": 51639, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 51640, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 113, "end_offset": 138 } ]	[ { "id": 1119, "from_id": 51638, "to_id": 51640, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1120, "from_id": 51638, "to_id": 51639, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,562	It’s worth mentioning that they are not targeting a specific e-commerce framework, but e-commerce systems in general.	[]	[]	[]
13,563	If the store’s e-commerce system is vulnerable to XSS attacks, the malicious script will be loaded and executed on the merchant’s management panel once someone (like a system administrator or store employee) opens the said order.	[ { "id": 51641, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 50, "end_offset": 53 }, { "id": 51642, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 83 }, { "id": 51643, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 147 } ]	[ { "id": 1121, "from_id": 51642, "to_id": 51643, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1122, "from_id": 51642, "to_id": 51641, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
13,564	These scripts were managed with an XSS attack framework called “XSS.ME,” which helps attackers deal with their attack scripts and the stolen information.	[ { "id": 51644, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 38 }, { "id": 51645, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 64, "end_offset": 70 } ]	[]	[]
13,565	The source code of this framework is shared across many Chinese public forums.	[ { "id": 51646, "label": "location", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 63 }, { "id": 51647, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 33 } ]	[ { "id": 1123, "from_id": 51647, "to_id": 51646, "type": "related-to" } ]	[]
13,566	The basic attack script provided by the framework could report the victim’s location and browser cookies.	[ { "id": 51648, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 10, "end_offset": 24 } ]	[]	[]
13,567	We observed that the scripts used during the attacks were customized.	[]	[]	[]
13,568	The attackers delivered a variety of different XSS scripts, which could include one or more of the following behaviors: Page Grabber	[ { "id": 51649, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 50 } ]	[]	[]
13,569	The script sends an HTTP GET request to a specified URL address and forwards the received response to Water Pamola’s server.	[ { "id": 51650, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 102, "end_offset": 116 } ]	[]	[]
13,570	This is usually used during an early stage of the attack to grab content from the victim’s management page.	[]	[]	[]
13,571	Doing so allows the threat actor to understand the environment and design attack scripts appropriate to the victim’s environment. Figure 3.	[ { "id": 51651, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 74, "end_offset": 88 }, { "id": 51652, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 108, "end_offset": 114 }, { "id": 51653, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 33 } ]	[]	[]
13,572	The script for grabbing page content and sending it back to the attacker Credential Phishing	[ { "id": 51654, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 77, "end_offset": 96 } ]	[]	[]
13,573	Some of the delivered scripts revealed that the campaign was trying to obtain administrator credentials for e-commerce websites using two different approaches.	[ { "id": 51655, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 108, "end_offset": 127 } ]	[]	[]
13,574	The first way involves appending a fake login form to the page.	[]	[]	[]
13,575	The script hooks the mouse click event.	[ { "id": 42322, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 16 } ]	[]	[]
13,576	If the victim enters the credential in the fake form and clicks anywhere on the page, the script will take the credentials, encode them using base64, replace some characters with custom substrings, and then upload these to Water Pamola’s server. Figure 4.	[ { "id": 51656, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 223, "end_offset": 244 }, { "id": 51657, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 90, "end_offset": 96 } ]	[ { "id": 1124, "from_id": 51657, "to_id": 51656, "type": "communicates-with" } ]	[]
13,577	The script to create and delete fake login form for credential phishing The other approach involves showing an authorization error message and then redirecting the user to a phishing website that asks users to enter their credentials.	[ { "id": 51659, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 178, "end_offset": 186 }, { "id": 51658, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 52, "end_offset": 71 } ]	[]	[]
13,578	The subdomains of their phishing sites were configured to match the names of the targets’ domain, such as “{victim’s domain}[.]basic-authentication[.]live”.	[ { "id": 51660, "label": "URL", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 154 } ]	[]	[]
13,579	Figure 5.	[]	[]	[]
13,580	The script replaces the page content with an authorization error message and redirects users to the phishing website Webshell/PHP backdoor injection	[ { "id": 51661, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 } ]	[]	[]
13,581	Some of the delivered malicious scripts attempt to install backdoors to the websites built with the EC-CUBE framework, which is popular in Japan.	[ { "id": 51662, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 100, "end_offset": 117 }, { "id": 51664, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 22, "end_offset": 39 }, { "id": 51663, "label": "location", "start_offset": 139, "end_offset": 144 } ]	[ { "id": 1125, "from_id": 51662, "to_id": 51663, "type": "related-to" }, { "id": 1126, "from_id": 51664, "to_id": 51662, "type": "targets" } ]	[]
13,582	The attack we found only works on Series 2 of EC-CUBE; the current version is Series 4, with Series 2 now under extended support.	[ { "id": 51667, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 53 }, { "id": 51668, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 86 } ]	[]	[]
13,583	There are three different approaches used to upload the backdoor.	[]	[]	[]
13,584	The first method is uploading a PHP web shell file by calling the native API provided by the framework.	[ { "id": 42347, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 45 } ]	[]	[]
13,585	The name of the web shell file is hardcoded to be either “ec_ver.php,” “log3.php,” or “temp.php.”	[ { "id": 51670, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 58, "end_offset": 69 }, { "id": 51671, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 80 }, { "id": 51672, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 87, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 42348, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 25 } ]	[ { "id": 1127, "from_id": 42348, "to_id": 51670, "type": "related-to" }, { "id": 1128, "from_id": 42348, "to_id": 51671, "type": "related-to" }, { "id": 1129, "from_id": 42348, "to_id": 51672, "type": "related-to" } ]	[]
13,586	The web shell can execute any PHP code sent by an HTTP POST request to the web shell.	[ { "id": 51673, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 14 } ]	[]	[]
13,587	Note the screenshot in Figure 6: The same web shell with the same “only_pcd” keyword is mentioned in this Chinese blog post.	[ { "id": 51674, "label": "location", "start_offset": 106, "end_offset": 113 }, { "id": 51675, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 75 } ]	[]	[]
13,588	The blog post describes a web shell with two components — a PHP script and an HTML uploading file — however, the second one is not needed as the proper POST request can be created with any custom or third-party tool (e.g., Fiddler). Figure 6.	[ { "id": 51676, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 35 }, { "id": 51677, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 60, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 51678, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 97 } ]	[ { "id": 1130, "from_id": 51676, "to_id": 51677, "type": "consists-of" }, { "id": 1131, "from_id": 51676, "to_id": 51678, "type": "consists-of" } ]	[]
13,589	The script for uploading the PHP web shell to an e-commerce website The second method is modifying the page header to inject PHP code, which will then execute any PHP code, sent by the parameter “ec_ver2update” in the HTTP request.	[ { "id": 51680, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 51681, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 51679, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 200, "end_offset": 213 } ]	[]	[]
13,590	Note that the PHP code below is obfuscated.	[]	[]	[]

13,487

Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.

[ { "id": 51560, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 11 }, { "id": 51561, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 55 } ]

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These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.

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We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.

[ { "id": 51562, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 54 }, { "id": 51563, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 62 } ]

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Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.

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We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.

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Cybercriminals have different motivations: for example, some malicious actors have disruptive political attacks as their objective, while others might be more inclined towards cyberespionage and gathering information on their victims.

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Of course, financial gain remains a powerful cybercrime motivation — perhaps even the most common one.

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Some malicious actors, such as ransomware operators, earn directly from their cyberattacks.

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Others, however, prefer to act as “cybermercenaries,” selling their services to anyone willing to pay.

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One of the most prolific cybermercenaries is Void Balaur, a Russian-speaking threat actor group that has launched attacks against different sectors and industries all over the world.

[ { "id": 51564, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 45, "end_offset": 56 } ]

[]

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Although Void Balaur offers a wide range of services, the group’s bread and butter is cyberespionage and information theft, selling highly sensitive information on individuals in underground forums and websites such as Probiv.

[ { "id": 51565, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 20 } ]

[]

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The group primarily targets email accounts and mailboxes.

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While it offers standard mailbox copies that was likely stolen with the help of credential phishing, Void Balaur also offers copies of mailboxes that have not been interacted with — for a higher price.

[ { "id": 51567, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 112 }, { "id": 51568, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 80, "end_offset": 99 } ]

[ { "id": 1104, "from_id": 51567, "to_id": 51568, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

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This option is particularly interesting since it would be extremely difficult under normal circumstances to gather the contents of a mailbox without any user interaction, which points to possibilities such as insider assistance or even the compromise of the email provider’s systems.

[]

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Figure 1.

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Countries in which Void Balaur email targets were located In addition, Void Balaur also offers their customers access to a large amount of private data, which includes information such as flight and travel data (passports and ticket purchases); criminal records; financial records and credit histories; pension funds; and even printouts of SMS messages.

[ { "id": 51569, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 19, "end_offset": 30 }, { "id": 51570, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 76, "end_offset": 87 } ]

[]

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It’s easy to see why the services of a cybermercenary like Void Balaur is in demand — these types of information can be very useful for a group or an individual who wants to launch an attack on specific targets.

[ { "id": 51571, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 70 } ]

[]

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Void Balaur’s high-profile targets

[ { "id": 51572, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 12 } ]

[]

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What makes Void Balaur’s attacks particularly noteworthy is the often-lofty status of its targets.

[ { "id": 51573, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 23 } ]

[]

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While the threat actor has been known to offer its services to a more general audience — as seen in its online advertisements in the underground — research from groups such as eQualit.ie and Amnesty International show that Void Balaur is likely also involved in attacks against higher profile victims, ranging from human rights activists and journalists to politicians and even presidential candidates.

[ { "id": 51574, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 176, "end_offset": 186 }, { "id": 51575, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 191, "end_offset": 213 }, { "id": 51576, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 223, "end_offset": 234 } ]

[]

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One of the group’s more notable campaigns involved attacks that targeted the private email addresses of government officials and politicians in an Eastern European country in September 2021.

[ { "id": 51578, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 175, "end_offset": 189 }, { "id": 51577, "label": "location", "start_offset": 147, "end_offset": 163 } ]

[]

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Living up to its cybermercenary label, Void Balaur does not limit itself to the geopolitical scene.

[ { "id": 51579, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 51 } ]

[]

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Organizations that have access to a large amount of private information are also frequent victims of the group.

[]

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These targets belong to different industries such as the telecommunications, retail, financial, medical, and even the biotech sectors.

[]

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Organizational leaders and employees that are heavily involved with the company’s core business are among the threat actor’s favored targets, since these individuals will likely have access to the kind of information the group seeks.

[]

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Curtailing cybermercenary attacks

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Given what we’ve seen of cybermercenaries like Void Balaur, it is likely that these groups have access to a large number of tools and infrastructure that allows them to launch attacks even against prominent individuals and organizations.

[ { "id": 51580, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 58 } ]

[]

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However, this does not mean that practicing and implementing the right security safeguards will not help in defending against cybermercenary attacks.

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The following security best practices can help both individuals and organizations thwart cybermercenary attacks (and cyberattacks in general): Employ the services of a reputable provider that places high priority on security.

[]

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Consider using dedicated two-factor authentication apps or devices such as Yubikey instead of relying on SMS.

[]

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Use encryption systems for communication, especially when it involves sensitive information.

[]

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Encrypt the drives of all computers and other machines that are used to store sensitive information.

[]

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Practice good security hygiene by deleting old emails and messages to minimize the chances of an attacker gaining access to private information.

[]

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Learn more about the activities and targets of Void Balaur in our research paper, Void Balaur: Tracking a Cybermercenary’s Activities.

[ { "id": 42161, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 58 } ]

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Tags APT & Targeted Attacks | Cyber Crime | Research | Articles, News, Reports

[]

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The US Department of Energy (DOE) recently launched the Operational Technology (OT) Defender Fellowship.

[ { "id": 51581, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 33 } ]

[]

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In collaboration with DOE's Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' (FDD) Center for Cyber and Technology Innovation (CTTI), the OT Defender Fellowship hopes to expand the knowledge of primary US front-line critical infrastructure defenders.

[ { "id": 51583, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 29, "end_offset": 59 }, { "id": 51584, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 51585, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 113, "end_offset": 156 }, { "id": 51587, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 168, "end_offset": 190 } ]

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Sharing cybersecurity knowledge to the private sector

[]

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It will enable the program participants to engage with various cyber and national experts across the US government.

[]

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The program aims to also equip them with a better understanding of the strategies and tactics of the country's adversaries and how the US government cyber operations defend the nation.

[ { "id": 51590, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 135, "end_offset": 149 } ]

[]

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The Fellowship aligns with the bipartisan recommendations of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC).

[ { "id": 51592, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 90, "end_offset": 126 } ]

[]

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King also explains that the CSC report supports operationalizing cybersecurity partnership with the private sector and remolding how the government works with the private sector.

[ { "id": 51593, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 31 }, { "id": 51594, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 4 } ]

[]

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King added that this DOE initiative will better protect the US from cyberattacks.

[ { "id": 51595, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 4 }, { "id": 51596, "label": "location", "start_offset": 60, "end_offset": 62 } ]

[]

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Tom Fanning, Chairman, President & CEO of Southern Company, says that national security greatly depends on the collaboration between private sector and the government.

[ { "id": 51597, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 11 } ]

[]

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They must also be nominated by their organization's leadership and commit to the requirements imposed by the program.

[]

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The participant must also be a US citizen and currently hold or be able to attain federal security clearance at the Secret or higher level, or be in a role that justifies application for Department of Homeland Security-sponsored private sector clearance.

[]

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For more information about the OT Defender Fellowship, visit https://inl.gov/otdefender/ Tags Latest News | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Articles, News, Reports

[ { "id": 42228, "label": "URL", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 88 } ]

[]

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Since 2019, we have been tracking a threat campaign we dubbed as “Water Pamola.”

[ { "id": 51599, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 51600, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 78 } ]

[]

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The campaign initially compromised e-commerce online shops in Japan, Australia, and European countries via spam emails with malicious attachments.

[ { "id": 51605, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 118 }, { "id": 51606, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 12 }, { "id": 51607, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 51601, "label": "location", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 51602, "label": "location", "start_offset": 69, "end_offset": 78 }, { "id": 51603, "label": "location", "start_offset": 84, "end_offset": 92 } ]

[ { "id": 1105, "from_id": 51606, "to_id": 51607, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1106, "from_id": 51607, "to_id": 51601, "type": "located-at" }, { "id": 1107, "from_id": 51607, "to_id": 51602, "type": "located-at" }, { "id": 1108, "from_id": 51607, "to_id": 51603, "type": "located-at" }, { "id": 1110, "from_id": 51606, "to_id": 51605, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

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However, since early 2020, we’ve noticed some changes to Water Pamola’s activity.

[ { "id": 51609, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 69 }, { "id": 51610, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 15, "end_offset": 25 } ]

[]

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Victims are now mainly located only in Japan.

[ { "id": 51611, "label": "location", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 44 }, { "id": 51612, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 } ]

[ { "id": 1111, "from_id": 51612, "to_id": 51611, "type": "located-at" } ]

[]

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Recent telemetry data indicates that the attacks are not being launched via spam anymore.

[ { "id": 51613, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 76, "end_offset": 80 } ]

[]

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Instead, malicious scripts are being executed when the administrators look into customer orders in their online shop’s administration panel.

[ { "id": 51614, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 69 }, { "id": 51615, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 105, "end_offset": 139 }, { "id": 51616, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 26 } ]

[ { "id": 1112, "from_id": 51616, "to_id": 51615, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1113, "from_id": 51614, "to_id": 51615, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

13,544

Figure 1.

[]

13,545

The Water Pamola attack chain After further searching, we noticed that an online store administrator asked about a strange online order that contains JavaScript code inserted into the field where the customer’s address or company name would normally be located.

[ { "id": 51617, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 16 }, { "id": 51618, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 79, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 51620, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 155, "end_offset": 179 } ]

[ { "id": 1114, "from_id": 51617, "to_id": 51620, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

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This script is likely activated by exploiting a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the said store’s administration portal.

[ { "id": 51622, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 130 }, { "id": 51623, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 11 }, { "id": 51621, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 48, "end_offset": 74 } ]

[ { "id": 1115, "from_id": 51623, "to_id": 51622, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1116, "from_id": 51623, "to_id": 51621, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

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Figure 2.

[]

13,548

The question asked on a forum showing the payload related to Water Pamola.

[ { "id": 51624, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 73 } ]

[]

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The above is a screenshot of the text in a forum, which is translated by Google Translate as Problem, there is an order that seems to be a mischievous order.

[ { "id": 51625, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 94 } ]

[]

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The following characters are included in the address and company name.

[]

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The script connects to the Water Pamola’s server and downloads additional payloads.

[ { "id": 51627, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 51626, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 48 } ]

[ { "id": 1117, "from_id": 51627, "to_id": 51626, "type": "beacons-to" } ]

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Taken together, this led us to believe that Water Pamola places orders with this embedded XSS script across many targeted online shops.

[ { "id": 51628, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 44, "end_offset": 56 }, { "id": 42261, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 90, "end_offset": 93 } ]

[ { "id": 1118, "from_id": 51628, "to_id": 42261, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

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If they are vulnerable to this XSS attack, these will be loaded when the victim (i.e., an administrator at the targeted merchant) opens the order within their management panel.

[ { "id": 51629, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 34 }, { "id": 51630, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 159, "end_offset": 175 } ]

[]

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We have collected many attack scripts they delivered to different targets.

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The malicious behavior performed by the scripts includes page grabbing, credential phishing, web shell infection, and malware delivery.

[ { "id": 51631, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 70 }, { "id": 51634, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 134 }, { "id": 51632, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 91 }, { "id": 51633, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 112 } ]

[]

13,556

This campaign appears to be financially motivated.

[]

13,557

In at least one instance, a site that Water Pamola attacked later disclosed that they had suffered a data breach.

[ { "id": 51635, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 38, "end_offset": 50 } ]

[]

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Their server was illegally accessed and personal information, which included names, credit card numbers, card expiration dates, and credit card security codes, were potentially leaked.

[ { "id": 51636, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 12 } ]

[]

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This breach might be associated with Water Pamola, and it hints that this campaign’s overall goal is to steal the credit card data (similar to Magecart campaigns).

[ { "id": 51637, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 49 } ]

[]

13,560

Analysis of the XSS attack

[ { "id": 42282, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 19 } ]

[]

13,561

As previously mentioned, Water Pamola sent online shopping orders appended with a malicious XSS script to attack e-commerce administrators.

[ { "id": 51638, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 37 }, { "id": 51639, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 51640, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 113, "end_offset": 138 } ]

[ { "id": 1119, "from_id": 51638, "to_id": 51640, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1120, "from_id": 51638, "to_id": 51639, "type": "uses" } ]

[]

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It’s worth mentioning that they are not targeting a specific e-commerce framework, but e-commerce systems in general.

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13,563

If the store’s e-commerce system is vulnerable to XSS attacks, the malicious script will be loaded and executed on the merchant’s management panel once someone (like a system administrator or store employee) opens the said order.

[ { "id": 51641, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 50, "end_offset": 53 }, { "id": 51642, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 83 }, { "id": 51643, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 147 } ]

[ { "id": 1121, "from_id": 51642, "to_id": 51643, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 1122, "from_id": 51642, "to_id": 51641, "type": "uses" } ]

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13,564

These scripts were managed with an XSS attack framework called “XSS.ME,” which helps attackers deal with their attack scripts and the stolen information.

[ { "id": 51644, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 38 }, { "id": 51645, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 64, "end_offset": 70 } ]

[]

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The source code of this framework is shared across many Chinese public forums.

[ { "id": 51646, "label": "location", "start_offset": 56, "end_offset": 63 }, { "id": 51647, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 33 } ]

[ { "id": 1123, "from_id": 51647, "to_id": 51646, "type": "related-to" } ]

[]

13,566

The basic attack script provided by the framework could report the victim’s location and browser cookies.

[ { "id": 51648, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 10, "end_offset": 24 } ]

[]

13,567

We observed that the scripts used during the attacks were customized.

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The attackers delivered a variety of different XSS scripts, which could include one or more of the following behaviors: Page Grabber

[ { "id": 51649, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 50 } ]

[]

13,569

The script sends an HTTP GET request to a specified URL address and forwards the received response to Water Pamola’s server.

[ { "id": 51650, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 102, "end_offset": 116 } ]

[]

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This is usually used during an early stage of the attack to grab content from the victim’s management page.

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Doing so allows the threat actor to understand the environment and design attack scripts appropriate to the victim’s environment. Figure 3.

[ { "id": 51651, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 74, "end_offset": 88 }, { "id": 51652, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 108, "end_offset": 114 }, { "id": 51653, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 33 } ]

[]

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The script for grabbing page content and sending it back to the attacker Credential Phishing

[ { "id": 51654, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 77, "end_offset": 96 } ]

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13,573

Some of the delivered scripts revealed that the campaign was trying to obtain administrator credentials for e-commerce websites using two different approaches.

[ { "id": 51655, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 108, "end_offset": 127 } ]

[]

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The first way involves appending a fake login form to the page.

[]

13,575

The script hooks the mouse click event.

[ { "id": 42322, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 16 } ]

[]

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If the victim enters the credential in the fake form and clicks anywhere on the page, the script will take the credentials, encode them using base64, replace some characters with custom substrings, and then upload these to Water Pamola’s server. Figure 4.

[ { "id": 51656, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 223, "end_offset": 244 }, { "id": 51657, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 90, "end_offset": 96 } ]

[ { "id": 1124, "from_id": 51657, "to_id": 51656, "type": "communicates-with" } ]

[]

13,577

The script to create and delete fake login form for credential phishing The other approach involves showing an authorization error message and then redirecting the user to a phishing website that asks users to enter their credentials.

[ { "id": 51659, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 178, "end_offset": 186 }, { "id": 51658, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 52, "end_offset": 71 } ]

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The subdomains of their phishing sites were configured to match the names of the targets’ domain, such as “{victim’s domain}[.]basic-authentication[.]live”.

[ { "id": 51660, "label": "URL", "start_offset": 107, "end_offset": 154 } ]

[]

13,579

Figure 5.

[]

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The script replaces the page content with an authorization error message and redirects users to the phishing website Webshell/PHP backdoor injection

[ { "id": 51661, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 } ]

[]

13,581

Some of the delivered malicious scripts attempt to install backdoors to the websites built with the EC-CUBE framework, which is popular in Japan.

[ { "id": 51662, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 100, "end_offset": 117 }, { "id": 51664, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 22, "end_offset": 39 }, { "id": 51663, "label": "location", "start_offset": 139, "end_offset": 144 } ]

[ { "id": 1125, "from_id": 51662, "to_id": 51663, "type": "related-to" }, { "id": 1126, "from_id": 51664, "to_id": 51662, "type": "targets" } ]

[]

13,582

The attack we found only works on Series 2 of EC-CUBE; the current version is Series 4, with Series 2 now under extended support.

[ { "id": 51667, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 53 }, { "id": 51668, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 86 } ]

[]

13,583

There are three different approaches used to upload the backdoor.

[]

13,584

The first method is uploading a PHP web shell file by calling the native API provided by the framework.

[ { "id": 42347, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 36, "end_offset": 45 } ]

[]

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The name of the web shell file is hardcoded to be either “ec_ver.php,” “log3.php,” or “temp.php.”

[ { "id": 51670, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 58, "end_offset": 69 }, { "id": 51671, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 80 }, { "id": 51672, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 87, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 42348, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 25 } ]

[ { "id": 1127, "from_id": 42348, "to_id": 51670, "type": "related-to" }, { "id": 1128, "from_id": 42348, "to_id": 51671, "type": "related-to" }, { "id": 1129, "from_id": 42348, "to_id": 51672, "type": "related-to" } ]

[]

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The web shell can execute any PHP code sent by an HTTP POST request to the web shell.

[ { "id": 51673, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 14 } ]

[]

13,587

Note the screenshot in Figure 6: The same web shell with the same “only_pcd” keyword is mentioned in this Chinese blog post.

[ { "id": 51674, "label": "location", "start_offset": 106, "end_offset": 113 }, { "id": 51675, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 75 } ]

[]

13,588

The blog post describes a web shell with two components — a PHP script and an HTML uploading file — however, the second one is not needed as the proper POST request can be created with any custom or third-party tool (e.g., Fiddler). Figure 6.

[ { "id": 51676, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 35 }, { "id": 51677, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 60, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 51678, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 78, "end_offset": 97 } ]

[ { "id": 1130, "from_id": 51676, "to_id": 51677, "type": "consists-of" }, { "id": 1131, "from_id": 51676, "to_id": 51678, "type": "consists-of" } ]

[]

13,589

The script for uploading the PHP web shell to an e-commerce website The second method is modifying the page header to inject PHP code, which will then execute any PHP code, sent by the parameter “ec_ver2update” in the HTTP request.

[ { "id": 51680, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 51681, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 67 }, { "id": 51679, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 200, "end_offset": 213 } ]

[]

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Note that the PHP code below is obfuscated.

[]