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13,591 | First, the $IDFX variable uses XOR operation (see character ^) to decode the string “create_function”, then the resulting base64 string is decoded to @eval($_REQUEST['ec_ver2update']); which is the backdoor’s code. | [] | [] | [] |
13,592 | Figure 7. | [] | [] | [] |
13,593 | The script for modifying the shop page header to inject a web shell | [
{
"id": 51682,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 10
}
] | [] | [] |
13,594 | The third method is installing a malicious plugin embedded in a file named “MakePlugin.tar.gz” to the e-commerce framework. | [
{
"id": 51683,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 80,
"end_offset": 97
}
] | [] | [] |
13,595 | The plugin has been designed to drop multiple PHP web shell files on the server. | [
{
"id": 51684,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 73,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 42379,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 59
}
] | [
{
"id": 1132,
"from_id": 42379,
"to_id": 51684,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,596 | Figure 8. | [] | [] | [] |
13,597 | The script for uploading and installing the malicious plugin, “MakePlugin.tar.gz” Figure 9. | [
{
"id": 51685,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 80
}
] | [] | [] |
13,598 | The malicious plugin installs several files with web shells Malware Delivery | [] | [] | [] |
13,599 | In this case, the attack script will show an alert prompt with a message that reads “Your Flash version is too low, please install the latest version and try again!” and then redirects the victim to the fake Flash installer download website they control. | [
{
"id": 51686,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 32
}
] | [] | [] |
13,600 | (Note that Flash has been declared end-of-life by Adobe since December 31, 2020.) If the victim downloads and executes the installer downloaded from this page, the victim will be infected with a variant of Gh0stRat malware, previously also named Gh0stCringe or CineregRAT. | [
{
"id": 51687,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 62,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 51688,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 207,
"end_offset": 215
},
{
"id": 51689,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 247,
"end_offset": 258
},
{
"id": 51690,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 262,
"end_offset": 272
}
] | [
{
"id": 1133,
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"to_id": 51689,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1134,
"from_id": 51688,
"to_id": 51690,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,601 | This RAT’s code is based on leaked Gh0st RAT source code; however, its traffic encryption is customized and it added some new features, like QQ number theft. | [
{
"id": 51691,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 5,
"end_offset": 8
},
{
"id": 51692,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 35,
"end_offset": 44
}
] | [] | [] |
13,602 | The Gh0st RAT samples related to this campaign are obfuscated executable files, which decrypt the main payload in memory and execute its main export function named “Shellex.” Figure | [
{
"id": 51695,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 165,
"end_offset": 172
},
{
"id": 51694,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 13
}
] | [
{
"id": 1135,
"from_id": 51694,
"to_id": 51695,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,603 | The script showing the error message and redirect to the fake Flash installer Figure 11. | [] | [] | [] |
13,604 | The fake Flash installer download website Analysis of the fake Flash installer | [] | [] | [] |
13,605 | As described earlier, the XSS attack script redirects the victim to a fake Flash download site. | [
{
"id": 42403,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 29
}
] | [] | [] |
13,606 | Clicking on the “Install now” button downloads a .ZIP archive, which contains several legitimate files as well as a few malicious ones, which are usually in form of DLL libraries. | [] | [] | [] |
13,607 | These libraries will be sideloaded when the legitimate executable gets executed. | [] | [] | [] |
13,608 | Figure 12. | [] | [] | [] |
13,609 | The package of downloaded Flash installer | [] | [] | [] |
13,610 | In this example, AdobeAirFlashInstaller.exe (legitimate file) sideloads xerces-c_2_1_0.dll (patched legitimate file), which then sideloads ulibs.dll (malicious file). | [
{
"id": 51698,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 139,
"end_offset": 148
},
{
"id": 51696,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 17,
"end_offset": 43
},
{
"id": 51697,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 90
}
] | [
{
"id": 1136,
"from_id": 51696,
"to_id": 51697,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1137,
"from_id": 51697,
"to_id": 51698,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,611 | Ulibs.dll loads Adob.dll, which is a ZIP archive. | [
{
"id": 51699,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 9
},
{
"id": 51700,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 24
}
] | [] | [] |
13,612 | After extracting the content of the Adob.dll zip archive, two legitimate and signed executable files are present and executed, and a similar sideloading process happens once more. | [
{
"id": 51701,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 36,
"end_offset": 45
}
] | [] | [] |
13,613 | Figure 13. | [] | [] | [] |
13,614 | The package inside Adob.dll | [
{
"id": 51702,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 19,
"end_offset": 27
}
] | [] | [] |
13,615 | Here, svchost.exe (renamed legitimate and signed Launcher.exe file from Tencent) sideloads Utility.dll (patched legitimate file). | [
{
"id": 51704,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 49,
"end_offset": 61
},
{
"id": 51705,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 91,
"end_offset": 102
},
{
"id": 51703,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 6,
"end_offset": 17
}
] | [
{
"id": 1138,
"from_id": 51703,
"to_id": 51705,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1139,
"from_id": 51703,
"to_id": 51704,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,616 | This patched file contains one new section called .newimp (new import), which adds a new import item with a reference to the oplib.dll library. | [
{
"id": 51706,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 125,
"end_offset": 134
}
] | [] | [] |
13,617 | This oplib.dll library is then sideloaded. | [
{
"id": 51707,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 5,
"end_offset": 14
}
] | [] | [] |
13,618 | Figure 14. | [] | [] | [] |
13,619 | Oplib.dll side-loading | [
{
"id": 51708,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 9
}
] | [] | [] |
13,620 | This new import was very likely added manually by using a utility called Stud_PE. | [
{
"id": 51709,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 73,
"end_offset": 80
}
] | [] | [] |
13,621 | This utility has a feature called “Import Adder,” while “.newimp” is the default name of a newly added section containing newly added imports. | [] | [] | [] |
13,622 | Oplib.dll then loads a lib.DAT file from the windowsfiles directory, decodes and decrypts its contents (from a hexadecimal string; XOR 0x42), and loads it into the newly created svchost.exe process. | [
{
"id": 51712,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 178,
"end_offset": 189
},
{
"id": 51710,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 9
},
{
"id": 51711,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 23,
"end_offset": 30
}
] | [] | [] |
13,623 | In addition, persistence via registry keys and Scheduled Tasks are configured. | [] | [] | [] |
13,624 | Figure 15. XOR routine and svchost injection | [] | [] | [] |
13,625 | At the end, the last payload of this infection chain is a variant of a Gh0st RAT. | [
{
"id": 51713,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 80
}
] | [] | [] |
13,626 | Communication with C&C uses sockets and is encrypted with simple SUB 0x46, XOR 0x19 encryption. | [] | [] | [] |
13,627 | Figure 16. | [] | [] | [] |
13,628 | XOR routine that encrypts C&C communication Figure 17. | [] | [] | [] |
13,629 | A packetFlag “xy” was found inside this Gh0st RAT variant This Gh0st RAT variant implements additional features for stealing QQ messenger user information, for example, a list of users on a given machine and their QQ messenger numbers. | [
{
"id": 51715,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 67,
"end_offset": 76
},
{
"id": 51714,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 40,
"end_offset": 49
}
] | [] | [] |
13,630 | The code below obtains QQ numbers that are currently logged on the machine, mentioned here. | [] | [] | [] |
13,631 | Figure 18. | [] | [] | [] |
13,632 | The code used to obtain user QQ numbers Protecting e-commerce platforms from Water Pamola’s attacks Water Pamola attacked online merchants with an XSS script appended onto online shopping orders. | [
{
"id": 51716,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 81,
"end_offset": 93
},
{
"id": 51717,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 104,
"end_offset": 116
},
{
"id": 51718,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 126,
"end_offset": 142
},
{
"id": 51719,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 151,
"end_offset": 154
}
] | [
{
"id": 1141,
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"to_id": 51719,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 1140,
"from_id": 51717,
"to_id": 51718,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,633 | They also perpetrated social engineering attacks to phish credentials or prompt the download of a remote access tool. | [
{
"id": 51720,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 49
}
] | [] | [] |
13,634 | Online shop administrators should be aware that potential attacks may come not only from spam but also from different — and unexpected — infection vectors. | [] | [] | [] |
13,635 | We also recommend that administrators keep the versions of any e-commerce platforms in use by their websites up to date to prevent any potential vulnerabilities, including XSS attacks. | [
{
"id": 51721,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 172,
"end_offset": 183
}
] | [] | [] |
13,636 | Organizations can benefit from having Trend Micro™ endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security. | [] | [] | [] |
13,637 | These can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs. | [] | [] | [] |
13,638 | Indicators of compromise can be found in this appendix. | [] | [] | [] |
13,639 | Tags Endpoints | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats | [] | [] | [] |
13,640 | A series of ongoing business email compromise (BEC) campaigns that uses spear-phishing schemes on Office 365 accounts has been seen targeting business executives of over 1,000 companies across the world since March 2020. | [
{
"id": 51722,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 86
},
{
"id": 51723,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 98,
"end_offset": 117
},
{
"id": 51724,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 203,
"end_offset": 219
},
{
"id": 51725,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 142,
"end_offset": 161
},
{
"id": 51726,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 20,
"end_offset": 61
}
] | [
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"id": 1142,
"from_id": 51726,
"to_id": 51722,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 1143,
"from_id": 51726,
"to_id": 51725,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1144,
"from_id": 51726,
"to_id": 51724,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,641 | The recent campaigns target senior positions in the United States and Canada. | [
{
"id": 51729,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 44
},
{
"id": 51731,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 70,
"end_offset": 76
},
{
"id": 51728,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 20
},
{
"id": 51730,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 52,
"end_offset": 65
}
] | [
{
"id": 1145,
"from_id": 51728,
"to_id": 51729,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1146,
"from_id": 51729,
"to_id": 51730,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1147,
"from_id": 51729,
"to_id": 51731,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
13,642 | The fraudsters, whom we named “Water Nue,” primarily target accounts of financial executives to obtain credentials for further financial fraud. | [
{
"id": 51732,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 31,
"end_offset": 40
},
{
"id": 51734,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 72,
"end_offset": 92
}
] | [
{
"id": 1148,
"from_id": 51732,
"to_id": 51734,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
13,643 | The phishing emails redirect users to fake Office 365 login pages. | [
{
"id": 42476,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 12
}
] | [] | [] |
13,644 | Once the credentials are obtained and accounts are successfully compromised, emails containing invoice documents with tampered banking information are sent to subordinates in an attempt to siphon money through fund transfer requests. | [] | [] | [] |
13,645 | Tracking Water Nue’s activities | [] | [] | [] |
13,646 | The threat actor behind this campaign is interesting for several reasons. | [] | [] | [] |
13,647 | It appears that their technical capabilities are limited despite being able to successfully target high-level employees globally. | [] | [] | [] |
13,648 | While their phishing tools are basic (i.e., no backdoors, trojans, and other malware), they made use of public cloud services to conduct their operations. | [
{
"id": 51735,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 12,
"end_offset": 20
},
{
"id": 51736,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 104,
"end_offset": 125
}
] | [] | [] |
13,649 | The use of cloud services allowed them to obfuscate their operations by hosting infrastructures in the services themselves, making their activities tougher to spot for forensics. | [
{
"id": 51737,
"label": "Infrastucture",
"start_offset": 11,
"end_offset": 25
}
] | [] | [] |
13,650 | This tactic has become more commonplace among cybercriminals. | [] | [] | [] |
13,651 | We first noticed the campaign from a large group of email domains used in phishing attempts. | [
{
"id": 51739,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 74,
"end_offset": 82
},
{
"id": 51738,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 21,
"end_offset": 29
}
] | [
{
"id": 1149,
"from_id": 51738,
"to_id": 51739,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,652 | We found that most of the recipients hold high corporate positions, particularly in the finance department. | [] | [] | [] |
13,653 | In one of the first cases we encountered, the senior financial officer of a bank located in Africa purportedly sent a PDF invoice to a colleague, specifying a bank account in Hong Kong. | [
{
"id": 51742,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 46,
"end_offset": 70
},
{
"id": 51740,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 98
},
{
"id": 51741,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 175,
"end_offset": 184
},
{
"id": 51743,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 135,
"end_offset": 144
}
] | [
{
"id": 1150,
"from_id": 51742,
"to_id": 51740,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
13,654 | The email was sent from an IP address recorded on one of the phishing sites that the attacker tested its functionality on. | [
{
"id": 51744,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 61,
"end_offset": 69
}
] | [] | [] |
13,655 | The campaign is ongoing, with the threat actor switching to new infrastructures when used domain names get reported or blacklisted in systems. | [] | [] | [] |
13,656 | Water Nue Campaign Analysis | [] | [] | [] |
13,657 | The attackers use cloud-based email distribution services like SendGrid to deliver emails with a clickable link that redirects targets to a fake Office 365 page. | [
{
"id": 51745,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 13
},
{
"id": 51746,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 63,
"end_offset": 71
}
] | [
{
"id": 1151,
"from_id": 51745,
"to_id": 51746,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
13,658 | (We have reached out to SendGrid and shared our findings with them.) | [
{
"id": 51747,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 24,
"end_offset": 32
}
] | [] | [] |
13,659 | When the target user attempts to log in, credentials are recorded through a simple PHP script. | [] | [] | [] |
13,660 | Figure 1. Water Nue attack scenario Figure 2. Sample of recorded credentials | [] | [] | [] |
13,661 | While the techniques aren’t new, the attack attempts appear to be successful, collecting over 800 credentials from company executives at the time of writing. | [] | [] | [] |
13,662 | How accounts are targeted for phishing attacks | [
{
"id": 42527,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 30,
"end_offset": 38
}
] | [] | [] |
13,663 | In a July email sent to a C-level executive, we learned that the base domain URL is U10450540[.]ct[.]sendgrid[.]net, with the final URL being *getting-panes[.]sfo2*. Figure 3. | [
{
"id": 51748,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 84,
"end_offset": 116
},
{
"id": 51749,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 142,
"end_offset": 164
},
{
"id": 51750,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 43
}
] | [
{
"id": 1152,
"from_id": 51750,
"to_id": 51748,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 1153,
"from_id": 51750,
"to_id": 51749,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
13,664 | Email header “from” field shows New York and various email accounts indicating “Swiftme@{company domain names}” | [] | [] | [] |
13,665 | “Swiftme” appears in the phishing email headers and is accompanied by account names with forged company email domains. | [] | [] | [] |
13,666 | The displayed email header “from” and subject also pretend as a voicemail service. | [] | [] | [] |
13,667 | “Swiftme” is possibly a nod to electronic or wire transfers and reveals the campaign’s purpose after harvesting credentials. | [] | [] | [] |
13,668 | Figure 4. | [] | [] | [] |
13,670 | Emails with different X-Mailers and headers are likely appended through tools that can confuse scan engines. | [] | [] | [] |
13,671 | Here are some of the X-Mailers we observed: | [] | [] | [] |
13,672 | X-Mailer: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; de-AT; rv X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.7.6 (GTK+ 2.22.0; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) | [] | [] | [] |
13,673 | X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en]C-CCK-MCD NSCPCD47 (Win98; I) X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (8A293) | [] | [] | [] |
13,674 | X-Mailer: Opera7.22/Win32 M2 build 3221 | [] | [] | [] |
13,675 | X-Mailer: ZuckMail [version 1.00] | [] | [] | [] |
13,676 | X-Mailer: CommuniGate Pro WebUser v5.3.2 | [] | [] | [] |
13,677 | Figure 5. | [] | [] | [] |
13,678 | A phishing site imitates Office 365 login | [
{
"id": 42549,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 2,
"end_offset": 10
}
] | [] | [] |
13,679 | The originating IP of Water Nue’s test/deployment machine was left in a clear text file in the phishing site’s server for collected credentials. | [
{
"id": 51751,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 33
},
{
"id": 42553,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 95,
"end_offset": 103
}
] | [] | [] |
13,680 | Figure 6. | [] | [] | [] |
13,681 | Sitemap Figure 7. | [] | [] | [] |
13,682 | The landing page index.html has a dummy speech functio Figure 8. | [] | [] | [] |
13,683 | While the main collection function resides in app.js, command and control (C&C) location is embedded in JavaScript code Figure 9. | [] | [] | [] |
13,684 | jQuery method is used to post the target’s credentials to hosting site The phishing pages record passwords inputted by site visitors. | [
{
"id": 51752,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 79,
"end_offset": 87
}
] | [] | [] |
13,685 | Once the compromised credentials are used to successfully log in to accounts, fraudsters can identify themselves as executives. | [] | [] | [] |
13,686 | They will then send a fraudulent wire transfer request to trick recipients into wiring money into the criminals’ accounts. | [] | [] | [] |
13,687 | We found a BEC mail sample that was sent from the same IP. | [] | [] | [] |
13,688 | The email in question is an invoice request that has a legitimate email header, which is a known tactic used in BEC scams. | [
{
"id": 51753,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 112,
"end_offset": 121
}
] | [] | [] |
13,689 | Figure 10. | [] | [] | [] |
13,690 | An email sample with the same originating IP Figure 11. | [] | [] | [] |
13,691 | A sample fake PDF invoice in a BEC email | [
{
"id": 51754,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 31,
"end_offset": 34
}
] | [] | [] |