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base64: Rework base64decode to handle split encoded data correctly | 3a55ddd3c4c11ce75a86afbefd085d8d397ff957 | libplist | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl: fix digit correction bug in rsaz_1024_mul_avx2.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.
CVE-2017-3738
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | e502cc86df9dafded1694fceb3228ee34d11c11a | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Don't allow read/write after fatal error
OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
In order to exploit this issue an attacker would have to trick an
application into behaving incorrectly by issuing an SSL_read()/SSL_write()
after having already received a fatal error.
Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue and suggesting
this fix.
CVE-2017-3737
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | 898fb884b706aaeb283de4812340bb0bde8476dc | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry bug in bn_sqrx8x_internal.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.
CVE-2017-3736
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | 4443cf7aa0099e5ce615c18cee249fff77fb0871 | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid out-of-bounds read
Fixes CVE 2017-3735
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4276)
(cherry picked from commit b23171744b01e473ebbfd6edad70c1c3825ffbcd) | 068b963bb7afc57f5bdd723de0dd15e7795d5822 | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> | 4ad93618d26a3ea23d36ad5498ff4f59eff3a4d2 | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry bug in bn_sqr8x_internal.
CVE-2017-3732
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | a59b90bf491410f1f2bc4540cc21f1980fd14c5b | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | 00d965474b22b54e4275232bc71ee0c699c5cd21 | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | efbe126e3ebb9123ac9d058aa2bb044261342aaa | openssl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix a buffer overflow.
This is only the minimum workaround to prevent buffer overflow:
Stop iterating once the (fixed!) size of the output buffers is
reached. In response to
https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0317
However, this code is a huge mess anyway and is in no way
anything like up-to-date C++ code. Please, anyone, replace it
with something more modern. Thanks. | a70934eea95c76a7737b83773bffe8738935082d | libofx | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 43a6684519ab0a6c52024b5e25322476cabad893 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> | c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | 129a72a0d3c8e139a04512325384fe5ac119e74d | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | 33ab91103b3415e12457e3104f0e4517ce12d0f3 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CVE-2017-0576
Android Security Bulletin—April 2017 | 0dd1a733e60cf5239c0a185d4219ba2ef1118a8b | android_security | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380 | 09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486 | tor | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377. | 665baf5ed5c6186d973c46cdea165c0548027350 | tor | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]> | 56a7c5bc15e0447203a491c1ee37de9939ad1dcd | tor | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]> | 79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7 | tor | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed. | 874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50 | redis | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833. | da940424816e11d624362ce080bc026adffa26e8 | openjpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49 | d27ccf01c68a31ad62b33d2dc1ba2bb1eeaafe7b | openjpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_byteout(). Discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB (#835) | 397f62c0a838e15d667ef50e27d5d011d2c79c04 | openjpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fixed invalid memory reads detected by the address sanitizer | fd85f8c94182558ff1480d06a236d6fb927979a3 | yodl | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix CVE-2016-10351: Insecure cWorkingDir permissions.
Set 700 permisson on dir on every start.
Signed-off-by: Alexander GQ Gerasiov <[email protected]> | 388703b9ca1912a5438e37f9dd54c35805f2c594 | tdesktop | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix writing a tmp file with a predictable name in
passenger-install-nginx-module.
With access to the system, a user could plant a symlink in /tmp that
resulted in a chosen-file overwrite attempt whenever
passenger-install-nginx-module was run, using the access rights of
the executing user, potentially even with chosen content. | e5b4b0824d6b648525b4bf63d9fa37e5beeae441 | passenger | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy
On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user
could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they
had readonly access. This is obviously problematic, since such a
directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy
would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory
(for example).
Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an
encryption policy. This means that either the caller must own the file,
or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER.
(*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4
v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs}
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | 163ae1c6ad6299b19e22b4a35d5ab24a89791a98 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix readContigStripsIntoBuffer() in -i (ignore) mode so
that the output buffer is correctly incremented to avoid write outside bounds.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620 | 9657bbe3cdce4aaa90e07d50c1c70ae52da0ba6a | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary. | 9a72a69e035ee70ff5c41541c8c61cd97990d018 | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604 | 1044b43637fa7f70fb19b93593777b78bd20da86 | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* tools/tiffcp.c: avoid uint32 underflow in cpDecodedStrips that
can cause various issues, such as buffer overflows in the library.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2598 | 5397a417e61258c69209904e652a1f409ec3b9df | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611 | 43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596 | 438274f938e046d33cb0e1230b41da32ffe223e1 | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data. | 1f0dfe5a42911b6880a1445f13f6d615ddb55387 | jasper | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error. | bdfe95a6e81ffb4b2fad31a76b57943695beed20 | jasper | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed an integer overflow problem. | 988f8365f7d8ad8073b6786e433d34c553ecf568 | jasper | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer). | 2e82fa00466ae525339754bb3ab0a0474a31d4bd | jasper | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix issue #575 | 890c3f850293176c0e996a602ffa88b315f4e98f | yara | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c | 3119b232c9c453c98d8fa8b6ae4e37ba18117cd4 | yara | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]> | 3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Proper global init/deinit of GnuTLS
These are reference counted so it is important to retain symmetry
between the calls. Failure to do so will result in bad memory access
and crashes. | 8aa4bc53206c2430bbf0c8f4b642f59a379ee649 | tigervnc | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 32c231164b762dddefa13af5a0101032c70b50ef | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332 | ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e | libevent | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318 | 329acc18a0768c21ba22522f01a5c7f46cacc4d5 | libevent | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
evdns: name_parse(): fix remote stack overread
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"the name_parse() function in libevent's DNS code is vulnerable to a buffer overread.
971 if (cp != name_out) {
972 if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
973 *cp++ = '.';
974 }
975 if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
976 memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
977 cp += label_len;
978 j += label_len;
No check is made against length before the memcpy occurs.
This was found through the Tor bug bounty program and the discovery should be credited to 'Guido Vranken'."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/e4fcf540e9b89ab86d02):
set $PROT_NONE=0x0
set $PROT_READ=0x1
set $PROT_WRITE=0x2
set $MAP_ANONYMOUS=0x20
set $MAP_SHARED=0x01
set $MAP_FIXED=0x10
set $MAP_32BIT=0x40
start
set $length=202
# overread
set $length=2
# allocate with mmap to have a seg fault on page boundary
set $l=(1<<20)*2
p mmap(0, $l, $PROT_READ|$PROT_WRITE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $packet=(char *)$1+$l-$length
# hack the packet
set $packet[0]=63
set $packet[1]='/'
p malloc(sizeof(int))
set $idx=(int *)$2
set $idx[0]=0
set $name_out_len=202
p malloc($name_out_len)
set $name_out=$3
# have WRITE only mapping to fail on read
set $end=$1+$l
p (void *)mmap($end, 1<<12, $PROT_NONE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_FIXED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $m=$4
p name_parse($packet, $length, $idx, $name_out, $name_out_len)
x/2s (char *)$name_out
Before this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:33
After this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
$5 = -1
0x633030: "/"
0x633032: ""
(gdb) p $m
$6 = (void *) 0x40200000
(gdb) p $1
$7 = 1073741824
(gdb) p/x $1
$8 = 0x40000000
(gdb) quit
P.S. plus drop one condition duplicate.
Fixes: #317 | 96f64a022014a208105ead6c8a7066018449d86d | libevent | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/rtmppkt: Check for packet size mismatches
Fixes out of array access
Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | 7d57ca4d9a75562fa32e40766211de150f8b3ee7 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>. | 2a05c8f813de6f2278827734bf8102291e7484aa | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
imcb_file_send_start: handle ft attempts from non-existing users | 701ab8129ba9ea64f569daedca9a8603abad740f | bitlbee | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list | 4bc05fc490b66ef2d45b1de26abf1455b486b0dc | wavpack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #354: Signed Integer Overflow gd_io.c
GD2 stores the number of horizontal and vertical chunks as words (i.e. 2
byte unsigned). These values are multiplied and assigned to an int when
reading the image, what can cause integer overflows. We have to avoid
that, and also make sure that either chunk count is actually greater
than zero. If illegal chunk counts are detected, we bail out from
reading the image. | 69d2fd2c597ffc0c217de1238b9bf4d4bceba8e6 | libgd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix DOS vulnerability in gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx()
We must not pretend that there are image data if there are none. Instead
we fail reading the image file gracefully. | fe9ed49dafa993e3af96b6a5a589efeea9bfb36f | libgd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to [email protected]. | 60bfb401ad5a4a8ae995dcd36372fe15c71e1a35 | libgd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug | 5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2 | little-cms | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #73831 - NULL Pointer Dereference while unserialize php object | 8d2539fa0faf3f63e1d1e7635347c5b9e777d47b | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #73825 - Heap out of bounds read on unserialize in finish_nested_data() | 16b3003ffc6393e250f069aa28a78dc5a2c064b2 | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #73768 - Memory corruption when loading hostile phar | b28b8b2fee6dfa6fcd13305c581bb835689ac3be | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix int overflows in phar (bug #73764) | ca46d0acbce55019b970fcd4c1e8a10edfdded93 | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #73737 FPE when parsing a tag format | 1cda0d7c2ffb62d8331c64e703131d9cabdc03ea | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status. | 06eeacb6fe029804f296b065b3ce91e796e1cd0e | systemd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack
smbencrypt() points a scatterlist to the stack, which is breaks if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Fix it by switching to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(). The new code
should be considerably faster as an added benefit.
This code is nearly identical to some code that Eric Biggers
suggested.
Cc: [email protected] # 4.9 only
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | 06deeec77a5a689cc94b21a8a91a76e42176685d | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
libceph: introduce ceph_crypt() for in-place en/decryption
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.
There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:
"... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]> | a45f795c65b479b4ba107b6ccde29b896d51ee98 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> | a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | 48a992727d82cb7db076fa15d372178743b1f4cd | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix a small memory leak | aeff00de228bc5a158c2a975ab47845d8a1db456 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable | 9a64e62f0f20c9cf9b2e1609f037060eb2d8eb22 | libgit2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do. | 2fdef641fd0dd2828bd948234ae86de75221a11a | libgit2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
smart_pkt: verify packet length exceeds PKT_LEN_SIZE
Each packet line in the Git protocol is prefixed by a four-byte
length of how much data will follow, which we parse in
`git_pkt_parse_line`. The transmitted length can either be equal
to zero in case of a flush packet or has to be at least of length
four, as it also includes the encoded length itself. Not
checking this may result in a buffer overflow as we directly pass
the length to functions which accept a `size_t` length as
parameter.
Fix the issue by verifying that non-flush packets have at least a
length of `PKT_LEN_SIZE`. | 66e3774d279672ee51c3b54545a79d20d1ada834 | libgit2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
update lxc-attach manpage
- explain rationale behind allocation of pty
- briefly explain how a pty is allocated
- add a short note that describes the changed behavior for lxc-attach when the
user is not placed in a writeable cgroup at login
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> | e986ea3dfa4a2957f71ae9bfaed406dd6e1ffff6 | lxc | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640 | c7153361a4041260719b340f73f2f76 | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
* tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610 | 787c0ee906430b772f33ca50b97b8b5ca070faec | libtiff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/131 | f3b483e8b054c50149912523b4773687e18afe25 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Added check for invalid number of frames. | 8a370f9ab120faf182aa160900ba692ba8e2bcf0 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent fault in MSL interpreter | 56d6e20de489113617cbbddaf41e92600a34db22 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions | 0474237508f39c4f783208123431815f1ededb76 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129 | 134463b926fa965571aa4febd61b810be5e7da05 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Improve buffer flow sanity check | f8877abac8e568b2f339cca70c2c3c1b6eaec288 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196 | 4e914bbe371433f0590cefdf3bd5f3a5710069f9 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed memory leak. | 4ec444f4eab88cf4bec664fafcf9cab50bc5ff6a | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu) | 10b3823a7619ed22d42764733eb052c4159bc8c1 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix TIFF divide by zero (bug report from Donghai Zhu) | f983dcdf9c178e0cbc49608a78713c5669aa1bb5 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Changed the JPEG writer to raise a warning when the exif profile exceeds 65533 bytes and truncate it. | 9e187b73a8a1290bb0e1a1c878f8be1917aa8742 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent memory use after free | ecc03a2518c2b7dd375fde3a040fdae0bdf6a521 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
RLE check for pixel offset less than 0 (heap overflow report from Craig Young). | 73fb0aac5b958521e1511e179ecc0ad49f70ebaf | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=29710 | 3e9165285eda6e1bb71172031d3048b51bb443a4 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida | fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane) | 989f9f88ea6db09b99d25586e912c921c0da8d3f | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030. | 92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee | slurm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | 3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9 | src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for loading
keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This
doesn't appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but
was observed for novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@ | ac8147a06ed2e2403fb6b9a0c03e618a9333c0e9 | src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled | c76fac666ea038753294f2ac94d310f8adece9ce | src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@ | 9476ce1dd37d3c3218d5640b74c34c65e5f4efe5 | src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Complete the fix of bug #70172 for PHP 7 | b2af4e8868726a040234de113436c6e4f6372d17 | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #73631 - Invalid read when wddx decodes empty boolean element | 66fd44209d5ffcb9b3d1bc1b9fd8e35b485040c0 | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me). | 6045de69c7dedcba3eadf7c4bba424b19c81d00d | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #72696: imagefilltoborder stackoverflow on truecolor images
We must not allow negative color values be passed to
gdImageFillToBorder(), because that can lead to infinite recursion
since the recursion termination condition will not necessarily be met. | 863d37ea66d5c960db08d6f4a2cbd2518f0f80d1 | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid pre-decrement of pointer in big-endian CRC calculation.
There was a small optimization for PowerPCs to pre-increment a
pointer when accessing a word, instead of post-incrementing. This
required prefacing the loop with a decrement of the pointer,
possibly pointing before the object passed. This is not compliant
with the C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its
allocated memory is undefined. When tested on a modern PowerPC
with a modern compiler, the optimization no longer has any effect.
Due to all that, and per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior. | d1d577490c15a0c6862473d7576352a9f18ef811 | zlib | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result. | e54e1299404101a5a9d0cf5e45512b543967f958 | zlib | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Subsets and Splits