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Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | majority | Eisenstadt v. Baird | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108489/eisenstadt-v-baird/ | full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent fornication, and recognizing that the State may seek to deter prohibited conduct by punishing more severely those who facilitate than those who actually engage in its commission, we, like the Court of Appeals, cannot believe that in this instance Massachusetts has chosen to expose the aider and abetter who simply gives away a contraceptive to *450 20 times the 90-day sentence of the offender himself. The very terms of the State's criminal statutes, coupled with the de minimis effect of and A in deterring fornication, thus compel the conclusion that such deterrence cannot reasonably be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. Second. Section A was added to the Massachusetts Laws by Stat. 1966, c. 265, 1. The Supreme Judicial Court in held that the purpose of the amendment was to serve the health needs of the community by regulating the distribution of potentially harmful articles. It is plain that Massachusetts had no such purpose in mind before the enactment of A. As the Court of Appeals remarked, "Consistent with the fact that the statute was contained in a chapter dealing with `Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency and Good Order,' it was cast only in terms of morals. A physician was forbidden to prescribe contraceptives even when needed for the protection of health. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 198, 00 Mass. 72," 4 F. 2d, at 1401. Nor did the Court of Appeals "believe that the legislature [in enacting A] suddenly reversed its field and developed an interest in health. Rather, it merely made what it thought to be the precise accommodation necessary to escape the ruling." Again, we must agree with the Court of Appeals. If health were the rationale of A, the statute would be both discriminatory and overbroad. Dissenting in 55 Mass., at 758, Justices Whittemore and Cutter stated that they saw "in and A, read together, no public health purpose. If there is need to have a physician prescribe (and a pharmacist dispense) contraceptives, that need is as great for unmarried persons as for married persons." *451 The Court of Appeals added: "If the prohibition [on distribution to unmarried persons] is to be taken to mean that the same physician who can prescribe for married patients does not have sufficient skill to protect the health of patients who lack a marriage certificate, or who may be currently divorced, it is illogical to the point of irrationality."[8] Furthermore, we must join the Court of Appeals in noting that not all contraceptives are potentially |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | majority | Eisenstadt v. Baird | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108489/eisenstadt-v-baird/ | of Appeals in noting that not all contraceptives are potentially dangerous.[9] As a result, if the Massachusetts statute were a health measure, it would not only invidiously discriminate against the unmarried, but also be overbroad with respect to the married, a fact that the Supreme Judicial Court itself seems to have conceded in 58 Mass., at 260 N. E. 2d, at where it noted that "it may well be that certain contraceptive medication and devices constitute no hazard to health, in which event it could be argued that the statute swept too broadly in its prohibition." "In this posture," as the Court of *452 Appeals concluded, "it is impossible to think of the statute as intended as a health measure for the unmarried, and it is almost as difficult to think of it as so intended even as to the married." But if further proof that the Massachusetts statute is not a health measure is necessary, the argument of Justice Spiegel, who also dissented in 55 Mass., at 759, is conclusive: "It is at best a strained conception to say that the Legislature intended to prevent the distribution of articles `which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences.' If that was the Legislature's goal, is not required" in view of the federal and state laws already regulating the distribution of harmful drugs. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 50, as amended, U.S. C. 5; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 94, 187A, as amended. We conclude, accordingly, that, despite the statute's superficial earmarks as a health measure, health, on the face of the statute, may no more reasonably be regarded as its purpose than the deterrence of premarital sexual relations. Third. If the Massachusetts statute cannot be upheld as a deterrent to fornication or as a health measure, may it, nevertheless, be sustained simply as a prohibition on contraception? The Court of Appeals analysis "led inevitably to the conclusion that, so far as morals are concerned, it is contraceptives per se that are considered immoral to the extent that will permit such a declaration." -1402. The Court of Appeals went on to hold, at 1402: "To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and *45 for society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of morality is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the absence |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | majority | Eisenstadt v. Baird | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108489/eisenstadt-v-baird/ | that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the absence of demonstrated harm, we hold it is beyond the competency of the state." We need not and do not, however, decide that important question in this case because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. If under the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. See 94 U.S. 557[10] See also 16 U.S. 55 ; On the other hand, if is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives, the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons. In each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would be identical, and the underinclusion would be invidious. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express 112-11 made the point: "The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation." Although Mr. Justice Jackson's comments had reference to administrative regulations, the principle he affirmed has equal application to the legislation here. We hold that by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, Massachusetts *455 Laws Ann., c. 272, and A, violate the Equal Protection Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | concurring | Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4507882/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/ | “[I]t is a general rule that [religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.” Ante, at 9. But in upholding that principle, state actors cannot show hostility to religious views; rather, they must give those views “neutral and respectful consideration.” Ante, at 12. I join the Court’s opinion in full because I believe the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that obligation. I write separately to elaborate on one of the bases for the Court’s holding. The Court partly relies on the “disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of [three] other bakers” who “objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience.” Ante, at 14, 18. In the latter cases, a customer named William Jack sought “cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to make them. Ante, at 15; see post, at 3 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (further describing the requested cakes). Those bakers prevailed before the Colorado Civil Rights Division and Commission, while Phillips—who objected for 2 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N KAGAN, J., concurring religious reasons to baking a wedding cake for a same-sex couple—did not. The Court finds that the legal reasoning of the state agencies differed in significant ways as be- tween the Jack cases and the Phillips case. See ante, at 15. And the Court takes especial note of the suggestion made by the Colorado Court of Appeals, in comparing those cases, that the state agencies found the message Jack requested “offensive [in] nature.” Ante, at 16 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). As the Court states, a “principled rationale for the difference in treatment” can- not be “based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.” What makes the state agencies’ consideration yet more disquieting is that a proper basis for distinguishing the cases was available—in fact, was obvious. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) makes it unlawful for a place of public accommodation to deny “the full and equal enjoyment” of goods and services to individuals based on certain characteristics, including sexual orientation and creed. –34–601(2)(a) (2017). The three bakers in the Jack cases did not violate that law. Jack requested them to make a cake (one denigrating gay peo- ple and same-sex marriage) that they would not have made for any customer. In refusing that request, the bakers did not single out Jack because of his religion, |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | concurring | Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4507882/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/ | bakers did not single out Jack because of his religion, but instead treated him in the same way they would have treated anyone else—just as CADA requires. By contrast, the same-sex couple in this case requested a wedding cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex couple. In refusing that request, Phillips contravened CADA’s demand that customers receive “the full and equal enjoy- ment” of public accommodations irrespective of their sexual orientation. The different outcomes in the Jack cases and the Phillips case could thus have been justified by a plain reading and neutral application of Colorado law—untainted by any bias against a religious Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 3 KAGAN, J., concurring belief.* I read the Court’s opinion as fully consistent with that view. The Court limits its analysis to the reasoning of the state agencies (and Court of Appeals)—“quite apart from whether the [Phillips and Jack] cases should ultimately be distinguished.” Ante, at 15. And the Court itself recognizes the principle that would properly account for a difference in result between those cases. Colorado law, the Court —————— * JUSTICE GORSUCH disagrees. In his view, the Jack cases and the Phillips case must be treated the same because the bakers in all those cases “would not sell the requested cakes to anyone.” Post, at 4. That description perfectly fits the Jack cases—and explains why the bakers there did not engage in unlawful discrimination. But it is a surprising characterization of the Phillips case, given that Phillips routinely sells wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples. JUSTICE GORSUCH can make the claim only because he does not think a “wedding cake” is the relevant product. As JUSTICE GORSUCH sees it, the product that Phillips refused to sell here—and would refuse to sell to anyone—was a “cake celebrat- ing same-sex marriage.” ; see post, at 3, 6, 8–9. But that is wrong. The cake requested was not a special “cake celebrating same-sex marriage.” It was simply a wedding cake—one that (like other stand- ard wedding cakes) is suitable for use at same-sex and opposite-sex weddings alike. See ante, at 4 (majority opinion) (recounting that Phillips did not so much as discuss the cake’s design before he refused to make it). And contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’S view, a wedding cake does not become something different whenever a vendor like Phillips invests its sale to particular customers with “religious significance.” Post, at 11. As this Court has long held, and reaffirms today, a vendor cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion disap- proves selling a product to a group of |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | concurring | Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4507882/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/ | religion disap- proves selling a product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., (per curiam) (holding that a barbeque vendor must serve black customers even if he perceives such service as vindicating racial equality, in violation of his religious beliefs); ante, at 9. A vendor can choose the products he sells, but not the customers he serves—no matter the reason. Phillips sells wedding cakes. As to that product, he unlawfully discriminates: He sells it to opposite-sex but not to same-sex couples. And on that basis—which has nothing to do with Phillips’ religious beliefs—Colorado could have distinguished Phillips from the bakers in the Jack cases, who did not engage in any prohibited discrimination. 4 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N KAGAN, J., concurring says, “can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public.” Ante, at 10. For that reason, Colorado can treat a baker who discrimi- nates based on sexual orientation differently from a baker who does not discriminate on that or any other prohibited ground. But only, as the Court rightly says, if the State’s decisions are not infected by religious hostility or bias. I accordingly concur. Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 1 GORSUCH, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 16–111 MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | Impelling prompt registration of copyright claims, 17 U.S. C. states that “no civil action for infringe- ment of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” The question this case presents: Has “registration been made in accordance with [Title 17]” as soon as the claimant deliv- ers the required application, copies of the work, and fee to the Copyright Office; or has “registration been made” only after the Copyright Office reviews and registers the copyright? We hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, that registra- tion occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright. Upon registration of the copyright, however, a copyright owner can recover for infringement that oc- curred both before and after registration. Petitioner Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation (Fourth Estate) is a news organization producing online journalism. Fourth Estate licensed journalism works to 2 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC Opinion of the Court respondent Wall-Street.com, LLC (Wall-Street), a news website. The license agreement required Wall-Street to remove from its website all content produced by Fourth Estate before canceling the agreement. Wall-Street can- celed, but continued to display articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate sued Wall-Street and its owner, Jerrold Burden, for copyright infringement. The com- plaint alleged that Fourth Estate had filed “applications to register [the] articles [licensed to Wall-Street] with the Register of Copyrights.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a.1 Because the Register had not yet acted on Fourth Estate’s applications,2 the District Court, on Wall-Street and Bur- den’s motion, dismissed the complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Thereafter, the Register of Copyrights refused registration of the articles Wall-Street had allegedly infringed.3 We granted Fourth Estate’s petition for certiorari to resolve a division among U. S. Courts of Appeals on when registration occurs in accordance with 585 U. S. (2018). Compare, (case below) (registration has been made under when the Register of Copyrights registers a copyright), with, Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (CA9 2010) (registration has been made under when the copyright claimant’s “complete applica- tion” for registration is received by the Copyright Office). —————— 1 The Register of Copyrights is the “director of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress” and is appointed by the Librarian of Congress. 17 U.S. C. The Copyright Act delegates to the Register “[a]ll administrative functions and duties under [Title 17].” 2 Consideration of Fourth Estate’s filings was initially |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | [Title 17].” 2 Consideration of Fourth Estate’s filings was initially delayed be- cause the check Fourth Estate sent in payment of the filing fee was rejected by Fourth Estate’s bank as uncollectible. App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1a. 3 The merits of the Copyright Office’s decision refusing registration are not at issue in this Court. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 3 Opinion of the Court I Under the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, copyright protection attaches to “original works of authorship”— prominent among them, literary, musical, and dramatic works—“fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S. C. An author gains “exclusive rights” in her work immediately upon the work’s creation, including rights of reproduction, distribution, and display. See (“[F]ederal copyright protection run[s] from the work’s creation.”). The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to institute a civil action for infringement of those exclusive rights. Before pursuing an infringement claim in court, how- ever, a copyright claimant generally must comply with ’s requirement that “registration of the copyright claim has been made.” Therefore, although an owner’s rights exist apart from registration, see registration is akin to an administrative exhaustion re- quirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership rights, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. In limited circumstances, copyright owners may file an infringement suit before undertaking registration. If a copyright owner is preparing to distribute a work of a type vulnerable to predistribution infringement—notably, a movie or musical composition—the owner may apply for preregistration. (b)(1) (2018). The Copyright Office will “conduct a limited review” of the application and notify the claimant “[u]pon completion of the preregistration.” (c)(10). Once “prereg- istration has been made,” the copyright claimant may institute a suit for infringement. 17 U.S. C. Preregistration, however, serves only as “a preliminary step prior to a full registration.” Preregistration of Cer- tain Unpublished Copyright Claims, (2005). An infringement suit brought in reliance on pre- 4 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC Opinion of the Court registration risks dismissal unless the copyright owner applies for registration promptly after the preregistered work’s publication or infringement. A copyright owner may sue for infringement of a live broadcast before “registration has been made,” but faces dismissal of her suit if she fails to “make registration for the work” within three months of its first transmission. Even in these exceptional scenarios, then, the copyright owner must eventually pursue registration in order to maintain a suit for infringement. II All parties agree that, outside of statutory exceptions not applicable here, bars a copyright owner |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | of statutory exceptions not applicable here, bars a copyright owner from suing for infringement until “registration has been made.” Fourth Estate and Wall-Street dispute, however, whether “registration has been made” under when a copyright owner submits the application, materi- als, and fee required for registration, or only when the Copyright Office grants registration. Fourth Estate ad- vances the former view—the “application approach”— while Wall-Street urges the latter reading—the “registra- tion approach.” The registration approach, we conclude, reflects the only satisfactory reading of ’s text. We therefore reject Fourth Estate’s application approach. A Under “registration has been made,” and a copyright owner may sue for infringement, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.4 Section 411(a)’s —————— 4 Section 411(a) provides, in principal part: “[N]o civil action for in- fringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be insti- tuted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been deliv- ered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringe- Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 5 Opinion of the Court first sentence provides that no civil infringement action “shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made.” The section’s next sentence sets out an exception to this rule: When the required “deposit, application, and fee have been deliv- ered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registra- tion has been refused,” the claimant “[may] institute a civil action, if notice thereof is served on the Register.” Read together, ’s opening sentences focus not on the claimant’s act of applying for registration, but on action by the Copyright Office—namely, its registration or refusal to register a copyright claim. If application alone sufficed to “ma[ke]” registration, ’s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of registration—would be superfluous. What utility would that allowance have if a copyright claimant could sue for infringement immediately after applying for registration without awaiting the Register’s decision on her applica- tion? Proponents of the application approach urge that ’s second sentence serves merely to require a copy- right claimant to serve “notice [of an infringement suit] on the Register.” See Brief for Petitioner –32. This reading, however, requires the implausible assumption that Congress gave “registration” different meanings in consecutive, related sentences within a single statutory provision. In ’s first sentence, “registration” would mean the claimant’s act of filing an application, while in the section’s second sentence, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | of filing an application, while in the section’s second sentence, “registration” would entail the Register’s review of an application. We resist this improbable construction. See, Mid-Con Freight Sys- tems, —————— ment if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim” 6 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC Opinion of the Court 448 (2005) (declining to read “the same words” in con- secutive sentences as “refer[ring] to something totally different”). The third and final sentence of further per- suades us that the provision requires action by the Regis- ter before a copyright claimant may sue for infringement. The sentence allows the Register to “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.” This allowance would be negated, and the court conducting an infringement suit would lack the benefit of the Register’s assessment, if an infringement suit could be filed and resolved before the Register acted on an application. Other provisions of the Copyright Act support our read- ing of “registration,” as used in to mean action by the Register. Section 410 states that, “after examination,” if the Register determines that “the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter” and “other legal and formal requirements [are] met, the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration.” But if the Register determines that the deposited material “does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other reason, the Register shall refuse registration.” Section 410 thus confirms that application is discrete from, and precedes, registration. Section 410(d), further- more, provides that if the Copyright Office registers a claim, or if a court later determines that a refused claim was registrable, the “effective date of [the work’s] copy- right registration is the day on which” the copyright owner made a proper submission to the Copyright Office. There would be no need thus to specify the “effective date of a copyright registration” if submission of the required mate- rials qualified as “registration.” Section 408(f)’s preregistration option, too, would have little utility if a completed application constituted regis- Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 7 Opinion of the Court tration. Preregistration, as –4, allows the author of a work vulnerable to predistribution infringe- ment to enforce her exclusive rights in court before obtain- ing registration or refusal thereof. A copyright owner who fears prepublication infringement |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | or refusal thereof. A copyright owner who fears prepublication infringement would have no reason to apply for preregistration, however, if she could instead simply complete an application for registration and imme- diately commence an infringement suit. Cf. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, (rejecting an interpreta- tion that “would in practical effect render [a provision] superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances”). B Challenging the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, Fourth Estate primarily contends that the Copyright Act uses “the phrase ‘make registration’ and its passive-voice coun- terpart ‘registration has been made’ ” to describe submis- sions by the copyright owner, rather than Copyright Office responses to those submissions. Brief for Petitioner 21. Section 411(a)’s requirement that “registration has been made in accordance with this title,” Fourth Estate insists, most likely refers to a copyright owner’s compli- ance with the statutory specifications for registration applications. In support, Fourth Estate points to Copy- right Act provisions that appear to use the phrase “make registration” or one of its variants to describe what a copyright claimant does. See at 22–26 (citing 17 U.S. C. 205(c), 408(c)(3), 411(c), 412(2)). Further- more, Fourth Estate urges that its reading reflects the reality that, eventually, the vast majority of applications are granted. See Brief for Petitioner 41. Fourth Estate acknowledges, however, that the Copy- right Act sometimes uses “registration” to refer to activity by the Copyright Office, not activity undertaken by a copyright claimant. See at 27–28 (citing 17 U.S. C. Fourth Estate thus agrees that, to determine 8 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC Opinion of the Court how the statute uses the word “registration” in a particu- lar prescription, one must “look to the specific context” in which the term is used. Brief for Petitioner As ex- –7, the “specific context” of permits only one sensible reading: The phrase “registra- tion has been made” refers to the Copyright Office’s act granting registration, not to the copyright claimant’s request for registration. Fourth Estate’s contrary reading of stems in part from its misapprehension of the significance of cer- tain 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act. Before that year, ’s precursor provided that “[n]o action or proceed- ing shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.” 17 U.S. C. (1970 ed.). Fourth Estate urges that this provision posed the very question we resolve today—namely, whether a claimant’s application alone effects registration. The Second Circuit addressed that question, Fourth Estate observes, in Vacheron & |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | Circuit addressed that question, Fourth Estate observes, in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, (8). Brief for Petitioner 32– 34. In that case, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the court held that a copyright owner who completed an application could not sue for infringement immediately upon the Copyright Office’s refusal to register. Vacheron, –641. Instead, the owner first had to obtain a registration certificate by bringing a mandamus action against the Register. The Second Circuit dissenter would have treated the owner’s application as sufficient to permit commencement of an action for infringement. at 645. Fourth Estate sees Congress’ 1976 revision of the regis- tration requirement as an endorsement of the Vacheron dissenter’s position. Brief for Petitioner 34–36. We dis- agree. The changes made in 1976 instead indicate Con- Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 9 Opinion of the Court gress’ agreement with Judge Hand that it is the Register’s action that triggers a copyright owner’s entitlement to sue. In enacting 17 U.S. C. Congress both reaffirmed the general rule that registration must precede an in- fringement suit, and added an exception in that provi- sion’s second sentence to cover instances in which regis- tration is refused. See H. R. Rep. No. 94‒1476, p. 157 (1976). That exception would have no work to do if, as Fourth Estate urges, Congress intended the 1976 revisions to clarify that a copyright claimant may sue immediately upon applying for registration. A copyright claimant would need no statutory authorization to sue after refusal of her application if she could institute suit as soon as she has filed the application. Noteworthy, too, in years following the 1976 revisions, Congress resisted efforts to eliminate and the registration requirement embedded in it. In 1988, Con- gress removed foreign works from ’s dominion in order to comply with the Berne Convention for the Protec- tion of Literary and Artistic Works’ bar on copyright for- malities for such works. See Despite proposals to repeal ’s registration require- ment entirely, however, see S. Rep. No. 100‒352, p. 36 (1988), Congress maintained the requirement for domestic works, see Subsequently, in 1993, Congress considered, but declined to adopt, a proposal to allow suit immediately upon submission of a registration application. See H. R. Rep. No. 103–338, p. 4 (1993). And in 2005, Congress made a preregistration option available for works vulnerable to predistribution infringement. See Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, See –4. Congress chose that course in face of calls to eliminate registration in cases of predistribution infringement. Time and again, then, Congress has maintained registration as prerequisite to |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | and again, then, Congress has maintained registration as prerequisite to suit, and rejected proposals that would 10 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC Opinion of the Court have eliminated registration or tied it to the copyright claimant’s application instead of the Register’s action.5 Fourth Estate additionally argues that, as “registration is not a condition of copyright protection,” 17 U.S. C. should not be read to bar a copyright claimant from enforcing that protection in court once she has submitted a proper application for registration. Brief for Petitioner 37. But as ex the Copy- right Act safeguards copyright owners, irrespective of registration, by vesting them with exclusive rights upon creation of their works and prohibiting infringement from that point forward. If infringement occurs before a copy- right owner applies for registration, that owner may even- tually recover damages for the past infringement, as well as the infringer’s profits. She must simply apply for registration and receive the Copyright Office’s decision on her application before instituting suit. Once the Register grants or refuses registration, the copyright owner may seek an injunction barring the infringer from contin- ued violation of her exclusive rights and an order requir- ing the infringer to destroy infringing materials. 503(b). Fourth Estate maintains, however, that if infringement occurs while the Copyright Office is reviewing a registra- tion application, the registration approach will deprive the owner of her rights during the waiting period. Brief for Petitioner 41. See 1 P. Goldstein, Copyright —————— 5 Fourth Estate asserts that, if a copyright owner encounters a lengthy delay in the Copyright Office, she may be forced to file a mandamus action to compel the Register to rule on her application, the very problem exposed in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, (CA2 8), see But Congress’ answer to Vacheron, codified in ’s second sen- tence, was to permit an infringement suit upon refusal of registration, not to eliminate Copyright Office action as the trigger for an infringe- ment suit. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 11 Opinion of the Court p. 3:154.2 (3d ed. 2018 Supp.) (finding application ap- proach “the better rule”); 2 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright [b][ii] (2018) (infringement suit is conditioned on application, while prima facie presumption of validity depends on certificate of registration). The Copyright Act’s explicit carveouts from ’s general registration rule, however, show that Congress adverted to this concern. In the preregistration option, ), Con- gress provided that owners of works especially susceptible to prepublication infringement should be allowed to insti- tute suit before the Register has granted or refused regis- tration. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,019 | 5 | majority | Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4595875/fourth-estate-pub-benefit-corp-v-wall-streetcom/ | suit before the Register has granted or refused regis- tration. See Congress made the same determina- tion as to live broadcasts. see6 As to all other works, however, ’s general rule requires owners to await action by the Register before filing suit for infringement. Fourth Estate raises the specter that a copyright owner may lose the ability to enforce her rights if the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations runs out before the Copyright Office acts on her application for registration. Brief for Petitioner 41. Fourth Estate’s fear is overstated, as the average processing time for registration applications is currently seven months, leaving ample time to sue after the Register’s decision, even for infringement that began before submission of an application. See U. S. Copyright Office, Registration Processing Times (Oct. 2, 2018) (Regis- tration Processing Times), https://www.copyright.gov/ registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf The Copy- right Office grants requests for special handling in situations involving, inter alia, “[p]ending or prospective litigation,” and “make[s] every attempt to examine the application within five working days.” Compendium of U. S. Copyright Practices 623.4 12 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC Opinion of the Court Mar. 1, 2019). True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased from one or two weeks in 6 to many months today. See GAO, Improving Productivity in Copyright Registration 3 (GAO–AFMD–83–13 1982); Registration Processing Times. Delays in Copyright Office processing of applications, it appears, are attributable, in large measure, to staffing and budgetary shortages that Con- gress can alleviate, but courts cannot cure. See 5 W. Patry, Copyright (2019). Unfortunate as the cur- rent administrative lag may be, that factor does not allow us to revise ’s congressionally composed text. * * * For the reasons stated, we conclude that “registration has been made” within the meaning of 17 U.S. C. not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is accordingly Affirmed |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | This case[1] presents the question whether the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S. C. 801 et seq., requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a decision with formal findings of fact before assessing a civil penalty against a mine operator absent a request by the mine operator for an administrative hearing, the penalty being enforceable only by way of a subsequent judicial proceeding in which the operator is entitled to a trial de novo as to the amount of the penalty. The National Independent Coal Operators' Association sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that certain civil penalty assessment regulations utilized by the Secretary violated the procedural requirements of the Act. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the regulations did not violate the Act.[2]National Independent Coal Operators' We granted certiorari, to resolve the apparent conflict between the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit holding in reversed and remanded, post, p. 403. *391 (1) The statutory provision in question, 109 (3), 30 U.S. C. 819 (3), is part of the enforcement scheme of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. The Act prescribes health and safety standards for the protection of coal miners, Titles II and III, 30 U.S. C. 841 et seq.; it requires coal mine operators and miners to comply with the standards. 2 (g) (2), 30 U.S. C. 801 (g) (2). Section 103 of the Act, 30 U.S. C. 813, requires the Secretary to conduct continuing surveillance of mines by inspectors. Among the purposes of the inspections are finding imminently dangerous conditions and violations of mandatory health or safety standards. Section 104, 30 U.S. C. 814, provides procedures for abating the conditions found by the inspectors. If an imminent danger is found, the inspector is required to issue a withdrawal order compelling the mine operator to withdraw all persons from the danger area. If a violation of a mandatory standard is found that is not imminently dangerous, the inspector issues a notice to the operator fixing a reasonable time for its abatement. If the violation is not abated and the time for abatement is not extended, the inspector then issues a withdrawal order. Withdrawal orders are also issued for any "unwarrantable failure" of mine operators to comply with the standards. The notices and orders issued contain a detailed description of the dangerous conditions or violations and their locations. The notices must be in writing and given promptly to the mine operators. Under 105, 30 U.S. C. 815, an operator may |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | operators. Under 105, 30 U.S. C. 815, an operator may apply to the Secretary for review of the factual basis of any order or notice issued under 104, or for review of the amount of time allowed for abatement of violations. Upon application from a mine operator the Secretary *392 makes whatever investigation he deems appropriate; an opportunity for a public hearing is provided. Hearings are subject to 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. 554, and following the hearing the Secretary must make findings of fact. Section 105 also requires that actions by the Secretary be taken promptly because of the urgent need for prompt decision. The orders issued by the Secretary under this section are subject to judicial review under 106, 30 U.S. C. 816, by a court of appeals. As part of the enforcement scheme, the Act requires the Secretary to assess and collect civil penalties. Section 109 (1), 30 U.S. C. 819 (1), subjects mine operators to civil penalties not exceeding $10,000 for each violation of a mandatory standard or other provision of the Act. In determining the amount of the penalty, 109 (1) requires the Secretary to consider "the operator's history of previous violations, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect on the operator's ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of the operator charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation." The provision in question, 109 (3), as noted above, authorizes the Secretary to assess a civil penalty only after the operator charged with a violation "has been given an opportunity for a public hearing and the Secretary has determined, by decision incorporating his findings of fact therein, that a violation did occur, and the amount of the penalty which is warranted" Hearings under this section are to be consolidated with other proceedings when appropriate. They must be of record *393 and subject to provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. 554. If the operator does not pay the penalty assessed, the Secretary is required, pursuant to 109 (4), 30 U.S. C. 819 (4), to petition for judicial enforcement of the assessment in the district court for the district in which the mine is located. At that stage the court must resolve the issues relevant to the amount of the penalty in a de novo proceeding with a jury trial if requested. The trial de novo with a jury is not available for |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | trial de novo with a jury is not available for review of issues of fact which "were or could have been litigated" in the court of appeals under 106.[3] (2) We are concerned in this case with the regulations the Secretary has adopted to govern only one part of this statutory scheme: the assessment of penalties under 109 (3). When the Secretary initially implemented the Act, he published regulations that provided for civil penalty assessments to be determined by a hearing examiner, with a right of appeal to a departmental appeals board. 30 CFR pt. 301 (1971), recodified, 43 CFR 4.540 et seq. (1972). Nine months later, due to the large numbers of violations charged (approximately 80,000 or more per year), the Secretary adopted the regulations contested here. 30 CFR pt. 100 (1972).[4] These regulations provide *394 that assessment officers assess a penalty based on a notice of violation issued by mine inspectors and a penalty schedule graduated according to the seriousness of the violation.[5] The pt. 100 procedures follow the mandate of 109 (1) as to the criteria to be applied in determining the amount of the proposed penalty for an operator. 30 CFR 100.4[6] The regulations also provide that the operators are to be advised when they receive original or reissued proposed orders that they have 15 working days from the receipt of the order to "protest the proposed assessment, either partly or in its entirety." If an operator fails to make a timely protest and request adjudication, he is "deemed to have waived his right of protest including his right of formal adjudication and opportunity for hearing" The proposed assessment order then *395 becomes the "final assessment order of the Secretary." 30 CFR 100.4[7] In any case in which an operator makes a timely request for a formal hearing, by so indicating in his protest, or in response to a reissued or amended proposed assessment order, the assessment officer is required to forward the matter to the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior; a petition to assess a penalty can then be filed by the Solicitor with the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals. 30 CFR 100.4 (1); 43 CFR 4.540 The petition is served on the operator who then has an opportunity to answer and secure a public hearing. 30 CFR 100.4 (2). A hearing de novo is conducted and the examiner is free to assess a different penalty.[8] 30 CFR 100.4 (4). The Bureau of Mines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor, has the burden of proving the penalty by a preponderance |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | has the burden of proving the penalty by a preponderance of the evidence. 43 CFR 4.587. The regulations provide that the hearing examiner consider the statutory criteria. 43 CFR 4.546. *396 The decision is subject to review by the Secretary's delegate, the Board of Mine Operations Appeals. 43 CFR 4.1 (4), 4.500 (2), 4.600. Whether or not the operator requests formal adjudication, he may obtain de novo judicial review of the amount of the penalty by refusing to pay it and awaiting the Secretary's enforcement action in the district court. 109 (4), 30 U.S. C. 819 (4). (3) The National Independent Coal Operators' Association and various operators brought suit against the Secretary in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the use of the pt. 100 regulations. The court granted the Association's motion for summary judgment, holding that the summary procedures were not authorized by 109 of the Act. The court noted that there were no written guidelines within the assessment office to guide the assessment officers in evaluating or applying the statutory criteria for penalty assessment. The court held that the Secretary must make express findings of fact whether or not a hearing is requested. The court believed that requiring a mine operator to request a hearing "would shift the initial burden to the mine operator." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary need not render a formal decision incorporating findings of fact; it held that, absent a request for a hearing, the Secretary is entitled to conclude that the operator does not dispute the proposed order, including the factual basis of the violation. In the view of that court, a "decision incorporating his findings of fact" with findings and conclusions is required only if a hearing is requested and takes place; otherwise, any findings of fact would consist of essentially *397 the same information already recited in the proposed assessment order and would be a meaningless duplication. The court also noted that the legislative history of the Act supports an interpretation that the Secretary's findings are not required unless the operator requests a hearing; however, when a hearing is requested, the burden of proof remains with the Secretary. 161 U. S. App. D. C. 68, (4) Under the Act, a mine operator plainly has a right to notice of violations and proposed penalties; it is equally clear that an operator has a right to be heard, if a hearing is requested. In this Court the mine operators continue to urge that the Secretary may not |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | mine operators continue to urge that the Secretary may not assess a civil penalty without making formal "findings of fact" even though no hearing was requested as to the violation charged and the proposed order. Section 109 (3), as previously noted, provides: "A civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary only after the person charged with a violation under this Act has been given an opportunity for a public hearing and the Secretary has determined, by decision incorporating his findings of fact therein, that a violation did occur, and the amount of the penalty which is warranted" The operators argue that a penalty assessment itself is an adjudicatory function and hence the Secretary must make a formal "decision incorporating his findings of fact" even when an operator has not requested a hearing on the violation issue. In short, what they argue for is the same type of formal findings of fact that are the usual product of the adversary hearing to which they have an absolute right, but which was waived by failure to make a request. *398 Section 109 (3) provides the mine operators with no more than "an opportunity" for a hearing. The word "opportunity" would be meaningless if the statute contemplated formal adjudicated findings whether or not a requested evidentiary hearing is held. Absent a request, the Secretary has a sufficient factual predicate for the assessment of a penalty based on the reports of the trained and experienced inspectors who find violations; when the assessment officers fix penalties as the Secretary's "authorized representatives," the operators may still have review of the penalty in the district court.[9] See Morton v. Whitaker, Civ. No. 74.96 (appeal pending in CA6). We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the language of the statute, especially when read in light of its legislative history, requires the Secretary to make formal findings of fact specified in 109 (3) only when the mine operator requests a hearing. The requirement for a formal hearing under 109 (3) is keyed to a request, and the requirement for formal findings is keyed to the same request. This reading of the statute plainly comports with the purpose of the Act. Congressional attention was focused on the need for stricter coal mine regulations by a 1968 explosion in a Farmington, W. Va., mine which killed 78 miners, but Congress also recognized that an inordinate number of miners lose their lives in day-to-day accidents other than multidisaster situations. The Act was seen as a major step in preventing death and *399 injury in mines. H. R. Rep. No. |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | death and *399 injury in mines. H. R. Rep. No. 91-563, pp. 1-3 (1969). The need for stricter regulation of coal mines was commented on by President Truman when he signed the 1952 amendment to the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, In approving that measure into law he called the attention of Congress to its flaws: "The measure contains complex procedural provisions relating to inspections, appeals, and the postponing of orders which I believe will make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for those charged with the administration of the act to carry out an effective enforcement program." Congress noted President Truman's comments when it reported the 1969 Act. S. Rep. No. 91-411, p. 5 (1969). Effective enforcement of the Act would be weakened if the Secretary were required to make findings of fact for every penalty assessment including those cases in which the mine operator did not request a hearing and thereby indicated no disagreement with the Secretary's proposed determination. While a protest by a mine operator may trigger an administrative re-examination, the protest is not the equivalent of a request for a hearing. When no request for a hearing is made, the operator has in effect voluntarily defaulted and abandoned the right to a hearing and findings of fact on the factual basis of the violation and the penalty. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit regarded 109 as possibly ambiguous and turned to the legislative history. Assuming, arguendo, that the statute is ambiguous, we read that history as supporting the result reached by the Court of Appeals. The bills passed by the Senate and House each called for hearings only if requested. The House bill provided: "Upon written request made by an operator within thirty days after receipt of an order assessing a *400 penalty under this section, the Secretary shall afford such operator an opportunity for a hearing and, in accordance with the request, determine by decision whether or not a violation did occur or whether the amount of the penalty is warranted or should be compromised." H. R. 13950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 109 (1969). (Emphasis added.) The Senate bill read: "An order assessing a civil penalty under this subsection shall be issued by the Secretary only after the person against whom the order is issued has been given an opportunity for a hearing and the Secretary has determined by decision incorporating findings of fact based on the record of such hearing whether or not a violation did occur and the amount of the penalty, if any, which is warranted. Section 554 |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | National Independent Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109350/national-independent-coal-operators-assn-v-kleppe/ | of the penalty, if any, which is warranted. Section 554 of title 5 of the United States Code shall apply to any such hearing and decision." S. 2917, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 308 (3) (1969). (Emphasis added.) Thus it is clear that under both bills the requirement for a formal decision with findings was contingent on the operator's request for a hearing. Both bills were referred to a Conference Committee to resolve differences. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version but deleted the second italicized phrase. That change did not alter the requirement that if findings of fact are desired, a hearing must be requested. The Conference Committee explained 109 as follows: "Both the Senate bill and the House amendment provided an opportunity for a hearing in assessing such penalties, but the Senate bill required a record hearing under 5 U.S. C. [] 554. The conference substitute adopts the Senate provision with the *401 added provision that, where appropriate, such as in the case of an appeal from a withdrawal order, an effort should be made to consolidate the hearings. The commencement of such proceedings, however, shall not stay any notice or order involving a violation of a standard." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-761, p. 71 (1969). (Emphasis added.) No mention was made of the language deleted from the Senate bill or the similar language contained in the House bill. A change to require findings of fact without a request for a hearing would be a significant matter that would not likely have escaped attention; such a change would have called for explanation.[10] The importance of 109 in the enforcement of the Act cannot be overstated. Section 109 provides a strong incentive for compliance with the mandatory health and safety standards. That the violations of the Act have been abated or miners withdrawn from the dangerous area before 109 comes into effect is not dispositive; if a mine operator does not also face a monetary penalty for violations, he has little incentive to eliminate dangers until directed to do so by a mine inspector. The inspections may be as infrequent as four a year. A major objective of Congress was prevention of accidents and disaster; the deterrence provided by monetary sanctions is essential to that objective. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 does not mandate a formal decision with findings as a predicate for a penalty assessment order unless the mine *402 operator exercises his statutory right to request a hearing on the factual issues relating |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | The Court of Appeals disposed of this case as if a critical question to be decided were which of three clearly defined standards of equal protection review should be applied to a legislative classification discriminating against the mentally retarded.[1] In fact, our cases have not delineated three or even one or two such well-defined standards.[2] Rather, our cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from "strict scrutiny" at one extreme to "rational basis" at the other. I have never been persuaded that these so-called "standards" adequately explain the decisional process.[3] Cases involving classifications based on alienage, *452 illegal residency, illegitimacy, gender, age, or as in this case mental retardation, do not fit well into sharply defined classifications. "I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [tiered] analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself whether I could find a "rational basis" for the classification at issue. The term "rational," of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.[4] Thus, the word "rational" for me at least includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially.[5] The rational-basis test, properly understood, adequately explains why a law that deprives a person of the right to vote because his skin has a different pigmentation than that of other voters violates the Equal Protection Clause. It would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color. None of these attributes has any bearing at all *453 on the citizen's willingness or ability to exercise that civil right. We do not need to apply a special standard, or to apply "strict scrutiny," or even "heightened scrutiny," to decide such cases. In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor" by our laws?[6] What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?[7] In most cases the answer to these questions will tell us whether the statute has a "rational basis." The answers will result in the virtually automatic invalidation of racial classifications and in the validation of most economic classifications, but they will provide differing results in cases involving classifications based on alienage,[8] gender,[9] or illegitimacy.[10] But that is not because we *454 apply an "intermediate standard of review" in these cases; rather it is because the characteristics of these groups are sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant to a valid public purpose, or, more specifically, to the purpose that the challenged laws purportedly intended to serve.[11] Every law that places the mentally retarded in a special class is not presumptively irrational. The differences between mentally retarded persons and those with greater mental capacity are obviously relevant to certain legislative decisions. An impartial lawmaker indeed, even a member of a class of persons defined as mentally retarded could rationally vote in favor of a law providing funds for special education and special treatment for the mentally retarded. A mentally retarded person could also recognize that he is a member of a class that might need special supervision in some situations, both to protect himself and to protect others. Restrictions on his right to drive cars or to operate hazardous equipment might well seem rational even though they deprived him of employment opportunities and the kind of freedom of travel enjoyed by other citizens. "That a civilized and decent society expects and approves such legislation indicates that governmental consideration of those differences in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but also desirable." Ante, at 444. Even so, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that through ignorance and prejudice the mentally retarded "have been subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment." The discrimination *455A against the mentally retarded that is at issue in this case is the city's decision to require an annual special use permit before property in an apartment house district may be used as a group home for persons who are mildly retarded. The record convinces me that this permit was required because of the irrational fears of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally retarded persons who would reside in respondent's home.[12] Although the city argued in the Court of Appeals that legitimate interests of the neighbors justified the restriction, the court unambiguously rejected that argument. In this Court, the city has |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | unambiguously rejected that argument. In this Court, the city has argued that the discrimination was really motivated by a desire to protect the mentally retarded from the hazards presented by the neighborhood. Zoning ordinances are not usually justified on any such basis, and in this case, for the reasons explained by the Court, ante, at 447-450, I find that justification wholly unconvincing. I cannot believe that a rational member of this disadvantaged class could ever approve of the discriminatory application of the city's ordinance in this case. Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court. *455B JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. The Court holds that all retarded individuals cannot be grouped together as the "feebleminded" and deemed presumptively unfit to live in a community. Underlying this holding is the principle that mental retardation per se cannot be a proxy for depriving retarded people of their rights and interests without regard to variations in individual ability. *456 With this holding and principle I agree. The Equal Protection Clause requires attention to the capacities and needs of retarded people as individuals. I cannot agree, however, with the way in which the Court reaches its result or with the narrow, as-applied remedy it provides for the city of Cleburne's equal protection violation. The Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational-basis grounds and disclaims that anything special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place. Yet Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation. In my view, it is important to articulate, as the Court does not, the facts and principles that justify subjecting this zoning ordinance to the searching review the heightened scrutiny that actually leads to its invalidation. Moreover, in invalidating Cleburne's exclusion of the "feebleminded" only as applied to respondents, rather than on its face, the Court radically departs from our equal protection precedents. Because I dissent from this novel and truncated remedy, and because I cannot accept the Court's disclaimer that no "more exacting standard" than ordinary rational-basis review is being applied, ante, at 442, I write separately. I At the outset, two curious and paradoxical aspects of the Court's opinion must be noted. First, because the Court invalidates Cleburne's zoning ordinance on rational-basis grounds, the Court's wide-ranging discussion of heightened scrutiny is wholly superfluous to the decision of this case. This "two for the price of one" approach to constitutional decisionmaking rendering two constitutional rulings where one is enough to decide |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | rendering two constitutional rulings where one is enough to decide the case stands on their head traditional and deeply embedded principles governing exercise of the Court's Article III power. Just a few weeks ago, the Court "call[ed] to mind two of the cardinal rules governing *457 the federal courts: `One, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' " ).[1] When a lower court correctly decides a case, albeit on what this Court concludes are unnecessary constitutional grounds,[2] "our usual custom" is not to compound the problem by following suit but rather to affirm on the narrower, dispositive ground available. (2).[3] The Court offers no principled justification for departing from these principles, nor, given our equal protection precedents, could it. See Mississippi University for ; (5) *458 ; ; ; cf. Second, the Court's heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling given that Cleburne's ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny. To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called "second order" rational-basis review rather than "heightened scrutiny." But however labeled, the rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of ; Allied Stores of Ohio, and their progeny. The Court, for example, concludes that legitimate concerns for fire hazards or the serenity of the neighborhood do not justify singling out respondents to bear the burdens of these concerns, for analogous permitted uses appear to pose similar threats. Yet under the traditional and most minimal version of the rational-basis test, "reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." ; see American Federation of ; The "record" is said not to support the ordinance's classifications, ante, at 448, 450, but under the traditional standard we do not sift through the record to determine whether policy decisions are squarely supported by a firm factual foundation. Exxon ; ; 3 U.S. 129, 8-1 (8). Finally, the Court further finds it "difficult to believe" that the retarded present different or special hazards inapplicable to other groups. In normal circumstances, the burden is not on the legislature to convince the Court that the lines it has drawn are sensible; legislation is presumptively constitutional, and a State "is not required to |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | is presumptively constitutional, and a State "is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference" to its goals. Allied Stores of Ohio, ; see New ; Metropolis Theatre (19). I share the Court's criticisms of the overly broad lines that Cleburne's zoning ordinance has drawn. But if the ordinance is to be invalidated for its imprecise classifications, it must be pursuant to more powerful scrutiny than the minimal rational-basis test used to review classifications affecting only economic and commercial matters. The same imprecision in a similar ordinance that required opticians but not optometrists to be licensed to practice, see or that excluded new but not old businesses from parts of a community, see New would hardly be fatal to the statutory scheme. The refusal to acknowledge that something more than minimum rationality review is at work here is, in my view, unfortunate in at least two respects.[4] The suggestion that *460 the traditional rational-basis test allows this sort of searching inquiry creates precedent for this Court and lower courts to subject economic and commercial classifications to similar and searching "ordinary" rational-basis review a small and regrettable step back toward the days of Moreover, by failing to articulate the factors that justify today's "second order" rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked. Lower courts are thus left in the dark on this important question, and this Court remains unaccountable for its decisions employing, or refusing to employ, particularly searching scrutiny. Candor requires me to acknowledge the particular factors that justify invalidating Cleburne's zoning ordinance under the careful scrutiny it today receives. II I have long believed the level of scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should vary with "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn." San Antonio Independent School (3) See also ; 7 U.S. 471, (0) When a zoning ordinance works to exclude the retarded from all residential districts in a community, these two considerations require that the ordinance be convincingly justified as substantially furthering legitimate and important purposes. Mississippi University for ; (3); ; see also *461 First, the interest of the retarded in establishing group homes is substantial. The right to "establish a home" has long been cherished as one of the fundamental liberties embraced by the Due Process Clause. See 262 U.S. 0, 9 For retarded adults, this right means living together in group homes, for as deinstitutionalization has |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | means living together in group homes, for as deinstitutionalization has progressed, group homes have become the primary means by which retarded adults can enter life in the community. The District Court found as a matter of fact that "[t]he availability of such a home in communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded from the community." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-8. Excluding group homes deprives the retarded of much of what makes for human freedom and fulfillment the ability to form bonds and take part in the life of a community.[5] Second, the mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy and tragic history," University of California (8) of segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque. During much of the 19th century, mental retardation was viewed as neither curable nor dangerous and the retarded were largely left to their own devices.[6] By the latter part of the century and during the first decades of the new one, however, social views of the retarded underwent a radical transformation. Fueled by the rising tide of Social Darwinism, the "science" of eugenics, and the extreme *462 xenophobia of those years,[7] leading medical authorities and others began to portray the "feebleminded" as a "menace to society and civilization responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems."[8] A regime of statemandated segregation and degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and "nearly extinguish their race."[9] Retarded children were categorically excluded from *463 public schools, based on the false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported need to protect nonretarded children from them.[10] State laws deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship."[11] Segregation was accompanied by eugenic marriage and sterilization laws that extinguished for the retarded one of the "basic civil rights of man" the right to marry and procreate. Marriages of the retarded were made, and in some States continue to be, not only voidable but also often a criminal offense.[12] The purpose of such limitations, which frequently applied only to women of child-bearing age, was unabashedly eugenic: to prevent the retarded from propagating.[] To assure this end, 29 States enacted compulsory eugenic sterilization laws between 1907 and 1931. J. Landman, Human Sterilization 302- (1932). |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | between 1907 and 1931. J. Landman, Human Sterilization 302- (1932). See ; cf. ; 16 Wall. 0, Prejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined. See University of California 438 U. S., at 5 As of 9, most States still categorically disqualified "idiots" from voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion to exclude left in the hands of low-level election officials.[14] Not until Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended, 20 U.S. C. 1400 et seq., were "the door[s] of public education" opened wide to handicapped children. Hendrick Hudson District Board of[15] But most important, lengthy and continuing isolation of the retarded has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping that long have plagued them.[16] In light of the importance of the interest at stake and the history of discrimination the retarded have suffered, the Equal Protection Clause requires us to do more than review the distinctions drawn by Cleburne's zoning ordinance as if they appeared in a taxing statute or in economic or commercial legislation.[17] The searching scrutiny I would give to restrictions *465 on the ability of the retarded to establish community group homes leads me to conclude that Cleburne's vague generalizations for classifying the "feeble-minded" with drug addicts, alcoholics, and the insane, and excluding them where the elderly, the ill, the boarder, and the transient are allowed, are not substantial or important enough to overcome the suspicion that the ordinance rests on impermissible assumptions or outmoded and perhaps invidious stereotypes. See ; ; Mississippi University for ; III In its effort to show that Cleburne's ordinance can be struck down under no "more exacting standard than is normally accorded economic and social legislation," ante, at 442, the Court offers several justifications as to why the retarded do not warrant heightened judicial solicitude. These justifications, however, find no support in our heightened-scrutiny precedents and cannot withstand logical analysis. The Court downplays the lengthy "history of purposeful unequal treatment" of the retarded, see San Antonio Independent School by pointing to recent legislative action that is said to "beli[e] a continuing antipathy or prejudice." Ante, at 443. Building on this point, the Court similarly concludes that the retarded *466 are not "politically powerless" and deserve no greater judicial protection than "[a]ny minority" that wins some political battles and loses others. Ante, at 445. The import of these conclusions, it seems, is that the only discrimination courts may remedy is the discrimination they alone are perspicacious enough to see. Once society begins to recognize certain practices as discriminatory, in part because previously stigmatized groups have mobilized |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | as discriminatory, in part because previously stigmatized groups have mobilized politically to lift this stigma, the Court would refrain from approaching such practices with the added skepticism of heightened scrutiny. Courts, however, do not sit or act in a social vacuum. Moral philosophers may debate whether certain inequalities are absolute wrongs, but history makes clear that constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty, property, and due process, evolve over time; what once was a "natural" and "self-evident" ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and freedom. Compare and at with and (1). Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns at times come to make past practices appear inconsistent with fundamental principles upon which American society rests, an inconsistency legally cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. It is natural that evolving standards of equality come to be embodied in legislation. When that occurs, courts should look to the fact of such change as a source of guidance on evolving principles of equality. In an analysis the Court today ignores, the Court reached this very conclusion when it extended heightened scrutiny to gender classifications and drew on parallel legislative developments to support that extension: "[O]ver the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications *467 [citing examples]. Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration."[18] Moreover, even when judicial action has catalyzed legislative change, that change certainly does not eviscerate the underlying constitutional principle. The Court, for example, has never suggested that race-based classifications became any less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted on the subject. See For the retarded, just as for Negroes and women, much has changed in recent years, but much remains the same; outdated statutes are still on the books, and irrational fears or ignorance, traceable to the prolonged social and cultural isolation of the retarded, continue to stymie recognition of the dignity and individuality of retarded people. Heightened judicial scrutiny of action appearing to impose unnecessary barriers to the retarded is required in light of increasing recognition that such barriers are inconsistent with evolving principles of equality embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also offers a more general view of heightened scrutiny, a view focused primarily on when heightened scrutiny does not apply as opposed to when it does apply.[19] Two *468 principles appear central to the Court's theory. First, heightened scrutiny is said to be inapplicable where |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | theory. First, heightened scrutiny is said to be inapplicable where individuals in a group have distinguishing characteristics that legislatures properly may take into account in some Ante, at 441-442. Heightened scrutiny is also purportedly inappropriate when many legislative classifications affecting the group are likely to be valid. We must, so the Court says, "look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us," in deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny. Ante, at 446. If the Court's first principle were sound, heightened scrutiny would have to await a day when people could be cut from a cookie mold. Women are hardly alike in all their characteristics, but heightened scrutiny applies to them because legislatures can rarely use gender itself as a proxy for these other characteristics. Permissible distinctions between persons must bear a reasonable relationship to their relevant characteristics, and gender per se is almost never relevant. Similarly, that some retarded people have reduced capacities in some areas does not justify using retardation as a proxy for reduced capacity in areas where relevant individual variations in capacity do exist. The Court's second assertion that the standard of review must be fixed with reference to the number of classifications to which a characteristic would validly be relevant is similarly flawed. Certainly the assertion is not a logical one; that a characteristic may be relevant under some or even many circumstances does not suggest any reason to presume it relevant under other circumstances where there is reason to suspect it is not. A sign that says "men only" looks very *469 different on a bathroom door than a courthouse door. But see 16 Wall. 0 Our heightened-scrutiny precedents belie the claim that a characteristic must virtually always be irrelevant to warrant heightened scrutiny. for example, held that the status of being an undocumented alien is not a "constitutional irrelevancy," and therefore declined to review with strict scrutiny classifications affecting undocumented aliens. n. 19. While Frontiero stated that gender "frequently" and "often" bears no relation to legitimate legislative aims, it did not deem gender an impermissible basis of state action in all -687. Indeed, the Court has upheld some gender-based classifications. ; Michael Heightened but not strict scrutiny is considered appropriate in areas such as gender, illegitimacy, or alienage[20] because the Court views the trait as relevant under some circumstances but not others.[21] That view indeed the very concept of heightened, as opposed to strict, scrutiny is flatly inconsistent with the notion |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | to strict, scrutiny is flatly inconsistent with the notion that heightened scrutiny should not apply to the retarded because "mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions." Ante, at 446. Because the government also may not take this characteristic into account in many circumstances, such as those presented here, careful review is required to separate the permissible from the invalid in classifications relying on retardation. *470 The fact that retardation may be deemed a constitutional irrelevancy in some circumstances is enough, given the history of discrimination the retarded have suffered, to require careful judicial review of classifications singling out the retarded for special burdens. Although the Court acknowledges that many instances of invidious discrimination against the retarded still exist, the Court boldly asserts that "in the vast majority of situations" special treatment of the retarded is "not only legitimate but also desirable." Ante, at 444. That assertion suggests the Court would somehow have us calculate the percentage of "situations" in which a characteristic is validly and invalidly invoked before determining whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate. But heightened scrutiny has not been "triggered" in our past cases only after some undefined numerical threshold of invalid "situations" has been crossed. An inquiry into constitutional principle, not mathematics, determines whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate. Whenever evolving principles of equality, rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, require that certain classifications be viewed as potentially discriminatory, and when history reveals systemic unequal treatment, more searching judicial inquiry than minimum rationality becomes relevant. Potentially discriminatory classifications exist only where some constitutional basis can be found for presuming that equal rights are required. Discrimination, in the Fourteenth Amendment sense, connotes a substantive constitutional judgment that two individuals or groups are entitled to be treated equally with respect to something. With regard to economic and commercial matters, no basis for such a conclusion exists, for as Justice Holmes urged the Lochner Court, the Fourteenth Amendment was not "intended to embody a particular economic theory" As a matter of substantive policy, therefore, government is free to move in any *471 direction, or to change directions,[22] in the economic and commercial sphere.[] The structure of economic and commercial life is a matter of political compromise, not constitutional principle, and no norm of equality requires that there be as many opticians as optometrists, see or new businesses as old, see New But the Fourteenth Amendment does prohibit other results under virtually all circumstances, such as castes created by law along racial or ethnic lines, see -433; (7); (4); ; |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | along racial or ethnic lines, see -433; (7); (4); ; and significantly constrains the range of permissible government choices where gender or illegitimacy, for example, are concerned. Where such constraints, derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, are present, and where history teaches that they have systemically been ignored, a "more searching judicial inquiry" is required. United That more searching inquiry, be it called heightened scrutiny or "second order" rational-basis review, is a method of *472 approaching certain classifications skeptically, with judgment suspended until the facts are in and the evidence considered. The government must establish that the classification is substantially related to important and legitimate objectives, see, e. g., so that valid and sufficiently weighty policies actually justify the departure from equality. Heightened scrutiny does not allow courts to second-guess reasoned legislative or professional judgments tailored to the unique needs of a group like the retarded, but it does seek to assure that the hostility or thoughtlessness with which there is reason to be concerned has not carried the day. By invoking heightened scrutiny, the Court recognizes, and compels lower courts to recognize, that a group may well be the target of the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped action that offends principles of equality found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Where classifications based on a particular characteristic have done so in the past, and the threat that they may do so remains, heightened scrutiny is appropriate.[24] *473 As the history of discrimination against the retarded and its continuing legacy amply attest, the mentally retarded have been, and in some areas may still be, the targets of action the Equal Protection Clause condemns. With respect to a liberty so valued as the right to establish a home in the community, and so likely to be denied on the basis of irrational fears and outright hostility, heightened scrutiny is surely appropriate. IV In light of the scrutiny that should be applied here, Cleburne's ordinance sweeps too broadly to dispel the suspicion that it rests on a bare desire to treat the retarded as outsiders, pariahs who do not belong in the community. The Court, while disclaiming that special scrutiny is necessary or warranted, reaches the same conclusion. Rather than striking the ordinance down, however, the Court invalidates it merely as applied to respondents. I must dissent from the novel proposition that "the preferred course of adjudication" *474 is to leave standing a legislative Act resting on "irrational prejudice" ante, at 450, thereby forcing individuals in the group discriminated against to continue to run the Act's gauntlet. The Court appears to act out of |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | the Act's gauntlet. The Court appears to act out of a belief that the ordinance might be "rational" as applied to some subgroup of the retarded under some circumstances, such as those utterly without the capacity to live in a community, and that the ordinance should not be invalidated in toto if it is capable of ever being validly applied. But the issue is not "whether the city may never insist on a special use permit for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone." Ante, at 447. The issue is whether the city may require a permit pursuant to a blunderbuss ordinance drafted many years ago to exclude all the "feeble-minded," or whether the city must enact a new ordinance carefully tailored to the exclusion of some well-defined subgroup of retarded people in circumstances in which exclusion might reasonably further legitimate city purposes. By leaving the sweeping exclusion of the "feebleminded" to be applied to other groups of the retarded, the Court has created peculiar problems for the future. The Court does not define the relevant characteristics of respondents or their proposed home that make it unlawful to require them to seek a special permit. Nor does the Court delineate any principle that defines to which, if any, set of retarded people the ordinance might validly be applied. Cleburne's City Council and retarded applicants are left without guidance as to the potentially valid, and invalid, applications of the ordinance. As a consequence, the Court's as-applied remedy relegates future retarded applicants to the standardless discretion of low-level officials who have already shown an all too willing readiness to be captured by the "vague, undifferentiated fears," ante, at 449, of ignorant or frightened residents. Invalidating on its face the ordinance's special treatment of the "feeble-minded," in contrast, would place the responsibility for tailoring and updating Cleburne's unconstitutional *475 ordinance where it belongs: with the legislative arm of the city of Cleburne. If Cleburne perceives a legitimate need for requiring a certain well-defined subgroup of the retarded to obtain special permits before establishing group homes, Cleburne will, after studying the problem and making the appropriate policy decisions, enact a new, more narrowly tailored ordinance. That ordinance might well look very different from the current one; it might separate group homes (presently treated nowhere in the ordinance) from hospitals, and it might define a narrow subclass of the retarded for whom even group homes could legitimately be excluded. Special treatment of the retarded might be ended altogether. But whatever the contours such an ordinance might take, the city should not be allowed to keep |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | might take, the city should not be allowed to keep its ordinance on the books intact and thereby shift to the courts the responsibility to confront the complex empirical and policy questions involved in updating statutes affecting the mentally retarded. A legislative solution would yield standards and provide the sort of certainty to retarded applicants and administrative officials that case-by-case judicial rulings cannot provide. Retarded applicants should not have to continue to attempt to surmount Cleburne's vastly overbroad ordinance. The Court's as-applied approach might be more defensible under circumstances very different from those presented here. Were the ordinance capable of being cleanly severed, in one judicial cut, into its permissible and impermissible applications, the problems I have pointed out would be greatly reduced. Cf. United ; but cf. But no readily apparent construction appears, nor has the Court offered one, to define which group of retarded people the city might validly require a permit of, and which it might not, in the R-3 zone. The Court's as-applied holding is particularly inappropriate here, *476 for nine-tenths of the group covered by the statute appears similarly situated to respondents, see ante, at 442, n. 9 a figure that makes the statutory presumption enormously overbroad. Cf. Stanley v. (2) To my knowledge, the Court has never before treated an equal protection challenge to a statute on an as-applied basis. When statutes rest on impermissibly overbroad generalizations, our cases have invalidated the presumption on its face.[25] We do not instead leave to the courts the task of redrafting the statute through an ongoing and cumbersome process of "as applied" constitutional rulings. In Cleveland Board of (4), for *477 example, we invalidated, inter alia, a maternity leave policy that required pregnant schoolteachers to take unpaid leave beginning five months before their expected due date. The school board argued that some teachers became physically incapable of performing adequately in the latter stages of their pregnancy, and we accepted this justification for purposes of our decision. Assuming the policy might validly be applied to some teachers, particularly in the last few weeks of their pregnancy, n. we nonetheless invalidated it in toto, rather than simply as applied to the particular plaintiff. The Court required school boards to employ "alternative administrative means" to achieve their legitimate health and safety goal, or the legislature to enact a more carefully tailored statute, n. Similarly, (9), invalidated a law that required parental consent to adoption from unwed mothers but not from unwed fathers. This distinction was defended on the ground, inter alia, that unwed fathers were often more difficult to |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | concurring | Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111507/cleburne-v-cleburne-living-center-inc/ | inter alia, that unwed fathers were often more difficult to locate, particularly during a child's infancy. We suggested the legislature might make proof of abandonment easier or proof of paternity harder, but we required the legislature to draft a new statute tailored more precisely to the problem of locating unwed fathers. The statute was not left on the books by invalidating it only as applied to unwed fathers who actually proved they could be located. When a presumption is unconstitutionally overbroad, the preferred course of adjudication is to strike it down. See also United States Dept. of 4 U.S. 528 (3); Stanley v. (3); (5); 4 U.S. 634, (3); (2); 1 U.S. 68 (8). In my view, the Court's remedial approach is both unprecedented in the equal protection area and unwise. This doctrinal *478 change of course was not sought by the parties, suggested by the various amici, or discussed at oral argument. Moreover, the Court does not persuasively reason its way to its novel remedial holding nor reconsider our prior cases directly on point. Instead, the Court simply asserts that "this is the preferred course of adjudication." Given that this assertion emerges only from today's decision, one can only hope it will not become entrenched in the law without fuller consideration. V The Court's opinion approaches the task of principled equal protection adjudication in what I view as precisely the wrong way. The formal label under which an equal protection claim is reviewed is less important than careful identification of the interest at stake and the extent to which society recognizes the classification as an invidious one. Yet in focusing obsessively on the appropriate label to give its standard of review, the Court fails to identify the interests at stake or to articulate the principle that classifications based on mental retardation must be carefully examined to assure they do not rest on impermissible assumptions or false stereotypes regarding individual ability and need. No guidance is thereby given as to when the Court's freewheeling, and potentially dangerous, "rational-basis standard" is to be employed, nor is attention directed to the invidiousness of grouping all retarded individuals together. Moreover, the Court's narrow, as-applied remedy fails to deal adequately with the overbroad presumption that lies at the heart of this case. Rather than leaving future retarded individuals to run the gauntlet of this overbroad presumption, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety and would strike down on its face the provision at issue. I therefore concur in the judgment in part and dissent in part. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | second_dissenting | FBI v. Abramson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110712/fbi-v-abramson/ | Justice once explained the limits of statutory construction as follows: "[T]he courts are not at large. They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction. [T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do so." Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, *634 The Court does not approach this case in that spirit. Instead, it redrafts the statutory phrase "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" to exempt investigatory records that "were not compiled for law enforcement purposes," ante, at 623 (emphasis added).[1] Unfortunately, none of the usual grounds of statutory construction supports the Court's result. First, there is no doubt that if Exemption 7 is given the straightforward interpretation based on its plain language that the Court concedes is both "tenable," ante, at 624, and "plausible," ante, at 631, the name check summaries do not qualify for exemption. Second, the rather sparse legislative history of the Exemption provides, as the Court admits, ante, at 623, "[n]o express answer" regarding the meaning of the Exemption, leaving the Court no reason for overriding the usual presumption that the plain language of a statute controls its construction. Finally, the straightforward interpretation of Exemption 7, rejected by the Court, does not lead to consequences so absurd that one is forced to conclude that Congress could not have meant what it said in the Exemption. *635 Under these circumstances, the Court's rejection of the plain language of the Exemption must be viewed as an effort to perfect the FOIA by judicial alteration. Since reform of legislation is a task constitutionally allocated to Congress, not this Court, I believe the Court today errs. I respectfully dissent. I A "[S]tatutory construction `must begin with the language of the statute itself,' and `[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " Bread |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | second_dissenting | FBI v. Abramson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110712/fbi-v-abramson/ | that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " Bread Political Action In approaching a statute, moreover, a judge must presume that Congress chose its words with as much care as the judge himself brings to bear on the task of statutory interpretation. I begin, therefore, by focusing attention on the pertinent language of Exemption 7. At issue in this case[2] is the meaning of the seven-word phrase Congress used to describe the documents it intended to exempt: "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes." The Exemption's syntax is plain and unambiguous: "records" is twice modified, first, by "investigatory," and then, by "compiled for law enforcement purposes." Congress evidently meant to exempt "records" that are both "investigatory" and "compiled for law enforcement purposes."[3] *636 Since neither of the parties before this Court contends that the District Court erred in finding that the records at issue, though perhaps "investigatory," were "not compiled for law enforcement purposes," ante, at 623, the case would, at first blush, seem to be over: the documents withheld by the FBI do not fit within the language of the Exemption and, therefore, must be released to the respondent.[4] The logic of this straightforward result is all the more compelling in light of the canons of construction peculiar to FOIA cases. As we have emphasized before, the enumerated exemptions to the FOIA "[were] explicitly made exclusive," and "must be narrowly construed." Department of Air[5] The reason for preferring a narrow construction is simply that " `the recognized principal purpose of the FOIA requires us to choose that interpretation *637 most favoring disclosure.' " quoting Even if it were possible to concoct genuine doubts about the plain meaning of Exemption 7's language, therefore, those doubts would have to be resolved in favor of disclosure. Under the conceded facts of the present case, however, no doubts arise.[6] The records at issue were not "compiled for *638 law enforcement purposes." The statutory language thus clearly proclaims that the documents are not exempt from disclosure. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote more than a century and a half ago: "The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction." United B Of course, while it is elementary that the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its favor,[7] it is also true that Congress cannot, in every instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it said. Statutes, therefore, "are not to be construed |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | second_dissenting | FBI v. Abramson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110712/fbi-v-abramson/ | what it said. Statutes, therefore, "are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature." Thus, a "clearly expressed legislative intention" to the contrary could dislodge the meaning apparent from the plain language of Exemption 7, even though that meaning "must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive," Consumer Product Safety[8] *639 The Court, however, rejects the plain language of Exemption 7 without identifying any "obvious" evidence of a "clearly expressed" congressional intention to have Exemption 7 mean something other than what it says.[9] In fact, the Court candidly admits that "[n]o express answer is provided by the legislative history," ante, at 623, which explains, perhaps, why the Court's opinion is nearly devoid of references to it. The Court cites the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to Exemption 7 no more than four times during the course of its opinion. None of those citations provides anything like sufficient grounds for displacing the plain meaning of the Exemption.[10] In fact, none of the Court's four citations directly addresses the question. In sum, the Exemption's *640 legislative history provides no basis whatever for ignoring the words of the Act.[11] C Even without the legislative history on its side, to be sure, the Court might be entitled to reject the plain language of Exemption 7 in order to avoid "patently absurd consequences," United that Congress could not possibly have intended. The Court, however, cannot, and does not, claim that the plain language of Exemption 7 leads to such results, though the Court does level a lesser charge. In the Court's words: "The Court of Appeals would protect information compiled in a law enforcement record when transferred in original form to another agency for nonexempt purposes but would withdraw that protection if the same information or record is transmitted in slightly different form. In terms of the statutory objectives, this distinction makes little sense." Ante, at 628 (footnote omitted). In short, the Court accuses Congress of having arbitrarily drawn the line between exempt and nonexempt materials. Congress, however, ordinarily is free to draw lines without cavil from this Court, so long as it respects the constitutional proprieties. We do not, and should not, make it our business *641 to second-guess the Legislature's judgment when it comes to such matters. Line-drawing, after all, frequently requires arbitrary decisions that cannot sensibly be subjected to judicial review.[12] "In terms of the statutory objectives," moreover, it is plain that the principal purpose of the FOIA was "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure," S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | second_dissenting | FBI v. Abramson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110712/fbi-v-abramson/ | agency disclosure," S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), in order "to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view," even if it must come from "unwilling official *642 hands." It scarcely needs to be repeated that Congress' ultimate objective in requiring such disclosure was "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed." Clearly, the disclosure of the name check summaries required by the plain language of Exemption 7 comports with this statutory objective, since it mandates the release of documents that the District Court found to have been compiled for political, not "law enforcement," purposes. Unquestionably, of course, Congress' intent in enacting the FOIA was not singlemindedly to require disclosure whatever the costs. Congress realized that, under certain circumstances, the costs of disclosure exceed the benefits. Congress weighed those costs and benefits, and recorded the results of its deliberations in the "clearly delineated statutory language," S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), of the FOIA's nine exclusive exemptions. The Senate Committee described the legislative balancing process: "It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one either. Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest possible disclosure." Once having completed the arduous and demanding task of balancing interests, and having recorded the results in the nine enumerated exemptions from the FOIA, Congress then attempted to insulate its product from judicial tampering and to preserve the emphasis on disclosure by admonishing that the "availability of records to the public" is not limited, "except as specifically stated." 5 U.S. C. 552(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). The Court now presumes to suggest that the balance as struck in Exemption 7 "makes little sense" "[i]n terms of the statutory objectives." Ante, at *643 628 (footnote omitted). The statutory objectives, however, point in different directions, demanding a balance between the Act's primary focus on disclosure and other, sometimes equally compelling, interests. The particular balance struck by Congress and enshrined in Exemption 7 may be open to attack as ill-advised, but, exactly because it represents a compromise between competing policies, it cannot be said to lead to results so "patently absurd" that a court can only conclude that Congress did not mean what it said. In short, if the Court hopes to support its result on the basis that a straightforward interpretation of the statute |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | second_dissenting | FBI v. Abramson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110712/fbi-v-abramson/ | on the basis that a straightforward interpretation of the statute "makes little sense," the Court errs, unless, of course, the "sense" to which the Court refers is to be found, not in logic, but in the Court's view of what makes "sense" as a matter of public policy. II To reach its result, the Court assumes that, through inadvertence or inattention, Congress' pen slipped while amending Exemption 7 in 1974. Proceeding on this basis, the Court helpfully undertakes to rewrite the Exemption, substituting for the statutory phrase "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" something like "records containing investigatory information originally gathered for law enforcement purposes." As the Court is quick to point out, its new creation has advantages. The Court notes that "[t]he reasons for an Exemption 7 exemption" might apply to "information in a law enforcement record [that has been] recompiled in another document for a non-law-enforcement function." Ante, at 630. The Court then suggests that, without its redaction of Exemption 7, no guarantee would exist that some other provision of the FOIA would halt disclosure. For this reason, the Court candidly concludes that "[i]t is therefore critical that the compiled-for-law-enforcement requirement be construed to avoid the release of information that would produce undesirable results." Evidently, the Court arrives at *644 this conclusion, not because the language of Exemption 7 requires it, not because the legislative history supports it, not because the statute would have "absurd consequences" otherwise, but rather because "the statesmanship of policy-making. wisely suggest[s]" it. It is not the function of this Court, however, to apply the finishing touches needed to perfect legislation. Our job does not extend beyond attempting to fathom what it is that Congress produced, blemished as the Court may perceive that creation to be. Our task is solely to give effect to the intentions, as best they can be determined, of the Congress that enacted the legislation. Absent compelling evidence requiring a contrary conclusion, the best indication of Congress' intent is Congress' own language. Therefore, I dissent. |
Justice O'Connor | 2,002 | 14 | dissenting | Ring v. Arizona | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121165/ring-v-arizona/ | I understand why the Court holds that the reasoning of is irreconcilable with Yet in choosing which to overrule, I would choose Apprendi, not I continue to believe, for the reasons I articulated in my dissent in Apprendi, that the decision in Apprendi was a serious mistake. As I argued in that dissent, Apprendi `s rule that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated as an element of the crime is not required by the Constitution, by history, or by our prior cases. See -552. Indeed, the rule directly contradicts several of our prior cases. See and ). And it ignores the "significant history in this country of discretionary sentencing by judges." The Court has failed, both in Apprendi and in the decision announced today, to "offer any meaningful justification for deviating from years of cases both suggesting and holding that application of the `increase in the maximum penalty' rule is not required by the Constitution." Not only was the decision in Apprendi unjustified in my view, but it has also had a severely destabilizing effect on our criminal justice system. I predicted in my dissent that the decision would "unleash a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or *620 in part on the authority of [Apprendi]. " As of May 31, 2002, less than two years after Apprendi was announced, the United States Courts of Appeals had decided approximately 1,802 criminal appeals in which defendants challenged their sentences, and in some cases even their convictions, under Apprendi.[1] These federal appeals are likely only the tip of the iceberg, as federal criminal prosecutions represent a tiny fraction of the total number of criminal prosecutions nationwide. See ("In 1998 federal criminal prosecutions represented only about 0.4% of the total number of criminal prosecutions in federal and state courts"). The number of second or successive habeas corpus petitions filed in the federal courts also increased by 77% in 2001, a phenomenon the Administrative Office of the United States Courts attributes to prisoners bringing Apprendi claims. Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, 2001 Judicial Business 17. This Court has been similarly overwhelmed by the aftershocks of Apprendi. A survey of the petitions for certiorari we received in the past year indicates that 18% raised Apprendi -related claims.[2] It is simply beyond dispute that Apprendi threw countless criminal sentences into doubt and thereby caused an enormous increase in the workload of an already overburdened judiciary. The decision today is only going to add to these already serious effects. The Court effectively declares five |
Justice O'Connor | 2,002 | 14 | dissenting | Ring v. Arizona | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121165/ring-v-arizona/ | to these already serious effects. The Court effectively declares five States' capital sentencing schemes unconstitutional. See ante, at 608, n. 6 (identifying Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska as having sentencing schemes like Arizona's). There are 168 prisoners on death row in these States, Criminal Justice of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row U. S. A. (Spring 2002), each of whom *621 is now likely to challenge his or her death sentence. I believe many of these challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful, either because the prisoners will be unable to satisfy the standards of harmless error or plain error review, or because, having completed their direct appeals, they will be barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal collateral review. See 28 U.S. C. 2244(b)(2)(A), 2254(d)(1); Nonetheless, the need to evaluate these claims will greatly burden the courts in these five States. In addition, I fear that the prisoners on death row in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, which the Court identifies as having hybrid sentencing schemes in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determination, see ante, at 608, n. 6, may also seize on today's decision to challenge their sentences. There are 629 prisoners on death row in these States. Criminal Justice By expanding on Apprendi, the Court today exacerbates the harm done in that case. Consistent with my dissent, I would overrule Apprendi rather than |
Justice Thomas | 2,006 | 1 | dissenting | Dolan v. Postal Service | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145678/dolan-v-postal-service/ | The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the Government's sovereign immunity for civil suits seeking money damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting *493 within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. ง 1346(b)(1), save several exceptions found in ง 2680. As relevant here, Congress reserved to the Government its sovereign immunity respecting "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." ง 2680(b) (postal exception). Petitioner Barbara Dolan claims to have suffered personal injuries when she tripped over letters, packages, and periodicals that an employee of the United States Postal Service (Postal Service) negligently left on her porch. Today, the Court concludes that Dolan's lawsuit may proceed because her claim does not fall within the exception. I disagree. Dolan's claim arises out of the Postal Service's "negligent transmission" of mail and is thus covered by the terms of the postal exception. Even if the exception is ambiguous, this Court's cases require that ambiguities as to the scope of the Government's waiver of immunity be resolved in its favor. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I The text of the postal exception, and every term therein, should be ascribed its ordinary meaning. See The term in controversy here is "negligent transmission." The crux of my disagreement with the majority is its failure to assign the term "transmission" its plain meaning. That term is defined as the "[a]ct, operation, or process, of transmitting." Webster's New International Dictionary 2692 (2d ed. 1934, as republished 1945). "Transmit" is defined as, inter alia, "[t]o send or transfer from one person or place to another; to *494 forward by rail, post, wire, etc., [t]o cause to pass or be conveyed." There is no cause to conclude that Congress was unaware of the ordinary definition of the terms "transmission" and "transmit" when it enacted the FTCA and the postal exception in 1946. Nor is there textual indication that Congress intended to deviate from the ordinary meaning of these terms.[1] Accordingly, I would interpret the term "transmission" consistent with its ordinary meaning, see ante, at 486, and conclude that the postal exception exempts the Government from liability for any claim arising out of the negligent delivery of the mail to a Postal Service patron, including Dolan's slip-and-fall claim. |
Justice Thomas | 2,006 | 1 | dissenting | Dolan v. Postal Service | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145678/dolan-v-postal-service/ | mail to a Postal Service patron, including Dolan's slip-and-fall claim. Rejecting the "ordinary meaning and usage" of "negligent transmission," the majority concludes that the term covers only injury arising "directly or consequentially" from "negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address." Ante, at 486, 489. Thus, in the majority's view, "negligent transmission" covers direct injury to the mail as well as personal injury arising from injury to the mail, but does not cover personal injury that does not arise from damage to the mail. For example, in the majority's view, if a mail carrier negligently drops a box containing glassware on a patron's doorstep, causing the contents to shatter, and the patron later injures himself while attempting to handle the shards of glass, the postal exception would bar a claim for damages for the destroyed item as well as a related claim for personal injury. That *495 view is correct, as far as it goes. However, under the majority's view, if the mail carrier negligently places a heap of mail on a patron's front porch and the patron trips and falls over the mail as he walks out of his front door, his personal injury claim may go forward. There is no basis in the text for the line drawn by the majority. Indeed, the majority's view is at odds with the broad language of the postal exception, which expressly applies to "[a]ny claim arising out of negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." ง 2680(b) The majority rationalizes its view by concluding that the terms "loss" and "miscarriage" necessarily limit the term "transmission." Ante, at 486. Applying the rule of noscitur a sociisโthat a word is known by the company it keepsโ the majority reasons that because both "loss" and "miscarriage" refer to "failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if `negligent transmission' swept far more broadly." Ante, at 487. But there is nothing "odd" about interpreting the term "negligent transmission" to encompass more ground than the decidedly narrower terms "loss" and "miscarriage." The rule of noscitur a sociis is intended to prevent ascribing to one word a meaning so expansive that it conflicts with other terms of the provision in a manner that gives "`unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.'" That rule, however, "does not require [the Court] to construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of the terms," where, as here, nothing in the text |
Justice Thomas | 2,006 | 1 | dissenting | Dolan v. Postal Service | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145678/dolan-v-postal-service/ | of the terms," where, as here, nothing in the text demands a more limited construction. (emphasis deleted). Indeed, to read Congress' use of narrow terms in a list as limiting the meaning of broad terms in the same list "would defy common sense; doing so would prevent Congress from giving effect to expansive words in a list whenever they are combined *496 with one word with a more restricted meaning." Nor does this Court's opinion in support the majority's narrow construction of the postal exception. In Kosak, this Court suggested that the postal exception does not apply to suits arising from the negligent handling of motor vehicles by Postal Service employees. Specifically, the Court stated: "One of the principal purposes of the [FTCA] was to waive the Government's immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents. In order to ensure that ง 2680(b) did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibilityโnamely, `the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter'" That observation has no import beyond the recognition that the postal exceptionโwhatever its scope may beโwas carefully crafted so as not to undermine an undisputed principal purpose of the FTCAโto waive the Government's immunity for injuries arising from auto accidents. It says nothing further about the acts Congress intended to capture when enacting the postal exception, and, thus, is unremarkable for purposes of construing the exception.[2] *497 Even if Kosak does inform the outcome in this case, it does not support the majority's interpretation of "negligent transmission." As discussed above, the majority does not purport to limit the type of negligent act that may fall under the postal exception; rather it limits the scope of the exception based on the type of consequence that the negligent act causes (damage to the mail, late delivery, etc.). But Kosak's exclusion of the act of negligent drivingโregardless of whether the consequence of that act is damage to the mail or injury to a personโfrom the scope of the postal exception implies, if anything, that the Kosak Court envisioned discrete acts as being covered, independently of the nature of their consequences. See As such, Kosak does not support an interpretation of "negligent transmission" based upon the type of injury that is caused by the Postal Service's negligent handling of the mail. II Assuming that the postal exception is ambiguous, as the majority suggests, see ante, at 486-487, settled principles *498 |
Justice Thomas | 2,006 | 1 | dissenting | Dolan v. Postal Service | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145678/dolan-v-postal-service/ | the majority suggests, see ante, at 486-487, settled principles *498 governing the interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity require us to rule in favor of the Government. A court may only exercise jurisdiction over the Government pursuant to "a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver." United "[A] waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." These settled legal principles apply not only to the interpretation of the scope of the Government's waiver of immunity, but also to the interpretation of the scope of any exceptions to that waiver. See Thus, the majority is incorrect to conclude that "this case does not implicate the general rule that `a waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.'" Ante, at 491. As this case clearly illustrates, the Government's amenability to suit can only be ascertained after construing both the waiver of immunity and its exceptions. The well-established rationale for construing a waiver in favor of the sovereign's immunity, thus, applies with equal force to the construction of an exception to that waiver. Accordingly, even if I were to conclude that the majority's interpretation of "negligent transmission" were as plausible as my own, I would still resolve this case in favor of the Government's sovereign immunity as mandated by our canons of construction.[3] *499 * * * For these reasons, I would hold that a tort claim for personal injury arising out of negligent delivery of mail to a postal patron is barred by 28 U.S.C. ง 2680(b), the postal exception. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | concurring | American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109444/american-motorists-ins-co-v-starnes/ | Like the Court, I am "unable to say that the treatment of foreign corporations effected by Exception 27 constitutes discrimination repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause." I reach this conclusion, however, for somewhat different reasons from those the Court sets out. A plaintiff may sue a foreign or domestic corporation in Texas without proving up a cause of action at a preliminary hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence or by making out a prima facie case. The only "discrimination" between the two types of corporations is that a foreign corporation may be sued without such proof wherever it has "an agency or representative." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 1995, Exception 27 (1964). In my view, this does not amount to a denial of equal protection. "It is not the mere tribunal into which a person is authorized to proceed by a State which determines whether the equal protection of the law has been afforded, but whether in the tribunals which the State has provided equal laws prevail." Cincinnati Street R. Co. To the extent that the statute treats foreign corporations differently, the difference has a rational basis. "The degree of effective control which the state may exercise over domestic corporations as opposed to foreign corporations in general justifies the classification adopted by the state legislature. The state policy in this respect is not so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional. As regards foreign corporations submitting to a certain degree of control by qualifying to do business in the state, the justification is less evident, but nevertheless the state is not able to give its citizens the same assurance of effective redress for injuries committed by foreign corporations as it can in the case of domestic corporations." Commercial Ins. (Tex. Civ. App.), writ refused, In Bain Peanut this Court held: "The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints." See also Power Mfg. Appellee invoked the broad Texas provision for venue of suits against foreign corporations to sue in McLennan County, where appellant had an agent. Had appellant been a domestic corporation, the analogous venue provision would have permitted appellee to bring suit only in the corporation's home county. In neither instances would appellee have been required to prove up his cause of action in order to show proper venue, and there is thus no difference in the treatment of the two types of corporations beyond the provision for broader *648 venue against foreign corporations. In my view, |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | concurring | American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109444/american-motorists-ins-co-v-starnes/ | for broader *648 venue against foreign corporations. In my view, this case raises no other issue. It is true that, had appellant been a domestic corporation, appellee might also have sued in McLennan County, under a provision that permits suits against domestic corporations to be brought in the county where the plaintiff resided when the cause of action accrued, so long as the corporation has an agent there. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 1995, Exception 23 (1964). Had appellee used Exception 23 to sue this hypothetical domestic corporation outside its home county, the corporation could have required him to prove up his cause of action in order to show proper venue. The Court implies that this difference in treatment would create an equal protection problem were it not for the fact that the state courts do not really require proof of the cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence. Because a similarly situated domestic corporation could not have required appellee to use Exception 23, I fail to see how appellant could have a "right" to the procedures that attend its use, or how appellant was denied anything that a domestic corporation would have had. It seems to me, in short, that the Court has posed a synthetic problem by casting the issue as it does. To dispose of it, the Court proceeds to rely on a rather novel proposition: so long as counsel for a private litigant states, on oral argument in this Court, that, in spite of what the state courts say to the contrary, the State does not in most cases enforce a law discriminatory on its face, this Court will uphold the law. I cannot believe the Court would accept this proposition in any case that presented a serious issue of equal protection, and I prefer not to rely upon it in this case. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | This case presents the question whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by an officer who *4 acted in reliance on a police record indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warranta record that is later determined to be erroneousmust be suppressed by virtue of the exclusionary rule regardless of the source of the error. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence even if the erroneous information resulted from an error committed by an employee of the office of the Clerk of Court. We disagree. In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed respondent Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street in front of the police station. The officer stopped respondent and asked to see his driver's license. After respondent told him that his license had been suspended, the officer entered respondent's name into a computer data terminal located in his patrol car. The computer inquiry confirmed that respondent's license had been suspended and also indicated that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest. Based upon the outstanding warrant, Officer Sargent placed respondent under arrest. While being handcuffed, respondent dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that the officers determined smelled of marijuana. Officers proceeded to search his car and discovered a bag of marijuana under the passenger's seat. The State charged respondent with possession of marijuana. When the police notified the Justice Court that they had arrested him, the Justice Court discovered that the arrest warrant previously had been quashed and so advised the police. Respondent argued that because his arrest was based on a warrant that had been quashed 17 days prior to his arrest, the marijuana seized incident to the arrest should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Respondent also argued that "[t]he `good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule [was] inapplicable because it was police error, not judicial error, which caused the invalid arrest." App. 5. At the suppression hearing, the Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified that a Justice of the Peace had issued the *5 arrest warrant on December 13, 1990, because respondent had failed to appear to answer for several traffic violations. On December 19, 1990, respondent appeared before a pro tem Justice of the Peace who entered a notation in respondent's file to "quash warrant." The Chief Clerk also testified regarding the standard court procedure for quashing a warrant. Under that procedure a justice court clerk calls and informs the warrant section of the Sheriff's Office when a warrant has been quashed. The Sheriff's Office then |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | when a warrant has been quashed. The Sheriff's Office then removes the warrant from its computer records. After calling the Sheriff's Office, the clerk makes a note in the individual's file indicating the clerk who made the phone call and the person at the Sheriff's Office to whom the clerk spoke. The Chief Clerk testified that there was no indication in respondent's file that a clerk had called and notified the Sheriff's Office that his arrest warrant had been quashed. A records clerk from the Sheriff's Office also testified that the Sheriff's Office had no record of a telephone call informing it that respondent's arrest warrant had been quashed. At the close of testimony, respondent argued that the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest should be suppressed because "the purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served here by making the clerks for the court, or the clerk for the Sheriff's office, whoever is responsible for this mistake, to be more careful about making sure that warrants are removed from the records." The trial court granted the motion to suppress because it concluded that the State had been at fault for failing to quash the warrant. Presumably because it could find no "distinction between State action, whether it happens to be the police department or not," the trial court made no factual finding as to whether the Justice Court or Sheriff's Office was responsible for the continued presence of the quashed warrant in the police records. *6 A divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed because it "believe[d] that the exclusionary rule [was] not intended to deter justice court employees or Sheriff's Office employees who are not directly associated with the arresting officers or the arresting officers' police department." Therefore, it concluded, "the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding the evidence obtained in this case." The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. The court rejected the "distinction drawn by the court of appeals between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and similar mistakes by court employees." The court predicted that application of the exclusionary rule would "hopefully serve to improve the efficiency of those who keep records in our criminal justice system." Finally, the court concluded that "[e]ven assuming that deterrence is the principal reason for application of the exclusionary rule, we disagree with the court of appeals that such a purpose would not be served where carelessness by a court clerk results in an unlawful arrest." We granted certiorari to determine whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to an arrest resulting from an inaccurate computer record, regardless of whether police personnel or court personnel were responsible for the record's continued presence in the police computer.[1] We now reverse. We first must consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the Arizona Supreme Court's decision. Respondent argues that we lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1257 because the Arizona Supreme Court never passed upon the *7 Fourth Amendment issue and instead based its decision on the Arizona good-faith statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-3925 (1993), an adequate and independent state ground. In the alternative, respondent asks that we remand to the Arizona Supreme Court for clarification. In we adopted a standard for determining whether a state-court decision rested upon an adequate and independent state ground. When "a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so." We adopted this practice, in part, to obviate the "unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court." We also concluded that this approach would "provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of federal law." Justice Ginsburg would overrule because she believes that the rule of that case "impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for testing solutions to novel legal problems." Post, at 24.[2] The opinion *8 in describes the 60-year history of the Court's differing approaches to the determination whether the judgment of the highest court of a state rested on federal or non federal grounds. -1040. When we were in doubt, on some occasions we dismissed the writ of certiorari; on other occasions we vacated the judgment of the state court and remanded so that it might clarify the basis for its decision. See The latter approach did not always achieve the desired result and burdened the state courts with additional work. We believe that properly serves its purpose and should not be disturbed. Under it, state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution. They also are |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | similar provisions of the United States Constitution. They also are free to serve as experimental laboratories, in the sense that Justice Brandeis used that term in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Under our decision today, the State of Arizona remains free to seek whatever solutions it chooses to problems of law enforcement posed by the advent of computerization.[3] Indeed, it is freer to do so because it is disabused of its erroneous view of what the United States Constitution requires. State courts, in appropriate cases, are not merely free to they are bound tointerpret the United States Constitution. In doing so, they are not free from the final authority of this *9 Court. This principle was enunciated in and presumably Justice Ginsburg does not quarrel with it.[4] In we recognized that our authority as final arbiter of the United States Constitution could be eroded by a lack of clarity in state-court decisions. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases For no other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here, will reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the constitutional jurisdiction of the states." We therefore adhere to the standard adopted in Applying that standard here, we conclude that we have jurisdiction. In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile it may be inappropriate to invoke the exclusionary rule where a magistrate has issued a facially valid warrant (a discretionary judicial function) based on an erroneous evaluation of the facts, the law, or both, it is useful and proper *10 to do so where negligent record keeping (a purely clerical function) results in an unlawful arrest." 177 Ariz., 866 P. 2d, at 872. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court's decision to suppress the evidence was based squarely upon its interpretation of federal law. See Nor did it offer a plain statement that its references to federal law were "being used only for the purpose of guidance, and d[id] not themselves compel the result that [it] reached." The Fourth Amendment states |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | compel the result that [it] reached." The Fourth Amendment states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." We have recognized, however, that the Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. See United "The wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment is `fully accomplished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself," ), and the use of the fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure "`work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong,'" at (quoting at ). "The question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." ; see also United ; ; The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect. at *11 ; As with any remedial device, the rule's application has been restricted to those instances where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. ; Where "the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use is unwarranted." United In we applied these principles to the context of a police search in which the officers had acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a neutral and detached Magistrate, that later was determined to be On the basis of three factors, we determined that there was no sound reason to apply the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring misconduct on the part of judicial officers who are responsible for issuing warrants. See (analyzing First, we noted that the exclusionary rule was historically designed "`to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.' " (quoting ). Second, there was "`no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires the application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.' " (quoting ). Third, and of greatest importance, there was no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. The Court then examined whether application of the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | or magistrate. The Court then examined whether application of the exclusionary rule could be expected to alter the behavior of the law enforcement officers. We concluded: "[W]here the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, `excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that the officer is acting as a reasonable *12 officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.' " (quoting ). See also Thus, we held that the "marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Respondent relies on United and argues that the evidence seized incident to his arrest should be suppressed because he was the victim of a Fourth Amendment Brief for Respondent 10-12, 21-22. In the Court determined that evidence uncovered as a result of a stop pursuant to was admissible because the officers who made the stop acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a flyer that had been issued by officers of another police department who possessed a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry Because the Court determined that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, the Court never considered whether the seized evidence should have been excluded. does not contradict our earlier pronouncements that "[t]he question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." Gates, at ; see also at ; *13 Respondent also argues that Whiteley v.Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, compels exclusion of the evidence. In Whiteley, the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment had been violated when police officers arrested Whiteley and recovered inculpatory evidence based upon a radio report that two suspects had been involved in two robberies. Although the "police were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin," the Court determined that there had been a Fourth Amendment violation because the initial complaint, upon which the arrest warrant and subsequent radio bulletin were based, was insufficient to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. The Court concluded that "an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest." Because the "arrest violated [Whiteley's] constitutional rights under |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | the arrest." Because the "arrest violated [Whiteley's] constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident thereto should have been excluded from his trial." Although Whiteley clearly retains relevance in determining whether police officers have violated the Fourth Amendment, see its precedential value regarding application of the exclusionary rule is dubious. In Whiteley, the Court treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured incident to that 401 U.S., Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule. Cf. ; United ; United States v., These later cases have emphasized that the issue of exclusion is separate from whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, see, e. g., at and exclusion is appropriate only if the * remedial objectives of the rule are thought most efficaciously served, see Our approach is consistent with the dissenting Justices' position in our only major case since and involving the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In that case, the Court found that the good-faith exception applies when an officer conducts a search in objectively reasonable reliance on the constitutionality of a statute that subsequently is declared unconstitutional. Even the dissenting Justices in agreed that provided the proper framework for analyzing whether the exclusionary rule applied; they simply thought that "application of `s stated rationales le[d] to a contrary result." In sum, respondent does not persuade us to abandon the framework. Applying the reasoning of to the facts of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court must be reversed. The Arizona Supreme Court determined that it could not "support the distinction drawn between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and similar mistakes by court employees," 177 Ariz., 866 P. 2d, at 871, and that "even assuming that responsibility for the error rested with the justice court, it does not follow that the exclusionary rule should be inapplicable to these facts," This holding is contrary to the reasoning of and, If court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction. First, as we noted in the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees. See ; see also Second, respondent offers no evidence that court employees are inclined *15 to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. See and n. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Arizona v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117905/arizona-v-evans/ | application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. See and n. ; see also -351. To the contrary, the Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified at the suppression hearing that this type of error occurred once every three or four years. App. 37. Finally, and most important, there is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed. Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, see they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. Cf. ; The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform police officials that a warrant had been quashed. Cf. ; If it were indeed a court clerk who was responsible for the erroneous entry on the police computer, application of the exclusionary rule also could not be expected to alter the behavior of the arresting officer. As the trial court in this case stated: "I think the police officer [was] bound to arrest. I think he would [have been] derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest." App. 51. Cf. ("`Excluding the evidence can in no way affect [the officer's] future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.' " quoting ). The Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified that this type of error occurred "on[c]e every three or four years." App. 37. In fact, once the court clerks discovered the error, they immediately corrected it, and then proceeded to search their files to make sure that no similar mistakes had occurred, There is no indication that the arresting *16 officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record. Application of the framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees. See -922; at[5] The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | The elements/means distinction that the Court draws should not matter for sentencing purposes. I fear that the majority’s contrary view will unnecessarily complicate federal sentencing law, often preventing courts from properly applying the sentencing statute that Congress enacted. I consequently dissent. I The federal statute before us imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a per convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if that per also has three previous convictions for (among several other things) “burglary.” 18 U.S. C. The petitioner here has been convicted of being a felon in possession, and he previously was convicted of three other crimes that qualify him for the federal mandatory minimum if, but only if, those previous convictions count as “burglary.” To decide whether he has committed what the federal statute calls a “burglary,” we must look to the state statute that he violated. The relevant state statute, an Iowa statute, says that a per commits a crime if he (1) “enters an occupied struc- ture,” (2) “having no right to do so,” (3) with “the intent to commit a felony.” (2013). It then 2 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting goes on to define “occupied structure” as including any (1) “building,” (2) “structure,” (3) “land” vehicle, (4) “water” vehicle, or (5) “air vehicle, or similar place.” The problem arises because, as we have previously held, see if the structure that an offender unlawfully entered (with intent to commit a felony) was a “building,” the state crime that he committed counts under the federal statute as “bur- glary.” But if the structure that the offender unlawfully entered was a land, water, or air vehicle, the state crime does not count as a “burglary.” Thus, a conviction for violating the state statute may, or may not, count as a “burglary,” depending upon whether the structure that he entered was, say, a “building” or a “water vehicle.” Here, if we look at the court documents charging Mathis with a violation of the state statute, they tell us that he was charged with entering, for example, a “house and garage.” App. 60–73 (charging documents). They say nothing about any other structure, say, a “water vehicle.” Thus, to convict him, the jury—which had to find that he unlawfully entered an “occupied structure”—must have found that he entered a “house and garage,” which conced- edly count as “building[s].” So why is that not the end of this matter? Why does the federal statute not apply? Just to be sure, let us look at how we previously treated an almost identical instance. In a state |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | we previously treated an almost identical instance. In a state statute made criminal the “breaking and entering [of] a building, booth, tent, boat, or railroad car.” n. 1. We explained that breaking into a building would amount to “burglary” under the federal statute, but breaking into a railroad car would not. But the conviction document itself said only that the offender had violated the statute; it did not say whether he broke into a building or a rail- road car. See at 598–. We said that in such a case the federal sentencing judge could look at the charging papers and the jury instructions in the state case to try to Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 3 BREYER, J., dissenting determine what the state conviction was actually for: building, tent, or railroad car. We wrote that “in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, if the indictment or information and jury instructions show that the de- fendant was charged only with a burglary of a build- ing, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement.” at (We later added that where a conviction rests upon an offender’s guilty plea, the federal judge can look to the facts that the offender admitted at his plea colloquy for the same purpose. See 20–21 (5).) So, again, what is the problem? The State’s “burglary statut[e] include[s] entry” of a vehicle as well as a “build- ing.” 495 U.S., at The conviction document might not specify what kind of a structure the defendant entered (i.e., whether a building or an automobile). But the federal sentencing judge can look at the charging documents (or plea colloquy) to see whether “the defend- ant was charged only with a burglary of a building.” And here that was so. In addition, since the charging documents show that the defendant was charged only with illegal entry of a “building”—not a tent or a railroad car— the jury, in order to find (as it did) that the defendant broke into an occupied structure, would “necessarily [have] had to find an entry of a building.” Hence, “the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement.” The majority, however, does not agree that the two cases I have described are almost identical. To the con- trary, it notes correctly that our precedent often uses the word “element” to describe the relevant facts to which a 4 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | to which a 4 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting statute refers when it uses words such as “building,” “tent,” “boat,” or “railroad car.” See, e.g., ante, at 8–9. It points out that, here, the Iowa Supreme Court described those words as referring, not to “elements” of a crime, but rather to “means” through which a crime was committed. See ante, at 5–6. And that fact, in the majority’s view, makes all the difference. See ante, at 13–16. But why? I, of course, see that there is a distinction between means and elements in the abstract, but—for sentencing pur- poses—I believe that it is a distinction without a difference. II I begin with a point about terminology. All the relevant words in this case, such as “building,” “structure,” “water vehicle,” and the like, are statutory words. Moreover, the statute uses those words to help describe a crime. Fur- ther, the statute always uses those words to designate facts. Whether the offender broke into a building is a fact; whether he broke into a water vehicle is a fact. Some- times, however, a State may treat certain of those facts as elements of a crime. And sometimes a State may treat certain of those facts as means of committing a crime. So far, everyone should agree. See (describing both “ele- ments” and “means” as “facts”). Where we disagree is whether that difference, relevant to the application of state law, should make a difference for federal sentencing purposes. III Whether a State considers the statutory words “boat” or “building” to describe elements of a crime or a means of committing a crime can make a difference for purposes of applying the State’s criminal law, but it should not make a difference in respect to the sentencing question at issue here. The majority, I believe, reas something like this: Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 5 BREYER, J., dissenting Suppose the jury unanimously agreed that the defendant unlawfully entered some kind of structure with felonious intent, but the jury is deadlocked six to six as to whether that structure is (1) a “boat” or (2) a “house.” If the statute uses those two words to describe two different elements of two different crimes—i.e., (1) breaking into a boat, and (2) breaking into a house—then the defendant wins, for the jury has not found unanimously each element of either crime. But if the statute uses those two words to describe two different means of committing the same crime—i.e., breaking into an occupied structure that consists of either a house or a boat—then the |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | that consists of either a house or a boat—then the defendant loses, for (as long as the jury decides unanimously that the defendant broke into an occupied structure of whichever kind) the jury need not decide unanimously which particular means the defendant used to commit the crime. See ante, at 2–5. I accept that reaing. But I do not see what it has to do with sentencing. In the majority’s view, the label “means” opens up the possibility of a six-to-six jury split, and it believes that fact would prevent us from knowing whether the conviction was for breaking into a “building” or a “boat.” See ante, at 4–5. But precisely the same is true were we to use the label “element” to describe the facts set forth in the state statute. The federal sentencing judge may see on the defendant’s record a conviction for violating a particular provision of the state criminal code; that code may list in a single sentence both “buildings” and “boats”; the State may interpret the two words as separate elements of two separate crimes; and the federal judge will not know from the simple fact of conviction for violating the statute (without more) which of the two crimes was at issue (that is, was it the one aimed at bur- glaries of buildings, or the one aimed at burglaries of boats?). That is why the Court said in that in such a case the federal judge may look to the “indictment or information and jury instructions” to determine whether 6 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting “the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building,” rather than a boat, “to convict.” 495 U.S., at If so, the federal judge may count the conviction as falling within the federal statutory word “burglary” and use it for sentencing. In my view, precisely the same is true if the state courts label the statute-mentioned facts (“building,” “boat,” etc.) as “means” rather than “elements.” The federal judge should be able to “look to” the charging documents and the plea agreement to see if “the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building,” rather than a boat, “to con- vict.” If so, the federal judge should be able to count the conviction as a federal-statute “burglary” conviction and use it for sentencing. Of course, sometimes the charging documents will not give us the answer to the question. But often they will. If, for example, the charging document accuses Smith of breaking and entering into a house (and does not mention any other structure), then |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | a house (and does not mention any other structure), then (1) the jury had to find unani- mously that he broke into a “house,” if “house” is an ele- ment, and (2) the jury had to find unanimously that he broke into a “house,” if “house” is the only means charged. (Otherwise the jury would not have unanimously found that he broke into an “occupied structure,” which is an element of the statutory crime.) Suppose, for example, that breaking into a “building” is an element of Iowa’s burglary crime; and suppose the State charges that Smith broke into a building located in Des Moines (and presents evidence at trial concerning only a Des Moines offense), but the jury returns its verdict on a special-verdict form showing that six jurors voted for guilt on the theory that he broke into a building located in Detroit—not Des Moines. The conviction would fail (at least in Iowa), would it not? See, e.g., (“If substantial evidence is presented to support each alternative method of commit- Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 7 BREYER, J., dissenting ting a single crime, and the alternatives are not repugnant to each other, then unanimity of the jury as to the mode of commission of the crime is not required. At the root of this standard is the principle that the unanimity rule requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged” (emphasis added; citation, brackets, and internal quota- tion marks omitted)). Similarly, we would know that—if the charging documents claim only that the defendant broke into a house, and the Government presented proof only of that kind of burglary—the jury had to find unani- mously that he broke into a house, not a boat. And that is so whether state law considers the statutory word “house” to be an element or a means. I have not found any non- fanciful example to the contrary. IV Consider the federal statute before us—the statute that contains the word “burglary”—from a more general sen- tencing perspective. By way of background, it is im- portant to understand that, as a general matter, any sentencing system must embody a host of compromises between theory and practicality. From the point of view of pure theory, there is much to be said for “real offense” sentencing. Such a system would require a commission or a sentencing judge to determine in some detail “the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged,” i.e., what the defendant really |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | in which the defendant engaged,” i.e., what the defendant really did now and in the past. United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A, p. 5 (Nov. 2015). Such a system would produce greater certainty that two offenders who engaged in (and had previously engaged in) the same real conduct would be punished similarly. See Pure “real offense” sentencing, however, is too complex to work. It requires a sentencing judge (or a sentencing 8 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting commission) to know all kinds of facts that are difficult to discover as to present conduct and which a present sen- tencing judge could not possibly know when he or she seeks to determine what conduct underlies a prior convic- tion. Because of these practical difficulties, the USSC created Guidelines that in part reflect a “charge offense” system, a system based “upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted.” A pure “charge offense” system, however, also has seri- ous problems. It can place great authority to determine a sentence in the hands of the prosecutor, not the judge, creating the very nonuniformity that a commission would hope to minimize. Hence, the actual federal sentencing system retains “a significant number of real offense ele- ments,” allowing adjustments based upon the facts of a defendant’s case. And the Commission is cur- rently looking for new ways to create a better compromise. See, e.g., USSC, Amendments to the Sentencing Guide- lines, at 24 (Apr. 2016) (effective Nov. 1, 2016) (creating a “sentence-imposed model for determining” whether prior convictions count for sentence-enhancement purposes in the context of certain immigration crimes). With this background in mind, turn to the federal stat- ute before us. The statute, reflecting the impossibility of knowing in detail the conduct that underlies a prior con- viction, uses (in certain cases involving possession of weapons) the fact of certain convictions (including convic- tions for burglary) as (conclusive) indications that the present defendant has previously engaged in highly unde- sirable conduct. And, for the general reas earlier described, it is practical considerations, not a general theory, that would prevent Congress from listing the specific prior conduct that would warrant a higher present sentence. Practical considerations, particularly of admin- istration, can explain why Congress did not tell the courts Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 9 BREYER, J., dissenting precisely how to apply its statutory word “burglary.” And similar practical considerations can help explain why this Court, in and later cases, described a modified categorical |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | this Court, in and later cases, described a modified categorical approach for separating the sheep from the goats. Those cases recognize that sentencing judges have limited time, they have limited information about prior convictions, and—within practical constraints—they must try to determine whether a prior conviction reflects the kind of behavior that Congress intended its proxy (i.e., “burglary”) to cover. The majority’s approach, I fear, is not practical. Per- haps the statutes of a few States say whether words like “boat” or “building” stand for an element of a crime or a means to commit a crime. I do not know. I do know, however, that many States have burglary statutes that look very much like the Iowa statute before us today. See, e.g., –4–101, 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (2015); –2–101, 45–6–201, 45–6–204 (2015); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2015); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. 12.1–22–06 ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2911.11–2911.13 ; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 3502 (2015); S. D. Codified Laws 22–32–1, 22–32–3, 22–32–8 (6); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6–3–301 (2015); see also ALI, Model Penal Code 221.1 (1980); cf. 495 U.S., at 598 (“burglary” in the federal statute should reflect the version of burglary “used in the criminal codes of most States”). I also know that there are very few States where one can find authoritative judicial opinions that decide the means/element question. In fact, the Government told us at oral argument that it had found only “two States” that, in the context of burglary, had answered the means/elements question. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45; see at 37. The lack of information is not surprising. After all, a prosecutor often will charge just one (e.g., a “building”) of 10 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting several statutory alternatives. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U. S. (2013) (slip op., ). A jury that convicts, then, would normally have to agree unanimously about the existence of that particular fact. See Richard- (“Our decision [whether something is an element or a means] will make a difference where the Government introduces evidence that the defendant has committed more underlying drug crimes than legally necessary to make up a ‘series’ ”). Hence, it will not matter for that particular case whether the State, as a general matter, would categorize that fact (to which the statute refers) as an “element” or as a “means.” So on the majority’s approach, what is a federal sentenc- ing judge to do when facing a state statute that refers to a “building,” a “boat,” a “car,” etc.? The charging documents will not answer the question, for—like the documents |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | charging documents will not answer the question, for—like the documents at issue here—they will simply charge entry into, say, a “building,” without more. But see ante, at 17–18 (suggest- ing that a defendant’s charging documents will often answer the question). The parties will have to look to other state cases to decide whether that fact is a “means” or an “element.” That research will take time and is likely not to come up with an answer. What was once a simple matter will produce a time-consuming legal tangle. See, e.g., State v. Peter, 230 P.3d 588, 591 (2010) (“ ‘There is simply no bright-line rule by which the courts can determine whether the legislature intended to provide alternate means of committing a particular crime. Instead, each case must be evaluated on its own merits’ ” (brackets omitted)); (the “alternative means” definition is “mind-bending in its application”). That is why lower court judges have criticized the ap- proach the majority now adopts. See, e.g., Omargharib v. Holder, (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (“Because of the ever-morphing analysis and Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 11 BREYER, J., dissenting the increasingly blurred articulation of applicable stand- ards, we are being asked to decide, without clear and workable standards, whether disjunctive phrases in a criminal law define alternative elements of a crime or alternative means of committing it I find it espe- cially difficult to comprehend the distinction” (emphasis deleted)). V The majority bases its conclusion primarily upon prece- dent. In my view, precedent does not demand the conclu- sion that the majority reaches. I agree with the majority that our cases on the subject have all used the word “ele- ment” in contexts similar to the present context. But that fact is hardly surprising, for all the cases in which that word appears involved elements—or at least the Court assumed that was so. See Descamps, 570 U. S., at n. 2 (slip op., at 8, n. 2). In each of those cases, the Court used the word generally, simply to refer to the matter at issue, without stating or suggesting any view about the subject of the present case. See, e.g., at (slip op., at 5) (“Sentencing courts may look only to the statutory definitions—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s prior offenses” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Shepard, –17 (using the terms “statutory definition” and “statutory elements” interchangeably); 495 U.S., at (“[A]n offense constitutes ‘burglary’ for pur- poses of [the Armed Career Criminal Act] if either its statutory definition substantially corresponds to ‘generic’ burglary, or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of ge- neric burglary”). The genius of the common law consists in part in its ability to modify a prior holding in light of new circum- stances, particularly where, as Justice Holmes said, an existing principle runs up against a different principle 12 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting that requires such modification. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, A fortiori, we should not apply this Court’s use of a word in a prior case—a word that was not necessary to the decision of the prior case, and not intended to set forth a generally appli- cable rule—to a new circumstance that differs signifi- cantly in respect to both circumstances and the legal question at issue. Does Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S 466 (0), require the majority’s result here? There we held that any fact (“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction”) that must be proved in order to increase the defendant’s sentence above what would otherwise be the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reaable doubt. at 490. Where, as here, the State charges only one kind of “occupied structure”—namely, entry into a “garage”—that criterion is met. The State must prove to the jury beyond a reaable doubt that the defendant unlawfully entered a garage. And that is so, whether the statute uses the term “garage” to refer to a fact that is a means or a fact that is an element. If the charging papers simply said “occupied structure,” leaving the jury free to disagree about whether that structure was a “garage” or was, in- stead, a “boat,” then we lack the necessary assurance about jury unanimity; and the sentencing judge conse- quently cannot use that conviction as a basis for an in- creased federal sentence. And that is true whether the state statute, when using the words “garage” and “boat,” intends them to refer to a fact that is a means or a fact that is an element. What about Descamps? The statute there at issue made it a crime to “ente[r] certain locations with intent to com- mit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” 570 U. S., at (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute made no distinction between (1) lawful entry (e.g., entering a department store before closing time) and (2) Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 13 BREYER, J., dissenting unlawful entry (e.g., breaking into a store after it has closed). See The difference matters because unlaw- |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | after it has closed). See The difference matters because unlaw- ful entry is a critical constituent of the federal statute’s version of “burglary.” If the entry is lawful, the crime does not fall within the scope of that word. We held that a conviction under this statute did not count as a “burglary” for federal purposes. We reaed that the statute required the Government only to prove “entry,” that there was no rea to believe that charging documents would say whether the entry was lawful or unlawful, and that, “most important[ly],” even if they did, the jury did not have to decide that the entry was unlaw- ful in order to convict (that is, any description in the charging document that would imply or state that the entry was illegal, say, at 2:00 in the morning, would be coincidental). at (slip op., at 18); see at (slip op., at 14). Here, by way of contrast, the charging documents must allege entry into an “occupied structure,” and that “struc- ture” can consist of one of several statutory alternatives. 702.12. The present law thus bears little resemblance to the hypothetical statute the majority describes. That hypothetical statute makes it a crime to break into a “premises” without saying more. Ante, at 15– 16. Thus, to apply the federal sentencing statute to such a nonspecific, hypothetical statute would require sentencing judges to “imaginatively transfor[m]” “every element of [the] statute so that [the] crime is seen as containing an infinite number of sub-crimes corresponding to ‘all the possible ways an individual can commit’ ” the crime—an impossibly difficult task. Descamps, 570 U. S., at – (slip op., at 18–19). But the Iowa statute before us contains explicit (not hypothetical) statutory alternatives, and therefore it is likely (not unlikely) that the charging documents will list one or more of these alternatives. Indeed, that is the case 14 MATHIS v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., dissenting with each of Mathis’ charging documents. See App. 60–73. And if the charging documents list only one of these alter- natives, say, a “building,” the jury normally would have to find unanimously that the defendant entered into a build- ing in order to convict. See Bratthauer, 354 N.W.2d, at To repeat my central point: In my view, it is well within our precedent to count a state burglary conviction as a “burglary” within the meaning of the federal law where (1) the statute at issue lists the alternative means by which a defendant can commit the crime (e.g., burgling a “building” or a “boat”) and (2) the charging documents make clear |
Justice Breyer | 2,016 | 2 | dissenting | Mathis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3216494/mathis-v-united-states/ | or a “boat”) and (2) the charging documents make clear that the state alleged (and the jury or trial judge necessarily found) only an alternative that matches the federal version of the crime. Descamps was not that kind of case. It concerned a statute that did not explicitly list alternative means for commission of the crime. And it concerned a fact extrane- ous to the crime—the fact (whether entry into the burgled structure was lawful or unlawful) was neither a statutory means nor an element. As the Court in that case de- scribed it, the fact at issue was, under the state statute, a “legally extraneous circumstanc[e]” of the State’s case. 570 U. S., at (slip op., at 14). But this case concerns a fact necessary to the crime (regardless of whether the Iowa Supreme Court generally considers that fact to be a means or an element). Precedent, by the way, also includes And, as I have pointed out, says that the modified categorical approach it sets forth may “permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.” 495 U.S., at is the precedent that I believe governs here. Because the majority takes a different view, with respect, I dissent. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–6092 RICHARD MATHIS, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | Decisions of this Court for at least a century have construed the Contract Clause largely to be powerless in binding a State to contracts limiting the authority of successor legislatures to enact laws in furtherance of the health, safety, and similar collective interests of the polity. In short, those decisions established the principle that lawful exercises of a State's police powe stand paramount to private rights held under contract. Today's decision, in invalidating the New Jeey Legislature's 1974 repeal of its predecessor's 2 covenant, rejects this previous undetanding and remolds the Contract Clause into a potent instrument for oveeeing important policy determinations of the state legislature. At the same time, by creating a constitutional safe haven for property rights embodied in a contract, the decision substantially distorts modern constitutional jurisprudence governing regulation of private economic interests. I might undetand, though I could not accept, this revival of the Contract Clause were it in accordance with some coherent and constructive view of public policy. But elevation of the Clause to the status of regulator of the municipal bond market at the heavy price of frustration of sound legislative policymaking is as demonstrably unwise as it is unnecessary. The justification for today's decision, therefore, remains a mystery to me, and I respectfully dissent. I The Court holds that New Jeey's repeal of the 2 covenant constitutes an unreasonable invasion of contract rights and hence an impairment of contract. The formulation of *34 the legal standard by which the Court would test asserted impairments of contracts is, to me, both unprecedented and most troubling. But because the Constitution primarily is " `intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories,' " Faitoute Iron & Steel it is necessary to sketch the factual background of this dispute before discussing the reasons for my concern. In my view, the Court's casual consideration both of the substantial public policies that prompted New Jeey's repeal of the 2 covenant, and of the relatively inconsequential burdens that resulted for the Authority's credito, belies its conclusion that the State acted unreasonably in seeking to relieve its citizens from the strictures of this earlier legislative policy. A In an era when problems of municipal planning increasingly demand regional rather than local solutions, the Port Authority provides the New York-New Jeey community with a readymade, efficient regional entity encompassing some 1,500 square miles surrounding the Statue of Liberty. As the Court notes, from the outset public officials of both New York and New Jeey were well aware of the Authority's heavy dependence on public financing. Consequently, beginning in the |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | Authority's heavy dependence on public financing. Consequently, beginning in the decade prior to the enactment of the 2 covenant, the Authority's general reserve bonds, its primary vehicle of public finance, have featured two rigid security devices designed to safeguard the investment of bondholde. Fit, puuant to a so-called "1.3 test," the Authority has been disabled from issuing new consolidated bonds unless the best one-year net revenues derived from all of the Authority's facilities at least equal 130% of the prospective debt service for the calendar year during which the debt service for all outstanding and proposed bonds would be at a maximum. Second, according to a procedure known as a "section 7 certification," *35 the Authority may not issue bonds to finance additional facilities unless it "shall certify" that the issue "will not, during the ensuing ten yea or during the longest term of any such bonds proposed to be issued whichever shall be longer, materially impair the sound credit standing of the Authority" App. 811a-812a. The 2 covenant existed alongside these security provisions. Viewed in simplest terms, the covenant served to preclude Authority investment and participation in transportation programs by shifting the financial focal point from the creditworthiness of the Authority's activities as a whole to the solvency of each proposed new transit project. Whereas the 1.3 and section 7 tests permit expanded involvement in mass transportation provided that the enormous revenue-generating potential of the Authority's bridges and tunnels aggregately suffice to secure the investments of credito, the covenant effectively foreclosed participation in any new project that was not individually "self-supporting."[1] Both parties to this litigation are in apparent agreement that few functional mass transit systems are capable of satisfying this requirement. Whether the 2 New Jeey Legislature acted wisely in accepting this new restriction is, for me, quite irrelevant. What is important is that the passage of the yea conclusively demonstrated that this effective barrier to the development *36 of rapid transit in the port region squarely conflicts with the legitimate needs of the New York metropolitan community, and will peist in doing so into the next century.[2] In the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, 49 U.S. C. 11a, Congress found that "within urban areas the ability of all citizens to move quickly and at a reasonable cost [has become] an urgent national problem." Concurrently, the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1857 et seq., advocated the curtailment of air pollution through the development of transportation-control strategies that place heavy emphasis on rapid transit alternatives to the automobile. For northern New Jeey in particular, |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | alternatives to the automobile. For northern New Jeey in particular, with ambient air-quality levels among the wot in the Nation, the Clean Air Act has led to new regulations premised on the policy: "The development of large-scale mass transit facilities and the expansion and modification of existing mass transit facilities is essential to any effort to reduce automotive pollution through reductions in vehicle use. The planning, acquisition, and operation of a mass transit system is, and should remain, a regional or State responsibility. Many improvements are being planned in mass transit facilities in the State that will make it possible for more people to use mass transit instead of automobiles." (1973). Finally, the Court itself cites the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S. C. 751 (a) (3) (1970 ed., Supp. V), which signaled "a national energy crisis which is a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare," and sought to stimulate *37 further initiatives toward the development of public transportation and similar programs. See ante, at 14. It was in response to these societal demands that the New Jeey and New York Legislatures repealed the 2 covenant. The trial court found: "In April 1970 Governo Cahill and Rockefeller announced a joint program to increase the Port Authority's role in mass transportation by building a rail link to John F. Kennedy International Airport and extending PATH [a commuter rail line under Authority control] to Newark International Airport and other parts of New Jeey." 134 N. J. Super. 124, 168-169, But, the court found, this expansion "was not economically feasible under the terms of the 2 covenant." Consequently, the States repealed the covenant. On signing the New York legislation, Governor Rockefeller stated: "Passed with overwhelming bipartisan support in both houses of the Legislature, the bill removes the absolute statutory prohibition against the use of the revenues of the Port of New York Authority for railroad purposes. That statutory covenant, together with the provision of the bi-state compact creating the Authority that neither State will construct competing facilities within the Port District, could forever preclude the two states from undertaking vitally needed mass transportation projects. In removing the present restriction, the bill would not jeopardize the security of Port Authority bondholde or their rights to maintain that security." Quoted In following suit, New Jeey also expressly grounded its action upon the necessity of overturning " `the restrictions imposed by the covenant [that] effectively preclude sufficient port authority participation in the development of a public transportation system in the port district.' " 338 *. Approximately one year later, on April 10, the Port |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | *. Approximately one year later, on April 10, the Port Authority announced an increase in bridge and tunnel tolls amounting to $40 million, the resulting revenue designed to assist in the financing of passenger transportation facilities without jeopardizing the reserve fund set aside for the Authority's credito. The Court's consideration of this factual background is, I believe, most unsatisfactory. The Court never explicitly takes issue with the core of New Jeey's defense of the repeal: that the State was faced with serious and growing environmental, energy, and transportation problems, and the covenant worked at cross-purposes with efforts at remedying these concerns. Indeed, the Court candidly concedes that the State's purposes in effectuating the 1974 repeal were "admittedly important." Ante, at 29. Instead, the Court's analysis focuses upon related, but peripheral, matte. For example, several hypothetical alternative methods are proposed whereby New Jeey might hope to secure funding for public transportation, and these are made the basis for a holding that repeal of the covenant was not "necessary." Ante, at 29-31. Setting aside the propriety of this surprising legal standard,[3] the Court's effort at fashioning its own legislative program for New York and New Jeey is notably unsuccessful. In fact, except for those proffered alternatives which also amount to a repeal or substantial modification of the 2 covenant,[4] none of the Court's suggestions is compatible *39 with the basic antipollution and transportation-control strategies that are crucial to metropolitan New York. As the Court itself accurately recognizes, the environmental and transportation program for the New York area rests upon a two-step campaign: "The States inten[d] [1] to discourage private automobile use by raising bridge and tunnel tolls and [2] to use the extra revenue from those tolls to subsidize improved commuter railroad service." Ante, at 29. This co-ordinated two-step strategy has not been arbitrarily or casually created, but is dictated by contemporaneous federal enactments such as the Clean Air Act,[5] and stems both from New York City's unique geographic situation[6] and from longstanding provisions in federal law that require the existence of "reasonable and just" expenseswhich may include diveion to mass transit subsidiesas a precondition to any increase in intetate bridge tolls.[7] The Court's various *40 alternative proposals, while perhaps interesting speculations, simply are not responsive to New York's and New Jeey's real environmental and traffic problems,[8] and, in any event, intrude the Court deeply into complex and localized policy matte that are for the States' legislatures and not the judiciary to resolve. Equally unconvincing is the Court's contention that repeal of the 2 covenant was unreasonable because the environmental and energy |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | the 2 covenant was unreasonable because the environmental and energy concerns that prompted such action "were not unknown in 2, and the subsequent changes were of degree and not of kind." Ante, at 32. Nowhere are we told why a state policy, no matter how responsive to the general welfare of its citizens, can be reasonable only if it confronts issues that previously were absolutely unforeseen.[9] Indeed, *41 this arbitrary pepective seems peculiarly inappropriate in a case like this where at least three new and independent congressional enactments between the yea 2 and 1974 summoned major urban cente like New York and New Jeey to action in the environmental, energy, and transportation fields. In short, on this record, I can neither undetand nor accept the Court's characterization of New Jeey's action as unreasonable. B If the Court's treatment of New Jeey's legitimate policy interests is inadequate, its consideration of the countervailing injury ostensibly suffered by the appellant is barely discernible at all. For the Court apparently holds that a mere "technical impairment" of contract suffices to subject New Jeey's repealer to serious judicial scrutiny and invalidation under the Contract Clause. Ante, at 21. The Court's modest statement of the economic injury that today attracts its judicial intervention is, however, undetandable. For fairly read, the record before us makes plain that the repeal of the 2 covenant has occasioned only the most minimal damage on the part of the Authority's bondholde. Obviously, the heart of the obligation to the bondholde and the interests ostensibly safeguarded by the 2 covenant is the periodic payment of interest and the repayment of principal when due. The Court does not, and indeed cannot, contend that either New Jeey or the Authority has called into question the validity of these underlying obligations. No creditor complains that public authorities have defaulted on a coupon payment or failed to redeem a bond that has matured. In fact, the Court does not even offer any reason whatever for fearing that, as a result of the covenant's repeal, the securities in appellant's portfolio are jeopardized. Such a contention cannot be made in the face of the finding of the trial judge, who, in referring to the increasingly lucrative financial *42 position of the Authority at the date of the covenant's repeal in comparison to 2, concluded: "Suffice it to say that between 2 and 1974 the security afforded bondholde had been substantially augmented by a vast increase in Authority revenues and reserves, and the Authority's financial ability to absorb greater deficits, from whatever source and without any significant impairment of |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | deficits, from whatever source and without any significant impairment of bondholder security, was correspondingly increased." 134 N. J. Super., at[10] By simply ignoring this unchallenged finding concerning the Authority's overall financial posture, the Court is able to argue that the repeal of the 2 covenant impaired the Authority's bonds in two particular respects. Fit, it is suggested that repeal of the covenant may have adveely affected the secondary market for the securities. Ante, at 19. The Court, however, acknowledges that appellant has adduced only ambiguous evidence to support this contention, and that the actual price position of Authority bonds was, at most, only temporarily affected by the repeal. Ibid.[11] In fact, the trial *43 court also explicitly rejected the ultimate significance of this alleged injury: "The bottom line of plaintiff's proofs on this issue is simply that the evidence fails to demonstrate that the secondary market price of Authority bonds was adveely affected by the repeal of the covenant, except for a short-term fall-off in price, the effect of which has now been dissipated insofar as it can be related to the enactment of the repeal." 134 N. J. Super., at Secondly, repeal of the covenant is said to have canceled an important security provision enjoyed by the credito. Ante, at 19. Of coue, there is no question that appellant prefe the retention to the removal of the covenant, but surely this alone cannot be an acceptable basis for the Court's wooden application of the Contract Clause or for its conclusion that the repeal unfairly diminished bondholder security. By placing reliance on this superficial allegation of economic injury, the Court again is able simply to disregard the trial court's contrary finding that appellant's complaint of insecurity is without factual merit: "The claim that bondholder security has been materially impaired or destroyed by the repeal is simply not supported by the record. The pledge of the Authority's net revenues and reserves remains intact; the Authority will still be barred from the issuance of any new consolidated bonds unless the 1.3 test required by the CBR is met, and the Authority will continue to be prohibited from the *44 issuance of any consolidated bonds or other bonds secured by a pledge of the general reserve fund without the certification required by section 7 of the series resolutions, to wit, that in the opinion of the Authority the estimated expenditures in connection with any additional facility for which such bonds are to be issued would not, for the ensuing ten yea, impair the sound credit standing of the Authority, the investment status of |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | sound credit standing of the Authority, the investment status of its consolidated bonds, or the Authority's obligations to its consolidated bondholde." 134 N. J. Super.,[12] In brief, only by disregarding the detailed factual findings of the trial court in a systematic fashion is the Court today able to maintain that repeal of the 2 covenant was anything but a minimal interference with the realistic economic interests of the bondholde. The record in this case fairly establishes that we are presented with a relatively inconsequential infringement of contract rights in the puuit of substantial and important public ends. Yet, this meager record is seized upon by the Court as the vehicle for resuscitation of long discarded Contract Clause doctrinea step out of line with both the history of Contract Clause jurisprudence and with constitutional doctrine generally in its attempt to delineate the reach of the lawmaking power of state legislatures in the face of advee claims by property owne. II The Court today dusts off the Contract Clause and thereby undermines the bipartisan policies of two States that manifestly *45 seek to further the legitimate needs of their citizens. The Court's analysis, I submit, fundamentally misconceives the nature of the Contract Clause guarantee. One of the fundamental premises of our popular democracy is that each generation of representatives can and will remain responsive to the needs and desires of those whom they represent. Crucial to this end is the assurance that new legislato will not automatically be bound by the policies and undertakings of earlier days. In accordance with this philosophy, the Frame of our Constitution conceived of the Contract Clause primarily as protection for economic transactions entered into by purely private parties, rather than obligations involving the State itself. See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 4 ; B. Schwartz, A Commentary On the Constitution of the United States, pt. 2, The Rights of Property 274 (5); B. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 15-16 (1938).[13] The Frame fully recognized that nothing would so jeopardize the legitimacy of a system of government that relies upon the ebbs and flows of politics to "clean out the rascals" than the possibility that those same rascals might perpetuate their policies simply by locking them into binding contracts. Following an early opinion of the Court, however, that *46 took the fit step of applying the Contract Clause to public undertakings, later decisions attempted to define the reach of the Clause consistently with the demands of our governing processes. The central principle developed by these decisions, beginning at least a century ago, has been that Contract |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | beginning at least a century ago, has been that Contract Clause challenges such as that raised by appellant are to be resolved by according unusual deference to the lawmaking authority of state and local governments. Especially when the State acts in furtherance of the variety of broad social interests that came clustered together under the rubric of "police powe," see E. Freund, The Police Power (1904)in particular, matte of health, safety, and the preservation of natural resources the decisions of this Court puued a coue of steady return to the intention of the Constitution's Frame by closely circumscribing the scope of the Contract Clause. This theme of judicial self-restraint and its underlying premise that a State always retains the sovereign authority to legislate in behalf of its people was commonly expressed by the doctrine that the Contract Clause will not even recognize efforts of a State to enter into contracts limiting the authority of succeeding legislato to enact laws in behalf of the health, safety, and similar collective interests of the polity[14]in *47 short, that that State's police power is inalienable by contract. For example, in Fertilizing the Illinois General Assembly granted to a fertilizer company an 1867 corporate charter to run for 50 yea. The corporation thereafter invested in a factory and depot on land which it owned within the area designated by the charter. Five yea later, the village authorities of Hyde adopted an ordinance that rendered the company's charter valueless *48 by prohibiting the transportation of offal within the village and forbidding the operation of a fertilizer factory within the village confines. This Court nonetheless rejected the contention that the new ordinance offended the Contract Clause: "We cannot doubt that the police power of the State was applicable and adequate to give an effectual remedy [to the nuisance]. That power belonged to the States when the Federal Constitution was adopted. They did not surrender it, and they all have it now. ". Pure air and the comfortable enjoyment of property are as much rights belonging to [the village residents] as the right of possession and occupancy. "The [company's] charter was a sufficient license until revoked; but we cannot regard it as a contract guaranteeing, in the locality originally selected, exemption for fifty yea from the exercise of the police power of the State, however serious the nuisance might become in the future" Two yea later, this principle of the Contract Clause's subservience to the States' broad lawmaking powe was reasserted in another context. In 1867, the Mississippi Legislature entered into a contract with a company whereby the |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | Legislature entered into a contract with a company whereby the latter was chartered to operate a lottery within the State "in consideration of a stipulated sum in cash" The next year the State adopted a constitutional provision abolishing lotteries. The Court once again unhesitantly dismissed a challenge to this provision grounded on the Contract Clause, : " `Irrevocable grants of property and franchises may be made if they do not impair the supreme authority to make laws for the right government of the State; but no legislature can curtail the power of its successo to make *49 such laws as they may deem proper in matte of police' No one denies that [this legislative power] extends to all matte affecting the public health or the public morals." Later cases continued to read the Contract Clause as qualified by the States' powe to legislate for the betterment of their citizens, while further expanding the range of permissible police powe. For example, in Atlantic Coast Line R. the State chartered and contracted with the plaintiff railway company to operate rail lines within the State. Puuant to this contract, the railroad acquired in fee land for use as rights-of-way and similar transportation activities. The Court recognized that the charter was a binding contract, and that the company, in reliance on the agreement, had acquired land which it enjoys as "complete and unqualified" owner. Yet, the Court brushed aside a constitutional challenge to subsequent ordinances that greatly circumscribed the railroad's activities on its own land: "For it is settled that neither the `contract' clause nor the `due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise." In perfect conformity with these earlier cases that recognized the States' broad authority to legislate for the welfare of their citizens, New Jeey and New York sought to repeal the 2 covenant in furtherance of "admittedly important" interests, ante, at 29, in environmental protection, clean air, and safe and efficient transportation facilities. The States' policy of deploying excess tolls for the maintenance and expansion *50 of rapid transit was not oppressively or capriciously chosen; rather, it squarely complies with the commands embodied by Congress in several contemporaneous national laws. By invalidating the 1974 New Jeey repeal and, by necessity, like action by |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | 1974 New Jeey repeal and, by necessity, like action by New Yorkthe Court regrettably departs from the virtually unbroken line of our cases that remained true to the principle that all private rights of property, even if acquired through contract with the State, are subordinated to reasonable exercises of the States' lawmaking powe in the areas of health ; Butche' Union ); environmental protection ; ; cf. Hendeon ; Illinois Central R. Illinois, ); and transportation ; Erie R. Public Util. Comm', ; & R. G. R. ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Northern Pac. R. Duluth, ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. ex rel. Omaha, U.S. 57 ; New York & N. E. R. Bristol, ). In its disregard of these teachings, the Court treats New Jeey's social and economic policies with lesser sensitivity than former Membe of this Court who stressed the protection of contract and property rights. Even Mr. Justice Butler recognized that the Contract Clause does not interfere with state legislative efforts in behalf of its citizens' welfare unless such actions "are clearly unreasonable and arbitrary [And in applying this standard] [u]ndoubtedly the city, acting as the arm of the State, has a wide discretion in determining what precautions in the public interest are necessary or appropriate under the circumstances." New Orleans Pub. *51 Thus, with at best a passing nod to the long history of judicial deference to state lawmaking in the face of challenges under the Contract Clause, see ante, at 23 n. 20, the Court today imposes severe substantive restraints on New Jeey's attempt to free itself from a contractual provision that it deems inconsistent with the broader interests of its citizens. Today's decision cannot be harmonized with our earlier cases by the simple expedient of labeling the covenant "purely financial," ante, at 25, rather than a forfeiture of "an essential attribute of [New Jeey's] sovereignty," ante, at 23. As either an analytical or practical matter, this distinction is illusory. It rests upon an analytical foundation that has long been discarded as unhelpful.[15] And as a *52 purely practical matter, an interference with state policy is no less intrusive because a contract prohibits the State from resorting to the most realistic and effective financial method of preserving its citizens' legitimate interests in healthy and safe transportation systems rather than directly proscribing the States from exercising their police powe in this area. The day has long since passed when analysis under the Contract Clause usefully can turn on such formalistic differences. Cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Nor is the Court's reading of earlier constitutional doctrine |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | Loan Nor is the Court's reading of earlier constitutional doctrine aided by cases where the Contract Clause was held to forestall state efforts intentionally to withhold from credito the unpaid interest on, Von or principal of, Louisiana ex rel. 215 U.S. ; outstanding bonded indebtedness. Beyond dispute, the Contract Clause has come to prohibit a State from embarking on a policy motivated by a simple desire to escape its financial obligations or to injure othe through "the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them." Home Bldg. & Loan Nor will the Constitution permit *53 a State recklessly to puue its legitimate policies involving matte of health, safety, and the like with "studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his appropriate protection" W. B. Worthen Kavanaugh, In this regard, the Court merely creates its own straw man when it characterizes the choice facing it today either as adopting its new, expansive view of the scope of the Contract Clause, or holding that the Clause "would provide no protection at all." Ante, at 26. The Constitution properly prohibits New Jeey and all States from disadvantaging their credito without reasonable justification or in a spirit of oppression, and New Jeey claims no such prerogatives. But if a State, as here, manifestly acts in furtherance of its citizens' general welfare, and its choice of policy, even though infringing contract rights, is not "plainly unreasonable and arbitrary," & R. G. R. our inquiry should end: "The question is whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." Home Bldg. & Loan at The Court, however, stands the Contract Clause completely on its head, see and both formulates and strictly applies a novel standard for reviewing a State's attempt to relieve its citizens from unduly hah contracts entered into by earlier legislato:[16] Such "an impairment may be constitutional *54 if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." Ante, at 25. Not only is this apparently spontaneous formulation virtually assured of frustrating the undetanding of court and litigant alike,[17] but it *55 is wholly out of step with the modern attempts of this Court to define the reach of the Contract Clause when a State's own contractual obligations are placed in issue. Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in W. B. Worthen Kavanaugh, is the prime exposition of the *56 modern view. As a relief measure for financially depressed local governments, Arkansas enacted a statute that greatly diminished the remedies available to |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | enacted a statute that greatly diminished the remedies available to credito under their bonds. This resulted in a remedial scheme whereby credito were "without an effective remedy" for a minimum of 6 1/2 yea, during which time the government's obligation to pay principal or interest was suspended. The Court invalidated the alteration in remedies. It did so, however, only after concluding that the challenged state law cut recklessly and excessively into the value of the credito' bonds: "[W]ith studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his appropriate protection [the State has] taken from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational investor." at "So viewed [the State's action is] seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral security." In the present case, the trial court expressly applied the Kavanaugh standard to New Jeey's repeal of the covenant, and properly found appellant's claim to be wanting in all material respects: In a detailed and peuasive discussion, the court concluded that neither New Jeey nor New York repealed the covenant with the intention of damaging their credito' financial position. Rather, the States acted out of "vital interest[s]," for "[t]he passage of time and events between 2 and 1974 satisfied the Legislatures of the two states that the public interest which the Port Authority was intended to serve could not be met within the terms of the covenant." 134 N. J. Super., at And the credito' corresponding injury did not even remotely reach that proscribed in Kavanaugh: Not only have Authority bonds remained "an `acceptable investment,' " but "[t]he claim that bondholder security has been materially impaired or destroyed by the repeal is simply not supported by the record." The Court, as I read today's opinion, does not hold that *57 the trial court erred in its application of the facts of this case to Mr. Justice Cardozo's formulation. Instead, it manages to take refuge in the fact that Kavanaugh left open the possibility that the test it enunciated may merely represent the " `outermost limits' " of state authority. Ante, at 27. This, I submit, is a slender thread upon which to hang a belated revival of the Contract Clause some 40 yea later. And, in any event, whatever opening remained after Kavanaugh was surely closed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Faitoute Iron & Steel Speaking for a unanimous Court, he employed the precise constitutional standard established by Mr. Justice Cardozo seven yea earlier, and upheld under the Contract Clause a New Jeey plan |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | and upheld under the Contract Clause a New Jeey plan to reorganize the outstanding debt obligations held by credito of Asbury The Court thereby authorized an impairment of credito' financial interests that was far more substantial than that involved here: In fact, the reorganization plan both extended the maturity date of the city's bonds by some 30 yea and reduced the relevant coupon rate. Yet, rather than suggesting, as does the Court today, that New Jeey possessed lesser authority in the public interest to amend its own contracts than to alter private undertakings, the Court made clear that the State's powe are more expansive "[w]here the respective parties are not private peons. but are peons or corporations whose rights and powe were created for public purposes, by legislative acts, and where the subject-matter of the contract is one which affects the safety and welfare of the public." at n. 2, quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R. U. S., at 72. In my view, the fact that New Jeey's repeal of the 2 covenant satisfies the constitutional standards defined in Kavanaugh and Faitoute should, as the state courts concluded, terminate this litigation. But even were I to agree that the test *58 in Kavanaugh remains open to further refinement, that, I repeat, would hardly justify the Court's attempt to deploy the Contract Clause as an apparently unyielding instrument for policing the policies of New Jeey and New York. For such an interpretation plainly is at odds with the principles articulated in Kavanaugh and Faitoute, and subsequently reconfirmed by El (5). The Court there considered a provision of Texas law that abolished an unlimited redemption period for landowne whose land had been defaulted to the State for nonpayment of interest, substituting a 5-year reinstatement period in its place. Unlike appellant here, at least could claim to have suffered tangible economic injury by virtue of the State's modification of his land-sale contract; indeed, as a result of that "impairment" he permanently lost property to the State. And, of coue, Texas' "self-interest [was] at stake," ante, at 26, since it alone was the beneficiary of ' curtailed right of reinstatement. Yet, properly applying the teachings of Kavanaugh, and Faitoute, the Court had little difficulty in sustaining the measure as a means of removing clouds on title arising from pending reinstatement rights, -509 : "The opinion, which amounted to a comprehensive restatement of the principles underlying the application of the Contract Clause, makes it quite clear that `[n]ot only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the State retains over remedial |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | the measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect."' `Once we are in this domain of the reserve power of a State we must respect the "wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary." ' " *59 It need hardly be said that today's decision is markedly out of step with this deferential philosophy. The Court's willingness to uphold an impairment of contractno matter how "technical" the injuryonly on a showing of "necessity" ante, at 29-31, is particularly distressing, for this Court always will be able to devise abstract alternatives to the concrete action actually taken by a State. For example, in virtually every decided Contract Clause case, the government could have exercised the Court's "lesser alternative" of resorting to its powe of taxation as a substitute for modifying overly restrictive contracts. Ante, at 30 n. 29. Nothing, at least on the level of abstraction and conjecture engaged in by the Court today, prevented the appropriation of monies by Illinois to buy back or modify the corporate charter of the polluting fertilizer company in Fertilizing ; or by New Jeey to ensure the financial solvency of Asbury bonds, Faitoute Iron & Steel or by Texas to purchase the unlimited redemption rights involved in El Yet, in all these cases, modifications of state contracts were countenanced, and this Court did not feel compelled or qualified to instruct the state legislatures how best to puue their business. In brief, these cases recognized that when economic matte are concerned, "the availability of alternatives does not render the [decisionmaker's] choice invalid." State legislation "may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part." By the same token, if unforeseeability is the key to a "reasonable" decision, as the Court now contends, ante, at 32, almost all prior cases again must be repudiated. Surely the legislato of Illinois could not convincingly have claimed surprise because a fertilizer company polluted the air and transported fertilizer to its factory, Fertilizing Hyde * Nor was it unforeseeable to Mississippi that a corporation which was expressly chartered to operate a lottery, in fact, did so, And, of coue, it was "not unknown," ante, at 32, to either debtor or creditor that a municipality's financial condition might falter as in Faitoute Iron & Steel indeed, |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | condition might falter as in Faitoute Iron & Steel indeed, the foreseeability of that very risk inheres in the process of selecting an appropriate coupon rate. Yet, in all of these instances this Court did not construe the Contract Clause to prevent the States from confronting their real problems if and when their legislato came to believe that such action was warranted. It is not our province to contest the "reasonable judgments" of the duly authorized decisionmake. Thus, as I had occasion to remark only last Term, the Court again offe a constitutional analysis that rests upon "abstraction[s] without substance," National League of 8 Given that this is the fit case in some 40 yea in which this Court has seen fit to invalidate purely economic and social legislation on the strength of the Contract Clause, one may only hope that it will prove a rare phenomenon, turning on the Court's particularized appraisal of the facts before it. But there also is reason for broader concern. It is worth remembering that there is nothing sacrosanct about a contract. All property rights, no less than a contract, are rooted in certain "expectations" about the sanctity of one's right of ownehip. Compare ante, at 19-21, n. 17, with J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation c. 8 (1911 ed.). And other constitutional doctrines are akin to the Contract Clause in directing their protections to the property interests of private parties. Hence the command of the Fifth Amendment that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation" also "remains a part of our written Constitution." Ante, at 16. And during the heyday of economic due process associated with and similar cases long since discarded, see at this Court treated "the liberty of contract" under the Due Process Clause as virtually indistinguishable from the Contract Clause. G. Gunther Constitutional Law, 3-4 ; Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, (4). In more recent times, however, the Court wisely has come to embrace a coherent, unified interpretation of all such constitutional provisions, and has granted wide latitude to "a valid exercise of [the States'] police powe," (2), even if it results in severe violations of property rights. See Pittsburgh v. Alco ing Corp., ; ; ; cf. If today's case signals a return to substantive constitutional review of States' policies, and a new resolve to protect property owne whose interest or circumstances may happen to appeal to Membe of this Court, then more than the citizens of New Jeey and New York will be the lose. III I would not want |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109647/united-states-trust-co-of-ny-v-new-jersey/ | York will be the lose. III I would not want to be read as suggesting that the States should blithely proceed down the path of repudiating their obligations, financial or otherwise. Their credibility in the credit market obviously is highly dependent on exercising their vast lawmaking powe with self-restraint and discipline, and I, for one, have little doubt that few, if any, jurisdictions would choose to use their authority "so foolish[ly] as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs for them," Erie R. Public Util. Comm', But in the final analysis, there is no reason to doubt that appellant's financial welfare is being adequately policed by the political processes and the *62 bond marketplace itself.[18] The role to be played by the Constitution is at most a limited For this Court should have learned long ago that the Constitutionbe it through the Contract or Due Process Clausecan actively intrude into such economic and policy matte only if my Brethren are prepared to bear enormous institutional and social costs. Because I consider the potential dange of such judicial interference to be intolerable, I dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117927/united-states-v-lopez/ | The welfare of our future "Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States," U. S. Const., Art. I, ง 8, cl. 3, is vitally dependent on the character of the education of our children. I therefore agree entirely with Justice Breyer's explanation of why Congress has ample power to prohibit the possession of firearms in or near schoolsโjust as it may protect the school environment from harms posed by controlled substances such as asbestos or alcohol. I also agree with Justice Souter's exposition of the radical character of the Court's holding and its kinship with the discredited, pre-Depression version of substantive due process. Cf. I believe, however, that the Court's extraordinary decision merits this additional comment. Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce. Their possession is the consequence, *603 either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my judgment, Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of their potentially harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress may also prohibit their possession in particular markets. The market for the possession of handguns by school-age children is, distressingly, substantial.[*] Whether or not the national interest in eliminating that market would have justified federal legislation in 1789, it surely does today. |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | Mickens v. Taylor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118492/mickens-v-taylor/ | This case raises three uniquely important questions about a fundamental component of our criminal justice system the constitutional right of a person accused of a capital offense to have the effective assistance of counsel for his defense.[1] The first is whether a capital defendant's attorney *180 has a duty to disclose that he was representing the defendant's alleged victim at the time of the murder. Second, is whether, assuming disclosure of the prior representation, the capital defendant has a right to refuse the appointment of the conflicted attorney. Third, is whether the trial judge, who knows or should know of such prior representation, has a duty to obtain the defendant's consent before appointing that lawyer to represent him. Ultimately, the question presented by this case is whether, if these duties exist and if all of them are violated, there exist "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United I The first critical stage in the defense of a capital case is the series of pretrial meetings between the accused and his counsel when they decide how the case should be defended. A lawyer cannot possibly determine how best to represent a new client unless that client is willing to provide the lawyer with a truthful account of the relevant facts. When an indigent defendant first meets his newly appointed counsel, he will often falsely maintain his complete innocence. Truthful disclosures of embarrassing or incriminating facts are contingent on the development of the client's confidence in the undivided loyalty of the lawyer. Quite obviously, knowledge that the lawyer represented the victim would be a substantial obstacle to the development of such confidence. It is equally true that a lawyer's decision to conceal such an important fact from his new client would have comparable ramifications. The suppression of communication and truncated investigation that would unavoidably follow from such a decision would also make it difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish the necessary level of trust that should *181 characterize the "delicacy of relation" between attorney and client.[2] In this very case, it is likely that Mickens misled his counsel, Bryan Saunders, given the fact that Mickens gave false testimony at his trial denying any involvement in the crime despite the overwhelming evidence that he had killed Timothy Hall after a sexual encounter. In retrospect, it seems obvious that the death penalty might have been avoided by acknowledging Mickens' involvement, but emphasizing the evidence suggesting that their sexual encounter was consensual. Mickens' habeas counsel garnered evidence suggesting |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | Mickens v. Taylor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118492/mickens-v-taylor/ | sexual encounter was consensual. Mickens' habeas counsel garnered evidence suggesting that Hall was a male prostitute, App. 137, 9, 162, 169; that the area where Hall was killed was known for prostitution, ; and that there was no evidence that Hall was forced to the secluded area where he was ultimately murdered. An unconflicted attorney could have put forward a defense tending to show that Mickens killed Hall only after the two engaged in consensual sex, but Saunders offered no such defense. This was a crucial omissiona finding of forcible sodomy was an absolute prerequisite to Mickens' eligibility for the death penalty.[3] Of course, since that *182 strategy would have led to conviction of a noncapital offense, counsel would have been unable to persuade the defendant to divulge the information necessary to support such a defense and then ultimately to endorse the strategy unless he had earned the complete confidence of his client. Saunders' concealment of essential information about his prior representation of the victim was a severe lapse in his professional duty. The lawyer's duty to disclose his representation of a client related to the instant charge is not only intuitively obvious, it is as old as the profession. Consider this straightforward comment made by Justice Story in 1824: "An attorney is bound to disclose to his client every adverse retainer, and even every prior retainer, which may affect the discretion of the latter. No man can be supposed to be indifferent to the knowledge of facts, which work directly on his interests, or bear on the freedom of his choice of counsel. When a client employs an attorney, he has a right to presume, if the latter be silent on the point, that he has no engagements, which interfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the cause confided to him; that he has no interest, which may betray his judgment, or endanger his fidelity." (No. 17,733) (CC Me.). Mickens' lawyer's violation of this fundamental obligation of disclosure is indefensible. The relevance of Saunders' prior representation of Hall to the new appointment was far too important to be concealed. II If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, the ensuing proceedings that determine whether he will be put to death are critical in every sense of the word. At those proceedings, testimony about the impact of the crime on the victim, including testimony about the character of the victim, may have a critical effect on the jury's decision. Because a lawyer's fiduciary relationship with his deceased client survives the client's death, Swidler & Saunders necessarily |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | Mickens v. Taylor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118492/mickens-v-taylor/ | deceased client survives the client's death, Swidler & Saunders necessarily labored under conflicting obligations that were irreconcilable. He had a duty to protect the reputation and confidences of his deceased client, and a duty to impeach the impact evidence presented by the prosecutor.[4] Saunders' conflicting obligations to his deceased client, on the one hand, and to his living client, on the other, were unquestionably sufficient to give Mickens the right to insist on different representation.[5] For the "right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client," Von[6] Moreover, in my judgment, the right to conflict-free counsel is just as firmly protected by the Constitution as the defendant's right *184 of self-representation recognized in[7] III When an indigent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer, the trial judge's appointment of counsel is itself a critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding, by definition, the defendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the judge. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the proceedings." Von Moltke, This duty with respect to indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a conflict that arises when retained counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry."[8] But when, as was true in this *185 case, the judge is not merely reviewing the permissibility of the defendants' choice of counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or should know that a conflict does exist, the duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and unqualified.[9] Indeed, under far less compelling circumstances, we squarely held that when a record discloses the "possibility of a conflict" between the interests of the defendants and the interests of the party paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge even when no objection was made. IV Mickens had a constitutional right to the services of an attorney devoted solely to his interests. That right was violated. The lawyer who did represent him had a duty to disclose his prior representation of the victim |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | Mickens v. Taylor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118492/mickens-v-taylor/ | a duty to disclose his prior representation of the victim to Mickens and to the trial judge. That duty was violated. When Mickens had no counsel, the trial judge had a duty to "make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure the fullest protection of" his right to counsel. Von Moltke, 332 *. Despite knowledge of the lawyer's prior representation, she violated that duty. We will never know whether Mickens would have received the death penalty if those violations had not occurred nor precisely what effect they had on Saunders' representation of Mickens.[10] We do know that he did not receive the kind of representation that the Constitution guarantees. If Mickens had been represented by an attorney-impostor who never passed a bar examination, we might also be unable to determine whether the impostor's educational shortcomings "`actually affected the adequacy of his representation.' " Ante, at 171 (emphasis deleted). We would, however, surely set aside his conviction if the person who had represented him was not a real lawyer. Four compelling reasons make setting aside the conviction the proper remedy in this case. First, it is the remedy dictated by our holdings in and In this line of precedent, our focus was properly upon the duty of the trial court judge to inquire into a potential conflict. This duty was triggered either via defense counsel's objection, as was the case in Holloway, or some other "special circumstances" whereby the serious potential for conflict was brought to the attention of the trial court judge. As we unambiguously stated in " mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it `knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict *187 exists.' " n. 18. It is thus wrong for the Court to interpret Justice Powell's language as referring only to a division of loyalties "that affected counsel's performance." Ante, at 171, and n. 3 (emphasis deleted).[11] nowhere hints of this meaning of "actual conflict of interest" nor does it reference in "shorthand," ante, at 171. Rather, cites explicitly in order to make a factual distinction: In a circumstance, such as in in which the judge knows or should know of the conflict, no showing of adverse effect is required. But when, as in the judge lacked this knowledge, such a showing is required. -274.[12] *188 Second, it is the only remedy that responds to the real possibility that Mickens would not have received the death penalty if he had been represented by conflict-free counsel during the critical stage of the proceeding in |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | Mickens v. Taylor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118492/mickens-v-taylor/ | conflict-free counsel during the critical stage of the proceeding in which he first met with his lawyer. We should presume that the lawyer for the victim of a brutal homicide is incapable of establishing the kind of relationship with the defendant that is essential to effective representation. Third, it is the only remedy that is consistent with the legal profession's historic and universal condemnation of the representation of conflicting interests without the full disclosure and consent of all interested parties.[13] The Court's novel and na0131¨ve assumption that a lawyer's divided loyalties *189 are acceptable unless it can be proved that they actually affected counsel's performance is demeaning to the profession. Finally, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Setting aside Mickens' conviction is the only remedy that can maintain public confidence in the fairness of the procedures employed in capital cases. Death is a different kind of punishment from any other that may be imposed in this country. "From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." A rule that allows the State to foist a murder victim's lawyer onto his accused is not only capricious; it poisons the integrity of our adversary system of justice. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Souter | 2,000 | 20 | dissenting | Ohler v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118367/ohler-v-united-states/ | The majority holds that a testifying defendant perforce waives the right to appeal an adverse in limine ruling admitting prior convictions for impeachment. The holding is without support in precedent, the rules of evidence, or the reasonable objectives of trial, and I respectfully dissent. The only case of this Court that the majority claims as even tangential support for its waiver rule is Ante, at 759. We held there that a criminal defendant who remained off the stand could not appeal an in limine ruling to admit prior convictions as impeachment evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a). Since the defendant had not testified, he had never suffered the impeachment, and the question was whether he should be allowed to appeal the in limine ruling anyway, on the rationale that the threatened impeachment had discouraged the exercise of his right to defend by his own testimony. The answer turned on the practical realities of appellate review. An appellate court can neither determine why a defendant refused to testify, nor compare the actual trial with the one that would have occurred if the accused had taken the stand. With unavoidable uncertainty about whether and how much the in limine ruling harmed the defendant, and whether it affected the trial at all, a rule allowing a silent defendant *761 to appeal would require courts either to attempt wholly speculative harmless-error analysis, or to grant new trials to some defendants who were not harmed by the ruling, and to some who never even intended to testify. In requiring testimony and actual impeachment before a defendant could appeal an in limine ruling to admit prior convictions, therefore, Luce did not derive a waiver rule from some general notion of fairness; it merely acknowledged the incapacity of an appellate court to assess the significance of the ruling for a defendant who remains silent. This case is different, there being a factual record on which Ohler's claim can be reviewed. She testified, and there is no question that the in limine ruling controlled her counsel's decision to enquire about the earlier conviction; defense lawyers do not set out to impeach their own witnesses, much less their clients. Since analysis for harmless error is made no more difficult by the fact that the convictions came out on direct examination, not cross-examination, the case raises none of the practical difficulties on which Luce turned, and Luce does not dictate today's result.[1] In fact, the majority's principal reliance is not on precedent but on the "commonsense" rule that "a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence |
Justice Souter | 2,000 | 20 | dissenting | Ohler v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118367/ohler-v-united-states/ | party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence *762 was erroneously admitted." Ante, at 755. But this is no more support for today's holding than Luce is, for the common sense that approves the rule also limits its reach to a point well short of this case. The general rule makes sense, first, when a party who has freely chosen to introduce evidence of a particular fact later sees his opponent's evidence of the same fact erroneously admitted. He suffers no prejudice. See ; 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 5039, p. 203 (1977). The rule makes sense, second, when the objecting party takes inconsistent positions, first requesting admission and then assigning error to the admission of precisely the same evidence at his opponent's behest. "The party should not be permitted `to blow hot and cold' in this way." 1 J. Strong, on Evidence 55, p. 246, n. 14 (5th ed. 1999). Neither of these reasons applies when (as here) the defendant has opposed admission of the evidence and introduced it herself only to mitigate its effect in the hands of her adversary. Such a case falls beyond the scope of the general principle, and the scholarship almost uniformly treats it as exceptional. See, e. g., 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence 18, p. 836 (P. Tillers rev. 1983) ("[A] party who has made an unsuccessful motion in limine to exclude evidence that he expects the proponent to offer may be able to first offer that same evidence without waiving his claim of error"); M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 103.4, p. 17 (1981) ("However, the party may himself bring out evidence ruled admissible over his objection to minimize its effect without it constituting a waiver of his objection"); 1 55, at 246 ("[W]hen [a party's] objection is made and overruled, he is entitled to treat this ruling as the `law of the trial' and to explain or rebut, if he can, the evidence admitted over his protest"); D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 11, p. 65 (1977) ("Having done his best by objecting, the adversary would be indeed ill treated if then *763 he was held to have thrown it all away by doing his best to protect his position by offering evidence of his own").[2] The general thrust of the law of evidence, then, not only fails to support the majority's approach, but points rather clearly in the other direction. With neither precedent nor principle to support its chosen rule, the majority is reduced to saying that "there is nothing `unfair' about putting |
Justice Souter | 2,000 | 20 | dissenting | Ohler v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118367/ohler-v-united-states/ | reduced to saying that "there is nothing `unfair' about putting petitioner to her choice in accordance with the normal rules of trial."[3]Ante, at 759. Things are not this simple, however. Any claim of a new rule's fairness under normal trial conditions will have to stand or fall on how well the rule would serve the objects that trials in general, and the Rules of Evidence in particular, are designed to achieve. Thus the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 102, that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." A judge's job, accordingly, is to curb the tactics of the trial battle in favor of weighing evidence calmly and getting to the most sensible understanding of whatever gave rise to the controversy before the court. The question is not which side gains a tactical advantage, but which rule assists in uncovering the truth. Today's new rule can make no such claim. *764 Previously convicted witnesses may testify honestly, but some convictions raise more than the ordinary question about the witness's readiness to speak truthfully. A factfinder who appreciates a heightened possibility of perjury will respond with heightened scrutiny, and when a defendant discloses prior convictions at the outset of her testimony, the jury will bear those convictions in mind as she testifies, and will scrutinize what she says more carefully. The purpose of Rule 609, in making some convictions admissible to impeach a witness's credibility, is thus fully served by a defendant's own testimony that the convictions occurred. It is true that when convictions are revealed only on cross-examination, the revelation also warns the factfinder, but the timing of their disclosure may do more. The jury may feel that in testifying without saying anything about the convictions the defendant has meant to conceal them. The jury's assessment of the defendant's testimony may be affected not only by knowing that she has committed crimes in the past, but by blaming her for not being forthcoming when she seemingly could have been. Creating such an impression of current deceit by concealment is very much at odds with any purpose behind Rule 609, being obviously antithetical to dispassionate factfinding in support of a sound conclusion. The chance to create that impression is a tactical advantage for the Government, but only in the majority's dismissive sense of the term; it may affect the outcome of the trial, but only if it disserves |
Justice Marshall | 1,989 | 15 | majority | Neitzke v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112254/neitzke-v-williams/ | The question presented is whether a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is automatically frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. 1915(d). The answer, we hold, is no. I On October 27, 1986, respondent Harry Williams, Sr., an inmate in the custody of the Indiana Department of Corrections, filed a complaint under 42 U.S. C. in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, naming five Indiana correctional officials as defendants. App. 38. The complaint alleged that, while at the Indiana State Prison, Williams had been diagnosed by a prison doctor *321 as having a small brain tumor which affected his equilibrium. Because of this condition, the doctor placed Williams for one year on "medical idle status." A medical report Williams attached to the complaint stated that "[i]t is very likely that he will have this condition for some time to come." The complaint further alleged that, when Williams was transferred to the Indiana State Reformatory, he notified the reformatory staff about the tumor and about the doctor's recommendation that he not participate in any prison work program. Despite this notification, reformatory doctors refused to treat the tumor, -41, and reformatory officials assigned Williams to do garment manufacturing work, After Williams' equilibrium problems worsened and he refused to continue working, the reformatory disciplinary board responded by transferring him to a less desirable cell house. -43. The complaint charged that by denying medical treatment, the reformatory officials had violated Williams' rights under the Eighth Amendment, and by transferring him without a hearing, they had violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint sought money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Along with the complaint, Williams filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1915(a), stating that he had no assets and only prison income. App. 36-37. The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous under 28 U.S. C. 1915(d) on the grounds that Williams had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Insofar as Williams claimed deficient medical care, his pleadings did not state a claim of "deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs," as prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims must under but instead described a constitutionally noncognizable *322 instance of medical malpractice. Cause No. IP 86-1307-C (SD Ind., Jan. 16, 1987), reprinted at App. 67. Insofar as Williams protested his transfer without a hearing, his pleadings failed to state a due |
Justice Marshall | 1,989 | 15 | majority | Neitzke v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112254/neitzke-v-williams/ | without a hearing, his pleadings failed to state a due process violation, for a prisoner has no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in being incarcerated in a particular institution or a particular wing. The court gave no other reasons for finding the complaint frivolous. On Williams' ensuing motion to vacate the judgment and amend his pleadings, the District Court reached these same conclusions. Cause No. IP 86-1307-C (SD Ind., Mar. 11, 1987), reprinted at App. 29.[1] The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In its view, the District Court had wrongly equated the standard for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) with the standard for frivolousness under 1915(d). The frivolousness standard, authorizing sua sponte dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint "only if the petitioner cannot *323 make any rational argument in law or fact which would entitle him or her to relief," is a "more lenient" standard than that of Rule 12(b)(6), the court Unless there is " `indisputably absent any factual or legal basis' " for the wrong asserted in the complaint, the trial court, "[i]n a close case," should permit the claim to proceed at least to the point where responsive pleadings are required. Evaluated under this frivolousness standard, the Court of Appeals held, Williams' Eighth Amendment claims against two of the defendants had been wrongly dismissed. Although the complaint failed to allege the level of deliberate indifference necessary to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), at this stage of the proceedings, the court stated, "we cannot state with certainty that Williams is unable to make any rational argument in law or fact to support his claim for relief" against these defendants. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded these claims to the District Court.[2] The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Williams' due process claims as frivolous, however. Because the law is clear that prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in a particular wing of a prison, the court stated, *324 Williams could make no rational argument in law or fact that his transfer violated due process. We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, filed by those defendants against whom Williams' claims still stand to decide whether a complaint that fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is necessarily frivolous within the meaning of 1915(d), a question over which the Courts of Appeals have disagreed.[3] We now affirm. II The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S. C. |
Justice Marshall | 1,989 | 15 | majority | Neitzke v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112254/neitzke-v-williams/ | enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S. C. 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts. Toward this end, 1915(a) allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, inter alia, that he is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit. Congress recognized, however, that a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits. To prevent such abusive or captious litigation, 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss a claim filed in forma pauperis "if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." Dismissals on these grounds are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints. See The brevity of 1915(d) and the generality of its terms have left the judiciary with the not inconsiderable tasks of *325 fashioning the procedures by which the statute operates and of giving content to 1915(d)'s indefinite adjectives.[4] Articulating the proper contours of the 1915(d) term "frivolous," which neither the statute nor the accompanying congressional reports defines, presents one such task. The Courts of Appeals have, quite correctly in our view, generally adopted as formulae for evaluating frivolousness under 1915(d) close variants of the definition of legal frivolousness which we articulated in the Sixth Amendment case of There, we stated that an appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where "[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits." By logical extension, a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. As the Courts of Appeals have recognized, 1915(d)'s term "frivolous," when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.[5] Where the appellate courts have diverged, however, is on the question whether a complaint which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) automatically satisfies this frivolousness standard. The petitioning prison officials urge us to adopt such a per se reading, primarily on the policy ground that such a reading will halt the "flood of frivolous litigation" generated by prisoners that has swept over the federal judiciary. Brief for Petitioners 7. In support of this position, petitioners note the large and growing *326 |
Justice Marshall | 1,989 | 15 | majority | Neitzke v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112254/neitzke-v-williams/ | of this position, petitioners note the large and growing *326 number of prisoner civil rights complaints, the burden which disposing of meritless complaints imposes on efficient judicial administration, and the need to discourage prisoners from filing frivolous complaints as a means of gaining a " `short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse.' " quoting Because a complaint which states no claim "must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) anyway," petitioners assert, "delay[ing] this determination until after service of process and a defendant's response only delays the inevitable." Reply Brief for Petitioners 3. We recognize the problems in judicial administration caused by the surfeit of meritless in forma pauperis complaints in the federal courts, not the least of which is the possibility that meritorious complaints will receive inadequate attention or be difficult to identify amidst the overwhelming number of meritless complaints. See Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section Suits in the Federal Courts, Nevertheless, our role in appraising petitioners' reading of 1915(d) is not to make policy, but to interpret a statute. Taking this approach, it is evident that the failure-to-state-a-claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the frivolousness standard of 1915(d) were devised to serve distinctive goals, and that while the overlap between these two standards is considerable, it does not follow that a complaint which falls afoul of the former standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter. Appealing though petitioners' proposal may appear as a broadbrush means of pruning meritless complaints from the federal docket, as a matter of statutory construction it is untenable. Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. ; This procedure, operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, streamlines * litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding. Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously insupportable. On the contrary, if as a matter of law "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," at a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one. What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. District court judges looking to dismiss claims on such grounds must look elsewhere for legal support.[6] Section 1915(d) has a separate function, one which molds rather differently the power to dismiss which it confers. Section 1915(d) is designed |
Justice Marshall | 1,989 | 15 | majority | Neitzke v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112254/neitzke-v-williams/ | power to dismiss which it confers. Section 1915(d) is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Examples of the former class are claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit, see, e. g., and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist, like respondent Williams' claim that his transfer within the reformatory violated his rights under the Due *328 Process Clause. Examples of the latter class are claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar. To the extent that a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and 1915(d) both counsel dismissal.[7] But the considerable common ground between these standards does not mean that the one invariably encompasses the other. When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not. This conclusion follows naturally from 1915(d)'s role of replicating the function of screening out inarguable claims which is played in the realm of paid cases by financial considerations. The cost of bringing suit and the fear of financial sanctions doubtless deter most inarguable paid claims, but such deterrence presumably screens out far less frequently those arguably meritorious legal theories whose ultimate failure is not apparent at the outset. Close questions of federal law, including claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S. C. have on a number of occasions arisen on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and have been substantial enough to warrant this Court's granting review, under its certiorari jurisdiction, to resolve them. See, e. g., ; 427 U.S. 2 ; ; It can hardly be said that the substantial legal claims raised in these cases were so defective that they should never have been brought at the outset. To term these claims frivolous *329 is to distort measurably the meaning of |
Justice Marshall | 1,989 | 15 | majority | Neitzke v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112254/neitzke-v-williams/ | claims frivolous *329 is to distort measurably the meaning of frivolousness both in common and legal parlance. Indeed, we recently reviewed the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a complaint based on 42 U.S. C. and found by a 9-to-0 vote that it had, in fact, stated a cognizable claim a powerful illustration that a finding of a failure to state a claim does not invariably mean that the claim is without arguable merit. See That frivolousness in the 1915(d) context refers to a more limited set of claims than does Rule 12(b)(6) accords, moreover, with the understanding articulated in other areas of law that not all unsuccessful claims are frivolous. See, e. g., ; Christiansburg Garment (attorney's fees may not be assessed against a plaintiff who fails to state a claim under 42 U.S. C. or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless his complaint is frivolous); Our conclusion today is consonant with Congress' overarching goal in enacting the in forma pauperis statute: "to assure equality of consideration for all litigants." ; see also H. R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1892). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon.[8] These procedures alert him to the legal theory underlying the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations *330 so as to conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action. This adversarial process also crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review of a trial court dismissal by creating a more complete record of the case. Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 158, 4 F.2d 56, cert. denied, By contrast, the sua sponte dismissals permitted by, and frequently employed under, 1915(d), necessary though they may sometimes be to shield defendants from vexatious lawsuits, involve no such procedural protections. To conflate the standards of frivolousness and failure to state a claim, as petitioners urge, would thus deny indigent plaintiffs the practical protections against unwarranted dismissal generally accorded paying plaintiffs under the Federal Rules. A complaint like that filed by Williams under the Eighth Amendment, whose only defect was its failure to state a claim, will in all likelihood be dismissed sua sponte, whereas an identical complaint filed by a paying plaintiff will in all likelihood receive |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | The Government agents' intrusions upon Ronald Dunn's privacy and property violated the Fourth Amendment for *30 two reasons. First, the barnyard invaded by the agents lay within the protected curtilage of Dunn's farmhouse. Second, the agents infringed upon Dunn's reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn and its contents. Our society is not so exclusively urban that it is unable to perceive or unwilling to preserve the expectation of farmers and ranchers that barns and their contents are protected from (literally) unwarranted government intrusion. I I briefly recount the relevant facts. Respondent's ranch of 198 acres is encircled by a perimeter fence. The residence and its outbuildings are located in a clearing surrounded by woods, one-half mile from a road, down a chained, locked driveway. Neither the farmhouse nor its outbuildings are visible from the public road or from the fence that encircles the entire property. Once inside this perimeter fence, it is necessary to cross at least one more "substantial" fence before approaching Dunn's farmhouse or either of his two barns. United The front of the barn involved here is enclosed by a wooden fence. Its back and sides "were composed of brick, metal siding, and large metal sliding doors and were completely enclosed. The front of the barn was partially composed of a wooden wall with windows. The remainder was enclosed by waist-high wood slatting and wooden gates. At the time of [the] agent['s] visits the top half of the front of the barn was covered by a fishnet type material from the ceiling down to the top of the locked wooden gates. To see inside the barn it was necessary to stand immediately next to the netting [under the barn's overhang]. From as little as a few feet distant, visibility into the barn was obscured by the netting and slatting." *307 The issues are whether the barn was within the protected curtilage of the house, and whether the conduct of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents "circling the large barn, being unable to see inside through the back or sides, climbing a wooden fence at its front, entering its overhang and going into the immediate proximity of the fishnet and wooden gate front enclosure" infringed upon Dunn's reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn or its contents. II A In the Court affirmed its holding in that the Fourth Amendment protects the home and its curtilage, but not the "open fields." We explained that curtilage is "the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the `sanctity of a man's home and the privacies |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | with the `sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' " ). The Court states that curtilage questions are often resolved through evaluation of four factors: "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Ante, at 301. The Court applies this test and concludes that Dunn's barn and barnyard were not within the curtilage of his dwelling. This conclusion overlooks the role a barn plays in rural life and ignores extensive authority holding that a barn, when clustered with other outbuildings near the residence, is part of the curtilage. State and federal courts have long recognized that a barn, like many other outbuildings, is "a domestic building constituting an integral part of that group of structures making up the farm home." Consequently, the general rule is that the *308 "[c]urtilage includes all outbuildings used in connection with a residence, such as garages, sheds, [and] barns connected with and in close vicinity of the residence." The overwhelming majority of state courts have consistently held that barns are included within the curtilage of a farmhouse. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ); ; ; ("Premises other than dwellings have *309 been held within the protection of the Fourth Amendment[,] for example a barn. As construed by the courts from the earliest to the latest times the words `dwelling' or `dwelling-house' have been construed to include not only the main but all the cluster of buildings convenient for the occupants of the premises, generally described as within the curtilage"). Federal courts, too, have held that barns, like other rural outbuildings, lie within the curtilage of the farmhouse. See United ); ; ; United v. Swann, F. Supp. 1305, ; United v. King, 305 F. Supp. Thus, case law demonstrates that a barn is an integral part of a farm home and therefore lies within the curtilage. The Court's opinion provides no justification for its indifference to the weight of state and federal precedent. The above-cited authority also reveals the infirmities in the Court's application of its four-part test. First, the distance between the house and the barn does not militate against the barn or barnyard's presence in the curtilage. Many of the cases cited involve a barn separated from a residence by a distance in excess of 0 yards. Second, the cases make evident |
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