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kexec/uefi: copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag
in original kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <[email protected]> | 4b2b64d5a6ebc84214755ebccd599baef7c1b798 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002 | cb31827d62066a04b02111df3052949fda4b6888 | systemd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69. | 7ca3e5279d05fceb1e8a043c6f5b6f58dea3ed38 | pgbouncer | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix scripts that use well-known temp files. | 080ab97461d80a01636f77ba6aecc667c3c0087c | opa-ff | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9 | util-linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CVE-2015-5221 | df5d2867e8004e51e18b89865bc4aa69229227b3 | jasper | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[Bug 2382] Implement LOGTOD using ldexp() instead of shifting | 5f295cd05c3c136d39f5b3e500a2d781bdbb59c8 | ntp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL. | 52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be | ntp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[Bug 1593] ntpd abort in free() with logconfig syntax error. | 553f2fa65865c31c5e3c48812cfd46176cffdd27 | ntp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Use looks_like_pbl() to disallow .pbl file inclusion (bug #23504)
This function is implemented using case-insensitive pattern matching,
unlike filesystem::ends_with(). I missed this when writing my original
fix, so the vulnerability still applied to .pbl files on a
case-insensitive filesystem (e.g. NTFS and FAT* on Windows) by using
different case to bypass the check. | b2738ffb2fdd2550ececb74f76f75583c43c8b59 | wesnoth | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Disallow inclusion of .pbl files from WML (bug #23504)
Note that this will also cause Lua wesnoth.have_file() to return false
on .pbl files. | f8914468182e8d0a1551b430c0879ba236fe4d6d | wesnoth | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]> | f95864afe8833fe3ad782d714b41378e860977b1 | squashfs-tools | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42). | 74d6e5f7de5ec736f71204b7b422af7380c19ac5 | pgbouncer | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix for CVE-2015-3887
closes #60 | 9ab7dbeb3baff67a51d0c5e71465c453be0890b5#diff-803c5170888b8642f2a97e5e9423d399 | proxychains-ng | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix expired certificate validation (gobby #61) | c97f870f5ae13112988d9f8ad464b4f679903706 | libinfinity | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ccpp: stop reading hs_error.log from /tmp
The file might contain anything and there is no way to verify its
contents.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> | 17cb66b13997b0159b4253b3f5722db79f476d68 | abrt | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | fbfa4d1083ea84c5429992ca3e996d7d4fbc8238 | kvm-guest-drivers-windows | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
whiteboard: fixup a few reversed tests (GH #446)
This is a follow-up to commit 3a3ec26. | 3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70 | tcpdump | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SECURITY: Additional CPU amplification case.
Unfortunately, commit 104870608fde3c698483fdef6b97f093fc15685d missed a case of CPU amplification via struct lists with zero-sized elements.
See advisory: https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/blob/master/security-advisories/2015-03-05-0-c++-addl-cpu-amplification.md | 80149744bdafa3ad4eedc83f8ab675e27baee868 | capnproto | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SECURITY: CPU usage amplification attack.
Details: https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/tree/master/security-advisories/2014-03-02-0-all-cpu-amplification.md | 104870608fde3c698483fdef6b97f093fc15685d | capnproto | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SECURITY: Integer underflow in pointer validation.
Details: https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/tree/master/security-advisories/2014-03-02-1-c++-integer-underflow.md | 26bcceda72372211063d62aab7e45665faa83633 | capnproto | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SECURITY: Integer overflow in pointer validation.
Details: https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/tree/master/security-advisories/2014-03-02-0-c++-integer-overflow.md | f343f0dbd0a2e87f17cd74f14186ed73e3fbdbfa | capnproto | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
configure: move the default dump location to /var/spool
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> | 7d023c32a565e83306cddf34c894477b7aaf33d1 | abrt | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Merge pull request #89 from linuxmaniac/vseva/defaults
set defaults of fifo and ctl to /var/run/kamailio
Closes: #48
Closes: #89 | 06177b12936146d48378cc5f6c6e1b157ebd519b | kamailio | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
DNP3: fix reachable assertion and buffer over-read/overflow.
A DNP3 packet using a link layer header that specifies a zero length can
trigger an assertion failure if assertions are enabled. Assertions are
enabled unless Bro is compiled with the NDEBUG preprocessor macro
defined. The default configuration of Bro will define this macro and so
disables assertions, but using the --enable-debug option in the
configure script will enable assertions. When assertions are disabled,
or also for certain length values, the DNP3 parser may attempt to pass a
negative value as the third argument to memcpy (number of bytes to copy)
and result in a buffer over-read or overflow.
Reported by Travis Emmert. | 6cedd67c381ff22fde653adf02ee31caf66c81a0 | bro | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> | 60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
git-prompt.sh: don't put unsanitized branch names in $PS1
Both bash and zsh subject the value of PS1 to parameter expansion,
command substitution, and arithmetic expansion. Rather than include
the raw, unescaped branch name in PS1 when running in two- or
three-argument mode, construct PS1 to reference a variable that holds
the branch name. Because the shells do not recursively expand, this
avoids arbitrary code execution by specially-crafted branch names such
as '$(IFS=_;cmd=sudo_rm_-rf_/;$cmd)'.
Signed-off-by: Richard Hansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | 8976500cbbb13270398d3b3e07a17b8cc7bff43f | git | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> | 69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ipv4: fix a race in ip4_datagram_release_cb()
Alexey gave a AddressSanitizer[1] report that finally gave a good hint
at where was the origin of various problems already reported by Dormando
in the past [2]
Problem comes from the fact that UDP can have a lockless TX path, and
concurrent threads can manipulate sk_dst_cache, while another thread,
is holding socket lock and calls __sk_dst_set() in
ip4_datagram_release_cb() (this was added in linux-3.8)
It seems that all we need to do is to use sk_dst_check() and
sk_dst_set() so that all the writers hold same spinlock
(sk->sk_dst_lock) to prevent corruptions.
TCP stack do not need this protection, as all sk_dst_cache writers hold
the socket lock.
[1]
https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ipv4_dst_check
Read of size 2 by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff817daa3a>] ipv4_dst_check+0x1a/0x90 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1116
[<ffffffff8175b789>] __sk_dst_check+0x89/0xe0 ./net/core/sock.c:531
[<ffffffff81830a36>] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x46/0x390 ??:0
[<ffffffff8175eaea>] release_sock+0x17a/0x230 ./net/core/sock.c:2413
[<ffffffff81830882>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x462/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Freed by thread T15455:
[<ffffffff8178d9b8>] dst_destroy+0xa8/0x160 ./net/core/dst.c:251
[<ffffffff8178de25>] dst_release+0x45/0x80 ./net/core/dst.c:280
[<ffffffff818304c1>] ip4_datagram_connect+0xa1/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Allocated by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff8178d291>] dst_alloc+0x81/0x2b0 ./net/core/dst.c:171
[<ffffffff817db3b7>] rt_dst_alloc+0x47/0x50 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1406
[< inlined >] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70
__mkroute_output ./net/ipv4/route.c:1939
[<ffffffff817dde08>] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2161
[<ffffffff817deb34>] ip_route_output_flow+0x14/0x30 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2249
[<ffffffff81830737>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x317/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
[2]
<4>[196727.311203] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
<4>[196727.311224] Modules linked in: xt_TEE xt_dscp xt_DSCP macvlan bridge coretemp crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel gpio_ich microcode ipmi_watchdog ipmi_devintf sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm tpm_bios ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler isci igb libsas i2c_algo_bit ixgbe ptp pps_core mdio
<4>[196727.311333] CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 3.10.26 #1
<4>[196727.311344] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+/X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+, BIOS 3.0 07/05/2013
<4>[196727.311364] task: ffff885e6f069700 ti: ffff885e6f072000 task.ti: ffff885e6f072000
<4>[196727.311377] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f8c7f>] [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.311399] RSP: 0018:ffff885effd23a70 EFLAGS: 00010282
<4>[196727.311409] RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8854c398ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000040
<4>[196727.311423] RDX: dead000000100100 RSI: dead000000100100 RDI: dead000000200200
<4>[196727.311437] RBP: ffff885effd23a80 R08: ffffffff815fd9e0 R09: ffff885d5a590800
<4>[196727.311451] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311464] R13: ffffffff81c8c280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880e85ee16ce
<4>[196727.311510] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885effd20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311554] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[196727.311581] CR2: 00007a46751eb000 CR3: 0000005e65688000 CR4: 00000000000407e0
<4>[196727.311625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311669] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
<4>[196727.311713] Stack:
<4>[196727.311733] ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff885effd23ab0 ffffffff815b7f42
<4>[196727.311784] ffff88be6595bc00 ffff8854c398ecc0 0000000000000000 ffff8854c398ecc0
<4>[196727.311834] ffff885effd23ad0 ffffffff815b86c6 ffff885d5a590800 ffff8816827821c0
<4>[196727.311885] Call Trace:
<4>[196727.311907] <IRQ>
<4>[196727.311912] [<ffffffff815b7f42>] dst_destroy+0x32/0xe0
<4>[196727.311959] [<ffffffff815b86c6>] dst_release+0x56/0x80
<4>[196727.311986] [<ffffffff81620bd5>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a5/0x4a0
<4>[196727.312013] [<ffffffff81622b5a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x7da/0x820
<4>[196727.312041] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312070] [<ffffffff815de02d>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x7d/0x150
<4>[196727.312097] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312125] [<ffffffff815fda92>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb2/0x230
<4>[196727.312154] [<ffffffff815fdd9a>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90
<4>[196727.312183] [<ffffffff815fd799>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x360
<4>[196727.312212] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312242] [<ffffffffa0339680>] ? macvlan_broadcast+0x160/0x160 [macvlan]
<4>[196727.312275] [<ffffffff815b0c62>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x512/0x640
<4>[196727.312308] [<ffffffff811427fb>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13b/0x150
<4>[196727.312338] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312368] [<ffffffff815b0fa1>] netif_receive_skb+0x31/0xa0
<4>[196727.312397] [<ffffffff815b1ae8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x140
<4>[196727.312433] [<ffffffffa00274f1>] ixgbe_poll+0x551/0x11f0 [ixgbe]
<4>[196727.312463] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ? ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312491] [<ffffffff815b1691>] net_rx_action+0x111/0x210
<4>[196727.312521] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312552] [<ffffffff810519d0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x270
<4>[196727.312583] [<ffffffff816cef3c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
<4>[196727.312613] [<ffffffff81004205>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90
<4>[196727.312640] [<ffffffff81051c85>] irq_exit+0x55/0x60
<4>[196727.312668] [<ffffffff816cf5c3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0
<4>[196727.312696] [<ffffffff816c5aaa>] common_interrupt+0x6a/0x6a
<4>[196727.312722] <EOI>
<1>[196727.313071] RIP [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.313100] RSP <ffff885effd23a70>
<4>[196727.313377] ---[ end trace 64b3f14fae0f2e29 ]---
<0>[196727.380908] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Reported-by: Alexey Preobrazhensky <[email protected]>
Reported-by: dormando <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8141ed9fcedb2 ("ipv4: Add a socket release callback for datagram sockets")
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 9709674e68646cee5a24e3000b3558d25412203a | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | d7325bac173492b358417a0ad49fabad44447d52 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | 89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc | util-linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab | 88702a3ce4c28a973bf69023cd0312f412f6193e | aircrack-ng | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Buddy-ng: Fixed segmentation fault (Closes #15 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2418 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab | da087238963c1239fdabd47dc1b65279605aca70 | aircrack-ng | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978). | 9c2cd3c93c05d009a91d84eedbb85873b0cb505d | rawstudio | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Removed possible command injection | e001e38738c17219a1d9dd8c31f7d82b9c0013c7 | node-printer | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent possible buffer overflow in yyerror() | d266bb2b4154d11c27252b56d86963aef4434750 | graphviz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed infinite loop cauesd by invalid dns packets | 58c893e834ff20495d00770922 | inspircd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed out of bounds memory access from malformed DNS queries that have an invalid length label. Introduced in a6a07de0daa353bcd29056a4535a9c4784c113c8. | ed28c1ba666b39581adb860bf51cdde43c84cc89 | inspircd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
- ini-agent: added Write(.section_private.SECTION, BOOLEAN) (bnc#713661, CVE-2011-3177)
- system agent: added Write(.target.string, [filename, mode], content)
svn merge -r66758:66764 http://svn.opensuse.org/svn/yast/branches/SuSE-Code-11-SP2-Branch/core
svn path=/trunk/core/; revision=67117 | 7fe2e3df308b8b6a901cb2cfd60f398df53219de | yast-core | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | fc0a80798576f80ca10b3f6c9c7097f12fd1d64e | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
INIT_TASK() should initialize ->thread_group list
The trivial /sbin/init doing
int main(void)
{
kill(0, SIGKILL)
}
crashes the kernel.
This happens because __kill_pgrp_info(init_struct_pid) also sends SIGKILL
to the swapper process which runs with the uninitialized ->thread_group.
Change INIT_TASK() to initialize ->thread_group properly.
Note: the real problem is that the swapper process must not be visible to
signals, see the next patch. But this change is right anyway and fixes
the crash.
Reported-and-tested-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | fa2755e20ab0c7215d99c2dc7c262e98a09b01df | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
V4L/DVB (6751): V4L: Memory leak! Fix count in videobuf-vmalloc mmap
This is pretty serious bug. map->count is never initialized after the
call to kmalloc making the count start at some random trash value. The
end result is leaking videobufs.
Also, fix up the debug statements to print unsigned values.
Pushed to http://ifup.org/hg/v4l-dvb too
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | 0b29669c065f60501e7289e1950fa2a618962358 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> | 6c4841c2b6c32a134f9f36e5e08857138cc12b10 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> | 4dcc29e1574d88f4465ba865ed82800032f76418 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | 5aba5b89d0b1d73164d3b81764828bb8b20ff32a | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | a7e032a277452366771951e29fd0bf2bd5c029f0 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/pva: Check for EOF before retrying in read_part_of_packet()
Fixes: Infinite loop
Fixes: pva-4b1835dbc2027bf3c567005dcc78e85199240d06
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | 9807d3976be0e92e4ece3b4b1701be894cd7c2e1 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | 2b46ebdbff1d8dec7a3d8ea280a612b91a582869 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/mms: Add missing chunksize check
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: mms-crash-01b6c5d85f9d9f40f4e879896103e9f5b222816a
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
1st hunk by Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | cced03dd667a5df6df8fd40d8de0bff477ee02e8 | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed the Zip Slip vulnerability in JlCompress
When extracting a file with a dangerous path like "../evil.exe"
from a ZIP archive with JlCompress::extractDir(), the target
file would be created outside of the target directory, potentially
even overwriting an existing file there. | 5d2fc16a1976e5bf78d2927b012f67a2ae047a98 | quazip | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup. | 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 | libarchive | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun | 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 | libarchive | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
writes to the freed region can be observed.
This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. | bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 | libarchive | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym. | 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 | libarchive | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks | baee520e3dd9be6511c45a14c5f5e77784de1471 | freerdp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Issue: 15232 AllowScript should use atom::ContentSettingsManager like other Allow* methods in the observer | c18663aa171c6cdf03da3e8c70df8663645b97c4 | muon | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line | 252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996 | minisphere | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | a45b599ad808c3c982fdcdc12b0b8611c2f92824 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches. | a8c4a82787b8b6c256d61bd5c42fb7f92d1bae00 | memcached | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Use case-insensitive switch comparisons | ce361a12e355f9e1e99c989f1ea056c9e502dbe7 | electron | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
disable UDP port by default
As reported, UDP amplification attacks have started to use insecure
internet-exposed memcached instances. UDP used to be a lot more popular as a
transport for memcached many years ago, but I'm not aware of many recent
users.
Ten years ago, the TCP connection overhead from many clients was relatively
high (dozens or hundreds per client server), but these days many clients are
batched, or user fewer processes, or simply anre't worried about it.
While changing the default to listen on localhost only would also help, the
true culprit is UDP. There are many more use cases for using memcached over
the network than there are for using the UDP protocol. | dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974 | memcached | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bb11588 - fix out of bounds read. | d96a6b8bcc7439fa7e3876207aa0a8e79c8451b6 | clamav-devel | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix segfault on complex pointer formatting (#642) | 8cf30aa2be256eba07bb1cefb998c52326e846e7 | fmt | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files | 244d83bc3d859293f55812d48b3db168e581f6ab | stb | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0 | 6b830a1640ca20528032c89a4fdd8291a4d2d8b2 | tcpreplay | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1). | 151481489192e6d1997f8bde52c5c425ea41741d | libxsmm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT
Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to
userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible
to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields
instead of using memcpy().
BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 9824dfae5741275473a23a7ed5756c7b6efacc9d | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent infinite loop | db0add932fb850d762b02604ca3053b7d7ab6deb | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12375 - Crash in bd+ao (#12382) | a1bc65c3db593530775823d6d7506a457ed95267 | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12376 - crash in: rasm2 -a arm -b 64 '0 ,0,0,0,0,0,0,' | df167c7db545953bb7f71c72e98e7a3ca0c793bf | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12417/#12418 attempts. | 88a8adf080a9f8ed5a4250a2507752e133ba54dd | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12374 - oobread crash in truncated dyldcache ##bin | 4e98402f09a0ef0bb8559a33a4c1988c54938eaf | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx-- | 9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185 | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[[email protected]: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17 | 5e6d1796106df8ba6bc1973ee0917c170d929086 | krb5 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | 704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix acl_file being ignore for default listener if with per_listener_settings
Close #1073. Thanks to Jef Driesen.
Bug: https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/issues/1073 | 9097577b49b7fdcf45d30975976dd93808ccc0c4 | mosquitto | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | f43f39958beb206b53292801e216d9b8a660f087 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12242 - Crash in x86.nz assembler (#12266) | f17bfd9f1da05f30f23a4dd05e9d2363e1406948 | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix #12239 - crash in the x86.nz assembler ##asm (#12252) | 66191f780863ea8c66ace4040d0d04a8842e8432 | radare2 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
issue #54: fix potential out-of-bounds heap read | bba5389dc598a92bdf2b297c3ea34620b6679b5b | wavpack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
issue #53: error out on zero sample rate | 070ef6f138956d9ea9612e69586152339dbefe51 | wavpack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Remove legacy workaround for parsing modulo operator
Fixes #2659 | 210fdff7a65370c2ae24e022a2b35da8c423cc5f | libsass | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix UAF decrement if card has no live interfaces in card.c
If a USB sound card reports 0 interfaces, an error condition is triggered
and the function usb_audio_probe errors out. In the error path, there was a
use-after-free vulnerability where the memory object of the card was first
freed, followed by a decrement of the number of active chips. Moving the
decrement above the atomic_dec fixes the UAF.
[ The original problem was introduced in 3.1 kernel, while it was
developed in a different form. The Fixes tag below indicates the
original commit but it doesn't mean that the patch is applicable
cleanly. -- tiwai ]
Fixes: 362e4e49abe5 ("ALSA: usb-audio - clear chip->probing on error exit")
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | 5f8cf712582617d523120df67d392059eaf2fc4b | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497. | bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d | sleuthkit | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ResetUri: Protect against NULL | f58c25069cf4a986fe17a80c5b38687e31feb539 | uriparser | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
UriQuery.c: Catch integer overflow in ComposeQuery and ...Ex | f76275d4a91b28d687250525d3a0c5509bbd666f | uriparser | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team | 864f5d4c127def386dd5cc926ad96934b297f04e | uriparser | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix buffer overflow in extract_status_code()
Issue #960 identified that the buffer allocated for copying the
HTTP status code could overflow if the http response was corrupted.
This commit changes the way the status code is read, avoids copying
data, and also ensures that the status code is three digits long,
is non-negative and occurs on the first line of the response.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> | f28015671a4b04785859d1b4b1327b367b6a10e9 | keepalived | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[mod_alias] security: potential path traversal with specific configs
Security: potential path traversal of a single directory above the alias
target with a specific mod_alias config where the alias which is matched
does not end in '/', but alias target filesystem path does end in '/'.
e.g. server.docroot = "/srv/www/host/HOSTNAME/docroot"
alias.url = ( "/img" => "/srv/www/hosts/HOSTNAME/images/" )
If a malicious URL "/img../" were passed, the request would be
for directory "/srv/www/hosts/HOSTNAME/images/../" which would resolve
to "/srv/www/hosts/HOSTNAME/". If mod_dirlisting were enabled, which
is not the default, this would result in listing the contents of the
directory above the alias. An attacker might also try to directly
access files anywhere under that path, which is one level above the
intended aliased path.
credit: Orange Tsai(@orange_8361) from DEVCORE | 2105dae0f9d7a964375ce681e53cb165375f84c1 | lighttpd1.4 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> | c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067 | keepalived | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> | 04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306 | keepalived | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> | d2f007dbe7e4c9583eea6eb04d60001e85c6f1bd | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ICU-20246 Fixing another integer overflow in number parsing. | 53d8c8f3d181d87a6aa925b449b51c4a2c922a51 | icu | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | e4f3aa2e1e67bb48dfbaaf1cad59013d5a5bc276 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> | 7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
add anti "../" and leading slash protection to chmextract | 7cadd489698be117c47efcadd742651594429e6d | libmspack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes | 8759da8db6ec9e866cb8eb143313f397f925bb4f | libmspack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CAB block input buffer is one byte too small for maximal Quantum block | 40ef1b4093d77ad3a5cfcee1f5cb6108b3a3bcc2 | libmspack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
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