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Justice Kennedy
| 2,018 | 4 |
majority
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503819/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/
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“the historical background of the deci- sion under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contempo- raneous statements made by members of the decisionmak- ing body.” In view of these factors the record here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of Phil- lips’ religious beliefs. The Commission gave “every ap- pearance,” of adjudicating Phillips’ religious objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of the particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for it. It hardly requires restating that government has no role in deciding or even suggest- ing whether the religious ground for Phillips’ conscience- based objection is legitimate or illegitimate. On these facts, the Court must draw the inference that Phillips’ religious objection was not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires. While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be concluded that the State’s interest could have been 18 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N Opinion of the Court weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. The official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ com- ments—comments that were not disavowed at the Com- mission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commis- sion’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For these reasons, the order must be set aside. III The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. How- ever later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be invalidated. The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be re- solved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Madison v. Alabama
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
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The Eighth Amendment, this Court has held, prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from “rational[ly] understanding” why the State seeks to impose that punishment. v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007). In this case, Vernon ar- gued that his memory loss and dementia entitled him to a stay of execution, but an Alabama court denied the relief. We now address two questions relating to the Eighth Amendment’s bar, disputed below but not in this Court. First, does the Eighth Amendment forbid execution when- ever a prisoner shows that a mental disorder has left him without any memory of committing his crime? We (and, now, the parties) think not, because a person lacking such a memory may still be able to form a rational understand- ing of the reasons for his death sentence. Second, does the Eighth Amendment apply similarly to a prisoner suffering from dementia as to one experiencing psychotic delusions? We (and, now, the parties) think so, because either condi- tion may—or, then again, may not—impede the requisite comprehension of his punishment. The only issue left, on which the parties still disagree, is what those rulings 2 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court mean for ’s own execution. We direct that issue to the state court for further consideration in light of this opinion. I A This Court decided in (1986), that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments precludes executing a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing. While on death row, Alvin was beset by “pervasive delu- sion[s]” associated with “[p]aranoid [s]chizophrenia.” at 402–403. Surveying both the common law and state statutes, the Court found a uniform practice against tak- ing the life of such a prisoner. See –409. Among the reasons for that time-honored bar, the Court ex- plained, was a moral “intuition” that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand his crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.” ; see at 409 (citing the “natural abhorrence civilized societies feel” at perform- ing such an act). Another rationale rested on the lack of “retributive value” in executing a person who has no com- prehension of the meaning of the community’s judgment. ; see (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that the death penalty’s “retributive force[ ] depends on the defendant’s awareness of the penalty’s existence and purpose”). The resulting rule, now stated as a matter of constitutional law, held “a category of defendants defined by their mental state” incompetent to be executed. The Court clarified the scope of that category in v. Quarterman
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
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Court clarified the scope of that category in v. Quarterman by focusing on whether a prisoner can “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” Like Alvin Scott suffered from “gross delusions” stemming from “extreme psychosis.” In reversing a Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 3 Opinion of the Court ruling that he could still be executed, the Court set out the appropriate “standard for competency.” at 957. the Court now noted, had not provided “specific criteria.” But had explored what lay behind the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition, high- lighting that the execution of a prisoner who cannot com- prehend the reasons for his punishment offends moral values and “serves no retributive purpose.” 551 U.S., at 958. Those principles, the Court explained, indi- cate how to identify prisoners whom the State may not execute. The critical question is whether a “prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness” that he lacks a “rational understanding” of “the State’s rationale for [his] execution.” 58–959. Or similarly put, the issue is whether a “prisoner’s concept of reality” is “so impair[ed]” that he cannot grasp the execution’s “meaning and purpose” or the “link between [his] crime and its punishment.” B Vernon killed a police officer in 1985 during a domestic dispute. An Alabama jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. He has spent most of the ensuing decades on the State’s death row. In recent years, ’s mental condition has sharply deteriorated. suffered a series of strokes, includ- ing major ones in 2015 and 2016. See Tr. 19, 46–47 (Apr. 14, 2016). He was diagnosed as having vascular dementia, with attendant disorientation and confusion, cognitive impairment, and memory loss. See at 19–20, 52–54. In particular, claims that he can no longer recol- lect committing the crime for which he has been sentenced to die. See Tr., Pet. Exh. 2, p. 8. After his 2016 stroke, petitioned the trial court for a stay of execution on the ground that he had become 4 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court mentally incompetent. Citing and he argued that “he no longer understands” the “status of his case” or the “nature of his conviction and sentence.” Pet. for Sus- pension in No. CC–85–1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Feb. 12, 2016), pp. 11, 14. And in a later filing, emphasized that he could not “independently recall the facts of the offense he is convicted of.” Brief Pursuant to Order (Apr. 21, 2016), p. 8. Alabama countered that Mad- ison had “a rational understanding of [the reasons
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
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that Mad- ison had “a rational understanding of [the reasons for] his impending execution,” as required by and even assuming he had no memory of committing his crime. Brief on ’s Competency (April 21, 2016), pp. 4–5, 8. And more broadly, the State claimed that could not possibly qualify as incompetent under those two decisions because both “concerned themselves with ‘[g]ross delusions’ ”—which all agree does not have. at 2; see ( “failed to implicate” and because he “does not suffer from psychosis or delusions”). Expert reports from two psychologists largely aligned with the parties’ contending positions. Dr. John Goff, ’s expert, found that although “un- derst[ood] the nature of execution” in the abstract, he did not comprehend the “reasoning behind” Alabama’s effort to execute him. Tr., Pet. Exh. 2 (Apr. 14, 2016), p. 8; see Goff stated that had “Major Vascular Neurological Disorder”— called vascular dementia— which had caused “significant cognitive decline.” And Goff underscored that “demonstrate[d] retrograde amnesia” about his crime, meaning that he had no “independent recollection[ ]” of the murder. ; see For his part, Dr. Karl Kirkland, the court- appointed expert, reported that “was able to discuss his case” accurately and “appear[ed] to understand his legal situation.” Tr., Ct. Exh. 1, pp. 10–11. Although Kirkland acknowledged that ’s strokes had led to Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 5 Opinion of the Court cognitive decline, see the psychologist made no men- tion of ’s diagnosed vascular dementia. Rather, Kirkland highlighted that “[t]here was no evidence of psychosis, paranoia, or delusion.” ; see (Mad- ison “did not seem delusional at all”). At a competency hearing, Alabama similarly stressed ’s absence of psychotic episodes or delusions. The State asked both experts to affirm that was “neither delusional [n]or psychotic.” Tr. 56; see And its closing argument focused on their agreement that he was not. As the State summarized: “He’s not psychotic. He’s not delusional.” 1. On the State’s view, that fact answered the competency question because “[t]he Supreme Court is looking at whether someone’s delusions or someone’s paranoia or someone’s psychosis is standing in the way of ” rationally understanding his punishment. 2. ’s counsel disputed that point. “[T]he State would like to say, well, he’s not delusional, he’s not psychotic,” the attorney recapped. 3. But, she continued, “[t]hat’s not really the criteria” under Tr. 83. Rather, the Court there barred executing a person with any mental illness—“dementia” and “brain injuries” no less than psychosis and delusions—that prevents him from comprehending “why he is being executed.” The trial court found competent to be executed. Its order first
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
trial court found competent to be executed. Its order first recounted the evidence given by each expert witness. The summary of Kirkland’s report and testimony began by stating that the psychologist had “found no evidence of paranoia[,] delusion [or] psychosis.” Order (Apr. 29, 2016), p. 5 (2016 Order). The court then noted Kirkland’s view that could “give details of the history of his case” and “appear[ed] to understand his legal situation.” Turning to the Goff report, the court noted the expert’s finding that was “amne- sic” and could not recollect his crime. ; see at 7. In a single, final paragraph, the court provided both its 6 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court ruling and its reasoning. had failed to show, the court wrote, that he did not “rationally understand the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” The court “accept[ed] the testimony of Dr. Kirkland as to the understanding has concerning the situation.” “Further,” the court concluded, “the evidence does not support that Mr. Madi- son is delusional.” next sought habeas relief in federal court, where he faced the heavy burden of showing that the state-court ruling “involved an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly established federal law” or rested on an “un- reasonable determination of the facts.” Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S. C. The District Court rejected his petition, but the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Madi- son had demonstrated both kinds of indisputable error. See This Court then summarily reversed the appeals court’s decision. See Dunn v. 583 U. S. (per curiam). We explained, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s principal holding, that “[n]either nor ‘clearly established’ that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed” because of a simple failure to remember his crime. at (slip op., at 4). And we found that the state court did not act unreasonably—otherwise put, did not err “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”—when it found that had the necessary understanding to be executed. But we made clear that our decision was premised on AEDPA’s “demanding” and “deferential standard.” at (slip op., 4). “We express[ed] no view” on the question of ’s competency “outside of the AEDPA context.” at (slip op., at 4).1 —————— 1 Neither did we opine on—or even mention—the subsidiary legal Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 7 Opinion of the Court When Alabama set an execution date in 2018, returned to state court to argue again that his mental condition precluded the State from going forward. In his petition, reiterated the
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
the State from going forward. In his petition, reiterated the facts and arguments he had previously presented to the state court. But claimed that since that court’s decision (1) he had suffered further cognitive decline and (2) a state board had suspended Kirkland’s license to practice psychology, thus discrediting his prior testimony. See Pet. to Suspend Execution in No. CC–85–1385.80 pp. 1–2, 16–19.2 Alabama responded that nothing material had changed since the court’s first com- petency hearing. See Motion to Dismiss p. 9. The State repeated its argument that permits executing pointing to the experts’ agreement that he is “not delusional or psychotic” and —————— question whether a mental disorder other than delusions may render a person incompetent to be executed. Alabama told the Eleventh Circuit that it could not, thus reprising the claim the State had made in the trial court. See (describing Alabama’s argument that “only a prisoner suffering from gross delusions can show incompetency under ”); Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 16–12279 (CA11, June 23, 2016), at 26:36–26:45 (“In this case, what we have is someone who claims to have a mental illness, dementia,” but does not have “delusions, which is what requires”); at 26:48–27:21 (When asked if someone with “severe dementia” but no delusions could be executed, the State responded “I think so because they don’t have delusions”). (Alabama alternatively argued that the state court’s decision was not based on that view, see Brief for Appellee in No. 16– 12279 (CA11), pp. 37–38; the quotations the dissent picks out, see post, n. 4, come from that additional argument.) The Eleventh Circuit rejected the State’s contention that dementia could not preclude an execution as “inconsistent with the principles underlying” and But we had no reason to address that holding in light of the errors we saw in other parts of the appeals court’s analysis. 2 As ’s petition recounted, the license suspension followed the opening of a criminal investigation into whether Kirkland had commit- ted narcotics offenses. See Pet. to Suspend Execution 17–19. 8 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court asserting that neither “memory impairment [n]or demen- tia [could] suffice to satisfy the and stand- ards” without “an expansion” of those decisions. Motion to Dismiss 4, 10. A week before the scheduled execution, the state court again found mentally competent. Its brief order stated only that “did not provide a substantial threshold showing of insanity[ ] sufficient to convince this Court to stay the execution.” App. A to Pet. for Cert. then filed in this Court a request to stay his execution and a petition
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
Court a request to stay his execution and a petition for certiorari. We ordered the stay on the scheduled execution date and granted the petition a few weeks later. See 583 U. S. (2018). Because the case now comes to us on direct review of the state court’s decision (rather than in a habeas proceeding), AEDPA’s deferential standard no longer governs. (And for that reason—contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 12—our decision on ’s habeas petition cannot help resolve the questions raised here.) II Two issues relating to ’s application are before us. Recall that our decision there held the Eighth Amendment to forbid executing a prisoner whose mental illness makes him unable to “reach a rational understand- ing of the reason for [his] execution.” ; see at 2–3. The first question presented is whether prohibits executing merely because he cannot remember committing his crime. The second ques- tion raised is whether permits executing merely because he suffers from dementia, rather than psychotic delusions.3 In prior stages of this case, as we —————— 3 The dissent is in high dudgeon over our taking up the second ques- tion, arguing that it was not presented in ’s petition for certio- rari. See post, at 1–6. But that is incorrect. The petition presented two questions—the same two we address here. The first question asked Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 9 Opinion of the Court have described, the parties disagreed about those matters. See at 4–8. But at this Court, accepted Alabama’s positon on the first issue and Alabama accepted ’s on the second. See, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 36. And rightly so. As the parties now recognize, the standard set out in supplies the answers to both questions. First, a person lacking memory of his crime may yet ra- tionally understand why the State seeks to execute him; if so, the Eighth Amendment poses no bar to his execution. Second, a person suffering from dementia may be unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment does not allow his execution. What matters is whether a person has the “rational un- derstanding” requires—not whether he has any particular memory or any particular mental illness. A Consider initially a person who cannot remember his crime because of a mental disorder, but who otherwise has —————— whether the Eighth Amendment bars executing because he has no “memory of his commission of the capital offense.” Pet. for Cert. iii. The second question asked whether that Amendment bars his execution because his “vascular dementia” and “severe cognitive dys-
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
his execution because his “vascular dementia” and “severe cognitive dys- function” prevent him from either remembering his crime “or under- standing the circumstances of his scheduled execution.” So the first question concerned whether memory loss alone could form the basis of a claim and the second whether the varied consequences of dementia could do so. The body of the petition, to be sure, devoted more space to the first question. But it clearly referenced the second. See Pet. for Cert. 18 (“[T]his Court has never sought to constrain the world of maladies that can give rise to a finding that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed”); (“[C]ourts have recognized dementia and attendant cognitive decline and memory impairment as a basis for a finding of incompetency to be executed”). And in any event, the number of words spent on each is not what matters. Our Rule states that the Court will consider “[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein.” This Court’s Rule 14.1(a). Here, we consider, in order, the two questions set out in ’s petition. 10 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court full cognitive function. The memory loss is genuine: Let us say the person has some kind of amnesia, which has produced a black hole where that recollection should be. But the person remains oriented in time and place; he can make logical connections and order his thoughts; and he comprehends familiar concepts of crime and punishment. Can the State execute him for a murder? When we con- sidered this case before, using the deferential standard applicable in habeas, we held that a state court could allow such an execution without committing inarguable error. See 583 U. S., at (slip op., at 4) (stat- ing that no prior decision had “clearly established” the opposite); Today, we address the issue straight-up, sans any deference to a state court. Again, is the failure to remember committing a crime alone enough to prevent a State from executing a prisoner? It is not, under ’s own terms. That decision asks about understanding, not memory—more specifically, about a person’s understanding of why the State seeks capital punishment for a crime, not his memory of the crime itself. And the one may exist without the other. Do you have an independent recollection of the Civil War? Obviously not. But you may still be able to reach a rational—indeed, a sophisticated—understanding of that conflict and its consequences. Do you recall your first day of school? Probably not. But if your mother told you years later that you were sent
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
your mother told you years later that you were sent home for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping the story. And similarly, if you somehow blacked out a crime you committed, but later learned what you had done, you could well appreci- ate the State’s desire to impose a penalty. Assuming, that is, no other cognitive impairment, loss of memory of a crime does not prevent rational understanding of the State’s reasons for resorting to punishment. And that kind of comprehension is the standard’s singular focus. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 11 Opinion of the Court The same answer follows from the core justifications offered for framing its Eighth Amendment test as it did. Echoing reasoned that execution has no retributive value when a prisoner cannot appreciate the meaning of a community’s judgment. See 551 U.S., at 958–959 (citing –408); But as just explained, a person who can no longer remember a crime may yet recognize the retributive message society intends to convey with a death sentence. Similarly, and stated that it “offends humanity” to execute a person so wracked by mental illness that he cannot com- prehend the “meaning and purpose of the punishment.” ; 551 U. S., 60; see 58. But that offense to morality must be much less when a per- son’s mental disorder causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss. Moral values do not exempt the simply forgetful from punishment, whatever the neurological reason for their lack of recall. But such memory loss still may factor into the “rational understanding” analysis that demands. If that loss combines and interacts with other mental shortfalls to deprive a person of the capacity to comprehend why the State is exacting death as punishment, then the standard will be satisfied. That may be so when a person has difficulty preserving any memories, so that even newly gained knowledge (about, say, the crime and punishment) will be quickly forgotten. Or it may be so when cognitive deficits prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that memory gaps go forever uncompensated. As indicated, neurologists, psychologists, and other experts can contribute to a court’s understanding of issues of that kind. See 62. But the sole inquiry for the court remains whether the prisoner can rationally understand the reasons for his death sentence. 12 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court B Next consider a prisoner who suffers from dementia or a similar disorder, rather than psychotic delusions. The dementia, as is typical, has compromised this prisoner’s cognitive functions. But it has not resulted in the kind
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
cognitive functions. But it has not resulted in the kind of delusional beliefs that Alvin and Scott held. May the prisoner nonetheless receive a stay of execution under and ? Or instead, is a delusional disor- der a prerequisite to declaring a mentally ill person in- competent to be executed? We did not address that issue when we last considered this case, on habeas review; in that sense, the question is one of first impression. See n. 1. But here too, has already answered the ques- tion. Its standard focuses on whether a mental disorder has had a particular effect: an inability to rationally un- derstand why the State is seeking execution. See at 2–3. Conversely, that standard has no interest in es- tablishing any precise cause: Psychosis or dementia, delu- sions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under so long as they produce the requisite lack of com- prehension. To be sure, on occasion spoke of “gross delusions” in explaining its holding. 551 U.S., at 960. And similarly, talked about the “insane,” which sometimes refers to persons holding such irrational be- liefs. See, 410.4 But those refer- ences are no more than a predictable byproduct of the two cases’ facts. At the same time (and interchangeably), used more inclusive terms, such as “mental ill- —————— 4 Alternatively, however, the term may be used to encompass persons with other mental conditions, so long as they are “severe enough [to] prevent[ ] a person from having legal capacity and excuse[ ] the person from criminal or civil responsibility.” Black’s Law Diction- ary 914 (10th ed. 2014). In that different understanding, “insanity” connotes a general standard of legal competency rather than a more limited description of delusional disorders. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 13 Opinion of the Court ness,” “mental disorder,” and “psychological dysfunction.” 551 U.S., 36, 959, 960; see – 409, n. 2 (referring to prisoners with “mental illness”). And most important, framed its test, as just de- scribed, in a way utterly indifferent to a prisoner’s specific mental illness. The standard concerns, once again, not the diagnosis of such illness, but a consequence—to wit, the prisoner’s inability to rationally understand his punishment. And here too, the key justifications and offered for the Eighth Amendment’s bar confirm our con- clusion about its reach. As described above, those deci- sions stated that an execution lacks retributive purpose when a mentally ill prisoner cannot understand the socie- tal judgment underlying his sentence. See 551 U.S., 58–959; ; at 2–3. And they indicated that an execution offends morality in the same
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
they indicated that an execution offends morality in the same circumstance. See 960; 477 U. S., at 409; at 2–3. Both rationales for the consti- tutional bar thus hinge (just as the standard deriving from them does) on the prisoner’s “[in]comprehension of why he has been singled out” to die. ; see at 2–3. Or said otherwise, if and when that failure of understanding is present, the rationales kick in—irrespective of whether one disease or another (say, psychotic delusions or dementia) is to blame. In evaluating competency to be executed, a judge must therefore look beyond any given diagnosis to a down- stream consequence. As and recognized, a delusional disorder can be of such severity—can “so impair the prisoner’s concept of reality”—that someone in its thrall will be unable “to come to grips with” the punish- ment’s meaning. ; 477 U.S., at 409. But delusions come in many shapes and sizes, and not all will interfere with the understanding that the Eighth Amendment requires. See 551 14 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court U. S., 62 (remanding the case to consider expert evi- dence on whether the prisoner’s delusions did so). And much the same is true of dementia. That mental condition can cause such disorientation and cognitive decline as to prevent a person from sustaining a rational understanding of why the State wants to execute him. See at 11– 12. But dementia has milder forms, which allow a person to preserve that understanding. Hence the need— for dementia as for delusions as for any other mental disorder—to attend to the particular circumstances of a case and make the precise judgment requires. III The only question left—and the only one on which the parties now disagree—is whether ’s execution may go forward based on the state court’s decision below. ’s counsel says it cannot because that ruling was tainted by legal error—specifically, the idea that only delusions, and not dementia, can support a finding of mental incompetency. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 21, 25, 27. Alabama counters that the state court did not rely on that (concededly) incorrect view of the law. See 7–41. But we come away at the least unsure whether that is so—especially given Alabama’s evidence and arguments in the state court. As noted earlier, the 2018 ruling we review today con- tains only one sentence of explanation. See –8. It states that “did not provide a substantial threshold showing of insanity[ ] sufficient to convince this Court to stay the execution.” App. A to Pet. for Cert. If the state court used the word
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Madison v. Alabama
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
|
Pet. for Cert. If the state court used the word “insanity” to refer to a delu- sional disorder, then error occurred: The court would have denied a stay on the ground that did not have that specific kind of mental illness. And the likelihood that the court made that mistake is heightened by the State’s emphasis, at that stage of the proceedings (as at Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 15 Opinion of the Court others), that was “not delusional or psychotic” and that “dementia” could not suffice to bar his execution absent “an expansion of and ” Motion to Dismiss 4, 10; see at 4–8; but see post, –10, and n. 4 (disregarding those arguments).5 Alabama argues, however, that the court spoke of “insanity” only because the state statute under which sought relief uses that term. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; –16–23 (2011) (allowing a stay of execution “on account of the [convict’s] insanity”). But even if so, that does not advance the State’s view that the state court properly understood the Eighth Amendment bar when assessing ’s competency. Alabama told this Court in opposing certio- rari that its statute covers only those with delusional disorders, and not those with dementia. See Brief in Opposition 12 (“[T]he sole question to be answered under the state statute was whether was insane, not whether he suffered from dementia”). The state court’s (supposed) echoing of statutory language understood in that way cannot provide assurance that the court knew a person with dementia might receive a stay of execution; indeed, it suggests exactly the opposite. The court’s 2018 order thus calls out for a do-over. Alabama further contends, however, that we should look past the state court’s 2018 decision to the court’s initial 2016 determination of competency. (The dissent similarly begins with the 2016 ruling, see post, –7, even though that is not the decision under review here.) According to the State, nothing material changed in the interim period, see ; thus, we may find the meaning of the later ruling in the earlier one, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. And, —————— 5 The State once again repeated that argument in its Brief in Opposi- tion to ’s certiorari petition. See Brief in Opposition 11–12 (“ does not argue that he is insane. Instead, he argues that he suffers from dementia” and that his execution should be barred “under a yet-unannounced expansion of and ”). 16 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court the State continues, the 2016 opinion gets the law right. Alabama’s proof is that the court, after summarizing
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Madison v. Alabama
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
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law right. Alabama’s proof is that the court, after summarizing the psychologists’ testimony, found that “ has a ra- tional[ ] understanding, as required by” concern- ing the “punishment he is about to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” 2016 Order, ; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; –6. (The dissent quotes the same passage. See post,) But the state court’s initial decision does not aid Ala- bama’s cause. First, we do not know that the court in 2018 meant to incorporate everything in its prior opinion. The order says nothing to that effect; and though it came out the same way as the earlier decision, it need not have rested on all the same reasoning. Second, the 2016 opin- ion itself does not show that the state court realized that persons suffering from dementia could satisfy the standard. True enough, as Alabama says, that the court accurately stated that standard in its decision. But as described above, Alabama had repeatedly argued to the court (over ’s objection) that only prisoners suffer- ing from delusional disorders could qualify as incompetent under See, Brief on ’s Competency 2 ( “failed to implicate” and because he “does not suffer from psychosis or delusions”); Tr. 82 (“The Supreme Court [in ] is looking at whether some- one’s delusions or someone’s paranoia or someone’s psy- chosis is standing in the way of ” rationally understanding his punishment); see at 4–5; but see post, – 10, and n. 4 (disregarding those arguments). And Ala- bama relied on the expert opinion of a psychologist who highlighted ’s lack of “psychosis, paranoia, or delusion,” while never mentioning his dementia. Tr., Ct. Exh. 1 (Apr. 14, 2016), p. 9. That too-limited understand- ing of ’s compass is reflected in the court’s 2016 opinion. In its single paragraph of analysis, the court “accept[ed] the testimony” of the State’s preferred psy- Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 17 Opinion of the Court chologist.6 And the court further found that “the evidence does not support that Mr. is delusional”—without ever considering his undisputed dementia. 2016 Order, For those reasons, we must return this case to the state court for renewed consideration of ’s competency (assuming Alabama sets a new execution date). See, Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 581 U. S. (slip op., ) (remanding when “uncertain” whether “an impermissible taint occurred”); In that proceed- ing, two matters disputed below should now be clear. First, under and the Eighth Amendment may permit executing even if he cannot remem- ber committing his crime. Second, under those same decisions,
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Madison v. Alabama
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594417/madison-v-alabama/
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remem- ber committing his crime. Second, under those same decisions, the Eighth Amendment may prohibit executing even though he suffers from dementia, rather than delusions. The sole question on which ’s competency depends is whether he can reach a “rational understanding” of why the State wants to execute him. In answering that question—on which we again express no view, see —the state court may not rely on any arguments or evidence tainted with the legal errors we have addressed. And because that is so, the court should consider whether it needs to supplement the existing record. Some evidence in that record, including portions of the experts’ reports and testimony, expressly reflects an incorrect view of the relevance of delusions or memory; still other evidence might have implicitly rested on those same misjudgments. —————— 6 The court well understood that expert’s exclusive focus on whether had psychotic delusions. In summarizing his testimony, the court began as follows: “Dr. Kirkland in his exam found no evidence of paranoia or delusion at the time of his examin[ation], on March 31, 2016. He found that there was no psychosis present.” 2016 Order, ; see 18 MADISON v. ALABAMA Opinion of the Court The state court, we have little doubt, can evaluate such matters better than we. It must do so as the first step in assessing ’s competency—and ensuring that if he is to be executed, he understands why. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the state court and remand the case for further proceedings not incon- sistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17–7505 VERNON MADISON, PETITIONER v.
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Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
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Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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Gary Small, having recently emerged from three years in Japanese prison for illegally importing weapons into that *39 country, bought a gun in the United This violated (g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to possess a firearm in or affecting commerce. Yet the majority decides that Small's gun possession did not violate the statute, because his prior convictions occurred in a Japanese court rather than an American court. In concluding that "any" means not what it says, but rather "a subset of any," the Court distorts the plain meaning of the statute and departs from established principles of statutory construction. I respectfully dissent. I In December 1992, Small shipped a 19-gallon electric water heater from the United States to Okinawa, Japan, ostensibly as a present for someone in Okinawa. App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 02-278 (CA3), pp. 07a-10a, 30a-31a, 34a, 98a (hereinafter Appellant's App.). Small had sent two other water heaters to Japan that same year. at 23a-27a. Thinking it unusual for a person to ship a water tank from overseas as a present, at 99a, Japanese customs officials searched the heater and discovered 2 rifles, 8 semiautomatic pistols, and 410 rounds of ammunition, at 3a-4a; at a, 267a, 277a. The Japanese Government indicted Small on multiple counts of violating Japan's weapons-control and customs laws. at 261a-a. Each offense was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Small was tried before a three-judge court in Naha, Japan, Appellant's App. 4a, convicted on all counts on April 14, 333 F.3d, at and sentenced to years' imprisonment with credit for 320 days served, at n. 1; Government's Brief in Support of Detention in Crim. No. 00-1 (WD Pa.), pp. 3-4. He was paroled on November 22, 1996, and his parole terminated on May 26, 333 F.3d, at n. 1. *396 A week after completing parole for his Japanese convictions, on June 2, 1998, Small purchased a 9-millimeter SWD Cobray pistol from a firearms dealer in Pennsylvania. Appellant's App. 48a, 98a. Some time later, a search of his residence, business premises, and automobile revealed a380-caliber Browning pistol and more than 300 rounds of ammunition. at 47a-1a, 98a-99a. This prosecution ensued. II The plain terms of 922(g)(1) prohibit Small a person "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" from possessing a firearm in the United "Read naturally, the word `any' has an expansive meaning, that is, `one or
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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word `any' has an expansive meaning, that is, `one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.'" United ; see also Department of Housing and Urban 3 U.S. 12, ; 22 U.S. 398, ; United 11 U.S. 30, 36, 38 () No exceptions appear on the face of the statute; "[n]o modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction," 44 U.S. on the scope of the term "court." See at The broad phrase "any court" unambiguously includes all judicial bodies[1] with jurisdiction to impose the requisite conviction a conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than a year. Indisputably, Small was convicted in a Japanese court of crimes punishable by a prison term exceeding one year. The clear terms of the statute prohibit him from possessing a gun in the United Of course, the phrase "any court," like all other statutory language, must be read in context. E.g., 08 U.S. 129, The context of 922(g)(1), however, suggests that there is no geographic limit on the scope of "any court."[2] By contrast to other parts of the firearms-control law that expressly mention only state or federal law, "any court" is not qualified by jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) ; 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (defining a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" by *398 reference to "Federal or State law").[3] Congress' explicit use of "Federal" and "State" in other provisions shows that it specifies such restrictions when it wants to do so. Counting foreign convictions, moreover, implicates no special federalism concerns or other clear statement rules that have justified construing "any" narrowly in the past.[4] And it is eminently practical to put foreign convictions to the same use as domestic ones; foreign convictions indicate dangerousness just as reliably as domestic convictions. See Part III-B, infra. The expansive phrase "convicted in any court" straightforwardly encompasses Small's Japanese convictions. III Faced with the inescapably broad text, the Court narrows the statute by assuming that the text applies only to domestic convictions, ante, at 388-389; criticizing the accuracy of foreign convictions as a proxy for dangerousness, ante, at 389-390; finding that the broad, natural reading of the statute "creates anomalies," ante, at 391; and suggesting that Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions counted, ante, at 393. None of these arguments is persuasive. *399 A The Court first invents a canon of statutory interpretation what it terms "an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes," ante, at 390 to cabin the statute's reach. This new "assumption" imposes a clear statement rule on Congress: Absent a clear statement, a statute refers to
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
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Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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on Congress: Absent a clear statement, a statute refers to nothing outside the United The Court's denial that it has created a clear statement rule is implausible. After today's ruling, the only way for Congress to ensure that courts will construe a law to refer to foreign facts or entities is to describe those facts or entities specifically as foreign. If this is not a "special burden of specificity," ib I am not sure what is. The Court's innovation is baseless. The Court derives its assumption from the entirely different, and well-recognized, canon against extraterritorial application of federal statutes: "It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United " But the majority rightly concedes that the canon against extraterritoriality itself "does not apply directly to this case." Ante, at 389. Though foreign as well as domestic convictions trigger 922(g)(1)'s prohibition, the statute criminalizes gun possession in this country, not abroad. In prosecuting Small, the Government is enforcing a domestic criminal statute to punish domestic criminal conduct. Pasquantino v. United States, ante, at 371-372 (federal wire fraud statute covers a domestic scheme aimed at defrauding a foreign government of tax revenue). The extraterritoriality cases cited by the Court, ante, at 389, do not support its new assumption. They restrict federal statutes from applying outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United See 07 U.S. 197, ; Arabian American *400 Oil at 249-21 ; Foley Bros., 28-286 ; United These straightforward applications of the extraterritoriality canon, restricting federal statutes from reaching conduct beyond U.S. borders, lend no support to the Court's unprecedented rule restricting a federal statute from reaching conduct within U.S. borders. We have, it is true, recognized that the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes is rooted in part in the "commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." at 204, n. But my reading of 922(g)(1) is entirely true to that notion: Gun possession in this country is surely a "domestic concern." We have also consistently grounded the canon in the risk that extraterritorially applicable U.S. laws could conflict with foreign laws, for example, by subjecting individuals to conflicting obligations. Arabian American Oil at That risk is completely absent in applying 922(g)(1) to Small's conduct. Quite the opposite, 922(g)(1) takes foreign law as it finds it. Aside from the extraterritoriality canon, which the Court properly concedes does not apply, I know of no principle of statutory construction justifying the result the Court reaches. Its concession that
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
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Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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construction justifying the result the Court reaches. Its concession that the canon is inapposite should therefore end this case. Rather than stopping there, the Court introduces its new "assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes" *401 sua sponte, without briefing or argument on the point,[] and without providing guidance on what constitutes a "domestically oriented statut[e]." Ante, at 390. The majority suggests that it means all statutes except those dealing with subjects like "immigration or terrorism," ante, at 391, apparently reversing our previous rule that the extraterritoriality canon "has special force" in statutes "that may involve foreign and military affairs," 09 U.S. 1, ; cf. The Court's creation threatens to wreak havoc with the established rules for applying the canon against extraterritoriality.[6] B In support of its narrow reading of the statute, the majority opines that the natural reading has inappropriate results. It points to differences between foreign and domestic convictions, primarily attacking the reliability of foreign convictions as a proxy for identifying dangerous individuals. Ante, at 389-390. Citing various foreign laws, the Court observes that, if interpreted to include foreign convictions, 922(g) would include convictions for business and speech activities "that [United States] laws would permit," ante, at 389; convictions "from a legal system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness," ; and convictions *402 "for conduct that [United States] law punishes far less severely," ante, at 390. The Court therefore concludes that foreign convictions cannot trigger 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession. The Court's claim that foreign convictions punishable by imprisonment for more than a year "somewhat less reliably identif[y] dangerous individuals" than domestic convictions, ib is untenable. In compiling examples of foreign convictions that might trigger 922(g)(1), ante, at 389-390, the Court constructs a parade of horribles. Citing laws of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Cuba, and Singapore, it cherry-picks a few egregious examples of convictions unlikely to correlate with dangerousness, inconsistent with American intuitions of fairness, or punishable more severely than in this country. This ignores countless other foreign convictions punishable by more than a year that serve as excellent proxies for dangerousness and culpability.[7] Surely a "reasonable human being" drafting this language would have considered whether foreign convictions are, on average and as a whole, accurate at gauging dangerousness and culpability, not whether the worst-of-the-worst are. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 6 S. Cal. L. Rev. 84, 84 The Court also ignores the facts of this very case: A week after *403 completing his sentence for shipping two rifles, eight semiautomatic pistols, and hundreds of rounds of
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
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Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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two rifles, eight semiautomatic pistols, and hundreds of rounds of ammunition into Japan, Small bought a gun in this country. It was eminently reasonable for Congress to use convictions punishable by imprisonment for more than a year foreign no less than domestic as a proxy for dangerousness. Contrary to the majority's assertion, it makes sense to bar people convicted overseas from possessing guns in the United The Court casually dismisses this point with the observation that only "`10 to a dozen'" prosecutions under the statute have involved foreign convictions as predicate convictions. Ante, at 394 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 32). The rarity of such prosecutions, however, only refutes the Court's simultaneous claim, ante, at 389-390, that a parade of horribles will result if foreign convictions count. Moreover, the Court does not claim that any of these few prosecutions has been based on a foreign conviction inconsistent with American law. As far as anyone is aware, the handful of prosecutions thus far rested on foreign convictions perfectly consonant with American law, like Small's conviction for international gunrunning. The Court has no answer for why including foreign convictions is unwise, let alone irrational. C The majority worries that reading 922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions "creates anomalies" under other firearms-control provisions. Ante, at 391-392. It is true, as the majority notes, that the natural reading of 922(g)(1) affords domestic offenders more lenient treatment than foreign ones in some respects: A domestic antitrust or business regulatory offender could possess a gun, while a similar foreign offender could not; the perpetrator of a state misdemeanor punishable by two years or less in prison could possess a gun, while an analogous foreign offender could not. In other respects, domestic offenders would receive harsher treatment than their foreign counterparts: One who *404 committed a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in the United States could not possess a gun, while a similar foreign offender could; and a domestic drug offender could receive a 1-year mandatory minimum sentence for unlawful gun possession, while a foreign drug offender could not. These outcomes cause the Court undue concern. They certainly present no occasion to employ, nor does the Court invoke, the canon against absurdities. We should employ that canon only "where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone." Public ; 41 U.S. 12, ("avoidance of unhappy consequences" is inadequate basis for interpreting a
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
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Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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("avoidance of unhappy consequences" is inadequate basis for interpreting a text); cf. Here, the "anomalies" to which the Court points are not absurd. They are, at most, odd; they may even be rational. For example, it is not senseless to bar a Canadian antitrust offender from possessing a gun in this country, while exempting a domestic antitrust offender from the ban. Congress might have decided to proceed incrementally and exempt only antitrust offenses with which it was familiar, namely, domestic ones. In any event, the majority abandons the statute's plain meaning based on results that are at most incongruous and certainly not absurd. As with the extraterritoriality canon, the Court applies a mutant version of a recognized canon when the recognized canon is itself inapposite. *40 Whatever the utility of canons as guides to congressional intent, they are useless when modified in ways that Congress could never have imagined in enacting 922(g)(1). Even assuming that my reading of the statute generates anomalies, the majority's reading creates ones even more dangerous. As explained above, the majority's interpretation permits those convicted overseas of murder, rape, assault, kidnaping, terrorism, and other dangerous crimes to possess firearms freely in the United and n. 7. Meanwhile, a person convicted domestically of tampering with a vehicle identification number, 18 U.S.C. 11(a)(1), is barred from possessing firearms. The majority's concern with anomalies provides no principled basis for choosing its interpretation of the statute over mine. D The Court hypothesizes "that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase `convicted in any court' applies to domestic as well as foreign convictions," ante, at 392, and takes that as license to restrict the clear breadth of the text. Whether the Court's empirical assumption is correct is anyone's guess. Regardless, we have properly rejected this method of guesswork-as-interpretation. In 11 U.S. 368 (), we interpreted other provisions of the federal firearms laws to mean that a person convicted of a federal crime is not relieved of the firearms disability unless his civil rights have been restored under federal (as opposed to state) law. We acknowledged the possibility "that the phrases on which our reading of the statute turns were accidents of statutory drafting," ; and we observed that some legislators might have read the phrases differently from the Court's reading, "or, more likely, never considered the matter at all," We nonetheless adhered to the unambiguous meaning of the statute. ; cf. National Organization for Women, 10 U.S. 249, () Here, as in Beecham, "our task is not the hopeless one of ascertaining what the legislators who passed the law would
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,005 | 1 |
dissenting
|
Small v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142890/small-v-united-states/
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of ascertaining what the legislators who passed the law would have decided had they reconvened to consider [this] particular cas[e]," 11 U.S., but the eminently more manageable one of following the ordinary meaning of the text they enacted. That meaning includes foreign convictions. The Court's reliance on the absence of any discussion of foreign convictions in the legislative history is equally unconvincing. Ante, at 393. Reliance on explicit statements in the history, if they existed, would be problematic enough. Reliance on silence in the history is a new and even more dangerous phenomenon. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 43 U.S. 0, (criticizing the Court's novel "Canon of Canine Silence"). I do not even agree, moreover, that the legislative history is silent. As the Court describes, the Senate bill that formed the basis for this legislation was amended in Conference, to change the predicate offenses from "`Federal' crimes" punishable by more than one year's imprisonment and "crimes `determined by the laws of a State to be a felony'" to conviction "`in any court of, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.'" Ante, at 393. The Court seeks to explain this change by saying that "the enacted version is simpler and avoids potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may define the term `felony' differently." But that does not explain why all limiting reference to "Federal" and "State" was eliminated. The revised provision would have been just as simple, and would just as well have avoided the potential difficulties, if it read "convicted in any Federal or State court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year." Surely that would have been the natural change if *407 expansion beyond federal and state convictions were not intended. The elimination of the limiting references suggests that not only federal and state convictions were meant to be covered. Some, of course, do not believe that any statement or text that has not been approved by both Houses of Congress and the President (if he signed the bill) is an appropriate source of statutory interpretation. But for those who do, this committee change ought to be strong confirmation of the fact that "any" means not "any Federal or State," but simply "any." IV The Court never convincingly explains its departure from the natural meaning of 922(g)(1). Instead, it institutes the troubling rule that "any" does not really mean "any," but may mean "some subset of `any,'" even if nothing in the context so indicates; it distorts the established canons against extraterritoriality and absurdity; it faults without reason
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,973 | 19 |
majority
|
United States v. Fuller
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/
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Respondents operated a large-scale "cow-calf" ranch near the confluence of the Big Sandy and Bill Williams Rivers in western Arizona. Their activities were conducted on lands consisting of 1,280 acres that they *489 owned in fee simple (fee lands), 12,027 acres leased from the State of Arizona, and 31,461 acres of federal domain held under Taylor Grazing Act permits issued in accordance with 3 of the Act, as amended, 43 U.S. C. 315b. The Taylor Grazing Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits to livestock owners for grazing their stock on Federal Government lands. These permits are revocable by the Government. The Act provides, moreover, that its provisions "shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands." The United States, petitioner here, condemned 920 acres of respondents' fee lands. At the trial in the District Court for the purpose of fixing just compensation for the lands taken, the parties disagreed as to whether the jury might consider value accruing to the fee lands as a result of their actual or potential use in combination with the Taylor Grazing Act "permit" lands. The Government contended that such element of incremental value to the fee lands could neither be taken into consideration by the appraisers who testified for the parties nor considered by the jury. Respondents conceded that their permit lands could not themselves be assigned any value in view of the provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act. They contended, however, that if on the open market the value of their fee lands was enhanced because of their actual or potential use in conjunction with permit lands, that element of value of the fee lands could be testified to by appraisers and considered by the jury. The District Court substantially adopted respondents' position, first in a pretrial order and then in its charge to the jury over appropriate objection by the Government. On the Government's appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment and approved the charge of the District Court. and distinguished our holding in United The dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit thought the issue controlled by We granted certiorari. Our prior decisions have variously defined the "just compensation" that the Fifth Amendment requires to be made when the Government exercises its power of eminent domain. The owner is entitled to fair market value, United but that term is "not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of valuation." United The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness, United
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,973 | 19 |
majority
|
United States v. Fuller
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/
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much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness, United as its does from technical concepts of property law. The record shows that several appraiser witnesses for respondents testified that they included as an element of the value that they ascribed to respondents' fee lands the availability of respondents' Taylor Grazing Act permit lands to be used in conjunction with the fee lands. Under the District Court's charge to the jury, the jury was entitled to consider this element of value testified to by the appraisers. This Court has held that generally the highest and best use of a parcel may be found to be a use in conjunction with other parcels, and that any increment of value resulting from such combination may be taken into consideration in valuing the parcel taken. The question presented by this case is whether there is an exception to that general rule where the parcels to be aggregated with the land taken are themselves owned *491 by the condemnor and used by the condemnee only under revocable permit from the condemnor. To say that this element of value would be considered by a potential buyer on the open market, and is therefore a component of "fair market value," is not the end of the inquiry. In United this Court held that the increment of fair market value represented by knowledge of the Government's plan to construct the project for which the land was taken was not included within the constitutional definition of "just compensation." The Court there said: "But [respondents] insist that no element which goes to make up value is to be discarded or eliminated. We think the proposition is too broadly stated." 317 U.S., at United held that the just compensation required to be paid to the owner of a tug requisitioned by the Government in October 1942, during the Second World War, could not include the appreciation in market value for tugs created by the Government's own increased wartime need for such vessels. The Court said: "That is a value which the government itself created and hence in fairness should not be required to pay." A long line of cases decided by this Court dealing with the Government's navigational servitude with respect to navigable waters evidences a continuing refusal to include, as an element of value in compensating for fast lands that are taken, any benefits conferred by access to such benefits as a potential portsite or a potential hydro-electric site. United United ; United *492 These cases go far toward establishing the general principle that the Government as condemnor may
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,973 | 19 |
majority
|
United States v. Fuller
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/
|
establishing the general principle that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements of value that the Government has created, or that it might have destroyed under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain. If, as in the Government need not pay for value that it could have acquired by exercise of a servitude arising under the commerce power, it would seem a fortiori that it need not compensate for value that it could remove by revocation of a permit for the use of lands that it owned outright. We do not suggest that such a general principle can be pushed to its ultimate logical conclusion. In United the Court held that "just compensation" did include the increment of value resulting from the completed project to neighboring lands originally outside the project limits, but later brought within them. Nor may the United States "be excused from paying just compensation measured by the value of the property at the time of the taking" because the State in which the property is located might, through the exercise of its lease power, have diminished that value without paying compensation. United States ex rel. "Courts have had to adopt working rules in order to do substantial justice in eminent domain proceedings." United Seeking as best we may to extrapolate from these prior decisions such a "working rule," we believe that there is a significant difference between the value added to property by a completed public works project, for which the Government must pay, and the value added to fee lands by a revocable permit authorizing the use of neighboring lands that the Government owns. The Government *493 may not demand that a jury be arbitrarily precluded from considering as an element of value the proximity of a parcel to a post office building, simply because the Government at one time built the post office. But here respondents rely on no mere proximity to a public building or to public lands dedicated to, and open to, the public at large. Their theory of valuation aggregates their parcel with land owned by the Government to form a privately controlled unit from which the public would be excluded. If, as we held in a person may not do this with respect to property interests subject to the Government's navigational servitude, he surely may not do it with respect to property owned outright by the Government. The Court's statement in respecting portsite value is precisely applicable to respondents' contention here that they may aggregate their fee lands
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,973 | 19 |
majority
|
United States v. Fuller
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/
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respondents' contention here that they may aggregate their fee lands with permit lands owned by the Government for valuation purposes: "[I]f the owner of the fast lands can demand port site value as part of his compensation, `he gets the value of a right that the Government in the exercise of its dominant servitude can grant or withhold as it chooses. To require the United States to pay for this value would be to create private claims in the public domain.' " quoting United We hold that the Fifth Amendment does not require the Government to pay for that element of value based on the use of respondents' fee lands in combination with the Government's permit lands. The Court of Appeals based its holding in part on its conclusion that although the Fifth Amendment might not have required the Government to pay compensation *494 of the sort permitted by the trial court's charge to the jury, the history of the Taylor Grazing Act indicated that Congress had intended that such compensation be paid. Congress may, of course, provide in connection with condemnation proceedings that particular elements of value or particular rights be paid for even though in the absence of such provision the Constitution would not require payment. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock But we do think the factors relied upon by the Court of Appeals fall far short of the direction contained in the Reclamation Act of 1902, as amended, that payment be made for rights recognized under state law, which was determinative of the outcome in Gerlach. The provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act make clear the congressional intent that no compensable property right be created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance of the permit. Given that intent, it would be unusual, we think, for Congress to have turned around and authorized compensation for the value added to fee lands by their potential use in connection with permit lands. We find no such authorization in the applicable congressional enactments. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR.
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
|
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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The very facts of this case demonstrate that uncritical acceptance of the Pennsylvania libel law here involved would be inconsistent with those important First and Fourteenth Amendment values we first treated with in an analogous context in New York However, as the plurality opinion implicitly recognizes, only an undiscriminating assessment of those values would lead us to extend the New York rule in full force to all purely private libels. My Brother BRENNAN'S opinion would resolve the dilemma by distinguishing those private libels that arise out of events found to be of "public or general concern" from those that do not, and subjecting the former to full-scale application of the New York rule. For the reasons set forth in Part I of my Brother MARSHALL'S dissent, I cannot agree to such a solution. As he so well demonstrates, the principal failing of the plurality opinion is its inadequate appreciation of the limitations imposed by the legal process in accommodating the tension between state libel laws and the federal constitutional protection given to freedom of speech and press. *63 Once the evident need to balance the values underlying each is perceived, it might seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the final judgment leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values[1] transcend the legitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who prevailed. This seems to be what is done in the plurality opinion. But we did not embrace this technique in New York Instead, as my Brother MARSHALL observes, we there announced a rule of general application, not ordinarily dependent for its implementation upon a case-by-case examination of trial court verdicts. See also my dissent in Time, Nor do I perceive any developments in the seven years since we decided New York that suggest our original method should now be abandoned. At least where we can discern generally applicable rules that should balance with fair precision the competing interests at stake, such rules should be preferred to the plurality's approach both in order to preserve a measure of order and predictability in the law that must govern the daily conduct of affairs and to avoid subjecting the press to judicial second-guessing of the newsworthiness of each item they print Consequently, I fully concur in Part I of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent. *64 Further, I largely agree with the alternative proposals of that dissent. I, too, think that, when dealing with private libel, the States should be free to define for
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Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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private libel, the States should be free to define for themselves the applicable standard of care so long as they do not impose liability without fault; that a showing of actual damage should be a requisite to recovery for libel; and that it is impermissible, given the substantial constitutional values involved, to fail to confine the amount of jury verdicts in such cases within any ascertainable limits. However, my reasons for so concluding are somewhat different than his, and I therefore reach a different result than he does with respect to the tolerable limits of punitive damages. I I think we all agree on certain core propositions. First, as a general matter, the States have a perfectly legitimate interest, exercised in a variety of ways, in redressing and preventing careless conduct, no matter who is responsible for it, that inflicts actual, measurable injury upon individual citizens. Secondly, there is no identifiable value worthy of constitutional protection in the publication of falsehoods. Third, although libel law provides that truth is a complete defense, that principle, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional interest in freedom of speech and press. For we have recognized that it is inevitable that there will be "some error in the situation presented in free debate," Time, a process that needs "breathing space," to flourish, and that "putting to the pre-existing prejudices of a jury the determination of what is `true' may effectively institute a system of censorship." Time, at Moreover, any system that punishes certain speech is likely to induce self-censorship by those who would otherwise *65 exercise their constitutional freedom. Given the constitutionally protected interest in unfettered speech, it requires an identifiable, countervailing state interest, consistent with First Amendment values, to justify a regulatory scheme that produces such results. And, because the presence of such values dictates closer scrutiny of this aspect of state tort law than the Fourteenth Amendment would otherwise command, it may well be that certain rules, impervious to constitutional attack when applied to ordinary human conduct, may have to be altered or abandoned where used to regulate speech. Finally, as determined in New York the constitutional interest in tolerance of falsehood as well as the need to adjust competing societal interests, prohibits, at a minimum, the imposition of liability without fault. The precise standard of care necessary to achieve these goals is, however, a matter of dispute as is the range of penalties a State may prescribe for a breach of that standard. In analyzing these problems it is necessary to begin with a general analytical framework that defines those
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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to begin with a general analytical framework that defines those competing interests that must be reconciled. My Brother MARSHALL'S opinion, I think, dwells too lightly upon the nature of the legitimate countervailing interests promoted by the State's libel law and, as a result, overstates the case against punitive damages. Because we deal with a set of legal rules that treat truth as a complete defense it strikes, I think, somewhat wide of the mark to treat the State's interest as one of protecting reputations from "unjustified invasion." Post, at 78. By hypothesis, the respondent here was free to reveal any true facts about petitioner's "obscure private life."[2] *66 Given the defense of truth, it is my judgment that, in order to assure that it promotes purposes consistent with First Amendment values, the legitimate function of libel law must be understood as that of compensating individuals for actual, measurable harm caused by the conduct of others. This can best be demonstrated by postulating a law that subjects publishers to jury verdicts for falsehoods that have done the plaintiff no harm. In my view, such a rule can only serve a purpose antithetical to those of the First Amendment. It penalizes speech, not to redress or avoid the infliction of harm, but only to deter the press from publishing material regarding private behavior that turns out to be false simply because of its falsity. This the First Amendment will not tolerate. Where the State cannot point to any tangible danger, even knowingly erroneous publication is entitled to constitutional protection because of the interest in avoiding an inquiry into the mere truth or falsity of speech. Moreover, such a scheme would impose a burden on speaking not generally placed upon constitutionally unprotected conductthe payment of private fines for conduct which, although not conformed to established limits of care, causes no harm in fact. Conversely, I think that where the purpose and effect of the law are to redress actual and measurable injury to private individuals that was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the publication, there is no necessary conflict with the values of freedom of speech. Just as an automobile negligently driven can cost a person his physical and mental well-being and the fruits of his labor, so can a printing press negligently set. While the First Amendment protects the press from the imposition of special liabilities upon it, "[t]o exempt a publisher, because of the nature of his calling, from an imposition generally exacted from other members of the community, would be to extend a protection not required by the constitutional
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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be to extend a protection not required by the constitutional *67 guarantee." Curtis Publishing A business "is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others." Associated That the damage has been inflicted by words rather than other instrumentalities cannot insulate it from liability. States may legitimately be required to use finer regulatory tools where dealing with "speech," but they are not wholly disabled from exacting compensation for its measurable adverse consequences. If this is not so, it is difficult to understand why governments may, for example, proscribe "misleading" advertising practices or specify what is "true" in the dissemination of consumer credit advertisements. Nor does this interest in compensating victims of harmful conduct somehow disappear when the damages inflicted are great. So long as the effect of the law of libel is simply to make publishers pay for the harm they cause, and the standard of care required is appropriately adjusted to take account of the special countervailing interests in an open exchange of ideas, the fact that this may involve the payment of substantial sums cannot plausibly be said to raise serious First Amendment problems. If a newspaper refused to pay its bills because to do so would put it out of business, would the First Amendment dictate that this be treated as a partial or complete defense? If an automobile carrying a newsman to the scene of a history-making event ran over a pedestrian, would the size of the verdict, if based upon generally applicable tort law principles, have to be assessed against the probability that it would deter broadcasters from news gathering before it could pass muster under the First Amendment? *68 However, without foreclosing the possibility that other limiting principles may be surfaced by subsequent experience, I do think that since we are dealing, by hypothesis, with infliction of harm through the exercise of freedom of speech and the press to which the Constitution gives explicit protection, recoverable damages must be limited to those consequences of the publication which are reasonably foreseeable. The usual tort rule seems to be that once some foreseeable injury has been inflicted, the negligent defendant must compensate for all damages he proximately caused in fact, no matter how peculiar were the circumstances of the particular plaintiff involved. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 50 However, our cases establish, I think, that, unless he has knowledge to the contrary, a speaker
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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that, unless he has knowledge to the contrary, a speaker is entitled to presume that he is addressing an audience that is not especially susceptible to distress at the specter of open, uninhibited, robust speech. Cohen v. California, ante, p. 15. See also ; Thus, I think the speaker should be free from a duty to compensate for actual harm inflicted by his falsehoods where the defamation would not have caused such harm to a person of average sensibilities unless, of course, the speaker knew that his statements were made concerning an unusually sensitive person. In short, I think the First Amendment does protect generally against the possibility of self-censorship in order to avoid unwitting affronts to the frail and the queasy. II Of course, it does not follow that so long as libel law performs the same compensatory function as civil law generally it is necessarily legitimate in all its various applications. The presence of First Amendment values means that the State can be compelled to utilize finer, *69 more discriminating instruments of regulation where necessary to give more careful protection to these countervailing interests. New York and Curtis Publishing established that where the injured party is a "public figure" or a "public official," the interest in freedom of speech dictates that the States forgo their interest in compensating for actual harm, even upon a basis generally applicable to all members of society, unless the plaintiff can show that the injurious publication was false and was made "with `actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Tacitly recognizing that it would unduly sacrifice the operative legitimate state interests to extend this rule to all cases where the injured party is simply a private individual, the plurality opinion would nevertheless apply it where the publication concerned such a person's "involvement in an event of public or general concern." Ante, at 52. I would not overrule New York or Curtis Publishing and I do agree, as indicated above, that making liability turn on simple falsity in the purely private libel area is not constitutionally permissible. But I would not construe the Federal Constitution to require that the States adhere to a standard other than that of reasonable care where the plaintiff is an ordinary citizen. My principal concern with the plurality's view, of course, is that voiced by my Brother MARSHALL. However, even if this objection were not tenable, unlike the plurality, I do think there is a difference, relevant to the interests here involved, between the
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
|
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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a difference, relevant to the interests here involved, between the public and the private plaintiff, as our cases have defined these categories, and that maintaining a constitutional distinction between them is at least as likely to protect true First Amendment concerns as one that eradicates such a line and substitutes for it a distinction between matters we think are of true social significance and those we think are not. *70 To begin, it does no violence, in my judgment, to the value of freedom of speech and press to impose a duty of reasonable care upon those who would exercise these freedoms. I do not think it can be gainsaid that the States have a substantial interest in encouraging speakers to carefully seek the truth before they communicate, as well as in compensating persons actually harmed by false descriptions of their personal behavior. Additionally, the burden of acting reasonably in taking action that may produce adverse consequences for others is one generally placed upon all in our society. Thus, history itself belies the argument that a speaker must somehow be freed of the ordinary constraints of acting with reasonable care in order to contribute to the public good while, for example, doctors, accountants, and architects have constantly performed within such bounds. This does not mean that I do not agree with the rule of New York but only that I deem it inapplicable here. That rule was not, I think, born solely of a desire to free speech that would otherwise have been stifled by overly restrictive rules, but also rested upon a determination that the countervailing state interests, described above, were not fully applicable where the subject of the falsehood was a public official or a public figure. For me, it does seem quite clear that the public person has a greater likelihood of securing access to channels of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concerning him than do private individuals in this country who do not toil in the public spotlight. Similarly, our willingness to assume that public personalities are more impervious to criticism, and may be held to have run the risk of publicly circulated falsehoods concerning them, does not rest solely upon an empirical assertion of fact, but also upon a belief that, in our political system, the individual speaker is entitled to act upon such an assumption if our institutions are to be held *71 up, as they should be, to constant scrutiny. And, at least as to the "public official," it seems to be universally the case that he is entitled to an absolute immunity
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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the case that he is entitled to an absolute immunity for what he may utter in response to the charges of others. Where such factors are present the need to provide monetary compensation for defamation appears a good deal more attenuated. Finally, in light of the plurality opinion's somewhat extravagant delineation of the public interest involved in the dissemination of information about nonpublic persons, it bears emphasizing that a primary rationale for extending the New York rule to public figures was the desire to reflect, in the constitutional balance, the fact that "in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred," Curtis Publishing and to treat constitutional values as specially implicated where important, albeit nonofficial, policy and behavior were the subjects of discussion. At the very least, this tends to diminish the force of any contention that libelous depictions of nonpublic persons are often likely to involve matters of abiding public significance. I cannot agree that the First Amendment gives special protection to the press from "[t]he very possibility of having to engage in litigation," ante, at 52 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Were this assertion tenable, I do not see why the States could ever enforce their libel laws. Cf. my Brother BLACK'S opinion, ante, at 57. Further, it would certainly cast very grave doubts upon the constitutionality of so-called "right-of-reply statutes" advocated by the plurality, ante, at 47 n. 15, and ultimately treat the application of any general law to a publisher or broadcaster as an important First Amendment issue. The notion that such an interest, in the context of a purely private libel, is a significant independent constitutional value is an unfortunate consequence of the plurality's *72 single-minded devotion to the task of preventing self-censorship, regardless of the purposes for which such restraint is induced or the evils its exercise tends to avoid. It is, then, my judgment that the reasonable care standard adequately serves those First Amendment values that must inform the definition of actionable libel and that those special considerations that made even this standard an insufficiently precise technique when applied to plaintiffs who are "public officials" or "public figures" do not obtain where the litigant is a purely private individual. III There remains the problem of punitive damages.[3] No doubt my Brother MARSHALL is correct in asserting that the specter of being forced to pay out substantial punitive damage awards is likely to induce self-censorship. This would probably also be the case where the harm actually caused is likely to be great. But, as I indicated above, this fact in itself would
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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But, as I indicated above, this fact in itself would not justify construing the First Amendment to impose an arbitrary limitation on the amount of actual damages recoverable. Thus, as my Brother MARSHALL would apparently agreesince he, too, proposes no limitation on actual damagesone cannot jump from the proposition that fear of substantial punitive damage awards may be an important factor in *73 inducing self-censorship directly to the result that punitive damages cannot be assessed in all private libel cases. A more particularized inquiry into the nature of the competing interests involved is necessary in order to ascertain whether awarding punitive damages must inevitably, in private libel cases, serve only interests that are incompatible with the First Amendment. At a minimum, even in the purely private libel area, I think the First Amendment should be construed to limit the imposition of punitive damages to those situations where actual malice is proved. This is the typical standard employed in assessing anyone's liability for punitive damages where the underlying aim of the law is to compensate for harm actually caused, see, e. g., 3 L. Frumer et al., Personal Injury 2.02 ; H. Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property 30 (1955), and no conceivable state interest could justify imposing a harsher standard on the exercise of those freedoms that are given explicit protection by the First Amendment. The question then arises whether further limitations on this general state power must be imposed in order to serve the particularized goals of the First Amendment. The most compelling rationale for providing punitive damages where actual malice is shown is that such damages assure that deterrent force is added to the jury's verdict. If the speaker's conduct was quite likely to produce substantial harm, but fortuitously did not, simple assessment of actual damages will not fully reflect the social interest in deterring that conduct generally. Further, even if the harm done was great the defendant may have unusually substantial resources that make the award of actual damages a trivial inconvenience of no actual deterrent value. And even where neither of these factors obtains, the State always retains an interest in punishing more severely conduct that, although it causes the same effect, is more morally blameworthy. For example, consider *74 the distinction between manslaughter and first-degree murder. I find it impossible to say, at least without further judicial experience in this area, that the First Amendment interest in avoiding self-censorship will always outweigh the state interest in vindicating these policies. It seems that a legislative choice is permissible which, for example, seeks to induce, through a
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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is permissible which, for example, seeks to induce, through a reasonable monetary assessment, repression of false material, published with actual malice, that was demonstrably harmful and reasonably thought capable of causing substantial harm, but, in fact, was not so fully injurious to the individual attacked. Similarly, the State surely has a legitimate interest in seeking to assure that its system of compensating victims of negligent behavior also operates upon all as an inducement to avoidance of such conduct. And, these are burdens that are placed on all members of society, thus permitting the press to escape them only if its interest is somehow different in this regard. However, from the standpoint of the individual plaintiff such damage awards are windfalls. They are, in essence, private fines levied for purposes that may be wholly unrelated to the circumstances of the actual litigant. That fact alone is not, I think, enough to condemn them. The State may, as it often does, use the vehicle of a private lawsuit to serve broader public purposes. It is noteworthy that my Brother MARSHALL does not rest his objection to punitive damages upon these grounds. He fears, instead, the self-censorship that may flow from the unbridled discretion of juries to set the amount of such damages. I agree that where these amounts bear no relationship to the actual harm caused, they then serve essentially as springboards to jury assessment, without reference to the primary legitimating compensatory function of the system, of an infinitely wide range of penalties wholly unpredictable in amount at the time of the publication *75 and that this must be a substantial factor in inducing self-censorship. Further, I find it difficult to fathom why it may be necessary, in order to achieve its justifiable deterrence goals, for the States to permit punitive damages that bear no discernible relationship to the actual harm caused by the publication at issue. A rational determination of the injury a publication might potentially have inflicted should typically proceed from the harm done in fact. And where the compensatory scheme seeks to achieve deterrence as a subsidiary by-product, the desired deterrence, if not precisely measured by actual damages, should be informed by that touchstone if deterrence of falsehood is not to replace compensation for harm as the paramount goal. Finally, while our legal system does often mete out harsher punishment for more culpable acts, it typically begins with a gradation of offenses defined in terms of effects. Compare, for example, larceny with murder. It is not surprising, then, that most States apparently require that punitive damages in most private
|
Justice Harlan
| 1,971 | 22 |
dissenting
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108361/rosenbloom-v-metromedia-inc/
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most States apparently require that punitive damages in most private civil actions bear some reasonable relation to the actual damages awarded, Oleck, at 275, Pennsylvania included, However, where the amount of punitive damages awarded bears a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done, I cannot agree that the Constitution must be read to prohibit such an award. Indeed, as I understand it, my Brother MARSHALL'S objection to my position[4] is not that the interest in freedom of speech dictates eliminating such judgments, but that this result *76 is compelled by the need to avoid involving courts in an "ad hoc balancing" of "the content of the speech and the surrounding circumstances," post, at 86, 85, much like that undertaken today in Part VI of the plurality opinion, the same technique criticized in my dissent in Time, I find this argument unpersuasive. First, I do not see why my proposed rule would necessarily require frequent judicial reweighing of the facts underlying each jury verdict. A carefully and properly instructed jury should ordinarily be able to arrive at damage awards that are self-validating. It is others, not I, who have placed upon the federal courts the general duty of reweighing jury verdicts regarding the degree of fault demonstrated in libel actions. Further, to the extent that supervision of jury verdicts would be required it would entail a different process from that undertaken where judges redetermine the degree of fault. The defendant's resources, the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff, and the publication's potential for actual harm are all susceptible of more or less objective measurement. And the overriding principle that deterrence is not to be made a substitute for compensation should serve as a useful mechanism for adjusting the equation. Finally, even if some marginal "ad hoc balancing" becomes necessary, I should think it the duty of this Court at least to attempt to implement such a process before pre-empting, for itself, all state power in this regard.[5] *77 In sum, given the fact that it seems to reflect the majority rule, that most of our jurisprudence proceeds upon the premise that legislative purposes can be achieved by fitting the punishment to the crime, and since we deal here with a precise constitutional interest that may legitimately require the States to resort to more discriminating regulation within a more circumscribed area of permissible concern, I would hold unconstitutional, in a private libel case, jury authority to award punitive damages which is unconfined by the requirement that these awards bear a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done. Conversely,
|
Justice Black
| 1,971 | 21 |
dissenting
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California v. Byers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108335/california-v-byers/
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Since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall this Court has been steadfastly committed to the principle that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination forbids the Federal Government to compel a person to supply information which can be used as a "link in the chain of testimony" needed to prosecute him for a crime. United (No. 14,692e) (CC Va. 1807). It is now established that the Fourteenth Amendment makes that provision of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the The plurality opinion if agreed to by a majority of the Court, would practically wipe out the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination. This protective constitutional safeguard against arbitrary government was first most clearly declared by Chief Justice Marshall in the trial of Aaron in 1807. United In erasing this principle from the Constitution the plurality opinion retreats from a cherished guarantee of liberty fashioned by James Madison and the other founders of what they proudly proclaimed to be our free government. One need only read with care the past cases cited in today's opinions to understand the shrinking process to which the Court today subjects a vital safeguard of our Bill of Rights. *460 The plurality opinion labors unsuccessfully to distinguish this case from our previous holdings enforcing the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; The plurality opinion, ante, at 431, appears to suggest that those previous cases are not controlling because respondent Byers would not have subjected himself to a "substantial risk of self-incrimination" by stopping after the accident and providing his name and address as required by California law. See California Vehicle Code 20002 (a) (1) (Supp. 1971). This suggestion can hardly be taken seriously. A California driver involved in an accident causing property damage is in fact very likely to have violated one of the hundreds of state criminal statutes regulating automobiles which constitute most of two volumes of the California Code.[1] More important, the particular facts of this case demonstrate that Byers would have subjected himself to a "substantial risk of self-incrimination," ante, at 431, had he given his name and address at the scene of the accident. He has now been charged not only with failing to give his name but also with passing without maintaining a safe distance as prohibited by California Vehicle Code 21750 (Supp. 1971). It is stipulated that the allegedly improper passing caused the accident from which Byers left without stating his name and address. In a prosecution under 21750, the State will be required to prove that Byers was the driver who passed
|
Justice Black
| 1,971 | 21 |
dissenting
|
California v. Byers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108335/california-v-byers/
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required to prove that Byers was the driver who passed without maintaining a safe distance. Thus, if Byers had stopped and provided his name and address as the driver involved in the accident, the State could have used that information to *461 establish an essential element of the crime under 21750. It seems absolutely fanciful to suggest that he would not have faced a "substantial risk of self-incrimination," ante, at 431, by complying with the disclosure statute. The plurality opinion also seeks to distinguish this case from our previous decisions on the ground that 20002 (a) (1) requires disclosure in an area not "permeated with criminal statutes" and because it is not aimed at a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities." Ante, at 430. Of course, these suggestions ignore the fact that this particular respondent would have run a serious risk of self-incrimination by complying with the disclosure statute. Furthermore, it is hardly accurate to suggest that the activity of driving an automobile in California is not "an area permeated with criminal statutes." And it is unhelpful to say the statute is not aimed at an "inherently suspect" group because it applies to "all persons who drive automobiles in California." The compelled disclosure is required of all persons who drive automobiles in California who are involved in accidents causing property damage.[2] If this group is not "suspect" of illegal activities, it is difficult to find such a group. The plurality opinion purports to rely on United to support its result. But Sullivan held only that a taxpayer could not defeat a *462 prosecution for failure to file a tax return on the grounds that his income was illegally obtained. The Court there suggested that the defendant could lawfully have refused to answer particular questions on the return if they tended to incriminate him.[3] Here, unlike Sullivan, the only information that the State requires Byers to disclose greatly enhances the probability of conviction for crime. As I have pointed out, if Byers had stopped and identified himself as the driver of the car in the accident, he would have handed the State an admission to use against him at trial on a charge of failing to maintain a safe distance while passing. Thus, Byers' failure to stop is analogous to a refusal to answer a particular incriminating question on a tax return, an act protected by the Fifth Amendment under this Court's decision in Sullivan. Cf. I also find unacceptable the alternative holding that the California statute is valid because the disclosures it requires are not "testimonial" (whatever that
|
Justice Black
| 1,971 | 21 |
dissenting
|
California v. Byers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108335/california-v-byers/
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because the disclosures it requires are not "testimonial" (whatever that term may mean). Ante, at 431. Even assuming that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the State only from compelling a man to produce "testimonial" evidence against himself, the California requirement here is still unconstitutional. What evidence can possibly be more "testimonial" than a man's own statement that he is a person who has just been involved in an automobile accident inflicting property *463 damage? Neither United v. Wade, nor any other case of this Court has ever held that the State may convict a man by compelling him to admit that he is guilty of conduct constituting an element of a crime. Cf. United Yet the plurality opinion apparently approves precisely that result. My Brother HARLAN'S opinion makes it clear that today the Court "balances" the importance of a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be forced to help convict himself against the government's interest in forcing him to do so. As in previous decisions, this balancing inevitably results in the dilution of constitutional guarantees. See, e. g., By my Brother HARLAN'S reasoning it appears that the scope of the Fifth Amendment's protection will now depend on what value a majority of nine Justices chooses to place on this explicit constitutional guarantee as opposed to the government's interest in convicting a man by compelling self-incriminating testimony. In my view, vesting such power in judges to water down constitutional rights does indeed "embark us" on Brother HARLAN'S "uncharted and treacherous seas." Ante, at 458. I can only assume that the unarticulated premise of the decision is that there is so much crime abroad in this country at present that Bill of Rights' safeguards against arbitrary government must not be completely enforced. I can agree that there is too much crime in the land for us to treat criminals with favor. But I can never agree that we should depart in the slightest way from the Bill of Rights' guarantees that give this country its high place among the free nations of the world. If we affirmed the State Supreme Court, California could still require persons involved in accidents to stop and give their names and addresses. The State *464 would only be denied the power to violate the Fifth Amendment by using the fruits of such compelled testimony against them in criminal proceedings. Instead of criticizing the Supreme Court of California for its rigid protections of individual liberty, I would without more ado affirm its judgment. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person held pursuant to a state-court judgment if the state-court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a state court unreasonably applied clearly established law when it held that the respondent was not in custody for purposes. We disagree and reverse. I Paul Soto and respondent Michael Alvarado attempted to steal a truck in the parking lot of a shopping mall in Santa *656 Fe Springs, California. Soto and Alvarado were part of a larger group of teenagers at the mall that night. Soto decided to steal the truck, and Alvarado agreed to help. Soto pulled out a357 Magnum and approached the driver, Francisco Castaneda, who was standing near the truck emptying trash into a dumpster. Soto demanded money and the ignition keys from Castaneda. Alvarado, then five months short of his 18th birthday, approached the passenger side door of the truck and crouched down. When Castaneda refused to comply with Soto's demands, Soto shot Castaneda, killing him. Alvarado then helped hide Soto's gun. Los Angeles County Sheriff's detective Cheryl Comstock led the investigation into the circumstances of Castaneda's death. About a month after the shooting, Comstock left word at Alvarado's house and also contacted Alvarado's mother at work with the message that she wished to speak with Alvarado. Alvarado's parents brought him to the Pico Rivera Sheriff's Station to be interviewed around lunchtime. They waited in the lobby while Alvarado went with Comstock to be interviewed. Alvarado contends that his parents asked to be present during the interview but were rebuffed. Comstock brought Alvarado to a small interview room and began interviewing him at about 12:30 p.m. The interview lasted about two hours, and was recorded by Comstock with Alvarado's knowledge. Only Comstock and Alvarado were present. Alvarado was not given a warning under Comstock began the interview by asking Alvarado to recount the events on the night of the shooting. On that night, Alvarado explained, he had been drinking alcohol at a friend's house with some other friends and acquaintances. After a few hours, part of the group went home and the rest walked to a nearby mall to use its public telephones. In Alvarado's initial telling, that was the end of
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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telephones. In Alvarado's initial telling, that was the end of it. The group went back to the friend's home and "just went to bed." App. 101. Unpersuaded, Comstock pressed on: *657 "Q. Okay. We did real good up until this point and everything you've said it's pretty accurate till this point, except for you left out the shooting. "A. The shooting? "Q. Uh huh, the shooting. "A. Well I had never seen no shooting. "Q. Well I'm afraid you did. "A. I had never seen no shooting. "Q. Well I beg to differ with you. I've been told quite the opposite and we have witnesses that are saying quite the opposite. "A. That I had seen the shooting? "Q. So why don't you take a deep breath, like I told you before, the very best thing is to be honest. You can't have that many people get involved in a murder and expect that some of them aren't going to tell the truth, okay? Now granted if it was maybe one person, you might be able to keep your fingers crossed and say, god I hope he doesn't tell the truth, but the problem is is that they have to tell the truth, okay? Now all I'm simply doing is giving you the opportunity to tell the truth and when we got that many people telling a story and all of a sudden you tell something way far fetched different." At this point, Alvarado slowly began to change his story. First he acknowledged being present when the carjacking occurred but claimed that he did not know what happened or who had a gun. When he hesitated to say more, Comstock tried to encourage Alvarado to discuss what happened by appealing to his sense of honesty and the need to bring the man who shot Castaneda to justice. See, e. g., ("[W]hat I'm looking for is to see if you'll tell the truth"); ("I know it's very difficult when it comes time to `drop the dime' on somebody[,] [but] if that had been *658 your parent, your mother, or your brother, or your sister, you would darn well want [the killer] to go to jail `cause no one has the right to take someone's life like that"). Alvarado then admitted he had helped the other man try to steal the truck by standing near the passenger side door. Next he admitted that the other man was Paul Soto, that he knew Soto was armed, and that he had helped hide the gun after the murder. Alvarado explained that he had expected
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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gun after the murder. Alvarado explained that he had expected Soto to scare the driver with the gun, but that he did not expect Soto to kill anyone. Toward the end of the interview, Comstock twice asked Alvarado if he needed to take a break. Alvarado declined. When the interview was over, Comstock returned with Alvarado to the lobby of the sheriff's station where his parents were waiting. Alvarado's father drove him home. A few months later, the State of California charged Soto and Alvarado with first-degree murder and attempted robbery. Citing Alvarado moved to suppress his statements from the Comstock interview. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the interview was noncustodial. App. 196. Alvarado and Soto were tried together, and Alvarado testified in his own defense. He offered an innocent explanation for his conduct, testifying that he happened to be standing in the parking lot of the mall when a gun went off nearby. The government's cross-examination relied on Alvarado's statement to Comstock. Alvarado admitted having made some of the statements but denied others. When Alvarado denied particular statements, the prosecution countered by playing excerpts from the audio recording of the interview. During cross-examination, Alvarado agreed that the interview with Comstock "was a pretty friendly conversation," that there was "sort of a free flow between [Alvarado] and Detective Comstock," and that Alvarado did not "feel coerced or threatened in any way" during the interview, The jury convicted Soto and Alvarado of first-degree murder and attempted robbery. The *659 trial judge later reduced Alvarado's conviction to second-degree murder for his comparatively minor role in the offense. The judge sentenced Soto to life in prison and Alvarado to 15-years-to-life. On direct appeal, the Second Appellate District Court of Appeal (hereinafter state court) affirmed. The state court rejected Alvarado's contention that his statements to Comstock should have been excluded at trial because no warnings were given. The court ruled Alvarado had not been in custody during the interview, so no warning was required. The state court relied upon the custody test articulated in which requires a court to consider the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and then determine whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to leave. The state court reviewed the facts of the Comstock interview and concluded Alvarado was not in custody. App. to Pet. for Cert. C-17. The court emphasized the absence of any intense or aggressive tactics and noted that Comstock had not told Alvarado that he could not leave. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Alvarado filed a petition for a
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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Court denied discretionary review. Alvarado filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The District Court agreed with the state court that Alvarado was not in custody for purposes during the interview. No. ED CV-00-326-VAP(E) App. to Pet. for Cert. B-1 to B. "At a minimum," the District Court added, the deferential standard of review provided by 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) foreclosed relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, the Court of Appeals held that the state court erred in failing to account for Alvarado's youth and inexperience when evaluating whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt *660 free to leave. It noted that this Court has considered a suspect's juvenile status when evaluating the voluntariness of confessions and the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. See at 843 and In re Gault, ). The Court of Appeals held that in light of these authorities, Alvarado's age and experience must be a factor in the custody A minor with no criminal record would be more likely to feel coerced by police tactics and conclude he is under arrest than would an experienced adult, the Court of Appeals reasoned. This required extra "safeguards commensurate with the age and circumstances of a juvenile defendant." See According to the Court of Appeals, the effect of Alvarado's age and inexperience was so substantial that it turned the interview into a custodial interrogation. The Court of Appeals next considered whether Alvarado could obtain relief in light of the deference a federal court must give to a state-court determination on habeas review. The deference required by AEDPA did not bar relief, the Court of Appeals held, because the relevance of juvenile status in Supreme Court case law as a whole compelled the "extension of the principle that juvenile status is relevant" to the context of custody determinations. In light of the clearly established law considering juvenile status, it was "simply unreasonable to conclude that a reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police interviews, would have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." We granted certiorari. II We begin by determining the relevant clearly established law. For purposes of 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)(1), clearly established law as determined by this Court "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of *661 the time of the relevant state-court decision." We look for "the governing legal principle or principles
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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decision." We look for "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." itself held that preinterrogation warnings are required in the context of custodial interrogations given "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." 384 U.S., at 8. The Court explained that "custodial interrogation" meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The decision did not provide the Court with an opportunity to apply that test to a set of facts. After the Court first applied the custody test in In a police officer contacted the suspect after a burglary victim identified him. The officer arranged to meet the suspect at a nearby police station. At the outset of the questioning, the officer stated his belief that the suspect was involved in the burglary but that he was not under arrest. During the 30-minute interview, the suspect admitted his guilt. He was then allowed to leave. The Court held that the questioning was not custodial because there was "no indication that the questioning took place in a context where [the suspect's] freedom to depart was restricted in any way." The Court noted that the suspect had come voluntarily to the police station, that he was informed that he was not under arrest, and that he was allowed to leave at the end of the interview. In 463 U.S. 1 the Court reached the same result in a case with facts similar to those in In the state court had distinguished based on what it described as differences in the totality of the circumstances. The police interviewed shortly after the crime occurred; had been drinking earlier in the day; he was emotionally *662 distraught; he was well known to the police; and he was a parolee who knew it was necessary for him to cooperate with the 463 U.S., at 4-5. The Court agreed that "the circumstances of each case must certainly influence" the custody determination, but reemphasized that "the ultimate is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." at 5 The Court found the case indistinguishable from It noted that how much the police knew about the suspect and how much time had elapsed after the crime occurred were irrelevant to the custody 463 U.S., at 5. Our more recent cases instruct that custody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect's
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances. In a police officer stopped a suspected drunk driver and asked him some questions. Although the officer reached the decision to arrest the driver at the beginning of the traffic stop, he did not do so until the driver failed a sobriety test and acknowledged that he had been drinking beer and smoking marijuana. The Court held the traffic stop noncustodial despite the officer's intent to arrest because he had not communicated that intent to the driver. "A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was `in custody' at a particular time," the Court explained. "[T]he only relevant is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." In a footnote, the Court cited a New York state case for the view that an objective test was preferable to a subjective test in part because it does not "`place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question.'" n. 35 ). *663 confirmed this analytical framework. explained that "the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Courts must examine "all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" and determine "how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action." Finally, in the Court offered the following description of the custody test: "Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate : was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." 516 U.S., at We turn now to the case before us and ask if the state-court adjudication of the claim "involved an unreasonable application" of clearly established law when it concluded that Alvarado was not in custody. 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)(1). See The term "`unreasonable'" is "a common term in the legal world and, *664 accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning." At the same time, the range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. Cf. Based on these principles, we conclude that the state court's application of our clearly established law was reasonable. Ignoring the deferential standard of 2254(d)(1) for the moment, it can be said that fairminded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody. On one hand, certain facts weigh against a finding that Alvarado was in custody. The police did not transport Alvarado to the station or require him to appear at a particular time. Cf. 429 U. S., They did not threaten him or suggest he would be placed under arrest. Alvarado's parents remained in the lobby during the interview, suggesting that the interview would be brief. See In fact, according to trial counsel for Alvarado, he and his parents were told that the interview was "`not going to be long.'" App. 186. During the interview, Comstock focused on Soto's crimes rather than Alvarado's. Instead of pressuring Alvarado with the threat of arrest and prosecution, she appealed to his interest in telling the truth and being helpful to a police officer. Cf. In addition, Comstock twice asked Alvarado if he wanted to take a break. At the end of the interview, Alvarado went home. App. 186. All of these objective *665 facts are consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. Indeed, a number of the facts echo those of a per curiam summary reversal in which we found it "clear from these facts" that the suspect was not in custody. 494 U.S., Other facts point in the opposite direction. Comstock interviewed Alvarado at the police station. The interview lasted two hours, four times longer than the 30-minute interview in Unlike the officer in Comstock did not tell Alvarado that he was free to leave. Alvarado was brought to the police station by his legal guardians rather than arriving on his own accord, making the extent of his control over his presence unclear. Counsel for Alvarado alleges that Alvarado's parents
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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his presence unclear. Counsel for Alvarado alleges that Alvarado's parents asked to be present at the interview but were rebuffed, a fact that if known to Alvarado might reasonably have led someone in Alvarado's position to feel more restricted than otherwise. These facts weigh in favor of the view that Alvarado was in custody. These differing indications lead us to hold that the state court's application of our custody standard was reasonable. The Court of Appeals was nowhere close to the mark when it concluded otherwise. Although the question of what an "unreasonable application" of law might be is difficult in some cases, it is not difficult here. The custody test is general, and the state court's application of our law fits within the matrix of our prior decisions. We cannot grant relief under AEDPA by conducting our own independent into whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly." Relief is available under 2254(d)(1) only if the state court's decision is objectively unreasonable. See * 529 U. S., ; Under that standard, relief cannot be granted. III The Court of Appeals reached the opposite result by placing considerable reliance on Alvarado's age and inexperience with law enforcement. Our Court has not stated that a suspect's age or experience is relevant to the custody analysis, and counsel for Alvarado did not press the importance of either factor on direct appeal or in habeas proceedings. According to the Court of Appeals, however, our Court's emphasis on juvenile status in other contexts demanded consideration of Alvarado's age and inexperience here. The Court of Appeals viewed the state court's failure to "`extend a clearly established legal principle [of the relevance of juvenile status] to a new context'" as objectively unreasonable in this case, requiring issuance of the ). The petitioner contends that if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand then the rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of the state-court decision. Brief for Petitioner 10-24. See also There is force to this argument. Section 2254(d)(1) would be undermined if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to existing law. Cf. At the same time, the difference between applying a rule and extending it is not always clear. Certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt. This is not such a case, however. Our opinions applying the custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age, much less mandated its consideration. The only indications *667 in the Court's opinions relevant to a suspect's experience with law enforcement have rejected reliance on such factors. See 463 U. S., at 5 ; 468 U. S., n. 35 (citing 21 N.Y. 2d, at 233 N.E.2d, at which noted the difficulties of a subjective test that would require police to "`anticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question'"); -432 There is an important conceptual difference between the custody test and the line of cases from other contexts considering age and experience. The custody is an objective test. As we stated in Keohane, "[o]nce the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate " 516 U.S., at The objective test furthers "the clarity of ['s] rule," ensuring that the police do not need "to make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect," To be sure, the line between permissible objective facts and impermissible subjective experiences can be indistinct in some cases. It is possible to subsume a subjective factor into an objective test by making the latter more specific in its formulation. Thus the Court of Appeals styled its as an objective test by considering what a "reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police interviews," would perceive. 316 F.3d, At the same time, the objective custody could reasonably be viewed as different from doctrinal tests that depend on the actual mindset of a particular suspect, where we do consider a suspect's age and experience. For example, the voluntariness of a statement is often said to *668 depend on whether "the defendant's will was overborne," a question that logically can depend on "the characteristics of the accused," U.S. 218, The characteristics of the accused can include the suspect's age, education, and intelligence, see ib as well as a suspect's prior experience with law enforcement, see at In concluding that there was "no principled reason" why such factors should not also apply to the custody 316 F.3d, the Court of Appeals ignored the argument that the custody states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's individual characteristics including his age could be viewed as creating a subjective Cf. 429 U. S., -496
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,004 | 4 |
majority
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134748/yarborough-v-alvarado/
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viewed as creating a subjective Cf. 429 U. S., -496 (noting that facts arguably relevant to whether an environment is coercive may have "nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the rule"). For these reasons, the state court's failure to consider Alvarado's age does not provide a proper basis for finding that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Indeed, reliance on Alvarado's prior history with law enforcement was improper not only under the deferential standard of 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)(1), but also as a de novo matter. In most cases, police officers will not know a suspect's interrogation history. See Even if they do, the relationship between a suspect's past experiences and the likelihood a reasonable person with that experience would feel free to leave often will be speculative. True, suspects with prior law enforcement experience may understand police procedures and reasonably feel free to leave unless told otherwise. On the other hand, they may view past as prologue and expect another in a string of arrests. We do not ask police officers to consider these contingent psychological factors when deciding when suspects should be advised of their rights. See *669 -432. The turns too much on the suspect's subjective state of mind and not enough on the "objective circumstances of the interrogation." 511 U. S., The state court considered the proper factors and reached a reasonable conclusion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
concurring
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Greer v. Miller
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111956/greer-v-miller/
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Having dissented in I can readily understand why the Court might want to overrule that case. But if there is to be a rule that prohibits a prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence, it should be a clearly defined rule. Whether the trial court sustains an objection to an impermissible question, or whether the prosecutor is allowed to refer to the defendant's silence in his or her closing arguments, are questions that are relevant to the harmless-error inquiry, or to deciding whether the error made the trial fundamentally unfair. But they play no role in deciding whether a prosecutor violated the implicit promise of Miranda as understood in Doyle that the defendant's silence will not be used against him. I, therefore, agree with the 10 Illinois judges and 12 federal judges who have concluded that the rule of the Doyle case was violated when the prosecutor called the jury's attention to respondent's silence. Moreover, for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, I think the violation was serious enough to support that court's conclusion that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States ex rel. Were this case here on direct appeal, therefore, I would vote to reverse the conviction. *768 Nonetheless, I concur in the Court's judgment because I believe the question presented in the certiorari petition whether a federal court should apply a different standard in reviewing Doyle errors in a habeas corpus action should be answered in the affirmative. In I argued that there are at least four types of alleged constitutional errors. "The one most frequently encountered is a claim that attaches a constitutional label to a set of facts that does not disclose a violation of any constitutional right. The second class includes constitutional violations that are not of sufficient import in a particular case to justify reversal even on direct appeal, when the evidence is still fresh and a fair retrial could be promptly conducted. ; A third category includes errors that are important enough to require reversal on direct appeal but do not reveal the kind of fundamental unfairness to the accused that will support a collateral attack on a final judgment. See, e. g., The fourth category includes those errors that are so fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity of the process by which that judgment was obtained." (footnote omitted). In my view, Doyle violations which cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt typically fall within the third of these categories. On direct review,
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Justice Stevens
| 1,987 | 16 |
concurring
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Greer v. Miller
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111956/greer-v-miller/
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fall within the third of these categories. On direct review, a conviction should be reversed if a defendant can demonstrate that a Doyle error occurred at trial, and the State cannot demonstrate that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in typical collateral attacks, such as today's, Doyle errors are not so fundamentally unfair that convictions must be reversed whenever the State cannot bear the heavy burden of proving that *769 the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, there may be extraordinary cases in which the Doyle error is so egregious, or is combined with other errors or incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, that the integrity of the process is called into question. In such an event, habeas corpus relief should be afforded.[*] In sum, although I agree with the Court's judgment, and the standard that it applies here, I would apply this standard only to Doyle violations being considered on collateral review. On direct appeal, a Doyle error should give rise to reversal of the conviction unless the State can prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Justice Ginsburg
| 1,996 | 5 |
majority
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Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118029/doctors-associates-inc-v-casarotto/
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This case concerns a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of a Subway sandwich shop in Montana. *63 When a dispute arose between parties to the agreement, franchisee Paul Casarotto sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI), and DAI's Montana development agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court. DAI and Lombardi sought to stop the litigation pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out on page nine of the franchise agreement. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act) declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S. C. 2. Montana law, however, declares an arbitration clause unenforceable unless "[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration" is "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." Mont. Code Ann. 2-5114(4) The question here presented is whether Montana's law is compatible with the federal Act. We hold that Montana's first-page notice requirement, which governs not "any contract," but specifically and solely contracts "subject to arbitration," conflicts with the FAA and is therefore displaced by the federal measure. I Petitioner DAI is the national franchisor of Subway sandwich shops. In April 19, DAI entered a franchise agreement with respondent Paul Casarotto, which permitted Casarotto to open a Subway shop in Great Falls, Montana. The franchise agreement stated, on page nine and in ordinary type: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof shall be settled by Arbitration" App. 5. In October 1992, Casarotto sued DAI and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in Montana state court, alleging state-law contract and tort claims relating to the franchise agreement. DAI demanded arbitration of those claims, and successfully moved in the Montana trial court to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration. *64 The Montana Supreme Court reversed. That court left undisturbed the trial court's findings that the franchise agreement fell within the scope of the FAA and covered the claims Casarotto stated against DAI and Lombardi. The Montana Supreme Court held, however, that Mont. Code Ann. 2-5114(4) rendered the agreement's arbitration clause unenforceable. The Montana statute provides: "Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration." Notice of the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement did not appear on the first page of the contract. Nor was anything relating to the clause typed in underlined capital letters. Because
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Justice Ginsburg
| 1,996 | 5 |
majority
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Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118029/doctors-associates-inc-v-casarotto/
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relating to the clause typed in underlined capital letters. Because the State's statutory notice requirement had not been met, the Montana Supreme Court declared the parties' dispute "not subject to arbitration." 6 P. 2d, at 939. DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued before the Montana Supreme Court that 2-5114(4) was preempted by 2 of the FAA.[1] DAI and Lombardi dominantly relied on our decisions in Southland and In Southland, we held that 2 of the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts, see and "withdr[aws] the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration," We noted in the pathmarking South- *65 land decision that the FAA established a "broad principle of enforceability," and that 2 of the federal Act provided for revocation of arbitration agreements only upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." In we reiterated: "[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the text of 2]." n. 9. The Montana Supreme Court, however, read our decision in Volt Information Sciences, as limiting the preemptive force of 2 and correspondingly qualifying Southland and -939. As the Montana Supreme Court comprehended Volt, the proper inquiry here should focus not on the bare words of 2, but on this question: Would the application of Montana's notice requirement, contained in 2-5114(4), "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA." 6 P. 2d, at 93 Section 2-5114(4), in the Montana court's judgment, did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA, for the notice requirement did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether; it simply prescribed "that before arbitration agreements are enforceable, they be entered knowingly." DAI and Lombardi petitioned for certiorari. Last Term, we granted their petition, vacated the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, and remanded for further consideration in light of Terminix See In we restated what our decisions in Southland and had established: *66 "States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause `upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' 9 U.S. C. 2 (emphasis added). What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price,
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Justice Ginsburg
| 1,996 | 5 |
majority
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Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118029/doctors-associates-inc-v-casarotto/
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is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal `footing,' directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress's intent." On remand, without inviting or permitting further briefing or oral argument,[2] the Montana Supreme Court adhered to its original ruling. The court stated: "After careful review, we can find nothing in the [] decision which relates to the issues presented to this Court in this case." Elaborating, the Montana court said it found "no suggestion in [] that the principles from Volt on which we relied [to uphold 2-5114(4)] have been modified in any way." 901 P.2d, at -599. We again granted certiorari, and now reverse. II Section 2 of the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S. C. 2 (emphasis added). Repeating our observation in the text of 2 declares that state law may be applied "if that law arose to govern issues *6 concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally." n. 9. Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening 2. See 513 U. S., at 21; Rodriguez de 490 U.S. 4, 43-44 ; Shearson/American Express 42 U.S. 220, Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions. See 513 U. S., at 21; 42 U. S., at 493, n. 9. By enacting 2, we have several times said, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed "upon the same footing as other contracts." 41 U.S. 506, (194) Montana's 2-5114(4) directly conflicts with 2 of the FAA because the State's law conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally. The FAA thus displaces the Montana statute with respect to arbitration agreements covered by the Act. See 2 I. Macneil, R. Speidel, T. Stipanowich, & G. Shell, Federal Arbitration Law 19.1.1, pp. 19:4-19:5 (under Southland and "state legislation requiring greater information or choice in the making of agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts is preempted").[3] *6 The Montana Supreme Court misread our Volt decision and therefore reached a conclusion in this case at odds with our rulings. Volt involved an arbitration agreement that
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Justice Ginsburg
| 1,996 | 5 |
majority
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Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118029/doctors-associates-inc-v-casarotto/
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odds with our rulings. Volt involved an arbitration agreement that incorporated state procedural rules, one of which, on the facts of that case, called for arbitration to be stayed pending the resolution of a related judicial proceeding. The state rule examined in Volt determined only the efficient order of proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself. We held that applying the state rule would not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA," 49 U.S., at 4, because the very purpose of the Act was to "ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms," at 49. Applying 2-5114(4) here, in contrast, would not enforce the arbitration clause in the contract between DAI and Casarotto; instead, Montana's first-page notice requirement would invalidate the clause. The "goals and policies" of the FAA, this Court's precedent indicates, are antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provisions. Section 2 "mandate[s] the enforcement of arbitration agreements," Southland, 465 U. S., "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," 9 U.S. C. 2. Section 2-5114(4) of Montana's law places arbitration agreements in a class apart from "any contract," and singularly limits their validity. The State's prescription is thus inconsonant with, and is therefore preempted by, the federal law. *69 * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
majority
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Adams v. Williams
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108571/adams-v-williams/
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Respondent Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun found during a "stop and frisk," as well as of possession of heroin that was found during a full search incident to his weapons arrest. After respondent's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, this Court denied certiorari. Williams' petition for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court and by a divided panel of the Second Circuit, but on rehearing en banc the Court of Appeals granted relief. That court held that evidence introduced at Williams' trial had been obtained by an unlawful search of his person and car, and thus the state court judgments of conviction should be set aside. Since we conclude that the policeman's actions here conformed to the standards this Court laid down in we reverse. Police Sgt. John Connolly was alone early in the morning on car patrol duty in a high-crime area of Bridgeport, Connecticut. At approximately 2:15 a.m. a person known to Sgt. Connolly approached his cruiser *145 and informed him that an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. After calling for assistance on his car radio, Sgt. Connolly approached the vehicle to investigate the informant's report. Connolly tapped on the car window and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the sergeant reached into the car and removed a fully loaded revolver from Williams' waistband. The gun had not been visible to Connolly from outside the car, but it was in precisely the place indicated by the informant. Williams was then arrested by Connolly for unlawful possession of the pistol. A search incident to that arrest was conducted after other officers arrived. They found substantial quantities of heroin on Williams' person and in the car, and they found a machete and a second revolver hidden in the automobile. Respondent contends that the initial seizure of his pistol, upon which rested the later search and seizure of other weapons and narcotics, was not justified by the informant's tip to Sgt. Connolly. He claims that absent a more reliable informant, or some corroboration of the tip, the policeman's actions were unreasonable under the standards set forth in In Terry this Court recognized that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
majority
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Adams v. Williams
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108571/adams-v-williams/
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an arrest." The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. *146 See A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. ; see ; United The Court recognized in Terry that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect. "When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others," he may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law. So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop,[1] and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose. Applying these principles to the present case, we believe that Sgt. Connolly acted justifiably in responding to his informant's tip. The informant was known to him personally and had provided him with information in the past. This is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip. The informant here came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene. Indeed, under *147 Connecticut law, the informant might have been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint had Sgt. Connolly's investigation proved the tip incorrect.[2] Thus, while the Court's decisions indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, see, e. g., ; the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams. In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent's argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person. Informants' tips,
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,972 | 19 |
majority
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Adams v. Williams
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108571/adams-v-williams/
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rather than on information supplied by another person. Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple rule will not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some situationsfor example, when the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crimethe subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police response. While properly investigating the activity of a person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly *148 had ample reason to fear for his safety.[3] When Williams rolled down his window, rather than complying with the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his movements could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at Williams' waist became an even greater threat. Under these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable. The loaded gun seized as a result of this intrusion was therefore admissible at Williams' trial. 392 U. S., Once Sgt. Connolly had found the gun precisely where the informant had predicted, probable cause existed to arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapon. Probable cause to arrest depends "upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. In the present case the policeman found Williams in possession of a gun in precisely the place predicted by the informant. This tended to corroborate the reliability of the informant's further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding circumstances, certainly suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the *149 gun. Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction. See Rather, the court will evaluate generally the circumstances at the time of the arrest to decide if the officer had probable cause for
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112086/lingle-v-norge-div-of-magic-chef-inc/
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In Illinois an employee who is discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim may recover compensatory and punitive damages from her employer. The question presented in this case is whether an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides her with a contractual remedy for discharge without just cause may enforce her state-law remedy for retaliatory discharge. The Court of Appeals held that the application of the state tort remedy was pre-empted by 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S. C. 185. We disagree. I Petitioner was employed in respondent's manufacturing plant in Herrin, Illinois. On December 5, she notified respondent that she had been injured in the course of her employment and requested compensation for her medical expenses pursuant to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. On December 11, respondent discharged her for filing a "false worker's compensation claim." The union representing petitioner promptly filed a grievance pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement that covered all production and maintenance employees in the Herrin plant. The agreement protected those employees, including petitioner, from discharge except for "proper" or "just" cause, App. 13-14, and established a procedure for the arbitration of grievances, The term grievance *402 was broadly defined to encompass "any dispute between the Employer and any employee, concerning the effect, interpretation, application, claim of breach or violation of this Agreement." Ultimately, an arbitrator ruled in petitioner's favor and ordered respondent to reinstate her with full backpay. See Meanwhile, on July 9, petitioner commenced this action against respondent by filing a complaint in the Illinois Circuit Court for Williamson County, alleging that she had been discharged for exercising her rights under the Illinois workers' compensation laws. App. 2-4; see ; ; see also Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, ¶ 138.4(h) Respondent removed the case to the Federal District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, and then filed a motion praying that the court either dismiss the case on pre-emption grounds or stay further proceedings pending the completion of the arbitration. Record, Doc. No. 7. Relying on our decision in Allis-Chalmers the District Court dismissed the complaint. It concluded that the "claim for retaliatory discharge is `inextricably intertwined' with the collective bargaining provision prohibiting wrongful discharge or discharge without just cause" and that allowing the state-law action to proceed would undermine the arbitration procedures set forth in the parties' contract. The Court of Appeals agreed that the state-law claim was pre-empted by 301. In an en banc opinion, over the dissent of two judges, it rejected petitioner's argument that the tort action was not "inextricably intertwined" with the
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Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112086/lingle-v-norge-div-of-magic-chef-inc/
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that the tort action was not "inextricably intertwined" with the collective-bargaining agreement because the disposition of a retaliatory discharge claim in Illinois does not depend upon an interpretation of the agreement; on the contrary, the court concluded that "the same analysis of the facts" was implicated under both procedures. 823 F.2d, 46. It took note of, and *403 declined to follow, contrary decisions in the Tenth, Third, and Second Circuits.[1] We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits. II Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S. C. 185(a), provides. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." In Textile we held that 301 not only provides federal-court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective-bargaining agreements, but also "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements."[2] In we were confronted with a straightforward question of contract interpretation: whether a collective-bargaining agreement implicitly prohibited a strike that had been called by the union. The Washington Supreme Court had answered that question by applying state-law rules of contract interpretation. *404 We rejected that approach, and held that 301 mandated resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management disputes.[3] *405 In Allis-Chalmers we considered whether the Wisconsin tort remedy for badfaith handling of an insurance claim could be applied to the handling of a claim for disability benefits that were authorized by a collective-bargaining agreement. We began by examining the collective-bargaining agreement, and determined that it provided the basis not only for the benefits, but also for the right to have payments made in a timely manner. We then analyzed the Wisconsin tort remedy, explaining that it "exists for breach of a `duty devolv[ed] upon the insurer by reasonable implication from the express terms of the contract,' the scope of which, crucially, is `ascertained from a consideration of the contract itself.' " ). Since the "parties' agreement as to the manner in which a benefit claim would be handled [would] necessarily [have been] relevant to any allegation that the claim was handled in a dilatory manner," we concluded that 301 pre-empted the application of the Wisconsin tort remedy
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112086/lingle-v-norge-div-of-magic-chef-inc/
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that 301 pre-empted the application of the Wisconsin tort remedy in this setting. Thus, Lueck faithfully applied the principle of 301 preemption developed in Lucas Flour:[4] if the resolution of a *406 state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles necessarily uniform throughout the Nation must be employed to resolve the dispute.[5] Illinois courts have recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim,[6] and *407 have held that it is applicable to employees covered by union contracts, cert. denied, "[T]o show retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that (1) he was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter him from exercising his rights under the Act or to interfere with his exercise of those rights." cert. denied, ; see Each of these purely factual questions pertains to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer. Neither of the elements requires a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement. To defend against a retaliatory discharge claim, an employer must show that it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge, cf. Loyola University of ; this purely factual inquiry likewise does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is "independent" of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of "independent" that matters for 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.[7] *408 The Court of Appeals seems to have relied upon a different way in which a state-law claim may be considered "independent" of a collective-bargaining agreement. The court wrote that "the just cause provision in the collective-bargaining agreement may well prohibit such retaliatory discharge," and went on to say that if the state-law cause of action could go forward, "a state court would be deciding precisely the same issue as would an arbitrator: whether there was `just cause' to discharge the worker." 823 F.2d, 46 The court concluded, "the state tort of retaliatory discharge is inextricably intertwined with the collective-bargaining agreements here, because it implicates the same analysis of the facts as would an inquiry under the just cause provisions of the agreements." We agree with the court's explanation that the state-law analysis might well involve attention
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112086/lingle-v-norge-div-of-magic-chef-inc/
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court's explanation that the state-law analysis might well involve attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether Lingle was fired for just cause. But we disagree with the court's conclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis. For while there may be instances in which the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter *409 of the law in question,[8] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements.[9] In other words, even if dispute resolution *410 pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for 301 pre-emption purposes.[10] IV The result we reach today is consistent both with the policy of fostering uniform, certain adjudication of disputes over the *411 meaning of collective-bargaining agreements and with cases that have permitted separate fonts of substantive rights to remain unpre-empted by other federal labor-law statutes. First, as we explained in Lueck, "[t]he need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central reasons that underlay the Court's holding in Lucas Flour." "A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance procedures would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, as well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor contract law under 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor contract in the first instance." See ; Today's decision should make clear that interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm;[11] judges can determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not require construing collective-bargaining agreements. Second, there is nothing novel about recognizing that substantive rights in the labor relations context can exist without interpreting collective-bargaining agreements. "This Court has, on numerous occasions, declined to hold that individual employees are, because of the availability of arbitration, barred from bringing claims under federal statutes. See, e. g., ; ; U.S. 36 Although the analysis of the question under each statute is quite distinct, the theory running through these cases is that *412 notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging arbitration, `different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,988 | 16 |
majority
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Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112086/lingle-v-norge-div-of-magic-chef-inc/
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arbitration, `different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.'" Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Although our comments in Buell, construing the scope of Railway Labor Act pre-emption, referred to independent federal statutory rights, we subsequently rejected a claim that federal labor law pre-empted a state statute providing a one-time severance benefit to employees in the event of a plant closing. In Fort Halifax Packing we emphasized that "pre-emption should not be lightly inferred in this area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State." We specifically held that the Maine law in question was not pre-empted by the NLRA, "since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not impermissibly intrude upon the collective-bargaining process." The Court of Appeals "recognize[d] that 301 does not pre-empt state anti-discrimination laws, even though a suit under these laws, like a suit alleging retaliatory discharge, requires a state court to determine whether just cause existed to justify the discharge." 823 F.2d, 46, n. 17. The court distinguished those laws because Congress has affirmatively endorsed state antidiscrimination remedies in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5(c) and 2000e-7, whereas there is no such explicit endorsement of state workers' compensation laws. As should be plain from our discussion in Part this distinction is unnecessary for determining whether 301 pre-empts the state law in question. The operation of the antidiscrimination laws does, however, illustrate the relevant point for 301 pre-emption analysis that the mere fact that a broad contractual protection against discriminatory or retaliatory *413 discharge may provide a remedy for conduct that coincidentally violates state law does not make the existence or the contours of the state-law violation dependent upon the terms of the private contract. For even if an arbitrator should conclude that the contract does not prohibit a particular discriminatory or retaliatory discharge, that conclusion might or might not be consistent with a proper interpretation of state law. In the typical case a state tribunal could resolve either a discriminatory or retaliatory discharge claim without interpreting the "just cause" language of a collective-bargaining agreement. V In sum, we hold that an application of state law is preempted by 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.[12] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,981 | 18 |
majority
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Lehman v. Nakshian
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110550/lehman-v-nakshian/
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The question presented by this case is whether a plaintiff in an action against the United States under 15 (c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is entitled to trial by jury. I The 197 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967[1] added a new 15,[2] which brought the Federal Government within the scope of the Act for the first time. Section 15 (a)[3] prohibits the Federal Government from discrimination based on age in most of its civilian employment decisions concerning persons over 0 years of age. Section 15 (b)[] provides that enforcement of 15 (a) *15 in most agencies, including military departments, is the responsibility of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Commission is directed to "issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as [the Commission] deems necessary and appropriate" to carry out that responsibility. Section 15 (c)[5] provides: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act." In 197, respondent Alice Nakshian, who was then a 62-year-old civilian employee of the United States Department of the Navy, brought an age discrimination suit against the Navy under 15 (c). She requested a jury trial. The defendant moved to strike the request, and the District Court denied the motion. (DC). The court stressed that the "legal or equitable relief" language used by Congress to establish a right to sue the Federal Government for age discrimination was identical to the language Congress had previously used in 7 (c) of the Act[6] to authorize private ADEA suits. That language, *159 the District Court said, was an important basis for this Court's holding in that 7 (c) permits jury trials in private suits under the Act. The court stated that "if Congress had intended its consent to ADEA suits [against the Government] to be limited to non-jury trials, it could have easily said as much." Recognizing that as a result of 197 amendments to the ADEA 7 (c) (2) expressly confers a right to jury trial, whereas no such language exists in 15,[7] the court found no "explicit refusal" by Congress to grant the right to jury trial against the Government, and noted that the legislative history of the 197 amendments spoke in general terms about a right to jury trial in ADEA suits. On interlocutory appeal under 2 U.S. C. 1292 (b), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 202 U. S. App. D. C. 59, The appellate court rejected the Secretary's argument that a
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,981 | 18 |
majority
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Lehman v. Nakshian
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110550/lehman-v-nakshian/
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59, The appellate court rejected the Secretary's argument that a plaintiff is entitled to trial by jury in a suit against the United States only when such a trial has been expressly authorized. Instead, the court viewed the question as "an ordinary question of statutory interpretation," and found sufficient evidence of legislative intent to provide for trial by jury in cases such as this. Noting that Congress had conferred jurisdiction over ADEA suits upon the federal district courts, rather than the Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that "`absent a provision as to the method of trial, a grant of jurisdiction to a district court as a court of law carries with it a right to jury trial.'" 62 F.2d, The Court of Appeals also adopted the District Court's view of the "legal relief" language in 15 (c). Further, it was the court's view that the existence of the explicit statutory right to jury trial in suits against private employers does not *160 negate the existence of a right to jury trial in suits against the Government, since the provision for jury trials in private suits was added only to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals on that issue and to confirm the correctness of this Court's decision in the case. We granted certiorari to consider the issue presented. Sub nom. II It has long been settled that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply in actions against the Federal Government. In the Court observed (footnotes omitted): "The suit is one to enforce a monetary claim against the United States. It hardly can be maintained that under the common law in 1791 jury trial was a matter of right for persons asserting claims against the sovereign. Whatever force the Amendment has therefore is derived because Congress, in the legislation cited, has made it applicable." See also Glidden ; Moreover, the Court has recognized the general principle that "the United States, as sovereign, `is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.'" United quoting United See also United Thus, if Congress waives the Government's immunity from suit, as it has in the ADEA, 29 U.S. C. 3a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), the plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury only where that right is one of "the terms of [the Government's] consent to be sued." at Like a waiver of immunity itself, which must be "unequivocally expressed," United
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,981 | 18 |
majority
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Lehman v. Nakshian
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110550/lehman-v-nakshian/
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waiver of immunity itself, which must be "unequivocally expressed," United *161 at quoting United "this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." See also United U.S. 111, ; United When Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States, it has almost always conditioned that waiver upon a plaintiff's relinquishing any claim to a jury trial. Jury trials, for example, have not been made available in the Court of Claims for the broad range of cases within its jurisdiction under 2 U.S. C. 191i. e., all claims against the United States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." See Glidden And there is no jury trial right in this same range of cases when the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See 2 U.S. C. 136 (a) (2) and 202. Finally, in tort actions against the United States, see 2 U.S. C. 136 (b), Congress has similarly provided that trials shall be to the court without a jury. 2 U.S. C. 202.[] *162 The appropriate inquiry, therefore, is whether Congress clearly and unequivocally departed from its usual practice in this area, and granted a right to trial by jury when it amended the ADEA.[9] A Section 15 of the ADEA, 29 U.S. C. 3a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), prohibits age discrimination in federal employment. Section 15 (c) provides the means for judicial enforcement of this guarantee: any person aggrieved "may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes" of the Act. Section 15 contrasts with 7 (c) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 626 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III), which authorizes civil actions against private employers and state and local governments, and which expressly provides for jury trials. Congress accordingly demonstrated that it knew how to provide a statutory right to a jury trial when it wished to do so elsewhere in the very "legislation cited." Galloway, But in 15 it failed explicitly to do so.[10] See *1 9 U.S. 90, ; cf. Monroe v. Standard Oil 52 U.S. 59, The respondent infers statutory intent from the language in 15 (c) providing for the award of "legal or equitable relief," relying on for the proposition that the authorization of "legal" relief supports a statutory jury trial
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,981 | 18 |
majority
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Lehman v. Nakshian
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110550/lehman-v-nakshian/
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the authorization of "legal" relief supports a statutory jury trial right. But has no application in this context. In the first place, the word "legal" cannot be deemed to be what the Court described as "a term of art" with respect to the availability of jury trials in cases where the defendant is the Federal Government. In the authorization for the award of "legal" relief was significant largely because of the presence of a constitutional question. The Court observed that where legal relief is granted in litigation between private parties, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury, and reasoned that Congress must have been aware of the significance of the word "legal" in that context. But the Seventh Amendment has no application in actions at law against the Government, as Congress and this Court have always recognized. Thus no particular significance can be attributed to the word "legal" in 15 (c). Moreover, another basis of the decision in was that when Congress chose to incorporate the enforcement scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) into 7 of the ADEA, it adopted in ADEA the FLSA practice of making jury trials 3 U.S., at 50-53. Again, that reasoning has no relevance to this case, because Congress did not incorporate the FLSA enforcement scheme into 15. See 29 U.S. C. 3a (f) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Rather, 15 (a) and (b) are patterned after 717 (a) and (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 196, as amended in March 1972, see Stat. 111-112, which extend the protection of *16 Title VII to federal employees. 2 U.S. C. 2000e-16 (a) and (b). See 11 Cong. Rec. 2397 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen, principal sponsor of 15 of ADEA). And, of course, in contrast to the FLSA,[11] there is no right to trial by jury in cases arising under Title VII. See at 53-5; Great American Federal Savings & Loan 2 U.S. 366, and n. 19. The respondent also infers a right to trial by jury from the fact that Congress conferred jurisdiction over ADEA suits upon the federal district courts, where jury trials are ordinarily available, rather than upon the Court of Claims, where they are not. Not only is there little logical support for this inference, but the legislative history offers no support for it either.[12] Moreover, Rule 3 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the right to a jury trial "as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given *165 by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to
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Justice Stewart
| 1,981 | 18 |
majority
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Lehman v. Nakshian
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a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate" (emphasis added). This language hardly states a general rule that jury trials are to be presumed whenever Congress provides for cases to be brought in federal district courts.[13] Indeed, Rule 3 (a) requires an affirmative statutory grant of the right where, as in this case, the Seventh Amendment does not apply. B As already indicated, it is unnecessary to go beyond the language of the statute itself to conclude that Congress did not intend to confer a right to trial by jury on ADEA plaintiffs proceeding against the Federal Government. But it is helpful briefly to explore the legislative history, if only to demonstrate that it no more supports the holding of the Court of Appeals than does the statutory language itself. *166 The respondent cannot point to a single reference in the legislative history to the subject of jury trials in cases brought against the Federal Government. There is none. And there is nothing to indicate that Congress did not mean what it plainly indicated when it expressly provided for jury trials in 7 (c) cases but not in 15 (c) cases. In fact, the few inferences that may be drawn from the legislative history are inconsistent with the respondent's position. The ADEA originally applied only to actions against private employers. Section 7 incorporated the enforcement scheme used in employee actions against private employers under the FLSA. In the Court found that the incorporation of the FLSA scheme into 7 indicated that the FLSA right to trial by jury should also be incorporated. The holding was codified in 197 when 7 (c) was amended to provide expressly for jury trials in actions brought under that section. Congress expanded the scope of ADEA in 197 to include state and local government and Federal Government employers. State and local governments were added as potential defendants by a simple expansion of the term "employer" in the ADEA. The existing substantive and procedural provisions of the Act, including 7 (c), were thereby extended to cover state and local government employees. In contrast, Congress added an entirely new section, 15, to address the problems of age discrimination in federal employment. Here Congress deliberately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme applicable only to the federal sector,[1] and one based not on *167 the FLSA but, as already indicated, on Title VII.[15] where, unlike the FLSA, there was no right to trial by jury.[16] Finally, in a 197 amendment to ADEA. Congress declined an opportunity to extend a right to trial by jury to
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Justice Stewart
| 1,981 | 18 |
majority
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Lehman v. Nakshian
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opportunity to extend a right to trial by jury to federal employee plaintiffs. Before the announcement of the Senate, but not the House, had included an amendment to 7 (c) to provide for jury trials in a pending bill to revise ADEA. After the Conference Committee recommended and Congress enacted the present 7 (c) (2), closely resembling the jury trial amendment passed by the Senate. But the Conference did not recommend, and Congress did not enact, any corresponding amendment of 15 (c) to provide for jury trials in cases against the Federal Government. Indeed, *16 the conferees recommended and Congress enacted a new 15 (f), 29 U.S. C. 3a (f) (1976 ed., Supp. III), providing that federal personnel actions covered by 15 are not subject to any other section of ADEA, with one exception not relevant here. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, p. 11 (197). See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-527, p. 11 (1977) ("Section 15 is complete in itself"). Since the new subsection (f) clearly emphasized that 15 was self-contained and unaffected by other sections, including those governing procedures applicable in actions against private employers, Judge Tamm, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, was surely correct when he concluded that "[i]n amending both sections as it did, Congress could not have overlooked the need to amend [ 15 (c)] to allow jury trials for government employees if it had so wished." 202 U. S. App. D. C., at 69, n. n. C But even if the legislative history were ambiguous, that would not affect the proper resolution of this case, because the plaintiff in an action against the United States has a right to trial by jury only where Congress has affirmatively and unambiguously granted that right by statute. Congress has most obviously not done so here. Neither the provision for federal employer cases to be brought in district courts rather than the Court of Claims, nor the use of the word "legal" in that section, evinces a congressional intent that ADEA plaintiffs who proceed to trial against the Federal Government may do so before a jury. Congress expressly provided for jury trials in the section of the Act applicable to privatesector employers, and to state and local governmental entities. It did not do so in the section applicable to the Federal Government as an employer, and indeed, patterned that section after provisions in another Act under which there is no right to trial by jury. The conclusion is inescapable that Congress did not depart from its normal practice of not providing a *169 right to
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 964 permits the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue a subpoena to obtain evidence from an employer that is relevant to a pending investigation. The statute autho- rizes a district court to issue an order enforcing such a subpoena. The question presented here is whether a court of appeals should review a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena de novo or for abuse of discretion. This decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. I A Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 964 prohibits em- ployment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, reli- gion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S. C. The statute entrusts the enforce- ment of that prohibition to the EEOC. See The EEOC’s responsibilities “are triggered by the filing of a specific sworn charge of discrimination,” University of 2 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC Opinion of the Court v. EEOC, which can be filed either by the person alleging discrimination or by the EEOC itself, see When it receives a charge, the EEOC must first notify the employer, ib and must then investigate “to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” University of 493 U.S., at This case is about one of the tools the EEOC has at its disposal in conducting its investigation: a subpoena. In order “[t]o enable the [EEOC] to make informed decisions at each stage of the enforcement process,” Title VII “con- fers a broad right of access to relevant evidence.” at 9. It provides that the EEOC “shall have access to, for the purposes of examination, any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that re- lates to unlawful employment practices covered by” Title VII and “is relevant to the charge under investigation.” 42 U.S. C. And the statute enables the EEOC to obtain that evidence by “authoriz[ing] [it] to issue a subpoena and to seek an order enforcing [the subpoena].” University of ; see Under that authority, the EEOC may issue “subp[o]enas requir- ing the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence.” 29 U.S. C. An employer may petition the EEOC to revoke the subpoena, see ib but if the EEOC rejects the petition and the employer still “refuse[s] to obey [the] subp[o]ena,” the EEOC may ask a district court to issue an order enforcing it, see A district court’s role in an EEOC subpoena enforcement proceeding, we have twice explained, is a straightforward —————— The statute does so by conferring on the EEOC
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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—————— The statute does so by conferring on the EEOC the same authority given to the National Labor Relations Board to conduct investigations. See 42 U.S. C. (“For the purpose of all investigations conducted by the Commission section 6 of title 29 shall apply”). Cite as: 58 U. S. (207) 3 Opinion of the Court one. See University of ; Shell 4 U.S., A district court is not to use an en- forcement proceeding as an opportunity to test the strength of the underlying complaint. Rather, a district court should “ ‘satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is “relevant” to the charge.’ ” University of It should do so cognizant of the “generou[s]” construction that courts have given the term “relevant.” Shell 4 U.S., at 68–69 (“virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer”). If the charge is proper and the material requested is relevant, the district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer estab- lishes that the subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been is- sued for an “illegitimate purpose,” or is unduly burden- some. See United (“The gist of the protec- tion is in the requirement that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable” (internal quotation marks omitted)). B This case arises out of a Title VII suit filed by a woman named Damiana Ochoa. Ochoa worked for eight years as a “cigarette selector” for petitioner McLane Co., a supply- chain services company. According to McLane, the job is a demanding one: Cigarette selectors work in distribution centers, where they are required to lift, pack, and move large bins containing products. McLane requires employ- ees taking physically demanding jobs—both new employ- ees and employees returning from medical leave—to take a physical evaluation. According to McLane, the evalua- tion “tests range of motion, resistance, and speed” and “is designed, administered, and validated by a third party.” Brief for Petitioner 6. In 2007, Ochoa took three months of maternity leave. When she attempted to return 4 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC Opinion of the Court to work, McLane asked her to take the evaluation. Ochoa attempted to pass the evaluation three times, but failed. McLane fired her. Ochoa filed a charge of discrimination, alleging (among other things) that she had been fired on the basis of her gender. The EEOC began an investigation, and—at its request—McLane provided it with basic information about the evaluation, as well as a list of anonymous employees that McLane had asked to take the evaluation. McLane’s list included each employee’s gender, role at the company,
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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McLane’s list included each employee’s gender, role at the company, and evaluation score, as well as the reason each employee had been asked to take the evaluation. But the company refused to provide what the parties call “pedigree infor- mation”: the names, Social Security numbers, last known addresses, and telephone numbers of the employees who had been asked to take the evaluation. Upon learning that McLane used the evaluation nationwide, the EEOC expanded the scope of its investigation, both geographi- cally (to focus on McLane’s nationwide operations) and sub- stantively (to investigate whether McLane had discrimi- nated against its employees on the basis of age). It issued subpoenas requesting pedigree information as it related to its new investigation. But McLane refused to provide the pedigree information, and so the EEOC filed two actions in Federal District Court—one arising out of Ochoa’s charge and one arising out of a separate age- discrimination charge the EEOC itself had filed—seeking enforcement of its subpoenas. The enforcement actions were assigned to the same District Judge, who, after a hearing, declined to enforce the subpoenas to the extent that they sought the pedigree information. See *5 (D Ariz., Apr. 4, 202) (age discrimination charge); Civ. No. 2–2469 (D Ariz., Nov. 9, 202), App. to Pet. for Cert. Cite as: 58 U. S. (207) 5 Opinion of the Court 28–30 (Title VII charge).2 In the District Court’s view, the pedigree information was not “relevant” to the charges because “ ‘an individual’s name, or even an interview he or she could provide if contacted, simply could not shed light on whether the [evaluation] represents a tool of dis- crimination.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29 (quoting 202 WL 32758, at *5; some internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit reversed. See Consistent with Circuit precedent, the panel reviewed the District Court’s decision to quash the subpoena de novo, and concluded that the District Court had erred in finding the pedigree information irrelevant. But the panel questioned in a footnote why de novo review applied, observing that its sister Circuits “appear[ed] to review issues related to enforcement of administrative subpoenas for abuse of discretion.” ; see infra, at 7 (reviewing Court of Appeals authority). This Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagree- ment between the Courts of Appeals over the appropriate standard of review for the decision whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena. 579 U. S. (206). Because the United States agrees with McLane that such a decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, Stephen B. Kinnaird was appointed as amicus curiae to defend the judgment
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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Kinnaird was appointed as amicus curiae to defend the judgment below. 580 U. S. (206). He has ably discharged his duties. —————— 2 The District Court also refused to enforce the subpoena to the extent that it sought a second category of evidence: information about when and why those employees who had been fired after taking the test had been fired. The District Court provided no explanation for not enforc- ing the subpoena to the extent it sought this information, and the Court of Appeals reversed on that ground. McLane does not challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. 6 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC Opinion of the Court II A When considering whether a district court’s decision should be subject to searching or deferential appellate review—at least absent “explicit statutory command”—we traditionally look to two factors. v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (988). First, we ask whether the “history of appellate practice” yields an answer. Second, at least where “neither a clear statutory prescription nor a historical tradition exists,” we ask whether, “ ‘as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in ques- tion.’ ” 559–560 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 04, 4 (985)). Both factors point toward abuse-of- discretion review here. First, the longstanding practice of the courts of appeals in reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an administrative subpoena is to review that decision for abuse of discretion. That practice predates even Title VII itself. As noted, Title VII confers on the EEOC the same authority to issue subpoenas that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) confers on the National Labor Rela- tions Board (NLRB). See n. During the three decades between the enactment of the NLRA and the incorporation of the NLRA’s subpoena-enforcement provi- sions into Title VII, every Circuit to consider the question had held that a district court’s decision whether to enforce an NLRB subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discre- tion. See NLRB v. Consolidated Vacuum Corp., 395 F.2d 46, 49–420 (CA2 968); NLRB v. Friedman, 352 F.2d 545, 547 (CA3 965); NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., 48 F.2d 24, 29 (CA7 945); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 22 F.2d 450, (CA6 94). By the time Congress amended Title VII to authorize EEOC subpoenas in 972, it did so against this uniform backdrop of deferen- tial appellate review. Cite as: 58 U. S. (207) 7 Opinion of the Court Today, nearly as uniformly, the Courts of
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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of the Court Today, nearly as uniformly, the Courts of Appeals apply the same deferential review to a district court’s decision as to whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena. Almost every Court of Appeals reviews such a decision for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 295–296 (CA3 200); 442 (CA4 202); EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., 26 F.3d 634, 638 (CA6 200); ; 448 F.3d 035, 038 ; EEOC v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 30 F.3d 27, 274 ; 77 F.3d 757, 760 (CA 204) (per curiam). As Judge Watford—writing for the panel below—recognized, the Ninth Circuit alone applies a more searching form of review. See 804 F.3d, at 056, n. 3 (“Why we review questions of relevance and undue burden de novo is unclear”); see also (CA9 988) (holding that de novo review applies). To be sure, the inquiry into the appropriate standard of review cannot be resolved by a head-counting exercise. But the “long his- tory of appellate practice” here, 487 U.S., carries significant persuasive weight. Second, basic principles of institutional capacity counsel in favor of deferential review. The decision whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena is a case-specific one that turns not on “a neat set of legal rules,” 462 U.S. 23, (983), but instead on the application of broad standards to “multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization,” 487 U.S., at 56–562 In the mine run of cases, the district court’s decision whether to enforce a subpoena will turn either on whether the evi- dence sought is relevant to the specific charge before it or whether the subpoena is unduly burdensome in light of the circumstances. Both tasks are well suited to a district 8 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC Opinion of the Court judge’s expertise. The decision whether evidence sought is relevant requires the district court to evaluate the rela- tionship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter under investigation—an analysis “vari- able in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry.” Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 86, 209 (946). Similarly, the decision whether a subpoena is overly burdensome turns on the nature of the materials sought and the difficulty the employer will face in producing them. These inquiries are “generally not amenable to broad per se rules,” Sprint/United Manage- ment ; rather, they are the kind of “fact-intensive, close calls” better suited to resolution by the district court than the court of appeals, Cooter & 4043 Other functional considerations also show that abuse-of- discretion review is appropriate here. For one, district courts have considerable experience in other contexts
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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For one, district courts have considerable experience in other contexts making decisions similar—though not identical—to those they must make in this one. See (200) (“[T]he comparatively greater expertise” of the district court may counsel in favor of deferential review). District courts decide, for instance, whether evidence is relevant at trial, Fed. Rule Evid. 40; whether pretrial criminal subpoenas are unreasonable in —————— 3 To be sure, there are pure questions of law embedded in a district court’s decision to enforce or quash a subpoena. Whether a charge is “valid,” —that is, legally sufficient—is a pure question of law. And the question whether a district court employed the correct standard of relevance, see at 68–69—as opposed to how it applied that standard to the facts of a given case—is a question of law. But “applying a unitary abuse-of- discretion standard” does not shelter a district court that makes an error of law, because “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” Cooter & Cite as: 58 U. S. (207) 9 Opinion of the Court scope, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(c)(2); and more. These decisions are not the same as the decisions a district court must make in enforcing an administrative subpoena. But they are similar enough to give the district court the “in- stitutional advantag[e],” that comes with greater experience. For another, as we noted in Cooter & Gell, deferential review “streamline[s] the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district court,” 496 U.S., at 404—a particularly important consideration in a “satel- lite” proceeding like this one, ib designed only to facili- tate the EEOC’s investigation. B Amicus’ arguments to the contrary have aided our con- sideration of this case. But they do not persuade us that de novo review is appropriate. Amicus’ central argument is that the decision whether a subpoena should be enforced does not require the exercise of discretion on the part of the district court, and so it should not be reviewed for abuse of discretion. On amicus’ view, the district court’s primary role is to test the legal sufficiency of the subpoena, not to weigh whether it should be enforced as a substantive matter. Cf. Shell 4 U.S., (rejecting the argument that the district court should assess the validity of the underlying claim in a proceeding to enforce a subpoena). Even accepting amicus’ view of the district court’s task, however, this understanding of abuse-of-discretion review is too narrow. As commentators
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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this understanding of abuse-of-discretion review is too narrow. As commentators have observed, abuse-of-discretion re- view is employed not only where a decisionmaker has “a wide range of choice as to what he decides, free from the constraints which characteristically attach whenever legal rules enter the decision[making] process”; it is also em- ployed where the trial judge’s decision is given “an unu- 0 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC Opinion of the Court sual amount of insulation from appellate revision” for func- tional reasons. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, (97); see also 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Prac- tice and Procedure §5. (2d ed. 202). And as we have explained, it is in large part due to functional concerns that we conclude the district court’s decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Even if the district court’s decision can be characterized in the way that ami- cus suggests, that characterization would not be incon- sistent with abuse-of-discretion review. Nor are we persuaded by amicus’ remaining arguments. Amicus argues that affording deferential review to a dis- trict court’s decision would clash with Court of Appeals decisions instructing district courts to defer themselves to the EEOC’s determination that evidence is relevant to the charge at issue. See Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 24 F.3d 304, 307 (CADC 997) (district courts should defer to agency appraisals of relevance unless they are “obviously wrong”); EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Aero & Naval Systems, 6 F.3d 0, 3 (CA4 997) (same). In amicus’ view, it is “analyt- ically impossible” for the court of appeals to defer to the district court if the district court must itself defer to the agency. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. We think the better reading of those cases is that they rest on the established rule that the term “relevant” be understood “generously” to permit the EEOC “access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.” Shell 4 U.S., at 68–69. A district court deciding whether evidence is “relevant” under Title VII need not defer to the EEOC’s decision on that score; it must simply answer the question cognizant of the agency’s broad authority to seek and obtain evidence. Because the statute does not set up any scheme of double deference, amicus’ arguments as to the infirmities of such a scheme are misplaced. Cite as: 58 U. S. (207) Opinion of the Court Nor do we agree that, as amicus suggests, the constitu- tional underpinnings of the Shell standard require a different result. To
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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underpinnings of the Shell standard require a different result. To be sure, we have described a subpoena as a “ ‘constructive’ search,” Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S., at 202, and implied that the Fourth Amendment is the source of the requirement that a subpoena not be “too indefinite,” Morton But not every decision that touches on the Fourth Amendment is subject to searching review. Subpoenas in a wide variety of other contexts also implicate the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, but courts routinely review the enforcement of such subpoenas for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United 48 U.S. 683, (974) (pretrial subpoenas duces tecum); In re Grand Jury Sub- poena, (CA5 202) (grand jury subpoe- nas); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, F.3d 86, 20 (CA0 200) (same). And this Court has emphasized that courts should pay “great deference” to a magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause, —a decision more akin to a district court’s preenforcement review of a subpoena than the warrantless searches and seizures we considered in 57 U.S. 690 (996), on which amicus places great weight. The constitutional pedigree of Shell does not change our view of the correct standard of review. III For these reasons, a district court’s decision to enforce an EEOC subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discre- tion, not de novo. The United States also argues that the judgment below can be affirmed because it is clear that the District Court abused its discretion. But “we are a court of review, not of first view,” 78, n. 7 (2005), and the Court of Appeals has not had the chance to 2 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC Opinion of the Court review the District Court’s decision under the appropriate standard. That task is for the Court of Appeals in the first instance. As part of its analysis, the Court of Appeals may also consider, as and to the extent it deems appropriate, any arguments made by McLane regarding the burdens imposed by the subpoena. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings con- sistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 58 U. S. (207) Opinion of GINSBURG, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 5–248 MCLANE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [April 3, 207] JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I agree with the Court that “abuse of discretion” is generally the proper review standard for district court
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,017 | 24 |
majority
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McLane Co. v. EEOC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380153/mclane-co-v-eeoc/
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discretion” is generally the proper review standard for district court decisions reviewing agency subpoenas, I would neverthe- less affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in this case. As the Court of Appeals explained, the District Court’s re- fusal to enforce the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) subpoena for pedigree information rested on a legal error. Lower court resolution of a ques- tion of law is ordinarily reviewable de novo on appeal. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. and n. 2 (204) (slip op., at 4, and n. 2). According to the District Court, it was not yet “nec- essary [for the EEOC] to seek such information.” 202 WL 5868959, *6 (D Ariz., Nov. 9, 202). As the Ninth Circuit correctly conveyed, however: “The EEOC does not have to show a ‘particularized necessity of access, beyond a show- ing of mere relevance,’ to obtain evidence.” 804 F.3d 05, 057 ). Because the District Court erred as a matter of law in demanding that the EEOC show more than relevance in order to gain enforcement of its sub- poena, I would not disturb the Court of Appeals’ judgment
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Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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The plurality opinion in concluded that the City of San Diego could, consistently with the First Amendment, restrict the commercial use of billboards in order to "preserve and improve the appearance of the City." Today, the Court sustains the constitutionality of Los Angeles' similarly motivated ban on the posting of political signs on public property. Because the Court's lenient approach towards the restriction of speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the protections of the First Amendment, I dissent. The Court finds that the City's "interest [in eliminating visual clutter] is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees' expression" and that the effect of the ordinance on speech is "no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's purpose." Ante, at 805. These are the right questions to consider when analyzing the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance, see ; but the answers that the Court provides reflect a startling insensitivity to the principles embodied in the First Amendment. In my view, the City of Los Angeles has not shown that its interest in eliminating "visual clutter" justifies its restriction of appellees' ability to communicate with the local electorate. I The Court recognizes that each medium for communicating ideas and information presents its own particular problems. Our analysis of the First Amendment concerns implicated by a given medium must therefore be sensitive to these particular problems and characteristics. The posting of signs is, *819 of course, a time-honored means of communicating a broad range of ideas and information, particularly in our cities and towns. At the same time, the unfettered proliferation of signs on public fixtures may offend the public's legitimate desire to preserve an orderly and aesthetically pleasing urban environment. In this case, as in we are called upon to adjudge the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a local government's response to this recurring dilemma namely, the clash between the public's aesthetic interest in controlling the use of billboards, signs, handbills, and other similar means of communication, and the First Amendment interest of those who wish to use these media to express their views, or to learn the views of others, on matters of importance to the community. In deciding this First Amendment question, the critical importance of the posting of signs as a means of communication must not be overlooked. Use of this medium of communication is particularly valuable in part because it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats, typographies, and graphics, and conveys its message in a manner that is easily
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Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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and conveys its message in a manner that is easily read and understood by its reader or viewer. There may be alternative channels of communication, but the prevalence of a large number of signs in Los Angeles[1] is a strong indication that, for many speakers, those alternatives are far less satisfactory. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Nevertheless, the City of Los Angeles asserts that ample alternative avenues of communication are available. The City notes that, although the posting of signs on public property is prohibited, the posting of signs on private property and the distribution of handbills are not. Brief for Appellants *820 25-26. But there is no showing that either of these alternatives would serve appellees' needs nearly as well as would the posting of signs of public property. First, there is no proof that a sufficient number of private parties would allow the posting of signs on their property. Indeed, common sense suggests the contrary at least in some instances. A speaker with a message that is generally unpopular or simply unpopular among property owners is hardly likely to get his message across if forced to rely on this medium. It is difficult to believe, for example, that a group advocating an increase in the rate of a property tax would succeed in persuading private property owners to accept its signs. Similarly, the adequacy of distributing handbills is dubious, despite certain advantages of handbills over signs. See Particularly when the message to be carried is best expressed by a few words or a graphic image, a message on a sign will typically reach far more people than one on a handbill. The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is typically read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be spent distributing them. The average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore likely to be far higher than the average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted on public property are doubtless "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people," and their prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of communication. Cf. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 233, 257. Because the City has completely banned the use of this particular medium of communication, and because, given the circumstances, there are no equivalent alternative media that provide an adequate substitute, the Court must examine with particular care the justifications that the City proffers
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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examine with particular care the justifications that the City proffers for its ban. See ; Linmark Associates, II As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 805, when an ordinance significantly limits communicative activity, "the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation." (19). The Court's first task is to determine whether the ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech, and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies the suppression. Consolidated Edison ; Police Department of If the restriction is content-neutral, the court's task is to determine (1) whether the governmental objective advanced by the restriction is substantial, and (2) whether the restriction imposed on speech is no greater than is essential to further that objective. Unless both conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated. See ante, at 805, 808, 810.[2] My suggestion in was that courts should exercise special care in addressing these questions when a purely aesthetic objective is asserted to justify a restriction of speech. Specifically, "before deferring to a city's judgment, a court must be convinced that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment." I adhere to that view. Its correctness premised largely on my concern that aesthetic interests are easy for a city to assert and difficult for a court to evaluate is, for me, reaffirmed by this case. The fundamental problem in this kind of case is that a purely aesthetic state interest offered to justify a restriction on speech that is, a governmental objective justified solely *822 in terms like "proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression," ante, at 806 creates difficulties for a reviewing court in fulfilling its obligation to ensure that government regulation does not trespass upon protections secured by the First Amendment. The source of those difficulties is the unavoidable subjectivity of aesthetic judgments the fact that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." As a consequence of this subjectivity, laws defended on aesthetic grounds raise problems for judicial review that are not presented by laws defended on more objective grounds such as national security, public health, or public safety.[3] In practice, therefore, the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a reviewing court meaningfully to make the required inquiries.[4] A Initially, a reviewing court faces substantial difficulties determining whether the actual objective is
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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court faces substantial difficulties determining whether the actual objective is related to the suppression of speech. The asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a facade for content-based suppression. Of course, all would agree that the improvement and preservation *823 of the aesthetic environment are important governmental functions, and that some restrictions on speech may be necessary to carry out these functions. But a governmental interest in aesthetics cannot be regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify a restriction of speech based on an assertion that the content of the speech is, in itself, aesthetically displeasing. Because aesthetic judgments are so subjective, however, it is too easy for government to enact restrictions on speech for just such illegitimate reasons and to evade effective judicial review by asserting that the restriction is aimed at some displeasing aspect of the speech that is not solely communicative for example, its sound, its appearance, or its location. An objective standard for evaluating claimed aesthetic judgments is therefore essential; for without one, courts have no reliable means of assessing the genuineness of such claims. For example, in evaluating the ordinance before us in this case, the City might be pursuing either of two objectives, motivated by two very different judgments. One objective might be the elimination of "visual clutter," attributable in whole or in part to signs posted on public property. The aesthetic judgment underlying this objective would be that the clutter created by these signs offends the community's desire for an orderly, visually pleasing environment. A second objective might simply be the elimination of the messages typically carried by the signs.[5] In that case, the aesthetic judgment would be that the signs' messages are themselves displeasing. The first objective is lawful, of course, but the second is not. Yet the City might easily mask the second *824 objective by asserting the first and declaring that signs constitute visual clutter. In short, we must avoid unquestioned acceptance of the City's bare declaration of an aesthetic objective lest we fail in our duty to prevent unlawful trespasses upon First Amendment protections. B A total ban on an important medium of communication may be upheld only if the government proves that the ban (1) furthers a substantial government objective, and (2) constitutes the least speech-restrictive means of achieving that objective. Here too, however, meaningful judicial application of these standards is seriously frustrated. (1) No one doubts the importance of a general governmental interest in aesthetics, but in order to justify a restriction of speech, the particular objective behind the restriction must be substantial. E. g., United ;
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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behind the restriction must be substantial. E. g., United ; Perry Education ; United Therefore, in order to uphold a restriction of speech imposed to further an aesthetic objective, a court must ascertain the substantiality of the specific objective pursued. Although courts ordinarily defer to the government's assertion that its objective is substantial, that assertion is not immune from critical examination. See, e. g., This is particularly true when aesthetic objectives underlie the restrictions. But in such cases independent judicial assessment of the substantiality of the government's interest is difficult. Because aesthetic judgments are entirely subjective, the government may too easily overstate the substantiality of its goals. Accordingly, unless courts carefully scrutinize *825 aesthetics-based restrictions of speech, they risk standing idly by while important media of communication are foreclosed for the sake of insubstantial governmental objectives. (2) Similarly, when a total ban is justified solely in terms of aesthetics, the means inquiry necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of the ban may be impeded by deliberate or unintended government manipulation. Governmental objectives that are purely aesthetic can usually be expressed in a virtually limitless variety of ways. Consequently, objectives can be tailored to fit whatever program the government devises to promote its general aesthetic interests. Once the government has identified a substantial aesthetic objective and has selected a preferred means of achieving its objective, it will be possible for the government to correct any mismatch between means and ends by redefining the ends to conform with the means. In this case, for example, any of several objectives might be the City's actual substantial goal in banning temporary signs: (1) the elimination of all signs throughout the City, (2) the elimination of all signs in certain parts of the City, or (3) a reduction of the density of signs. Although a total ban on the posting of signs on public property would be the least restrictive means of achieving only the first objective, it would be a very effective means of achieving the other two as well. It is quite possible, therefore, that the City might select such a ban as the means by which to further its general interest in solving its sign problem, without explicitly considering which of the three specific objectives is really substantial. Then, having selected the total ban as its preferred means, the City would be strongly inclined to characterize the first objective as the substantial one. This might be done purposefully in order to conform the ban to the least-restrictive-means requirement, or it might be done inadvertently as a natural *826 concomitant of considering means and
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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inadvertently as a natural *826 concomitant of considering means and ends together. But regardless of why it is done, a reviewing court will be confronted with a statement of substantiality the subjectivity of which makes it impossible to question on its face. This possibility of interdependence between means and ends in the development of policies to promote aesthetics poses a major obstacle to judicial review of the availability of alternative means that are less restrictive of speech. Indeed, when a court reviews a restriction of speech imposed in order to promote an aesthetic objective, there is a significant possibility that the court will be able to do little more than pay lipservice to the First Amendment inquiry into the availability of less restrictive alternatives. The means may fit the ends only because the ends were defined with the means in mind. In this case, for example, the City has expressed an aesthetic judgment that signs on public property constitute visual clutter throughout the City and that its objective is to eliminate visual clutter. We are then asked to determine whether that objective could have been achieved with less restriction of speech. But to ask the question is to highlight the circularity of the inquiry. Since the goal, at least as currently expressed, is essentially to eliminate all signs, the only available means of achieving that goal is to eliminate all signs. The ease with which means can be equated with aesthetic ends only confirms the importance of close judicial scrutiny of the substantiality of such ends. See In this case, for example, it is essential that the Court assess the City's ban on signs by evaluating whether the City has a substantial interest in eliminating the visual clutter caused by all posted signs throughout the City as distinguished from an interest in banning signs in some areas or in preventing densely packed signs. If, in fact, either of the latter two objectives constitute the substantial interest underlying this ordinance, they could be achieved by means far less restrictive *827 of speech than a total ban on signs, and the ban, therefore, would be invalid. C Regrettably, the Court's analysis is seriously inadequate. Because the Court has failed to develop a reliable means of gauging the nature or depth of the City's commitment to pursuing the goal of eradicating "visual clutter," it simply approves the ordinance with only the most cursory degree of judicial oversight. Without stopping to consider carefully whether this supposed commitment is genuine or substantial, the Court essentially defers to the City's aesthetic judgment and in so
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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essentially defers to the City's aesthetic judgment and in so doing precludes serious assessment of the availability of alternative means. The Court begins by simply affirming that "[t]he problem addressed by this ordinance the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property constitutes a significant substantive end within the City's power to prohibit." Ante, at 807. Then, addressing the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the Court can do little more than state the unsurprising conclusion that "[b]y banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy." Ante, at 808. Finally, as if to explain the ease with which it reaches its conclusion, the Court notes that "[w]ith respect to signs posted by appellees it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape." Ante, at 810. But, as I have demonstrated, it is precisely the ability of the State to make this judgment that should lead us to approach these cases with more caution. III The fact that there are difficulties inherent in judicial review of aesthetics-based restrictions of speech does not imply *828 that government may not engage in such activities. As I have said, improvement and preservation of the aesthetic environment are often legitimate and important governmental functions. But because the implementation of these functions creates special dangers to our First Amendment freedoms, there is a need for more stringent judicial scrutiny than the Court seems willing to exercise. In cases like this, where a total ban is imposed on a particularly valuable method of communication, a court should require the government to provide tangible proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of its aesthetic objective. Justifications for such restrictions articulated by the government should be critically examined to determine whether the government has committed itself to addressing the identified aesthetic problem. In my view, such statements of aesthetic objectives should be accepted as substantial and unrelated to the suppression of speech only if the government demonstrates that it is pursuing an identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are unrelated to the restriction of speech. 3 U. S., at 531 Without such a demonstration, I would invalidate the restriction as violative of the First Amendment. By requiring this type of showing, courts can ensure that governmental regulation of the aesthetic environment remains within the constraints established by the First Amendment. First, we would have a reasonably reliable indication that it is not the content
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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a reasonably reliable indication that it is not the content or communicative aspect of speech that the government finds unaesthetic. Second, when a restriction of speech is part of a comprehensive and seriously pursued program to promote an aesthetic objective, we have a more reliable indication of the government's own assessment of the substantiality of its objective. And finally, when an aesthetic objective is pursued on more than one front, we have a better basis upon which to ascertain its precise nature *829 and thereby determine whether the means selected are the least restrictive ones for achieving the objective.[6] This does not mean that a government must address all aesthetic problems at one time or that a government should hesitate to pursue aesthetic objectives. What it does mean, however, is that when such an objective is pursued, it may not be pursued solely at the expense of First Amendment freedoms, nor may it be pursued by arbitrarily discriminating against a form of speech that has the same aesthetic characteristics as other forms of speech that are also present in the community. See Accordingly, in order for Los Angeles to succeed in defending its total ban on the posting of signs, the City would have to demonstrate that it is pursuing its goal of eliminating visual clutter in a serious and comprehensive manner. Most importantly, the City would have to show that it is pursuing its goal through programs other than its ban on signs, that at least some of those programs address the visual clutter problem through means that do not entail the restriction of speech, and that the programs parallel the ban in their stringency, geographical scope, and aesthetic focus. In this case, however, as the Court of Appeals found, there is no indication that the City has addressed its visual clutter problem in any way other than by prohibiting the posting of signs *830 throughout the City and without regard to the density of their presence. Therefore, I would hold that the prohibition violates appellees' First Amendment rights. In light of the extreme stringency of Los Angeles' ban barring all signs from being posted and its wide geographical scope covering the entire City it might be difficult for Los Angeles to make the type of showing I have suggested. Cf. A more limited approach to the visual clutter problem, however, might well pass constitutional muster. I have no doubt that signs posted on public property in certain areas including, perhaps, parts of Los Angeles could contribute to the type of eyesore
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,984 | 13 |
dissenting
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Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111175/members-of-city-council-of-los-angeles-v-taxpayers-for-vincent/
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Los Angeles could contribute to the type of eyesore that a city would genuinely have a substantial interest in eliminating. These areas might include parts of the City that are particularly pristine, reserved for certain uses, designated to reflect certain themes, or so blighted that broad-gauged renovation is necessary. Presumably, in these types of areas, the City would also regulate the aesthetic environment in ways other than the banning of temporary signs. The City might zone such areas for a particular type of development or lack of development; it might actively create a particular type of environment; it might be especially vigilant in keeping the area clean; it might regulate the size and location of permanent signs; or it might reserve particular locations, such as kiosks, for the posting of temporary signs. Similarly, Los Angeles might be able to attack its visual clutter problem in more areas of the City by reducing the stringency of the ban, perhaps by regulating the density of temporary signs, and coupling that approach with additional measures designed to reduce other forms of visual clutter. There are a variety of ways that the aesthetic environment can be regulated, some restrictive of speech and others not, but it is only when aesthetic regulation is addressed in a comprehensive and focused manner that we can ensure that the *831 goals pursued are substantial and that the manner in which they are pursued is no more restrictive of speech than is necessary. In the absence of such a showing in this case, I believe that Los Angeles' total ban sweeps so broadly and trenches so completely on appellees' use of an important medium of political expression that it must be struck down as violative of the First Amendment.[7] I therefore dissent.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
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Thigpen v. Roberts
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111236/thigpen-v-roberts/
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The Court granted certiorari in this case to review a single question presented by the petition for certiorari: whether the Court of Appeals properly applied our decision in in sustaining respondent's claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the Clause was a bar to further prosecution on a charge of manslaughter stemming from the death of a 10-year-old child who had been a passenger in the truck involved in a collision with respondent's car. This Court, however, in an unexampled bit of procedural footwork which surely has adverse implications for the "rule of four" principle governing our grants of certiorari, simply refuses to even consider the double jeopardy issue raised by the State in its petition for certiorari. Without any explanation whatever, the Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals on an alternative ground. The only precedent cited for this unexplained and I dare say unexplainable decision is United But that case stands only for the unexceptionable proposition that a respondent may argue to this Court any basis supported by the record for affirming the judgment of the lower court, even though respondent did not cross-petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, in New York Telephone Co. the Court decided the issue presented in the petition for certiorari in addition to ruling on the alternative basis for affirmance urged by the respondent. *34 See See also[1] I believe that the Court is obligated to confront the State's contention that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in this case. The Court being unwilling to undertake that obligation, I turn to it in dissent. Respondent was tried and convicted of the misdemeanor offense of reckless driving in a Justice Court in Tallahatchie County, Miss., a county in northwestern Mississippi with a population of approximately 17,000 people. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 for this offense. As permitted by the Mississippi "two-tier" system, he appealed his conviction to the State Circuit Court where he was entitled to a trial de novo. But before he was retried on the misdemeanor charge in the Circuit Court, he was indicted for the felony offense of manslaughter for causing the death of the 10-year-old child who was riding in the truck that respondent struck with his car. The misdemeanor offense was "nolle prossed" before trial, but respondent was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and sentenced to 20 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Respondent's conviction was affirmed
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Thigpen v. Roberts
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111236/thigpen-v-roberts/
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of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Respondent's conviction was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. After exhausting his state postconviction remedies, respondent filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. This *35 writ was granted by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that determination. The Court of Appeals held that "because Roberts has a substantial double jeopardy claim under the Supreme Court's holding in the district court's granting of habeas corpus relief must be affirmed." App. to Pet. for Cert. A13. In reaching this conclusion, I believe that the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied upon a mere form of expression in the Court's opinion in to depart from all of our previous double jeopardy holdings in this area. The Court of Appeals apparently felt that the opinion changed governing double jeopardy law to permit a defendant to establish a substantial, and apparently dispositive, claim of double jeopardy merely by showing that the State actually relied upon the same evidence to prove both crimes. While there is one sentence in the Court's opinion in that supports this construction, I do not believe that construction is consistent with the opinion as a whole. Until the present case, the relevant question to be answered by any court is whether the evidence required to prove the statutory elements of crime is the same, not whether the evidence actually used at trial is the same. In the Supreme Court of Illinois had held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the prosecution of a defendant for manslaughter because the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to reduce speed arising out of the same incident. This Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, saying: "The point is that if manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure to slow, then the two offenses are not the `same' under the Blockburger test. The mere possibility that the State will seek to rely on all of the ingredients necessarily included in the traffic *36 offense to establish an element of its manslaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter prosecution." It seems to me that this is about as clear a statement as there can be of the principle that the double jeopardy inquiry turns on the statutory elements of the two offenses in question, and not on the actual evidence that may be used by the State to convict in a particular case. Nonetheless, the Court went on in to distinguish and in so doing
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
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Thigpen v. Roberts
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111236/thigpen-v-roberts/
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Court went on in to distinguish and in so doing stated: "By analogy, if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." I cannot say that this last expression did not afford the Court of Appeals some ground for the views which it expressed, nor can I say that I think it is entirely consistent with the first quotation from the opinion. But I am reasonably sure that the Court did not intend to transmute the traditional double jeopardy analysis from an either "up or down" inquiry based on the evidence required to prove the statutory elements of a crime into a "substantial claim" inquiry based on the evidence the State introduced at trial. I think that there are ambiguities in which urgently need resolution by this Court, that the present case affords an ample opportunity to do this, and that the Court's failure to do it is an unexampled abdication of its responsibility. I would unambiguously reaffirm the statement in relied upon in that *37 " `[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' " quoting Applying that principle to this case, it seems to me that the Court of Appeals was demonstrably wrong in its treatment of the double jeopardy issue. Comparing the elements of the Mississippi reckless driving statute with the Mississippi manslaughter statute, that court said: "A narrow focus on the two statutes provides one answer. Proof of manslaughter does not necessarily entail proof of reckless driving, for manslaughter could be proved in a situation completely foreign to a vehicular collision." App. to Pet. for Cert. A10-A11 But the court went on to say that taking into account a "judicial veneer" which had been placed on the statute by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "it is apparent that manslaughter by automobile cannot be proven without at the same time proving reckless driving. Because the specific felony offense, manslaughter by automobile, is not statutorily defined, this Court is confronted with a novel situation. Depending on whether the focus is on the manslaughter statute alone or on its case law veneer as well, application of the first prong of the analysis
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
|
Thigpen v. Roberts
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111236/thigpen-v-roberts/
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as well, application of the first prong of the analysis gives different results." at A11. But the Court of Appeals declined to resolve the inquiry based on the elements of the two statutes, as mandated by and went on to say that there was a "second prong" of the inquiry based upon the evidence actually presented at trial. Because the same evidence that led to respondent's conviction on the misdemeanor charge was also *38 introduced in the manslaughter trial, respondent was said to have a "substantial claim" of double jeopardy, whatever that phrase may mean. Because respondent had such a "substantial claim," the Court of Appeals set aside a state-court conviction. I believe that a straightforward analysis of the holding in requires the conclusion that there was a different element in each of the offenses involved which need not be proved with respect to the other offense. The offense of reckless driving is based on the manner of operation of a motor vehicle upon the public roads, and in no wise requires any result in injury to persons or property. The crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence simply requires the causing of a death with a particular state of mind, and need not in any way involve an automobile.[2] *39 The fact that in this particular case the "same evidence" might be used to prove the "reckless" element in the automotive offense and the "culpable negligence" in the manslaughter offense is also not dispositive. For reckless driving a defendant must have driven an automobile, which he need not do to be found guilty of manslaughter; for manslaughter a defendant's act must have caused a death, which is not required for the offense of reckless driving. Applying the "Blockburger" test to a question of statutory construction, the Court in said: "[T]he Court's application of the test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes." Since we have reaffirmed the Blockburger test that the evidence required to prove the statutory elements of a crime determines whether particular crimes are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See The actual evidence test which the Court of Appeals inferred from the single sentence in has never been applied to bar a second trial on grounds of double jeopardy. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it upheld respondent's double jeopardy claim. Because the Court of Appeals did not pass
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Renne v. Geary
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112627/renne-v-geary/
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The majority's concerns about the justiciability of this case, even though ultimately misplaced, are understandable, in light of the failure by the courts below to analyze the precise nature of the constitutional challenge that is presented here. Those concerns, however, should not prevent us from independently examining the record and deciding the issues that are properly presented. In doing so, I conclude that the only constitutional challenge that is properly before us is to the action by the San Francisco Registrar of Voters in deleting references in official voter pamphlets to political party endorsements, a challenge that is fully justiciable. Because the registrar's action does not violate the First Amendment, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I therefore dissent from the majority's disposition of this case. *328 I The courts below erred in treating respondents' challenge in this case as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Article II, 6(b), of the California Constitution. Respondents' complaint reveals that they challenged only the application of 6(b) by San Francisco's Registrar of Voters in refusing to print in voter pamphlets references to endorsements by political parties.[*] After listing the defendants, the complaint sets forth the background for its three causes of action: "In connection with each municipal election, the City and County mails a voters pamphlet to all registered voters. Said pamphlet contains ballot arguments for and against City and County measures, and statements of qualifications of candidates for City and County offices. Defendant PATTERSON [the Registrar of Voters] is responsible for preparing and publishing said voters pamphlet." App. 3, ¶ 10. The first cause of action then challenges the registrar's deletion of portions of proposed ballot arguments submitted for inclusion in the voter pamphlets. 2 Record, Complaint ¶¶ 11-20. The second cause of action challenges the registrar's charge of a fee for ballot arguments. The third cause of action is the one that is at issue in this case. That cause of action, like the two before it, concerns *329 actions by the registrar with regard to the voter pamphlets. Specifically, respondents alleged: "In the past, defendants PATTERSON and CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO have deleted all references in candidate's statements for City and County offices to endorsements by political party central committees or officers or members of such committees. Unless restrained from doing so by order of this court, defendants threaten to continue to delete or exclude all references in candidate's statements to endorsement of candidates by political party central committees, or officers or members of such central committees." App. 5, ¶ Respondents stated that
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Renne v. Geary
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112627/renne-v-geary/
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of such central committees." App. 5, ¶ Respondents stated that they "desire to read endorsements of candidates for city and county office as part of candidate's statements printed in the San Francisco voters pamphlet." ¶ 37. Finally, the only injunctive relief sought based on the third cause of action relates to the deletion of endorsements from the voter pamphlets. In entering summary judgment in favor of respondents on the third cause of action, the District Court described respondents' claim as follows: "Plaintiffs claimand defendants admitthat defendants refuse to permit political party and political party central committee endorsements of candidates for such offices to be printed in the San Francisco voter's pamphlet on account of said state constitutional provision." Similarly, both the original Ninth Circuit panel and the en banc panel stated: "The basis of [respondents'] complaint as it relates to this appeal was the refusal of [petitioners], the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Registrar of Voters, to permit official political party and party central committee endorsements of candidates for nonpartisan offices to be printed in the San Francisco Voter Pamphlet in connection with elections scheduled for June *330 2 and November 3, 1987. [Petitioners] based their refusal to print party endorsements on the language of article II, 6(b)." ; As the above discussion reveals, and as the majority recognizes, see ante, at 323-324, it is far from clear that a facial challenge to the constitutionality of 6(b) was presented in this case. Both the District Court and the en banc Court of Appeals nevertheless invalidated 6(b) on its face, without analyzing the nature of respondents' claim. In doing so, they violated two important rules of judicial restraint applicable to the resolution of constitutional issues"`one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'" United quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. See -305 (arguing that 6(b) should not be invalidated on this record). II I have no doubt that the narrow issue presented in this case is justiciable. As the majority recognizes, ante, at 319, respondents in their capacity as registered voters are alleging that 6(b), as applied by the registrar to the voter pamphlets, interferes with their right to receive information concerning party endorsements. Such a claim finds support in our decisions, which have long held that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, and that this
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Renne v. Geary
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112627/renne-v-geary/
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the right to receive information and ideas, and that this right is sufficient to confer standing to challenge restrictions on speech. See, e. g., Virginia State Bd. of ; ; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 5 *, 0 ; 4 U.S. 557, The majority nevertheless speculates that there is no standing here because a provision in the California Elections Code "might be construed to prevent candidates from mentioning party endorsements in voter pamphlets, even in the absence of 6(b)." Ante, at 319. That makes no sense. A constitutional challenge to a law is not barred merely because other laws might mandate the allegedly unconstitutional action. If so, it would mean that the States or the Federal Government could insulate unconstitutional laws from attack simply by making them redundant. The majority's confusion on this issue is illustrated by its reliance on ASARCO There, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of a state statute governing mineral leases, basing their standing on the claim that the statute deprived school trust funds of millions of dollars and thereby resulted in higher taxes. Four Members of this Court noted that even if the statute were struck down, it was far from clear that the plaintiffs would enjoy any tax relief: "If respondents prevailed and increased revenues from state leases were available, maybe taxes would be reduced, or maybe the State would reduce support from other sources so that the money available for schools would be unchanged." The difference between ASARCO and the present case is obvious. In ASARCO, the State could, by other actions, legally preclude the relief sought by the plaintiffs. By contrast, in this case if petitioners' refusal to allow references to party endorsements in voter pamphlets is unconstitutional when based on 6(b), it probably is unconstitutional if based on some other state law, such as California's Elections Code. The injury alleged by respondents, therefore, "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." *332 The majority's concerns about the ripeness of respondents' challenge, see ante, at 320-323, are not sufficient to preclude our review. Although I agree with the majority that the possible applications of 6(b) to speech by political parties and their members is not properly before us, here respondents have alleged, and petitioners have admitted, that San Francisco's Registrar of Voters has deleted references to political party endorsements from candidate statements printed in official voter pamphlets, and that he threatens to continue to do so in the future. See App. 5, ¶ ; ¶ XIV. Indeed, the majority admits that the record contains "evidence of a credible threat that 6(b)
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
dissenting
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Renne v. Geary
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112627/renne-v-geary/
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the record contains "evidence of a credible threat that 6(b) will be enforced against candidates in the context of voter pamphlets." Ante, at 322. The registrar's past conduct makes his threat "sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy." See, e. g., ; It is well settled that "`[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.'" quoting This is particularly true in the election context, where we often have allowed pre-enforcement challenges to restrictions on speech. See, e. g., 489 U.S. 4 ; ; I therefore dissent from the judgment ordering dismissal for want of justiciability. III Although the Court does not discuss the merits, I shall briefly outline my view that the state constitutional provision *333 at issue in this case is constitutional as applied to the exclusion of party endorsements from the official voter pamphlets. California has decided that its "[j]udicial, school, county, and city offices shall be nonpartisan." Cal. Const., Art. II, 6(a). I am confident that this provision is valid at least insofar as it authorizes the State not to identify on the official ballot candidates for nonpartisan offices as the candidates of political parties. The interests proffered as supporting California's nonpartisan provisionpromotion of the impartial administration of government, prevention of corruption, and the avoidance of the appearance of biasare interests that we have already held are sufficiently important to justify restrictions on partisan political activities. See Civil Service These interests are similar to the interests supporting limitations on ballot access and voting eligibility that have been upheld by this Court. See American Party of ; ; ; If the State may exclude party designations from the ballot, it surely may exclude party endorsements from candidate statements contained in the official voter pamphlet prepared by the government and distributed to prospective voters. It is settled that "the First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." United States Postal The voter information pamphlet obviously is not a traditional public forum, and its use may be limited to its intended purpose, which is to inform voters about nonpartisan elections. See Perry Ed. Refusing to permit references in candidate statements to party endorsements is therefore plainly constitutional. *334 Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
|
Justice Burger
| 1,981 | 12 |
majority
|
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110525/connecticut-bd-of-pardons-v-dumschat/
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The question presented is whether the fact that the Connecticut Board of Pardons has granted approximately three-fourths of the applications for commutation of life sentences creates a constitutional "liberty interest" or "entitlement" in life-term inmates so as to require that Board to explain its reasons for denial of an application for commutation. *460 I In 1964, respondent Dumschat was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. Under state law, he was not eligible for parole until December 1983.[1] The Connecticut Board of Pardons is empowered to commute the sentences of life inmates by reducing the minimum prison term,[2] and such a commutation accelerates eligibility for parole.[3] The authority of the Board of Pardons derives from (1981), which provides in pertinent part: "(a) Jurisdiction over the granting of, and the authority to grant, commutations of punishment or releases, conditioned or absolute, in the case of any person convicted of any offense against the state and commutations from the penalty of death shall be vested in the board of pardons. "(b) Said board shall have authority to grant pardons, conditioned or absolute, for any offense against the state at any time after the imposition and before or after the service of any sentence." *461 On several occasions prior to the filing of this suit in February 1976, Dumschat applied for a commutation of his sentence. The Board rejected each application without explanation. Dumschat then sued the Board under 42 U.S. C. 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board's failure to provide him with a written statement of reasons for denying commutation violated his rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing testimony from officials of the Board of Pardons and the Board of Parole, the District Court concluded (a) that Dumschat had a constitutionally protected liberty entitlement in the pardon process, and (b) that his due process rights had been violated when the Board of Pardons failed to give "a written statement of reasons and facts relied on" in denying commutation. The court relied chiefly on a showing that "at least 75 percent of all lifers received some favorable action from the pardon board prior to completing their minimum sentences" and that virtually all of the pardoned inmates were promptly paroled.[4] at 1314. In response to postjudgment motions, the District Court allowed other life inmates to intervene, certified the suit as a class action, and heard additional evidence.[5]*462 The court held that all prisoners serving life sentences in Connecticut state prisons have a constitutionally protected expectancy of commutation and therefore that they have a right to a
|
Justice Burger
| 1,981 | 12 |
majority
|
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110525/connecticut-bd-of-pardons-v-dumschat/
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commutation and therefore that they have a right to a statement of reasons when commutation is not granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed, and we vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its original decision, stating: "In marked contrast [to the Nebraska statute considered in ], Connecticut's pardons statute contains neither a presumption in favor of pardon nor a list of factors to be considered by the Board of Pardons. Instead, the statute grants the board unfettered discretion in the exercise of its power. The statute offers only the `mere hope' of pardon; it does not create a legitimate expectation of freedom and therefore does not implicate due process." The Court of Appeals also noted that the District Court's holding that the mere possibility of a pardon creates a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest or entitlement was "no longer tenable" in light of 618 F. 2d, at 221; see -11. However, the Court of Appeals then proceeded to conclude that "[t]he overwhelming likelihood that Connecticut life inmates will be pardoned and released before they complete their minimum terms gives them a constitutionally protected liberty interest in pardon proceedings." *463 618 F. 2d, at 220. The Court of Appeals also understood our opinion in to hold that under the Due Process Clause, a brief statement of reasons is "not only constitutionally sufficient but also constitutionally necessary."[6] 618 F. 2d, at 222. On that reading of the case was remanded to the District Court for a determination of "how many years life inmates must serve before the probability of pardon becomes so significant as to give rise to a protected liberty interest."[7] II A A state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right. See ; Plainly, however, the underlying right must have come into existence before it can trigger due process protection. See, e. g., In far from spelling out any judicially divined "entitlement," we did no more than apply the unique Nebraska statute. We rejected the claim that a constitutional entitlement to release from a valid prison sentence exists independently *464 of a right explicitly conferred by the State. Our language in leaves no room for doubt: "There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its
|
Justice Burger
| 1,981 | 12 |
majority
|
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110525/connecticut-bd-of-pardons-v-dumschat/
|
resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: `[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.'" pointedly distinguished parole revocation and probation revocation cases,[8] noting that there is a "critical" difference between denial of a prisoner's request for initial release on parole and revocation of a parolee's conditional liberty. quoting, inter alia, Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," Unlike probation, pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.[9] Cf. A decision whether to commute a long-term sentence generally depends not simply on objective factfinding, but also on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior by those entrusted with the decision. A commutation decision therefore shares some of the characteristics of a decision whether to grant parole. See -10. Far from supporting an "entitlement," therefore compels the conclusion that an inmate has "no constitutional or inherent right" to commutation of his sentence. *465 Respondents nevertheless contend that the Board's consistent practice of granting commutations to most life inmates is sufficient to create a protectible liberty interest. They argue: "[T]he State Board has created an unwritten common law of sentence commutation and parole acceleration for Connecticut life inmates. In effect, there is an unspoken understanding between the State Board and inmates. The terms are simple: If the inmate cooperates with the State, the State will exercise its parole power on the inmate's behalf. Both the State and the inmate recognize those terms. Each expects the other to abide by them." Brief for Respondents 17-18. This case does not involve parole, and respondents' argument wholly misconceives the nature of a decision by a state to commute the sentence of a convicted felon. The petition in each case is nothing more than an appeal for clemency. See In terms of the Due Process Clause, a Connecticut felon's expectation that a lawfully imposed sentence will be commuted or that he will be pardoned is no more substantial than an inmate's expectation, for example, that he will not be transferred to another prison;[10] it is simply a unilateral hope. ; see -444. A constitutional entitlement cannot "be createdas if by estoppelmerely because a wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in the past." No matter how frequently a particular form of clemency has been granted, the statistical probabilities standing alone generate no constitutional protections; a contrary conclusion would trivialize the Constitution. The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be
|
Justice Burger
| 1,981 | 12 |
majority
|
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110525/connecticut-bd-of-pardons-v-dumschat/
|
The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency. *466 The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that Connecticut has conferred "unfettered discretion" on its Board of Pardons, butparadoxicallythen proceeded to fetter the Board with a halter of constitutional "entitlement." The statute imposes no limit on what procedure is to be followed, what evidence may be considered, or what criteria are to be applied by the Board. Respondents challenge the Board's procedure precisely because of "the absence of any apparent standards." Brief for Respondents 28. We agree that there are no explicit standards by way of statute, regulation, or otherwise. This contrasts dramatically with the Nebraska statutory procedures in which expressly mandated that the Nebraska Board of Parole "shall" order the inmate's release "unless" it decided that one of four specified reasons for denial was 442 U.S., The Connecticut commutation statute, having no definitions, no criteria, and no mandated "shalls," creates no analogous duty or constitutional entitlement. It is clear that the requirement for articulating reasons for denial of parole in derived from unique mandates of the Nebraska statutes. Thus, although we noted that under the terms of the Nebraska statute, the inmates' expectancy of parole release "is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection," we emphasized that "this statute has unique structure and language and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case basis." Moreover, from the standpoint of a reasons requirement, there is a vast difference between a denial of paroleparticularly on the facts of and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence. When Nebraska statutes directed that inmates who are eligible for parole "shall" be released "unless" *467 a certain finding has been made, the statutes created a right. By contrast, the mere existence of a power to commute a lawfully imposed sentence, and the granting of commutations to many petitioners, create no right or "entitlement." A state cannot be required to explain its reasons for a decision when it is not required to act on prescribed grounds. We hold that the power vested in the Connecticut Board of Pardons to commute sentences conferred no rights on respondents beyond the right to seek commutation. Reversed.
|
Justice Ginsburg
| 1,997 | 5 |
dissenting
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McMillian v. Monroe County
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118118/mcmillian-v-monroe-county/
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Petitioner Walter McMillian, convicted of capital murder, spent nearly six years on Alabama's Death Row. In 1993, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that government officials, including the Sheriff of Monroe County, had concealed evidence of McMillian's innocence. Based on that evidence, the court overturned the conviction. The State thereafter dismissed all charges against McMillian and released him from prison. *797 Seeking redress for an arrest and years of incarceration in violation of his federal constitutional rights, McMillian commenced the instant action under 42 U.S. C. 1983. He named as defendants both Monroe County and the County's Sheriff, Tom Tate. McMillian alleged that Sheriff Tate withheld exculpatory evidence, generated false, inculpatory evidence, and subjected him to gross racial insults and relentless intimidation. Sheriff Tate, it is uncontested, has "final policymaking authority" under Alabama law over matters of law enforcement in Monroe County. Our precedent instructs that, if the sheriff makes policy for the State, Monroe County would not be accountable, under 1983, for that policy; if, on the other hand, the sheriff acts as law enforcement policymaker for Monroe County, then the county would be answerable under 1983. See Alabama has 67 county sheriffs, each elected, paid, and equipped locally, each with countywide, not statewide, authority. Unlike judges who work within the State's judicial hierarchy, or prosecutors who belong to a prosecutorial corps superintended by the State's Attorney General, sheriffs are not part of a state command and serve under no "State Sheriff General." The Court, nonetheless, holds that the policies set by Sheriff Tate in Monroe County, though discrete from, and uncoordinated with, the policies of sheriffs in other counties, "may fairly be said to represent [Alabama] policy." See I disagree. I In my view, Alabama law defining the office of sheriff indicates that the sheriff acts within and for the county when setting and implementing law enforcement policy.[1] In explaining *798 why it concludes otherwise and deems the sheriff the State's, not the county's, policymaker, the Court leans heavily on provisions of the State's Constitution. The Court relies on the Alabama Constitution's designation of "a sheriff for each county" as a member of the State's "executive department." See Ala. Const., Art. V, 112; ante, at 787. In addition, the Court points to two 1901 amendments relating to the impeachment of sheriffs. See ante, at 788-789. These measures are the strongest supports for the Court's classification of county sheriffs as state actors. They are not sturdy enough, however, to justify the Court's holding that county sheriffs are state officials. Alabama law does not consistently designate sheriffs as "executive
|
Justice Ginsburg
| 1,997 | 5 |
dissenting
|
McMillian v. Monroe County
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118118/mcmillian-v-monroe-county/
|
officials. Alabama law does not consistently designate sheriffs as "executive department" officers; instead, Alabama law in several instances refers to sheriffs as county officials. See In re Opinions of Justices, ; Ala. Code 36-34(a) (sheriff, a "county officer," shall be elected to four-year term); Ala. Code 36-22-16(a) Moreover, designations Alabama attaches to sheriffs in its laws and decisions are not dispositive of a court's assessment of Sheriff Tate's status for 1983 purposes. Cf. Regents of Univ. of ; (defenses to 1983 actions are questions of federal law); (state law granting immunity to parole officers does not control question whether such officers have immunity under 1983). If a State's designation sufficed to answer the federal question at issue, "States would then be *799 free to nullify for their own people the legislative decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the People." Nor are the 1901 impeachment measures secure indicators that a sheriff acts on behalf of the State, not the county. As the Court explains, the impeachment amendments were intended to provide a state check on county sheriffs in view of their glaring lapses in acquiescing to abductions and lynchings in the late 1800's. See ante, at 788. However, making an officer eligible for impeachment, by itself, does not change the governmental unit to which the officer belongs. See Ala. Const., Art. VII, 175 (listing numerous county officials subject to impeachment); Ala. Code 36-11 1(a) (same). And transferring impeachment proceedings from county courts to the State Supreme Court, see Ala. Const., Art. VII, 174, is sensibly seen as an acknowledgment of the power wielded by sheriffs within their own counties, and the consequent need for placement of removal authority outside a sheriff's bailiwick. Furthermore, impeachment of sheriffs is not a power reserved exclusively to state officials; "five resident taxpayers" of the sheriff's county can initiate an impeachment. See Ala. Code 36 11-6 Impeachment, in sum, provides an ultimate check on flagrant behavior, but does not serve as a tight control rein. The prime controllers of a sheriff's service are the county residents, the people who select their sheriff at quadrennial elections. Sheriff Tate owes his position as chief law enforcement officer of Monroe County to the county residents who elected him, and who can unseat him. See Ala. Const., Art. V, 138, as amended by Amdt. No. 35 ("A sheriff shall be elected in each county by the qualified electors thereof."). On the ballot, candidates for the office of sheriff are grouped with candidates for other county offices, and are not listed with state office candidates. See Ala. Code
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