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Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
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claim raised in the fifth count, as the damage from the reverse installation of the astern guardian valve allegedly occurred after Richmond chartered the Bay Ridge. B The torts alleged in the first, second, third, and fifth counts clearly fall within the admiralty jurisdiction. The claims satisfy the traditional "locality" requirement that the wrong *864 must have occurred on the high seas or navigable waters. See, e. g., The Plymouth, The first and fifth counts allege that the injury to the Stuyvesant's high-pressure turbine and the Bay Ridge's low-pressure turbine occurred while the ships were sailing on the high seas. The damage to the Williamsburgh and the Brooklyn, alleged in the second and third counts, occurred at sea, and was discovered in port, also a maritime locale. See Southern S. S. When torts have occurred on navigable waters within the United States, the Court has imposed an additional requirement of a "maritime nexus" that the wrong must bear "a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." See Executive Jet ; Foremost Ins. We need not reach the question whether a maritime nexus also must be established when a tort occurs on the high seas. Were there such a requirement, it clearly was met here, for these ships were engaged in maritime commerce, a primary concern of admiralty law. C With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. See Executive Jet Absent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies. United ; Knickerbocker Ice Drawn from state[2] and federal sources, the general *865 maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules. See ; This Court has developed a body of maritime tort principles, see, e. g., ; see generally Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," S. Ct. Rev. 8, 164, and is now asked to incorporate products-liability concepts, long a part of the common law of torts, into the general maritime law. See cert. denied, The Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty overwhelmingly have adopted concepts of products liability, based both on negligence, aff'd on other grounds, and on strict liability, Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously had stated that the question whether principles of strict products liability are part of maritime law "is no longer seriously contested." Ocean Barge Transport We join the Courts of Appeals in recognizing products liability, including strict liability, as part of the general maritime law. This Court's precedents relating to injuries of maritime workers long have pointed in that
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
|
to injuries of maritime workers long have pointed in that direction. See Seas Shipping ; Italia Societa per Azioni di The Court's rationale in those cases that strict liability should be imposed on the party best able to protect persons from hazardous equipment is equally applicable when the claims are based on products liability. Compare Sieracki, -, with 4 (14) And to the extent that products actions are based on negligence, they are grounded in principles already incorporated into the general maritime law. See 358 U. S., Our incorporation of products liability into maritime law, however, is only the threshold determination to the main issue in this case. IV Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment that people need more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by the law of warranty. See It is clear, however, that if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort. See G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 87- (1974). We must determine whether a commercial product injuring itself is the kind of harm against which public policy requires manufacturers to protect, independent of any contractual obligation. A The paradigmatic products-liability action is one where a product "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril," distributed without reinspection, causes bodily injury. See, e. g., The manufacturer is liable whether or not it is negligent because "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling *867 of 24 Cal. 2d, at 0 P.2d, at 4 For similar reasons of safety, the manufacturer's duty of care was broadened to include protection against property damage. See Marsh Wood Products ; Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Such damage is considered so akin to personal injury that the two are treated alike. See 403 P.2d, at 2. In the traditional "property damage" cases, the defective product damages other property. In this case, there was no damage to "other" property. Rather, the first, second, and third counts allege that each supertanker's defectively designed turbine components damaged only the turbine itself. Since each turbine was supplied by Delaval as an integrated package, see App. 162-163, each is properly regarded as a single unit. "Since all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, [a contrary] holding would require a finding of `property damage' in virtually every case where a product damages itself. Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
|
a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict products liability." Northern Power & Engineering The fifth count also alleges injury to the product itself. Before the high-pressure and low-pressure turbines could become an operational propulsion system, they were connected to piping and valves under the supervision of Delaval personnel. See App. 78, 162-163, 181. Delaval's supervisory obligations were part of its manufacturing agreement. The fifth count thus can best be read to allege that Delaval's negligent manufacture of the propulsion system by allowing the installation in reverse of the astern guardian valve damaged the propulsion system. Cf. Obviously, damage to a product itself *868 has certain attributes of a products-liability claim. But the injury suffered the failure of the product to function properly is the essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain. B The intriguing question whether injury to a product itself may be brought in tort has spawned a variety of answers.[3] At one end of the spectrum, the case that created the majority land-based approach, held that preserving a proper role for the law of warranty precludes imposing tort liability if a defective product causes purely monetary harm. See also Jones & Laughlin Steel At the other end of the spectrum is the minority land-based approach, whose progenitor, held that a manufacturer's duty to make nondefective products encompassed injury to the product itself, *869 whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm.[4] See also The courts adopting this approach, including the majority of the Courts of Appeals sitting in admiralty that have considered the issue.[5]e. g., Emerson G. M. Diesel, find that the safety and insurance rationales behind strict liability apply equally where the losses are purely economic. These courts reject the Seely approach because they find it arbitrary that economic losses are recoverable if a plaintiff suffers bodily injury or property damage, but not if a product injures itself. They also find no inherent difference between economic loss and personal injury or property damage, because all are proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. Further, they believe recovery for economic loss would not lead to unlimited liability because they think a manufacturer can predict and insure against product failure. See Emerson G. M. Diesel, 732 F. 2d, at 1474. Between the two poles fall a number of cases that would permit a products-liability action under certain circumstances when a product injures only itself. These cases attempt to differentiate between "the disappointed users and the *870 endangered ones,"
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
|
differentiate between "the disappointed users and the *870 endangered ones," Russell v. Ford Motor and permit only the latter to sue in tort. The determination has been said to turn on the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand 652 F. 2d, at 1 (relied on by the Court of Appeals in this case). The Alaska Supreme Court allows a tort action if the defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other property, and loss occurs as a proximate result of that danger and under dangerous circumstances. Northern Power & Engineering We find the intermediate and minority land-based positions unsatisfactory. The intermediate positions, which essentially turn on the degree of risk, are too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior. Nor do we find persuasive a distinction that rests on the manner in which the product is injured. We realize that the damage may be qualitative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be calamitous. Compare with Cloud v. Kit Mfg. But either way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain traditionally the core concern of contract law. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts 12.8, pp. 839-840 We also decline to adopt the minority land-based view espoused by Santor and Emerson. Such cases raise legitimate questions about the theories behind restricting products liability, but we believe that the countervailing arguments are more powerful. The minority view fails to account for the *871 need to keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages. C Exercising traditional discretion in admiralty, see Pope & Talbot, we adopt an approach similar to Seely and hold that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.[6] "The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the `luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products." 403 P.2d, at 1. When
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
|
undertake in distributing his products." 403 P.2d, at 1. When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong. The tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself. When a person is injured, the "cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune," and one the person is not prepared to meet. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 24 Cal. 2d, at 0 P.2d, at 4 In contrast, when a product injures itself, the commercial user stands to lose the value of the product, risks the displeasure of its customers who find that the product does not meet their needs, or, as in this case, experiences increased costs in performing a service. Losses like these can be insured. *872 See 10A G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 42:385-42:401, 42:4-7 ; 7 E. Benedict, Admiralty, Form No. 1.16-7, p. 1-239 ; 5A J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 3252 (1970). Society need not presume that a customer needs special protection. The increased cost to the public that would result form holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing 9 F.2d 169, (CA2 17). Damage to a product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim. Such damage means simply that the product has not met the customer's expectations, or, in other words, that the customer has received "insufficient product value." See J. White & R. Uniform Commercial Code 406 The maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties.[7] See UCC 2-313 (express warranty), 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability), and 2-3 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). Therefore, a claim of a nonworking product can be brought as a breach-of-warranty action. Or, if the customer prefers, it can reject the product or revoke its acceptance and sue for breach of contract. See UCC 2-601, 2-608, 2-612. Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the parties may set the terms of their own *873 agreements.[8] The manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limits, by disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies. See UCC 2-316, 2-719. In exchange, the purchaser pays less for the product. Since a commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining power, cf. we see no reason to intrude
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
|
in bargaining power, cf. we see no reason to intrude into the parties' allocation of the risk. While giving recognition to the manufacturer's bargain, warranty law sufficiently protects the purchaser by allowing it to obtain the benefit of its bargain. See White & ch. 10. The expectation damages available in warranty for purely economic loss give a plaintiff the full benefit of its bargain by compensating for forgone business opportunities. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 Yale L. J. 52, 60-63 (1936); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 4.8 (3d ed. 1986). Recovery on a warranty theory would give the charterers their repair costs and lost profits, and would place them in the position they would have been in had the turbines functioned properly.[9] See 146 A. 6 Thus, both the nature of the injury and the resulting damages indicate it is more natural to think of injury to a product itself in terms of warranty. A warranty action also has a built-in limitation on liability, whereas a tort action could subject the manufacturer to damages of an indefinite amount. The limitation in a contract action comes from the agreement of the parties and the requirement that consequential damages, such as lost profits, be a foreseeable result of the breach. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 3, 6 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). In a warranty action where the loss is purely economic, the limitation derives from the requirements of foreseeability and of privity, which is still generally enforced for such claims in a commercial setting. See UCC 2-7; White & at 396, 406-0. In products-liability law, where there is a duty to the public generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake. Cf. Kinsman Transit v. City of Buffalo, See also Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, Permitting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a manufacturer liable for vast sums. It would be difficult for a manufacturer to take into account the expectations of persons downstream who may encounter its product. In this case, for example, if the charterers already one step removed from the transaction were permitted to recover their economic losses, then the companies that subchartered the ships might claim their economic losses from the delays, and the charterers' customers also might claim their economic losses, and so on. "The law does not spread its protection so far." Robins Dry Dock & Repair v. Flint, *875 And to the extent that courts try to limit purely economic damages
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,986 | 11 |
majority
|
East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111693/east-river-ss-corp-v-transamerica-delaval-inc/
|
the extent that courts try to limit purely economic damages in tort, they do so by relying on a far murkier line, one that negates the charterers' contention that permitting such recovery under a products-liability theory enables admiralty courts to avoid difficult line drawing. Cf. Ultramares 174 N.E. 4 ; Louisiana ex rel. (dissenting opinion), cert. pending sub nom. White v. M/V Testbank, No. 84-1808. D For the first three counts, the defective turbine components allegedly injured only the turbines themselves. Therefore, a strict products-liability theory of recovery is unavailable to the charterers. Any warranty claims would be subject to Delaval's limitation, both in time and scope, of its warranty liability. App. 78-79. The record indicates that Seatrain and Delaval reached a settlement agreement. Deposition of Stephen Russell, p. 32. We were informed that these charterers could not have asserted the warranty claims. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Even so, the charterers should be left to the terms of their bargains, which explicitly allocated the cost of repairs. In the charterers' agreements with the owners, the charterers took the ships in "as is" condition, after inspection, and assumed full responsibility for them, including responsibility for maintenance and repairs and for obtaining certain forms of insurance. ; App. 86, 88, 99, 101, 112, 114, 125-126, 127. In a separate agreement between each charterer and Seatrain, Seatrain agreed to guarantee certain payments and covenants by each charterer to the owner. at 142-6. The contractual responsibilities thus were clearly laid out. There is no reason to extricate the parties from their bargain. Similarly, in the fifth count, alleging the reverse installation of the astern guardian valve, the only harm was to the *876 propulsion system itself rather than to persons or other property. Even assuming that Delaval's supervision was negligent, as we must on this summary judgment motion, Delaval owed no duty under a products-liability theory based on negligence to avoid causing purely economic loss. Cf. Flintkote v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 2 ; S. M. Wilson & v. Smith International, Inc., Thus, whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic loss. While we hold that the fourth count should have been dismissed, we affirm the entry of judgment for Delaval. It is so ordered.
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per_curiam
| 1,991 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Lozada v. Deeds
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112532/lozada-v-deeds/
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Petitioner Jose M. Lozada was convicted in Nevada state court in 1987 of four crimes arising out of the possession and sale of a controlled substance in violation of the laws of that State. Lozada filed no direct appeal. After exhausting state postconviction remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Lozada contended that ineffective assistance of counsel had deprived him of the opportunity to appeal his state-court convictions. In particular, he alleged that his attorney failed to inform him of his right to appeal, of the procedures *431 and time limitations for an appeal, and of his right to appointed counsel. The habeas petition alleged further that the attorney had failed to file a notice of appeal or to ensure that Lozada received appointed counsel on appeal. It also implied that Lozada had been misled when the attorney told Lozada's sister that his case had been forwarded to the public defender's office. Without holding a hearing on Lozada's claims, a federal Magistrate recommended that the petition be dismissed. The District Court agreed and dismissed the petition, rejecting the ineffective-assistance claim on the ground that petitioner's allegations failed to satisfy the standard set forth in our decision in The court acknowledged that trial counsel's alleged failure to inform petitioner of his right to appeal might constitute conduct below constitutional standards. It reasoned, however, that Lozada had not indicated what issues he would have raised on appeal and had not demonstrated that the appeal might have succeeded. As a result, the court concluded that petitioner had not shown prejudice under the Strickland test. The District Court later denied Lozada a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of habeas relief, see 28 U.S. C. 2253, again stating that Lozada had failed to show any prejudice from counsel's alleged errors. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also denied a certificate of probable cause in a one-sentence order. Lozada filed the instant petition for a writ of certiorari, which we now grant along with his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In we delineated the standards for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. We agreed with the Courts of Appeals that had ruled that "a certificate of probable cause requires petitioner to make a `substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.'" cert. denied, ). *432 We also quoted with approval which explained that in order to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right a petitioner
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per_curiam
| 1,991 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Lozada v. Deeds
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112532/lozada-v-deeds/
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showing of the denial of a federal right a petitioner who has been denied relief in a district court "`must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are "adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."'" 463 U.S., n. 4. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in denying Lozada a certificate of probable cause because, under the standards set forth in Barefoot, Lozada made a substantial showing that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. The District Court rested its analysis on the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry, and that was presumably the basis for the Court of Appeals' decision to deny a certificate of probable cause. We believe the issue of prejudice caused by the alleged denial of the right to appeal could be resolved in a different manner from the one followed by the District Court. Since Strickland, at least two Courts of Appeals have presumed prejudice in this situation. See F.2d 821, ; ; see also The order of the Court of Appeals did not cite or analyze this line of authority as reflected in Estes, which had been decided before the Ninth Circuit issued its ruling. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE O'CONNOR would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112638/cohen-v-cowles-media-co/
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I agree with the Court that the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota rested on federal grounds and that the judicial enforcement of petitioner's promissory estoppel claim constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not agree, however, that the use of that claim to penalize the reporting of truthful information regarding a political campaign does not violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, I dissent. The majority concludes that this case is not controlled by the decision in to the effect that a State may not punish the publication of lawfully obtained, truthful information "absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Instead, we are told, the controlling precedent is "the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news." Ante, at 669. See, e. g., ; Oklahoma Press Publishing ; Minneapolis Star & Tribune I disagree. I do not read the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota to create any exception to, or immunity from, the laws of that State for members of the press. In my view, the court's decision is premised, not on the identity of the speaker, but on the speech itself. Thus, the court found it to be of "critical significance," that "the promise of anonymity arises in the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our democratic society, namely, a political source involved in a political campaign." ; see also holds that a state may not adopt a state rule of law to impose impermissible restrictions on the federal constitutional freedoms of speech and press"). Necessarily, the First Amendment protection afforded respondents would be equally available to nonmedia defendants. See, e. g., ("The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion"). The majority's admonition that "`[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws,'" ante, at 670, and its *674 reliance on the cases that support that principle, are therefore misplaced. In Branzburg, for example, this Court found it significant that "these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold [N]o penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue here." Indeed, "[t]he
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112638/cohen-v-cowles-media-co/
|
content of published material is at issue here." Indeed, "[t]he sole issue before us" in Branzburg was "the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime." See also Associated ; Associated ; Citizen Publishing In short, these cases did not involve the imposition of liability based upon the content of speech.[1] Contrary to the majority, I regard our decision in Hustler Magazine, to be precisely on point. There, we found that the use of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to impose liability for the publication of a satirical critique violated the First *675 Amendment. There was no doubt that Virginia's tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was "a law of general applicability" unrelated to the suppression of speech.[2] Nonetheless, a unanimous Court found that, when used to penalize the expression of opinion, the law was subject to the strictures of the First Amendment. In applying that principle, we concluded, that "public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with `actual malice,'" as defined by New York Times In so doing, we rejected the argument that Virginia's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional distress was sufficient to remove from First Amendment protection a "patently offensive" expression of[3] As in Hustler, the operation of Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel in this case cannot be said to have a merely "incidental" burden on speech; the publication of important political speech is the claimed violation. Thus, as in Hustler, the law may not be enforced to punish the expression *676 of truthful information or [4] In the instant case, it is undisputed that the publication at issue was true. To the extent that truthful speech may ever be sanctioned consistent with the First Amendment, it must be in furtherance of a state interest "of the highest order." 443 U. S., Because the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion makes clear that the State's interest in enforcing its promissory estoppel doctrine in this case was far from compelling, see -, I would affirm that court's decision. I respectfully dissent.
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Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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Appellant Wardair Canada Inc., a Canadian airline that operates charter flights to and from the United States, maintains in this action that the Commerce Clause[1] of the Constitution precludes Florida from applying to it a tax on aviation fuel purchased in that State. Wardair also asserts that the Florida tax must fall because it violates a "clear unequivocal directive of Congress," allegedly implicit in the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S. C. App. 1301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II), that the Federal Government has exclusive regulatory power over foreign air commerce. Brief for Appellant v, 15. We disagree with appellant's view and analysis of the operation of the Commerce Clause, and find that Congress has not acted to pre-empt state taxes such as that imposed by Florida. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida upholding the tax. I Florida has for many years taxed the sale of fuel to common carriers, including airlines, within the State. Prior to April 1, 1983, the tax was prorated on a mileage basis, so that a carrier was liable for only the portion of the otherwise payable tax that was equal to the ratio of its Florida mileage to its worldwide mileage for the previous fiscal year. Fla. Stat. 212.08 (4) (1975). Effective April 1, 1983, the Florida *4 law was amended to repeal the mileage proration formula for airlines, and the fuel tax was established at a rate of 5% on a deemed price of $1.148 per gallon. Fla. Stat. 212.08 (4)(2) (1985).[2] Under the amended law, an airline was liable for the full amount of the fuel tax whether that fuel was used to fly within or without the State, and regardless of whether the airline engaged in a substantial or a nominal amount of business within the State. The effect of this amendment was, of course, to increase substantially the tax liability of airlines, such as foreign airlines, who fly largely outside of Florida, and who had, under the old scheme, paid little Florida tax on fuel. Shortly after the new law was enacted, appellant filed suit in state court attacking its validity insofar as it authorized the assessment and collection of a tax on fuel used by foreign airlines exclusively in foreign commerce. Wardair argued, among other things, that the law was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and that it was inconsistent with the Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement, May 8, 1974, United States-Canada, Art. XII, 25 U. S. T. 787, T. I. A. S. No. 7826 (U. S.-Canadian Agreement or Agreement), a bilateral agreement between
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Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
|
7826 (U. S.-Canadian Agreement or Agreement), a bilateral agreement between the Governments of Canada and the United States regulating air charter service between the two countries. Wardair's case was consolidated for trial with a similar suit brought by a number of other foreign airlines. In a separate order addressing only Wardair's claims, the trial court rejected the Commerce Clause arguments but found that the U. S.-Canadian Agreement expressed a "federal policy" to exempt foreign airlines from fuel taxes. The court further found that this "policy" precluded the individual States from acting in this area and thus preventing the *5 United States from "speaking with one voice" with respect to foreign commerce. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied largely on our decision in Japan The court granted appellant a permanent injunction against the Florida Department of Revenue from assessing and collecting the fuel tax from Wardair. The case was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reversed, in part, the trial court. The Supreme Court first noted that the U. S.-Canadian Agreement by its terms exempted carriers only from national, as opposed to state or local (or, in the case of Canada, provincial) excise taxes, inspection fees, and other charges, and thus held that the Agreement did not pre-empt state sales taxes. Nor was the court persuaded that the Florida tax was invalid under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The court again referred to the fact that the Agreement exempted only national taxes, and "presume[d] this has been done intentionally." Having determined that the Federal Government had, in effect, itself elected not to prohibit the States from taxing aviation fuel, the court rejected the contention that the state tax "prevents our federal government from speaking with one voice," ibid., and thus distinguished Japan We noted probable jurisdiction, and now affirm. II Wardair suggests that by enacting the Federal Aviation Act (Act), Congress "left no room for local government participation" with respect to foreign air travel. Brief for Appellant 39. Appellant does not expressly label this a preemption argument; rather, it relies on metaphor and tells us that "in the field of foreign air commerce it is the Federal Government that calls the tune. It is the Federal Government that is the conductor of the music, deciding how it is to be played and who are the players." We *6 assume that appellant intends, by this metaphor, to persuade us that Congress has determined to "occupy the field" of international aviation, and thus to pre-empt all state regulation. The argument is without merit. It is of course true, as appellant notes,
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Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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without merit. It is of course true, as appellant notes, that Congress has, through the Act, regulated aviation extensively. The agencies charged by Congress with regulatory responsibility over foreign air travel exercise power, as appellant observes, over licensing, route services, rates and fares, tariffs, safety, and other aspects of air travel. However, state law is not pre-empted whenever there is any federal regulation of an activity or industry or area of law. The Supremacy Clause, among other things, confirms that when Congress legislates within the scope of its constitutionally granted powers, that legislation may displace state law, and this Court has throughout the years employed various verbal formulations in identifying numerous varieties of pre-emption. See, e. g., Louisiana Public Service But we have consistently emphasized that the first and fundamental inquiry in any pre-emption analysis is whether Congress intended to displace state law, and where a congressional statute does not expressly declare that state law is to be pre-empted, and where there is no actual conflict between what federal law and state law prescribe, we have required that there be evidence of a congressional intent to pre-empt the specific field covered by the state law. Pacific Gas & Electric ; In the present case, not only is there no indication that Congress wished to preclude state sales taxation of airline fuel, but, to the contrary, the Act expressly permits States to impose such taxes. Section 1113 of the Act, as added, and as amended, 49 U.S. C. App. 1513, addresses the issue of "State taxation of air commerce," detailing in 1113 the kinds of taxes which are prohibited and in 1113(b) those *7 which are permissible. Among the permissible taxes are "sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services." It is, of course, plausible that Congress never considered whether States should be permitted to impose sales taxes on foreign, as opposed to domestic, carriers, and therefore we do not rely on the existence of this section to answer the Commerce Clause issue raised here by appellant and considered by us infra. However, this section of the Act does provide the complete response to appellant's pre-emption argument. For what 1113(b) shows is that, to the degree that Congress considered the power of the States to tax air travel, it expressly and unequivocally permitted the States to exercise that authority. In other words, rather than prohibit state regulation in the area, Congress invited it. This is not the stuff of pre-emption. III In cases involving the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, both interstate and foreign, the Federal Government has not
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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Clause, both interstate and foreign, the Federal Government has not affirmatively acted, and it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether action taken by state or local authorities unduly threatens the values the Commerce Clause was intended to serve. See Southern Pacific As we have previously observed: "The few simple words of the Commerce Clause reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation." In recognition of the importance of this conviction, we have acknowledged the selfexecuting nature of the Commerce Clause and held on countless occasions that, even in the absence of specific action taken by the Federal Government to disapprove of state regulation implicating interstate or foreign commerce, state *8 regulation that is contrary to the constitutional principle of ensuring that the conduct of individual States does not work to the detriment of the Nation as a whole, and thus ultimately to all of the States, may be invalid under the unexercised Commerce Clause. See H. P. Hood & Sons, ; Southern Pacific In the unique context of foreign commerce, we have alluded to the special need for federal uniformity: " `In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.' Board of' " Japan 441 U. S., 8. As in the context of cases alleging violations of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause, the concern in these Foreign Commerce Clause cases is not with an actual conflict between state and federal law, but rather with the policy of uniformity, embodied in the Commerce Clause, which presumptively prevails when the Federal Government has remained silent. When a state tax is challenged as violative of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause, we have asked four questions: is the tax applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State; is the tax fairly apportioned; does the tax discriminate against interstate commerce; and is the tax fairly related to the services provided by the State. Complete Auto Transit, In Japan we noted that when the state tax allegedly interferes with the Federal Government's authority to regulate foreign commerce, two additional questions must be asked: "first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." In the present case, appellant concedes that Florida's tax satisfies the four-part test set out in Complete Auto. In *9 other words, it is not disputed that if this case did not involve foreign commerce, the Florida tax on the sale of aviation fuel would not contravene the Commerce Clause. Appellant also recognizes that there is no threat of multiple international taxation in this case, since the tax is imposed only upon the sale of fuel, a discrete transaction which occurs within one national jurisdiction only. Appellant and the United States as amicus curiae thus rely entirely on the final factor identified in Japan and argue that the Florida tax violates the Foreign Commerce Clause because it threatens the ability of the Federal Government to "speak with one voice." Specifically, they urge that there exists a federal policy of reciprocal tax exemptions for aircraft, equipment, and supplies, including aviation fuel, that constitute the instrumentalities of international air traffic, and that this "policy" represents the statement that the "one voice" of the Federal Government wishes to make and which is threatened by the state law. We disagree. In our view, the evidence relied upon by appellant and the United States not only fails to reveal any such federal policy, but, even more fundamentally, shows also that in the context of this case we do not confront federal governmental silence of the sort that triggers dormant Commerce Clause analysis. On the contrary, the international agreements cited demonstrate that the Federal Government has affirmatively acted, rather than remained silent, with respect to the power of the States to tax aviation fuel, and thus that the case does not call for dormant Commerce Clause analysis at all. Moreover, in our view the actions taken by the Federal Government accept the authority of States to tax as Florida has here, and lend further support to the position and views advanced by appellee and relied on by the Florida Supreme Court in rejecting Wardair's arguments. Appellant and the United States maintain that the policy of tax exemption for the instrumentalities of international air traffic is manifested by, among other things, (1) the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, *10 Dec. 7, 1944, an international convention to which the United States and 156 other nations, including Canada, are parties; (2) a Resolution (Resolution) adopted November 14, 1966, by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an organization of which the United States
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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Aviation Organization (ICAO), an organization of which the United States is a member by virtue of being a party to the Chicago Convention; (3) more than 70 bilateral agreements, including the U. S.-Canadian Agreement, into which the United States has entered with various foreign countries dealing with international aviation. But what these documents show is that while there appears to be an international aspiration on the one hand to eliminate all impediments to foreign air travel including taxation of fuel the law as it presently stands acquiesces in taxation of the sale of that fuel by political subdivisions of countries. Thus, Article 24 of the Chicago Convention by its terms precludes the imposition of local taxes on fuel only when the fuel is "on board an aircraft on arrival and retained on board on leaving" a contracting party; it does not prohibit taxation of fuel purchased in that country. We agree with amici National Governors' Association et al. that the negative implications of this provision support recognizing Florida's power to tax; certainly, the provision demonstrates the international community's awareness of the problem of state and local taxation of international air travel, specifically aviation fuel, and represents a decision by the parties to that Convention to address the problem by curtailing and limiting only some of the localities' power to tax, while implicitly preserving other aspects of that authority. Nor does the Resolution provide support for appellant's contention that there is a clear national policy of exempting aviation fuel from state sales taxes. While the Resolution undeniably does endorse an international scheme whereby fuel would be exempt " `from all customs and other duties,' " which it defines as including " `import, export, excise, sales, consumption and internal duties and taxes of all kinds levied *11. by any taxing authority within a State,' " Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (Sept. 17, 1985), quoting Resolution pp. 3, 4 (emphasis deleted), the Resolution is formally merely the work product of an international organization of which the United States is a member; it has not been specifically endorsed, let alone signed, entered into, agreed upon, approved, or passed by either the Executive or Legislative Branch of the Federal Government. In other words, no action has been taken to give the Resolution the force of law. While it is not argued by either appellant or by the United States as amicus that this Resolution in and of itself should operate to pre-empt state law, we also think it untenable to assert, as they do, that this Resolution represents a policy
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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assert, as they do, that this Resolution represents a policy of the United States, as opposed to a policy of an organization of which the United States is one of many members. Our reluctance in this regard is bolstered by the fact that the United States has, since the time that the Convention came into force, become a party to more than 70 bilateral aviation agreements, and in not one of these agreements has the United States agreed to deny the States the power asserted by Florida in this case. Most of these agreements explicitly commit the United States to refrain from imposing national taxes on aviation fuel used by airlines of the other contracting party, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-17, 19, but as the United States concedes, "none of our bilateral aviation agreements explicitly interdicts state or local taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign airlines in international traffic." Most strikingly as it relates to the case before us, the U. S.-Canadian Agreement itself limits the tax exemption to be afforded to foreign air carriers to "national duties and charges." App. A-58. Taxation by political subdivisions of either the United States or Canada are not mentioned, an omission which must be understood as representing a policy choice by the contracting parties, especially in light of the fact that the Resolution addressed this concern eight years before the United States and Canada entered *12 into the Agreement. We note that throughout the time that the U. S.-Canadian Agreement has been in force, some American States, as well as some Canadian Provinces, have imposed taxes within their jurisdictions on aviation fuel used by Canadian and American carriers respectively in international travel. Furthermore, there was not, until recently, any challenge to the localities' legal authority to do so. Although not dispositive, this course of conduct suggests that the parties to the Agreement and those most immediately affected by it understood it to permit this sort of taxation. What all of this makes abundantly clear is that the Federal Government has not remained silent with regard to the question whether States should have the power to impose taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign carriers in international travel. By negative implication arising out of more than 70 agreements entered into since the Chicago Convention, the United States has at least acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international travel. Again, in the U. S.-Canadian Agreement only "national" charges are barred, and we presume that drafters from two federalist nations understood this as representing a choice
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,986 | 13 |
majority
|
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111709/wardair-canada-inc-v-florida-dept-of-revenue/
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from two federalist nations understood this as representing a choice not to preclude local taxation. It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside down to apply it where the Federal Government has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow. For the dormant Commerce Clause, in both its interstate and foreign incarnations, only operates where the Federal Government has not spoken to ensure that the essential attributes of nationhood will not be jeopardized by States acting as independent economic actors. However, the Federal Government is entitled in its wisdom to act to permit the States varying degrees of regulatory authority. In our view, the facts presented by this case show that the Federal Government has affirmatively decided to permit the States to impose these sales taxes on aviation fuel. Accordingly, *13 there is no need for us to consider, and nothing in this opinion should be understood to address, whether, in the absence of these international agreements, the Foreign Commerce Clause would invalidate Florida's tax. In Japan 441 U. S., we explained that Foreign Commerce Clause analysis requires that a court ask whether a state tax "prevents the Federal Government from `speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.' " But we never suggested in that case or any other that the Foreign Commerce Clause insists that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice. In light of the above, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is Affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
|
Justice Powell
| 1,982 | 17 |
concurring
|
Hutto v. Davis
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110594/hutto-v-davis/
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The Court holds that the Eighth Amendment countenances a prison term of 40 years and a fine of $20,000 for respondent's possession and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marihuana said to have a street value of about $200. I view the sentence as unjust and disproportionate to the offense. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below I reluctantly conclude that the Court's decision in is controlling on the facts before us. Accordingly, I join the judgment only. I The respondent met Eads in prison. During Eads' confinement, his wife had become a drug user. Concerned about this development and its effect on their 2-year-old child, Eads offered to cooperate the police "to assist in the exposure and arrest of those supplying drugs to his wife and any illicit drug distributor in the area, including who Eads identified as an active drug dealer in Wythe County." *376 On furlough from prison, Eads told he wished to buy drugs for himself and some mutual friends currently in prison. Shortly thereafter, the two went to ' home where sold Eads three ounces of marihuana for $74. also gave Eads "drug pills which included L. S. D and another illicit controlled drug." A police raid on ' home later uncovered about six ounces of marihuana, two scales, and other drug paraphernalia. was found guilty of both distributing marihuana and of possessing marihuana intent to distribute. On each count, he received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. These sentences were imposed on a consecutive basis. The District Court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the sentences were "so grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment"[1] This judgment was reversed on appeal, but reinstated by the Court of Appeals on rehearing en banc.[2] We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in supra.[3] By an equally divided vote en banc, the Court of Appeals again affirmed.[4] II The sole authority upon which the Court today relies is its decision in Rummel decided that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments[5] was not transgressed by the imposition of life imprisonment for a recidivist's third felony, each a nonviolent fraud involving less than $125. The Court also observed, however: *377 "This is not to say that a proportionality principle [viz., that grossly disproportionate punishments are unconstitutional] would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, post, at 288, if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." n. 11. The
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Justice Powell
| 1,982 | 17 |
concurring
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Hutto v. Davis
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110594/hutto-v-davis/
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parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." n. 11. The Rummel Court therefore did not reject the proportionality principle long settled by our cases.[6] It did take such a restricted view of the principle that in the future appellate courts, duty bound to follow the decision of this Court, often will be compelled to accept sentences that arguably are cruel and unusual. I recognize, of course, that under our system the limits of a prison sentence normally are a matter of legislative prerogative, and trial courts have the primary responsibility to determine an appropriate sentence in these limits in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Review of sentencing is not generally a function of appellate review. Yet, our system of justice always has recognized that appellate courts do have a responsibility expressed in the proportionality principle not to shut their eyes to grossly disproportionate sentences that are manifestly unjust. I therefore have no criticism of the District Court or the Court of Appeals for exercising this responsibility and reaching the judgments that are reversed here today. There are features of this case that arguably distinguish it from Rummel. I identify these briefly. The first is a letter from the Commonwealth Attorney who successfully prosecuted The letter is set forth in full below.[7] It was *378 solicited by ' lawyer, some three years after had commenced to serve his 40-year term. One can say, of course, that such a letter often can be obtained from a prosecutor who may have second thoughts as to the justness of a sentence he had sought at trial. I normally would give little weight to such a letter. But the prosecutor here, in a thoughtful letter, did advance a nonfrivolous reason for his conclusion that ' sentence was a "gross injustice." He referred to the "grave disparity in sentencing" in comparable drug offenses in the "Commonwealth [of Virginia] and the nation."[8] *379 The second and more important factor that arguably distinguishes Rummel is the action of the Virginia State Legislature in 1979. It then reduced the maximum penalty for offenses of which was convicted to 10 years on each count regardless of aggravating circumstances. See Va. Code 18.2-248.1(a)(2) (Supp. 1981) and 18.2-10(e) (1975). This maximum is less than half the sentence received. Because it sets a maximum, the legislative action takes all relevant aggravating circumstances into account. This reduction five years after ' conviction and two years after his prosecutor's letter evidences Virginia's present sentencing judgment that marihuana possession and distribution in
|
Justice Powell
| 1,982 | 17 |
concurring
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Hutto v. Davis
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110594/hutto-v-davis/
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Virginia's present sentencing judgment that marihuana possession and distribution in small amounts no longer would justify ' sentence.[9] Although this change in law was not made retroactive, it is evidence from the most authoritative state source that ' sentence was unjust and no longer would be valid. III Based on this evidence of comparative sentencing and the relatively minor degree of ' criminality, affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals arguably could be justified. I conclude, however, that Rummel requires reversal. was convicted of distributing marihuana, and had dealt in other drugs as well. He was willing to sell marihuana for *380 use by prison inmates and "probably as well to the wife of an inmate left alone an infant child." He previously had been sentenced on a drug-related offense.[10] By comparison, Rummel's offenses three minor frauds involving almost trifling sums of money were far less serious. Rummel's sentence, moreover, was more severe than '. And has been unable to show by means of statutory comparisons that his sentences suffer from a greater degree of disproportionality than Rummel's did. Compare v. Zahradnick, -302. These cases illustrate the seriousness of the disparity in sentencing that may distinguish our system of justice from other mature systems. Sentencing disparity in our country primarily results not from varying statutory limits among the States. Rather, in a nation of our size and the sentencing decision in particular cases vested as it should be in trial courts, a good deal of disparity is inevitable. Effort to minimize this, at least on a state-by-state basis, certainly should be continued. Nor should reform in this respect be addressed only to prevent excessive penalties. The criticism of courts occurs more frequently, often fully justified, when persons guilty of crimes of violence, or serious drug distribution offenses, are given sentences that are disproportionately light in view of their offenses, as well as disparate in comparison *381 other sentences. Sentencing that is just should take into account the paramount interest of society in being protected from criminal conduct as well as the right of convicted persons to be dealt fairly according to law. I join the judgment of the Court.
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,008 | 16 |
concurring
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Medellin v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145822/medellin-v-texas/
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There is a great deal of wisdom in Justice BREYER's dissent. I agree that the text and history of the Supremacy Clause, as well as this Court's treaty-related cases, do not support a presumption against self-execution. See post, at 1377-1380. I also endorse the proposition that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, "is itself self-executing and judicially enforceable." Post, at 1385. Moreover, I think this case presents a closer question than the Court's opinion allows. In the end, however, I am persuaded that the relevant treaties do not authorize this Court to enforce the judgment of the International *1373 Court of Justice (ICJ) in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (Avena). The source of the United States' obligation to comply with judgments of the ICJ is found in Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter, which was ratified in 1945. Article 94(1) provides that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party." T.S. No. 993 (emphasis added). In my view, the words "undertakes to comply"while not the model of either a self-executing or a non-self-executing commitmentare most naturally read as a promise to take additional steps to enforce ICJ judgments. Unlike the text of some other treaties, the terms of the United Nations Charter do not necessarily incorporate international judgments into domestic law. Cf., e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI, Art. 39, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 570 ("[D]ecisions of the [Seabed Disputes] Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought"). Moreover, Congress has passed implementing legislation to ensure the enforcement of other international judgments, even when the operative treaty provisions use far more mandatory language than "undertakes to comply."[1] On the other hand Article 94(1) does not contain the kind of unambiguous language foreclosing self-execution that is found in other treaties. The obligation to undertake to comply with ICJ decisions is more consistent with self-execution than, for example, an obligation to enact legislation. Cf., e.g., International Plant Protection Convention, Art. I, Dec. 6, 1951, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 2770, T.I.A.S. No. 7465 ("[T]he contracting Governments undertake to adopt the legislative, technical and administrative measures specified in this Convention"). Furthermore, whereas the Senate has issued declarations of
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,008 | 16 |
concurring
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Medellin v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145822/medellin-v-texas/
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this Convention"). Furthermore, whereas the Senate has issued declarations of non-self-execution when ratifying some treaties, it did not do so with respect to the United Nations Charter.[2] Absent a presumption one way or the other, the best reading of the words "undertakes to comply" is, in my judgment, one that contemplates future action by the political branches. I agree with the dissenters that "Congress is unlikely to authorize automatic judicial enforceability of all ICJ judgments, for that could include some politically sensitive judgments and others better suited for enforcement by other branches." Post, at 1388. But this concern counsels in favor of reading any ambiguity in Article 94(1) as leaving the *1374 choice of whether to comply with ICJ judgments, and in what manner, "to the political, not the judicial department."[3] The additional treaty provisions cited by the dissent do not suggest otherwise. In an annex to the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) states that a decision of the ICJ "has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Art. 59, Because I read that provision as confining, not expanding, the effect of ICJ judgments, it does not make the undertaking to comply with such judgments any more enforceable than the terms of Article 94(1) itself. That the judgment is "binding" as a matter of international law says nothing about its domestic legal effect. Nor in my opinion does the reference to "compulsory jurisdiction" in the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention, Art. I, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, shed any light on the matter. This provision merely secures the consent of signatory nations to the specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to claims arising out of the Vienna Convention. See ICJ Statute, Art. 36(1), Even though the ICJ's judgment in Avena is not "the supreme Law of the Land," U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, no one disputes that it constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States. Ante, at 1356. By issuing a memorandum declaring that state courts should give effect to the judgment in Avena, the President made a commendable attempt to induce the States to discharge the Nation's obligation. I agree with the Texas judges and the majority of this Court that the President's memorandum is not binding law. Nonetheless, the fact that the President cannot legislate unilaterally does not absolve the United States from its promise to take action necessary to comply with the ICJ's
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,008 | 16 |
concurring
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Medellin v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145822/medellin-v-texas/
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promise to take action necessary to comply with the ICJ's judgment. Under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause, the United States' obligation to "undertak[e] to comply" with the ICJ's decision falls on each of the States as well as the Federal Government. One consequence of our form of government is that sometimes States must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation. Texas' duty in this respect is all the greater since it was Texas thatby failing to provide consular notice in accordance with the Vienna Conventionensnared the United States in the current controversy. Having already put the Nation in breach of one treaty, it is now up to Texas to prevent the breach of another. The decision in Avena merely obligates the United States "to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals," 2004 I.C. J., at 72, ¶ 153(9), "with a view to ascertaining" whether the failure to provide proper notice to consular officials "caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice," *1375 at 60, ¶ 121. The cost to Texas of complying with Avena would be minimal, particularly given the remote likelihood that the violation of the Vienna Convention actually prejudiced Jose Ernesto Medellín. See ante, at 1354-1355, and n. 1. It is a cost that the State of Oklahoma unhesitatingly assumed.[4] On the other hand, the costs of refusing to respect the ICJ's judgment are significant. The entire Court and the President agree that breach will jeopardize the United States' "plainly compelling" interests in "ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law." Ante, at 1367. When the honor of the Nation is balanced against the modest cost of compliance, Texas would do well to recognize that more is at stake than whether judgments of the ICJ, and the principled admonitions of the President of the United States, trump state procedural rules in the absence of implementing legislation. The Court's judgment, which I join, does not foreclose further appropriate action by the State of Texas.
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
|
This case presents the question whether a trustee in bankruptcy may "avoid" (i. e., recover) from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) payments of certain withholding and excise taxes that the debtor made before it filed for bankruptcy. We hold that the funds paid here were not the property of the debtor prior to payment; instead, they were held in trust by the debtor for the IRS. We accordingly conclude that the trustee may not recover the funds. I American International Airways, Inc. (AIA), was a commercial airline. As an employer, AIA was required to withhold federal income taxes and to collect Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes from its employees' wages. 26 U.S. C. 3402(a) (income taxes); 3102(a) (FICA taxes). As an airline, it was required to collect excise taxes from its customers for payment to the IRS. 4291. Because the amount of these taxes is "held to be a special fund in trust for the United States," 7501, they are often called "trust-fund *56 taxes." See, e. g., By early 1984, AIA had fallen behind in its payments of its trust-fund taxes to the Government. In February of that year, the IRS ordered AIA to deposit all trust-fund taxes it collected thereafter into a separate bank account. AIA established the account, but did not deposit funds sufficient to cover the entire amount of its trust-fund tax obligations. It nonetheless remained current on these obligations through June 1984, paying the IRS $695,000 from the separate bank account and $946,434 from its general operating funds. AIA and the IRS agreed that all of these payments would be allocated to specific trust-fund tax obligations. On July 19, 1984, AIA petitioned for relief from its creditors under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S. C. 1101 et seq. (1982 ed.). AIA unsuccessfully operated as a debtor in possession for three months. Accordingly, on September 19, the Bankruptcy Court appointed petitioner Harry P. Begier, Jr., trustee, and a plan of liquidation in Chapter 11 was confirmed. Among the powers of a trustee is the power under 547(b)[1] to avoid certain payments made by the *57 debtor that would "enabl[e] a creditor to receive payment of a greater percentage of his claim against the debtor than he would have received if the transfer had not been made and he had participated in the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt estate." H. R. Rep. No. p. 177 (1977). Seeking to exercise his avoidance power, Begier filed an adversary action against the Government to recover the entire amount that AIA had paid the IRS for
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
|
Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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the entire amount that AIA had paid the IRS for trust-fund taxes during the 90 days before the bankruptcy filing. The Bankruptcy Court found for the Government in part and for the trustee in part. In re American International Airways, Inc., It refused to permit the trustee to recover any of the money AIA had paid out of the separate account on the theory that AIA had held that money in trust for the IRS. It allowed the trustee to avoid most of the payments that AIA had made out of its general accounts, however, holding that "only where a tax trust fund is actually established by the debtor and the taxing authority is able to trace funds segregated by the debtor in a trust account established for the purpose of paying the taxes in question would we conclude that such funds are not property of the debtor's estate." The District Court affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22-A-26. On appeal by the Government, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that any prepetition payment of trust-fund taxes is a payment of funds that are not the debtor's property and that such a payment is therefore not an avoidable preference.[2] We granted certiorari, and we now affirm. *58 II A Equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code. According to that policy, creditors of equal priority should receive pro rata shares of the debtor's property. See, e. g., 11 U.S. C. 726(b) (1982 ed.); H. R. Rep. No. Section 547(b) furthers this policy by permitting a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain preferential payments made before the debtor files for bankruptcy. This mechanism prevents the debtor from favoring one creditor over others by transferring property shortly before filing for bankruptcy. Of course, if the debtor transfers property that would not have been available for distribution to his creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, the policy behind the avoidance power is not implicated. The reach of 547(b)'s avoidance power is therefore limited to transfers of "property of the debtor." The Bankruptcy Code does not define "property of the debtor." Because the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate the property available for distribution to creditors "property of the debtor" subject to the preferential transfer provision is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. For guidance, *59 then, we must turn to 541, which delineates the scope of "property of the estate" and
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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which delineates the scope of "property of the estate" and serves as the postpetition analog to 547(b)'s "property of the debtor."[3] Section 541(a)(1) provides that the "property of the estate" includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Section 541(d) provides: "Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only legal title and not an equitable interest becomes property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold." Because the debtor does not own an equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not "property of the estate." Nor is such an equitable interest "property of the debtor" for purposes of 547(b). As the parties agree, then, the issue in this case is whether the money AIA transferred from its general operating accounts to the IRS was property that AIA had held in trust for the IRS. *60 B We begin with the language of 26 U.S. C. 7501, the Internal Revenue Code's trust-fund tax provision: "Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any other person and to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States." The statutory trust extends, then, only to "the amount of tax so collected or withheld." Begier argues that a trust-fund tax is not "collected or withheld" until specific funds are either sent to the IRS with the relevant return or placed in a segregated fund. AIA neither put the funds paid from its general operating accounts in a separate account nor paid them to the IRS before the beginning of the preference period. Begier therefore contends that no trust was ever created with respect to those funds and that the funds paid to the IRS were therefore property of the debtor. We disagree. The Internal Revenue Code directs "every person receiving any payment for facilities or services" subject to excise taxes to "collect the amount of the tax from the person making such payment." 4291. It also requires that an employer "collec[t]" FICA taxes from its employees "by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid." 3102(a) (emphasis added). Both provisions make clear that the act of "collecting" occurs at
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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provisions make clear that the act of "collecting" occurs at the time of payment the recipient's payment for the service in the case of excise taxes and the employer's payment of wages in the case of FICA taxes. The mere fact that AIA neither placed the taxes it collected in a segregated fund nor paid them to the IRS does not somehow mean that AIA never collected the taxes in the first place. The same analysis applies to taxes the Internal Revenue Code requires that employers "withhold." Section 3402(a) (1) requires that "every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages [the employee's federal income tax]." (Emphasis added.) Withholding thus *61 occurs at the time of payment to the employee of his net wages. S. Rep. No. 95-1106, p. 33 ("[A]ssume that a debtor owes an employee $100 for salary on which there is required withholding of $20. If the debtor paid the employee $80, there has been $20 withheld. If, instead, the debtor paid the employee $85, there has been withholding of $15 (which is not property of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy)"). See The common meaning of "withholding" supports our interpretation. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2627 (1981) (defining "withholding" to mean "the act or procedure of deducting a tax payment from income at the source") (emphasis added). Our reading of 7501 is reinforced by 7512, which permits the IRS, upon proper notice, to require a taxpayer who has failed timely "to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over [trust-fund taxes]," or who has failed timely "to make deposits, payments, or returns of such tax," 7512(a)(1), to "deposit such amount in a separate account in a bank and. keep the amount of such taxes in such account until payment over to the United States," 7512(b). If we were to read 7501 to mandate segregation as a prerequisite to the creation of the trust, 7512's requirement that funds be segregated in special and limited circumstances would become superfluous. Moreover, petitioner's suggestion that we read a segregation requirement into 7501 would mean that an employer could avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate. Nothing in 7501 indicates, however, that Congress wanted the IRS to be protected only insofar as dictated by the debtor's whim. We conclude, therefore, that AIA created a trust within the meaning of 7501 at the moment the relevant payments (from customers to AIA for excise *62 taxes and from AIA to its employees for FICA and income taxes) were made. C Our holding that a trust
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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income taxes) were made. C Our holding that a trust for the benefit of the IRS existed is not alone sufficient to answer the question presented by this case: whether the particular dollars that AIA paid to the IRS from its general operating accounts were "property of the debtor." Only if those particular funds were held in trust for the IRS do they escape characterization as "property of the debtor." All 7501 reveals is that AIA at one point created a trust for the IRS; that section provides no rule by which we can decide whether the assets AIA used to pay the IRS were assets belonging to that trust. In the absence of specific statutory guidance on how we are to determine whether the assets transferred to the IRS were trust property, we might naturally begin with the common-law rules that have been created to answer such questions about other varieties of trusts. Unfortunately, such rules are of limited utility in the context of the trust created by 7501. Under common-law principles, a trust is created in property; a trust therefore does not come into existence until the settlor identifies an ascertainable interest in property to be the trust res. G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees 111 (rev. 2d ed. 1984); 1A W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts 76 (4th ed. 1987). A 7501 trust is radically different from the common-law paradigm, however. That provision states that "the amount of [trust-fund] tax collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States." (Emphasis added.) Unlike a common-law trust, in which the settlor sets aside particular property as the trust res, 7501 creates a trust in an abstract "amount" a dollar figure not tied to any particular assets rather than in the actual dollars withheld.[4] Common-law tracing rules, designed *63 for a system in which particular property is identified as the trust res, are thus unhelpful in this special context. Federal law delineating the nature of the relationship between the 7501 trust and preferential transfer rules is limited. The only case in which we have explored that topic at any length is United a case dealing with a postpetition transfer of property to discharge trust-fund tax obligations that the debtor had accrued prepetition. There, a court had ordered a debtor in possession to maintain a separate account for its withheld federal income and FICA taxes, but the debtor did not comply. When the debtor was subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt, the United States sought to recover from the debtor's general assets the
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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States sought to recover from the debtor's general assets the amount of withheld taxes ahead of the expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding. The Government argued that the debtor held the amount of taxes due in trust for the IRS and that this amount could be traced to the funds the debtor had in its accounts when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The trustee maintained that no trust had been created because the debtor had not segregated the funds. The Court declined directly to address either of these contentions. Rather, the Court simply refused to permit the IRS to recover the taxes ahead of administrative expenses, stating that "the statutory policy of subordinating taxes to costs and expenses of administration would not be served by creating or enforcing trusts which eat up an estate, leaving little or nothing for creditors and court officers whose goods and services created the assets." In 1978, Congress fundamentally restructured bankruptcy law by passing the new Bankruptcy Code. Among the changes Congress decided to make was a modification of the rule this Court had enunciated in Randall under the old Bankruptcy Act. The Senate bill attacked Randall directly, providing in 541 that trust-fund taxes withheld or collected *64 prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition were not "property of the estate." See S. Rep. No. 95-1106, at 33. See also (footnote omitted). The House bill did not deal explicitly with the problem of trust-fund taxes, but the House Report stated that "property of the estate" would not include property held in trust for another. See H. R. Rep. No. at 368. Congress was unable to hold a conference, so the Senate and House floor managers met to reach compromises on the differences between the two bills. See 124 Cong. Rec. 32392 ; Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, The compromise reached with respect to the relevant portion of 541, which applies to postpetition transfers, was embodied in the eventually enacted House amendment and explicitly provided that "in the case of property held in trust, the property of the estate includes the legal title, but not the beneficial interest in the property." 124 Cong. Rec., at 37 Cf. Accordingly, the Senate language specifying that withheld or collected trust-fund taxes are not part of the bankruptcy estate was deleted as "unnecessary since property of the estate does not include the beneficial interest in property held by the debtor as a trustee. Under [ 7051], the amounts of withheld taxes are held to be a special fund in trust for the United States." at 37[5] *65
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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fund in trust for the United States." at 37[5] *65 Representative Edwards discussed the effects of the House language on the rule established by Randall, indicating that the House amendment would supplant that rule: "[A] serious problem exists where `trust fund taxes' withheld from others are held to be property of the estate where the withheld amounts are commingled with other assets of the debtor. The courts should permit the use of reasonable assumptions under which the Internal Revenue Service, and other tax authorities, can demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case." The context of Representative Edwards' comment makes plain that he was discussing whether a postpetition payment of trust-fund taxes involved "property of the estate." This focus is not surprising given that Randall, the case Congress was addressing, involved a postpetition demand for payment by the IRS. But Representative Edwards' discussion also applies to the question whether a prepetition payment is made from "property of the debtor." We have explained that "property of the debtor" is that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. The same "reasonable assumptions" therefore apply in both contexts. The strict rule of Randall thus did not survive the adoption of the new Bankruptcy Code. But by requiring the IRS to "demonstrate that amounts of taxes withheld are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case [i. e., at the filing of the petition]," 124 Cong. Rec., at 37 Congress expected that the IRS would have to show some connection between the 7501 trust *66 and the assets sought to be applied to a debtor's trust-fund tax obligations. See United (IRS cannot exclude funds from the estate if it cannot trace them to 7501 trust property). The question in this case is how extensive the required nexus must be. The Bankruptcy Code provides no explicit answer, and Representative Edwards' admonition that courts should "permit the use of reasonable assumptions" does not add much. The House Report does, however, give sufficient guidance regarding those assumptions to permit us to conclude that the nexus requirement is satisfied here. That Report states: "A payment of withholding taxes constitutes a payment of money held in trust under Internal Revenue Code 7501(a), and thus will not be a preference because the beneficiary of the trust, the taxing authority, is in a separate class with respect to those taxes, if they have been properly held for payment, as they will
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Justice Marshall
| 1,990 | 15 |
majority
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Begier v. IRS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112445/begier-v-irs/
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they have been properly held for payment, as they will have been if the debtor is able to make the payments." H. R. Rep. No.[6] Under a literal reading of the above passage, the bankruptcy trustee could not avoid any voluntary prepetition payment of trust-fund taxes, regardless of the source of the funds. As the House Report expressly states, the limitation that the funds must "have been properly held for payment" is satisfied "if the debtor is able to make the payments." The debtor's act of voluntarily paying its trust-fund tax obligation *67 therefore is alone sufficient to establish the required nexus between the "amount" held in trust and the funds paid. We adopt this literal reading. In the absence of any suggestion in the Bankruptcy Code about what tracing rules to apply, we are relegated to the legislative history. The courts are directed to apply "reasonable assumptions" to govern the tracing of funds, and the House Report identifies one such assumption to be that any voluntary prepetition payment of trust-fund taxes out of the debtor's assets is not a transfer of the debtor's property. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history casts doubt on the reasonableness of that assumption. Other rules might be reasonable, too, but the only evidence we have suggests that Congress preferred this one. We see no reason to disregard that evidence. III We hold that AIA's payments of trust-fund taxes to the IRS from its general accounts were not transfers of "property of the debtor," but were instead transfers of property held in trust for the Government pursuant to 7501. Such payments therefore cannot be avoided as preferences. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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[] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits successive prosecution or multiple punishment for "the same offence." This case, which involves application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, asks us to consider whether a court violates that proscription by convicting and sentencing a defendant for a crime when the conduct underlying that offense has been considered in determining the defendant's sentence for a previous conviction. I In June 1990, petitioner Steven Kurt Witte and several co-conspirators, including Dennis Mason and Tom Pokorny, arranged with Roger Norman, an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, to import large amounts of marijuana from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala. Norman had the task of flying the contraband into the United States, with Witte providing the ground transportation for the drugs once they had been brought into the country. The following month, the Mexican marijuana source advised the conspiracy participants that cocaine might be added to the *392 first shipment if there was room on the plane or if an insufficient quantity of marijuana was available. Norman was informed in August 1990 that the source was prepared to deliver 4,400 pounds of marijuana. Once Norman learned the location of the airstrip from which the narcotics would be transported, federal agents arranged to have the participants in the scheme apprehended in Mexico. Local authorities arrested Mason and four others on August 12 and seized 591 kilograms of cocaine at the landing field. While still undercover, Norman met Witte the following day to explain that the pilots had been unable to land in Mexico because police had raided the airstrip. Witte was not taken into custody at that time, and the activities of the conspiracy lapsed for several months. Agent Norman next spoke with Witte in January and asked if Witte would be interested in purchasing 1,000 pounds of marijuana. Witte agreed, promised to obtain a $50,000 down payment, and indicated that he would transport the marijuana in a horse trailer he had purchased for the original 1990 transaction and in a motor home owned by an acquaintance, Sam Kelly. On February 7, Witte, Norman, and Kelly met in Houston, Texas. Norman agreed to give the drugs to Witte in exchange for the $25,000 in cash Witte had been able to secure at that time and for a promise to pay the balance of the down payment in three days. Undercover agents took the motor home and trailer away to load the marijuana, and Witte escorted Norman to Witte's hotel room to view the money. The agents returned the
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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hotel room to view the money. The agents returned the vehicles the next morning loaded with approximately 375 pounds of marijuana, and they arrested Witte and Kelly when the two men took possession of the contraband. In March a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Texas indicted Witte and Kelly for conspiring and attempting to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S. C. 841(a) and 846. The indictment was limited on its face to conduct occurring on or about *393 January 25 through February 8, thus covering only the later marijuana transaction. On February 21, 1992, Witte pleaded guilty to the attempted possession count and agreed to cooperate "with the Government by providing truthful and complete information concerning this and all other offenses about which [he] might be questioned by agents of law enforcement," and by testifying if requested to do so. App. 14. In exchange, the Government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy count and, if Witte's cooperation amounted to "substantial assistance," to file a motion for a downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 5K1.1 (USSG). In calculating Witte's base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, the presentence report prepared by the United States Probation Office considered the total quantity of drugs involved in all of the transactions contemplated by the conspirators, including the planned 1990 shipments of both marijuana and cocaine. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing range for a particular offense is determined on the basis of all "relevant conduct" in which the defendant was engaged and not just with regard to the conduct underlying the offense of conviction. USSG 1B1.3. The Sentencing Commission has noted that, "[w]ith respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook." USSG 1B1.3, comment., n. 2; see also USSG 2D1.1, comment., nn. 6, 12. The presentence report therefore suggested that Witte was accountable for the 1,000 pounds of marijuana involved in the attempted possession offense to which he pleaded guilty, 15 tons of marijuana that Witte, Mason, and Pokorny had planned to import from Mexico in *394 1990, 500 kilograms of cocaine that the conspirators originally proposed to import from Guatemala, and the 591 kilograms of cocaine seized at the Mexican airstrip in August 1990. At the sentencing hearing, both petitioner and the Government urged
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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At the sentencing hearing, both petitioner and the Government urged the court to hold that the 1990 activities concerning importation of cocaine and marijuana were not part of the same course of conduct as the marijuana offense to which Witte had pleaded guilty, and therefore should not be considered in sentencing for the offense. The District Court concluded, however, that because the 1990 importation offenses were part of the same continuing conspiracy, they were "relevant conduct" under 1B1.3 of the Guidelines and should be taken into account. The court therefore accepted the presentence report's aggregation of the quantities of drugs involved in the 1990 and episodes, resulting in a base offense level of 40, with a Guideline range of 292 to 365 months' imprisonment. App. 80-81; see also USSG 2D1.1. From that base offense level, Witte received a two-level increase for his aggravating role in the offense, see USSG 3B1.1, and an offsetting two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG 3E1.1. Finally, the court granted the Government's 5K1.1 motion for downward departure based on Witte's substantial assistance. By virtue of that departure, the court sentenced Witte to 144 months in prison, see App. 76, which was 148 months below the minimum sentence of 292 months under the predeparture Guideline range. Witte appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the case when Witte failed to file a brief. In September 1992, another grand jury in the same district returned a two-count indictment against Witte and Pokorny for conspiring and attempting to import cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S. C. 952(a) and 963. The indictment alleged that, between August and August 1990, Witte tried to import about 1,091 kilograms of cocaine from Central America. Witte moved to dismiss, arguing that he had already been *395 punished for the cocaine offenses because the cocaine involved in the 1990 transactions had been considered as "relevant conduct" at sentencing for the marijuana offense. The District Court dismissed the indictment in February on grounds that punishment for the indicted offenses would violate the prohibition against multiple punishments contained in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. App. 130-136. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Relying on our decision in the court held that "the use of relevant conduct to increase the punishment of a charged offense does not punish the offender for the relevant conduct." Thus, although the sentencing court took the quantity of cocaine involved in the 1990 importation scheme into account when determining the sentence for Witte's marijuana possession offense, the Court of Appeals concluded that Witte had not
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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offense, the Court of Appeals concluded that Witte had not been punished for the cocaine offenses in the first prosecutionand that the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore did not bar the later action. In reaching this result, the court expressly disagreed with contrary holdings in United cert. denied, and United that when a defendant's actions are included in relevant conduct in determining the punishment under the Sentencing Guidelines for one offense, those actions may not form the basis for a later indictment without violating double jeopardy. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Circuits, and now affirm. II The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. We have explained that "the Clause serves the function of preventing *396 both successive punishment and successive prosecution," United and that "the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it," Ex parte See also ; United Significantly, the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against more than the actual imposition of two punishments for the same offense; by its terms, it protects a criminal defendant from being twice put in jeopardy for such punishment. See That is, the Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense." Petitioner clearly was neither prosecuted for nor convicted of the cocaine offenses during the first criminal proceeding. The offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced in 1992 was attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, whereas the crimes charged in the instant indictment are conspiracy to import cocaine and attempted importation of the same. Under "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." See also Under the Blockburger test, the indictment in this case did not charge the same offense to which petitioner formerly had pleaded guilty. *397 Petitioner nevertheless argues that, because the conduct giving rise to the cocaine charges was taken into account during sentencing for the marijuana conviction, he effectively was "punished" for that conduct during the first proceeding. As a result, he contends, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the instant prosecution. This claim is ripe at this stage of the prosecutionalthough
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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This claim is ripe at this stage of the prosecutionalthough petitioner has not yet been convicted of the cocaine offensesbecause, as we have said, "courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial." See also ; Ex parte at Thus, if petitioner is correct that the present case constitutes a second attempt to punish him criminally for the same cocaine offenses, see at then the prosecution may not proceed. We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that petitioner's double jeopardy theory that consideration of uncharged conduct in arriving at a sentence within the statutorily authorized punishment range constitutes "punishment" for that conductis not supported by our precedents, which make clear that a defendant in that situation is punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted. Traditionally, "[s]entencing courts have not only taken into consideration a defendant's prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant's past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior." We explained in that "both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources *398 and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law." That history, combined with a recognition of the need for individualized sentencing, led us to conclude that the Due Process Clause did not require "that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence." Thus, "[a]s a general proposition, a sentencing judge `may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.' " at ). See also Against this background of sentencing history, we specifically have rejected the claim that double jeopardy principles bar a later prosecution or punishment for criminal activity where that activity has been considered at sentencing for a separate crime. arose out of a kidnaping and murder committed by the petitioner while attempting to escape from police after a robbery. Following his arrest, Williams pleaded guilty to murder and was given a life sentence. He was later convicted of kidnaping, which was then a capital offense in and the sentencing court took into account, in assessing the death penalty,
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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sentencing court took into account, in assessing the death penalty, the fact that the kidnaping victim had been murdered. We rejected Williams' contention that this use of the conduct that had given rise to the prior conviction violated double jeopardy. Emphasizing that "the exercise of a sound discretion in such a case required consideration of all the circumstances of the crime," we made clear that "one of the aggravating circumstances involved in this kidnaping crime was the fact that petitioner shot and killed the victim in the course of its commission," and rejected the claim "that the sentencing judge was not entitled to consider that circumstance, * along with all the other circumstances involved, in determining the proper sentence to be imposed for the kidnaping crime." We then disposed of the petitioner's double jeopardy claim as follows: "[I]n view of the obvious fact that, under the law of kidnaping is a separate crime, entirely distinct from the crime of murder, the court's consideration of the murder as a circumstance involved in the kidnaping crime cannot be said to have resulted in punishing petitioner a second time for the same offense" We thus made clear that use of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We find this case to be governed by Williams; it makes no difference in this context whether the enhancement occurred in the first or second sentencing proceeding. Here, petitioner pleaded guilty to attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S. C. 841(a) and 846. The statute provides that the sentence for such a crime involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana must be between 5 and 40 years in prison. 841(b)(1)(B). By including the cocaine from the earlier transactionand not just the marijuana involved in the offense of convictionin the drug quantity calculation, the District Court ended up with a higher offense level (40), and a higher sentence range (292 to 365 months), than it would have otherwise under the applicable Guideline, which specifies different base offense levels depending on the quantity of drugs involved. USSG 2D1.1. This higher Guideline range, however, still falls within the scope of the legislatively authorized penalty (5 to 40 years). As in Williams, the uncharged criminal conduct was used to enhance petitioner's sentence within the range authorized by statute. If use of the murder to justify the death sentence for the kidnaping conviction was not "punishment" for
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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death sentence for the kidnaping conviction was not "punishment" for the murder in Williams, it is impossible to conclude *400 that taking account of petitioner's plans to import cocaine in fixing the sentence for the marijuana conviction constituted "punishment" for the cocaine offenses. Williams, like this case, concerned the double jeopardy implications of taking the circumstances surrounding a particular course of criminal activity into account in sentencing for a conviction arising therefrom. Similarly, we have made clear in other cases, which involved a defendant's background more generally and not conduct arising out of the same criminal transaction as the offense of which the defendant was convicted, that "[e]nhancement statutes, whether in the nature of criminal history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing Guidelines, or recidivist statutes which are common place in state criminal laws, do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." 511 U. S., at In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense "is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes," but instead as "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one." See also ; ; In addition, by authorizing the consideration of offenderspecific information at sentencing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal trial, our cases necessarily imply that such consideration does not result in "punishment" *401 for such conduct. In we upheld against a due process challenge Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, which imposed a 5-year minimum sentence for certain enumerated felonies if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense. Significantly, we emphasized that the statute at issue "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." That is, the statute "simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishmentthe instrumentality used in committing a violent felonyand dictated the precise weight to be given that factor if the instrumentality is a firearm." For this reason, we approved the lesser standard of proof provided for in the statute, thereby "reject[ing] the claim that whenever a State links the `severity of punishment' to `the presence or absence of
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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the `severity of punishment' to `the presence or absence of an identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt." ). These decisions reinforce our conclusion that consideration of information about the defendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not result in "punishment" for any offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted. We are not persuaded by petitioner's suggestion that the Sentencing Guidelines somehow change the constitutional analysis. A defendant has not been "punished" any more for double jeopardy purposes when relevant conduct is included in the calculation of his offense level under the Guidelines than when a pre-Guidelines court, in its discretion, took similar uncharged conduct into account. Cf. McMillan, As the Government argues, "[t]he fact that the sentencing process has become more transparent under the Guidelines does not mean that the defendant is now being `punished' for uncharged relevant conduct as though it were a distinct criminal `offense.' " Brief for United States 23. The relevant conduct provisions are designed to channel the sentencing discretion of the district courts and to make mandatory the consideration of factors that previously would have been optional. United (explaining that, "very roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines' enactment"). See also ; Regardless of whether particular conduct is taken into account by rule or as an act of discretion, the defendant is still being punished only for the offense of conviction. Justice Stevens disagrees with our conclusion because, he contends, "[u]nder the Guidelines, an offense that is included as `relevant conduct' does not relate to the character of the offender (which is reflected instead by criminal history), but rather measures only the character of the offense." Post, at 411. The criminal history section of the Guidelines, however, does not seem to create this bright line distinction; indeed, the difference between "criminal history" and "relevant conduct" is more temporal than qualitative, with the former referring simply to a defendant's past criminal conduct (as evidenced by convictions and prison terms), see USSG 4A1.1, and the latter covering activity arising out of the same course of criminal conduct as the instant offense, see USSG 1B1.3. To the extent that the Guidelines aggravate punishment for related conduct outside the elements of the crime on the *403 theory that such conduct bears on the "character of the offense," the offender is still punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased punishment, not for a different
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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a manner that warrants increased punishment, not for a different offense (which that related conduct may or may not constitute). But, while relevant conduct thus may relate to the severity of the particular crime, the commission of multiple offenses in the same course of conduct also necessarily provides important evidence that the character of the offender requires special punishment. Similarly, as we have said in the recidivism cases, a crime committed by an offender with a prior conviction "is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one." Gryger, 334 U. S., at Nothing about the labels given to these categories controls the use to which such information is put at sentencing. Under the Guidelines, therefore, as under the traditional sentencing regimes Justice Stevens approves, "it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether a given offense has affected the judge's assessment of the character of the offender, the character of the offense, or both." Post, at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even under Justice Stevens' framework, the structure of the Guidelines should not affect the outcome of this case. The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, like their criminal history counterparts and the recidivism statutes discussed above, are sentencing enhancement regimes evincing the judgment that a particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the authorized range if it was either accompanied by or preceded by additional criminal activity. Petitioner does not argue that the range fixed by Congress is so broad, and the enhancing role played by the relevant conduct so significant, that consideration of that conduct in sentencing has become "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." McMillan, ; cf. We hold that, where the legislature has authorized such a particular punishment range for a given crime, the resulting *404 sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the double jeopardy inquiry. Accordingly, the instant prosecution for the cocaine offenses is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a second attempt to punish petitioner for the same crime. III At its core, much of petitioner's argument addresses not a claim that the instant cocaine prosecution violates principles of double jeopardy, but the more modest contention that he should not receive a second sentence under the Guidelines for the cocaine activities that were considered as relevant conduct for the marijuana sentence. As an examination of the pertinent sections should make clear, however, the Guidelines take into account the potential unfairness with which petitioner is concerned. Petitioner argues that the Sentencing Guidelines require that drug offenders
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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Petitioner argues that the Sentencing Guidelines require that drug offenders be sentenced in a single proceeding for all related offenses, whether charged or uncharged. See Brief for Petitioner 20-23. Yet while the Guidelines certainly envision that sentences for multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal activity ordinarily will be imposed together, they also explicitly contemplate the possibility of separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping "relevant conduct." See USSG 5G1.3, comment., n. 2 (addressing cases in which "a defendant is prosecuted in two or more federal jurisdictions, for the same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that were part of the same course of conduct"). There are often valid reasons why related crimes committed by the same defendant are not prosecuted in the same proceeding, and 5G1.3 of the Guidelines attempts to achieve some coordination of sentences imposed in such situations with an eye toward having such punishments approximate the total penalty that would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time (i. e., had all *405 of the offenses been prosecuted in a single proceeding). See USSG 5G1.3, comment., n. 3. Because the concept of relevant conduct under the Guidelines is reciprocal, 5G1.3 operates to mitigate the possibility that the fortuity of two separate prosecutions will grossly increase a defendant's sentence. If a defendant is serving an undischarged term of imprisonment "result[ing] from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account [as relevant conduct] in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense," 5G1.3(b) provides that "the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment." And where 5G1.3(b) does not apply, an accompanying policy statement provides, "the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense." USSG 5G1.3(c) (policy statement). Significant safeguards built into the Sentencing Guidelines therefore protect petitioner against having the length of his sentence multiplied by duplicative consideration of the same criminal conduct; he would be able to vindicate his interests through appropriate appeals should the Guidelines be misapplied in any future sentencing proceeding. Even if the Sentencing Commission had not formalized sentencing for multiple convictions in this way, district courts under the Guidelines retain enough flexibility in appropriate cases to take into account the fact that conduct underlying the offense at issue has previously been taken into account in sentencing for another offense. As the Commission has explained, "[u]nder 18 U.S.
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,995 | 14 |
majority
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Witte v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117954/witte-v-united-states/
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another offense. As the Commission has explained, "[u]nder 18 U.S. C. 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds `that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines *406 that should result in a sentence different from that described.' " USSG 5K2.0 (policy statement). This departure power is also available to protect against petitioner's second major practical concern: that a second sentence for the same relevant conduct may deprive him of the effect of the downward departure under 5K1.1 of the Guidelines for substantial assistance to the Government, which reduced his first sentence significantly. Should petitioner be convicted of the cocaine charges, he will be free to put his argument concerning the unusual facts of this case to the sentencing judge as a basis for discretionary downward departure. IV Because consideration of relevant conduct in determining a defendant's sentence within the legislatively authorized punishment range does not constitute punishment for that conduct, the instant prosecution does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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This case presents the question whether a district court has authority to grant a postverdict motion for judgment of *418 acquittal filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). I Petitioner Charles Carlisle, along with several co-defendants, was tried by jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S. C. 841, 846, 1265. He did not move during the trial for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). On July 13, 1993, the jury returned a guilty verdict and was discharged. On July 23, 1993, Carlisle filed a "Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)," arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. App. 6-9. Rule 29(c) provides that "a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the -day period." Excluding the intermediate Saturday and Sunday (as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a) requires), the -day period in this case ended on July 22, 1993. The United States' response to Carlisle's motion argued that it should be denied as untimely and, alternatively, that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The District Court denied Carlisle's motion on August 19, 1993. Its written opinion did not address the timeliness issue, but concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Carlisle knew about, and knowingly and voluntarily joined, the charged conspiracy. When Carlisle appeared for sentencing on October 14, 1993, the District Court announced that it was reversing its ruling. When it made its decision in August, the court said, it had prepared two opinions, one granting and one denying the motion, and it had now decided to substitute the former for the latter. The court subsequently entered an order that *419 (i) withdrew the opinion and order denying the motion to acquit and (ii) granted "Carlisle's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c), filed July 23, 1993." App. 45. An opinion accompanying the order concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Carlisle knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana. In a footnote, the opinion acknowledged that the motion for judgment of acquittal was filed one day late, but concluded: ". I can conceive of no prejudice to the United States which
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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can conceive of no prejudice to the United States which will result from consideration of a motion that is one day lat[e] in this case. Because I believe that refusal to hear this motion would result in grave injustice, and because [Rule 29(c)] permits the Court to extend the deadline, I will consider this motion as if it were filed in a timely manner." The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal and remanded to the District Court for reinstatement of the jury's verdict and for sentencing. It held that under Rule 29 a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, and that a district court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment of acquittal sua sponte after the case has been submitted to the jury. We granted certiorari. II Petitioner argues that district courts "should be given the power to go outside the strict time limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)" when (1) there is a claim that the defendant was legally innocent, (2) the motion is filed prior to sentencing, and (3) the motion was not timely filed because of attorney error. Brief for Petitioner 8. Petitioner seeks to root this argument in, among other places, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. *420 Rule 29 is reproduced in its entirety below.[1] Subdivision (c) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty, a motion for judgment of acquittal may *421 be made or renewed within days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the -day period." Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) provides that whereas certain untimely acts may be accorded validity upon a showing of excusable neglect, "the court may not extend the time for taking any action under Rul[e] 29 except to the extent and under the conditions stated in [the Rule]." These Rules are plain and unambiguous. If, as in this case, a guilty verdict is returned, a motion for judgment of acquittal must be filed, either within seven days of the jury's discharge, or within an extended period fixed by the court during that -day period. There is simply no room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b) for the granting of an untimely postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of legal innocence, is filed before sentencing, or was filed late because of attorney error. Unable to offer any reading of Rule 29(c) that
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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error. Unable to offer any reading of Rule 29(c) that would permit an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal to be granted, Carlisle contends that Rule 29(a) gives a district court authority to enter a judgment of acquittal sua sponte at any time before sentencing. Rule 29(a), entitled "Motion Before Submission to Jury," provides in relevant part: "The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." It would be quite a surprise to find a district court's sua sponte power to grant judgment of acquittal after submission of the case to the jury hidden away in a provision entitled "Motion Before Submission to Jury." We are not inclined to adopt an interpretation that creates such a surprise unless the intent that the text exceed its caption is clear. *422 Here, to the contrary, the structure of Rule 29 indicates that subdivision (a) is limited as its caption says. Petitioner's proposed reading would create an odd system in which defense counsel could move for judgment of acquittal for only seven days after the jury's discharge, but the court's power to enter such a judgment would linger. In United we declined to read former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which placed a 5-day limit on the making of a motion for new trial, as "permit[ting] the judge to order retrial without request and at any time," "[I]t would be a strange rule," we said, "which deprived a judge of power to do what was asked when request was made by the person most concerned, and yet allowed him to act without petition," and such an arrangement "would almost certainly subject trial judges to private appeals or application by counsel or friends of one convicted," The same is true here.[2] In addition, petitioner's reading makes a farce of subdivision (b) of Rule 29, which provides that a court may reserve decision on the motion for judgment of acquittal and decide it after submission to the jury. There would be no need for this procedure if, even without reserving, the court had continuing power to grant judgment of acquittal on its own. In *423 sum, even without the captions (and a fortiori with them) it is clear that subdivisions (a) and (b) of Rule 29 pertain to motions made before submission, and subdivisions (c) and (d) to motions made
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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before submission, and subdivisions (c) and (d) to motions made after discharge. The Government offers an alternative theory of a court's power to act sua sponte under Rule 29: Because Rule 29(a) refers to both a "motion of a defendant" and a court's "own motion," whereas Rule 29(c) refers only to "a motion" simpliciter, the latter must refer to motions both of defendants and of courts, permitting both such "motions" to be made within seven days after the jury's discharge. We do not find this reading plausible. Rule 29(c) not only provides that "a motion for judgment of acquittal" may be made or renewed within seven days after the jury is discharged. It goes on to provide, in its second and third sentences: "If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal." The phrase "on such motion" is notably absent from the third sentenceconveying the idea that, where a jury has not returned a verdict, a court can act without motion, but where a jury has returned a guilty verdict, it cannot. But if "on such motion" includes action taken by a court on its own initiative, the limiting phrase "on such motion" in the second sentence has no effect, and a court may act on its own whether or not a verdict has been returned. That is to say, the inclusion of the phrase "on such motion" in one sentence but not in the other would be inexplicable.[3] *424 Petitioner contends that even if Rule 29 does not permit a court to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 vests the court with supervisory power to enter judgment of acquittal. Rule 2 provides: "These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." This Rule is of no aid to petitioner. It sets forth a principle of interpretation to be used in construing ambiguous rules, not a principle of law superseding clear rules that do not achieve the stated objectives. It does not, that is to say, provide that rules shall be construed to mean something other than what they plainly saywhich is what petitioner's proposed construction of Rule 29(c) would require. We must acknowledge that there is precedent in this Court for using Rule 2 as a basis for deviating from time
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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using Rule 2 as a basis for deviating from time limits imposed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In we cited Rule 2 in the course of excusing the failure of an incarcerated paraplegic pro se petitioner to comply with the time limit for filing a notice of appeal under former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(a). Concluding that the petitioner "had done all that could reasonably be expected" to file a timely appeal, including mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk's office two days before the notice was due, we "decline[d] to read the Rules so rigidly as to bar a determination of his appeal on the merits." Fallen has been made obsolete by an amendment to Rule 3(a).[4] And *425 of course Fallen was a narrow ruling when it was announced, as is evident from a decision announced on the same day as Fallen, summarily affirming the dismissal of an appeal that had been filed one day late. Finally, petitioner cannot rely on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 as the source of the District Court's authority in this case. The version of Rule 5 in effect when criminal proceedings against petitioner commenced (and which he relied upon at oral argument) states, in relevant part, that, "[i]n all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges. may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." The relevant portion of the current version of Rule 5 is captioned "Procedure When There Is No Controlling Law," and states: "A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(b). We need not decide which version of this Rule controls the present case, because neither authorizes the District Court's action here. A rule permitting a party to submit and prevail on an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal is "inconsistent" (or not "consistent") with Rule 29's -day filing limit; and the question of when a motion for judgment of acquittal may be granted does not present a case "not provided for" by Rule 29; and Rule 29 is the "controlling law" governing this question. III As alternative authority for the District Court's action, petitioner invokes courts' "inherent supervisory power." Brief for Petitioner 9. We have recognized that federal *426 courts "may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress." United Whatever the scope of this "inherent power," however, it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As we recognized in Bank of Nova holding that federal courts may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent Rule 52(a): "[F]ederal courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions." Whether the action of the District Court here is described as the granting of an untimely motion, or the sua sponte entry of a judgment of acquittal, it contradicted the plain language of Rule 29(c), and effectively annulled the -day filing limit. In we said that we would not "`lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles' such as the scope of a court's inherent power," at ). Similarly, in we said that since a district court's authority to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution was a "sanction of wide usage," we would not assume, in the absence of a clear expression, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which allowed a party to move for dismissal for lack of prosecution, abrogated this "long unquestioned" power. That cautionary principle does not apply in the present case, not only because of the clarity of the text, but also because we are unaware of any "long unquestioned" power of federal district courts to acquit for insufficient evidence sua sponte, after return of a guilty verdict. Indeed, we are aware of only two cases prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that could be read as asserting in dictum the existence of *42 such a power. United (No. 15,664) (ED Va. 188); United (No. 15,333) (NDNY 18).[5] *428 The case law of this Court that petitioner relies upon does not establish any "inherent power" to act in contravention of applicable Rules. In which reinstated an appeal that had been dismissed for want of timely prosecution, there was no suggestion that reinstatement was contrary to any statute or rule of procedure. And in United which approved exercise of a District Court's inherent authority to order the disclosure of certain witness statements, we felt it necessary to make sure that such exercise did not conflict with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Petitioner's best case is which, contrary to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a), gave effect to a notice of appeal filed more than 60 days from the entry of judgment. Thompson, however, is not pertinent here, since it expressly relied upon the "`unique circumstances'" that the cause of the failure to meet the Rule's deadline was an erroneous ruling or assurance
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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meet the Rule's deadline was an erroneous ruling or assurance by the District Court itself. ). IV Petitioner's three remaining arguments need not detain us long. First, he argues that the District Court had power to enter a judgment of acquittal in this case under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S. C. 1651, through the writ of coram nobis. Apart from the fact that the District Court was not asked to *429 issue, and did not purport to be issuing, a writ of coram nobis, that writ would not have lain here, since it was traditionally available only to bring before the court factual errors "material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself," such as the defendant's being under age or having died before the verdict. See United Moreover, "[t]he All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling." Pennsylvania Bureau of 4 U.S. 34, As we noted a few years after enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "it is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or appropriate." United 331 U. S., at 5, n. 4. In the present case, Rule 29 provides the applicable law. Second, petitioner asserts that the failure to allow the District Court to enter a judgment of acquittal would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. His argument on this point consists of nothing more than bald assertions that Rule 29(c) as applied to the facts of this case transgresses principles of fundamental fairness, "shocks the conscience," and interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Brief for Petitioner 28-29 (internal quotation marks omitted) ; ; ). Petitioner has failed to proffer any historical, textual, or controlling precedential support for his argument that the inability of a district court to grant an untimely postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal violates the Fifth Amendment, and we decline to fashion a new due process right out of thin air. *0 Third, petitioner argues that prohibiting a district court from granting a motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day late will lead to needless appeals and habeas corpus proceedings, where it will be more difficult for defendants to obtain relief than in motions directed to the trial court. Assuming, arguendo, that these contentions are accurate, we cannot permit them to
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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that these contentions are accurate, we cannot permit them to alter our analysis, for we are not at liberty to ignore the mandate of Rule 29 in order to obtain "optimal" policy results. Cf. United We are similarly unmoved by petitioner's contention that the "rationale" behind Rule 29(c)'s time limit does not apply where the motion for judgment of acquittal is filed a mere eight days after the trial. The only evident "rationale" behind Rule 29(c)'s -day time limit is that a motion for judgment of acquittal filed eight days after trial is a motion filed one day later than justice and equity demand. As we said in a case involving the filing deadline of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 196, U.S. C. 144 (1988 ed.): "If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some individuals will always fall just on the other side of it." United 1 U.S. 84, V Finally, we may respond to some of the many arguments put forward by the dissent. The dissent makes the sweeping assertion that "a district court clearly has the inherent authority to ensure that a legally innocent defendant is not wrongfully convicted," post, at 442. Perhaps so. As the dissent itself recognizes, however, that power has come to an end once an appeal has been taken. Post, at 452-453. We are in accord, then, that there is some point at which the district court is rendered powerless to enter a judgment of acquittal, and the disagreement between us and the dissent *1 comes down to nothing more cosmic than the question of timing which we find answered by the text of Rule 29. In an effort to explain why, if a Rule 29(c) motion is in any event unnecessary, it makes any sense to impose a -day deadline upon the making of it, the dissent maintains that the untimeliness of a motion gives a district court discretion to ignore it. Post, at 445. This presents the disedifying prospect of a court vested with "the inherent authority to ensure that a legally innocent defendant is not wrongfully convicted," post, at 442, exercising its discretion to let an innocent defendant be wrongfully convicted. Quite obviously, this explanation of the deadline is incompatible with the premise that underlies the dissent's entire argument. As for the dissent's concern, post, at 448, that our decision runs afoul of Rule 2's
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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at 448, that our decision runs afoul of Rule 2's mandate that the rules "be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay": We see neither simplicity, nor fairness, nor elimination of delay in a regime that makes it discretionary whether an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal will be entertained. The dissent asserts that "permissive rules do not withdraw pre-existing inherent powers." Post, at 452. That assertion is really not relevant to the present case since, as we have discussed, the power to enter postverdict judgments of acquittal sua sponte was not a "pre-existing inherent power." See and n. 5. But besides the lack of factual predicate for its application here, the principle the dissent proposes would produce some extraordinary consequences. For example, as the cases cited by the dissent illustrate, see post, at 9-440, courts previously have ordered new trials sua sponte. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, however, provides that "[t]he court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial." Following the dissent's logic, Rule 33, being permissive, does not preclude a court from granting a new trial without motion, thereby leaving open to the court a course of action that may well *2 violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. But see Advisory Committee's Notes on 1966 Amendment of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33, 18 U.S. C. App., p. 801 ("The amendments to the first two sentences make it clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant. Problems of double jeopardy arise when the court acts on its own motion"). Similarly, a pre-existing practice, if there was one, would allow a subpoena to be served by a party or a minor despite Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(d) ("A subpoena may be served by the marshal, by a deputy marshal or by any other person who is not a party and who is not less than 18 years of age"); would allow a judge from another district to take over a jury trial from a disabled judge despite Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a) ("If. the judge before whom a jury trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court may proceed with and finish the trial"); and would allow a court to correct a technical error in a sentence more than seven days after the imposition of the sentence, despite Federal
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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seven days after the imposition of the sentence, despite Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c) ("The court, acting within days after the imposition of sentence, may correct a sentence that was imposed as a result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error"). The decisions of Justice Harlan relied upon by the dissent to support the proposition that permissive rules do not eliminate inherent powers are not germane. We have discussed Link above, see In United Justice Harlan noted that this Court has proceeded on the assumption that we have inherent authority to "affect judgments by action which would otherwise be out of time under [our own] Rules." That statement would be relevant if the present case involved a district court's departure from one of its own ruleswhich of course it does not. In Fernandez v. United *3 States, (Harlan, J., in chambers), Justice Harlan recognized that the provision of former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) that a "person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail" (emphasis added) did not withdraw district courts' authority to revoke bail in a noncapital case. Fernandez, and n. and n. What admitting to bail implies with respect to revocation of bail is not comparable to what granting judgment on motion implies with respect to granting judgment without motion. What the dissent needs, in the Fernandez context, is a case holding that a statute which permits bail for "persons arrested for noncapital offenses" does not preclude bail for persons arrested for capital offenses. Of course, such a case will not be found. Finally, the dissent contends that United 399 U.S. 26 (190), supports existence of the "inherent power" petitioner invokes. See post, at 448-449. We think not. Sisson did not "implicitly conclude" that it was proper to enter a postverdict judgment of acquittal without motion, because the propriety of the judgment of acquittal was irrelevant to the decision. The only issue was whether the judgment appealed from was a judgment of acquittal (proper or improper), because that would mean that the Government's appeal under the former 18 U.S. C. 331 (which did not apply to judgments of acquittal) must be dismissed. See United * * * We conclude that the District Court had no authority to grant petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. It is so ordered.
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Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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The building trades union in this case supported its efforts to organize mechanical subcontractors by picketing certain general contractors, including petitioner. The union's sole objective was to compel the general contractors to agree that in letting subcontracts for mechanical work they would deal only with firms that were * parties to the union's current collective-bargaining agreement. The union disclaimed any interest in representing the general contractors' employees. In this case the picketing succeeded, and petitioner seeks to annul the resulting agreement as an illegal restraint on competition under federal and state law. The union claims immunity from federal antitrust statutes and argues that federal labor regulation pre-empts state law. I Local 100 is the bargaining representative for workers in the plumbing and mechanical trades in Dallas. When this litigation began, it was party to a multiemployer bargaining agreement with the Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas, a group of about 75 mechanical contractors. That contract contained a "most favored nation" clause, by which the union agreed that if it granted a more favorable contract to any other employer it would extend the same terms to all members of the Association. Connell Construction Co. is a general building contractor in Dallas. It obtains jobs by competitive bidding and subcontracts all plumbing and mechanical work. Connell has followed a policy of awarding these subcontracts on the basis of competitive bids, and it has done business with both union and nonunion subcontractors. Connell's employees are represented by various building trade unions. Local 100 has never sought to represent them or to bargain with Connell on their behalf. In November 1970, Local 100 asked Connell to agree that it would subcontract mechanical work only to firms that had a current contract with the union. It demanded that Connell sign the following agreement: "WHEREAS, the contractor and the union are engaged in the construction industry, and *620 "WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement applying in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8 (e) of the Labor-Management Relations Act; "WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor does not grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representative of any employees of the signatory contractor; and "WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation provided herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor does not perform with his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to other firms; "THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to work falling within the scope of this agreement that is to be done at the site
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Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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this agreement that is to be done at the site of construction, alteration, painting or repair of any building, structure, or other works, that [if] the contractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work falling within the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such work only to firms that are parties to an executed, current collective bargaining agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry." When Connell refused to sign this agreement, Local 100 stationed a single picket at one of Connell's major construction sites. About 150 workers walked off the job, and construction halted. Connell filed suit in state court to enjoin the picketing as a violation of Texas anti-trust laws. Local 100 removed the case to federal court. Connell then signed the subcontracting agreement under protest. It amended its complaint to claim that the *621 agreement violated 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1 and 2, and was therefore invalid. Connell sought a declaration to this effect and an injunction against any further efforts to force it to sign such an agreement. By the time the case went to trial, Local 100 had submitted identical agreements to a number of other general contractors in Dallas. Five others had signed, and the union was waging a selective picketing campaign against those who resisted. The District Court held that the subcontracting agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws because it was authorized by the construction industry proviso to 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as added, 29 U.S. C. 158 (e). The court also held that federal labor legislation pre-empted the State's antitrust laws. 78 L. R. R. M. 3012 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, with one judge dissenting. It held that Local 100's goal of organizing nonunion subcontractors was a legitimate union interest and that its efforts toward that goal were therefore exempt from federal antitrust laws. On the second issue, it held that state law was pre-empted under San Diego Building We granted certiorari on Connell's petition. We reverse on the question of federal antitrust immunity and affirm the ruling on state law pre-emption. II The basic sources of organized labor's exemption from federal antitrust laws are 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, and 738, 15 U.S. C. 17 and 29 U.S. C. 52, and the Norris-La Guardia Act, 71, and 73, 29 U.S. C. 104, 105, and 113. These statutes declare *622 that labor unions
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Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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105, and 113. These statutes declare *622 that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and exempt specific union activities, including secondary picketing and boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust laws. See United They do not exempt concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties. Mine The Court has recognized, however, that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. Meat The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences in wages and working conditions. See Mine ; Jewel Labor policy clearly does not require, however, that a union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who employ its members. Thus, while the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some restraints by acting unilaterally, e. g., Federation of the nonstatutory exemption offers no similar protection when a union and a nonlabor *623 party agree to restrain competition in a business market. See Allen ; Cox, Labor and the Antitrust LawsA Preliminary Analysis, ; Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, In this case Local 100 used direct restraints on the business market to support its organizing campaign. The agreements with Connell and other general contractors indiscriminately excluded nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from more efficient operating methods. Curtailment of competition based on efficiency is neither a goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect of the elimination of competition among workers. Moreover, competition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws strive to protect. The multiemployer bargaining agreement between Local 100 and the Association, though not challenged in this suit, is relevant in determining the effect that the agreement between Local 100 and Connell would have on the business market. The "most favored nation" clause in the multiemployer agreement promised to eliminate competition between members of the Association and any other subcontractors that
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Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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between members of the Association and any other subcontractors that Local 100 might organize. By giving members of the Association a contractual right to insist on terms as favorable as those given any competitor, it guaranteed that the union would make no agreement that would give an unaffiliated contractor a competitive advantage over members of the Association.[1] Subcontractors in the Association thus *624 stood to benefit from any extension of Local 100's organization, but the method Local 100 chose also had the effect of sheltering them from outside competition in that portion of the market covered by subcontracting agreements between general contractors and Local 100. In that portion of the market, the restriction on subcontracting would eliminate competition on all subjects covered by the multiemployer agreement, even on subjects unrelated to wages, hours, and working conditions. Success in exacting agreements from general contractors would also give Local 100 power to control access to the market for mechanical subcontracting work. The agreements with general contractors did not simply prohibit subcontracting to any nonunion firm; they prohibited subcontracting to any firm that did not have a contract with Local 100. The union thus had complete control over subcontract work offered by general contractors that had signed these agreements. Such control could result in significant adverse effects on the market and on consumerseffects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing workers and standardizing working conditions. For example, if the union thought the interests of its members would be served by having fewer subcontractors competing for the available work, *625 it could refuse to sign collective-bargaining agreements with marginal firms. Cf. Mine Or, since Local 100 has a well-defined geographical jurisdiction, it could exclude "traveling" subcontractors by refusing to deal with them. Local 100 thus might be able to create a geographical enclave for local contractors, similar to the closed market in Allen This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other than organizing as many subcontractors as possible.[2] This goal was legal, even though a successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that unionized employers face from nonunion firms. But the methods the union chose are not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal. Here Local 100, by agreement with several contractors, made nonunion subcontractors ineligible to compete for a portion of the available work. This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not
|
Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws. There can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in other contexts, that a restraint of this magnitude *626 might be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful collective-bargaining agreement. Cf. Mine -665; Jewel -690 ; In this case, Local 100 had no interest in representing Connell's employees. The federal policy favoring collective bargaining therefore can offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell or its campaign to exclude nonunion firms from the subcontracting market. III Local 100 nonetheless contends that the kind of agreement it obtained from Connell is explicitly allowed by the construction-industry proviso to 8 (e) and that antitrust policy therefore must defer to the NLRA. The majority in the Court of Appeals declined to decide this issue, holding that it was subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the This Court has held, however, that the federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws.[3] We conclude that 8 (e) does not allow this type of agreement. Local 100's argument is straightforward: the first proviso to 8 (e) allows "an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other *627 work."[4] Local 100 is a labor organization, Connell is an employer in the construction industry, and the agreement covers only work "to be done at the site of construction, alteration, painting or repair of any building, structure, or other works." Therefore, Local 100 says, the agreement comes within the proviso. Connell responds by arguing that despite the unqualified language of the proviso, Congress intended only to allow subcontracting agreements within the context of a collective-bargaining relationship; that is, Congress did not intend to permit a union to approach a "stranger" contractor and obtain a binding agreement not to deal with nonunion *628 subcontractors. On its face, the proviso suggests no such limitation. This Court has held, however, that 8 (e) must be interpreted in light of the statutory setting and the circumstances surrounding its enactment: "It is a `familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
|
Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' Holy Trinity Section 8 (e) was part of a legislative program designed to plug technical loopholes in 8 (b) (4)'s general prohibition of secondary activities. In 8 (e) Congress broadly proscribed using contractual agreements to achieve the economic coercion prohibited by 8 (b) (4). See National Woodwork The provisos exempting the construction and garment industries were added by the Conference Committee in an apparent compromise between the House bill, which prohibited all "hot cargo" agreements, and the Senate bill, which prohibited them only in the trucking industry.[5] Although the garment-industry proviso was supported by detailed explanations in both Houses,[6] the construction-industry proviso was explained only by bare references to "the pattern of collective *629 bargaining" in the industry.[7] It seems, however, to have been adopted as a partial substitute for an attempt to overrule this Court's decision in[8] Discussion of "special problems" in the construction industry, applicable to both the 8 (e) proviso and the attempt to overrule Denver Building focused on the problems of picketing a single nonunion subcontractor on a multiemployer building project, and the close relationship between contractors and subcontractors *630 at the jobsite.[9] Congress limited the construction-industry proviso to that single situation, allowing subcontracting agreements only in relation to work done on a jobsite. In contrast to the latitude it provided in the garment-industry proviso, Congress did not afford construction unions an exemption from 8 (b) (4) (B) or otherwise indicate that they were free to use subcontracting agreements as a broad organizational weapon. In keeping with these limitations, the Court has interpreted the construction-industry proviso as "a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there, but to ban secondary-objective agreements concerning nonjobsite work, in which respect the construction industry is no different from any other." National Woodwork -639 Other courts have suggested that it serves an even narrower function: "[T]he purpose of the section 8 (e) proviso was to alleviate the frictions that may arise when union men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construction site." Drivers Local See also Denver Building 341 U. S., ; Essex County & Vicinity *631 District Council of Local 100 does not suggest that its subcontracting agreement is related to any of these policies. It does not claim to be protecting Connell's employees from having to work alongside nonunion men. The agreement apparently was not designed to protect Local 100's members in that regard, since it was not limited to jobsites on
|
Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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that regard, since it was not limited to jobsites on which they were working. Moreover, the subcontracting restriction applied only to the work Local 100's members would perform themselves and allowed free subcontracting of all other work, thus leaving open a possibility that they would be employed alongside nonunion subcontractors. Nor was Local 100 trying to organize a nonunion subcontractor on the building project it picketed. The union admits that it sought the agreement solely as a way of pressuring mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas area to recognize it as the representative of their employees. If we agreed with Local 100 that the construction-industry proviso authorizes subcontracting agreements with "stranger" contractors, not limited to any particular jobsite, our ruling would give construction unions an almost unlimited organizational weapon.[10] The unions *632 would be free to enlist any general contractor to bring economic pressure on nonunion subcontractors, as long as the agreement recited that it only covered work to be performed on some jobsite somewhere. The proviso's jobsite restriction then would serve only to prohibit agreements relating to subcontractors that deliver their work complete to the jobsite. It is highly improbable that Congress intended such a result. One of the major aims of the 1959 Act was to limit "top-down" organizing campaigns, in which unions used economic weapons to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of his employees.[11] Congress accomplished this goal by enacting 8 (b) (7), which restricts primary recognitional picketing, and by further tightening 8 (b) (4) (B), which prohibits the use of most secondary tactics in organizational campaigns. Construction unions are fully covered by these sections. The only special consideration given them in organizational campaigns is 8 (f), which allows "prehire" agreements in the construction industry, but only under careful safeguards preserving workers' rights to decline union representation. The legislative history accompanying 8 (f) also suggests that Congress may not *633 have intended that strikes or picketing could be used to extract prehire agreements from unwilling employers.[12] These careful limits on the economic pressure unions may use in aid of their organizational campaigns would be undermined seriously if the proviso to 8 (e) were construed to allow unions to seek subcontracting agreements, at large, from any general contractor vulnerable to picketing. Absent a clear indication that Congress intended to leave such a glaring loophole in its restrictions on "top-down" organizing, we are unwilling to read the construction-industry proviso as broadly as Local 100 suggests.[13] Instead, we think its authorization extends only to agreements in the context of collective-bargaining relationships and, in light of congressional references
|
Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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context of collective-bargaining relationships and, in light of congressional references to the Denver Building problem, possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as well.[14] Finally, Local 100 contends that even if the subcontracting agreement is not sanctioned by the construction-industry *634 proviso and therefore is illegal under 8 (e), it cannot be the basis for antitrust liability because the remedies in the NLRA are exclusive. This argument is grounded in the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. Congress rejected attempts to regulate secondary activities by repealing the antitrust exemptions in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, and created special remedies under the labor law instead.[15] It made secondary activities unfair labor practices under 8 (b) (4), and drafted special provisions for preliminary injunctions at the suit of the NLRB and for recovery of actual damages in the district courts. 10 (l) of the NLRA, as added, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 160 (l), and 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 187. But whatever significance this legislative choice has for antitrust suits based on those secondary activities prohibited by 8 (b) (4), it has no relevance to the question whether Congress meant to preclude antitrust suits based on the "hot cargo" agreements that it outlawed in 1959. There is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress suggesting that labor-law remedies for 8 (e) violations were intended to be exclusive, or that Congress thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases like the present one would be inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the NLRA.[16] *635 We therefore hold that this agreement, which is outside the context of a collective-bargaining relationship and not restricted to a particular jobsite, but which nonetheless obligates Connell to subcontract work only to firms that have a contract with Local 100, may be the basis of a federal antitrust suit because it has a potential for restraining competition in the business market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working conditions. IV Although we hold that the union's agreement with Connell is subject to the federal antitrust laws, it does not follow that state antitrust law may apply as well. The Court has held repeatedly that federal law pre-empts state remedies that interfere with federal labor policy or with specific provisions of the NLRA. E. g., Motor Coach ; msters v. Morton, ; msters v.[17] The use of state antitrust law to *636 regulate union activities in aid of organization must also be pre-empted because it creates a substantial risk of conflict with policies central to
|
Justice Powell
| 1,975 | 17 |
majority
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109262/connell-construction-co-v-plumbers-steamfitters-local-union-no-100/
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creates a substantial risk of conflict with policies central to federal labor law. In this area, the accommodation between federal labor and antitrust policy is delicate. Congress and this Court have carefully tailored the antitrust statutes to avoid conflict with the labor policy favoring lawful employee organization, not only by delineating exemptions from antitrust coverage but also by adjusting the scope of the antitrust remedies themselves. See Apex Hosiery State antitrust laws generally have not been subjected to this process of accommodation. If they take account of labor goals at all, they may represent a totally different balance between labor and antitrust policies.[18] Permitting state antitrust law to operate in this field could frustrate the basic federal policies favoring employee organization and allowing elimination of competition among wage earners, and interfere with the detailed system Congress has created for regulating organizational techniques. *637 Because employee organization is central to federal labor policy and regulation of organizational procedures is comprehensive, federal law does not admit the use of state antitrust law to regulate union activity that is closely related to organizational goals. Of course, other agreements between unions and nonlabor parties may yet be subject to state antitrust laws. See msters v. The governing factor is the risk of conflict with the NLRA or with federal labor policy. V Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals decided whether the agreement between Local 100 and Connell, if subject to the antitrust laws, would constitute an agreement that restrains trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The issue was not briefed and argued fully in this Court. Accordingly, we remand for consideration whether the agreement violated the Sherman Act.[19] Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. *638 MR.
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Justice Scalia
| 2,011 | 9 |
concurring
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Fowler v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217514/fowler-v-united-states/
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I disagree with the Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S. C. In my view, the Government must prove that the defendant intended to prevent a communication which, had it been made, would beyond a reasonable doubt have been made to a federal law enforcement officer. The Court’s vague “reasonable likelihood” standard has no basis in the statutory text and will serve only to confuse judges and juries. Accordingly, although I agree the case should be remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether the objection to sufficiency of the evidence was preserved or whether the District Court committed plain error, I would hold that there was insufficient evidence to support Fowler’s conviction. I Section 1512(a)(1)(C) of Title 18 makes it a federal crime “to kill another person, with intent to prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” Viewed in isolation, this provision contains an ambiguity: Does the mens rea of the statute include a specific intent to prevent communication to a law enforcement officer of the United States; or is it satisfied by the mere intent to 2 FOWLER v. UNITED STATES SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment prevent communication to a law enforcement officer who happens to be a law enforcement officer of the United States? Happily, a different statutory provision resolves this ambiguity. It states that “no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance that the law enforce ment officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Gov ernment.” This makes clear that the first possibility is wrong, and the second right. But removing the “federal officer” requirement as an element of the statute’s mens rea does not remove it as an element of the actus reus—that is, as an element of the facts that must be proved for conviction. It must be proved, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that the communication in tended to be prevented was communication to a federal officer. Thus, if a suspect in an investigation murders an informant to prevent him from talking to authorities, but is unaware that the informant was working for the FBI, the suspect would be guilty: He would have committed a murder with the intention of preventing the informant’s communication to authorities about his criminal activities, and the communication he sought to prevent would neces sarily have been to federal law enforcement. Likewise, a suspect would be guilty if he committed a murder to pre vent a witness from informing law enforcement that
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Justice Scalia
| 2,011 | 9 |
concurring
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Fowler v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217514/fowler-v-united-states/
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to pre vent a witness from informing law enforcement that he lied on his federal income tax return: He sought to pre vent a communication that would have been made to federal officials, because they alone prosecute federal tax violations. But a suspect who commits a murder with the general intent of preventing law enforcement from learn ing about activities that violate both state and federal law would not be guilty, because the Government would be unable to prove that the communication he sought to prevent necessarily would have been to a federal official. Applying that standard, this is an easy case. There was evidence that Fowler murdered Officer Horner in order Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment to prevent him from communicating information about Fowler’s criminal activities. But the only evidence prof fered by the Government to establish that the communica tion would have been to a federal law enforcement agent was the fact that a different state police officer, four years later, contacted federal law enforcement about a robbery by Fowler’s confederate—and that only because the state law statute of limitations for the robbery had expired. That is not nearly enough to demonstrate Fowler’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. II The Court gives the statute a broader reading than the one I ascribe. The Government can obtain a conviction, it says, so long as it can prove a “reasonable likelihood” that the communication would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer. I know of no precedent for using a “likelihood” standard rather than the “beyond a rea sonable doubt” standard for a finding of fact essential to a criminal conviction; and the justifications the Court presents for that course in the present case are not convincing. The Court maintains that the Government need not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the communication would have been to a federal officer because “[t]he relevant question concerns the defendant’s intent.” Ante, at 5. But that reasoning is directly contrary to which expressly states that the defendant’s intent is not the relevant question with respect to the federal character of law enforcement officer meant to be deprived of the infor mation. The Court’s observation that “a defendant can kill a victim with an intent to prevent the victim from commu nicating with federal law enforcement officers even if there is some considerable doubt that any such communi cation would otherwise have taken place,” ante, at 6, is completely irrelevant to the question presented. 4 FOWLER v. UNITED STATES SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment The
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,011 | 9 |
concurring
|
Fowler v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217514/fowler-v-united-states/
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FOWLER v. UNITED STATES SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment The Court also proclaims that a narrower view “would conflict with the statute’s basic purpose,” which is to prevent witness tampering “at a time when the precise communication and nature of the officer who may receive it are not yet known.” Ante, at 4. It cites no basis for attributing that purpose, and there is none—other than the fact that it supports the Court’s outcome. Another purpose is just as likely—and indeed more likely, since it can be achieved without abandonment of the ancient rule that in criminal prosecutions facts must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Murder, after all, is a crime, and often a capital crime, under all state laws. There is no reason to ascribe to Congress the “purpose” of transferring murder prosecutions that would ordinarily be brought in state court to federal court based on only a tangential federal interest. Congress was concerned with preserving the integrity and effectiveness of federal prosecutions, and where they are not clearly involved (as the ordinary be yond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would require) a federal murder prosecution has no proper place. Limited as I have suggested, the federal law would still have ample scope, reaching what were surely the principal cases Con gress had in mind—the killing of prospective witnesses in federal trials or in ongoing federal investigations. Here, as would be the case in many situations involving a merely hypothetical link to a federal investigation, Fowler murdered a state police officer. The natural place to have prosecuted him would have been state court. The Court’s analysis is even less persuasive in light of the rule of lenity, under which we must construe ambigu ous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Here, the Court adopts a kind of rule of harshness, discarding the most straightforward construction of the text in favor of textually implausible one, based on vague intuitions about the statute’s purpose. The Court’s opinion never cites the rule of lenity, probably because it cannot honestly say that Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment the statute is so clear that “there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve.” Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 136 (2008). To make matters worse, the Court’s standard is hope lessly indeterminate. The Government must show that a communication to a federal officer is “reasonably likely,” which is less likely than “more likely than not,” but more likely than “reasonably possible.” Ante, at 7–9. I doubt that any jury can grasp the distinction between “you must
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,011 | 9 |
concurring
|
Fowler v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217514/fowler-v-united-states/
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that any jury can grasp the distinction between “you must find that a communication to a federal officer was rea sonably likely” and “you must find that a communication to a federal officer was reasonably possible.” Under standably, the Court refuses to give any examples of what “reasonably likely” means, except for an absurd example involving communications with Lithuanian police officers, ante, at 10—which obviously would not be “reasonably possible” either. Indeed, the Court refuses to apply its standard to the facts of this case, leaving that precarious task to the lower court. III The dissent adopts a view of the statute that is even broader than the Government’s. It effectively contends that the Government need not prove anything with respect to the fact that the communication sought to be prevented was “to a law enforcement officer of the United States.” As long as the Government can prove that the defendant sought to prevent the communication of information about a federal crime (including a federal crime that is also a state crime) it will necessarily have proved that the “set of law enforcement officers (whose identities were unknown to him)” he had in mind “included law enforcement officers who were employed by the United States.” Post, at 3 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Conviction requires neither any specific intent regarding the federal status of the officer, nor even any likelihood that a communication to a federal 6 FOWLER v. UNITED STATES SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment officer would have occurred. The principal defect in this interpretation is that it makes the words “of the United States” superfluous. Section 1512(a)(1)(C) specifically requires that the in formation the defendant seeks to prevent from being com municated be “information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” If the phrase “to a law enforcement officer of the United States” requires nothing more than this it is utterly without effect. The implication of this view is that Congress enacted reference to “a law enforcement officer of the United States,” only to immediately nullify it by “no state of mind” provision. Not likely—and not sound statutory interpretation. The dissent claims that my analysis “confuses what the prosecution must prove with what a rational jury may choose to infer in a particular case.” Post, at 6. I find this contention difficult to understand. In the dissent’s view, a properly instructed jury should be required to find neither that the defendant’s mens rea had any connection to a federal officer, nor that the defendant’s actus reus had any connection to a federal officer. It therefore
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,011 | 9 |
concurring
|
Fowler v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217514/fowler-v-united-states/
|
reus had any connection to a federal officer. It therefore follows that under the dissent’s view, a properly instructed jury should be required to find nothing about a connection to a federal officer beyond the fact that the information related to a federal offense, which means that, unless the jury is acting irrationally or is engaging in jury nullification, the “of the United States” provision is indeed superfluous. The dis sent is correct that the proof of one element of a crime (such as an overt act) can sometimes be used to prove that a different element (such as a conspiratorial agreement) is satisfied, post, at 6–7, n. 2; but in such cases, the jury is instructed that it is required to make a separate finding to convict (e.g., that a conspiratorial agreement actually occurred). Here, the dissent identifies no separate finding the jury must make beyond the fact of a federal offense. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 7 SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment The dissent also observes that when a defendant murders a federal officer to prevent him from communicating in formation about a nonfederal crime, he does not violate the statute. Post, at 7. This observation convincingly establishes that the statutory words “Federal offense” are not superfluous under the dissent’s view, an observation irrelevant to my point that the dissent makes the statu tory words “of the United States” superfluous. The dissent contends that my interpretation “has no grounding in the language of the statute.” Post, at 4. It asserts that “the text of the statute makes it perfectly clear that the federal officer requirement is exclusively an element of the defendant’s mens rea.” Post, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps the only thing “per fectly clear” about this statute is that it states the precise opposite of that proposition: “[N]o state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government.” The dissent’s interpretation would federalize crimes that have no connection to any federal investigation. A person caught by a state police officer with marijuana who murders the state police officer to cover it up could be prosecuted in federal court. That would approach the outer limits of Congress’s enumerated powers. We have adopted a federalism principle that applies when a statute would render “traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for federal enforcement”: “[U]nless Congress con veys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.” Jones v. United States,
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,011 | 9 |
concurring
|
Fowler v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217514/fowler-v-united-states/
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balance in the prosecution of crimes.” Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the dissent adds to the Court’s “rule of harshness” a rule of antifederalism, under which a court must actually ignore a federal connection that Congress prescribed so as to avoid intrusion into traditionally local law enforcement. 8 FOWLER v. UNITED STATES SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment * * * Because the Government did not establish that Fowler intended to prevent a communication that, if made, would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating Since there remains, however, the ques tion whether Fowler preserved this issue at trial or whether the inadequacy of the evidence constituted plain error, I concur in the Court’s order vacating the judgment and remanding for resolution of that question. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–5443 CHARLES ANDREW FOWLER, AKA MAN, PETITIONER v.
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
|
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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This case raises three importat questios regardig state taxatio of the icome of a vertically itegrated corporatio doig busiess i several States. The first issue is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteeth Amedmet prevets a State from applyig its statutory apportiomet formula to the total corporate icome of the taxpayer whe the taxpayer's fuctioal accoutig separates its icome ito the three distict categories of marketig, exploratio ad productio, ad refiig, ad whe the taxpayer performs oly marketig operatios withi the State. The secod issue is whether the Due Process Clause permits a State to subject to taxatio uder its statutory apportiomet formula icome derived from the extractio of oil ad gas located outside the State which is used by the refiig departmet of the taxpayer, or whether the State is required to allocate such icome to the situs State. The third issue is whether the Commerce Clause requires such a allocatio to the situs State. I A Appellat Exxo Corp.,[1] a vertically itegrated petroleum compay, is orgaized uder the laws of Delaware with its *211 geeral offices located i Housto, Tex. Durig the years i questio here, 1965 through 1968, appellat's corporate orgaizatio structure cosisted of three parts: Corporate Maagemet, Coordiatio ad Services Maagemet, ad Operatios Maagemet. Corporate Maagemet, which was the highest order of maagemet for the etire corporatio, cosisted of the board of directors, the executive committee, the chairma of the board (who was also the chief executive officer), the presidet, ad various directors-i-charge who were members of the board of directors. Coordiatio ad Services Maagemet was composed of corporate staff departmets which provided specialized corporate services. These services icluded log-rage plaig for the compay, maximizatio of overall compay operatios, developmet of fiacial policy ad procedures, fiacig of corporate activities, maiteace of the accoutig system, legal advice, public relatios, labor relatios, purchase ad sale of raw crude oil ad raw materials, ad coordiatio betwee the refiig ad other operatig fuctios "so as to obtai a optimum short rage operatig program." App. 189;[2] The third level of maagemet withi the corporatio was *212 Operatios Maagemet, which was resposible for directig the operatig activities of the fuctioal departmets of the compay. These fuctioal departmets were Exploratio ad Productio, Refiig, Marketig, Marie, Coal ad Shale Oil, Mierals, ad Lad Maagemet. Each fuctioal departmet was orgaized as a separate uit operatig idepedetly of the other operatig segmets, ad each departmet had its ow separate maagemet resposible for the proper coduct of the operatio. These departmets were treated as separate ivestmet ceters by the compay, ad a profit was determied for
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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ceters by the compay, ad a profit was determied for each fuctioal departmet. At all relevat times each operatig departmet was idepedetly resposible for its performace. This arragemet permitted cetralized maagemet to evaluate each operatio separately. Each departmet was therefore required to compete with the other departmets for available ivestmet fuds, ad with other members of the idustry performig the same fuctio for the compay's raw materials ad refied products. There was o requiremet that appellat's crude oil go to its ow refieries or that the refied products sold through marketig be produced from appellat's crude oil. Trasfers of products ad raw materials amog the three major fuctioal departmetsExploratio ad Productio, Refiig, ad Marketigwere theoretically based o competitive wholesale market prices. For purposes of separate fuctioal accoutig, trasfers of crude oil from Exploratio ad Productio to Refiig were treated as sales at posted idustry prices; trasfers of products from Refiig to Marketig were also based o wholesale market prices. If o readily available wholesale market value existed for a product, the represetatives of the two departmets ivolved would egotiate as to the appropriate iteral trasfer value. Appellat had o exploratio ad productio operatios or refiig operatios i Wiscosi; the oly activity carried out *213 i that State was marketig. The Wiscosi marketig district reported admiistratively to the cetral regio office i Chicago, which i tur was resposible to the Marketig Departmet headquarters i Housto. App. 217. The motor oils, greases, ad other packaged materials sold by appellat i Wiscosi durig this period were maufactured outside the State ad the shipped ito that State from cetral warehouse facilities i Chicago. Tires, batteries, ad accessories were cetrally purchased through the Housto office ad the shipped ito Wiscosi for resale. The gasolie sold i Wiscosi was ot produced by Exxo but rather was obtaied from Pure Oil Co. i Illiois uder a exchage agreemet, permittig Exxo to reduce the cost of trasportig the gasolie from its source to the retail outlets. This exchage agreemet was egotiated by the Supply ad Refiig Departmets. Additives were put ito the Pure Oil gasolie i order to make the fial product coform to uiform Exxo stadards. Exxo used a atiowide uiform credit card system, which was admiistered out of the atioal headquarters i Housto. Uiform packagig ad brad ames were used, ad the overall pla for distributio of products was developed i Housto. Promotioal display equipmet was desiged by the egieerig staff at the marketig headquarters. B Because appellat marketed its products i Wiscosi durig the caledar years 1965 through 1968, it was required to file corporate
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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years 1965 through 1968, it was required to file corporate icome ad frachise tax returs i that State for those years. Exxo prepared the returs based o separate state accoutig methods, reflectig oly the Wiscosi marketig operatio. The returs showed losses i the amouts of $821,320 for 1965, $1,159,830 for 1966, $1,026,224 for 1967, ad $919,575 for 1968. Accordigly, o tax was show as beig due for ay of those years. *214 Appellee Wiscosi Departmet of Reveue audited Exxo for the years i questio, ad o Jue 25, 1971, the Departmet set the taxpayer a otice of assessmet of additioal icome ad frachise tax. The Departmet cocluded that pursuat to (2) [3] the Wiscosi marketig operatio was "a itegral part of a uitary busiess," ad therefore Exxo's taxable icome i Wiscosi must be determied by applicatio of the State's apportiomet formula to the taxpayer's total icome. The Departmet's calculatio revealed a additioal taxable icome of $4,532,155 for the period 1965 through 1968. Additioal *215 taxes i the amout of $316,470.85 were assessed agaist appellat.[4] Exxo filed a applicatio for abatemet i July 1971, which the Departmet deied o November 30, 1971. Appellat the filed a petitio for review with the Wiscosi Tax Appeals The agreed with the Departmet that Exxo's separate geographical accoutig did ot accurately reflect its Wiscosi icome for tax purposes. CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶ 201-223, p. 10,410 (1976). However, the cocluded that appellat's three mai fuctioal operatig departmetsExploratio ad Productio, Refiig, ad Marketigwere separate uitary busiesses. Accordig to the Exxo's marketig operatio i Wiscosi was a itegral part of its overall marketig fuctio, but was ot a itegral part of its exploratio ad productio fuctio or its refiig fuctio. The foud that the statutory apportiomet formula as applied by the Departmet "had the effect of imposig a tax o the [appellat's] exploratio ad o its refiig et icome, all of which was derived solely from operatios outside the State of Wiscosi ad which had o itegral relatioship to the [appellat's] marketig operatios withi Wiscosi." The also foud that taxatio by Wiscosi of Exxo's et icome from its exploratio ad productio fuctio ad its refiig fuctio would subject *216 appellat "to multiple-state taxatio' as to such icome." The therefore cocluded that the Departmet had erred i its applicatio of the apportiomet formula sice it had icluded "extraterritorial icome," but that "apportioig icome eared by the [appellat] from its marketig fuctio withi ad without the State of Wiscosi, would be proper." The Circuit Court for Dae Couty set aside some of the factual fidigs ad coclusios of law
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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aside some of the factual fidigs ad coclusios of law of the Tax Appeals CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶ 201-373, pp. 10,501-10,504 I particular, the Circuit Court held that the 's fidig that Exxo's three mai fuctioal operatig departmets were separate uitary busiesses was a erroeous coclusio of law. Similarly, the court set aside the fidigs that there was o ecoomic depedece betwee the Wiscosi marketig operatios ad Exxo's exploratio ad productio fuctio or its refiig fuctio. Istead the court held that "[t]he Wiscosi operatio cotributed sales to [Exxo's] busiess of producig, refiig ad marketig petroleum products. This cotributio was sufficiet aloe i the opiio of this Court to make [Exxo's] busiess a uitary oe." Accordigly, appellat's busiess durig the relevat years "cosidered as a whole both withi ad without Wiscosi costituted a uitary busiess" withi the meaig of the apportiomet statute. The Circuit Court cocluded, however, that aother statute, (1)[5] excluded from icome subject to the apportiomet formula all situs icome derived *217 from appellat's oil ad gas wells. CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶ 201-373, -10,504. The Departmet had used a so-called "barrel formula" to separate two sets of icome figures: icome derived from the sale of crude oil to third parties, ad icome derived from crude oil produced by Exxo ad trasferred to its ow refieries. The former was allocated to the situs State ad excluded from Wiscosi taxable icome, ad the latter was icluded i the apportiomet formula. A similar divisio was made of the icome derived from appellat's gas productio. The Circuit Court held that both sets of icome were derived from the oil ad gas wells ad should be allocated to the situs State uder the statute. The court oted that "there is o questio but that the departmet's iclusio of [Exxo's] icome derived from crude oil ad gas produced ad ot sold to third parties by [Exxo's] productio departmet resulted i double taxatio of such icome."[6] at 10,503. The Wiscosi Supreme Court affirmed i part ad reversed i part. That court cocluded that the test for what costituted a uitary busiess was "`whether or ot the operatio of the portio of the busiess withi the state is depedet upo or cotributory to the operatio of the busiess outside the state. If there is such a relatioship the busiess is uitary.'" quotig G. Altma *218 & F. Keeslig, Allocatio of Icome i State Taxatio 101 (2d ed. 1950). Reviewig the orgaizatioal structure ad busiess operatios of Exxo, the court reasoed that Exxo's productio ad refiig fuctios were depedet o its marketig operatio to provide a
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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fuctios were depedet o its marketig operatio to provide a outlet for its products, ad Wiscosi was a part of that marketig system. I a high capital ivestmet idustry such as the petroleum idustry, the court foud, the existece of a stable marketig system was importat for the full utilizatio of refiig capacity. 281 N. W. 2d, at 104. Accordigly, the court cocluded that Exxo's Wiscosi marketig operatios were a itegral part of oe uitary busiess ad therefore its total corporate icome was subject to the statutory apportiomet formula. -106. The Wiscosi Supreme Court disagreed with the Circuit Court o the issue of situs icome. While the extractio ad productio of oil ad gas costituted "miig" withi the meaig of (1) 281 N. W. 2d, at 106, the court agreed with the Departmet that situs icome which is part of the uitary stream of icome is oetheless apportioable uder the statute, while situs icome which does ot eter the uitary stream of icome is oapportioable ad must be excluded from the formula. -107. The Wiscosi Supreme Court rejected appellat's cotetio that its separate fuctioal accoutig proved that its exploratio ad productio icome was eared totally outside Wiscosi, otig that "the idea of separate fuctioal accoutig seems to be icompatible with the `very essece of formulary apportiomet, amely, that where there are itegrated, iterdepedet steps i the ecoomic process carried o by a busiess eterprise, there is o logical or viable method for accurately separatig out the profit attributable to oe step i the ecoomic process from other steps.'" quotig J. Hellerstei, State ad Local Taxatio 400 (3d ed. 1969). The court cocluded that the *219 State was actig withi costitutioal limitatios despite appellat's evidece based o separate fuctioal accoutig. The court also rejected Exxo's argumet that the sources of icome derived from exploratio ad productio were all outside of Wiscosi ad therefore could ot be taxed i that State without impermissibly burdeig iterstate commerce. Accordig to the court, Wiscosi was taxig oly its "fair share" of appellat's icome, there was a substatial exus betwee appellat ad the State, the tax was ot claimed to discrimiate betwee iterstate ad itrastate commerce, ad the tax was fairly related to services provided by Wiscosi. -731, 281 N. W. 2d, at 110-111. Because of the importace of the issues raised, we oted probable jurisdictio, We ow affirm. II We recetly set forth at some legth the basic priciples for state taxatio of the icome of a busiess operatig i iterstate commerce, see Mobil Oil ad eed ot repeat them here i great detail. It
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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ad eed ot repeat them here i great detail. It has log bee settled that "the etire et icome of a corporatio, geerated by iterstate as well as itrastate activities, may be fairly apportioed amog the States for tax purposes by formulas utilizig i-state aspects of iterstate affairs." Northwester States Portlad Cemet ; Mobil Oil See geerally Uderwood Typewriter ; Has Rees' ; Butler ; Moorma Mfg. See also Bass, Ratcliff & Gretto, The Due Process Clause of the Fourteeth Amedmet imposes two requiremets for such state taxatio: a "miimal coectio" or "exus" betwee the iterstate activities ad the taxig State, ad "a *220 ratioal relatioship betwee the icome attributed to the State ad the itrastate values of the eterprise." Mobil Oil 437. See Moorma Mfg. ; Natioal Bellas Hess, ; Norfolk & Wester R. The tax caot be "out of all appropriate proportio to the busiess trasacted by the appellat i that State." Has Rees' The exus is established if the corporatio "avails itself of the 'substatial privilege of carryig o busiess' withi the State." Mobil Oil quotig I the preset case, Exxo does ot dispute that it avails itself of that privilege through its marketig operatios withi Wiscosi. Appellat coteds, however, that this exus is isufficiet to permit iclusio of all of Exxo's corporate icome withi the apportiomet formula. While appellat appears to cocede that Wiscosi may properly apply its apportiomet statute to Exxo's Marketig Departmet icome as established by its separate fuctioal accoutig, see Brief for Appellat 18, 29, 33; Reply Brief for Appellat 2-3, it argues that it has demostrated through its accoutig method what portio of its icome is derived from exploratio ad productio ad from refiigfuctios which do ot occur i Wiscosi ad of which the marketig operatio i that State is ot a itegral part. Appellat relies heavily o Moorma Mfg. The pricipal issue i that case was whether the sigle-factor sales formula used by Iowa to apportio for icome tax purposes the icome of a iterstate busiess was prohibited by either the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause. I the course of that decisio we oted that "[a]ppellat does ot suggest that it has show that a sigificat portio of the icome attributed to Iowa i fact was geerated *221 by its Illiois operatios; the record does ot cotai ay separate accoutig aalysis showig what portio of appellat's profits was attributable to sales, to maufacturig, or to ay other phase of the compay's operatios." See also Exxo coteds that Moorma sactios the use of separate fuctioal accoutig i order to prove
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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the use of separate fuctioal accoutig i order to prove the extraterritorial reach of a state tax statute, ad that its accoutig i this case demostrates that the Wiscosi Supreme Court's applicatio of the state apportiomet statute violates the Due Process Clause. We caot agree. As this Court has o several occasios recogized, a compay's iteral accoutig techiques are ot bidig o a State for tax purposes. For example, i Butler a iterstate busiess challeged the applicatio of the Califoria apportiomet statute. The compay was egaged i the wholesale dry goods ad geeral merchadise busiess as a middlema, ad it had distributig houses i seve States, icludig oe i Califoria. Each house maitaied stocks of goods, had a cogizable territory, had its ow sales force, did its ow solicitatio of sales, made its ow credit ad collectio arragemets, ad kept its ow books. There was, however, a cetral buyig divisio that was able to purchase goods for resale at a lower price. The compay used "recogized accoutig priciples," to allocate all costs ad charges to each house, with certai cetralized expeses allocated amog the houses. Based o that "separate accoutig system," the busiess asserted there was o et icome i Califoria. We cocluded that Califoria could costitutioally apply its apportiomet formula to the compay's total et icome to establish taxable icome, rather tha beig limited to the icome show by the taxpayer's accoutig methods to be attributable to the oe house i that State. The compay had the "distict burde of showig by `clear ad coget evidece' that it results i extraterritorial values beig taxed," *222 ib quotig Norfolk & Wester R. Co. v. North Carolia ex rel. ad the taxpayer's accoutig evidece was isufficiet to meet that burde. "[W]e eed ot impeach the itegrity of that accoutig system to say that it does ot prove appellat's assertio that extraterritorial values are beig taxed. Accoutig practices for icome statemets may vary cosiderably accordig to the problem at had. A particular accoutig system, though useful or ecessary as a busiess aid, may ot fit the differet requiremets whe a State seeks to tax values created by busiess withi its borders. That may be due to the fact, as stated by Mr. Justice Bradeis i Uderwood Typewriter that a State i attemptig to place upo a busiess extedig ito several States `its fair share of the burde of taxatio' is `faced with the impossibility of allocatig specifically the profits eared by the processes coducted withi its borders.' Furthermore, the particular system used may ot reveal the facts basic to the State's determiatio.
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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may ot reveal the facts basic to the State's determiatio. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretto, Ltd. v. Tax I either aspect of the matter, the results of the accoutig system employed by appellat do ot impeach the validity or propriety of the formula which Califoria has applied here." 315 U.S., -508. Similarly, i Mobil Oil we oted that "separate accoutig, while it purports to isolate portios of icome received i various States, may fail to accout for cotributios to icome resultig from fuctioal itegratio, cetralizatio of maagemet, ad ecoomies of scale." Sice such factors arise "from the operatio of the busiess as a whole, it becomes misleadig to characterize the icome of the busiess as havig a sigle idetifiable `source.' Although separate geographical *223 accoutig may be useful for iteral auditig, for purposes of state taxatio it is ot costitutioally required." [7] The dicta i Moorma upo which appellat relies are ot icompatible with these priciples. I Moorma we simply oted that the taxpayer had made o showig that its Illiois operatios were resposible for profits from sales i Iowa. This hardly leads to the coclusio, urged by Exxo here, that a taxpayer's separate fuctioal accoutig, if it purports to separate out icome from various aspects of the busiess, must be accepted as a matter of costitutioal law for state tax purposes. Such evidece may be helpful, but Moorma i o sese reders such accoutig coclusive.[8] The "lichpi of apportioability" for state icome taxatio of a iterstate eterprise is the "uitary-busiess priciple." Mobil Oil If a compay is a uitary busiess, the a State may apply a apportiomet formula to the taxpayer's total icome i order to obtai a "rough approximatio" of the corporate icome that is "reasoably related to the activities coducted withi the taxig State." Moorma Mfg. See also Uderwood Typewriter I order to exclude certai icome from the apportiomet formula, the compay must prove that "the icome was eared i the course of activities urelated to the sale of petroleum products i that State." Mobil Oil The court looks to the "uderlyig ecoomic realities of a *224 uitary busiess," ad the icome must derive from "urelated busiess activity" which costitutes a "discrete busiess eterprise," 442, 439. We agree with the Wiscosi Supreme Court that Exxo is such a uitary busiess ad that Exxo has ot carried its burde of showig that its fuctioal departmets are "discrete busiess eterprises" whose icome is beyod the apportiomet statute of the State. While Exxo may treat its operatioal departmets as idepedet profit ceters, it is oetheless true that this case ivolves a
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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ceters, it is oetheless true that this case ivolves a highly itegrated busiess which beefits from a umbrella of cetralized maagemet ad cotrolled iteractio. As has already bee oted, Exxo's Coordiatio ad Services Maagemet provided may essetial corporate services for the etire compay, icludig the coordiatio of the refiig ad other operatioal fuctios "to obtai a optimum short rage operatig program." App. 189. May of the items sold by appellat i Wiscosi were obtaied through a cetralized purchasig office i Housto whose obvious purpose was to icrease overall corporate profits through bulk purchases ad efficiet allocatio of supplies amog retailers. Cf. Butler Eve the gasolie sold i Wiscosi was available oly because of a exchage agreemet with aother compay arraged by the Supply Departmet, part of Coordiatio ad Services Maagemet, ad the Refiig Departmet. Similarly, sales were facilitated through the use of a uiform credit card system, uiform packagig, brad ames, ad promotioal displays, all ru from the atioal headquarters. The importat lik amog the three mai operatig departmets of appellat was stated most clearly i the *225 testimoy of a Exxo seior vice presidet. This official testified: "[I] ay idustry which is highly capital itesive, such as the petroleum idustry, the fixed operatig costs are highly relative to total operatig costs, ad for this reaso the profitability of such a idustry is very sesitive ad directly related to the full utilizatio of the capacity of the facilities. "So, i the case of the petroleum idustry it iswhere you have high capital ivestmets i refieries, the existece of a assured supply of raw materials ad crude is importat ad the assured ad stable outlet for products is importat, ad therefore whe there arewhe these segmets are uder a sigle corporate etity, it provides for some assurace that the risk of disruptios i refiig operatios are miimized due to supply ad demad imbalaces that may occur from time to time. "[T]he placig idividual segmets uder oe corporate etity does provide greater profits stability for the reaso that oparallel ad omutual ecoomic factors which may affect oe departmet may be offset by the factors existig i aother departmet." App. 224-225. The evidece fully supports the coclusio of the court below that appellat's marketig operatio i Wiscosi is a itegral part of a uitary busiess. Exxo's use of separate fuctioal accoutig, ad its decisio for purposes of corporate accoutability to assig wholesale market values to iterdepartmetal trasfers of products ad supplies, does ot defeat the clear ad sufficiet exus betwee appellat's iterstate activities ad the taxig State. The same aalysis disposes of the
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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ad the taxig State. The same aalysis disposes of the other prog of Exxo's Due Process Clause attack o the Wiscosi statute. Appellat coteds that at least the icome derived from exploratio *226 ad productio must be treated as situs icome ad allocated to the situs State rather tha icluded i the apportiomet statute.[9] Appellee did i fact exclude that icome derived from the sale of crude oil ad gas at the wellhead to third parties. However, the Departmet of Reveue cocluded that the icome characterized through appellat's separate fuctioal accoutig as icome derived from itracorporate trasfer of crude oil ad gas for refiig was part of the "uitary stream" of Exxo's icome ad apportioable. We agree with appellee. As previously oted, appellat's iteral accoutig system is ot bidig o the State for tax purposes. The decisio to assig wholesale market values to iteral trasfers of raw materials for corporate accoutability does ot chage the uitary ature of appellat's busiess. A effective marketig operatio is importat to assure full or early full use of the refiig capacities. Obviously the quality of the refied product affects the marketig operatio. Ad the success of the Exploratio ad Productio Departmet helps to keep the refieries operatig at a capacity which is cost-efficiet. There is ideed a uitary stream of icome, of which the icome derived from iteral trasfers of raw materials from exploratio ad productio to refiig is a part.[10] There is a sufficiet exus to satisfy the Due Process Clause. There is also the ecessary "ratioal relatioship" betwee the icome attributed to the State by the apportiomet formula *227 ad the itrastate value of the busiess. Exxo had a total of $60,073,293 i sales icome from its Wiscosi operatio i the years 1965 through 1968. App. 799. The Wiscosi assessed taxable icome for the four years i questio represeted 0.22 percet of total compay et icome adjusted to the Wiscosi basis, ad Exxo's Wiscosi sales for those years represeted 0.41 percet of total compay 281 N. W. 2d, at 110. This is hardly a case where the State has used its formula to attribute icome "out of all appropriate proportio to the busiess trasacted i that State," Has Rees' 283 U. S., ad applicatio of the formula has ot "led to a grossly distorted result," Norfolk & Wester R. See also Moorma Mfg. That Exxo's Wiscosi marketig operatio, through the use of separate geographic accoutig, failed to show a et profit for the years i questio does ot chage this ratioal relatioship. Butler 315 U. S., -508; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretto, Cf.
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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Butler 315 U. S., -508; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretto, Cf. Uderwood Typewriter The Wiscosi Supreme Court's applicatio of (1) ad (2) i this case does ot violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteeth Amedmet. III Appellat also coteds that the Commerce Clause requires allocatio of all icome derived from its exploratio ad productio fuctio to the situs State rather tha iclusio of such icome i the apportiomet formula.[11] The Court must therefore examie the "practical effect" of the tax to *228 determie whether it "`is applied to a activity with a substatial exus with the taxig State, is fairly apportioed, does ot discrimiate agaist iterstate commerce, ad is fairly related to the services provided by the State.'" Mobil Oil quotig Complete Auto Trasit, Ic. v. Brady, See also Japa Lie, Ltd. v. Couty of Los Ageles, ; Washigto Reveue Dept. v. Associatio of Wash. Stevedorig Cos., It has already bee demostrated that the ecessary exus is preset ad that the tax is fairly apportioed. Similarly, appellat does ot cotest the coclusio that the tax is fairly related to the services redered by Wiscosi, which iclude police ad fire protectio, the beefit of a traied work force, ad "the advatages of a civilized society." Japa Lie, Ltd. v. Couty of Los Ageles, Exxo asserts, however, that Wiscosi's taxig statute, as applied, subjects iterstate busiess to a ufair burde of multiple taxatio. We were faced with a very similar argumet i Mobil Oil ad we reject it ow for the same reasos we rejected it i that case. Here, as i that prior case, the State seeks to tax icome, ot property owership. Similarly, it is the risk of multiple taxatio that is beig asserted; actual multiple taxatio has ot bee show.[12] While of course "the costitutioality of a [Wiscosi] *229 tax should ot deped o the vagaries of [aother State's] tax policy," oetheless "the absece of ay existig duplicative tax does alter the ature of appellat's claim." Exxo asserts, i essece, that the Commerce Clause requires allocatio of exploratio ad productio icome to the situs State rather tha apportiomet amog the States, regardless of the situs State's actual tax policy. Cf. (divided icome). We do ot agree. As was the case with icome from itagibles, there is othig "talismaic" about the cocept of situs for icome from exploratio ad productio of crude oil ad gas. Presumably, the States i which appellat's crude oil ad gas productio is located are permitted to tax i some maer the icome derived from that productio, there beig a obvious exus betwee the taxpayer ad
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Justice Marshall
| 1,980 | 15 |
majority
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Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110297/exxon-corp-v-department-of-revenue-of-wis/
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productio, there beig a obvious exus betwee the taxpayer ad those States. However, "there is o reaso i theory why that power should be exclusive whe the [exploratio ad productio icome as distiguished through separate fuctioal accoutig] reflect[s] icome from a uitary busiess, part of which is coducted i other States. I that situatio, the icome bears relatio to beefits ad privileges coferred by several States. These are the circumstaces i which apportiomet is ordiarily the accepted method." -446. I short the Commerce Clause does ot require that ay icome which a taxpayer is able to separate through accoutig *230 methods ad attribute to exploratio ad productio of crude oil ad gas be allocated to the States i which those productio ceters are located. The geographic locatio of such raw materials does ot alter the fact that such icome is part of the uitary busiess of the iterstate eterprise ad is subject to fair apportiomet amog all States to which there is a sufficiet exus with the iterstate activities of the busiess. The judgmet of the Supreme Court of Wiscosi is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE STEWART took o part i the cosideratio or decisio of this case.
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the circumstances in which the Constitution requires that an indictment be dismissed because of delay between the commission of an offense and the initiation of prosecution. I On March 6, 1975, respondent was indicted for possessing eight firearms stolen from the United States mails, and for dealing in firearms without a license. The offenses were alleged to have occurred between July 25 and August 31, 1973, more than 18 months before the indictment was filed. Respondent moved to dismiss the indictment due to the delay. The District Court conducted a hearing on respondent's motion at which the respondent sought to prove that the delay was unnecessary and that it had prejudiced his defense. In an effort to establish the former proposition, respondent presented a Postal Inspector's report on his investigation that was prepared one month after the crimes were committed, *785 and a stipulation concerning the post-report progress of the probe. The report stated, in brief, that within the first month of the investigation respondent had admitted to Government agents that he had possessed and then sold five of the stolen guns, and that the agents had developed strong evidence linking respondent to the remaining three weapons.[1] The report also stated, however, that the agents had been unable to confirm or refute respondent's claim that he had found the guns in his car when he returned to it after visiting his son, a mail handler, at work.[2] The stipulation into which the Assistant United States Attorney entered indicated that little additional information concerning the crimes was uncovered in the 17 months following the preparation of the Inspector's report.[3] To establish prejudice to the defense, respondent testified that he had lost the testimony of two material witnesses due to the delay. The first witness, Tom Stewart, died more than a year after the alleged crimes occurred. At the hearing *786 respondent claimed that Stewart had been his source for two or three of the guns. The second witness, respondent's brother, died in April 1974, eight months after the crimes were completed. Respondent testified that his brother was present when respondent called Stewart to secure the guns, and witnessed all of respondent's sales. Respondent did not state how the witnesses would have aided the defense had they been willing to testify.[4] The Government made no systematic effort in the District Court to explain its long delay. The Assistant United States Attorney did expressly disagree, however, with defense counsel's suggestion that the investigation had ended after the Postal Inspector's report was prepared. App. 9-. The
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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after the Postal Inspector's report was prepared. App. 9-. The prosecutor also stated that it was the Government's theory that respondent's son, who had access to the mail at the rail-road terminal from which the guns were "possibly stolen," was responsible for the thefts,[5] Finally, the prosecutor elicited somewhat cryptic testimony from the Postal Inspector indicating that the case "as to these particular weapons involves other individuals"; that information had been presented to a grand jury "in regard to this case other than [on] the day of the indictment itself"; and that he had spoken to the prosecutors about the case on four or five occasions. Following the hearing, the District Court filed a brief opinion and order. The court found that by October 2, 1973, the date of the Postal Inspector's report, "the Government had *787 all the information relating to defendant's alleged commission of the offenses charged against him," and that the 17-month delay before the case was presented to the grand jury "had not been explained or justified" and was "unnecessary and unreasonable." The court also found that "[a]s a result of the delay defendant has been prejudiced by reason of the death of Tom Stewart, a material witness on his behalf." Pet. for Cert. 14a. Accordingly, the court dismissed the indictment. The Government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In its brief the Government explained the months of inaction by stating: "[T]here was a legitimate Government interest in keeping the investigation open in the instant case. The defendant's son worked for the Terminal Railroad and had access to mail. It was the Government's position that the son was responsible for the theft and therefore further investigation to establish this fact was important. ". Although the investigation did not continue on a full time basis, there was contact between the United States Attorney's office and the Postal Inspector's office throughout and certain matters were brought before a Federal Grand Jury prior to the determination that the case should be presented for indictment" Brief for United States in No. 75-1852 (CA8), pp. 5-6. The Court of Appeals accepted the Government's representation as to the motivation for the delay, but a majority of the court nevertheless affirmed the District Court's finding that the Government's actions were "unjustified, unnecessary, and unreasonable." The majority also found that respondent had established that his defense had been impaired by the loss of Stewart's testimony because it understood respondent to contend that "were Stewart's testimony available it would support [respondent's] claim that he did not know that the
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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support [respondent's] claim that he did not know that the guns were stolen from the United States *788 mails." The court therefore affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the three possession counts by a divided vote.[6] We granted certiorari, and now reverse.[7] II In United this Court considered the significance, for constitutional purposes, of a lengthy preindictment delay. We held that as far as the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment is concerned, such delay is wholly irrelevant, since our analysis of the language, history, and purposes of the Clause persuaded us that only "a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge engage the particular protections" of *789 that provision.[8] We went on to note that statutes of limitations, which provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecutorial delay, provide " `the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.' " quoting United But we did acknowledge that the "statute of limitations does not fully define [defendants'] rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment," and that the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. Respondent seems to argue that due process bars prosecution whenever a defendant suffers prejudice as a result of preindictment delay. To support that proposition respondent relies on the concluding sentence of the Court's opinion in where, in remanding the case, we stated that "[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time appellees' due process claims are speculative and premature." But the quoted sentence establishes only that proof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication, not that it makes the claim automatically valid. Indeed, two pages earlier in the opinion we expressly rejected the argument respondent advances here: "[W]e need not determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting from preaccusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution. Actual *790 prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may result from the shortest and most necessary delay; and no one suggests that every delay-caused detriment to a defendant's case should abort a criminal prosecution." (Footnotes omitted.) Thus makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. The Court of Appeals found that the sole reason for the delay here was "a hope on the part of the Government that others might be
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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on the part of the Government that others might be discovered who may have participated in the theft" 532 F.2d, at It concluded that this hope did not justify the delay, and therefore affirmed the dismissal of the indictment. But the Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek an indictment. Judges are not free, in defining "due process," to impose on law enforcement officials our "personal and private notions" of fairness and to "disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function." Our task is more circumscribed. We are to determine only whether the action complained ofhere, compelling respondent to stand trial after the Government delayed indictment to investigate furtherviolates those "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions," and which define "the community's sense of fair play and decency," 3. See also ; Lisenba v. ; ; Hurtado v. It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of *791 justice" when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause.[9] It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty "would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself," United From the perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when probable cause is established is undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but untried.[] These costs are by no means insubstantial since, as we recognized in a formal accusation may "interfere with the defendant's liberty, disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends." 404 U.S., From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible *792 by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited.[11] And from the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts.[12] Thus, no one's interests would be well served by compelling prosecutors to initiate prosecutions as soon as they are legally entitled to do so.[13] It might be argued that once the Government has assembled sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it should be constitutionally required to file charges promptly, even if its investigation of the entire criminal transaction is not complete. Adopting such a rule, however, would have many of the same consequences as adopting a rule requiring immediate prosecution upon probable cause. First, compelling a prosecutor to file public charges as soon as the requisite proof has been developed against one *793 participant on one charge would cause numerous problems in those cases in which a criminal transaction involves more than one person or more than one illegal act. In some instances, an immediate arrest or indictment would impair the prosecutor's ability to continue his investigation, thereby preventing society from bringing lawbreakers to justice. In other cases, the prosecutor would be able to obtain additional indictments despite an early prosecution, but the necessary result would be multiple trials involving a single set of facts. Such trials place needless burdens on defendants, law enforcement officials, and courts. Second, insisting on immediate prosecution once sufficient evidence is developed to obtain a conviction would pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in favor of early and possibly unwarranted The determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions. In the instant case, for example, since respondent admitted possessing at least five of the firearms, the primary factual issue in dispute was whether respondent knew the guns were stolen as required by 18 U.S. C. 8. Not surprisingly, the Postal Inspector's report contained no direct evidence bearing on this issue. The decision whether to prosecute, therefore, required a necessarily subjective evaluation of the strength of the circumstantial evidence available and the credibility of respondent's denial. Even if a prosecutor concluded that the case was weak and further investigation appropriate, he would have no assurance that a reviewing court would agree. To avoid the risk that a subsequent indictment would be dismissed for preindictment delay, the prosecutor might feel constrained to file premature charges, with all the disadvantages that would entail.[14] *794 Finally, requiring the Government
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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the disadvantages that would entail.[14] *794 Finally, requiring the Government to make charging decisions immediately upon assembling evidence sufficient to establish guilt would preclude the Government from giving full consideration to the desirability of not prosecuting in particular cases. The decision to file criminal charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government's case, in order to determine whether prosecution would be in the public interest.[15] Prosecutors often need more information than proof of a suspect's guilt, therefore, before deciding whether to seek an indictment. Again the instant case provides a useful illustration. Although proof of the identity of the mail thieves was not necessary to convict respondent of the possessory crimes with which he was charged, it might have been crucial in assessing respondent's culpability, as distinguished from his legal guilt. If, for example, further investigation were to show that respondent had no role in or advance knowledge of the theft and simply *795 agreed, out of paternal loyalty, to help his son dispose of the guns once respondent discovered his son had stolen them, the United States Attorney might have decided not to prosecute, especially since at the time of the crime respondent was over 60 years old and had no prior criminal record.[16] Requiring prosecution once the evidence of guilt is clear, however, could prevent a prosecutor from awaiting the information necessary for such a decision. We would be most reluctant to adopt a rule which would have these consequences absent a clear constitutional command to do so. We can find no such command in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In our view, investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the accused," United precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided.[17] Rather than deviating from elementary standards of "fair play and decency," a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition" to that of "mere speed," This the Due Process Clause does not require. We therefore hold that to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. In the present case, the Court of Appeals stated that the only reason the Government postponed action
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Justice Marshall
| 1,977 | 15 |
majority
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United States v. Lovasco
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109682/united-states-v-lovasco/
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Appeals stated that the only reason the Government postponed action was to await the results of additional investigation. Although there is, unfortunately, no evidence concerning the reasons for the delay in the record, the court's "finding" is supported by the prosecutor's implicit representation to the District Court, and explicit representation to the Court of Appeals, that the investigation continued during the time that the Government deferred taking action against respondent. The finding is, moreover, buttressed by the Government's repeated assertions in its petition for certiorari, its brief, and its oral argument in this Court, "that the delay was caused by the government's efforts to identify persons in addition to respondent who may have participated in the offenses." Pet. for Cert. 14.[18] We must assume that these statements by counsel have been made in good faith. In light of this explanation, it follows that compelling respondent to stand trial would not be fundamentally unfair. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in affirming the District Court's decision dismissing the indictment. III In we conceded that we could not determine in the abstract the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require dismissing More than five years later, that statement remains true. Indeed, in the intervening years so few defendants have established that they were prejudiced by delay that neither this Court *797 nor any lower court has had a sustained opportunity to consider the constitutional significance of various reasons for delay.[19] We therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first instance, the task of applying the settled principles of due process that we have discussed to the particular circumstances of individual cases. We simply hold that in this case the lower courts erred in dismissing the indictment. Reversed. MR.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about ordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop’s owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same- sex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did not recognize at that time. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimina- tion on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The Commission determined that the shop’s actions violated the Act and ruled in the couple’s favor. The Colo- rado state courts affirmed the ruling and its enforcement order, and this Court now must decide whether the Com- mission’s order violated the Constitution. The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to pro- tect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek 2 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amend- ment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning. One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defin- ing whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these details might make a difference. The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free exercise claim. A baker’s refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decora- tions on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless. Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise principles might be in some cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was incon- sistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality. The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capac- ity as the owner of a business serving the public, might Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be de- termined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires. Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that whatever the outcome of some future controversy involv- ing facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside. I A Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, a suburb of Denver. The shop offers a variety of baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies to elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday parties, weddings, and other events. Jack Phillips is an expert baker who has owned and operated the shop for 24 years. Phillips is a devout Chris- tian. He has explained that his “main goal in life is to be obedient to” Jesus Christ and Christ’s “teachings in all aspects of his life.” App. 148. And he seeks to “honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.” One of Phillips’ religious beliefs is that “God’s intention for mar- riage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.” To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs. 4 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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of the Court Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they entered his shop in the summer of 2012. Craig and Mul- lins were planning to marry. At that time, Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in Massachusetts and afterwards to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver. To pre- pare for their celebration, Craig and Mullins visited the shop and told Phillips that they were interested in order- ing a cake for “our wedding.” (emphasis de- leted). They did not mention the design of the cake they envisioned. Phillips informed the couple that he does not “create” wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. He ex- plained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same sex weddings.” The couple left the shop without further discussion. The following day, Craig’s mother, who had accompa- nied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their interaction with Phillips, telephoned to ask Phillips why he had declined to serve her son. Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize same-sex marriages. He later explained his belief that “to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something that directly goes against the teach- ings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.” B For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrim- ination in places of public accommodation. In 1885, less than a decade after Colorado achieved statehood, the General Assembly passed “An Act to Protect All Citizens Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court in Their Civil Rights,” which guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment” of certain public facilities to “all citizens,” “regardless of race, color or previous condition of servi- tude.” 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132–133. A decade later, the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply to “all other places of public accommodation.” 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139. Today, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) carries forward the state’s tradition of prohibiting discrim- ination in places of public accommodation. Amended in 2007 and 2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as other protected characteris- tics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows: “It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a per- son, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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per- son, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital sta- tus, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal en- joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public ac- commodation.” –34–601(2)(a) (2017). The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include any “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services to the public,” but excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes.” CADA establishes an administrative system for the resolution of discrimination claims. Complaints of dis- crimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first instance by the Colorado Civil Rights Division. The Divi- sion investigates each claim; and if it finds probable cause that CADA has been violated, it will refer the matter to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission, 6 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court in turn, decides whether to initiate a formal hearing be- fore a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who will hear evidence and argument before issuing a written decision. See 24–4–105(14). The decision of the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven- member appointed body. The Commission holds a public hearing and deliberative session before voting on the case. If the Commission determines that the evidence proves a CADA violation, it may impose remedial measures as provided by statute. See Available reme- dies include, among other things, orders to cease-and- desist a discriminatory policy, to file regular compliance reports with the Commission, and “to take affirmative action, including the posting of notices setting forth the substantive rights of the public.” Colorado law does not permit the Commission to assess money damages or fines. 24–34–605. C Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in August 2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop. App. 31. The complaint alleged that Craig and Mullins had been denied “full and equal service” at the bakery because of their sexual orientation, and that it was Phillips’ “standard business practice” not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings, The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation. The investigator found that “on multiple occasions,” Phillips “turned away potential customers on the basis of their sexual orientation, stating that he could not create a cake for a same-sex wedding ceremony or reception” because his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential customers “were doing something illegal” at
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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and because the potential customers “were doing something illegal” at that time. The investigation found that Phillips had de- clined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court same-sex couples on this basis. The investiga- tor also recounted that, according to affidavits submitted by Craig and Mullins, Phillips’ shop had refused to sell cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment celebra- tion because the shop “had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.” at 73. Based on these findings, the Division found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA and referred the case to the Civil Rights Commission. The Commission found it proper to conduct a formal hearing, and it sent the case to a State ALJ. Finding no dispute as to material facts, the ALJ entertained cross- motions for summary judgment and ruled in the couple’s favor. The ALJ first rejected Phillips’ argument that declining to make or create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins did not violate Colorado law. It was undisputed that the shop is subject to state public accommodations laws. And the ALJ determined that Phillips’ actions constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex- ual orientation, not simply opposition to same-sex marriage as Phillips contended. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–72a. Phillips raised two constitutional claims before the ALJ. He first asserted that applying CADA in a way that would require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his First Amendment right to free speech by com- pelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed. The ALJ rejected the contention that preparing a wedding cake is a form of protected speech and did not agree that creating Craig and Mullins’ cake would force Phillips to adhere to “an ideolog- ical point of view.” at 75a. Applying CADA to the facts at hand, in the ALJ’s view, did not interfere with Phillips’ freedom of speech. Phillips also contended that requiring him to create cakes for same-sex weddings would violate his right to the free exercise of religion, also protected by the First 8 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court Amendment. Citing this Court’s precedent in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the ALJ determined that CADA is a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” and therefore that applying it to Phillips in this case did not violate the Free
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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to Phillips in this case did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a– 83a. The ALJ thus ruled against Phillips and the cakeshop and in favor of Craig and Mullins on both consti- tutional claims. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full. at 57a. The Commission ordered Phillips to “cease and desist from discriminating against same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they] would sell to heterosexual couples.” It also ordered additional remedial measures, including “comprehensive staff training on the Public Accommodations section” of CADA “and changes to any and all company policies to comply with this Order.” at 58a. The Commission additionally required Phillips to prepare “quarterly com- pliance reports” for a period of two years documenting “the number of patrons denied service” and why, along with “a statement describing the remedial actions taken.” Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission’s legal determinations and remedial order. The court rejected the argument that the “Commission’s order unconstitutionally compels” Phillips and the shop “to convey a celebratory message about same sex marriage.” Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (2015). The court also rejected the argu- ment that the Commission’s order violated the Free Exer- cise Clause. Relying on this Court’s precedent in Smith, the court stated that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicabil- ity” on the ground that following the law would interfere with religious practice or The Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the statute did not violate his free exercise rights. The Colo- rado Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Phillips sought review here, and this Court granted certiorari. 582 U. S. (2017). He now renews his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. II A Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances pro- tected forms of expression. As this Court
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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some instances pro- tected forms of expression. As this Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. (2015), “[t]he First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.” at (slip op., at 27). Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applica- ble public accommodations law. See (per curiam); see also (1995) (“Provisions like these are well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to 10 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments”). When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion. This refusal would be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of religion, an exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth. Yet if that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma in- consistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations. It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public. And there are no doubt innumera- ble goods and services that no one could argue implicate the First Amendment. Petitioners conceded, moreover, that if a baker refused to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings, that would be a different matter and the State would have a strong case under this Court’s prece- dents that this would be a denial of goods and services that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the general public
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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baker who offers goods and services to the general public and is subject to a neutrally applied and generally applicable public accommodations law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 10. Phillips claims, however, that a narrower issue is pre- sented. He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 11 Opinion of the Court his own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would see the case, this contention has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere religious beliefs. In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a line where the customers’ rights to goods and services became a demand for him to exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message, a message he could not express in a way con- sistent with his religious beliefs. Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable given the background of legal principles and administra- tion of the law in Colorado at that time. His decision and his actions leading to the refusal of service all occurred in the year 2012. At that point, Colorado did not recognize the validity of gay marriages performed in its own State. See Colo. Const., Art. II, (2012); At the time of the events in question, this Court had not issued its decisions either in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), or Obergefell. Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take place in another State. At the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages the store- keeper considered offensive. Indeed, while enforcement proceedings against Phillips were ongoing, the Colorado Civil Rights Division itself endorsed this proposition in cases involving other bakers’ creation of cakes, concluding on at least three occasions that a baker acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned 12 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court gay persons or gay marriages. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bak- ery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24, 2015). There were, to be sure, responses to these arguments that the State could make when it contended for a differ- ent result in seeking the enforcement of its generally applicable state regulations of businesses that serve the public. And any decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs say- ing “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons. But, nonetheless, Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case. B The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phil- lips was entitled was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection. That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May 30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider Phillips’ case. At several points during its meet- ing, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business community. One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe “what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do business in the Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 13 Opinion of the Court state.” Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the— the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.” Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different inter- pretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s personal views. On the other hand, they might be seen as inappro- priate and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view of the comments that followed, the latter seems the more likely. On July 25,
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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followed, the latter seems the more likely. On July 25, 2014, the Commission met again. This meeting, too, was conducted in public and on the record. On this occasion another commissioner made specific reference to the previous meeting’s discussion but said far more to disparage Phillips’ beliefs. The commissioner stated: “I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimi- nation throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” Tr. 11–12. To describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use” is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetori- 14 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court cal—something insubstantial and even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is inappro- priate for a Commission charged with the solemn respon- sibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s anti- discrimination law—a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation. The record shows no objection to these comments from other commissioners. And the later state-court ruling reviewing the Commission’s decision did not mention those comments, much less express concern with their content. Nor were the comments by the commissioners disavowed in the briefs filed in this Court. For these reasons, the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case. Members of the Court have disagreed on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion. See Church of Lukumi Babalu 540– 542 (1993); (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In this case, however, the re- marks were made in a very different context—by an adju- dicatory body deciding a particular case. Another indication of hostility is the difference in treat- ment between Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers who objected to a requested cake on
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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of other bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and prevailed before the Commission. As noted above, on at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text. Each time, the Division found that the baker acted lawfully in refus- ing service. It made these determinations because, in the Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 15 Opinion of the Court words of the Division, the requested cake included “word- ing and images [the baker] deemed derogatory,” Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X, at 4; featured “language and images [the baker] deemed hateful,” Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, at 4; or displayed a message the baker “deemed as discriminatory, Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 4. The treatment of the conscience-based objections at issue in these three cases contrasts with the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ objection. The Commission ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message the requested wedding cake would carry would be at- tributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Divi- sion did not address this point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism. Additionally, the Division found no violation of CADA in the other cases in part because each bakery was willing to sell other products, including those depict- ing Christian themes, to the prospective customers. But the Commission dismissed Phillips’ willingness to sell “birthday cakes, shower cakes, [and] cookies and brown- ies,” App. 152, to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant. The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be distinguished. In short, the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did not accord with its treatment of these other objections. Before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Phillips protested that this disparity in treatment reflected hostility on the part of the Commission toward his beliefs. He argued that the Commission had treated the other bakers’ conscience- based objections as legitimate, but treated his as illegiti- mate—thus sitting in judgment of his religious beliefs themselves. The Court of Appeals addressed the disparity 16 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court only in passing and relegated its complete analysis of the issue to a footnote. There, the court stated that “[t]his case is distinguishable from
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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There, the court stated that “[t]his case is distinguishable from the Colorado Civil Rights Division’s recent findings that [the other bakeries] in Denver did not discriminate against a Christian patron on the basis of his creed” when they refused to create the requested n. 8. In those cases, the court continued, there was no impermissible discrimi- nation because “the Division found that the bakeries refuse[d] the patron’s request because of the offensive nature of the requested message.” A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness. Just as “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,” West Virginia Bd. of it is not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall be offensive. See Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. – (2017) (opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 22–23). The Colorado court’s at- tempt to account for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The court’s footnote does not, therefore, answer the baker’s concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection. C For the reasons just described, the Commission’s treat- ment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hos- tility to a religion or religious viewpoint. In Church of Lukumi Babalu the Court made clear that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 17 Opinion of the Court regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of af- fected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. The Free Exercise Clause bars even “subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of religion. Here, that means the Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remem- ber their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.” Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include “the historical background of the deci- sion under challenge, the
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