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Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111860/cts-corp-v-dynamics-corp-of-america/
|
law of only one State. No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 304 (1971) (concluding that the law of the incorporating State generally should "determine the right of a shareholder to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation"). Accordingly, we conclude that the Indiana Act does not create an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different States. C The Court of Appeals did not find the Act unconstitutional for either of these threshold reasons. Rather, its decision rested on its view of the Act's potential to hinder tender offers. We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created." Trustees of Dartmouth See First National Bank of 8-824 Every State in this country has enacted laws regulating corporate governance. *90 By prohibiting certain transactions, and regulating others, such laws necessarily affect certain aspects of interstate commerce. This necessarily is true with respect to corporations with shareholders in States other than the State of incorporation. Large corporations that are listed on national exchanges, or even regional exchanges, will have shareholders in many States and shares that are traded frequently. The markets that facilitate this national and international participation in ownership of corporations are essential for providing capital not only for new enterprises but also for established companies that need to expand their businesses. This beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation except in the rarest situations is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incorporation. These regulatory laws may affect directly a variety of corporate transactions. Mergers are a typical example. In view of the substantial effect that a merger may have on the shareholders' interests in a corporation, many States require supermajority votes to approve mergers. See, e. g., 2 MBCA
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111860/cts-corp-v-dynamics-corp-of-america/
|
supermajority votes to approve mergers. See, e. g., 2 MBCA 73 (requiring approval of a merger by a majority of all shares, rather than simply a majority of votes cast); RMBCA 11.03 (same). By requiring a greater vote for mergers than is required for other transactions, these laws make it more difficult for corporations to merge. State laws also may provide for "dissenters' rights" under which minority shareholders who disagree with corporate decisions to take particular actions are entitled to sell their shares to the corporation at fair market value. See, e. g., 2 MBCA 80, 81; RMBCA 13.02. By requiring the corporation to purchase the shares of dissenting shareholders, these laws may inhibit a corporation from engaging in the specified transactions.[12] *91 It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares. A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs. There can be no doubt that the Act reflects these concerns. The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the shareholders of Indiana corporations. It does this by affording shareholders, when a takeover offer is made, an opportunity to decide collectively whether the resulting change in voting control of the corporation, as they perceive it, would be desirable. A change of management may have important effects on the shareholders' interests; it is well within the State's role as overseer of corporate governance to offer this opportunity. The autonomy provided by allowing shareholders collectively to determine whether the takeover is advantageous to their *92 interests may be especially beneficial where a hostile tender offer may coerce shareholders into tendering their shares. Appellee Dynamics responds to this concern by arguing that the prospect of coercive tender offers is illusory, and that tender offers generally should be favored because they reallocate corporate assets into the hands of management who can use them most effectively.[13] See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, As Indiana's concern with tender offers is not groundless. Indeed, the potentially coercive aspects of tender offers have been recognized by the SEC, see SEC Release No. 21079, and by a number of scholarly commentators, see, e. g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, ; Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale L. J. 13,
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111860/cts-corp-v-dynamics-corp-of-america/
|
Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale L. J. 13, 20- (1985); 83 Colum. L. Rev., at The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory. We are not inclined "to secondguess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation," Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 450 U. S., at 9 In our view, the possibility of coercion in some takeover bids offers additional justification for Indiana's decision to promote the autonomy of independent shareholders. *93 Dynamics argues in any event that the State has " `no legitimate interest in protecting the nonresident shareholders.' " Brief for Appellee 21 (quoting ). Dynamics relies heavily on the statement by the MITE Court that "[i]nsofar as the law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law." But that comment was made in reference to an Illinois law that applied as well to out-of-state corporations as to in-state corporations. We agree that Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. But this Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana. We reject the contention that Indiana has no interest in providing for the shareholders of its corporations the voting autonomy granted by the Act. Indiana has a substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from becoming a shield for unfair business dealing. Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana. See Ind. Code 23-1-42-4(a)(3) Thus, every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in protecting. D Dynamics' argument that the Act is unconstitutional ultimately rests on its contention that the Act will limit the number of successful tender offers. There is little evidence that this will occur. But even if true, this result would not substantially affect our Commerce Clause analysis. We reiterate that this Act does not prohibit any entity resident or nonresident from offering to purchase, or from purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby to gain control. It only provides regulatory procedures designed for the better protection of the corporations' shareholders. We have rejected the "notion that the Commerce *94 Clause protects the particular structure or methods of operation in a market." Exxon v. Governor of The very commodity that is traded in the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined by state law. Similarly, the very commodity that is traded in the "market for corporate control" the corporation
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111860/cts-corp-v-dynamics-corp-of-america/
|
in the "market for corporate control" the corporation is one that owes its existence and attributes to state law. Indiana need not define these commodities as other States do; it need only provide that residents and nonresidents have equal access to them. This Indiana has done. Accordingly, even if the Act should decrease the number of successful tender offers for Indiana corporations, this would not offend the Commerce Clause.[14] IV On its face, the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter evenhandedly determines the voting rights of shares of Indiana corporations. The Act does not conflict with the provisions or purposes of the Williams Act. To the limited extent that the Act affects interstate commerce, this is justified by the State's interests in defining the attributes of shares in its corporations and in protecting shareholders. Congress has never questioned the need for state regulation of these matters. Nor do we think such regulation offends the Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,986 | 16 |
concurring
|
United States v. Von Neumann
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111551/united-states-v-von-neumann/
|
The fact that remission procedures are not constitutionally required, ante, at 249-250, does not shed any light on the question whether the Government has an obligation to process remission petitions with reasonable diligence. For even though it was not obligated to do so, Congress has enacted legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to create such a procedure. The importance of this statutory procedure is underlined by the fact that it is used to resolve almost 50,000 claims every year. Its practical significance is also suggested by the fact that the number of at least partially successful claimants in remission proceedings is triple the number that come away emptyhanded. This record indicates that the remission petition is a principal mechanism for resolving the dispute between the Government and the individual that frequently results from the seizure of property at our borders. *253 When Congress authorizes a member of the Cabinet to establish a procedure of this importance to thousands of individuals, it surely intends that the procedure will be administered in a regular and fundamentally fair way. One element of fair procedure is a requirement of reasonable diligence in processing claims. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, I would therefore construe the statute as implicitly commanding the Secretary to act diligently, and would not speculate about the possibility that a wholly arbitrary remission procedure would comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[*] Nevertheless, I agree with the Court's ultimate conclusion that on this record respondent has not demonstrated that the 36-day delay in responding to his petition was unlawful. I therefore concur in the judgment.
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,999 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Saenz v. Roe
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118286/saenz-v-roe/
|
I join The Chief Justice's dissent. I write separately to address the majority's conclusion that California has violated "the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State." Ante, at In my view, the majority attributes a meaning to the Privileges or Immunities Clause that likely was unintended when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and ratified. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1. Unlike the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, which have assumed near-talismanic status in modern constitutional law, the Court all but read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution in the Slaughter-House Cases, There, the Court held that the State of Louisiana had not abridged *522 the Privileges or Immunities Clause by granting a partial monopoly of the slaughtering business to one company. The Court reasoned that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was not intended "as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State." Rather the "privileges or immunities of citizens" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were limited to those "belonging to a citizen of the United States as such." The Court declined to specify the privileges or immunities that fell into this latter category, but it made clear that few did. See Unlike the majority, I would look to history to ascertain the original meaning of the Clause.[1] At least in American law, the phrase (or its close approximation) appears to stem *523 from the 1606 Charter of Virginia, which provided that "all and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realme of England. " 7 Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws 3788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). Other colonial charters contained similar guarantees.[2] Years later, as tensions between England and the American Colonies increased, the colonists adopted resolutions reasserting their entitlement to the privileges or immunities of English citizenship.[3] *524 The colonists' repeated assertions that they maintained the rights, privileges, and immunities of persons "born within the realm of England" and "natural born" persons suggests that, at the time of the founding, the terms "privileges" and "immunities" (and their counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,999 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Saenz v. Roe
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118286/saenz-v-roe/
|
(and their counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all persons. Presumably members of the Second Continental Congress so understood these terms when they employed them in the Articles of Confederation, which guaranteed that "the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States." Art. IV. The Constitution, which superceded the Articles of Confederation, similarly guarantees that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Art. IV, 2, cl. 1. Justice Bushrod Washington's landmark opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa. 1825), reflects this historical understanding. In Corfield, a citizen of Pennsylvania challenged a New Jersey law that prohibited any person who was not an "actual inhabitant and resident" of New Jersey from harvesting oysters from New Jersey waters. Justice Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, rejected the argument that the New Jersey law violated Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. He reasoned, "we cannot accede to the proposition that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in all the rights *525 which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens." Instead, Washington concluded: "We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; and an exemption
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,999 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Saenz v. Roe
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118286/saenz-v-roe/
|
kind in the courts of the state; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities." Washington rejected the proposition that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed equal access to all public benefits (such as the right to harvest oysters in public waters) that a State chooses to make available. Instead, he *526 endorsed the colonial-era conception of the terms "privileges" and "immunities," concluding that Article IV encompassed only fundamental rights that belong to all citizens of the United States.[4] Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield indisputably influenced the Members of Congress who enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. When Congress gathered to debate the Fourteenth Amendment, Members frequently, if not as a matter of course, appealed to Corfield, arguing that the Amendment was necessary to guarantee the fundamental rights that Justice Washington identified in his opinion. See Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L. J. 1385, 1418 (1992) (referring to a Member's "obligatory quotation from Corfield "). For just one example, in a speech introducing the Amendment to the Senate, Senator Howard the Privileges or Immunities Clause by quoting at length from Corfield.[5] Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (1866). Furthermore, it appears that no Member of Congress refuted the notion that Washington's analysis in Corfield undergirded the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.[6] *527 That Members of the 39th Congress appear to have endorsed the wisdom of Justice Washington's opinion does not, standing alone, provide dispositive insight into their understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Nevertheless, their repeated references to the Corfield decision, combined with what appears to be the historical understanding of the Clause's operative terms, supports the inference that, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, people understood that "privileges or immunities of citizens" were fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law. Accordingly, the majority's conclusionthat a State violates the Privileges or Immunities Clause when it "discriminates" against citizens who have been domiciled in the State for less than a year in the distribution of welfare benefitsappears contrary to the original understanding and is dubious at best. As The Chief Justice points out, ante, at 511, it comes as quite a surprise that the majority relies on the Privileges or Immunities Clause at all in this case. That is because, as
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,999 | 1 |
second_dissenting
|
Saenz v. Roe
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118286/saenz-v-roe/
|
Clause at all in this case. That is because, as I have the Slaughter-House Cases sapped the Clause of any meaning. Although the majority appears to breathe new life into the Clause today, it fails to address its historical underpinnings or its place in our constitutional jurisprudence. Because I believe that the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of our Fourteenth *528 Amendment jurisprudence, I would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case. Before invoking the Clause, however, we should endeavor to understand what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant. We should also consider whether the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence. The majority's failure to consider these important questions raises the specter that the Privileges or Immunities Clause will become yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights, limited solely by the "predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court." Moore v.East Cleveland, I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
|
These consolidated cases require us to consider the constitutionality of a state sales tax that excludes or exempts certain segments of the media but not others. I Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act imposes a 4% tax on receipts from the sale of all tangible personal property and specified services. 26-52-302 (1987 and Supp. 1989). The Act exempts from the tax certain sales of goods and services. 26-52-401 (Supp. 1989). Counties *442 within Arkansas impose a 1% tax on all goods and services subject to taxation under the Gross Receipts Act, 26-74-307, 26-74-222 (1987 and Supp. 1989), and cities may impose a further ½% or 1% tax on these items, 26-75-307 The Gross Receipts Act expressly exempts receipts from subscription and over-the-counter newspaper sales and subscription magazine sales. See 26-52-401(4), (14) (Supp. 1989); Revenue Policy Statement 1988-1 (Mar. 10, 1988), reprinted in CCH Ark. Tax Rep. ¶ 69-415. Before 1987, the Act did not list among those services subject to the sales tax either cable television[1] or scrambled satellite broadcast television services to home dish-antennae owners.[2] See 26-52-301 In 1987, Arkansas adopted Act 188, which amended the Gross Receipts Act to impose the sales tax on cable television. 1987 Ark. Gen. Acts, No. 188, 1. Daniel L. Medlock, a cable television subscriber, Community Communications Co., a cable television operator, and the Arkansas Cable Television Association, Inc., a trade organization composed of approximately 80 cable operators with systems throughout the State (cable petitioners), brought this class action in the Arkansas Chancery Court to challenge the extension of the sales tax to cable television services. Cable petitioners contended that their expressive activities are protected by the First Amendment and are comparable to those of newspapers, magazines, and scrambled satellite broadcast television. They argued that Arkansas' sales taxation *443 of cable services, and exemption or exclusion from the tax of newspapers, magazines, and satellite broadcast services, violated their constitutional rights under the First Amendment and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chancery Court granted cable petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, requiring Arkansas to place in escrow the challenged sales taxes and to keep records identifying collections of the taxes. Both sides introduced extensive testimony and documentary evidence at the hearing on this motion and at the subsequent trial. Following the trial, the Chancery Court concluded that cable television's necessary use of public rights-of-way distinguishes it for constitutional purposes from other media. It therefore upheld the constitutionality of Act 188, dissolved its preliminary injunction, and ordered all funds collected in escrow released. In 1989, shortly after the Chancery Court issued its
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
|
released. In 1989, shortly after the Chancery Court issued its decision, Arkansas adopted Act 769, which extended the sales tax to "all other distribution of television, video or radio services with or without the use of wires provided to subscribers or paying customers or users." 1989 Ark. Gen. Acts, No. 769, 1. On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, cable petitioners again challenged the State's sales tax on the ground that, notwithstanding Act 769, it continued unconstitutionally to discriminate against cable television. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the tax was invalid after the passage of Act 769, holding that the Constitution does not prohibit the differential taxation of different media. The court believed, however, that the First Amendment prohibits discriminatory taxation among members of the same medium. On the record before it, the court found that cable television services and satellite broadcast services to home dish-antennae owners were "substantially the same." The State Supreme Court rejected the Chancery Court's conclusion that cable television's use of public *444 rights-of-way justified its differential sales tax treatment, explaining that cable operators already paid franchise fees for that right. It therefore held that Arkansas' sales tax was unconstitutional under the First Amendment for the period during which cable television, but not satellite broadcast services, were subject to the tax. at ; 785 S.W.2d, at Both cable petitioners and the Arkansas Commissioner of Revenues petitioned this Court for certiorari. We consolidated these petitions and granted certiorari, in order to resolve the question, left open in Arkansas Writers' Project, whether the First Amendment prevents a State from imposing its sales tax on only selected segments of the media. II Cable television provides to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in "speech" under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the "press." See Los That it is taxed differently from other media does not by itself, however, raise First Amendment concerns. Our cases have held that a tax that discriminates among speakers is constitutionally suspect only in certain circumstances. In 297 U.S. the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a Louisiana law that singled out publications with weekly circulations above 20,000 for a 2% tax on gross receipts from advertising. The tax fell exclusively on 13 newspapers. Four other daily newspapers and 120 weekly newspapers with weekly circulations of less than 20,000 were not taxed. The Court discussed at length the pre-First Amendment English and American tradition of taxes imposed exclusively on the press. This invidious form of censorship was intended to curtail the circulation of
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
|
form of censorship was intended to curtail the circulation of newspapers and thereby prevent the *445 people from acquiring knowledge of government activities. The Court held that the tax at issue in was of this type and was therefore unconstitutional. In Minneapolis & Tribune we noted that it was unclear whether the result in depended on our perception in that case that the State had imposed the tax with the intent to penalize a selected group of newspapers or whether the structure of the tax was sufficient to invalidate it. See (citing cases and commentary). Minneapolis resolved any doubts about whether direct evidence of improper censorial motive is required in order to invalidate a differential tax on First Amendment grounds: "Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment." At issue in Minneapolis was a Minnesota special use tax on the cost of paper and ink consumed in the production of publications. The tax exempted the first $100,000 worth of paper and ink consumed annually. Eleven publishers, producing only 14 of the State's 388 paid circulation newspapers, incurred liability under the tax in its first year of operation. The Minneapolis & Tribune Co. ( Tribune) was responsible for roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax. The following year, 13 publishers, producing only 16 of the State's 374 paid circulation papers, paid the tax. Again, the Tribune bore roughly two-thirds of the tax's burden. We found no evidence of impermissible legislative motive in the case apart from the structure of the tax itself. We nevertheless held the Minnesota tax unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the tax singled out the press for special treatment. We noted that the general applicability of any burdensome tax law helps to ensure that it will be met with widespread opposition. When such a law applies only to a single constituency, however, it is insulated from this political *446 constraint. See Given "the basic assumption of our political system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government," we feared that the threat of exclusive taxation of the press could operate "as effectively as a censor to check critical comment." "Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment," that it is presumptively unconstitutional. Beyond singling out the press, the Minnesota tax targeted a small group of newspapersthose so large that they remained subject to the tax despite its exemption for the first $100,000 of ink and paper consumed annually. The tax thus resembled a
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
|
ink and paper consumed annually. The tax thus resembled a penalty for certain newspapers. Once again, the scheme appeared to have such potential for abuse that we concluded that it violated the First Amendment: "[W]hen the exemption selects such a narrowly defined group to bear the full burden of the tax, the tax begins to resemble more a penalty for a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller enterprises." Arkansas Writers' Project, reaffirmed the rule that selective taxation of the press through the narrow targeting of individual members offends the First Amendment. In that case, Arkansas Writers' Project sought a refund of state taxes it had paid on sales of the Arkansas Times, a general interest magazine, under Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act of 1941. Exempt from the sales tax were receipts from sales of religious, professional, trade and sports magazines. See We held that Arkansas' magazine exemption, which meant that only "a few Arkansas magazines pay any sales tax," operated in much the same way as did the $100,000 exemption in Minneapolis and therefore suffered from the same type of discrimination identified in that case. Moreover, the basis on which the tax differentiated among magazines depended entirely on their content. *447 These cases demonstrate that differential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. Absent a compelling justification, the government may not exercise its taxing power to single out the press. See -9; Minneapolis 460 U. S., The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse, and a tax limited to the press raises concerns about censorship of critical information and opinion. A tax is also suspect if it targets a small group of speakers. See ; Arkansas Writers', 481 U. S., Again, the fear is censorship of particular ideas or viewpoints. Finally, for reasons that are obvious, a tax will trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech. See -231. The Arkansas tax at issue here presents none of these types of discrimination. The Arkansas sales tax is a tax of general applicability. It applies to receipts from the sale of all tangible personal property and a broad range of services, unless within a group of specific exemptions. Among the services on which the tax is imposed are natural gas, electricity, water, ice, and steam utility services; telephone, telecommunications, and telegraph service; the furnishing of rooms by hotels, apartment hotels, lodging houses, and tourist camps; alteration, addition, cleaning,
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
|
apartment hotels, lodging houses, and tourist camps; alteration, addition, cleaning, refinishing, replacement, and repair services; printing of all kinds; tickets for admission to places of amusement or athletic, entertainment, or recreational events; and fees for the privilege of having access to, or use of, amusement, entertainment, athletic, or recreational facilities. See Ark. Code Ann. 26-52-301 (Supp. 1989). The tax does not single out the press and does not therefore threaten to hinder the press as a watchdog of government activity. Cf. Minneapolis We have said repeatedly that a State may impose on the press a generally applicable tax. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries ; Arkansas Writers', ; Minneapolis and n. 9. Furthermore, there is no indication in these cases that Arkansas has targeted cable television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with its First Amendment activities. Nor is the tax one that is structured so as to raise suspicion that it was intended to do so. Unlike the taxes involved in and Minneapolis the Arkansas tax has not selected a narrow group to bear fully the burden of the tax. The tax is also structurally dissimilar to the tax involved in Arkansas Writers'. In that case, only "a few" Arkansas magazines paid the State's sales tax. See Arkansas Writers', 481 U. S., and n. 4. Arkansas Writers' Project maintained before the Court that the Arkansas Times was the only Arkansas publication that paid sales tax. The Commissioner contended that two additional periodicals also paid the tax. We responded that, "[w]hether there are three Arkansas magazines paying tax or only one, the burden of the tax clearly falls on a limited group of publishers." n. 4. In contrast, Act 188 extended Arkansas' sales tax uniformly to the approximately 100 cable systems then operating in the State. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 90-38, p. 12a. While none of the seven scrambled satellite broadcast services then available in Arkansas, Tr. 12 was taxed until Act 769 became effective, Arkansas' extension of its sales tax to cable television hardly resembles a "penalty for a few." See Minneapolis ; Arkansas Writers', and n. 4. The danger from a tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers is the danger of censorship; a tax on a small number of speakers runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views. The risk is similar to that from content-based regulation: It will distort the market for ideas. "The constitutional right of free expression is intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, *449 putting the decision as to what views
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
|
public discussion, *449 putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests." There is no comparable danger from a tax on the services provided by a large number of cable operators offering a wide variety of programming throughout the State. That the Arkansas Supreme Court found cable and satellite television to be the same medium does not change this conclusion. Even if we accept this finding, the fact remains that the tax affected approximately 100 suppliers of cable television services. This is not a tax structure that resembles a penalty for particular speakers or particular ideas. Finally, Arkansas' sales tax is not content based. There is nothing in the language of the statute that refers to the content of mass media communications. Moreover, the record establishes that cable television offers subscribers a variety of programming that presents a mixture of news, information, and entertainment. It contains no evidence, nor is it contended, that this material differs systematically in its message from that communicated by satellite broadcast programming, newspapers, or magazines. Because the Arkansas sales tax presents none of the First Amendment difficulties that have led us to strike down differential taxation in the past, cable petitioners can prevail only if the Arkansas tax scheme presents "an additional basis" for concluding that the State has violated petitioners' First Amendment rights. See Arkansas Writers', at Petitioners argue that such a basis exists here: Arkansas' tax discriminates among media and, if the Arkansas Supreme Court's conclusion regarding cable and satellite television is accepted, discriminated for a time within a medium. Petitioners argue that such intermedia and intramedia discrimination, even in the absence of any evidence of intent to suppress speech or of any effect on the expression of particular *450 ideas, violates the First Amendment. Our cases do not support such a rule. stands for the proposition that a tax scheme that discriminates among speakers does not implicate the First Amendment unless it discriminates on the basis of ideas. In that case, we considered provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that discriminated between contributions to lobbying organizations. One section of the Code conferred tax-exempt status on certain nonprofit organizations that did not engage in lobbying activities. Contributions to those organizations were deductible. Another section of the Code conferred tax-exempt status on certain other nonprofit organizations that did lobby, but contributions to them were not deductible. Taxpayers contributing to veterans' organizations were,
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
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them were not deductible. Taxpayers contributing to veterans' organizations were, however, permitted to deduct their contributions regardless of those organizations' lobbying activities. The tax distinction between these lobbying organizations did not trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. We explained that a legislature is not required to subsidize First Amendment rights through a tax exemption or tax deduction.[3] at 546. For this proposition, we relied on In Cammarano, the Court considered an Internal Revenue regulation that denied a tax deduction for money spent by businesses on publicity programs directed at pending state legislation. The Court held that the regulation did not violate the First Amendment because it did not discriminate on the basis of who was spending the money on *451 publicity or what the person or business was advocating. The regulation was therefore "plainly not `"aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."'" quoting while similar to Cammarano, presented the additional fact that Congress had chosen to exempt from taxes contributions to veterans' organizations, while not exempting other contributions. This did not change the analysis. Inherent in the power to tax is the power to discriminate in taxation. "Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes." See also ; New York Rapid Transit ; Cammarano established that the government need not exempt speech from a generally applicable tax. established that a tax scheme does not become suspect simply because it exempts only some speech. reiterated in the First Amendment context the strong presumption in favor of duly enacted taxation schemes. In so doing, the Court quoted the rule announced more than 40 years earlier in Madden, an equal protection case: "`The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized. [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. Traditionally classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden. It has, because of this, been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot *452 have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" Madden, at quoted in 461 U. S., -548. On
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,991 | 14 |
majority
|
Leathers v. Medlock
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112572/leathers-v-medlock/
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classes.'" Madden, at quoted in 461 U. S., -548. On the record in there appeared no such "hostile and oppressive discrimination." We explained that "[t]he case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas." But that was not the case. The exemption for contributions to veterans' organizations applied without reference to the content of the speech involved; it was not intended to suppress any ideas; and there was no demonstration that it had that effect. Under these circumstances, the selection of the veterans' organizations for a tax preference was "obviously a matter of policy and discretion." That a differential burden on speakers is insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment concerns is evident as well from and Oklahoma Press Publishing Those cases do not involve taxation, but they do involve government action that places differential burdens on members of the press. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 201 et seq., applies generally to newspapers as to other businesses, but it exempts from its requirements certain small papers. 213(a)(8). Publishers of larger daily newspapers argued that the differential burden thereby placed on them violates the First Amendment. The Court upheld the exemption because there was no indication that the government had singled out the press for special treatment, or that the exemption was a "`deliberate and *453 calculated device'" to penalize a certain group of newspapers, quoting 297 U. S., Taken together, and Oklahoma Press establish that differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas. That was the case in Minneapolis and Arkansas Writers', but it is not the case here. The Arkansas Legislature has chosen simply to exclude or exempt certain media from a generally applicable tax. Nothing about that choice has ever suggested an interest in censoring the expressive activities of cable television. Nor does anything in this record indicate that Arkansas' broad-based, content-neutral sales tax is likely to stifle the free exchange of ideas. We conclude that the State's extension of its generally applicable sales tax to cable television services alone, or to cable and satellite services, while exempting the print media, does not violate the First Amendment. Before the Arkansas Chancery Court, cable petitioners contended that the State's tax distinction between cable and other media violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment. App. to Pet.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,998 | 19 |
majority
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Knowles v. Iowa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118250/knowles-v-iowa/
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An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding, but issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The question presented is whether such a procedure authorizes the officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the car. We answer this question "no." Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, after having been clocked driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The police officer issued a citation to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have arrested him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver's seat he found a bag of marijuana and a "pot pipe." Knowles was then arrested and charged with violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances. Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence so obtained. He argued that the search could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United because he had not been placed under arrest. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer conceded that he had *115 neither Knowles' consent nor probable cause to conduct the search. He relied on Iowa law dealing with such searches. (1)(a) provides that Iowa peace officers having cause to believe that a person has violated any traffic or motor vehicle equipment law may arrest the person and immediately take the person before a magistrate. Iowa law also authorizes the far more usual practice of issuing a citation in lieu of arrest or in lieu of continued custody after an initial arrest.[1] See (1) Section 805.1(4) provides that the issuance of acitation in lieu of an arrest "does not affect the officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search." The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as providing authority to officers to conduct a fullblown search of an automobile and driver in those cases where police elect not to make a custodial arrest and instead issue a citationthat is, a search incident to citation. See ; Based on this authority, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Knowles guilty. The Supreme Court of Iowa, sitting en banc, affirmed by a divided vote. Relying on its earlier opinion in the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search under a bright-line "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the *116 arresting officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been a custodial arrest. We granted certiorari, and we
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,998 | 19 |
majority
|
Knowles v. Iowa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118250/knowles-v-iowa/
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have been a custodial arrest. We granted certiorari, and we now reverse. The State contends that Knowles has challenged Iowa Code's 805.1(4) only "on its face" and not "as applied," in which case, the argument continues, his challenge would run afoul of But in his motion to suppress, Knowles argued that "[b]ecause the officer had no probable cause and no search warrant, and the search cannot otherwise be justified under the Fourth Amendment, the search of the car was unconstitutional." App. 7. Knowles did not argue below, and does not argue here, that the statute could never be lawfully applied. The question we therefore address is whether the search at issue, authorized as it was by state law, nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment.[2] In we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at See also United ; ; ; *117 ; But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "`both legitimate and weighty,' " The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." -235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called `Terry stop' than to a formal arrest." See also U.S. 291, This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See at ; But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they *118 may order out of a vehicle both the driver, and
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,998 | 19 |
majority
|
Knowles v. Iowa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118250/knowles-v-iowa/
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may order out of a vehicle both the driver, and any passengers, ; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, U.S. 1 ; conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, ; and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. Iowa nevertheless argues that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a suspect who is subject to a routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related to his identity (e. g., a driver's license or vehicle registration), or destroy evidence of another, as yet undetected crime. As for the destruction of evidence relating to identity, if a police officer is not satisfied with the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a basis for arresting him rather than merely issuing a citation. As for destroying evidence of other crimes, the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense seems remote. In we held that the authority to conduct a full field search as incident to an arrest was a "bright-line rule," which was based on the concern for officer safety and destruction or loss of evidence, but which did not depend in every case upon the existence of either concern. Here we *119 are asked to extend that "bright-line rule" to a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all. We decline to do so. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,989 | 11 |
second_dissenting
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Dellmuth v. Muth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112292/dellmuth-v-muth/
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I join JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion because he correctly ascertains the unmistakable intent of Congress to subject state agencies to liability for tuition-reimbursement awards under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S. C. 1415(e)(2). See also School Committee of Indeed, as JUSTICE BRENNAN convincingly demonstrates, this statute passes even the stringent test set forth in Atascadero State It is only by resorting to a stricter standard yet that the Court is able to reach the result that it does here. Because the Court never should have started down this road, it certainly should not take today's additional step. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. While I join JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent, I adhere to my view that a "statute cannot amend the Constitution." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., ante, at 24 (concurring opinion). Because this case deals with the judicially created doctrine of sovereign immunity rather than the real Eleventh Amendment's limitation on federal judicial power, the congressional decision to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts must prevail.
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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At issue here is whether the home office of a United States bank is obligated to use its general assets to repay a Eurodollar deposit made at one of its foreign branches, after the foreign country's government has prohibited the branch from making repayment out of its own assets. I The case arises from a transaction in what is known in the banking and financial communities as the Eurodollar market. As the District Court defined the term, Eurodollars are *66 United States dollars that have been deposited with a banking institution located outside the United States, with a corresponding obligation on the part of the banking institution to repay the deposit in United States dollars. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a; P. Oppenheim, International ing 24 (5th ed. 1987). The banking institution receiving the deposit can be either a foreign branch of a United States bank or a foreign bank. A major component of the Eurodollar market is interbank trading. In a typical interbank transaction in the Eurodollar market, the depositing bank ( A) agrees by telephone or telex, or through a broker, to place a deposit denominated in United States dollars with a second bank ( X). For the deposit to be a Eurodollar deposit, X must be either a foreign branch of a United States bank or a foreign bank; A, however, can be any bank, including one located in the United States. To complete the transactions, most banks that participate in the interbank trading market utilize correspondent banks in New York City, with whom they maintain, directly or indirectly, accounts denominated in United States dollars. In this example, the depositor bank, A, orders its correspondent bank in New York ( B) to transfer United States dollars from A's account to X's account with X's New York correspondent bank ( Y). The transfer of funds from B to Y is accomplished by means of a wire transfer through a clearing mechanism located in New York City and known as the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, or "CHIPS." See Scanlon, Definitions and Mechanics of Eurodollar Transactions, in The Eurodollar 16, 24-25 ; Brief for New York Clearing House Association et al. as Amici Curiae 4. Repayment of the funds at the end of the deposit term is accomplished by having Y transfer funds from X's account to B, through the CHIPS system, for credit to A's account. *664 The transaction at issue here follows this pattern. Respondent Wells Fargo Asia Limited (WFAL) is a Singapore-chartered bank wholly owned by Wells Fargo N. A., a bank chartered by the
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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by Wells Fargo N. A., a bank chartered by the United States. Petitioner Citibank, N. A. (Citibank), also a United States-chartered bank, operates a branch office in Manila, Philippines (Citibank/Manila). On June 10, 198, WFAL agreed to make two $1 million time deposits with Citibank/Manila. The rate at which the deposits would earn interest was set at 10%, and the parties agreed that the deposits would be repaid on December 9 and 10, 198. The deposits were arranged by oral agreement through the assistance of an Asian money broker, which made a written report to the parties that stated, inter alia: " `Pay: Citibank, N. A. New York Account Manila " `Repay: Wells Fargo International, New York Account Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., Singapore Account #XXX-XXXXXX.' " The broker also sent WFAL a telex containing the following " `[i]nstructions' ": " `Settlement Citibank NA NYC AC Manila " `Repayment Wells Fargo Bk Intl NYC Ac Wells Fargo Asia Ltd Sgp No XXX-XXXXXX.' " That same day, the parties exchanged telexes confirming each of the two deposits. WFAL's telexes to Citibank/ Manila read: " `We shall instruct Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York our correspondent please pay to our a/c with Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York to pay to Citibank NA customer's correspondent USD 1,000,000.' " The telexes from Citibank/Manila to WFAL read: " `Please remit US Dlr 1,000,000 to our account with Citibank New York. At maturity we remit US Dlr 1,049,444.44 to your account with Wells Fargo Intl Corp NY through Citibank New York.' " *665 A few months after the deposit was made, the Philippine government issued a Memorandum to Authorized Agent s (MAAB 47) which provided in relevant part: " `Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on all foreign obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial institutions, irrespective of maturity, shall be submitted to the Central [of the Philippines] thru the Management of External Debt and Investment Accounts Department (MEDIAD) for prior approval.' " According to the Court of Appeals, "[a]s interpreted by the Central of the Philippines, this decree prevented Citibank/Manila, an `authorized agent bank' under Philippine law, from repaying the WFAL deposits with its Philippine assets, i. e., those assets not either deposited in banks elsewhere or invested in non-Philippine enterprises." As a result, Citibank/Manila refused to repay WFAL's deposits when they matured in December 198. WFAL commenced the present action against Citibank in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that Citibank in New York was liable for the funds that WFAL deposited
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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New York was liable for the funds that WFAL deposited with Citibank/Manila. While the lawsuit was pending, Citibank obtained permission from the Central of the Philippines to repay its Manila depositors to the extent that it could do so with the non-Philippine assets of the Manila branch. It paid WFAL $94,000; the remainder of the deposits, $1,066,000, remains in dispute. During the course of this litigation, Citibank/ Manila, with the apparent consent of the Philippine government, has continued to pay WFAL interest on the outstanding principal. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. After a bench trial on the merits, the District Court accepted WFAL's invitation to assume that Philippine law governs the action. The court saw the issue to be whether, under Philippine law, a depositor with Citibank/Manila may look to assets booked at Citibank's non-Philippine offices for *666 repayment of the deposits. After considering affidavits from the parties, it concluded (1) that under Philippine law an obligation incurred by a branch is an obligation of the bank as a whole; (2) that repayment of WFAL's deposits with assets booked at Citibank offices other than Citibank/Manila would not contravene MAAB 47; and () that Citibank therefore was obligated to repay WFAL, even if it could do so only from assets not booked at Citibank/Manila. at 1a-5a. It entered judgment for WFAL, and Citibank appealed. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to clarify the basis for its judgment. The Second Circuit ordered the District Court to make supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following matters: "(a) Whether the parties agreed as to where the debt could be repaid, including whether they agreed that the deposits were collectible only in Manila. "(b) If there was an agreement, what were its essential terms? "(c) Whether Philippine law (other than MAAB 47) precludes or negates an agreement between the parties to have the deposits collectible outside of Manila. "(d) If there is no controlling Philippine law referred to in (c) above, what law does control?" at 26a. In response to the first query, the District Court distinguished the concepts of repayment and collection, defining repayment as "refer[ring] to the location where the wire transfers effectuating repayment at maturity were to occur," and collection as "refer[ring] to the place or places where plaintiff was entitled to look for satisfaction of its deposits in the event that Citibank should fail to make the required wire transfers at the place of repayment." at 14a. It concluded that the
|
Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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the place of repayment." at 14a. It concluded that the parties' confirmation slips established an agreement that repayment was to occur in New York, and that there was neither an express agreement nor one that *667 could be implied from custom or usage in the Eurodollar market on the issue of where the deposits could be collected. In response to the second question, the court stated that "[t]he only agreement relating to collection or repayment was that repayment would occur in New York." at 18a. As to third query, the court stated that it knew of no provision of Philippine law that barred an agreement making WFAL's deposits collectible outside Manila. Finally, in response to the last query, the District Court restated the issue in the case as follows: "Hence, the dispute in this case boils down to one question: is Citibank obligated to use its worldwide assets to satisfy plaintiff's deposits? In other words, the dispute is not so much about where repayment physically was to be made or where the deposits were collectible, but rather which assets Citibank is required to use in order to satisfy its obligation to plaintiff. As we have previously found that the contract was silent on this issue, we interpret query (d) as imposing upon us the task of deciding whether New York or Philippine law controls the answer to that question." at 19a. The District Court held that, under either New York or federal choice-of-law rules, New York law should be applied. After reviewing New York law, it held that Citibank was liable for WFAL's deposits with Citibank/Manila, and that WFAL could look to Citibank's worldwide assets for satisfaction of its deposits. The Second Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. Citing general banking law principles, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, in the ordinary course, a party who makes a deposit with a foreign branch of a bank can demand repayment of the deposit only at that branch. In the court's view, however, these same principles established that this "normal limitation" could be altered by an agreement between the bank and the depositor: "If the parties agree that repayment of a deposit in a foreign bank or branch may occur at another *668 location, they authorize demand and collection at that other location." The court noted that the District Court had found that Citibank had agreed to repay WFAL's deposits in New York. It concluded that the District Court's finding was not clearly erroneous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), and held that, as a result, WFAL was entitled "to collect
|
Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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held that, as a result, WFAL was entitled "to collect the deposits out of Citibank assets in New York." 852 F. 2d., at 661. We granted certiorari. We decide that the factual premise on which the Second Circuit relied in deciding the case contradicts the factual determinations made by the District Court, determinations that are not clearly erroneous. We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of the additional legal questions in the case. II Little need be said respecting the operation or effect of the Philippine decree at this stage of the case, for no party questions the conclusion reached by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that Philippine law does not bar the collection of WFAL's deposits from the general assets of Citibank in the State of New York. See 852 F. 2d, at 660-661; App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The question, rather, is whether Citibank is obligated to allow collection in New York, and on this point two principal theories must be examined. The first is that there was an agreement between the parties to permit collection in New York, or indeed at any place where Citibank has assets, an agreement implied from all the facts in the case as being within the contemplation of the parties. A second, and alternative, theory for permitting collection is that, assuming no such agreement, there is a duty to pay in New York in any event, a duty that the law creates when the parties have not contracted otherwise. See A. Corbin, Contracts 561, pp. 276-277 (1960). *669 The Court of Appeals appears to have relied upon the first theory we have noted, adopting the premise that the parties did contract to permit recovery from the general assets of Citibank in New York. Yet the District Court had made it clear that there is a distinction between an agreement on "repayment," which refers to the physical location for transacting discharge of the debt, and an agreement respecting "collection," which refers to the location where assets may be taken to satisfy it, and in quite specific terms, it found that the only agreement the parties made referred to repayment. The Court of Appeals, while it said that this finding was not clearly erroneous, appears to have viewed repayment and collection as interchangeable concepts, not divisible ones. It concluded that the agreement as to where repayment could occur constituted also an agreement as to which bank assets the depositor could look to for collection. The strongest indication that the Court
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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look to for collection. The strongest indication that the Court of Appeals was interpreting the District Court's findings in this manner is its answer to the argument, made by the United States as amicus curiae, that the home office of a bank should not bear the risk of foreign restrictions on the payment of assets from the foreign branch where a deposit has been placed, unless it makes an express agreement to do so. The court announced that "[o]ur affirmance in the present case is based on the district court's finding of just such an agreement." 852 F. 2d, at 661 That the Court of Appeals based its ruling on the premise of an agreement between the parties is apparent as well from the authorities upon which it relied to support its holding. The court cited three cases for the proposition that an agreement to repay at a particular location authorizes the depositor to collect the deposits at that location, all of which involve applications of the act of state doctrine: Allied (CA2), cert. dism'd, ; ; *670 and Each of these three cases turns upon the existence, or nonexistence, of an agreement for collection. In and Allied the agreement of the parties to permit collection at a location outside of the foreign country made the legal action of the foreign country irrelevant. See 75 F. 2d, at 646 (agreement between the parties was that "Chase's main office in New York would guarantee the certificate [of deposit] and that [the depositors] could be repaid by presenting the certificate at any Chase branch worldwide"); ; Allied In Braka, the agreement between the parties was that repayment and collection would be permitted only in the foreign country, and so the foreign law controlled. See - By its reliance upon these cases, the Court of Appeals, it seems to us, must have been relying upon the existence of an agreement between Citibank and WFAL to permit collection in New York. As noted above, however, this premise contradicts the express finding of the District Court. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court of Appeals is permitted to reject the District Court's findings only if those findings are clearly erroneous. As the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged, the record contains ample support for the District Court's finding that the parties agreed that repayment, defined as the wire transfers effecting the transfer of funds to WFAL when its deposits matured, would *671 take place in New York. The confirmation slips exchanged by the parties are explicit: The transfer of funds upon maturity was to
|
Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
|
are explicit: The transfer of funds upon maturity was to occur through wire transfers made by the parties' correspondent banks in New York. See As to collection, the District Court found that neither the parties' confirmation slips nor the evidence offered at trial with regard to whether "an agreement concerning the place of collection could be implied from custom and usage in the international banking field" established an agreement respecting collection. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. Upon review of the record, we hold this finding, that no such implied agreement existed based on the intent of the parties, was not clearly erroneous. The confirmation slips do not indicate an agreement that WFAL could collect its deposits from Citibank assets in New York; indeed, Citibank/Manila's confirmation slip, stating that "[a]t maturity we remit US Dlr 1,049,444.44 to your account with Wells Fargo Intl Corp NY through Citibank New York," see tends to negate the existence of any such agreement. The telexes from the money broker who arranged the deposits speak in terms of repayment, and indicate no more than that repayment was to be made to WFAL's account with its correspondent bank in New York; they do not indicate any agreement about where WFAL could collect its deposits in the event that Citibank/Manila failed to remit payment upon maturity to this account. Nor does the evidence contradict the District Court's conclusion that the parties, in this particular case, failed to establish a relevant custom or practice in the international banking community from which it could be inferred that the parties had a tacit understanding on the point. Citibank's experts testified that the common understanding in the banking community was that the higher interest rates offered for Eurodollar deposits, in contrast to dollar deposits with United States banks, reflected in part the fact that the deposits were not subject to reserve and insurance requirements *672 imposed on domestic deposits by United States banking law. This could only be the case, argues Citibank, if the deposits were "payable only" outside of the United States, as required by as amended, 12 U.S. C. 461 (b)(6), and as amended, 12 U.S. C. 181(1)(5). It argues further that higher rates reflected the depositor's assumption of foreign "sovereign risk," defined as the risk that actions by the foreign government having legal control over the foreign branch and its assets would render the branch unable to repay the deposit. See, e. g., App. 54-67 (testimony of Ian H. Giddy). WFAL's experts, on the other hand, testified that the identical interest rates being offered for Eurodollar deposits
|
Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
|
Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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that the identical interest rates being offered for Eurodollar deposits in both Manila and London at the time the deposits were made, despite the conceded differences in sovereign risk between the two locations, reflected an understanding that the home office of a bank was liable for repayment in the event that its foreign branch was unable to repay for any reason, including restrictions imposed by a foreign government. See, e. g., A fair reading of all of the testimony supports the conclusion that, at least in this trial, on the issue of the allocation of sovereign risk there was a wide variance of opinion in the international banking community. We cannot say that we are left with "the definite and firm conviction" that the District Court's findings are erroneous. United Because the Court of Appeals' holding relies upon contrary factual assumptions, the judgment for WFAL cannot be affirmed under the reasoning used by that court. Given the finding of the District Court that there was no agreement between the parties respecting collection from Citibank's general assets in New York, the question becomes whether collection is permitted nonetheless by rights and duties implied by law. As is its right, see WFAL seeks *67 to defend the judgment below on the ground that, under principles of either New York or Philippine law, Citibank was obligated to make its general assets available for collection of WFAL's deposits. See Brief for Respondent 18, 2, 0-49. It is unclear from the opinion of the Court of Appeals which law it found to be controlling; and we decide to remand the case for the Court of Appeals to determine which law applies, and the content of that law. See ; at One of WFAL's contentions is that the Court of Appeals' opinion can be supported on the theory that it is based upon New York law. We do not think this is a fair or necessary construction of the opinion. The Court of Appeals placed express reliance on its own opinion in without citing or discussing Perez v. Chase Manhattan N. A., In that case, the New York Court of Appeals was explicit in pointing out that its decision was in conflict with that reached two days earlier by the Second Circuit in a case that the Perez court deemed "similar on its facts." See n. n. Given this alignment of authorities, we are reluctant to interpret the Court of Appeals' decision as resting on principles of state law. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, moreover, refers to "general banking law principles" and "United States
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
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Citibank, NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112438/citibank-na-v-wells-fargo-asia-ltd/
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moreover, refers to "general banking law principles" and "United States law," 852 F. 2d, at 660; whether this is the semantic or legal equivalent of the law of New York is for the Court of Appeals to say in the first instance. Alternatively, if the Court of Appeals, based upon its particular expertise in the law of New York and commercial matters generally, is of the view that the controlling rule is supplied by Philippine law or, as Citibank would have it, by a federal common-law rule respecting bank deposits, it should make that determination, subject to any further review we deem appropriate. In view of our remand, we find *674 it premature to consider the other contentions of the parties respecting the necessity for any rule of federal common law, or the pre-emptive effect of federal statutes and regulations on bank deposits and reserves. See 12 U.S. C. 461(b)(6), 181(1)(5)(a); 12 CFR 204.128(c) (1990). All of these matters, of course, may be addressed by the Court of Appeals if necessary for a full and correct resolution of the case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,997 | 16 |
concurring
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Lambert v. Wicklund
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1088002/lambert-v-wicklund/
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We assumed in that a young woman's demonstration that an abortion would be in her best interest was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Ohio statute's judicial bypass provision. In my view, that case requires us to make the same assumption here. Whether that is a necessary showing is a question we need not reach. In Akron II, we upheld a statute authorizing a judicial bypass of a parental notice requirement on the understanding that (C)(2) (1995) required the juvenile court to authorize the procedure whenever it determined that "the abortion is in the minor's best interest," Given the fact that the relevant text of the Montana statute at issue in this case, (5)(b) (1995), is essentially identical to the Ohio provision, coupled with the fact that the Montana Attorney General has advised us that "the best interests standard in 50-20-212(5)(b) [is] either identical to or substantively indistinguishable from the best interests" provision construed in Akron II, Pet. for Cert. 7, it is surely appropriate to assume that the Montana provision also requires the court to authorize the minor's consent whenever the abortion is in her best interests. So understood, the Montana statute is plainly constitutional under our ruling in Akron II. Because the Court of Appeals erroneously construed the statute in a manner that caused that court to hold the statute unconstitutional, I agree with the majority that the judgment below should be reversed.[*] *302 While a showing that an abortion is in a young woman's best interest is therefore sufficient to satisfy the Montana judicial bypass provision as we understood an analogous statute in Akron II, I do not think the Court need address whether the Montana statute can be properly understood to make such a demonstration a necessary requirement. My colleagues suggest that the statute requires a minor "to show that abortion without notification is in her best interests," ante, at 297-298 (emphasis deleted). To the extent this language indicates that a young woman must demonstrate both that abortion is in her best interest and that notification is not, I think that question is best left for another day. I note, however, that the plain language of the statute makes passably clear that a showing that notification is not in the minor's best interest is alone sufficient. See (5)(b) (1995) Although I therefore do not agree with all of the Court's reasoning, I concur in the majority's view that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
|
Justice White
| 1,974 | 6 |
majority
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Spomer v. Littleton
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108907/spomer-v-littleton/
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This is a companion case to O'Shea v. Littleton, ante, p. 488, involving claims which the respondents, 17 black and two white residents of Cairo, Illinois, individually and as representatives of the class they purport to represent, set forth in that portion of their amended civil rights complaint which alleged wrongful conduct on the part of Peyton Berbling, individually and in his capacity as State's Attorney for Alexander County, Illinois, the county in which the city of Cairo is located. As discussed in O'Shea, the complaint alleged a broad range of racially discriminatory patterns and practices in the administration of the criminal justice system in Alexander County by the Police Commissioner of Cairo, Magistrate Michael O'Shea and Associate Judge Dorothy Spomer of the Alexander County Circuit Court, State's Attorney Berbling, and Earl Shepherd, an investigator for Berbling. Allegedly, a decade of active, but lawful, efforts to achieve racial equality for the black residents of Cairo had resulted in continuing intentional conduct on the part of those named as defendants in the complaint to deprive the plaintiff-respondents of the evenhanded protection of the criminal laws, in violation of various amendments to the Constitution and 42 U.S. C. 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. *516 In particular, the complaint charged State's Attorney Berbling with purposeful racial discrimination, under color of state law, by neglecting to provide for respondents' safety though knowing of the possibility of racial disorders, by refusing to prosecute persons who threaten respondents' safety and property, and by refusing to permit respondents to give evidence against white persons who threaten them. It was alleged, with particular incidents recounted as to some charges, that "Berbling has denied and continues to deny" the constitutional rights of respondents and members of their class by following the practices of (a) refusing to initiate criminal proceedings and to hear criminal charges against white persons upon complaint by members of respondents' class,[1]*517 (b) submitting misdemeanor complaints which have been filed by black persons against whites to a grand jury, rather than proceeding by information or complaint, and then either interrogating witnesses and complainants before the grand jury with purposeful intent to racially discriminate,[2] or failing to interrogate them at all,[3] (c) inadequately *518 prosecuting the few criminal proceedings instituted against whites at respondents' behest in order to lose the cases or settle them on terms more favorable than those brought against blacks, (d) recommending substantially greater bonds and sentences in cases involving respondents and members of their class than for cases involving whites, (e) charging respondents and members of their class with significantly more serious charges for
|
Justice White
| 1,974 | 6 |
majority
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Spomer v. Littleton
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108907/spomer-v-littleton/
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members of their class with significantly more serious charges for conduct which would result in no charge or a minor charge against a white person, and (f) depriving respondents of their right to give evidence concerning the security of members of their class.[4] Each of these practices was alleged to be willful, malicious, and carried out with intent to deprive respondents and members of their class of the benefits of the county criminal justice system and to deter them from peacefully boycotting or otherwise engaging in protected First Amendment activity. Since there was asserted to be no adequate remedy at law, respondents requested that Berbling be enjoined from continuing these practices, that he be required to "submit a monthly report to [the District Court] concerning the nature, status and disposition of any complaint brought to him by plaintiffs or members of their class, or by white persons against plaintiffs or members of their class," and that the District Court maintain continuing jurisdiction in this action.[5] *519 The District Court dismissed that portion of the complaint requesting injunctive relief against Berbling, as well as against Investigator Shepherd. Magistrate O'Shea, and Judge Dorothy Spomer, for want of jurisdiction to grant any such remedy, which was perceived as directed against discretionary acts on the part of these elected state officials. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that whatever quasi-judicial immunity from injunctive proscription it had previously recognized was appropriate for a prosecutor, was not absolute, and since respondents' alternative remedies at law were thought to be inadequate, an injunctive remedy might be available if respondents could prove their claims of racial discrimination at trial.[6] The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on October 6, 1972. At the subsequent election in November *520 of that year, petitioner W. C. Spomer[7] was chosen by the voters to succeed Berbling as State's Attorney for Alexander County, and Spomer took office on December 4. In the petition for certiorari filed with this Court on January 3, 1973, seeking review of the Court of Appeals' approval of the possibility of some form of injunctive relief addressed to the State's Attorney in the course of his prosecutorial role, petitioner Spomer relied upon Supreme Court Rule 48 (3), which provides that "[w]hen a public officer is a party to a proceeding here in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and his successor is automatically substituted as a party." Respondents did not oppose the substitution,[8] and we granted certiorari and set the case for argument together with
|
Justice White
| 1,974 | 6 |
majority
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Spomer v. Littleton
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108907/spomer-v-littleton/
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granted certiorari and set the case for argument together with It has become apparent, however, that there is nothing in the record upon which we may firmly base a conclusion that a concrete controversy between W. C. Spomer and the respondents is presented to this Court for resolution. No allegations in the complaint cited any conduct of W. C. Spomer as the basis for equitable or any other relief. Indeed, Spomer is not named as a *521 defendant in the complaint at all, and, of course, he never appeared before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. The injunctive relief requested against former State's Attorney Berbling, moreover, is based upon an alleged practice of willful and malicious racial discrimination evidenced by enumerated instances in which Berbling favored white persons and disfavored Negroes. The wrongful conduct charged in the complaint is personal to Berbling, despite the fact that he was also sued in his then capacity as State's Attorney.[9] No charge is made in the complaint that the policy of the office of State's Attorney is to follow the intentional practices alleged, apart from the allegation that Berbling, as the incumbent at the time, was then continuing the practices he had previously followed. Cf. Nor have respondents ever attempted to substitute Spomer for Berbling after the Court of Appeals decision, so far as the record shows, or made any record allegations that Spomer intends to continue the asserted practices of Berbling of *522 which they complain. The plain fact is that, on the record before us, respondents have never charged Spomer with anything and do not presently seek to enjoin him from doing anything.[10] Under these circumstances, recognizing that there may no longer be a controversy between respondents and any Alexander County State's Attorney concerning injunctive relief to be applied in futuro, see Two we remand to the Court of Appeals for a determination, in the first instance, of whether the former dispute regarding the availability of injunctive relief against the State's Attorney is now moot and whether respondents will want to, and should be permitted to, amend their complaint to include claims for relief *523 against the petitioner. Cf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration and proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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Because Hugo Roman Almendarez-Torres illegally reentered the United States after having been convicted of an aggravated felony, he was subject to a maximum possible sentence of 20 years' See 8 U.S. C. 1326(b)(2). Had he not been convicted of that felony, he would have been subject to a maximum of only two years. See 8 U.S. C. 1326(a). The Court today holds that 1326(b)(2) does not set forth a separate offense, and that conviction of a prior felony is merely a sentencing enhancement for the offense set forth in 1326(a). This causes the Court to confront the difficult question whether the Constitution requires a fact which substantially increases the maximum permissible punishment for a crime to be treated as an element of that crimeto be charged in the indictment, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Until the Court said so, it was far from obvious that the answer to this question was no; on the basis of our prior law, in fact, the answer was considerably doubtful. In all our prior cases bearing upon the issue, however, we confronted a criminal statute or state-court criminal ruling *249 that unambiguously relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving a critical fact to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In the statute provided that "`visibl[e] possess[ion] [of] a firearm' " "`shall not be an element of the crime,' " but shall be determined at sentencing by "`[t]he court by a preponderance of the evidence,' " (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712 (1982)). In In re it provided that determinations of criminal action in juvenile cases "`must be based on a preponderance of the evidence,' " (quoting N. Y. Family Court Act 744(b)). In the statute provided that extreme emotional disturbance "`is an affirmative defense,' " ). And in Maine's highest court had held that in murder cases malice aforethought was presumed and had to be negated by the defendant, at 689 ). In contrast to the provisions involved in these cases, 8 U.S. C. 1326 does not, on its face, place the constitutional issue before us: It does not say that subsection (b)(2) is merely a sentencing enhancement. The text of the statute supports, if it does not indeed demand, the conclusion that subsection (b)(2) is a separate offense that includes the violation described in subsection (a) but adds the additional element of prior felony conviction. I therefore do not reach the difficult constitutional issue in this case because I adopt, as I think our cases require, that reasonable interpretation of 1326 which avoids the problem. Illegal reentry simpliciter
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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interpretation of 1326 which avoids the problem. Illegal reentry simpliciter ( 1326(a)) and illegal reentry after conviction of an aggravated felony ( 1326(b)(2)) are separate criminal offenses. Prior conviction of an aggravated felony being an element of the latter offense, it must be charged in the indictment. Since it was not, petitioner's sentence must be set aside. *250 I "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." United States ex rel. Attorney This "cardinal principle," which "has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate," Edward J. DeBartolo requires merely a determination of serious constitutional doubt, and not a determination of unconstitutionality. That must be so, of course, for otherwise the rule would "mea[n] that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution." United States ex rel. Attorney at The Court contends that neither of the two conditions for application of this rule is present here: that the constitutional question is not doubtful, and that the statute is not susceptible of a construction that will avoid it. I shall address the former point first.[1] *251 That it is genuinely doubtful whether the Constitution permits a judge (rather than a jury) to determine by a mere preponderance of the evidence (rather than beyond a reasonable doubt) a fact that increases the maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is subject is clear enough from our prior cases resolving questions on the margins of this one. In In re we invalidated a New York statute under which the burden of proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding was reduced to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. We held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged," and that the same protection extends to "a juvenile charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult," Five years later, in we unanimously extended `s protections to determinations that went not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence. We invalidated Maine's homicide law, under which all intentional murders were presumed to be committed with malice aforethought (and, as
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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were presumed to be committed with malice aforethought (and, as such, were punishable by life imprisonment), unless the defendant could rebut this presumption with proof that he acted in the heat of passion (in which case the conviction would be reduced to manslaughter and the maximum sentence to 20 years). We acknowledged that "under Maine law these facts of intent [were] not general elements of the crime of felonious homicide[, but] [i]nstead, [bore] only on the appropriate punishment category." Nonetheless, we rejected this distinction between guilt and punishment. "[I]f " we said, "were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different *252 crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment." In we cut back on some of the broader implications of Mullaney. Although that case contained, we acknowledged, "some language that ha[d] been understood as perhaps construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting `the degree of criminal culpability,' " we denied that we "intend[ed] such far-reaching effect." -215, n. 15. Accordingly, we upheld in New York's law casting upon the defendant the burden of proving as an "affirmative defense" to seconddegree murder that he "`acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,' " which defense would reduce his crime to manslaughter. We explained that "[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required," and that the State need not "prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment." We cautioned, however, that while our decision might "seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes[,] there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard." Finally, and most recently, in we upheld 's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, which prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence of five years upon a judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of certain enumerated offenses which all carried maximum sentences of *253 more than five years. We observed that
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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sentences of *253 more than five years. We observed that "we [had] never attempted to define precisely the constitutional limits noted in i. e., the extent to which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases," but explained that, whatever those limits, 's law did not transgress them, primarily because it "neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor create[d] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm," The feebleness of the Court's contention that here there is no serious constitutional doubt is evidenced by the degree to which it must ignore or distort the analysis of McMillan. As just described, that opinion emphasizedand emphasized repeatedlythat an increase of the maximum penalty was not at issue. Beyond that, it specifically acknowledged that the outcome might have been different (i. e., the statute might have been unconstitutional) if the maximum sentence had been affected: "Petitioners' claim that visible possession under the statute is `really' an element of the offenses for which they are being punishedthat has in effect defined a new set of upgraded felonieswould have at least more superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to greater or additional punishment, cf. 18 U.S. C. 2113(d) (providing separate and greater punishment for bank robberies accomplished through `use of a dangerous weapon or device'), but it does not." The opinion distinguished one of our own precedents on this very ground, noting that the Colorado Sex Offenders Act invalidated in increased a sex offender's sentence from a 10-year maximum *254 to an indefinite term up to and including life 477 U.S., Despite all of that, the Court would have us believe that the present statute's alteration of the maximum permissible sentencewhich it acknowledges is "the major difference between this case and McMillan, " ante, at 244militates in favor of, rather than against, this statute's constitutionality, because an increase of the minimum sentence (rather than the permissible maximum) is more disadvantageous to the defendant. That is certainly an arguable position (it was argued, as the Court has the temerity to note, by the dissent in McMillan ). But it is a position which McMillan not only rejected, but upon the converse of which McMillan rested its judgment. In addition to inverting the consequence of this distinction (between statutes that prescribe a minimum sentence and those that increase the permissible maximum sentence) the Court
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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and those that increase the permissible maximum sentence) the Court seeks to minimize the importance of the distinction by characterizing it as merely one of five factors relied on in McMillan, and asserting that the other four factors here are the same. Ante, at 242-243. In fact, however, McMillan did not set forth any five-factor test; the Court selectively recruits "factors" from various parts of the discussion. Its first factor, for example, that "`the statute plainly does not transgress the limits expressly set out in ` " ante, at 242, quoting McMillan, 477 U. S, viz., that it does not "discar[d] the presumption of innocence" or "relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt," at 87merely narrows the issue to the one before the Court, rather than giving any clue to the resolution of that issue. It is no more a factor in solving the constitutional problem before us than is the observation that 1326 is not an ex post facto law and does not effect an unreasonable search or seizure. The Court's second, fourth, and part of its fifth "factors" are in fact all subparts of the crucial third factor (the one that is absent here), since they are all culled from the general discussion *255 in McMillan of how the statute simply limited a sentencing judge's discretion. We said that, whereas in Mullaney the State had imposed "`a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence' " (the Court's "second" factor), 's law "neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for the crime committed [the Court's `third' factor] nor create[d] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty [the Court's `fourth' factor]; it operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm [the Court's `third' factor]. The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense [part of the Court's `fifth' factor]." 477 U.S., The Court's recruitment of "factors" is, as I have said, selective. Omitted, for example, is McMillan' s statement that "petitioners do not contend that the particular factor made relevant [by the statute] has historically been treated `in the Anglo-American legal tradition' as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt." quoting Petitioner does make such an assertion in the present casecorrectly, as I shall discuss. But even with its selective harvesting, the Court is incorrect in its assertion that "most" of the "factors" it recites,
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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in its assertion that "most" of the "factors" it recites, ante, at 243 (and in its implication that all except the third of them) exist in the present case as well. The second of them contrasted the consequence of the fact assumed in Mullaney (extension of the permissible sentence from as little as a nominal fine to as much as a mandatory life sentence) with the consequence of the fact at issue in McMillan (no extension of the permissible sentence at all, but merely a "limit[ation of] the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available," 477 U.S., ). The present case resembles Mullaney rather than McMillan in this regard, *256 since the fact at issue increases the permissible sentence tenfold. And the only significant part of the fifth "factor" that the statute in McMillan "`dictated the precise weight to be given [the statutory] factor,' " ante, at 243, quoting McMillan, at 89-90is likewise a point of difference and not of similarity. But this parsing of various factors is really beside the point. No one can read our pre-McMillan cases, and especially Mullaney (whose limits were adverted to in but never precisely described), without entertaining a serious doubt as to whether the statute as interpreted by the Court in the present case is constitutional. And no one can read McMillan, our latest opinion on the point, without perceiving that the determinative element in our validation of the statute was the fact that it merely limited the sentencing judge's discretion within the range of penalty already available, rather than substantially increasing the available sentence. And even more than that: No one can read McMillan without learning that the Court was open to the argument that the Constitution requires a fact which does increase the available sentence to be treated as an element of the crime (such an argument, it said, would have "at least superficial appeal," 477 U.S., ). If all that were not enough, there must be added the fact that many State Supreme Courts have concluded that a prior conviction which increases maximum punishment must be treated as an element of the offense under either their State Constitutions, see, e. g., ; ; ; State ex rel. ; or as a matter of common law, see, e. g., People ex rel. ; People ; ; ; ; ;[2] In the end, the Court cannot credibly argue that the question whether a fact which increases maximum permissible punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is an easy one. That, perhaps, is why
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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reasonable doubt is an easy one. That, perhaps, is why the Court stresses, and stresses repeatedly, the limited subject matter that 1326(b) addressesrecidivism. It even tries, with utter lack of logic, to limit its rejection of the fair reading of McMillan to recidivism cases. "For the reasons just given," it says, "and in light of the particular sentencing factor at issue in this caserecidivism we should take *258 McMillan' s statement [regarding the "superficial appeal" the defendant's argument would have had if the factor at issue increased his maximum sentence] to mean no more than it said, and therefore not to make a determinative difference here." Ante, at 245 (emphasis added). It is impossible to understand how McMillan could mean one thing in a later case where recidivism is at issue, and something else in a later case where some other sentencing factor is at issue. One might say, of course, that recidivism should be an exception to the general rule set forth in McMillan but that more forthright characterization would display how doubtful the constitutional question is in light of our prior case law. In any event, there is no rational basis for making recidivism an exception. The Court is of the view that recidivism need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (a view that, as I shall discuss, is precisely contrary to the common-law tradition) because it "`goes to the punishment only.' " It relies for this conclusion upon our opinion in See ante, at 243, quoting ; see also ante, at 247. The holding of provides no support for the Court's position. It upheld against due process and double jeopardy objections a state recidivism law under which a defendant's prior convictions were charged and tried in a separate proceeding after he was convicted of the underlying offense. As the Court notes, ante, at 243, the prior convictions were not charged in the same indictment as the underlying offense; but they were charged in an "information" before the defendant was tried for the prior convictions, and, more importantly, the law explicitly preserved his right to a jury determination on the recidivism question. See ; see also It is true, however, that if the basis for `s holding were accepted, one would have to conclude that recidivism need not be tried to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The essence of `s reasoning *259 was that in the recidivism proceeding the defendant "was not held to answer for an offense," 224 U.S., since the recidivism charge "`goes to the punishment only,' " ib
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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the recidivism charge "`goes to the punishment only,' " ib quoting But that basis for dispensing with the protections of jury trial and findings beyond a reasonable doubt was explicitly rejected in Mullaney, which accorded these protections to facts that were "not general elements of the crime of felonious homicide [butbore] only on the appropriate punishment category," Whatever else Mullaney stands for, it certainly stands for the proposition that what used as the line of demarcation for double jeopardy and some due process purposes (the matter "goes only to the punishment") is not the line of demarcation for purposes of the right to jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So also does McMillan, which even while narrowing Mullaney made it very clear that the mere fact that a certain finding "goes only to the penalty" does not end the inquiry. The Court is certainly correct that the distinctive treatment of recidivism determinations for double jeopardy purposes takes some explaining; but it takes some explaining for the Court no less than for me. And the explanation assuredly is not (what the Court apparently suggests) that recidivism is never an element of the crime. It does much less violence to our jurisprudence, and to the traditional practice of requiring a jury finding of recidivism beyond a reasonable doubt, to explain as a recidivism exception to the normal double jeopardy rule that conviction of a lesser included offense bars later trial for the greater crime. Our double jeopardy law, after all, is based upon traditional American and English practice, see United ; United 3-344 and that practice has allowed recidivism to be charged and tried separately, see ; *260 625-626, 631; at 312-. It has not allowed recidivism to be determined by a judge as more likely than not. While I have given many arguments supporting the position that the Constitution requires the recidivism finding in this case to be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, I do not endorse that position as necessarily correct. Indeed, that would defeat my whole purpose, which is to honor the practice of not deciding doubtful constitutional questions unnecessarily. What I have tried to establishand all that I need to establishis that on the basis of our jurisprudence to date, the answer to the constitutional question is not clear. It is the Court's burden, on the other hand, to establish that its constitutional answer shines forth clearly from our cases. That burden simply cannot be sustained. I think it beyond question that there was, until today's unnecessary resolution of the point, "serious
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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there was, until today's unnecessary resolution of the point, "serious doubt" whether the Constitution permits a defendant's sentencing exposure to be increased tenfold on the basis of a fact that is not charged, tried to a jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt. If the Court wishes to abandon the doctrine of constitutional doubt, it should do so forthrightly, rather than by declaring certainty on a point that is clouded in doubt. II The Court contends that the doctrine of constitutional doubt is also inapplicable because 1326 is not fairly susceptible of the construction which avoids the constitutional problemi. e., the construction whereby subsection (b)(2) sets forth a separate criminal offense. Ante, at 238. The Court begins its statutory analysis not by examining the text of 1326, but by demonstrating that the "subject matter [of the statute]prior commission of a serious crimeis as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Ante, at 230. That is eminently demonstrable, sounds powerfully good, but in fact proves nothing at all. It is certainly true that a *261 judge (whether or not bound by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) is likely to sentence nearer the maximum permitted for the offense if the defendant is a repeat offender. But the same can be said of many, perhaps most, factors that are used to define aggravated offenses. For example, judges will "typically" sentence nearer the maximum that a statute allows if the crime of conviction is committed with a firearm, or in the course of another felony; but that in no way suggests that armed robbery and felony murder are sentencing enhancements rather than separate crimes. The relevant question for present purposes is not whether prior felony conviction is "typically" used as a sentencing factor, but rather whether, in statutes that provide higher maximum sentences for crimes committed by convicted felons, prior conviction is "typically" treated as a mere sentence enhancement or rather as an element of a separate offense. The answer to that question is the latter. That was the rule at common law, and was the near-uniform practice among the States at the time of the most recent study I am aware of. See Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 332, 333-334 (1965); Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions, 33 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210, 215-216 (1958). At common law, the fact of prior convictions had to be charged in the same indictment charging the underlying crime, and submitted to the jury for determination along with that crime. See, e. g., ; ; ;
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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along with that crime. See, e. g., ; ; ; While several States later altered this procedure by providing a separate proceeding for the determination of prior convictions, at least as late as 1965 all but eight retained the defendant's right to a jury determination on this issue. See Note, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 333-334, 347. I am at a loss to explain the Court's assertion that it has "found no statute that clearly makes recidivism an offense *262 element" added to another crime, ante, at 230. There are many such.[3] It is interesting that the Court drags the red herring of recidivism through both parts of its opinionthe "constitutional doubt" part and the "statutory interpretation" part alike. As just discussed, logic demonstrates that the nature of that charge (the fact that it is a "typical" sentencing factor) has nothing to do with what this statute means. And as discussed earlier, the text and reasoning of McMillan, and of the cases McMillan distinguishes, provide no basis for saying that recidivism is exempt from the Court's clear acknowledgment that taking away from the jury facts that increase the maximum sentence is constitutionally questionable. One wonders what state courts, and lower federal courts, are supposed to do with today's mysterious utterances. Are they to pursue logic, and conclude that all ambiguous statutes adding punishment for factors accompanying the principal offense are mere enhancements, or are they illogically to give this special treatment only to recidivism? Are they to deem the reasoning of McMillan superseded for all cases, or does it remain an open and doubtful question, for all cases except those involving recidivism, whether statutory maximums can be increased without the benefit of jury trial? Whatever else one may say about today's opinion, there is no doubt that it has brought to this area of the law more confusion than clarification. Passing over the red herring, let me turn now to the statute at issue 1326 as it stood when petitioner was convicted. * The author of today's opinion for the Court once agreed that the "language and structure" of this enactment "are subject to two plausible readings," one of them being that recidivism constitutes a separate offense. United[4] This would surely be enough to satisfy the requirement expressed by Justice Holmes, see United 241 U.S. 4, and approved by the Court, ante, at 237-238, that the constitutional-doubt-avoiding construction be "fairly possible." Today, however, the Court relegates statutory language and structure to merely two of five "factors" that "help courts determine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text,"
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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courts determine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text," ante, at 228. The statutory text reads, in relevant part, as follows: "Reentry of deported alien; criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported aliens "(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who [has been deported and thereafter reenters the United States] shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. "(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection "(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or "(2) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien *264 shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." 8 U.S. C. 1326(b). One is struck at once by the parallel structure of subsections (a) and (b). Neither subsection says that the individual it describes "shall be guilty of a felony," and both subsections say that the individuals they describe "shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than [2, 10, or 20] years." If this suffices to define a substantive offense in subsection (a) (as all agree it does), it is hard to see why it would not define a substantive offense in each paragraph of subsection (b) as well. Cf., for example, 21 U.S. C. 841, which has a subsection (a) entitled "Unlawful acts," and a subsection (b) entitled "Penalties." The opening phrase of subsection (b) certainly does not indicate that what follows merely supplements or enhances the penalty provision of subsection (a); what follows is to apply "notwithstanding" all of subsection (a), i. e., "in spite of" or "without prevention or obstruction from or by" subsection (a). See, e. g., Webster's New International Dictionary 1669 (2d ed. 1949). The next phrase ("in the case of any alien described in subsection [(a)]") imports by reference the substantive acts attributed to the hypothetical alien (deportation and unauthorized reentry) in subsection (a). Significantly, this phrase does not apply subsection (b) to any alien "convicted under" subsection (a)which is what one would expect if the provision was merely increasing the penalty for certain subsection (a) convictions. See, e. g., United Instead, subsection (b) applies to an alien "described in" subsection (a)one who has been deported and has reentered illegally. And finally, subsection (a)'s
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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been deported and has reentered illegally. And finally, subsection (a)'s provision that it applies "[s]ubject to subsection (b)" means that subsection (a) is inapplicable to an alien covered by subsection (b), just as subsection (b) applies "notwithstanding" *265 that the alien would otherwise be covered by subsection (a).[5] The Court relies on an earlier version of 1326 to support its interpretation of the statute in its current form. Ante, at 232. While I agree that such statutory history is a legitimate tool of construction, the statutory history of 1326 does not support, but rather undermines, the Court's interpretation. That earlier version contained a subsection (a) that, in addition to setting forth penalties (as did the subparts of subsection (b)), contained the phrase (which the subparts of subsection (b) did not) "shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof" With such a formulation, of course, it would be easier to conclude that subsection (a) defines the crime and sets forth the basic penalty, and subsection (b) sets forth merely penalty enhancements. But if that was what the additional language in subsection (a) of the 1988 statute connoted, then what was the elimination of that additional language (in the 1990 version of the statute at issue here) meant to achieve? See 543(b)(3), The more strongly the "shall be guilty of a felony" language suggests that subsection (b) of the 1988 statute contained only enhancements, the more strongly the otherwise inexplicable elimination of that language suggests *266 that subsection (b) of the 1990 statute was meant to be parallel with subsection (a)i. e., that both subsections were meant to set forth not merely penalties but also offenses.[6] After considering the subject matter and statutory language, the third factor the Court considers in arriving at its determination that this statute can only be read as a sentencing enhancement is the title of the 1988 amendment that added subsection (b)(2): "Criminal Penalties for Reentry of Certain Deported Aliens." See cited ante, at 234. Of course, this title pertains to a subsection (b)(2) which, unlike the (b)(2) under which petitioner was convicted, was not parallel with the preceding subsection (a). But even disregarding that, the title of the amendment proves nothing at all. While "Criminal Penalties for Reentry" might normally be more suggestive of an enhancement than of a separate offense, there is good reason to believe it imports no such suggestion here. For the very next provision of the same enactment, which adjusts the substantive requirements for the crime of aiding and abetting the unlawful entry of an alien, is entitled "Criminal Penalties
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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the unlawful entry of an alien, is entitled "Criminal Penalties for Aiding or Assisting Certain Aliens to Enter the United States." See 7346, Evidently, new substantive offenses that were penalized were simply entitled "Criminal Penalties" for the relevant offense. Moreover, *267 the 1988 amendment kept the original title of 1326 ("Reentry of Deported Alien") intact, leaving it to apply to both subsection (a) and subsection (b). See 276, 66 Stat. The Court's fourth factor leading it to conclude that this statute cannot reasonably be construed as establishing substantive offenses is legislative history. See ante, at 234. It is, again, the legislative history of the provision as it existed in 1988, before subsection (a) was stripped of the language "shall be guilty of a felony," thereby making subsections (a) and (b) parallel. Even so, it is of no help to the Court's case. The stray statements that the Court culls from the Congressional Record prove only that the new subsection (b) was thought to increase penalties for unlawful reentry. But there is no dispute that it does that! The critical question is whether it does it by adding penalties to the subsection (a) offense, or by creating additional, more severely punished, offenses. That technical point is not alluded to in any of the remarks the Court recites. The Court's fifth and last argument in support of its interpretation of the statute is the contention that "the contrary interpretation risks unfairness," ib because it would require bringing the existence of the prior felony conviction to the attention of the jury. But it is also "unfair," of course, to deprive the defendant of a jury determination (and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof) on the critical question of the prior conviction. This Court's own assessment of which of those disadvantages is the greater can be of relevance here only insofar as we can presume that that perception would have been shared by the enacting Congress. We usually presume, however, not that an earlier Congress agreed with our current policy judgments, but rather that it agreed with the disposition provided by traditional practice or the common law. See United States v. ; Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan ; Norfolk Redevel- *268 opment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone of Va., ; As noted earlier, the Court's hostility to jury determination of prior convictions is quite simply at odds with the manner in which recidivism laws have historically been treated in this country. Moreover, even if we were free to resolve this matter according to our current views of what is fair, the Court's
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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to our current views of what is fair, the Court's judgment that avoiding jury "infection" is more important than affording a jury verdict (beyond a reasonable doubt) does not seem to me sound. The Court is not correct, to begin with, that the fact of prior conviction is "almost never contested," ante, at 2, particularly in unlawful-entry cases. That is clear from the very legislative history of the present statute. Senator Chiles explained that "identifying and prosecuting illegal alien felons is a long and complex process" because "[i]t is not uncommon for an alien who has committed a certain felony to pay his bond and walk, only to be apprehended for a similar crime in the next county but with a new name and identification." 133 Cong. Rec. 8771 (1987). He went on to describe two specific aliens, one from whom police "seized 3 passports issued to him in 3 different names, 11 drivers licenses, immigration cards and numerous firearms and stolen property," and the other on whom immigration officials had "5 alien files with 13 aliases, different birth dates and different social security cards." He said that "these aliens [were] not exceptions but rather common amongst the 100,000 illegal alien felons in the United States." Representative Smith stated that aliens arrested for felonies "often are able to pay expensive bonds and disappear under a new identity often to reappear in court with a different name and a new offense. In some cases, they may return to their native lands and reenter the United States with new names and papers but committing the same crimes." And on the other side of the ledger, I doubt whether "infection" of the jury *269 with knowledge of the prior crime is a serious problem. See, e. g., ("The defendants' interests [in keeping prejudicial prior convictions from the jury] are protected by limiting instructions and by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit or forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence even though admissible under an accepted rule of evidence" (citation omitted)); Old ; cf. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 30 ("In 1996, 98.2% of all Section 1326 defendants pleaded guilty"). If it is a problem, however, there are legislative and even judicial means for dealing with it, short of what today's decision does: taking the matter away from the jury in all cases. See Note, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 333-334 (describing commonly used procedures under which defendant's right to a jury is invoked only "[i]f [he] denies the existence of prior convictions
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Justice Scalia
| 1,998 | 9 |
dissenting
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118188/almendarez-torres-v-united-states/
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invoked only "[i]f [he] denies the existence of prior convictions or stands mute"); In sum, I find none of the four nontextual factors relied upon by the Court to support its interpretation ("typicality" of recidivism as a sentencing factor; titles; legislative history; and risk of unfairness) persuasive. What does seem to me significant, however, is a related statutory provision, introduced by a 1996 amendment, which explicitly refers to subsection (b)(2) as setting forth "offenses." See 334, -6 (instructing United States Sentencing Commission to amend sentencing guidelines "for offenses under 1326(b)"). This later amendment can of course not cause subsection (b)(2) to have meant, at the time of petitioner's conviction, something different from what it then *270 said. But Congress's expressed understanding that subsection (b) creates separate offenses is surely evidence that it is "fairly possible" to read the provision that way.[7] I emphasize (to conclude this part of the discussion) that "fairly possible" is all that needs to be established. The doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require that the problem-avoiding construction be the preferable onethe one the Court would adopt in any event. Such a standard would deprive the doctrine of all function. "Adopt the interpretation that avoids the constitutional doubt if that is the right one" produces precisely the same result as "adopt the right interpretation." Rather, the doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is "susceptible of" the problem-avoiding interpretation, Delaware & Hudson 213 U. S., at when that interpretation is reasonable, though not necessarily the best. I think it quite impossible to maintain that this standard is not met by the interpretation of subsection (b) which regards it as creating separate offenses. * * * For the foregoing reasons, I think we must interpret the statute before us here as establishing a separate offense rather than a sentence enhancement. It can be argued that, once the constitutional doubts that require this course have been resolved, statutes no less ambiguous than the one before us here will be interpretable as sentence enhancements, *271 so that not much will have been achieved. That begs the question, of course, as to how the constitutional doubt will be resolved. Moreover, where the doctrine of constitutional doubt does not apply, the same result may be dictated by the rule of lenity, which would preserve rather than destroy the criminal defendant's right to jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e. g., People ex rel. 195 N. Y., at ("It is unnecessary in this case to decide how great punishment the legislature may constitutionally authorize Courts of Special Sessions
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Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
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Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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I do not believe that the question the Court answers is properly before us. Disputes between governmental branches or departments regarding the allocation of politi- cal power do not in my view constitute “cases” or “contro- versies” committed to our resolution by Art. III, of the Constitution. What those who framed and ratified the Constitution had in mind when they entrusted the “judicial Power” to a separate and coequal branch of the Federal Government was the judicial power they were familiar with—that traditionally exercised by English and American courts. The “cases” and “controversies” that those courts enter- tained did not include suits between units of government regarding their legitimate powers. The job of the courts was, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803). Tocqueville considered this one reason the new democracy could safely confer upon courts the immense power to hold legislation unconstitutional: “[B]y leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from 2 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N SCALIA, J., dissenting wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. “I am inclined to believe this practice of the Ameri- can courts to be at once most favorable to liberty and to public order. If the judge could only attack the leg- islator only openly and directly, he would sometimes be afraid to oppose him; and at other times party spir- it might encourage him to brave it at every turn. But the American judge is brought into the political arena independently of his own will. He judges the law only because he is obliged to judge a case. The po- litical question that he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interests of the parties, and he cannot refuse to decide it without a denial of justice.” A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 102-03 (P. Bradley ed. 1948). That doctrine of standing, that jurisdictional limitation upon our powers, does not have as its purpose (as the majority assumes) merely to assure that we will decide disputes in concrete factual contexts that enable “realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action,” ante, at 14. To the contrary. “[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” It keeps us minding our own business. We consult history and judicial tradition to determine whether a given “ ‘disput[e is] appropriately resolved through the
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Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
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Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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whether a given “ ‘disput[e is] appropriately resolved through the judicial process.’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted). What history and judicial tradition show is that courts do not resolve direct disputes between two political branches of the same government regarding their respec- tive powers. Nearly every separation-of-powers case presents questions like the ones in this case. But we have never passed on a separation-of-powers question raised Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 3 SCALIA, J., dissenting directly by a governmental subunit’s complaint. We have always resolved those questions in the context of a private lawsuit in which the claim or defense depends on the constitutional validity of action by one of the governmen- tal subunits that has caused a private party concrete harm. That is why, for example, it took this Court over 50 years to rule upon the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act, passed in 1867. If the law of standing had been otherwise, “presumably President Wilson, or Presidents Grant and Cleveland before him, would have had standing, and could have challenged the law preventing the removal of a Presidential appointee without the con- sent of Congress.” (1997). We do not have to look far back in the United States Reports to find other separation-of-powers cases which, if the Arizona Legislature’s theory of standing is correct, took an awfully circuitous route to get here. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, ante, p. the President could have sued for an injunction against Congress’s attempted “direct usurpa- tion” of his constitutionally-conferred authority to pro- nounce on foreign relations. Or in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U. S. (2015), a Federal District Judge could have sought a declaratory judgment that a bankruptcy court’s adjudicating a Stern claim improperly usurped his constitutionally conferred authority to decide cases and controversies. Or in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. (2014), the Senate could have sued the Pres- ident, claiming a direct usurpation of its prerogative to advise on and consent to Presidential appointments. Each of these cases involved the allocation of power to one or more branches of a government; and we surely would have dismissed suits arising in the hypothesized fashions. We have affirmatively rejected arguments for jurisdic- tion in cases like this one. For example, in 521 U.S., at 829–830, we refused to allow Members of Con- 4 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N SCALIA, J., dissenting gress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, which they claimed “ ‘unconstitutionally expand[ed] the President’s power’ ” and “ ‘alter[ed] the constitutional balance of pow- ers between the Legislative and
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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the constitutional balance of pow- ers between the Legislative and Executive Branches.’ ” In 479–480 (1923), we refused to allow a State to pursue its claim that a conditional congressional appropriation “con- stitute[d] an effective means of inducing the States to yield a portion of their sovereign rights.” (And Mellon involved a contention that one government infringed upon another government’s power—far closer to the traditional party-versus-party lawsuit than is an intragovernmental dispute.) We put it plainly: “In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the naked contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several States,” at 483—and because the State could not show a discrete harm except the alleged usurpa- tion of its powers, we refused to allow the State’s appeal. The sole precedent the Court relies upon is Coleman v. Miller, Coleman can be distin- guished from the present case as readily as it was distin- guished in In the accurate-in-fact (but inconsequential-in-principle) distinction was that the Senators in Coleman had their votes nullified, whereas the Members of Congress claimed that their votes could merely be rendered ineffective by a Presidential line-item veto. at 823–824. In the present case we could make the accurate-in-fact distinction that in Coleman individual legislators were found to have standing, whereas here it is the governmental body, the Arizona Legisla- ture, that seeks to bring suit. But the reality is that the supposed holding of Coleman stands out like a sore thumb from the rest of our jurisprudence, which denies standing for intragovernmental disputes. Coleman was a peculiar case that may well stand for nothing. The opinion discussing and finding standing, and Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 5 SCALIA, J., dissenting going on to affirm the Kansas Supreme Court, was written by Chief Justice Hughes and announced by Justice Stone. Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other Justices, held there was no standing, and would have dismissed the petition (leaving the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court in place). Justice Butler, joined by Justice McRey- nolds, dissented (neither joining Hughes’s opinion nor separately discussing standing) and would have reversed the Kansas Supreme Court. That adds up to two votes to affirm on the merits, two to reverse on the merits (without discussing standing) and four to dismiss for lack of standing. Justice Stanley Reed, who was on the Court and apparently participated in the case, is not mentioned in any of the opinions recorded in the United States Reports. So, in order to find Coleman a binding precedent on standing, rather than a 4-to-4 stand- off,
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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binding precedent on standing, rather than a 4-to-4 stand- off, one must assume that Justice Reed voted with Hughes. There is some reason to make that assumption: The four Justices rejecting standing went on to discuss the merits, because “the ruling of the Court just announced removes from the case the question of petitioners’ standing to sue.” But then again, if nine Justices participated, how could it be that on one of the two issues in the case the Court was “equally divided and therefore expresse[d] no opinion”? at 447. A pretty shaky foundation for a significant precedential ruling. Besides that, the two dissenters’ mere assumption of standing—neither saying anything about the subject nor joining Hughes’s opinion on the point—produces (if you assume Reed joined Hughes) a majority for standing but no majority opinion explaining why. And even under the most generous assumptions, since the Court’s judg- ment on the issue it resolved rested on the ground that that issue presented a political question—which is itself a rejection of jurisdiction, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 6 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N SCALIA, J., dissenting (2012) (slip op., at 5)—Coleman’s discussion of the additional jurisdictional issue of standing was quite super- fluous and arguably nothing but dictum. The peculiar decision in Coleman should be charitably ignored. The Court asserts, quoting – 820, that the Court’s standing analysis has been “especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the Court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Ante, at 14, n. 12. The cases cited to support this dictum fail to do so; they are merely cases where a determination of unconstitutionality is avoided by applying what there is no reason to believe is anything other than normal standing requirements. It seems to me utterly implausible that the Framers wanted federal courts limited to traditional judicial cases only when they were pronouncing upon the rights of Congress and the President, and not when they were treading upon the powers of state legislatures and executives. Quite to the contrary, I think they would be all the more averse to unprecedented judicial meddling by federal courts with the branches of their state governments. I would dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction. * * * Normally, having arrived at that conclusion, I would express no opinion on the merits unless my vote was necessary to enable the Court to produce a judgment. In the present case, however, the majority’s resolution of the merits question (“legislature” means
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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however, the majority’s resolution of the merits question (“legislature” means “the people”) is so outrageously wrong, so utterly devoid of textual or historic support, so flatly in contradiction of prior Supreme Court cases, so obviously the willful product of hostility to dis- tricting by state legislatures, that I cannot avoid adding my vote to the devastating dissent of the Chief Justice. Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–1314 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, APPELLANT v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [June 29, 2015] JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting. Reading today’s opinion, one would think the Court is a great defender of direct democracy in the States. As it reads “the Legislature” out of the Times, Places and Man- ner Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, the majority offers a paean to the ballot initiative. It speaks in glowing terms of the “characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.” Ante, at 27. And it urges “[d]eference to state lawmaking” so that States may perform their vital func- tion as “ ‘laboratories’ ”of democracy. Ante, at 28. These sentiments are difficult to accept. The conduct of the Court in so many other cases reveals a different atti- tude toward the States in general and ballot initiatives in particular. Just last week, in the antithesis of deference to state lawmaking through direct democracy, the Court cast aside state laws across the country—many of which were enacted through ballot initiative—that reflected the traditional definition of marriage. See Obergefell v. Hodges, ante, p. This Court’s tradition of disdain for state ballot initia- tives goes back quite a while. Two decades ago, it held unconstitutional an Arkansas ballot initiative imposing 2 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N THOMAS, J., dissenting term limits on that State’s Members of Congress, finding “little significance” in the fact that such term limits were adopted by popular referendum. U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, One year later, it held unconstitutional a ballot initiative that would have prevented the enactment of laws under which “ ‘homosex- ual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships [would] constitute or otherwise be the basis of any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.’ ” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). The Court neither gave deference to state lawmaking nor said anything about the virtues of direct democracy. It instead declared that the
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Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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the virtues of direct democracy. It instead declared that the result of the ballot initiative was an aberration—that “[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.” at 633. But if “constitutional tradition” is the measuring stick, then it is hard to understand how the Court con- dones a redistricting practice that was unheard of for nearly 200 years after the ratification of the Constitution and that conflicts with the express constitutional com- mand that election laws “be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” Art. I, The Court’s lack of respect for ballot initiatives is evi- dent not only in what it has done, but in what it has failed to do. Just this Term, the Court repeatedly refused to review cases in which the Courts of Appeals had set aside state laws passed through ballot initiative. See, e.g., County of Maricopa v. 575 U. S. (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (state constitutional amendment denying bail for illegal aliens arrested in certain circumstances); Herbert v. Kitchen, 574 U. S. (2014) (state constitutional amendment retaining traditional definition of marriage); Smith v. Bishop, 574 U. S. (2014) (same); Rainey v. Bostic, 574 U. S. (2014) (same); Walker v. Wolf, 574 U. S. (2014) (same). It did so despite warnings that its indiffer- Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting ence to such cases would “only embolden the lower courts to reject state laws on questionable constitutional grounds.” at (slip op., at 2). And it refused to grant a stay pending appeal of a decision purporting to require the State of Alabama to issue mar- riage licenses to same-sex couples, even though Alabama’s licensing laws had not been challenged in that case. See Strange v. Searcy, 574 U. S. (2015) (THOMAS, J., dis- senting from denial of application for stay). In each deci- sion, the cheers for direct democracy were conspicuously absent. Sometimes disapproval of ballot initiatives has been even more blatant. Just last Term, one dissenting opinion castigated the product of a state ballot initiative as “sty- mieing the right of racial minorities to participate in the political process.” Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U. S. (2014) (SOTOMAYOR, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissent- ing) (slip op., at 1). It did not hail the ballot initiative as the result of a “State’s empowerment of its people,” ante, at 19, nor offer any deference to state lawmaking. In- stead, it complained that “[t]he majority of Michigan voters changed the rules in the middle of the game, recon- figuring the existing political process”
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Justice Scalia
| 2,015 | 9 |
second_dissenting
|
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959749/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/
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middle of the game, recon- figuring the existing political process” Schuette, 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 4). And it criticized state ballot initiatives as biased against racial minorities because such minorities “face an especially uphill battle” in seeking the passage of such initiatives. at (slip op., at 20). How quickly the tune has changed. And how striking that it changed here. The ballot initi- ative in this case, unlike those that the Court has previ- ously treated so dismissively, was unusually democracy- reducing. It did not ask the people to approve a particular redistricting plan through direct democracy, but instead to take districting away from the people’s representatives and give it to an unelected committee, thereby reducing democratic control over the process in the future. The 4 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N THOMAS, J., dissenting Court’s characterization of this as direct democracy at its best is rather like praising a plebiscite in a “banana repub- lic” that installs a strongman as President for Life. And wrapping the analysis in a cloak of federalism does little to conceal the flaws in the Court’s reasoning. I would dispense with the faux federalism and would instead treat the States in an evenhanded manner. That means applying the Constitution as written. Although the straightforward text of Article I, prohibits redistricting by an unelected, independent commission, Article III limits our power to deciding cases or controversies. Be- cause I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that the Arizona Legis- lature lacks Article III standing to assert an institutional injury against another entity of state government, I would dismiss its suit. I respectfully dissent.
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Justice Stevens
| 1,998 | 16 |
dissenting
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American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118229/american-telephone-telegraph-co-v-central-office-telephone-inc/
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Everyone agrees that respondent's tortious interference claim would be barred by the filed rate doctrine if it is "wholly derivative of the contract claim for additional and better services." Ante, at 226 (majority opinion); ante, at 228 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). Moreover, it is true that when the Magistrate Judge ruled that respondent's case would not support a punitive damages award as a matter of state law, he characterized the tort claim as "stem[ming] from the alleged failure of AT&T to comply with its contractual relationship." Tr. 2207. In my opinion, however, the jury's verdict on respondent's tort claim is supported by evidence that went well beyond, and differed in nature from, the contract claim. If petitioner, in an effort to appropriate respondent's customers, had included with each bill sent to a customer a statement expressly characterizing respondent as an unethical, profit-hungry middleman, I would think it clear that the filed rate doctrine would not constitute a defense to such tortious conduct. The evidence in the record indicates that a similar result was obtained by mailing bills to the customers that disclosed the markup that respondent obtained on their calls. Respondent's tort claim was also premised in part on testimony that AT&T used a telemarketer to contact respondent's customers and, without their authorization, convert them to AT&T's own long-distance service. In rejecting AT&T's motion for a directed verdict on the tort claim, the Magistrate recognized that this practice of "slamming" customers could "easily be a case of intentional interference" that would not necessarily also constitute breach of contract. Slamming was clearly a part of the case presented in the District Court. There was an *232 allegation of slamming in respondent's amended complaint;[1] in the District Court, AT&T's trial counsel took issue with respondent's effort to make slamming "a big part of this case," and said in closing argument that slamming "is the basis for this intentional interference" claim, ; and nothing in the jury instructions remotely suggested that the tort claim required proof of broken promises by AT&T to provide additional services. Respondent's evidence easily fits within the definition of intentional interference set forth in the jury charge: "COT asserts that AT&T intentionally interfered with its business relations and expectations of future business relations with its customers, the end users of its SDN service. In order to prevail on this claim, COT must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, one, that COT had business relations with the probability of future economic benefit. Two, that AT&T was aware of the relationships and expectation of future benefits. Three, that AT&T intentionally
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,998 | 16 |
dissenting
|
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118229/american-telephone-telegraph-co-v-central-office-telephone-inc/
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relationships and expectation of future benefits. Three, that AT&T intentionally interfered with COT's business relations. Four, that AT&T interfered for an improper motive or by using improper means. And, five, that COT suffered economic injury as a result of the interference." App. 71. It may be the fact that the billing disclosures and slamming were the consequence of negligence rather than a deliberate plan to take over a network of customers that respondent had developed, but the jury concluded otherwise. It found that petitioner acted intentionally and willfully in interfering with respondent's business relations. See ibid.[2] That finding is doubly significant. *233 First, as the Court acknowledges, ante, at 228, the jury's finding precludes a defense based on the provisions of the tariff that purport to limit petitioner's liability. Second, and of greater importance, it determines that the most egregious tortious conduct was not merely derivative of the contract violations. Enforcement of respondent's state-law right to be free from tortious interference with business relations does not somehow award respondent an unlawful preference that should have been specified in the tariff (presumably in return for an added fee or higher rate); it instead gives effect to a generally applicable right that petitioner is required, by state law, to respect in dealing with all others, customers and noncustomers alike. Thus, at least some of the tortious interference occurred independently of the customer-carrier relationship and would have been actionable even if respondent had never entered into a contract with AT&T. The Court correctly states that the filed rate doctrine will pre-empt some tort claims, but we have never before applied that harsh doctrine to bar relief for tortious conduct with so little connection to, or effect upon, the relationship governed by the tariff. To the extent respondent's tort claim is based on petitioner's billing disclosures and slamming practices, it neither challenges the carrier's filed rates, as did the antitrust claim in nor seeks a special service or privilege of the sort requested in cases such as Chicago & Alton R. and More akin to this case is in which we held that a common-law tort action for fraudulent misrepresentation against a federally regulated air carrier could "coexist" with the Federal Aviation Act. To a limited degree it may be said that here, as in Nader, "any impact on rates that may result from the imposition of tort liability or from practices adopted by a carrier to avoid such liability would be merely incidental." If the Communications Act's *234 saving clause[3] means anything, it preserves state-law remedies against carriers on facts such as these.
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,998 | 16 |
dissenting
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American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118229/american-telephone-telegraph-co-v-central-office-telephone-inc/
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preserves state-law remedies against carriers on facts such as these. The District Court and the Court of Appeals never considered whether respondent's tort claim is wholly derivative of its contract claim for purposes of the filed rate doctrine, because those courts mistakenly believed that even the contract claim was not covered by the doctrine. On my own reading of the record, I think it clear that a portion of the tort claim is not pre-empted. The Court should therefore remand the case for a new trial rather than ordering judgment outright for AT&T.[4] Although the Court holds broadly that respondent's tort claim is totally barred, it declines to consider whether a portion of the claim might survive on remand because this issue was not part of the question presented in the petition for certiorari and was not specifically raised by respondent. Ante, at 226-227, n. 2. The latter point is wholly irrelevant, precisely because of the scope of the question presented. The only question that we agreed to decide was whether the filed rate doctrine pre-empts "state-law contract and tort claims based on a common carrier's failure to honor an alleged side agreement to give its customer better service than called for by the carrier's tariff." Pet. for Cert. i. The Court answers that legal question, and then decides an additional, factual one: whether respondent's tort claim is "based on" AT&T's "failure to honor an alleged side agreement," and thus is "wholly derivative" of the pre-empted contract claim. In resolving that issue, the Court cannot *235 simply rely on AT&T's bald assertion, supported only by a statement of the Magistrate taken out of context, that the tort claim is "wholly derivative"; we have an obligation either to study the record or at least to remand and allow the lower courts to consider the proper application of the legal rule to the facts of this case. I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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I dissent from the Court's disposition of this case. I agree with the Court that the issue before us is whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a proper exercise of Congress' power to enforce 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But as a yardstick for measuring the constitutionality of RFRA, the Court uses its holding in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of the decision that prompted Congress to enact RFRA as a means of more rigorously enforcing the Free Exercise Clause. I remain of the view that was *545 wrongly decided, and I would use this case to reexamine the Court's holding there. Therefore, I would direct the parties to brief the question whether represents the correct understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and set the case for reargument. If the Court were to correct the misinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause set forth in it would simultaneously put our First Amendment jurisprudence back on course and allay the legitimate concerns of a majority in Congress who believed that improperly restricted religious liberty. We would then be in a position to review RFRA in light of a proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. I I agree with much of the reasoning set forth in Part IIIA of the Court's opinion. Indeed, if I agreed with the Court's standard in I would join the opinion. As the Court's careful and thorough historical analysis shows, Congress lacks the "power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States." Ante, at 519 Rather, its power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends only to enforcing the Amendment's provisions. In short, Congress lacks the ability independently to define or expand the scope of constitutional rights by statute. Accordingly, whether Congress has exceeded its 5 powers turns on whether there is a "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Ante, at 520. This recognition does not, of course, in any way diminish Congress' obligation to draw its own conclusions regarding the Constitution's meaning. Congress, no less than this Court, is called upon to consider the requirements of the Constitution and to act in accordance with its dictates. But when it enacts legislation in furtherance of its delegated powers, Congress must make its judgments consistent with this Court's exposition of the Constitution and with the limits *546 placed on its legislative authority by provisions such as the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's analysis of whether RFRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress' 5 power, set forth in Part
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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constitutional exercise of Congress' 5 power, set forth in Part IIIB of its opinion, is premised on the assumption that correctly interprets the Free Exercise Clause. This is an assumption that I do not accept. I continue to believe that adopted an improper standard for deciding free exercise claims. In five Members of this Courtwithout briefing or argument on the issueinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit the government to prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by an individual's religious beliefs, so long as the prohibition is generally applicable. Contrary to the Court's holding in that case, however, the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out religious practice for unfavorable treatment. See Rather, the Clause is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law. Before our free exercise cases were generally in keeping with this idea: where a law substantially burdened religiously motivated conduct regardless whether it was specifically targeted at religion or applied generallywe required government to justify that law with a compelling state interest and to use means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See ; ; United ; ; ; ; ). *547 The Court's rejection of this principle in is supported neither by precedent nor, as discussed below, by history. The decision has harmed religious liberty. For example, a Federal District Court, in reliance on ruled that the Free Exercise Clause was not implicated where Hmong natives objected on religious grounds to their son's autopsy, conducted pursuant to a generally applicable state law. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that application of a city's zoning laws to prevent a church from conducting services in an area zoned for commercial uses raised no free exercise concerns, even though the city permitted secular notfor-profit organizations in that area. Cornerstone Bible ; see also Rector of St. Bartholomew's cert. denied, ; N.W.2d 393 These cases demonstrate that lower courts applying no longer find necessary a searching judicial inquiry into the possibility of reasonably accommodating religious practice. Stare decisis concerns should not prevent us from revisiting our holding in "`[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.' " Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. *548 200, 231 (1995)
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. *548 200, 231 (1995) ). This principle is particularly true in constitutional cases, whereas this case so plainly illustrates"correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Seminole Tribe of I believe that, in light of both our precedent and our Nation's tradition of religious liberty, is demonstrably wrong. Moreover, it is a recent decision. As such, it has not engendered the kind of reliance on its continued application that would militate against overruling it. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Accordingly, I believe that we should reexamine our holding in and do so in this very case. In its place, I would return to a rule that requires government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and to impose that burden only by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. II I shall not restate what has been said in other opinions, which have demonstrated that is gravely at odds with our earlier free exercise precedents. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, (stating that it is "difficult to escape the conclusion that, whatever `s virtues, they do not include a comfortable fit with settled law"); -901 ; see also McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Decision, Rather, I examine here the early American tradition of religious free exercise to gain insight into the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clausean inquiry the Court in did not undertake. We have previously recognized the importance of interpreting the Religion Clauses in light of their history. ; School Dist. of Abington The historical evidence casts doubt on the Court's current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The record instead reveals that its drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not unnecessarily hinder believers from freely practicing their religion, a position consistent with our pre jurisprudence. A The original Constitution, drafted in 1787 and ratified by the States in 1788, had no provisions safeguarding individual liberties, such as freedom of speech or religion. Federalists, the chief supporters of the new Constitution, took the view that amending the Constitution to explicitly protect individual freedoms was superfluous, since the rights that the amendments would protect were already completely secure. See, e. g., 1 Annals of Congress 440, 443-444, 448-459 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834) (remarks of James Madison, June 8, 1789). Moreover, they feared that guaranteeing certain civil liberties might backfire, since the express mention of some freedoms might imply that others were not protected. According to Alexander Hamilton, a Bill of Rights would even be
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
|
to Alexander Hamilton, a Bill of Rights would even be dangerous, in that by specifying "various exceptions to powers" not granted, it "would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted." The Federalist No. 84, p. 513 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Anti-Federalists, however, insisted on more definite guarantees. Apprehensive that the newly established Federal Government would overwhelm the rights of States and individuals, they wanted explicit assurances that the Federal Government had no power in matters of personal liberty. T. The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment 194 (1986). Additionally, Baptists and other Protestant dissenters feared for their religious liberty under *550 the new Federal Government and called for an amendment guaranteeing religious freedom. In the end, legislators acceded to these demands. By December 1791, the Bill of Rights had been added to the Constitution. With respect to religious liberty, the First Amendment provided: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. Neither the First Congress nor the ratifying state legislatures debated the question of religious freedom in much detail, nor did they directly consider the scope of the First Amendment's free exercise protection. It would be disingenuous to say that the Framers neglected to define precisely the scope of the Free Exercise Clause because the words "free exercise" had a precise meaning. L. Essays on American Constitutional History 173 As is the case for a number of the terms used in the Bill of Rights, it is not exactly clear what the Framers thought the phrase signified. But a variety of sources supplement the legislative history and shed light on the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. These materials suggest thatcontrary to the Framers did not intend simply to prevent the government from adopting laws that discriminated against religion. Although the Framers may not have asked precisely the questions about religious liberty that we do today, the historical record indicates that they believed that the Constitution affirmatively protects religious free exercise and that it limits the government's ability to intrude on religious practice. B The principle of religious "free exercise" and the notion that religious liberty deserved legal protection were by no *551 means new concepts in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified. To the contrary, these principles were first articulated in this country in the Colonies of Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Carolina, in the mid1600's. These Colonies, though established as sanctuaries for particular groups of religious dissenters, extended freedom of
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
|
sanctuaries for particular groups of religious dissenters, extended freedom of religion to groupsalthough often limited to Christian groupsbeyond their own. Thus, they encountered early on the conflicts that may arise in a society made up of a plurality of faiths. The term "free exercise" appeared in an American legal document as early as 1648, when Lord Baltimore extracted from the new Protestant Governor of Maryland and his councilors a promise not to disturb Christians, particularly Roman Catholics, in the "free exercise" of their religion. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, Soon after, in 1649, the Maryland Assembly enacted the first free exercise clause by passing the Act Concerning Religion: "[N]oe person professing to beleive in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee any waies troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion nor in the free exercise thereof nor any way [be] compelled to the beleife or exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent, soe as they be not unfaithfull to the Lord Proprietary, or molest or conspire against the civill Government." Act Concerning Religion of 1649, reprinted in 5 The Founders' Constitution 49, 50 (hereinafter Founders' Constitution). Rhode Island's Charter of 16 used the analogous term "liberty of conscience." It protected residents from being in any ways "molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinione, in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb the civil peace of our sayd colony." The Charter further provided that residents may "freely, and fully have and enjoy his and their own judgments, and conscience in matters of religious *552 concernments ; they behaving themselves peaceably and quietly and not using this liberty to licentiousness and profaneness; nor to the civil injury, or outward disturbance of others." Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 16, in 8 W. Swindler, Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions 3 (1979) (hereinafter Swindler). Various agreements between prospective settlers and the proprietors of Carolina, New York, and New Jersey similarly guaranteed religious freedom, using language that paralleled that of the Rhode Island Charter of 16. See New York Act Declaring Rights & Priviledges (1691); Concession and Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea, or New-Jersey (1664); Laws of West NewJersey, Art. X (1681); Fundamental Constitutions for East New-Jersey, Art. XVI (1683); First Charter of Carolina, Art. XVIII (16). N. Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights 23-27 (Galley 1997). These documents suggest that, early in our country's history, several Colonies acknowledged that freedom to pursue one's chosen religious
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
|
several Colonies acknowledged that freedom to pursue one's chosen religious beliefs was an essential liberty. Moreover, these Colonies appeared to recognize that government should interfere in religious matters only when necessary to protect the civil peace or to prevent "licentiousness." In other words, when religious beliefs conflicted with civil law, religion prevailed unless important state interests militated otherwise. Such notions parallel the ideas expressed in our pre- casesthat government may not hinder believers from freely exercising their religion, unless necessary to further a significant state interest. C The principles expounded in these early charters reemerged over a century later in state constitutions that were adopted in the flurry of constitution drafting that followed the American Revolution. By 1789, every State but Connecticut had incorporated some version of a free exercise *553 clause into its constitution. Origins of Free Exercise 1455. These state provisions, which were typically longer and more detailed than the Federal Free Exercise Clause, are perhaps the best evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution's protection of religious liberty. After all, it is reasonable to think that the States that ratified the First Amendment assumed that the meaning of the federal free exercise provision corresponded to that of their existing state clauses. The precise language of these state precursors to the Free Exercise Clause varied, but most guaranteed free exercise of religion or liberty of conscience, limited by particular, defined state interests. For example, the New York Constitution of 1777 provided: "[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State. " N. Y. Const., Art. XXXVIII, in 7 Swindler 178 Similarly, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 declared: "Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb others, in their religious worship." N. H. Const., Art. I, 5, in 6 Swindler 345 The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 read: "[N]o person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion *554 or profession, or for his
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
|
of his religious persuasion *554 or profession, or for his religious practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights." Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XXXIII in 4 Swindler 374 The religious liberty clause of the Georgia Constitution of 1777 stated: "All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State. " Ga. Const., Art. LVI, in 2 Swindler 449 In addition to these state provisions, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787which was enacted contemporaneously with the drafting of the Constitution and reenacted by the First Congressestablished a bill of rights for a territory that included what is now Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. Article I of the Ordinance declared: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and or- derly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments, in the said territory." Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, Art. I, The language used in these state constitutional provisions and the Northwest Ordinance strongly suggests that, around the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights, it was generally accepted that the right to "free exercise" required, where possible, accommodation of religious practice. If notand if the Court was correct in that generally applicable laws are enforceable regardless of religious conscience there would have been no need for these documents to specify, as the New York Constitution did, that rights of conscience should not be "construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of [the] State." Such a proviso would have been superfluous. *555 Instead, these documents make sense only if the right to free exercise was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden only when necessary to secure important government purposes. The Virginia Legislature may have debated the issue most fully. In May 1776, the Virginia Constitutional Convention wrote a constitution containing a Declaration of Rights with a clause on religious liberty. The initial drafter of the clause, George Mason, proposed the following: "That religion, or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR, and the manner of discharging it, can be (directed) only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
|
according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless, under colour of reli- gion, any man disturb the peace, the happiness, or safety of society. And that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other." Committee Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1 Papers of George Mason 284 285 (R. Rutland ed. 1970) Mason's proposal did not go far enough for a 26-year-old James Madison, who had recently completed his studies at the Presbyterian College of Princeton. He objected first to Mason's use of the term "toleration," contending that the word implied that the right to practice one's religion was a governmental favor, rather than an inalienable liberty. Second, Madison thought Mason's proposal countenanced too much state interference in religious matters, since the "exercise of religion" would have yielded whenever it was deemed inimical to "the peace, happiness, or safety of society." Madison suggested the provision read instead: "`That religion, or the duty we owe our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, being under the direction *556 of reason and conviction only, not of violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it, according to the dictates of conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities, unless under color of religion the preserva- tion of equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered.' " G. Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, in 1 Annual Report of the American Historical Association, H. R. Doc. No. 702, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 166-167 (1901) Thus, Madison wished to shift Mason's language of "toleration" to the language of rights. See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 492 (1902) (reprint 1970) (noting that Madison objected to the word "toleration" as belonging to "a system where was an established Church, and where a certain liberty of worship was granted, not of right, but of grace"). Additionally, under Madison's proposal, the State could interfere in a believer's religious exercise only if the State would otherwise "be manifestly endangered." In the end, neither Mason's nor Madison's language regarding the extent to which state interests could limit religious exercise made it into the Virginia Constitution's religious liberty clause. Like the Federal Free Exercise Clause, the Virginia religious liberty clause was simply silent on the subject, providing only that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
|
City of Boerne v. Flores
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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"all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience." Virginia Declaration of Rights, Art. XVI (1776), in 10 Swindler 50. For our purposes, however, it is telling that both Mason's and Madison's formulations envisioned that, when there was a conflict, a person's interest in freely practicing his religion was to be balanced against state interests. Although Madison endorsed a more limited state interest exception than did Mason, the debate would have been irrelevant if either had thought the right to free exercise did not *557 include a right to be exempt from certain generally applicable laws. Presumably, the Virginia Legislature intended the scope of its free exercise provision to strike some middle ground between Mason's narrower and Madison's broader notions of the right to religious freedom. D The practice of the Colonies and early States bears out the conclusion that, at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified, it was accepted that government should, when possible, accommodate religious practice. Unsurprisingly, of course, even in the American Colonies inhabited by people of religious persuasions, religious conscience and civil law rarely conflicted. Most 17th and 18th century Americans belonged to denominations of Protestant Christianity whose religious practices were generally harmonious with colonial law. The First Freedoms, at 219 ("The vast majority of Americans assumed that theirs was a Christian, i. e. Protestant, country, and they automatically expected that government would uphold the commonly agreed on Protestant ethos and morality"). Moreover, governments then were far smaller and less intrusive than they are today, which made conflict between civil law and religion unusual. Nevertheless, tension between religious conscience and generally applicable laws, though rare, was not unknown in preconstitutional America. Most commonly, such conflicts arose from oath requirements, military conscription, and religious assessments. Origins of Free Exercise 1466. The ways in which these conflicts were resolved suggest that Americans in the Colonies and early States thought that, if an individual's religious scruples prevented him from complying with a generally applicable law, the government should, if possible, excuse the person from the law's coverage. For example, Quakers and certain other Protestant sects refused on Biblical grounds to subscribe to oaths or "swear" allegiance to civil authority. A. Adams & C. Emmerich, *558 A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The Constitutional Heritage of the Religion Clauses 14 (hereinafter Adams & Emmerich). Without accommodation, their beliefs would have prevented them from participating in civic activities involving oaths, including testifying in court. Colonial governments created alternatives to the oath requirement for these individuals. In early decisions, for example, the
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
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City of Boerne v. Flores
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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requirement for these individuals. In early decisions, for example, the Carolina proprietors applied the religious liberty provision of the Carolina Charter of 1665 to permit Quakers to enter pledges in a book. The First Freedoms, at 56. Similarly, in 1691, New York enacted a law allowing Quakers to testify by affirmation, and in 1734, it permitted Quakers to qualify to vote by affirmation. By 1789, virtually all of the States had enacted oath exemptions. See Adams & Emmerich 62. Early conflicts between religious beliefs and generally applicable laws also occurred because of military conscription requirements. Quakers and Mennonites, as well as a few smaller denominations, refused on religious grounds to carry arms. Members of these denominations asserted that liberty of conscience should exempt them from military conscription. Obviously, excusing such objectors from military service had a high public cost, given the importance of the military to the defense of society. Nevertheless, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Maryland exempted Quakers from military service in the late 1600's. New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New Hampshire followed suit in the mid-1700's. Origins of Free Exercise 1468. The Continental Congress likewise granted exemption from conscription: "As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed Country, which they can consistently * with their religious principles." Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, pp. 187, 189 (W. Ford ed. 1905). Again, this practice of excusing religious pacifists from military service demonstrates that, long before the First Amendment was ratified, legislative accommodations were a common response to conflicts between religious practice and civil obligation. Notably, the Continental Congress exempted objectors from conscription to avoid "violence to their consciences," explicitly recognizing that civil laws must sometimes give way to freedom of conscience. Origins of Free Exercise 1468. States and Colonies with established churches encountered a further religious accommodation problem. Typically, these governments required citizens to pay tithes to support either the government-established church or the church to which the tithepayer belonged. But Baptists and Quakers, as well as others, opposed all governmentcompelled tithes on religious grounds. Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia responded by exempting such objectors from religious assessments. There are additional examples of early conflicts between civil laws and religious practice that were similarly settled through accommodation of religious exercise.
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
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City of Boerne v. Flores
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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practice that were similarly settled through accommodation of religious exercise. Both North Carolina and Maryland excused Quakers from the requirement of removing their hats in court; Rhode Island exempted Jews from the requirements of the state marriage laws; and Georgia allowed groups of European immigrants to organize whole towns according to their own faith. To be sure, legislatures, not courts, granted these early accommodations. But these were the days before there was a Constitution to protect civil libertiesjudicial review did not yet exist. These legislatures apparently believed that the appropriate response to conflicts between civil law and religious scruples was, where possible, accommodation of religious *560 conduct. It is reasonable to presume that the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendmentmany of whom served in state legislaturesassumed courts would apply the Free Exercise Clause similarly, so that religious liberty was safeguarded. E The writings of the early leaders who helped to shape our Nation provide a final source of insight into the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. The thoughts of James Madisonone of the principal architects of the Bill of Rightsas revealed by the controversy surrounding Virginia's General Assessment Bill of 1784, are particularly illuminating. Virginia's debate over religious issues did not end with its adoption of a constitutional free exercise provision. Although Virginia had disestablished the Church of England in 1776, it left open the question whether religion might be supported on a nonpreferential basis by a so-called "general assessment." Essays on American Constitutional History, In the years between 1776 and 1784, the issue how to support religion in Virginiaeither by general assessment or voluntarilywas widely debated. The First Freedoms, at 136. By 1784, supporters of a general assessment, led by Patrick Henry, had gained a slight majority in the Virginia Assembly. M. Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First Amendment 23 ; They introduced "A Bill Establishing a Provision for the Teachers of the Christian Religion," which proposed that citizens be taxed in order to support the Christian denomination of their choice, with those taxes not designated for any specific denomination to go to a public fund to aid seminaries. -201; at 140 ; Madison viewed religious assessment as a dangerous infringement of religious liberty and led the opposition to the bill. He took the case against religious assessment to the people of Virginia in his now-famous "Memorial *561 and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments." This pamphlet led thousands of Virginians to oppose the bill and to submit petitions expressing their views to the legislature. The bill eventually died in committee, and Virginia
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
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City of Boerne v. Flores
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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the legislature. The bill eventually died in committee, and Virginia instead enacted a Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which Thomas Jefferson had drafted in 1779. The "Memorial and Remonstrance" begins with the recognition that "[t]he Religion of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate." 2 Writings of James Madison 184 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). By its very nature, Madison wrote, the right to free exercise is "unalienable," both because a person's opinion "cannot follow the dictates of other[s]," and because it entails "a duty towards the Creator." Madison continued: "This duty [owed the Creator] is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. [E]very man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, [must] do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance." To Madison, then, duties to God were superior to duties to civil authoritiesthe ultimate loyalty was owed to God above all. Madison did not say that duties to the Creator are precedent only to those laws specifically directed at religion, nor did he strive simply to prevent deliberate acts of persecution or discrimination. The idea that civil obligations are subordinate to religious duty is consonant with the notion that government must accommodate, where possible, those religious practices that conflict with civil law. *562 Other early leaders expressed similar views regarding religious liberty. Thomas Jefferson, the drafter of Virginia's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, wrote in that document that civil government could interfere in religious exercise only "when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." In 1808, he indicated that he considered "`the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises.' " 11 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 428-429 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) (quoted in Office of Legal Policy, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Attorney General, Religious Liberty under the Free Exercise Clause 7 (1986)). Moreover, Jefferson believed that "`[e]very religious society has a right to determine for itself the time of these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it.' " George Washington expressly
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
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City of Boerne v. Flores
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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where the Constitution has deposited it.' " George Washington expressly stated that he believed that government should do its utmost to accommodate religious scruples, writing in a letter to a group of Quakers: "[I]n my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated with great delicacy and tenderness; and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard to the protection and essential interests of the nation may justify and permit." Letter from George Washington to the Religious Society Called Quakers (Oct. 1789), in George Washington on Religious Liberty and Mutual Understanding 11 (E. Humphrey ed. 1932). Oliver Ellsworth, a Framer of the First Amendment and later Chief Justice of the United States, expressed the similar view that government could interfere in religious matters only when necessary "to prohibit and punish gross immoralities *5 and impieties; because the open practice of these is of evil example and detriment." Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 4 Founders' Constitution 640. Isaac Backus, a Baptist minister who was a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying convention of 1788, declared that "`every person has an unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.' " Backus, A Declaration of Rights, of the Inhabitants of the State of Massachusetts-Bay, in Isaac Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism 487 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968). These are but a few examples of various perspectives regarding the proper relationship between church and government that existed during the time the First Amendment was drafted and ratified. Obviously, since these thinkers approached the issue of religious freedom somewhat differently, see Adams & Emmerich 21-31, it is not possible to distill their thoughts into one tidy formula. Nevertheless, a few general principles may be discerned. Foremost, these early leaders accorded religious exercise a special constitutional status. The right to free exercise was a substantive guarantee of individual liberty, no less important than the right to free speech or the right to just compensation for the taking of property. See P. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 17 (1964) ("[O]ur whole constitutional history supports the conclusion that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that its recognition may either require or permit preferential treatment on religious grounds in some instances "). As Madison put it in the concluding argument of his "Memorial and Remonstrance": "`[T]he equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of [his] conscience'
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,997 | 14 |
dissenting
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City of Boerne v. Flores
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118140/city-of-boerne-v-flores/
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of his Religion according to the dictates of [his] conscience' is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. [I]t is equally the gift of nature; it cannot be less dear to us; it is enumerated with equal solemnity, *564 or rather studied emphasis." 2 Writings of James Madison, at 190. Second, all agreed that government interference in religious practice was not to be lightly countenanced. Adams & Emmerich 31. Finally, all shared the conviction that "`true religion and good morals are the only solid foundation of public liberty and happiness.' " The First Freedoms, at 219 (quoting Continental Congress); see Adams & Emmerich 72 ("The Founders acknowledged that the republic rested largely on moral principles derived from religion"). To give meaning to these ideasparticularly in a society characterized by religious pluralism and pervasive regulationthere will be times when the Constitution requires government to accommodate the needs of those citizens whose religious practices conflict with generally applicable law. III The Religion Clauses of the Constitution represent a profound commitment to religious liberty. Our Nation's Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary religious expression, not of a secular society in which religious expression is tolerated only when it does not conflict with a generally applicable law. As the historical sources discussed above show, the Free Exercise Clause is properly understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious activities without impermissible governmental interference, even where a believer's conduct is in tension with a law of general application. Certainly, it is in no way anomalous to accord heightened protection to a right identified in the text of the First Amendment. For example, it has long been the Court's position that freedom of speecha right enumerated only a few words after the right to free exercisehas special constitutional status. Given the centrality of freedom of speech and religion to the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to conclude *565 that both should be treated with the highest degree of respect. Although it may provide a bright line, the rule the Court declared in does not faithfully serve the purpose of the Constitution. Accordingly, I believe that it is essential for the Court to reconsider its holding in and to do so in this very case. I would therefore direct the parties to brief this issue and set the case for reargument. I respectfully dissent from the Court's disposition of this case.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,006 | 4 |
majority
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Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145652/anza-v-ideal-steel-supply-corp/
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The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. 1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. III), prohibits certain conduct involving a "pattern of racketeering activity." 1962 (2000 ed.). One of RICO's enforcement mechanisms is a private right of action, available to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of RICO's substantive restrictions. 1964(c). In this Court held that a plaintiff may sue under 1964(c) only if the alleged RICO violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The instant case requires us to apply the principles discussed in to a dispute between two competing businesses. I Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint. See Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) sells steel mill products along with related supplies and services. It operates two store locations in New York, one in Queens and the other in the Bronx. Petitioner National Steel Supply, *454 Inc. (National), owned by petitioners Joseph and Vincent Anza, is Ideal's principal competitor. National offers a similar array of products and services, and it, too, operates one store in Queens and one in the Bronx. Ideal sued petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. It claimed petitioners were engaged in an unlawful racketeering scheme aimed at "gain[ing] sales and market share at Ideal's expense." App. 7. According to Ideal, National adopted a practice of failing to charge the requisite New York sales tax to cashpaying customers, even when conducting transactions that were not exempt from sales tax under state law. This practice allowed National to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin. Petitioners allegedly submitted fraudulent tax returns to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance in an effort to conceal their conduct. Ideal's amended complaint contains, as relevant here, two RICO claims. The claims assert that petitioners, by submitting the fraudulent tax returns, committed various acts of mail fraud (when they sent the returns by mail) and wire fraud (when they sent them electronically). See 18 U.S. C. 1341, 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. III). Mail fraud and wire fraud are forms of "racketeering activity" for purposes of RICO. 1961(1)(B). Petitioners' conduct allegedly constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity," see 1961(5) (2000 ed.), because the fraudulent returns were submitted on an ongoing and regular basis. Ideal asserts in its first cause of action that Joseph and Vincent Anza violated 1962(c), which makes it unlawful for "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,006 | 4 |
majority
|
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145652/anza-v-ideal-steel-supply-corp/
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employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." The complaint states that the Anzas' goal, which *455 they achieved, was to give National a competitive advantage over Ideal. The second cause of action is asserted against all three petitioners. It alleges a violation of 1962(a), which makes it unlawful for any person who has received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity "to use or invest" that income "in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of," an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. As described in the complaint, petitioners used funds generated by their fraudulent tax scheme to open National's Bronx location. The opening of this new facility caused Ideal to lose "significant business and market share." App. 18. Petitioners moved to dismiss Ideal's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The District Court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court began from the proposition that to assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud, a plaintiff must have relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Ideal not having alleged that it relied on petitioners' false tax returns, the court concluded Ideal could not go forward with its RICO claims. Ideal appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment. Addressing Ideal's 1962(c) claim, the court held that where a complaint alleges a pattern of racketeering activity "that was intended to and did give the defendant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff, the complaint adequately pleads proximate cause, and the plaintiff has standing to pursue a civil RICO claim." This is the case, the court explained, "even where the scheme depended on fraudulent communications directed to and relied on by a third party rather than the plaintiff." The court reached the same conclusion with respect to Ideal's 1962(a) claim. It reasoned that Ideal adequately *456 pleaded its claim because it alleged an injury by reason of petitioners' use and investment of racketeering proceeds, "as distinct from injury traceable simply to the predicate acts of racketeering alone or to the conduct of the business of the enterprise." We granted certiorari. II Our analysis beginsand, as will become evident, largely endswith That case arose from a complaint filed by the Securities Investor Protection
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,006 | 4 |
majority
|
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145652/anza-v-ideal-steel-supply-corp/
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arose from a complaint filed by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private corporation with a duty to reimburse the customers of registered broker-dealers who became unable to meet their financial obligations. SIPC claimed that the petitioner, Robert conspired with others to manipulate stock prices. When the market detected the fraud, the share prices plummeted, and the "decline caused [two] broker-dealers' financial difficulties resulting in their eventual liquidation and SIPC's advance of nearly $13 million to cover their customers' claims." 263. SIPC sued on several theories, including that participated in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 1962(c) and conspired to do so in violation of 1962(d). The Court held that SIPC could not maintain its RICO claims against for his alleged role in the scheme. The decision relied on a careful interpretation of 1964(c), which provides a civil cause of action to persons injured "by reason of" a defendant's RICO violation. The Court recognized the phrase "by reason of" could be read broadly to require merely that the claimed violation was a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's injury. It rejected this reading, however, noting the "unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover." *457 Proper interpretation of 1964(c) required consideration of the statutory history, which revealed that "Congress modeled 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal anti-trust laws, 4 of the Clayton Act." In Associated Gen. of Cal., the Court held that "a plaintiff's right to sue under 4 required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a `but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well." at (citing Associated Gen. ). This reasoning, the Court noted in "applies just as readily to 1964(c)." 503 U.S., at The Court turned to the common-law foundations of the proximate-cause requirement, and specifically the "demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." It concluded that even if SIPC were subrogated to the rights of certain aggrieved customers, the RICO claims could not satisfy this requirement of directness. The deficiency, the Court explained, was that "the link is too remote between the stock manipulation alleged and the customers' harm, being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the broker-dealers." Applying the principles of to the present case, we conclude Ideal cannot maintain its claim based on 1962(c). Section 1962(c), as noted above, forbids conducting or participating in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The Court has indicated the compensable injury
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,006 | 4 |
majority
|
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145652/anza-v-ideal-steel-supply-corp/
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of racketeering activity. The Court has indicated the compensable injury flowing from a violation of that provision "necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise." Sedima, S. P. R. Ideal's theory is that Joseph and Vincent Anza harmed it by defrauding the New York tax authority and using the *458 proceeds from the fraud to offer lower prices designed to attract more customers. The RICO violation alleged by Ideal is that the Anzas conducted National's affairs through a pattern of mail fraud and wire fraud. The direct victim of this conduct was the State of New York, not Ideal. It was the State that was being defrauded and the State that lost tax revenue as a result. The proper referent of the proximate-cause analysis is an alleged practice of conducting National's business through a pattern of defrauding the State. To be sure, Ideal asserts it suffered its own harms when the Anzas failed to charge customers for the applicable sales tax. The cause of Ideal's asserted harms, however, is a set of actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation (defrauding the State). The attenuation between the plaintiff's harms and the claimed RICO violation arises from a different source in this case than in where the alleged violations were linked to the asserted harms only through the broker-dealers' inability to meet their financial obligations. Nevertheless, the absence of proximate causation is equally clear in both cases. This conclusion is confirmed by considering the directness requirement's underlying premises. See -270. One motivating principle is the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages caused by some remote action. See The instant case is illustrative. The injury Ideal alleges is its own loss of sales resulting from National's decreased prices for cashpaying customers. National, however, could have lowered its prices for any number of reasons unconnected to the asserted pattern of fraud. It may have received a cash inflow from some other source or concluded that the additional sales would justify a smaller profit margin. Its lowering of prices *459 in no sense required it to defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact that a company commits tax fraud does not mean the company will lower its prices; the additional cash could go anywhere from asset acquisition to research and development to dividend payouts. Cf. There is, in addition, a second discontinuity between the RICO violation and the
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,006 | 4 |
majority
|
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145652/anza-v-ideal-steel-supply-corp/
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addition, a second discontinuity between the RICO violation and the asserted injury. Ideal's lost sales could have resulted from factors other than petitioners' alleged acts of fraud. Businesses lose and gain customers for many reasons, and it would require a complex assessment to establish what portion of Ideal's lost sales were the product of National's decreased prices. Cf. ("If the nonpurchasing customers were allowed to sue, the district court would first need to determine the extent to which their inability to collect from the broker-dealers was the result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate, as opposed to, say, the broker-dealers' poor business practices or their failures to anticipate developments in the financial markets"). The attenuated connection between Ideal's injury and the Anzas' injurious conduct thus implicates fundamental concerns expressed in Notwithstanding the lack of any appreciable risk of duplicative recoveries, which is another consideration relevant to the proximate-cause inquiry, see these concerns help to illustrate why Ideal's alleged injury was not the direct result of a RICO violation. Further illustrating this point is the speculative nature of the proceedings that would follow if Ideal were permitted to maintain its claim. A court considering the claim would need to begin by calculating the portion of National's price drop attributable to the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. It next would have to calculate the portion of Ideal's lost sales attributable to the relevant part of the price drop. *460 The element of proximate causation recognized in is meant to prevent these types of intricate, uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO litigation. It has particular resonance when applied to claims brought by economic competitors, which, if left unchecked, could blur the line between RICO and the antitrust laws. The requirement of a direct causal connection is especially warranted where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims. See -270 Again, the instant case is instructive. Ideal accuses the Anzas of defrauding the State of New York out of a substantial amount of money. If the allegations are true, the State can be expected to pursue appropriate remedies. The adjudication of the State's claims, moreover, would be relatively straightforward; while it may be difficult to determine facts such as the number of sales Ideal lost due to National's tax practices, it is considerably easier to make the initial calculation of how much tax revenue the Anzas withheld from the State. There is no need to broaden the universe of actionable harms to permit RICO suits by parties who have been injured only indirectly.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,006 | 4 |
majority
|
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145652/anza-v-ideal-steel-supply-corp/
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RICO suits by parties who have been injured only indirectly. The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, apparently reasoning that because the Anzas allegedly sought to gain a competitive advantage over Ideal, it is immaterial whether they took an indirect route to accomplish their goal. See 373 F.3d, This rationale does not accord with A RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming that the defendant's aim was to increase market share at a competitor's expense. See Associated Gen. When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries. In the instant case, the answer is no. We hold that Ideal's 1962(c) claim does not satisfy the requirement of proximate causation. Petitioners alternatively ask us to hold, in line with the District Court's decision granting petitioners' motion to dismiss, that a plaintiff may not assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud unless it demonstrates it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. They argue that RICO's private right of action must be interpreted in light of common-law principles, and that at common law a fraud action requires the plaintiff to prove reliance. Because Ideal has not satisfied the proximate-cause requirement articulated in we have no occasion to address the substantial question whether a showing of reliance is required. Cf. -276. III The amended complaint also asserts a RICO claim based on a violation of 1962(a). The claim alleges petitioners' tax scheme provided them with funds to open a new store in the Bronx, which attracted customers who otherwise would have purchased from Ideal. In this Court petitioners contend that the proximate-cause analysis should function identically for purposes of Ideal's 1962(c) claim and its 1962(a) claim. (Petitioners also contend that "a civil RICO plaintiff does not plead an injury proximately caused by a violation of 1962(a) merely by alleging that a corporate defendant reinvested profits back into itself," Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 5, but this argument has not been developed, and we decline to address it.) It is true that private actions for violations of 1962(a), like actions for violations of 1962(c), must be asserted under *462 1964(c). It likewise is true that a claim is cognizable under 1964(c) only if the defendant's alleged violation proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. The proximate-cause inquiry, however, requires careful consideration of the "relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." at Because 1962(c) and 1962(a) set forth distinct prohibitions, it is at least debatable whether Ideal's two claims should
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,979 | 13 |
majority
|
Steelworkers v. Weber
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/
|
Challenged here is the legality of an affirmative action plancollectively bargained by an employer and a union that reserves for black employees 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. The question for decision is whether Congress, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., left employers and unions in the private sector free to take such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. We hold that Title VII does not prohibit such race-conscious affirmative action plans. I In 1974, petitioner United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and petitioner Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (Kaiser) *198 entered into a master collective-bargaining agreement covering terms and conditions of employment at 15 Kaiser plants. The agreement contained, inter alia, an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's then almost exclusively white craftwork forces. Black crafthiring goals were set for each Kaiser plant equal to the percentage of blacks in the respective local labor forces. To enable plants to meet these goals, on-the-job training programs were established to teach unskilled production workers black and whitethe skills necessary to become craftworkers. The plan reserved for black employees 50% of the openings in these newly created in-plant training programs. This case arose from the operation of the plan at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy, La. Until 1974, Kaiser hired as craftworkers for that plant only persons who had had prior craft experience. Because blacks had long been excluded from craft unions,[1] few were able to present such credentials. As a consequence, prior to 1974 only 1.83% (5 out of 273) of the skilled craftworkers at the Gramercy plant were black, *199 even though the work force in the Gramercy area was approximately 39% black. Pursuant to the national agreement Kaiser altered its craft hiring practice in the Gramercy plant. Rather than hiring already trained outsiders, Kaiser established a training program to train its production workers to fill craft openings. Selection of craft trainees was made on the basis of seniority, with the proviso that at least 50% of the new trainees were to be black until the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. See During 1974, the first year of the operation of the Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan, 13 craft trainees were selected from Gramercy's production work force. Of these, seven were black
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,979 | 13 |
majority
|
Steelworkers v. Weber
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/
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from Gramercy's production work force. Of these, seven were black and six white. The most senior black selected into the program had less seniority than several white production workers whose bids for admission were rejected. Thereafter one of those white production workers, respondent Brain Weber (hereafter respondent), instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that the filling of craft trainee positions at the Gramercy plant pursuant to the affirmative action program had resulted in junior black employees' receiving training in preference to senior white employees, thus discriminating against respondent and other similarly situated white employees in violation of 703 (a)[2] and *200 (d)[3] of Title VII. The District Court held that the plan violated Title VII, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Kaiser and the USWA "from denying plaintiffs, Brian F. Weber and all other members of the class, access to on-the-job training programs on the basis of race." App. 171. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that all employment preferences based upon race, including those preferences incidental to bona fide affirmative action plans, violated Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment. We granted certiorari. We reverse. II We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry. Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, this case does not present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, since the Kaiser-USWA plan was adopted voluntarily, we are not concerned with what Title VII requires or with what a court might order to remedy a past proved violation of the Act. The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan. That question was *201 expressly left open in which held, in a case not involving affirmative action, that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks from certain forms of racial discrimination. Respondent argues that Congress intended in Title VII to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans. Respondent's argument rests upon a literal interpretation of 703 (a) and (d) of the Act. Those sections make it unlawful to "discriminate because of race" in hiring and in the selection of apprentices for training programs. Since, the argument runs, settled that Title VII forbids discrimination against whites as well as blacks,
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,979 | 13 |
majority
|
Steelworkers v. Weber
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/
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Title VII forbids discrimination against whites as well as blacks, and since the Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan operates to discriminate against white employees solely because they are white, it follows that the Kaiser-USWA plan violates Title VII. Respondent's argument is not without force. But it overlooks the significance of the fact that the Kaiser-USWA plan is an affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation. In this context respondent's reliance upon a literal construction of 703 (a) and (d) and upon McDonald is misplaced. See at It is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Holy Trinity The prohibition against racial discrimination in 703 (a) and (d) of Title VII must therefore be read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act arose. See ; National Woodwork Mfrs. ; United 3 U.S. 534, Examination of those sources makes *202 clear that an interpretation of the sections that forbade all race-conscious affirmative action would "bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute" and must be rejected. United See ; ; Texas & Pacific R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with "the plight of the Negro in our economy." 1 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to "unskilled and semi-skilled jobs." ; ; Because of automation the number of such jobs was rapidly decreasing. See ; As a consequence, "the relative position of the Negro worker [was] steadily worsening. In 1947 the nonwhite unemployment rate was only 64 percent higher than the white rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher." See also Congress considered this a serious social problem. As Senator Clark told the Senate: "The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up consistently as compared with white unemployment for the past 15 years. This is a social malaise and a social situation which we should not tolerate. That is one of the principal reasons why the bill should pass." Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American societycould not be achieved unless this trend were reversed. And Congress recognized that that would not be possible *203 unless blacks were able to secure jobs "which have a future." See
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,979 | 13 |
majority
|
Steelworkers v. Weber
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/
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were able to secure jobs "which have a future." See also As Senator Humphrey explained to the Senate: "What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his modest income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take full advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where he can use that education?" "Without a job, one cannot afford public convenience and accommodations. Income from employment may be necessary to further a man's education, or that of his children. If his children have no hope of getting a good job, what will motivate them to take advantage of educational opportunities?" These remarks echoed President Kennedy's original message to Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act in 1963. "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket and no job." 9 Cong. Rec. 11159. Accordingly, it was clear to Congress that "[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them," 1 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) and it was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment was primarily addressed. It plainly appears from the House Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act that Congress did not intend wholly to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as one method of solving this problem. The Report provides: "No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of *204 the causes and consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 18 (1963). (Emphasis supplied.) Given this legislative history, we cannot agree with respondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve. The very statutory words intended as a spur or catalyst to cause "employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,979 | 13 |
majority
|
Steelworkers v. Weber
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/
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last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history," Albemarle Paper v. Moody, cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action efforts to hasten the elimination of such vestiges.[4] It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," 1 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the *205 language and legislative history of 703 (j) of Title VII.[5] Opponents of Title VII raised two related arguments against the bill. First, they argued that the Act would be interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work forces to grant preferential treatment to racial minorities in order to integrate. Second, they argued that employers with racially imbalanced work forces would grant preferential treatment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the Act. See 1 Cong. Rec. 8618-8619 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman). Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action; as respondent urges, it easily could have answered both objections by providing that Title VII would not require or permit racially preferential integration efforts. But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather, Congress added 703 (j) which addresses only the first objection. The section provides that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any *206 employer to grant preferential treatment to any group because of the race of such group on account of" a de facto racial imbalance in the employer's work force. The section does not state that "nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances. The natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action. The reasons for this choice are evident from the legislative record. Title VII could not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for their support that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963). Section 703 (j) was proposed by Senator Dirksen to allay any fears that the Act might be interpreted in such a way as to upset this compromise. The
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,979 | 13 |
majority
|
Steelworkers v. Weber
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/
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in such a way as to upset this compromise. The section was designed to prevent 703 of Title VII from being interpreted in such a way as to lead to undue "Federal Government interference with private businesses because of some Federal employee's ideas about racial balance or racial imbalance." 1 Cong. Rec. 14 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller).[6] See also ; at 520 ; Clearly, a prohibition against all voluntary, race-conscious, affirmative action efforts would disserve these ends. Such a prohibition would augment the powers of the Federal Government and diminish traditional management prerogatives while at the same time impeding attainment of the ultimate statutory goals. In view of this legislative history and in view of Congress' desire to avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses, use of the word "require" rather than the phrase "require or permit" in 703 (j) fortifies the conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.[7] *208 We therefore hold that Title VII's prohibition in 703 (a) and (d) against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. III We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold that the challenged Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan falls on the permissible side of the line. The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to "open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them." 1 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964)[8] At the same time, the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees. Cf. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of those trained in the program will be white. Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the *209 percentage of blacks in the local labor force. See We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate
|
per_curiam
| 1,997 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
In Re Vey
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1088004/in-re-vey/
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Pro se petitioner Eileen Vey seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating her 13-year-old convictions. This is not Vey's first filing in this Court. In the past 6½ years, she has filed 11 petitions for certiorari, 12 petitions for extraordinary relief, and 2 applications for bail. All of these have been denied. For the first 14 of those submissions, we granted her motions to proceed in forma pauperis. Since then, we have five times denied her leave to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court's Rule 39.8.[*] We again deny petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Her various allegations are supported by nothing other than her own conclusory statements that they are true. *304 Petitioner is allowed until May 5, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. In light of her history of frivolous, repetitive filings, we direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33. We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in It is so ordered.
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per_curiam
| 1,972 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Haines v. Kerner
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108432/haines-v-kerner/
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Petitioner, an inmate at the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, Illinois, commenced this action against the Governor of Illinois and other state officers and prison officials under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. C. 1983, and 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3), seeking to recover damages for claimed injuries and deprivation of rights while incarcerated under a judgment not challenged here. *520 Petitioner's pro se complaint was premised on alleged action of prison officials placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure after he had struck another inmate on the head with a shovel following a verbal altercation. The assault by petitioner on another inmate is not denied. Petitioner's pro se complaint included general allegations of physical injuries suffered while in disciplinary confinement and denial of due process in the steps leading to that confinement. The claimed physical suffering was aggravation of a pre-existing foot injury and a circulatory ailment caused by forcing him to sleep on the floor of his cell with only blankets. The District Court granted respondents' motion under Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, suggesting that only under exceptional circumstances should courts inquire into the internal operations of state penitentiaries and concluding that petitioner had failed to show a deprivation of federally protected rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that prison officials are vested with "wide discretion" in disciplinary matters. We granted certiorari and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. The only issue now before us is petitioner's contention that the District Court erred in dismissing his pro se complaint without allowing him to present evidence on his claims. Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears *521 "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." See Accordingly, although we intimate no view whatever on the merits of petitioner's allegations, we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in
|
Justice Burger
| 1,970 | 12 |
dissenting
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Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108077/colonnade-catering-corp-v-united-states/
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I join in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK; however, since my position goes somewhat beyond his discussion I add my views separately. *78 I assume we could all agree that the search in question must be held valid, and the contraband discovered subject to seizure and forfeiture, unless (a) it is "unreasonable" under the Constitution or (b) it is prohibited by a statute imposing restraints apart from those in the Constitution. The majority sees no constitutional violation; I agree. The controlling statutes set out in notes 1 and 2 of the majority opinion affirmatively define the conditions and times when agents may enter premises and inspect. Under 26 U.S. C. 5146 (b) agents may enter to inspect "any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises." The time when this may be done is fixed as "during business hours." Section 7606 of 26 U.S. C., set forth in note 2 of the majority opinion, provides that agents may enter any building where taxable articles are kept, "so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects." The government agents needed neither a warrant nor these statutes to secure entry to this place of business since it was as open as any business establishment that seeks to sell goods and services to the public. The agents need to rely on the statutes only to carry out their duty to inspect after accomplishing entry. This was recognized implicitly by Congress in limiting the inspection to "business hours" and daytime. Congress went beyond mere entry; it provided for inspection. Inspection authorization would be meaningless if the agents could not open lockers, cabinets, closets, and storerooms and indeed pry open cases of liquor to see the contents. Surely Congress was not unaware that purveyors of liquor do not leave their wares or stores or reserve supplies lying casually about; on the contrary they keep supplies under lock in various ways, including lockers, cabinets, closets, or storerooms; this practice is so universal it can be judicially noticed. *79 Here the agents acted explicitly under statutes containing the language "so far as it may be necessary"; this is simple and clear and for me it is plainly broad enough to permit inspection of all spirits "kept or stored on such premises" whether in lockers, cabinets, closets, or storerooms. Congress having prescribed this as a reasonable means of enforcing the inspection necessary to tax collection, I see no basis for any court to say it cannot be done. That Congress provided an added
|
Justice Burger
| 1,970 | 12 |
dissenting
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Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108077/colonnade-catering-corp-v-united-states/
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say it cannot be done. That Congress provided an added penalty for those who refuse access for inspection is irrelevant. We can assume this was to encourage licensed purveyors to comply promptly to facilitate inspections. The majority views the $500 fine as the Government's exclusive remedy for the non-cooperation of the taxpayer. Congress could hardly be so naive as to give to the licensee the option to choose between the risk of a $500 fine against the certain discovery, if he is in violation, of a large store of liquor subject to forfeiture. At current prices $500 would represent four or five cases of spirits. The alternative of securing a warrant touches on the constitutional issues which the majority does not rely on. We should note, of course, that the majority holding eliminates any basis for a forfeiture of the contraband liquor and leaves the Government to another lawsuit to collect a $500 fine. With deference I submit the majority has needlessly complicated a relatively simple issue of statutory construction with undertones of constitutionally limited searches. The words "so far as it may be necessary" are quite plain and we all agree no issue of constitutional dimensions is presented. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR.
|
Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
|
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has written: "Shrimp, whether boiled, broiled, barbecued or fried, are a gustatory delight, but they did not evolve *519 to satisfy man's palate. Like other crustaceans, they wear their skeletons outside their bodies in order to shield their savory pink and white flesh against predators, including man. They also carry their intestines, commonly called veins, in bags (or sand bags) that run the length of their bodies. For shrimp to be edible, it is necessary to remove their shells. In addition, if the vein is removed, shrimp become more pleasing to the fastidious as well as more palatable."[1] Such "gustatory" observations are rare even in those piscatorially favored federal courts blissfully situated on the Nation's Gulf Coast, but they are properly recited in this case. Petitioner and respondent both hold patents on machines that devein shrimp more cheaply and efficiently than competing machinery or hand labor can do the job. Extensive litigation below has established that respondent, the Laitram Corp., has the superior claim and that the distribution and use of petitioner Deepsouth's machinery in this country should be enjoined to prevent infringement of Laitram's patents. Laitram We granted certiorari, to consider a related question: Is Deepsouth, barred from the American market by Laitram's patents, also foreclosed by the patent laws from exporting its deveiners, in less than fully assembled form, for use abroad? I A rudimentary understanding of the patents in dispute is a prerequisite to comprehending the legal issue presented. The District Court determined that the Laitram Corp. held two valid patents for machinery *520 used in the process of deveining shrimp. One, granted in 1954,[2] accorded Laitram over a "slitter" which exposed the veins of shrimp by using water pressure and gravity to force the shrimp down an inclined trough studded with razor blades. As the shrimp descend through the trough their backs are slit by the blades or other knife-like objects arranged in a zig-zag pattern. The second patent, granted in 1958, covers a "tumbler," "a device to mechanically remove substantially all veins from shrimp whose backs have previously been slit," App. 127, by the machines described in the 1954 patent. This invention uses streams of water to carry slit shrimp into and then out of a revolving drum fabricated from commercial sheet metal. As shrimp pass through the drum the hooked "lips" of the punched metal, "projecting at an acute angle from the supporting member and having a smooth rounded free edge for engaging beneath the vein of a shrimp and for wedging the
|
Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
|
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
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beneath the vein of a shrimp and for wedging the vein between the lip and the supporting member," App. 131, engage the veins and remove them. Both the slitter and the tumbler are combination patents; that is. "[n]one of the parts referred to are new, and none are claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination less than the whole claimed as new, or stated to produce any given result. The end in view is proposed to be accomplished by the union of all, arranged and combined together in the manner described. And this combination, composed of all the parts mentioned in the specification, and arranged with reference to each other, and to other *521 parts of the [machine] in the manner therein described, is stated to be the improvement, and is the thing patented." The slitter's elements as recited in Laitram's patent claim were: an inclined trough, a "knife" (actually, knives) positioned in the trough, and a means (water sprayed from jets) to move the shrimp down the trough. The tumbler's elements include a "lip," a "support member," and a "means" (water thrust from jets). As is usual in combination patents, none of the elements in either of these patents were themselves patentable at the time of the patent, nor are they now. The means in both inventions, moving water, was and is, of course, commonplace. (It is not suggested that Deepsouth infringed Laitram's patents by its use of water jets.) The cutting instruments and inclined troughs used in slitters were and are commodities available for general use. The structure of the lip and support member in the tumbler were hardly novel: Laitram concedes that the inventors merely adapted punched metal sheets ordered from a commercial catalog in order to perfect their invention. The patents were warranted not by the novelty of their elements but by the novelty of the combination they represented. Invention was recognized because Laitram's assignors[3] combined ordinary elements in an extraordinary waya novel union of old means was designed to achieve new ends.[4] Thus, *522 for both inventions "the whole in some way exceed[ed] the sum of its parts." Great A. & P. Tea II The lower court's decision that Laitram held valid combination patents entitled the corporation to the privileges bestowed by 35 U.S. C. 154, the keystone provision of the patent code. "[F]or the term of seventeen years" from the date of the patent, Laitram had "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States" The 154 right in turn provides the basis for
|
Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
|
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
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States" The 154 right in turn provides the basis for affording the patentee an injunction against direct, induced, and contributory infringement, 35 U.S. C. 283, or an award of damages when such infringement has already occurred, 35 U.S. C. 284. Infringement is defined by 35 U.S. C. 271 in terms that follow those of 154: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, [directly] infringes the patent. "(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. "(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement *523 of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." As a result of these provisions the judgment of Laitram's patent superiority forecloses Deepsouth and its customers from any future use (other than a use approved by Laitram or occurring after the Laitram patent has expired) of its deveiners "throughout the United States." The patent provisions taken in conjunction with the judgment below also entitle Laitram to the injunction it has received prohibiting Deepsouth from continuing to "make" or, once made, to "sell" deveiners "throughout the United States," Further, Laitram may recover damages for any past unauthorized use, sale, or making "throughout the United States." This much is not disputed. But Deepsouth argues that it is not liable for every type of past sale and that a portion of its future business is salvageable. Section 154 and related provisions obviously are intended to grant a patentee a monopoly only over the United States market; they are not intended to grant a patentee the bonus of a favored position as a flagship company free of American competition in international commerce. Deepsouth, itself barred from using its deveining machines, or from inducing others to use them "throughout the United States," barred also from making and selling the machines in the United States, seeks to make the parts of deveining machines, to sell them to foreign buyers, and to have the buyers assemble the parts and use the machines abroad.[5] Accordingly, *524 Deepsouth seeks judicial approval, expressed through a modification or interpretation of the injunction against it, for continuing its practice of shipping deveining equipment to foreign customers in
|
Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
|
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
|
its practice of shipping deveining equipment to foreign customers in three separate boxes, each containing only parts of the 1 3/4-ton machines, yet the whole assemblable in less than one hour.[6] The company contends that by this means both the "making" and the "use" of the machines occur abroad and Laitram's lawful monopoly over the making and use of the machines throughout the United States is not infringed. Laitram counters that this course of conduct is based upon a hypertechnical reading of the patent code that, if tolerated, will deprive it of its right to the fruits of the inventive genius of its assignors. "The right to make can scarcely be made plainer by definition" Deepsouth in all respects save final assembly of the parts "makes" the invention. It does so with the intent of having the foreign user effect the combination without Laitram's permission. Deepsouth sells these components as though they were the machines themselves; the act of assembly is regarded, indeed advertised, as of no importance. The District Court, faced with this dispute, noted that three prior circuit courts had considered the meaning of "making" in this context and that all three had resolved the question favorably to Deepsouth's position. *525 See Hewitt-Robins, ; Cold Metal Process ; and Radio Corp. of The District Court held that its injunction should not be read as prohibiting export of the elements of a combination patent even when those elements could and predictably would be combined to form the whole. "It may be urged that [this] result is not logical. But it is founded on twin notions that underlie the patent laws. One is that a combination patent protects only the combination. The other is that monopolieseven those conferred by patentsare not viewed with favor. These are logic enough." 3 F. Supp. 926, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, thus departing from the established rules of the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits. In the Fifth Circuit panel's opinion, those courts that previously considered the question "worked themselves into a conceptual box" by adopting "an artificial, technical construction" of the patent laws, a construction, moreover, which in the opinion of the panel, "[subverted] the Constitutional scheme of promoting `the Progress of Science and useful Arts' " by allowing an intrusion on a patentee's -939, citing U. S. Const., Art. I, 8. III We disagree with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[7] Under the common law the inventor had no *526 right to exclude others from making and using his invention. If Laitram has a right to suppress
|
Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
|
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
|
using his invention. If Laitram has a right to suppress Deepsouth's export trade it must be derived from its patent grant, and thus from the patent statue.[8] We find that 35 U.S. C. 271, the provision of the patent laws on which Laitram relies, does not support its claim. Certainly if Deepsouth's conduct were intended to lead to use of patented deveiners inside the United States its production and sales activity would be subject to injunction as an induced or contributory infringement. But it is established that there can be no contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a direct infringement. "In a word, if there is no [direct] infringement of a patent there can be no contributory infringer." Mercoid Aro Mfg. -342 succinctly articulates the law: "It is plain that 271 (c)a part of the Patent Code enacted in 1952made no change in the fundamental precept that there can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct infringement. That section defines contributory infringement in terms of direct infringementnamely the sale of a component of a patented combination or machine for use `in an infringement of such patent.' " *527 The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United States. 35 U.S. C. 271. See also Dowagiac Mfg. Thus, in order to secure the injunction it seeks, Laitram must show a 271 (a) direct infringement by Deepsouth in the United States, that is, that Deepsouth "makes," "uses," or "sells" the patented product within the bounds of this country. Laitram does not suggest that Deepsouth "uses" the machines. Its argument that Deepsouth sells the machines based primarily on Deepsouth's sales rhetoric and related indicia such as price[9]cannot carry the day unless it can be shown that Deepsouth is selling the "patented invention." The sales question thus resolves itself into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth "make" (and then sell) something cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it "make" (and then sell) something that fell short of infringement? The Court of Appeals, believing that the word "makes" should be accorded "a construction in keeping with the ordinary meaning of that term," held against Deepsouth on the theory that "makes" "means what it ordinarily connotesthe substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine." Passing the question of whether this definition more closely corresponds to the ordinary meaning of the term than that offered by Judge Swan in Andrea 35 years earlier (something is made when it reaches the state of *528
|
Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
|
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
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(something is made when it reaches the state of *528 final "operable" assembly), we find the Fifth Circuit's definition unacceptable because it collides head on with a line of decisions so firmly embedded in our patent law as to be unassailable absent a congressional recasting of the statute. We cannot endorse the view that the "substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine" constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts. "For as we pointed out in See also Leeds & Catlin : "A combination is a union of elements, which may be partly old and partly new, or wholly old or wholly new. But whether new or old, the combination is a meansan inventiondistinct from them." "[O]ne element is not the combination. Indeed, all of the elements are not. To be thatto be identical with the invention of the combinationthey must be united by the same operative law." And see In sum, "[i]f anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element, separately viewed, is within the grant." Aro Mfg. *529 It was this basic tenet of the patent system that led Judge Swan to hold in the leading case, Radio Corp. of that unassembled export of the elements of an invention did not infringe the patent. "[The] relationship is the essence of the patent. ". No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. His monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements capable of being, but never actually, associated to form the invention. Only when such association is made is there a direct infringement of his monopoly, and not even then if it is done outside the territory for which the monopoly was granted." See also Cold Metal Process 235 F. 2d, at ("We are in full accord with the rule thus laid down in the Andrea case and we think that the master and the district court were right in applying it here"); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link Belt 371 F. 2d, at 229 (to the same effect). We reaffirm this conclusion today. IV It is said that this conclusion is derived from too narrow and technical an interpretation of the statute, and that this Court should focus on the constitutional mandate "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
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Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
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Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries" Art. I, 8, and construe the statute in a manner that would, allegedly, better reflect the policy of the Framers. *530 We cannot accept this argument. The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress. We are here construing the provisions of a statute passed in 1952. The prevailing law in this and other courts as to what is necessary to show a patentable invention when a combination of old elements is claimed was clearly evident from the cases when the Act was passed; and at that time Andrea, representing a specific application of the law of infringement with respect to the export of elements of a combination patent, was 17 years old. When Congress drafted 271, it gave no indication that it desired to change either the law of combination patents as relevant here or the ruling of Andrea.[] Nor has it on any more recent occasion indicated that it wanted the patent privilege to run farther than it was understood to run for 35 years prior to the action of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, we must consider petitioner's claim in light of this Nation's historical antipathy to monopoly[11] and of repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster competition. As this Court recently said without dissent: "[I]n rewarding useful invention, the ` and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt *531 with and effectually guarded.' To that end the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced." Sears, Roebuck & v. Stiffel It follows that we should not expand patent by overruling or modifying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought. No such signal legitimizes respondent's position in this litigation. In conclusion, we note that what is at stake here is the right of American companies to compete with an American patent holder in foreign markets. Our
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Justice White
| 1,972 | 6 |
majority
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Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108547/deepsouth-packing-co-v-laitram-corp/
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compete with an American patent holder in foreign markets. Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; "these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States," ; and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over our markets. Cf. To the degree that the inventor needs protection in markets other than those of this country, the wording of 35 U.S. C. 154 and 271 reveals a congressional intent to have him seek it abroad through patents secured in countries where his goods are being used. Respondent holds foreign patents; it does not adequately explain why it does not avail itself of them. *532 V In sum: the case and statutory law resolves this case against the respondent. When so many courts have so often held what appears so evidenta combination patent can be infringed only by combinationwe are not prepared to break the mold and begin anew. And were the matter not so resolved, we would still insist on a clear congressional indication of intent to extend the patent privilege before we could recognize the monopoly here claimed. Such an indication is lacking. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
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East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
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In this admiralty case, we must decide whether a cause of action in tort is stated when a defective product purchased in a commercial transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and causing purely economic loss. The case requires us to consider preliminarily whether admiralty law, which already recognizes a general theory of liability for negligence, also incorporates principles of products liability, including strict liability. Then, charting a course between products liability and contract law, we must determine whether injury to a product itself is the kind of harm that should be protected by products liability or left entirely to the law of contracts. I In 1969, Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. (Shipbuilding), a wholly owned subsidiary of Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), announced it would build the four oil-transporting supertankers in issue the T. T. Stuyvesant, T. T. Williamsburgh, T. T. Brooklyn, and T. T. Bay Ridge. Each tanker was constructed pursuant to a contract in which a separate wholly owned subsidiary of Seatrain engaged Shipbuilding. Shipbuilding in turn contracted with respondent, now known as Transamerica Delaval Inc. (Delaval), to design, manufacture, and supervise the installation of turbines (costing $1.4 million each, see App. 163) that would be the main propulsion units for the 225,000-ton, $125 million, ibid., supertankers. When each ship was completed, its title was transferred from the contracting subsidiary to a trust company (as trustee for *860 an owner), which in turn chartered the ship to one of the petitioners, also subsidiaries of Seatrain. Queensway Tankers, Inc., chartered the Stuyvesant; Kingsway Tankers, Inc., chartered the Williamsburgh; East River Steamship Corp. chartered the Brooklyn; and Richmond Tankers, Inc., chartered the Bay Ridge. Each petitioner operated under a bareboat charter, by which it took full control of the ship for 20 or 22 years as though it owned it, with the obligation afterwards to return the ship to the real owner. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, Admiralty 4-1, 4-22 Each charterer assumed responsibility for the cost of any repairs to the ships. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 16-17, 35. The Stuyvesant sailed on its maiden voyage in late July On December 11 of that year, as the ship was about to enter the Port of Valdez, Alaska, steam began to escape from the casing of the high-pressure turbine. That problem was temporarily resolved by repairs, but before long, while the ship was encountering a severe storm in the Gulf of Alaska, the high-pressure turbine malfunctioned. The ship, though lacking its normal power, was able to continue on its journey to Panama and then San Francisco. In January an examination
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
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East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
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to Panama and then San Francisco. In January an examination of the high-pressure turbine revealed that the first-stage steam reversing ring virtually had disintegrated and had caused additional damage to other parts of the turbine. The damaged part was replaced with a part from the Bay Ridge, which was then under construction. In April the ship again was repaired, this time with a part from the Brooklyn. Finally, in August, the ship was permanently and satisfactorily repaired with a ring newly designed and manufactured by Delaval. The Brooklyn and the Williamsburgh were put into service in late 1973 and late 1974, respectively. In as a result of the Stuyvesant's problems, they were inspected while in port. Those inspections revealed similar turbine damage. Temporary repairs were made, and newly designed parts were installed as permanent repairs that summer. *861 When the Bay Ridge was completed in early 1979, it contained the newly designed parts and thus never experienced the high-pressure turbine problems that plagued the other three ships. Nonetheless, the complaint appears to claim damages as a result of deterioration of the Bay Ridge's ring that was installed in the Stuyvesant while the Bay Ridge was under construction. In addition, the Bay Ridge experienced a unique problem. In when the ship was on its maiden voyage, the engine began to vibrate with a frequency that increased even after speed was reduced. It turned out that the astern guardian valve, located between the high-pressure and low-pressure turbines, had been installed backwards. Because of that error, steam entered the low-pressure turbine and damaged it. After repairs, the Bay Ridge resumed its travels. II The charterers' second amended complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, invokes admiralty jurisdiction. It contains five counts alleging tortious conduct on the part of respondent Delaval and seeks an aggregate of more than $8 million in damages for the cost of repairing the ships and for income lost while the ships were out of service. The first four counts, read liberally, allege that Delaval is strictly liable for the design defects in the high-pressure turbines of the Stuyvesant, the Williamsburgh, the Brooklyn, and the Bay Ridge, respectively. The fifth count alleges that Delaval, as part of the manufacturing process, negligently supervised the installation of the astern guardian valve on the Bay Ridge. The initial complaint also had listed Seatrain and Shipbuilding as plaintiffs and had alleged breach of contract and warranty as well as tort claims. But after Delaval interposed a statute of limitations defense, the complaint was amended and the charterers
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
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East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
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of limitations defense, the complaint was amended and the charterers alone brought the suit in tort. The nonrenewed claims were dismissed with prejudice by the District Court. Delaval then moved *862 for summary judgment, contending that the charterers' actions were not cognizable in tort. The District Court granted summary judgment for Delaval, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. East River S. S. The Court of Appeals held that damage solely to a defective product is actionable in tort if the defect creates an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property other than the product itself, and harm materializes. Disappointments over the product's quality, on the other hand, are protected by warranty law. The charterers were dissatisfied with product quality: the defects involved gradual and unnoticed deterioration of the turbines' component parts, and the only risk created was that the turbines would operate at a lower capacity. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Therefore, neither the negligence claim nor the strict-liability claim was cognizable. Judge Garth concurred on "grounds somewhat different," and Judge Becker, joined by Judge Higginbotham, concurred in part and dissented in part. Although Judge Garth agreed with the majority's analysis on the merits, he found no strict-liability claim presented because the charterers had failed to allege unreasonable danger or demonstrable injury. Judge Becker largely agreed with the majority's approach, but would permit recovery for a "near miss," where the risk existed but no calamity occurred. He felt that the first count, concerning the Stuyvesant, stated a cause of action in tort. The exposure of the ship to a severe storm when the ship was unable to operate at full power due to the defective part created an unreasonable risk of harm. *863 We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty.[1] III A Initially, we conclude that the fourth count should have been dismissed because Richmond Tankers, Inc., the charterer of the Bay Ridge, lacks standing to bring a claim relating to the defective ring that was removed from the Bay Ridge when it was still under construction. The ring was installed in the Stuyvesant where it remained until April when it was removed due to disintegration. Richmond did not charter the Bay Ridge until May 1979, after the ship was completed with a newly designed, nondefective, high-pressure turbine. See Plaintiffs' Answers to First Set of Interrogatories of Defendants, No. 42. Richmond therefore can allege no cognizable injury. Richmond, of course, has standing to bring the claim raised in the fifth count, as the damage from
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