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Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | in excess of 0 yards. Second, the cases make evident that the configuration of fences is not determinative of the status of an outbuilding. Here, where the barn was connected to the house by a "well walked" and a "well driven" *310 path, App. to Supp. to Pet. for Cert. a, and was clustered with the farmhouse and other outbuildings in a clearing surrounded by woods, the presence of intervening fences fades into irrelevance. The third factor in the test the nature of the uses to which the area is put has been badly misunderstood and misapplied by the Court. The Court reasons that, because the barn and barnyard were not actually in domestic use, they were not within the curtilage. This reveals a misunderstanding of the level of generality at which the constitutional inquiry must proceed and is flatly inconsistent with the Court's analysis in Oliver. In Oliver, the Court held that, as a general matter, the open fields "are unlikely to provide the setting for activities whose privacy is sought to be protected by the Fourth Amendment." n. 10. The Court expressly refused to do a case-by-case analysis to ascertain whether, on occasion, an individual's expectation of privacy in a certain activity in an open field should be protected. In the instant case, the Court is confronted with the general rule that a barn is in domestic use. To be consistent with Oliver, the Court should refuse to do a case-by-case analysis of the expectation of privacy in any particular barn and follow the general rule that a barn is in domestic use. What should be relevant here, as in Oliver, is the typical use of an area or structure. The Court's willingness to generalize about the absence of a privacy interest in the open fields and unwillingness to generalize about the existence of a privacy interest in a barn near a residence are manifestly inconsistent and reflect a hostility to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the discovery that Dunn's barn was actually used as a drug laboratory is irrelevant to the question whether the area is typically in domestic use. No one would contend that, absent exigent circumstances, the police could intrude upon a home without a warrant to search for a drug *311 manufacturing operation. The Fourth Amendment extends that same protection to outbuildings in the curtilage of the home. Even accepting that courts should do a case-by-case inquiry regarding the use of buildings within the curtilage, the Court's analysis is faulty. The Court finds it significant that, because of the strong |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | The Court finds it significant that, because of the strong odor and the noise of a motor emanating from the barn, the officers knew that the barn was not in domestic use. But these Government agents were already within the curtilage when they detected the odor of phenylacetic acid. They were wandering about in the area between the barns and the farmhouse, an area that is itself part of the curtilage. The Court cannot abrogate the general rule that a barn is in the curtilage with evidence gathered after the intrusion has occurred.[1] Finally, neither the smell of the chemicals nor the sound of the motor running would remove the protection of the Fourth Amendment from an otherwise protected structure. A barn, like a home, may simultaneously be put to domestic and nondomestic uses, even the manufacture of drugs. Dual use does not strip a home or any building within the curtilage of Fourth Amendment protection. As this Court said in Taylor v. United where a garage adjacent to a city residence and within its curtilage was searched for illegal alcohol, "[p]rohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the owner of a building of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable *312 search."[2] What the evidence cited by the Court might suggest is that the DEA agents had probable cause to enter the barn or barnyard before they made any unconstitutional intrusion. If so and I do not concede it they should have obtained a warrant. With regard to the fourth factor of the curtilage test, I find astounding the Court's conclusion that "[r]espondent did little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields." Ante, at 303. Initially, I note that the fenced area immediately adjacent to the barn in this case is not part of the open fields, but is instead part of the curtilage and an area in which Dunn had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See infra, at 314-319. Second, Dunn in fact took elaborate measures to ensure his privacy. He locked his driveway, fenced in his barn, and covered its open end with a locked gate and fishnetting. The Court of Appeals found that "[t]o see inside the barn it was necessary to stand immediately next to the netting. From as little as a few feet distant, visibility into the barn was obscured by the netting and slatting." 7 F.2d, at The Fourth Amendment does not require the posting of a 24-hour guard to preserve |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | not require the posting of a 24-hour guard to preserve an expectation of privacy. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Dunn's barn and barnyard were within the curtilage of the farmhouse. This Court's reversal of that determination reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the typical role of a barn in rural domestic life.[3] * B Today's decision has an unforeseen consequence. In narrowing the meaning given to the concept of curtilage, the Court also narrows the scope of searches permissible under a warrant authorizing a search of building premises. Police officers often proceed as if a warrant that authorizes a search of the premises or the dwelling also authorizes a search of any outbuildings (such as garages, barns, sheds, smokehouses) because such buildings are commonly deemed within the curtilage. See 1 Ga. App. ; 11 Ga. App. 591, ; ; ; (185) After today, reliance upon this general rule is illegitimate, and warrants must specify that a search of the farmer's outbuildings is also contemplated. III Even if Dunn's barn were not within the curtilage of his farmhouse, his reasonable expectation of privacy in the barnyard would bring the Fourth Amendment into play. It is well established that the Fourth Amendment protects a privacy interest in commercial premises. See 4 U. S., at 178, n. 8[4] The questions in this case are whether a barn is a commercial structure and, if so, how far its owner's expectations of privacy reasonably extend. The Court assumes that respondent possessed an expectation of privacy in his barn and its contents because the barn was an essential part of his business. This assumption is *315 plainly correct. A ranch or a farm is a business like any other. As the Court of Appeals, like many other courts to consider the question,[5] concluded: "A barn is as much a part of a rancher's place of business as a warehouse or outbuilding is part of an urban merchant's place of business. It is and ought to be constitutionally protected from warrantless searches if the owner or occupier takes reasonable steps to effect privacy." 7 F.2d, at 885. This established, we inquire whether the owner of a commercial building has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surrounding or adjacent to that building.[] Since *31 v. United (197), this Court has applied the Fourth Amendment whenever "the person invoking its protection can claim a `justifiable,' a `reasonable,' or a `legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government action." This is a two-part inquiry. First, the individual must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | the individual must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search. See at[7] Dunn has met this standard. See Second, "the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.' " at 31 For a homeowner to preserve Fourth Amendment protection in the area immediately surrounding the residence, he or she must not conduct an activity or leave an item in the plain view of those outside that area. The occupant of a commercial building must take the additional step of affirmatively barring the public from the area because a business operator has a reasonable expectation of privacy only in those areas from which the public has been excluded.[8] When a business or commercial structure is not open to the public, "[a]pplication of the justified-expectation-of-privacy test requires consideration of where the police were at the time of surveillance and how the surveillance was conducted. If police using the naked eye or ear are able to see or hear while located on adjoining *317 property or even on property of the business which is readily accessible to the general public, this is not a search. "On the other hand, if the police engage in a much more intense form of surveillance, especially from places not ordinarily used by the public, this is a search under" 1 W. Search and Seizure 2.4 (b), pp. 433-434 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).[9] See 379 So. 2d 43, 47 (petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his barn because the "barn, as an integral part of petitioner's farming business, enjoyed the same fourth amendment protection as do other business premises" and because he "took overt steps to designate his farm and barn as a place not open to the public"). The Court applied this distinction between protected commercial premises (from which the public is excluded) and unprotected commercial premises (to which the public has access) in its analysis last Term in Dow Chemical Co. v. United 47 U.S. 227, In that case the Court held that "EPA's aerial photography of petitioner's 2,000-acre plant complex without a warrant was not a search under the Fourth Amendment." In so holding, the Court emphasized that "the narrow issue raised" was the lawfulness of observation "without physical entry" and that "[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions." For that reason, the Court determined *318 that the question of invasion of the so-called "business curtilage" was not presented. at 2, n. 7.[10] Looking into a building from a vantage point inaccessible |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Dunn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111833/united-states-v-dunn/ | 7.[10] Looking into a building from a vantage point inaccessible to the public here by climbing over the "substantial" wooden fence enclosing the front of the barn to intrude on Dunn's farmyard is an unacceptable invasion of a reasonable privacy interest. When, as here, the public is excluded from an area immediately surrounding or adjacent to a business structure, that area is not contrary to the Court's position part of the open fields. "[O]ccupants of business and commercial premises should not be put to the choice of taking extraordinary methods of sealing off those premises or else submitting to unrestrained police surveillance." 1[11] *319 A barn, like a factory, a plant, or a warehouse, is a business place not open to the general public. Like these other business establishments, the barn, and any area immediately surrounding or adjacent to it from which the public is excluded, should receive protection. A business operator is undisputably entitled to constitutional protection within the premises when steps have been taken to ensure privacy. It is equally clear that he or she is entitled to protection in those areas immediately surrounding the building when obvious efforts have been made to exclude the public.[12] IV The Fourth Amendment prohibits police activity which, if left unrestricted, would jeopardize individuals' sense of security or would too heavily burden those who wished to guard their privacy.[13] In this case, in order to look inside respondent's barn, the DEA agents traveled one-half mile off a public road over respondent's fenced-in property, crossed over three additional wooden and barbed wire fences, stepped under the eaves of the barn, and then used a flashlight to peer through otherwise opaque fishnetting. For the police habitually to engage in such surveillance without a warrant is constitutionally intolerable. Because I believe that farmers' and ranchers' expectations of privacy in their barns *320 and other outbuildings are expectations society would regard as reasonable, and because I believe that sanctioning the police behavior at issue here does violence to the purpose and promise of the Fourth Amendment, I dissent. |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | majority | Colgrove v. Battin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108843/colgrove-v-battin/ | Local Rule (d) (1) of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the United District Court for the District of *150 Montana provides that a jury for the trial of civil cases shall consist of six persons.[1] When respondent District Court Judge set this diversity case for trial before a jury of six in compliance with the Rule, petitioner sought mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to direct respondent to impanel a 12-member jury. Petitioner contended that the local Rule (1) violated the Seventh Amendment;[2] (2) violated the statutory provision, 28 U.S. C. 2072, that rules "shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment";[3]*151 and (3) was rendered invalid by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 83 because "inconsistent with" Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 48 that provides for juries of less than 12 when stipulated by the parties.[4] The Court of Appeals found no merit in these contentions, sustained the validity of local Rule (d) (1), and denied the writ, We granted certiorari, We affirm. I In the Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute providing for six-member juries in certain criminal cases. The constitutional challenge rejected in that case relied on the guarantees of jury trial secured the accused by Art. III, 2, cl. 3, of the Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment.[5] We expressly reserved, however, the question *152 whether "additional references to the `common law' that occur in the Seventh Amendment might support a different interpretation" with respect to jury trial in civil cases. at 92 n. 30. We conclude that they do not. The pertinent words of the Seventh Amendment are: "In Suits at common law the right of trial by jury shall be preserved"[6] On its face, this language is not directed to jury characteristics, such as size, but rather defines the kind of cases for which jury trial is preserved, namely, "suits at common law." And while it is true that "[w]e have almost no direct evidence concerning the intention of the framers of the seventh amendment itself,"[7] the historical setting in which the Seventh Amendment was adopted highlighted a controversy that was generated, not by concern for preservation of jury characteristics at common law, but by fear that the civil jury itself would be abolished unless protected in express words. Almost a century and a half ago, this Court recognized that "[o]ne of the strongest *153 objections originally taken against the constitution of the United was the want of an express provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | majority | Colgrove v. Battin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108843/colgrove-v-battin/ | provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases." But the omission of a protective clause from the Constitution was not because an effort was not made to include one. On the contrary, a proposal was made to include a provision in the Constitution to guarantee the right of trial by jury in civil cases but the proposal failed because the varied widely as to the cases in which civil jury trial was provided, and the proponents of a civil jury guarantee found too difficult the task of fashioning words appropriate to cover the different state practices.[8] The *154 strong pressures for a civil jury provision in the Bill of Rights encountered the same difficulty. Thus, it was agreed that, with no federal practice to draw on and *155 since state practices varied so widely, any compromising language would necessarily have to be general. As a result, although the Seventh Amendment achieved the primary goal of jury trial adherents to incorporate an explicit constitutional protection of the right of trial by jury in civil cases, the right was limited in general words to "suits at common law."[9] We can only conclude, therefore, that by referring to the "common law," the Framers of the Seventh Amendment were concerned with preserving the right of trial by jury in civil cases where it existed at common law, rather than the various incidents *156 of trial by jury.[10] In short, what was said in with respect to the criminal jury is equally applicable here: constitutional history reveals no intention on the part of the Framers "to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury." Consistently with the historical objective of the Seventh Amendment, our decisions have defined the jury right preserved in cases covered by the Amendment, as "the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure" Baltimore & Carolina Line,[11] The Amendment, therefore, does not "bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791," ; see also Ex parte ; and "[n]ew devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration of justice." Ex parte at -310; Our inquiry turns, then, to whether a jury of 12 is of the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury. Keeping in mind the purpose of the jury trial in criminal cases to prevent government oppression, and, in criminal and civil cases, to assure a |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | majority | Colgrove v. Battin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108843/colgrove-v-battin/ | oppression, and, in criminal and civil cases, to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues, Gasoline Products the question comes down to whether jury performance is a function of jury size. In we rejected the notion that "the reliability of the jury as a factfinder [is] a function of its size," -101, and nothing has been suggested to lead us to alter that conclusion. Accordingly, we think it cannot be said that 12 members is a substantive aspect of the right of trial by jury. It is true, of course, that several earlier decisions of this Court have made the statement that "trial by jury" means "a trial by a jury of twelve" Capital Traction ; see also American Publishing ; But in each case, the reference to "a jury of twelve" was clearly dictum and not a decision upon a question presented or litigated. Thus, in Capital Traction the case most often cited, the question presented was whether a civil action brought before a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia was triable by jury, *158 and that question turned on whether the justice of the peace was a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and advise them on the facts. Insofar as the statement implied that the Seventh Amendment required a jury of 12, it was at best an assumption. And even if that assumption had support in common-law doctrine,[12] our canvass of the relevant constitutional history, like the history canvassed in concerning the criminal jury, "casts considerable doubt on the easy assumption in our past decisions that if a given feature existed in a jury at common law then it was necessarily preserved in the Constitution." -93. We cannot, therefore, accord the unsupported dicta of these earlier decisions the authority of decided precedents.[] There remains, however, the question whether a jury of six satisfies the Seventh Amendment guarantee of "trial by jury." We had no difficulty reaching the conclusion in that a jury of six would guarantee an accused the trial by jury secured by Art. III and the Sixth Amendment. Significantly, our determination that there was "no discernible difference between the results reached by the two different-sized juries," drew largely upon the results of studies of the operations of juries of six in civil cases.[14] Since then, *159 much has been written about the six-member jury, but nothing that persuades us to depart from the conclusion reached in[15] Thus, while we express no view *160 as to whether any number less than six would suffice,[16] we conclude that a jury |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | majority | Colgrove v. Battin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108843/colgrove-v-battin/ | less than six would suffice,[16] we conclude that a jury of six satisfies the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases.[17] *161 II The statute, 28 U.S. C. 2072, authorizes this Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but provides that "[s]uch rules shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution."[18] Petitioner argues that in securing trial by jury "as at common law" and also "as declared by the Seventh Amendment," Congress meant to provide a jury having the characteristics of the common-law jury even if the Seventh Amendment did not require a jury with those characteristics. As the Court of Appeals observed, "[t]his would indeed be a sweeping limitation." 456 F.2d, at 80. Petitioner would impute to Congress an intention to saddle archaic and presently unworkable common-law procedures upon the federal courts[19] and thereby to nullify innovative changes approved by this Court over the years that have now become commonplace and, for *162 all practical purposes, "essential to the preservation of the right" of trial by jury in our modern society. Ex parte ; Galloway v. United 319 U. S., at -391. For to say that Congress chose this means to render our system of civil jury trial immutable as of 1791, or some other date, is to say the Congress meant to deny the judiciary the "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation [which] is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law." ; 290 U. S., at But petitioner's extravagant contention has not the slightest support in the legislative history of the provision. Section 2072 is derived from the Enabling Act of 1934,[20] Section 2 of that Act gave this Court the "power to unite the general rules prescribed for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both." H. R. Rep. No. 1829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). As emphasized by the Court of Appeals, the language of 2 preserving the right of trial by jury was included "to assure that with such union [of law and equity] the right of trial by jury would be neither expanded nor contracted." 456 F.2d, at 81, citing 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 38.06, p. 44 (2d ed. 1971). See also In other words, Congress used the language in question for the sole purpose of creating a statutory right coextensive with that under the Seventh *163 Amendment itself.[21] If Congress had meant to prescribe |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | majority | Colgrove v. Battin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108843/colgrove-v-battin/ | Seventh *163 Amendment itself.[21] If Congress had meant to prescribe a jury number or to legislate common-law features generally, "it knew how to use express language to that effect." III Petitioner's argument that local Rule (d) (1)[22] is inconsistent with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 48 rests on the proposition that Rule 48 implies a direction to impanel a jury of 12 in the absence of a stipulation of the parties for a lesser number. Rule 48 was drafted at the time the statement in Capital Traction that trial by jury means a "jury of twelve," was generally accepted. Plainly the assumption of the draftsmen that such was the case cannot be transmuted into an implied direction to impanel juries of 12 without regard to whether a jury of 12 was required by the Seventh Amendment. Our conclusion that the statement lacks precedential weight leaves Rule 48 without the support even of the draftsmen's assumption and thus there is nothing in the Rule with which the local Rule is inconsistent.[23]*164 See at 783-; Devitt, The Six Man Jury in the Federal Court, 53 F. R. D. 273, 274 n. 1 (1971). Similarly, we reject the argument that the local Rule conflicts with Rule 48 because it deprives petitioner of the right to stipulate to a jury of "any number less than twelve." Aside from the fact that there is no indication in the record that petitioner ever sought a jury of less than 12, Rule 48 "deals only with a stipulation by `[t]he parties.' It does not purport to prevent court rules which provide for civil juries of reduced size." Affirmed. *165 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 976 restricts the ability of state and local governments to levy discriminatory taxes on rail carriers. We consider here whether a railroad may invoke this statute to chal lenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers (among others), but exempt their competitors in the transportation industry. We conclude that the railroad may do so. I A Congress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and Regu latory Reform Act of 976 (Act or 4–R Act) to “restore the financial stability of the railway system of the United States,” among other purposes. To help achieve this goal, Congress targeted state and local taxation schemes that discriminate against rail carriers. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 48 U.S. 44, 47 (987). The provision of the Act at issue 2 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court here, now codified at 49 U.S. C. bars States and localities from engaging in four forms of discriminatory taxation. Section 0(b) describes the prohibited practices. It begins with three provisions addressed specifically to prop- erty taxes; it concludes with a catch-all provision con cerning other taxes. According to States (or their subdivisions) “may not”: “() Assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the as sessed value of other commercial and industrial prop erty in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and indus trial property. “(2) Levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under paragraph () of this subsection. “(3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial prop erty in the same assessment jurisdiction. “(4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.” The following subsection confers jurisdiction on federal courts to “prevent a violation” of notwithstand ing the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S. C. which ordi narily prohibits federal courts from enjoining the collec tion of state taxes when a remedy is available in state —————— This provision was originally codified at 49 U.S. C. (976 ed.). In 978, Congress recodified it at (976 ed., Supp. II), with slightly altered language but “without substantive change,” 92 Stat. 466. In 99, Congress again recodified the section without substantive change, this time at 49 U.S. C. This opinion refers to the statute’s current text. Cite as: 62 U. S. () 3 |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | statute’s current text. Cite as: 62 U. S. () 3 Opinion of the Court court. B Petitioner CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) is an inter state rail carrier that operates in Alabama and pays taxes there. Alabama imposes a sales tax of 4% on the gross receipts of retail businesses, –23–2() (0 Cum. Supp.), and a use tax of 4% on the storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property, (03). Railroads pay these taxes when they purchase or consume diesel fuel. But railroads’ main competitors— interstate motor and water carriers—are generally exempt from paying sales and use taxes on their fuel (although fuel for motor carriers is subject to a separate excise tax).3 Alleging that Alabama’s tax scheme discriminates against railroads in violation of (4) of the 4–R Act, CSX sued respondents, the Alabama Department of Revenue and its Commissioner (Alabama or State), in Federal District Court. In particular, CSX complained that the State could not impose sales and use taxes on railroads’ purchase and consumption of diesel fuel while —————— 2 The first sentence of subsection (c) provides: “Notwithstanding sec tion 34 of title 28 a district court of the United States has jurisdiction to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section.” The next sentence concerns the relief available for violations of §() and (2): “Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transpor tation property exceeds by at least percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.” 3 State law provides that motor carriers need not pay sales or use taxes on diesel fuel so long as they pay a different excise tax of $0.9 per gallon. –7–2() (03) (primary tax of $0.3 per gallon); (0 Cum. Supp.) (additional tax of $0.06 per gallon). State law wholly exempts interstate water carriers from sales and use taxes on diesel fuel. Nor do these water carriers pay any other tax on the fuel they purchase or consume. Brief for Respondents 6. 4 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court exempting motor and water carriers from those taxes. App. 22 (Complaint ¶26). The District Court dismissed CSX’s suit as not cogniza ble under the 4–R Act, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a brief per curiam decision. The Elev enth Circuit rested on its earlier decision in Norfolk R. Co. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 0 F.3d 306 (08), which involved a |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | Dept. of Revenue, 0 F.3d 306 (08), which involved a nearly identical challenge to the application of Alabama’s sales and use taxes. In Norfolk the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff railroad’s challenge, principally in reliance on this Court’s decision in Department of Revenue of In that case, we held that a railroad could not invoke (4) to chal lenge a generally applicable property tax on the basis that certain non-railroad property was exempt from the tax. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the case before it involved sales and use taxes—not property taxes, which the statutory scheme separately addresses. Norfolk The court concluded, how ever, that this difference was immaterial, and accordingly held that a railroad could not object to Alabama’s sales and use taxes simply because the State provides exemp tions from them. CSX petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Eleventh Circuit had misunderstood ACF Industries and noting a split of authority concerning whether railroads may bring a challenge under (4) to non-property taxes from which their competitors are exempt.4 We —————— 4 Compare Norfolk R. Co. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 0 F.3d 306, 36 (CA 08), and Atchison, T. & S. F. R. (rejecting a railroad’s challenge to a use tax that exempted motor carriers), with Burlington N., S. F. R. Co. v. Lohman, (entertaining a challenge to a sales and use tax that exempted rail carriers’ competitors), Burling Cite as: 62 U. S. () Opinion of the Court granted certiorari, 60 U. S. (0), and now reverse. II We begin, as in any case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute. Hardt v. Reliance Stan dard Life Ins. Co., 60 U. S. (0) (slip op., ). Section 0(b)(4) provides that a State may not “[i]mpose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.” CSX wishes to bring an action under this provi sion because rail carriers, but not motor or water carriers, must pay Alabama’s sales and use taxes on diesel fuel. To determine whether this suit may go forward, we must therefore answer two questions. Is CSX challenging “an other tax” within the meaning of the statute? And, if so, might that tax “discriminate” against rail carriers by exempting their competitors? —————— ton No. R. 8–9 (Minn. 00) (same), and Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Bair, 338 N.W. 2d 338, 348 (Iowa 983) (same). We consider here only questions relating to whether CSX can bring a claim for discrimination based on the State’s pattern of tax exemp tions. We do not consider any issues concerning whether these exemp |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | We do not consider any issues concerning whether these exemp tions actually discriminate against CSX. See infra, –9, and n. 8. Alabama has raised two such issues in this Court. First, Alabama contends that in deciding CSX’s claim, a federal court must consider not only the specific taxes challenged, but also the broader tax scheme. Brief for Respondents 8–60. Second, the State argues that the court must compare the taxation of CSX not merely to direct competitors but to other commercial entities as well. Most of the dissenting opinion is devoted to supporting the State’s argument on this second question. But we leave these and all other issues relating to whether Alabama actually has discriminated against CSX to the trial court on remand to address as and when it wishes. No court in this case has previously considered these questions, and the parties’ briefs in this Court have only sketchily addressed them. In addition, the parties dispute whether Alabama waived its claim on the second issue by initially agreeing that “the comparison class consists of motor carriers and water carriers,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a (internal quota tion marks omitted), and proceeding with the litigation on that basis. 6 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court An excise tax, like Alabama’s sales and use tax, is “an other tax” under subsection (b)(4).6 The 4–R Act does not define “tax”; nor does the statute otherwise place any matters within, or exclude any matters from, the term’s ambit. In these circumstances, we look to the word’s ordinary definition, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 3 U.S. 79, 87 (99), and we note what taxpayers have long since discovered—that the meaning of “tax” is expan sive. A State (or other governmental entity) seeking to raise revenue may choose among multiple forms of taxa tion on property, income, transactions, or activities. “[A]nother tax,” as used in subsection (b)(4), is best under stood to refer to all of these—more precisely, to encompass any form of tax a State might impose, on any asset or transaction, except the taxes on property previously ad dressed in subsections (b)()–(3). See Burlington Northern R. (Sub section (b)(4) includes “an income tax, a gross-receipts tax, a use tax, an occupation tax —whatever”). The phrase “another tax” is a catch-all. In particular, we see no reason to interpret subsection (b)(4) as applying only to the gross-receipts taxes—known as “in lieu” taxes—that some States imposed instead of property taxes at the time of the Act’s passage. See Brief for Respondents 3–; Brief for State of Washington et |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | Brief for Respondents 3–; Brief for State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae –22. The argument in favor of this construction relies on the House Report concerning —————— We think this question of waiver is also best considered by the trial court. 6 As originally enacted, the provision that is now 49 U.S. C. (4) prohibited the imposition of “any other tax” that discrimi nates against a railroad. (976 ed.). The substitution of “another tax” occurred when Congress first recodified the Act. In line with Congress’s statement that revisions made at that time should not be construed as having substantive effect, see n. we treat the two terms as synonymous. Cite as: 62 U. S. () 7 Opinion of the Court the bill, which described subsection (b)(4) as prohibiting “the imposition of the so-called ‘in lieu tax.’ ” H. R. Rep. No. 94–72, p. 77 (97). But the Conference Report on the final bill abandoned the House Report’s narrowing language and described the subsection as it was written— as prohibiting, without limitation, “the imposition of any other tax which results in the discriminatory treatment of any” railroad. S. Conf. Rep. No. 94–9, pp. 6–66 (976); accord, S. Rep. No. 94–499, p. 6 (97). And the statutory language is the real crux of the matter: Subsec tion (b)(4) speaks both clearly and broadly, and a legisla tive report misdescribing the provision cannot succeed in altering it.7 Nor do we agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s apparent view that CSX does not challenge “another tax” because its complaint relies on the exemptions the State has given. See Norfolk 0 F.3d, at 3 (“The language of section (b)(4) prohibits a discriminatory ‘tax’ not a dis criminatory tax exemption”); Brief for American Trucking Assns., Inc. as Amicus Curiae 9. What the complaint protests is Alabama’s imposition of taxes on the fuel CSX —————— 7 Alabama also invokes the remedial provision of subsection (c), n. 2, to urge that we read §0 as effectively limited to property or “in lieu” taxes. According to Alabama, that provision entitles federal courts to grant relief only when States overvalue railroad property under subsections (b)() and (b)(2): Federal courts, the State avers, “have no power to enjoin the granting of tax exemptions as a violation of subsection (b)(4), or, apparently [to remedy] any violation of sub- section (b)(4).” Brief for Respondents 37. But that interpretation of subsection (c)’s remedial provision cannot be right, because it would nullify subsection (b)(4) (and, for that matter, subsection (b)(3) as well). We understand subsection (c)’s remedial provision neither as limiting the broad grant |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | subsection (c)’s remedial provision neither as limiting the broad grant of jurisdiction to federal courts to prevent violations of subsection (b) nor as otherwise restricting the scope of that subsection. The remedial provision simply limits the availability of relief when a State discriminates in assessing the value of railroad property, as proscribed by subsections (b)() and (b)(2). That kind of discrimination is not at issue here. 8 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court uses; what the complaint requests is that Alabama cease to collect those taxes from CSX. App. 23. The exemptions, no doubt, play a central role in CSX’s argument: They demonstrate, in CSX’s view, that the State’s sales and use taxes discriminate against railroads. See ¶¶24– 26. But the essential subject of the complaint remains the taxes Alabama levies on CSX. The key question thus becomes whether a tax might be said to “discriminate” against a railroad under subsection (b)(4) because the State has granted exemptions from the tax to other entities (here, the railroad’s competitors). The statute does not define “discriminates,” and so we again look to the ordinary meaning of the word. See “Discrimination” is the “failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.” Black’s Law Dic tionary 34 ; accord, (th ed. 979); see also Webster’s Third New International Dic tionary 648 (976) (“discriminates” means “to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit”). To charge one group of taxpayers a 2% rate and another group a 4% rate, if the groups are the same in all relevant respects, is to discriminate against the latter. That discrimination continues (indeed, it increases) if the State takes the favored group’s rate down to 0%. And that is all an ex emption is. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 2 U.S. 86, –2 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judg ment) (noting that an “ ‘exemption’ from a ‘neutral’ tax” for favored persons “is no different in principle” than “a discriminatory tax imposing a higher liability” on disfavored persons). To say that such a tax (with such an exemption) does not “discriminate”—assuming the groups are similarly situated and there is no justification for the difference in treatment—is to adopt a definition of the term at odds with its natural meaning. Cite as: 62 U. S. () 9 Opinion of the Court In line with this understanding, our decisions have repeatedly recognized that tax schemes with exemptions may be discriminatory. In (989), |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | that tax schemes with exemptions may be discriminatory. In (989), for example, we reviewed a state income tax provision that exempted retirement benefits given by the State, but not those paid by the Federal Government. We held that the tax “discrimi nate[d]” against federal employees under 4 U.S. C. §, which serves to protect those employees from discrimina tory state taxation. Similarly, our dormant Commerce Clause cases have often held that tax exemptions given to local businesses discriminate against interstate actors. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, 268–269 (984) (holding that a state excise tax on alcohol “discriminate[d]” against interstate businesses because of exemptions granted to local producers); Camps New found/Owatonna, 88–89 (997) (invalidating as “discriminatory” a state property tax that exempted organizations operating for the benefit of residents, but not organizations aimed at nonresidents). And even our decision in ACF Industries, on which the Eleventh Circuit relied in dismissing CSX’s suit, made clear that tax exemptions “could be a variant of tax discrimination.” 0 U.S., Nor does the 4–R Act limit the prohibited discrimination to state tax schemes that unjustifiably exempt local actors, as opposed to interstate entities. Alabama argues for this result, claiming that is designed “to protect interstate carriers against discrimination vis-à-vis local businesses.” Brief for Respondents 29. But the text of tells a different story. Consistent with the Act’s purpose of restoring the financial stability of railroads (not of interstate carriers generally), at each of sub section (b)’s provisions proscribes taxes that specially burden a rail carrier’s property or otherwise discriminate against a rail carrier. And not a single provision of the 0 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court Act (including the references in subsections (b)()–(3) to “commercial and industrial property”) distinguishes be tween local and non-local taxpayers who receive favorable tax treatment. The distinctions drawn in are not between interstate and local actors, as the State con tends, but rather between railroads and other actors, whether interstate or local. Accordingly, a state excise tax that applies to railroads but exempts their interstate competitors is subject to challenge under subsection (b)(4) as a “tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.”8 —————— 8 This conclusion does not, as Alabama and the dissent contend, turn railroads into “most-favored-taxpayers,” entitled to any exemption (or other tax break) that a State gives to another entity. See Brief for Respondents 23; post, (opinion of THOMAS, J.). We hold only that (4) enables a railroad to challenge an excise or other non property tax as discriminatory on the basis of the tax scheme’s exemp tions—as the dissent apparently |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | basis of the tax scheme’s exemp tions—as the dissent apparently agrees, post, at Whether the railroad will prevail—that is, whether it can prove the alleged dis crimination—depends on whether the State offers a sufficient justifica tion for declining to provide the exemption at issue to rail carriers. See ; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2–26; Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Department of Taxation, Commonwealth of Va., 762 F.2d 37, 380–38, and n. 4 (CA4 98). So if, to use the dissent’s example, a railroad challenged a scheme in which “every person and business in the State of Alabama paid a $ annual tax, and one person was exempt,” post, for some reason having nothing to do with railroads, we presume the suit would be promptly dismissed. Nothing in this application of (4) offers a “windfall” to railroads. The dissent argues in addition that a State should prevail against any claim of discrimination brought under subsection (b)(4) if it can demonstrate that a tax does not “target” or “single out” a railroad, post, at ; that showing, without more, would justify the tax (although the dissent declines to say just what it means to “target,” post, at 7, n. 3). This argument primarily concerns the question whether Alabama’s tax scheme in fact discriminates under subsection (b)(4)—a question we have explained is inappropriate to address, see n. We note, however, that the dissent’s argument about subsection (b)(4) rests entirely on the premise that subsections (b)()–(3) prohibit only prop erty taxes that “target” or “single out” railroads, see post, at 4; so, the dissent would say, a State may impose a 4% property tax on railroads Cite as: 62 U. S. () Opinion of the Court III As against the plain language of subsection (b)(4), Ala bama offers two arguments based on our decision in ACF Industries. The first claim, which the Eleventh Circuit accepted, rests on the reasoning we adopted in ACF Indus tries: We concluded there that railroads could not chal lenge property tax exemptions under subsection (b)(4), and Alabama asserts that the same analysis applies to ex- cise (and other non-property) tax exemptions. The second contention focuses on alleged problems that would emerge in the application of if the rule of ACF Indus tries did not govern all tax exemptions. On this view, even if ACF Industries’ reasoning is irrelevant to cases involv ing excise taxes, its holding must extend to those cases to prevent inconsistent or anomalous results. We reject each of these arguments. We stand foursquare behind our decision in ACF Industries, but we |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | stand foursquare behind our decision in ACF Industries, but we will not extend it in the way the State wishes. A In ACF Industries, we considered whether a railroad could sue a State under subsection (b)(4) for taxing rail road property while exempting certain other commercial property. We held that the railroad could not do so. We noted that the language of subsection (b)(4), when viewed in isolation, could be read to allow such a challenge. But we reasoned that the structure of §0 required the opposite 0 U.S., The Eleventh Circuit —————— (assuming some unspecified number of other taxpayers also pay that rate) while levying only a 2% property tax on railroad competitors. But we have never decided, in ACF Industries or any other case, whether subsections (b)()–(3) should be interpreted in this manner. And even accepting the dissent’s unexplained premise, a serious question would remain about whether to transplant this construction of subsections (b)()–(3) to subsection (b)(4)’s very different terrain, see infra, at 6– 8. 2 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court considered ACF Industries “determinative” of the question here, Norfolk 0 F.3d, at 33, and Alabama agrees, Brief for Respondents 8. We think they misread that decision. We began our analysis in ACF Industries by explaining that railroads could not challenge property tax exemptions under subsections (b)()–(3)—the provisions of §0 specifically addressing property taxes. As noted earlier, subsections (b)()–(3) prohibit a State from imposing higher property tax rates or assessment ratios on “rail transportation property” than on “other commercial and industrial property.” The statute defines “commercial and industrial property” as including only “property subject to a property tax levy.” §0(a)(4). We interpreted that phrase to mean “property that is taxed,” rather than property that is potentially 0 U.S., at 34–342. As a result, we determined that exempt (i.e., non-taxed) property fell outside the category of “other commercial and industrial property” against which the taxation of railroad property is measured. The conclusion followed: Subsections (b)()–(3) permitted States to impose property taxes on railroads while exempting other entities. And because that was so, we stated, still another con clusion followed: Subsection (b)(4)’s prohibition on dis crimination likewise could not encompass property tax exemptions. We viewed this holding as a matter of simple deduction: “It would be illogical to con clude that Congress, having allowed the States to grant property tax exemptions in subsections (b)()–(3), would turn around and nullify its own choice in subsection (b)(4).” Or stated otherwise: “[R]eading subsection (b)(4) to prohibit what” other parts of the statute were “designed to allow,” |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | what” other parts of the statute were “designed to allow,” would “subvert the statutory plan” and “contravene the ‘elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.’ ” The structure of Cite as: 62 U. S. () 3 Opinion of the Court §0 thus compelled our conclusion that property tax exemptions—even if “a variant of tax discrimination,” —fell outside subsection (b)(4)’s reach. But this structural analysis—the core of ACF Indus tries—has no bearing on the question here. Subsections (b)()–(3) specifically address—and allow—property tax exemptions. But neither those subsections nor any other provision of the 4–R Act speaks to non-property tax ex emptions like those at issue in this case. Congress has expressed no intent to “allo[w] the States to grant” these exemptions. Reading subsection (b)(4) as written— to encompass non-property tax exemptions—therefore poses no danger of “nullify[ing]” a congressional policy choice or otherwise “subvert[ing] the statutory plan.” 343. To the contrary: Giving subsection (b)(4) something other than its ordinary meaning, absent any structural reason to do so, would itself contravene the expressed will of Congress. Implicitly acknowledging that ACF Industries’ central theory is irrelevant here, Alabama focuses on what that decision called “[o]ther considerations reinforc[ing]” its structural analysis. Most notably, Alabama underscores the following sentence from ACF Industries: “Given the prevalence of property tax exemptions when Congress enacted the 4–R Act, [§0’s] silence on the subject—in light of the explicit prohibition of tax rate and assessment ratio discrimination—reflects a determination to permit the States to leave their exemptions in place.” Alabama asserts that this statement “holds just as true” for sales and use taxes. Brief for Respon dents 4. That claim rings hollow. To be sure, ACF Industries noted that Congress had declined to speak “with any degree of particularity to” the permissibility of property tax exemptions, even though States often granted them. 0 U.S., But we thought that fact relevant only 4 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court because Congress had spoken with particularity in pro scribing other forms of discriminatory property taxes. The very sentence Alabama highlights makes our reasoning clear: Congress’s silence as to the practice of granting property tax exemptions reflected its acquiescence in that practice “in light of the explicit prohibition [in subsections (b)()–(3)] of [property] tax rate and assessment ratio discrimination.” If that explicit prohibition had not existed—if had consisted only of subsection (b)(4)’s broad ban on tax discrimination—we could not have gleaned what we did from congressional silence. After all, the very purpose of a catch-all provision like |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | After all, the very purpose of a catch-all provision like subsection (b)(4) is to avoid the necessity of listing each matter (here, each kind of tax discrimination) falling within it. And with respect to non property taxes (like Alabama’s sales and use taxes), sub section (b)(4) is all there is. So here again, our analysis in ACF Industries does not apply because it rested on subsec tions (b)()–(3)—that is, on the highly reticulated scheme in the 4–R Act relating solely to property taxes. Alabama also emphasizes our statement in ACF Indus tries that “ ‘[p]rinciples of federalism’ ” supported our hold ing, Brief for Respondents 4–43 (quoting 0 U.S., at 34), but this final effort to borrow from that decision’s analysis similarly fails. We indeed recognized in ACF Industries that the 4–R Act limits the traditional taxing power of the States. Because that is so, we expressed “hesitan[ce] to extend the statute beyond its evident scope.” 0 U.S., at 34. But here, for all the reasons already noted, we are not “extend[ing] the statute”; we are merely giving effect to its clear meaning. To reiterate: The 4–R Act distinguishes between property taxes and other taxes. Congress expressed its intent to insulate property tax exemptions from challenge; against that background, ACF Industries stated that permitting such suits would intrude on the States’ rightful authority. By contrast, Cite as: 62 U. S. () Opinion of the Court Congress drafted §0 to enable railroads to contest all other tax exemptions; and when Congress speaks in such preemptive terms, its decision must govern. Principles of federalism cannot narrow §0’s clear scope. See, e.g., CSX Transp., 2 U.S. 9, (rejecting the idea that federalism principles preclude challenges to state valuation method ologies when §0 “clearly authorized” such actions). Nothing in ACF Industries suggested otherwise. B Alabama additionally makes a subtler argument involv ing ACF Industries. Given that decision, Alabama con tends, a ruling in CSX’s favor here would create troubling inconsistencies. Alabama claims that subsection (b)(4)’s singular prohibition on “discriminat[ion]” would then mean one thing for property taxes (according to ACF Industries) and another for non-property taxes, even though nothing in the statute supports “morphing defini tions.” Brief for Respondents 32. And still worse than the difference in meaning would be the difference in result: A ruling for CSX, Alabama argues, would give railroads more protection against non-property taxes than against property taxes, even though no good reason exists for this distinction. Alabama’s one-word-two-meanings argument collapses because it again rests on a misunderstanding of ACF Industries. That decision did not define “discriminat[e]” or say that |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | Industries. That decision did not define “discriminat[e]” or say that a tax exemption could not fall within that term. Quite to the contrary: As noted earlier, ACF Industries frankly acknowledged that tax exemptions, including property tax exemptions, “could be a variant of tax dis crimination.” 0 U.S., ; We held that property tax exemptions were immune from challenge under subsection (b)(4) for structural, rather than linguis tic, reasons. Even assuming these exemptions “discrimi 6 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court nate[d],” they did so in a way that the specific provisions of §()–(3) allow, and accordingly (4)’s prohibition could not include them. That reasoning, once more, does not apply here, because subsections (b)()–(3) do not permit—indeed, in no way address—non-property tax exemptions. We therefore do not adopt a new defini tion of “discriminate” in this case; in the context of the 4–R Act, that word has, and has always had, just one meaning. What remains is Alabama’s complaint that a ruling in CSX’s favor, when combined with our decision in ACF Industries, will result in divergent treatment of property and non-property taxes. At times, Alabama dresses up this objection in Latin: It contends that the canon of ejus dem generis, which “limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified,” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 24, 28 (936), has a role to play in interpreting More particularly, Ala bama contends that this canon supports reading into (4) every limitation contained in §()– (3), including the exclusion of tax exemptions from the class of state actions subject to challenge. See Brief for Respondents 26–27. That interpretive move, Alabama rightly notes, would ensure equal treatment of property tax and non-property tax exemptions. But we think ejusdem generis is not relevant here. As an initial matter, subsection (b)(4), “[a]lthough something of a catchall, is not a general or collective term follow ing a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable (e.g., ‘fishing rods, nets, hooks, bobbers, sinkers, and other equipment’).” United States v. Aguilar, U.S. 93, 6 (99) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, that subsection is “one of several distinct and independent prohibitions.” Related to this structural point is a functional one. We typically use ejusdem generis to ensure that a general word will not render specific words meaningless. E.g., Cite as: 62 U. S. () 7 Opinion of the Court Circuit City Stores, 32 U.S. 0, 4– (0); see 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47:7 But that |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47:7 But that concern is absent here. Reading subsection (b)(4) to cover non-property tax exemptions will not deprive subsections (b)()–(3) of effect, because those subsections are ad dressed only to property taxes. A canon meaning literally “of the same kind” has no application to provisions di rected toward dissimilar subject matter. The better version of Alabama’s claim reads entirely in English; it is simply that distinguishing between property tax exemptions and other tax exemptions makes not a whit of sense. We are not much inclined to disagree. Neither CSX nor the United States as amicus curiae has offered a satisfying reason for why Congress drew this line—why in §()–(3) it barred challenges based on property tax exemptions, but then turned around in (4) to allow challenges based on, say, excise tax exemptions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–, 24–2. CSX, for example, has not presented any evidence that different tax exemptions posed different levels of threat to railroads’ financial stability. So even if Congress had a good reason for distinguishing between property and non-property tax exemptions, we acknowledge that it eludes us. But this admission does not take us far in Alabama’s direction. Even if the 4–R Act were ambiguous, we doubt we would interpret subsection (b)(4) to replicate each facet of subsections (b)()–(3). Treating property tax exemp tions and other tax exemptions equivalently might make sense, as Alabama argues. But so too might allowing railroads to challenge all taxes (property or non-property) that contain exemptions. After all, as we noted earlier, tax exemptions are an obvious form of tax discrimination. See –9. It is hardly self-evident why Congress would prohibit a State from charging a railroad a 4% tax and a competitor a 2% tax, but allow the State to charge 8 CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF REVENUE Opinion of the Court the railroad a 4% tax and the competitor nothing. The latter situation would frustrate the purposes of the Act even more than the former. In ACF Industries, we ac cepted that anomaly because the terms and structure of the Act demanded that we do so. But we could say no more in favor of the result than that it was “not so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.” 0 U.S., at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted). That was not a glowing recommendation, and we see no reason today to view the matter differently. Accordingly, even assuming that statutory ambiguity permitted us to do so, we would hesitate to extend the distinction between tax exemptions and differential |
Justice Kagan | 2,011 | 3 | majority | CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205202/csx-transportation-inc-v-alabama-dept-of-revenue/ | hesitate to extend the distinction between tax exemptions and differential tax rates in order to avoid a distinction between property and non-property taxes. That would seem a poor trade of statutory anomalies. In any event, and more importantly, the choice is not ours to make. Congress wrote the statute it wrote, and that statute draws a sharp line between property taxes and other taxes. Congress drafted §()–(3) to exclude tax exemptions from the sphere of prohibited property tax discrimination. But it drafted (4) more broadly, without any of the prior subsections’ limita tions, to proscribe other “tax[es] that discriminat[e],” including through the use of exemptions. That congres sional election settles this case. Alabama’s preference for symmetry cannot trump an asymmetrical statute. And its preference for the greatest possible latitude to levy taxes cannot trump Congress’s decision to restrict discrimina tory taxation of rail carriers. IV Our decision in this case is limited. We hold that CSX may challenge Alabama’s sales and use taxes as “tax[es] that discriminat[e] against rail carrier[s]” under (4). We do not address whether CSX should prevail in that challenge—whether, that is, Alabama’s Cite as: 62 U. S. () 9 Opinion of the Court taxes in fact discriminate against railroads by exempting interstate motor and water carriers. Alabama argues, in support of barring CSX’s challenge at the outset, that this inquiry into discrimination may pose difficulties. Brief for Respondents 3–37. We cannot deny that assertion, but neither can we respond to it by precluding CSX’s claim. Discrimination cases sometimes do raise knotty questions about whether and when dissimilar treatment is ade quately justified. In the context of the 4–R Act, those hard calls can arise when States charge different tax rates to different entities in a practice the statute specifically subjects to challenge. See (3). So too, difficult issues can emerge when, as here, States provide certain entities with tax exemptions. In either case, Congress has directed the federal courts to review a railroad’s challenge; and in either case, we would flout the congressional com mand were we to declare the matter beyond us. For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceed ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 62 U. S. () THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09– CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., PETITIONER v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ET AL. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,008 | 5 | majority | Burgess v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145816/burgess-v-united-states/ | For certain federal drug offenses, the Controlled Substances Act mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for 10 years. (b)(1)(A). That minimum doubles to 20 years for defendants previously convicted of a "felony drug offense." The question in this case is whether a state drug offense classified as a misdemeanor, but punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, is a "felony drug offense" as that term is used in 841(b)(1)(A). Two statutory definitions figure in our decision. Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term "felony" to mean any "offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony." Section 802(44) defines the compound term "felony drug offense" to mean an offense involving specified drugs that is "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country." The term "felony drug offense" contained in 841(b)(1)(A)'s provision for a 20-year minimum sentence, we hold, is defined exclusively by 802(44) and does not incorporate 802(13)'s definition of "felony." A state drug offense punishable by more than one year therefore qualifies as a "felony drug offense," even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. I Petitioner Keith Lavon Burgess pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846.[1] A *1576 violation of 841(a) involving that quantity of cocaine base ordinarily carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. 841(b)(1)(A). The minimum sentence increases to 20 years, however, if the crime follows a prior conviction for a "felony drug offense." Burgess had previously been convicted of possessing cocaine in violation of S.C.Code Ann. 44-53-3(c) and (d)(1) Although that offense carried a maximum sentence of two years' imprisonment, South Carolina classified it as a misdemeanor. 44-53-3(d)(1). Burgess' prior South Carolina conviction, the Government urged, raised the minimum sentence for his federal conviction to 20 years. The enhancement was mandatory, the Government maintained, because Congress defined "felony drug offense" to include state cocaine offenses "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 21 U.S.C. 802(44).[2] Burgess contested the enhancement of his federal sentence. The term "felony drug offense," he argued, incorporates the term "felony," a word separately defined in 802(13) to mean "any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony." A prior drug offense does not rank as a "felony drug offense," he contended, unless it is (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,008 | 5 | majority | Burgess v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145816/burgess-v-united-states/ | as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per 802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, per 802(44). Rejecting Burgess' argument, the District Court ruled that 802(44) alone controls the meaning of "felony drug offense" as that term is used in 841(b)(1)(A). Although the District Court's ruling subjected Burgess to a 20-year minimum sentence, the Government moved for a downward departure based on Burgess' substantial assistance in another prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) ( ed., Supp. V). The court granted the motion and sentenced Burgess to 156 months' imprisonment followed by ten years' supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The "`commonsense way to interpret "felony drug offense,"'" that court said, "`is by reference to the definition in 802(44).'" The Fourth Circuit found nothing in the "plain language or statutory scheme. to indicate that Congress intended `felony drug offense' also to incorporate the definition [of `felony'] in 802(13)." 478 F.3d, at Burgess, proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of certiorari. We granted the writ, 5 U.S. to resolve a split among the Circuits on the question Burgess presents: Does a drug crime classified as a misdemeanor by state law, but punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, rank as a "felony drug offense" under (b)(1)(A)? Compare (case below), and ( 802(44) provides exclusive definition of "felony drug offense"), with United (C.A.D.C.2005) (both 802(13) and 802(44) limit meaning of "felony drug offense"). *1577 II A The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., contains two definitions central to the dispute before us; they bear repetition in full. Section 802(13) provides: "The term `felony' means any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony." Section 802(44) states: "The term `felony drug offense' means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances." Burgess argues here, as he did below, that "felony drug offense," as used in 841(b)(1)(A), should be construed to incorporate both the definition of "felony" in 802(13) and the definition of "felony drug offense" in 802(44). Under his reading, the 841(b)(1)(A) enhancement is triggered only when the prior conviction is both "classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony," 802(13), and "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," 802(44). The Government, in contrast, reads 802(44) to provide the exclusive definition of "felony drug |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,008 | 5 | majority | Burgess v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145816/burgess-v-united-states/ | reads 802(44) to provide the exclusive definition of "felony drug offense." Under the Government's reading, all defendants whose prior drug crimes were punishable by more than one year in prison would be subject to the 841(b)(1)(A) enhancement, regardless of the punishing jurisdiction's classification of the offense. The Government's reading, we are convinced, correctly interprets the statutory text and context. Section 802(44) defines the precise phrase used in 841(b)(1)(A)"felony drug offense." "Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words in the usual case." See also ; 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47:7, pp. 298-299, and nn. 2-3 (hereinafter Singer). The CSA, to be sure, also defines the term "felony." The language and structure of the statute, however, indicate that Congress used the phrase "felony drug offense" as a term of art defined by 802(44) without reference to 802(13). First, Congress stated that "[t]he term `felony drug offense' means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 802(44) "As a rule, [a] definition which declares what a term `means' excludes any meaning that is not stated." See also ; 2A Singer 47:7, p. 306, and n. 20. Second, the term "felony" is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3559(a) ; Black's Law Dictionary 651 (8th ed.2004) (defining "felony" as "[a] serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death"). Section 802(44)'s definition of "felony drug offense" as "an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," in short, leaves no blank to be *1578 filled by 802(13) or any other definition of "felony." Third, if Congress wanted "felony drug offense" to incorporate the definition of "felony" in 802(13), it easily could have written 802(44) to state: "The term `felony drug offense' means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year" See 459 F.3d, at Congress has often used that drafting techniquei.e., repeating a discretely defined wordwhen it intends to incorporate the definition of a particular word into the definition of a compound expression. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1672(a)-(b) (defining "earnings" and then defining "disposable earnings" as "that part of the earnings" meeting certain criteria); 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(3)-(4) (defining "transaction" and then defining "financial transaction" as "a transaction which" meets other criteria); (1), (5) ( ed. and Supp. V) (defining "racketeering activity" and then defining "pattern of racketeering activity" to require "at least two acts of racketeering activity").[3] Fourth, our reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both 21 U.S.C. 802(13) and |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,008 | 5 | majority | Burgess v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145816/burgess-v-united-states/ | anomalies that would arise if both 21 U.S.C. 802(13) and 802(44) governed application of the sentencing enhancement in 841(b)(1)(A). Notably, 802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by more than one year, while 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses. Incorporation of 802(13) into 841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in 802(44)'s definition of "felony drug offense." Furthermore, some States and many foreign jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-4 (West 2005); Me. Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. -A, 12 ; Brief for United States 35. Burgess' compound definition of "felony drug offense" leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in those jurisdictions. See, e.g., United No such uncertainty arises under the precise definition Congress provided in 802(44). Finally, reading 802(44) as the exclusive definition of "felony drug offense" hardly renders 802(13) extraneous. Section 802(13) serves to define "felony" for many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. See, e.g., 824(a)(2) (revocation of license to manufacture controlled substances upon conviction of a felony), 843(b) (use of a communication facility to commit a felony), 843(d)(1)-(2) (sentencing enhancements), 843(e) (prohibition on engaging in transactions involving listed chemicals upon conviction of a felony involving those chemicals), 848(c)(1) (definition of "continuing criminal enterprise"), 848(e)(1)(B) (mandatory minimum term for killing a law enforcement officer to avoid prosecution for a felony), 853(d) (rebuttable presumption that property acquired during commission of certain felonies is subject to criminal forfeiture), 878(a)(3) (authority to make warrantless arrest where there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed). B The drafting history of the CSA reinforces our reading of 802(44) as the exclusive definition of "felony drug offense." In 1988, Congress first used the term "felony drug offense" to describe the type of prior conviction that would trigger a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under 841(b)(1)(A). See National Narcotics Leadership Act, Pub.L. 100-690, 64(a), The 1988 definition of the term was placed within 841(b)(1)(A) itself; the definition covered "an offense that is a felony under any Federal law. or any law of a State or a foreign country" prohibiting or restricting conduct relating to certain types of drugs. 64(a)(2), [4] But in Congress amended the definition, replacing "an offense that is a felony under any law of a State," with "an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of a State," Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub.L. 103-322, 90105(c)-(d), 108 Stat.1988 In lieu of incorporation within 841(b)(1)(A), the new definition was placed in a discrete 802 definition section. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,008 | 5 | majority | Burgess v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145816/burgess-v-united-states/ | new definition was placed in a discrete 802 definition section. This alteration lends considerable support to our reading of the statute. Before the definition of "felony drug offense" depended on the vagaries of state-law classifications of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. The amendments replaced that definition with a uniform federal standard based on the authorized length of imprisonment. By recognizing 802(44) as the exclusive definition of "felony drug offense," our reading serves an evident purpose of the revision: to *1580 bring a measure of uniformity to the application of 841(b)(1)(A) by eliminating disparities based on divergent state classifications of offenses. By contrast, Burgess reads the alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition that already requiredand, he contends, continues to requiredesignation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction. That view, however, is difficult to square with Congress' deletion of the word "felony" and substitution of the phrase "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." If Burgess were correct, moreover, the sole effect of the change would have been to exclude from the compass of 841(b)(1)(A) the few drug offenses classified as felonies under the law of the punishing jurisdiction but subject to a sentence of one year or less. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-8.[5] See also Brief for Petitioner 15 (purpose of alteration was to eliminate enhancement for "truly minor offenses" nonetheless classified as felonies). Burgess concedes that under his reading of the statute "the language that Congress added [in ] has very little practical effect," but defends his interpretation on the ground that Congress labeled the changes "conforming amendments." Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. See also ; Brief for Petitioner 12. Burgess places more weight on the "Conforming Amendments" caption than it can bear. Congress did not disavow any intent to make substantive changes; rather, the amendments were "conforming" because they harmonized sentencing provisions in the CSA and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. 951 et seq. Treating the amendments as nonsubstantive would be inconsistent with their text, not to mention Burgess' own view that 802(44) added a new length-of-imprisonment requirement to the definition of "felony drug offense." In sum, the alteration replaced a patchwork of state and foreign classifications with a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. Burgess' argument that Congress added somethingthe definition now in 802(44)but subtracted nothing encounters formidable impediments: the text and history of the statute. C Burgess urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determining whether the term "felony drug offense" incorporates 802(13)'s definition of "felony." "[T]he touchstone |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134731/bedroc-limited-llc-v-united-states/ | The question here is whether sand and gravel are "valuable minerals" reserved to the United States in land grants issued under the Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919 (Pittman Act or Act), ch. 77, We hold they are not. Beginning with the Homestead Act of 182, ch. 75, and stretching into the early 20th century, Congress enacted a series of land-grant statutes aimed at settling the American frontier. One of these was the Pittman Act. That Act sought to succeed where earlier homestead laws had failed: promoting development and population growth in the State of Nevada. H. R. Rep. No. 28, th Cong., 1st *179 Sess., 2 (1919).[1] It was thought that Nevada's lack of surface water resources was hindering its agricultural progress. After rejecting various proposals to directly fund exploration for underground water, Congress enacted the Pittman Act to encourage private citizens to prospect for water in Nevada. Nevada lies in the heart of the Great Basin, that part of the United States lying roughly between the Sierra Nevada Range on the west and the Wasatch and other mountain ranges on the east. The western face of the Sierra Nevada blocks rain-bearing winds off the Pacific Ocean from reaching the Great Basin, forming a rain shadow over the entire region. Nevada has, on the average, less precipitation than any other State in the Union. This is one reason why most of its rivers, instead of eventually flowing into the sea, disappear into "sinks." 5 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 2 (15th ed. 1985); Department of Agriculture Yearbook, Climate and Man 987-988 (191) ). The Pittman Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to designate certain "nonmineral" lands[2] in Nevada, on which settlers could obtain permits to drill for water. 1-2, -29. Any settler who could demonstrate successful irrigation of at least 20 acres of crops was eligible for a land grant, or patent, of up to 0 acres. 5, Of central importance here, each patent issued under the Act was required to contain "a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other valuable minerals in the lands, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same." 8, By virtue of this *180 reservation, the United States was free to dispose of the "coal and other valuable mineral deposits in such lands" in accordance with "the provisions of the coal and mineral land laws in force at the time of such disposal." The Pittman Act failed to significantly advance agricultural development in Nevada, S. Rep. No. 1282, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (19), and Congress |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134731/bedroc-limited-llc-v-united-states/ | No. 1282, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (19), and Congress repealed it in 19, Stat. 389. The repealing legislation, however, expressly reserved the rights of existing patentees. Two such patentees, Newton and Mabel Butler, were the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners in this case. In 190, the Butlers obtained a patent for 50 acres of land in Lincoln County, some 5 miles north of Las Vegas. As required by the Act, the patent reserved the "coal and other valuable minerals" to the United States. Common sand and gravel were plentiful and visible on the surface of the Butlers' land, but there was no commercial market for them due to Nevada's sparse population and the land's remote location. App. 10, 11. Earl Williams acquired the Butler property in 1993. By that time, the expansion of Las Vegas had created a commercial market for the sand and gravel on the land. Shortly after Williams began extracting the sand and gravel, however, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) served him with trespass notices pursuant to 3 CFR 9239.0-7 (1993) When Williams challenged the notices, the BLM ruled that by removing sand and gravel Williams had trespassed against the Government's reserved interest in the "valuable minerals" on the property. The Interior Board of Land Appeals affirmed that decision. Earl Williams, 10 I. B. L. A. 295 (1997). Meanwhile, petitioner BedRoc Limited, LLC (BedRoc), acquired the Butler property from Williams in 1995.[3]*181 BedRoc continued to remove sand and gravel under an interim agreement with the Department of the Interior, pending final resolution of the ownership dispute. Petitioners filed an action in the United States District Court seeking to quiet title to the sand and gravel on the Butler property. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government, holding that the contested sand and gravel are "valuable minerals" reserved to the United States by the Pittman Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying primarily on the legislative history of the Pittman Act and our decision in We granted certiorari, and now reverse. In Western we construed the mineral reservation in the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 191 (SRHA), 3 U.S. C. 291 et seq. "the most important land-grant statut[e] enacted in the early 1900's." Unlike the Pittman Act, the SRHA was not limited to Nevada; it applied to any "public lands" the Secretary of the Interior designated as "`stock-raising lands.'" 3 U.S. C. 291 (197 ed.) (repealed by Stat. 2787). A person could obtain a patent under the SRHA if he resided on stockraising lands for three years, 291, and |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134731/bedroc-limited-llc-v-united-states/ | he resided on stockraising lands for three years, 291, and "ma[de] permanent improvements upon the land tending to increase the value of the [land] for stock-raising purposes," 293 (repealed by Stat. 2787). The SRHA's mineral reservation was identical to the Pittman Act's in every respect, save one: Whereas the SRHA reserved to the United States "all the coal and other minerals," 299 (2000 ed.), the Pittman Act reserved "all the coal and other valuable minerals," 8, The question before us in Western was "whether gravel found on lands patented under the [SRHA] is a mineral reserved to the United States." A *182 closely divided Court held that it is. After determining that "neither the dictionary nor the legal understanding of the term `minerals' that prevailed in 191 sheds much light on the question before us," we turned to the purpose and history of the SRHA. We observed that the SRHA, like other land-grant Acts containing mineral reservations, sought to "facilitate development of both surface and subsurface resources." We therefore reasoned that "the determination of whether a particular substance is included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of the surface estate that Congress contemplated." Accordingly, we interpreted the SRHA's mineral reservation to include "substances that are mineral in character (i. e., that are inorganic), that can be removed from the soil, that can be used for commercial purposes, and that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be included in the surface estate." Because we thought it unlikely that Congress would have made the exploitation of gravel deposits dependent on farmers and ranchers "whose interests were known to lie elsewhere," and because gravel met our other criteria, we concluded that it is indeed a "mineral" reserved to the United States.[] The Government argues that our rationale in Western compels the outcome in this case, notwithstanding the Pittman Act's seemingly narrower reservation of "valuable" minerals. Petitioners, for their part, argue that Western *183 should be distinguished on this ground or, in the alternative, overruled altogether. While we share the concerns expressed in the Western dissent, see n. we decline to overrule our recent precedent. By the same token, we will not extend Western 's holding to conclude that sand and gravel are "valuable minerals." Whatever the correctness of Western 's broad construction of the term "minerals," we are not free to so expansively interpret the Pittman Act's reservation. In Western we had no choice but to speculate about congressional intent with respect to the scope of the amorphous term "minerals." |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134731/bedroc-limited-llc-v-united-states/ | with respect to the scope of the amorphous term "minerals." Here, by contrast, Congress has textually narrowed the scope of the term by using the modifier "valuable."[5] The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to "presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat. 503 U.S. 29, 253-25 Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous. 50 U.S. 52, 53 (200); Hartford Ins. ; Hughes Aircraft 525 U.S. 32, 38 ; Connecticut Nat. at 25. We think the term "valuable" makes clear that Congress did not intend *18 to include sand and gravel in the Pittman Act's mineral reservation. "In interpreting statutory mineral reservations like the one at issue here, we have emphasized that Congress `was dealing with a practical subject in a practical way' and that it intended the terms of the reservation to be understood in `their ordinary and popular sense.'" Amoco Production 52 U.S. 85, (quoting 23 U.S. 9, 79 (191)). Importantly, the proper inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the reservation at the time Congress enacted it. Amoco Production at 87; Leo Sheep v. United States, 0 U.S. 8, 82 ; see also U.S. 37, 2 Because the Pittman Act applied only to Nevada, the ultimate question is whether the sand and gravel found in Nevada were commonly regarded as "valuable minerals" in 1919. Common sense tells us, and the Government does not contest, that the answer to that question is an emphatic "No." Sand and gravel were, and are, abundant throughout Nevada; they have no intrinsic value; and they were commercially worthless in 1919 due to Nevada's sparse population and lack of development.[] Thus, even if Nevada's sand and gravel were regarded as minerals, no one would have mistaken them for valuable minerals. The Government argues only that sand and gravel were commercially marketable in other parts of the United States during World War I and that there is now a market for sand and gravel in some parts of Nevada. As we have explained, this evidence is simply *185 irrelevant to the proper inquiry into the meaning of the statutory mineral reservation. Cf. Amoco Production 52 U. S., at -880 Because we readily conclude that the "most natural interpretation" of the mineral reservation does not encompass sand and gravel, we "need not consider the applicability of the canon that ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the sovereign." The statutory context of the Pittman Act's mineral reservation |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134731/bedroc-limited-llc-v-united-states/ | sovereign." The statutory context of the Pittman Act's mineral reservation further confirms its ordinary meaning. The sentence directly following the reservation provides that the reserved "valuable mineral deposits shall be subject to disposal by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the mineral land laws in force at the time of such disposal." 8, Here, Congress was explicitly cross-referencing the General Mining Act of 1872, currently codified at Rev. Stat. 2319, 30 U.S. C. 22. Then, as now, the General Mining Act provided that "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States shall be free and open to exploration and purchase under regulations prescribed by law." We can therefore infer that the reserved "valuable minerals" in Pittman Act lands were the same class of minerals that could be located and disposed of under the General Mining Act. Cf. Western 2 U. S., at 59 It is beyond dispute that when the Pittman Act became law in 1919, common sand and gravel could not constitute a locatable "valuable mineral deposit" under the General Mining Act. The Secretary of the Interior had held as much in Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Lans. Ch. D. 310 (1910), see Western at 5 ; 2 U.S., at 3-5 (same), and this remained the Department's position until 1929, when it overruled Zimmerman *18 in Layman v. Ellis, 52 Lans. Ch. D. 71, see, e. g., Western at 5-9 ; Robert L. Beery, 83 I. D. 29, 253 (197) ("Prior to 1929 sand and gravel were not considered locatable under the general mining law").[7] Thus, in the unlikely event that some ambitious prospector had sought a patent from the United States in 1919 to extract sand and gravel from Pittman Act lands, the Secretary of the Interior would have flatly refused him. The Government is correct that the Western Court sidestepped the impact of this line of reasoning by relying on the ambiguity of the term "minerals" and the possibility that Congress was not aware of Interior's Zimmerman decision, see 2 U.S., at 5-7. But we decline to extend that approach beyond the SRHA. In our analysis, the statutory structure of the Pittman Act convincingly reinforces the unambiguous meaning of the term "valuable minerals." Notwithstanding the contemporaneous plain meaning of the Pittman Act's mineral reservation, the Government argues that the Act's legislative history counsels us to give "valuable minerals" precisely the same meaning we ascribed to "minerals" in Western Because we have held that the text of the statutory reservation clearly excludes sand and gravel, we have no occasion to resort to legislative |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | concurring | Bob Jones Univ. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110938/bob-jones-univ-v-united-states/ | I join the Court's judgment, along with Part III of its opinion holding that the denial of tax exemptions to petitioners does not violate the First Amendment. I write separately because I am troubled by the broader implications of the Court's opinion with respect to the authority of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and its construction of 170(c) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. I Federal taxes are not imposed on organizations "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes" 26 U.S. C. 501(c)(3). The Code also permits a tax deduction for contributions made to these organizations. 170(c). It is clear that petitioners, organizations incorporated for educational purposes, fall within the language of the statute. It also is clear that the language itself does not mandate refusal of tax-exempt status to any private school that maintains a racially discriminatory admissions policy. Accordingly, there is force in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's argument that 170(c) and 501(c)(3) should be construed as setting forth the only criteria Congress has established for qualification as a tax-exempt organization. See post, at 612-615 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Indeed, were we writing prior to the history detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the construction I would adopt. But there has been a decade of acceptance that is persuasive in the circumstances of these cases, and I conclude that there are now sufficient reasons for accepting the IRS's construction of the Code as proscribing *607 tax exemptions for schools that discriminate on the basis of race as a matter of policy. I cannot say that this construction of the Code, adopted by the IRS in 1970 and upheld by the Court of Appeals below, is without logical support. The statutory terms are not self-defining, and it is plausible that in some instances an organization seeking a tax exemption might act in a manner so clearly contrary to the purposes of our laws that it could not be deemed to serve the enumerated statutory purposes.[1] And, as the Court notes, if any national policy is sufficiently fundamental to constitute such an overriding limitation on the availability of tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3), it is the policy against racial discrimination in education. See ante, at 595-596. Finally, and of critical importance for me, the subsequent actions of Congress present "an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the [IRS's] 1970 and 1971 rulings" with respect to racially discriminatory schools. Ante, at 599. In particular, Congress' enactment of 501(i) in 1976 is strong evidence of agreement with these particular IRS |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | concurring | Bob Jones Univ. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110938/bob-jones-univ-v-united-states/ | 1976 is strong evidence of agreement with these particular IRS rulings.[2] *608 II I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that tax-exempt status under 170(c) and 501(c)(3) is not available to private schools that concededly are racially discriminatory. I do not agree, however, with the Court's more general explanation of the justifications for the tax exemptions provided to charitable organizations. The Court states: "Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption under 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred." Ante, at 591-592 (footnotes omitted). Applying this test to petitioners, the Court concludes that "[c]learly an educational institution engaging in practices affirmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole Government cannot be seen as exercising a `beneficial and stabilizing influenc[e] in community life,' and is not `charitable,' within the meaning of 170 and 501(c)(3)." Ante, at 598-599 ). With all respect, I am unconvinced that the critical question in determining tax-exempt status is whether an individual organization provides a clear "public benefit" as defined by the Court. Over 106,000 organizations filed 501(c)(3) returns in 1981. Internal Revenue Service, 1982 Exempt *609 Organization/Business Master File. I find it impossible to believe that all or even most of those organizations could prove that they "demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the public interest" or that they are "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life." Nor am I prepared to say that petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory policies, necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the community. It is clear from the substantially secular character of the curricula and degrees offered that petitioners provide educational benefits. Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity that appears to inform the Court's analysis. The Court asserts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a purpose that comports with "the common community conscience," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole Government." Taken together, these passages suggest that the primary function |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | concurring | Bob Jones Univ. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110938/bob-jones-univ-v-united-states/ | Government." Taken together, these passages suggest that the primary function of a tax-exempt organization is to act on behalf of the Government in carrying out governmentally approved policies. In my opinion, such a view of 501(c)(3) ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, private, nonprofit groups receive tax exemptions because "each group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." Walz, Far from representing an effort to reinforce any perceived "common community conscience," the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.[3] *610 Given the importance of our tradition of pluralism,[4] "[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice for private philanthropy is very great." I do not suggest that these considerations always are or should be dispositive. Congress, of course, may find that some organizations do not warrant tax-exempt status. In these cases I agree with the Court that Congress has determined that the policy against racial discrimination in education should override the countervailing interest in permitting unorthodox private behavior. *611 I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am unwilling to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to produce revenue for the Government, not to promote "public policy." As former IRS Commissioner has noted, questions concerning religion and civil rights "are far afield from the more typical tasks of tax administrators determining taxable income." Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 Catholic Lawyer 301 (1978). This Court often has expressed concern that the scope of an agency's authorization be limited to those areas in which the agency fairly may be said to have expertise,[5] and this concern applies with special force when the asserted administrative power is one to determine the scope of public policy. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has noted: "[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating *612 at the time but application of our tax laws should not operate in so fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in the first instance |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 entitles foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of courts in the United States, 28 U.S. C. 1604, subject to certain enumerated exceptions. 1605. One is that a foreign state shall not be immune in any case "in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state." 1605(a)(2). We hold that respondents' action alleging personal injury resulting from unlawful detention and torture by the Saudi Government is not "based upon a commercial activity" within the meaning of the Act, which consequently confers no jurisdiction over respondents' suit. I Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss the complaint, we assume that we have truthful factual allegations before us, see United though many of those allegations are subject to dispute, see Brief for Petitioners n. ; see also n. 1, infra. Petitioner Kingdom of Saudi Arabia owns and operates petitioner King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh, as well as petitioner Royspec Purchasing Services, the hospital's corporate purchasing agent in the United States. App. 91. The Hospital Corporation of America, Ltd. (HCA), an independent corporation existing under the laws of the Cayman Islands, recruits Americans for employment at the hospital *52 under an agreement signed with Saudi Arabia in 197. In its recruitment effort, HCA placed an advertisement in a trade periodical seeking applications for a position as a monitoring systems engineer at the hospital. The advertisement drew the attention of respondent Scott Nelson in September 198, while Nelson was in the United States. After interviewing for the position in Saudi Arabia, Nelson returned to the United States, where he signed an employment contract with the hospital, satisfied personnel processing requirements, and attended an orientation session that HCA conducted for hospital employees. In the course of that program, HCA identified Royspec as the point of contact in the United States for family members who might wish to reach Nelson in an emergency. In December 198, Nelson went to Saudi Arabia and began work at the hospital, monitoring all "facilities, equipment, utilities and maintenance systems to insure the safety of patients, hospital staff, and others." He did his job without significant incident until March 1984, when he discovered safety defects in the hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide lines that posed fire hazards and otherwise endangered patients' lives. Over a period of several months, Nelson repeatedly advised hospital officials of the safety defects and reported the defects to a Saudi Government commission as well. -5. Hospital officials instructed Nelson to ignore the problems. The |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | -5. Hospital officials instructed Nelson to ignore the problems. The hospital's response to Nelson's reports changed, however, on September 27, 1984, when certain hospital employees summoned him to the hospital's security office where agents of the Saudi Government arrested him.[1] The agents *5 transported Nelson to a jail cell, in which they "shackled, tortured and bea[t]" him, and kept him four days without food, 9. Although Nelson did not understand Arabic, government agents forced him to sign a statement written in that language, the content of which he did not know; a hospital employee who was supposed to act as Nelson's interpreter advised him to sign "anything" the agents gave him to avoid further beatings. Two days later, government agents transferred Nelson to the Al Sijan Prison "to await trial on unknown charges." At the prison, Nelson was confined in an overcrowded cell area infested with rats, where he had to fight other prisoners for food and from which he was taken only once a week for fresh air and exercise. Although police interrogators repeatedly questioned him in Arabic, Nelson did not learn the nature of the charges, if any, against him. For several days, the Saudi Government failed to advise Nelson's family of his whereabouts, though a Saudi official eventually told Nelson's wife, respondent Vivian Nelson, that he could arrange for her husband's release if she provided sexual favors. Although officials from the United States Embassy visited Nelson twice during his detention, they concluded that his allegations of Saudi mistreatment were "not credible" and made no protest to Saudi authorities. It was only at the personal request of a United States Senator that the Saudi Government released Nelson, 9 days after his arrest, on November 5, 1984. Seven days later, after failing to convince him to return to work at the hospital, the Saudi Government allowed Nelson to leave the country. -61. In Nelson and his wife filed this action against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking damages for personal injury. The Nelsons' complaint sets out 16 causes of action, which fall into three categories. Counts II through VII and counts X, XI, XIV, and XV allege that petitioners committed various *54 intentional torts, including battery, unlawful detainment, wrongful arrest and imprisonment, false imprisonment, inhuman torture, disruption of normal family life, and infliction of mental anguish. Counts I, IX, and XIII charge petitioners with negligently failing to warn Nelson of otherwise undisclosed dangers of his employment, namely, that if he attempted to report safety hazards the hospital would likely retaliate against |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | to report safety hazards the hospital would likely retaliate against him and the Saudi Government might detain and physically abuse him without legal cause. -6, 14, 18-19. Finally, counts VIII, XII, and XVI allege that Vivian Nelson sustained derivative injury resulting from petitioners' actions. Presumably because the employment contract provided that Saudi courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over claims for breach of contract, 7, the Nelsons raised no such matters. The District Court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S. C. 10, 1602 et seq. It rejected the Nelsons' argument that jurisdiction existed, under the first clause of 1605(a)(2), because the action was one "based upon a commercial activity" that petitioners had "carried on in the United States." Although HCA's recruitment of Nelson in the United States might properly be attributed to Saudi Arabia and the hospital, the District Court reasoned, it did not amount to commercial activity "carried on in the United States" for purposes of the Act. The court explained that there was no sufficient "nexus" between Nelson's recruitment and the injuries alleged. "Although [the Nelsons] argu[e] that but for [Scott Nelson's] recruitment in the United States, he would not have taken the job, been arrested, and suffered the personal injuries," the court said, "this `connection' [is] far too tenuous to support jurisdiction" under the Act. Likewise, the court concluded that Royspec's commercial activity in the United States, purchasing supplies and equipment for the hospital, at *55 9-94, had no nexus with the personal injuries alleged in the complaint; Royspec had simply provided a way for Nelson's family to reach him in an emergency, The Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that Nelson's recruitment and hiring were commercial activities of Saudi Arabia and the hospital, carried on in the United States for purposes of the Act, and that the Nelsons' action was "based upon" these activities within the meaning of the statute, 156. There was, the court reasoned, a sufficient nexus between those commercial activities and the wrongful acts that had allegedly injured the Nelsons: "the detention and torture of Nelson are so intertwined with his employment at the Hospital," the court explained, "that they are `based upon' his recruitment and hiring" in the United States. The court also found jurisdiction to hear the claims against Royspec.[2] After the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' suggestion for rehearing en banc, App. 1, we granted certiorari, We now reverse. II The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country." Argentine Under the Act, a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state. Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of ; see 28 U.S. C. 1604; J. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations 11, and n. 64 *56 Only one such exception is said to apply here. The first clause of 1605(a)(2) of the Act provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts in any case "in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state."[] The Act defines such activity as "commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the United States," 160(e), and provides that a commercial activity may be "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act," the "commercial character of [which] shall be determined by reference to" its "nature," rather than its "purpose," 160(d). There is no dispute here that Saudi Arabia, the hospital, and Royspec all qualify as "foreign state[s]" within the meaning of the Act. Brief for Respondents ; see 28 U.S. C. 160(a), (b) (term "`foreign state' " includes "`an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' "). For there to be jurisdiction in this case, therefore, the Nelsons' action must be "based upon" some "commercial activity" by petitioners that had "substantial contact" with the United States within the meaning of the Act. Because we conclude that the suit is not based upon any commercial activity by petitioners, we need not reach the issue of substantial contact with the United States. We begin our analysis by identifying the particular conduct on which the Nelsons' action is "based" for purposes of the Act. See Texas Trading & Milling cert. denied, ; Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, Although the Act contains no definition of the phrase "based upon," and the relatively sparse legislative history offers no assistance, guidance is hardly necessary. In denoting conduct that forms the "basis," or "foundation," for a claim, see Black's Law Dictionary 151 (defining "base"); Random House Dictionary 172 (2d ed. 1987) (same); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 180, 181 (defining "base" and "based"), the phrase is read most naturally to mean those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case. See ; accord, ; Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for North American Affairs, 272 U. S. App. D. C. 240, 246, What the natural meaning of the phrase "based upon" suggests, the context confirms. Earlier, see n. we noted that 1605(a)(2) contains two clauses following the one at issue here. The second allows for jurisdiction where a suit "is based upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere," and the third speaks in like terms, allowing for jurisdiction where an action "is based upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States." Distinctions among descriptions juxtaposed against each other are naturally understood to be significant, see Melkonyan v. Sulli- *58 van, and Congress manifestly understood there to be a difference between a suit "based upon" commercial activity and one "based upon" acts performed "in connection with" such activity. The only reasonable reading of the former term calls for something more than a mere connection with, or relation to, commercial activity.[4] In this case, the Nelsons have alleged that petitioners recruited Scott Nelson for work at the hospital, signed an employment contract with him, and subsequently employed him. While these activities led to the conduct that eventually injured the Nelsons, they are not the basis for the Nelsons' suit. Even taking each of the Nelsons' allegations about Scott Nelson's recruitment and employment as true, those facts alone entitle the Nelsons to nothing under their theory of the case. The Nelsons have not, after all, alleged breach of contract, see at 54, but personal injuries caused by petitioners' intentional wrongs and by petitioners' negligent failure to warn Scott Nelson that they might commit those wrongs. Those torts, and not the arguably commercial activities that preceded their commission, form the basis for the Nelsons' suit. Petitioners' tortious conduct itself fails to qualify as "commercial activity" within the meaning of the Act, although the Act is too "`obtuse' " to be of much help in reaching that conclusion. We have seen already that the Act defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular *59 commercial transaction or act," and provides that "[t]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S. C. 160(d). If this is a definition, it is one distinguished only by its diffidence; as we observed in our most recent case on the subject, it "leaves the critical term `commercial' largely undefined." Republic of ; see 99; Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim The Haiti Case, 49 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 77, 45, n. 244 (1974) (commenting on then-draft Act) ("Start with `activity,' proceed via `conduct' or `transaction' to `character,' then refer to `nature,' and then go back to `commercial,' the term you started out to define in the first place"); G. Born & D. Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 479 480 We do not, however, have the option to throw up our hands. The term has to be given some interpretation, and congressional diffidence necessarily results in judicial responsibility to determine what a "commercial activity" is for purposes of the Act. We took up the task just last Term in which involved Argentina's unilateral refinancing of bonds it had issued under a plan to stabilize its currency. Bondholders sued Argentina in federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the third clause of 1605(a)(2). In the course of holding the refinancing to be a commercial activity for purposes of the Act, we observed that the statute "largely codifies the so-called `restrictive' theory of foreign sovereign immunity first endorsed by the State Department in 1952." 504 U.S., at We accordingly held that the meaning of "commercial" for purposes of the Act must be the meaning Congress understood the restrictive theory to require at the time it passed the statute. See at -61. Under the restrictive, as opposed to the "absolute," theory of foreign sovereign immunity, a state is immune from the *60 jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign or public acts (jure imperii), but not as to those that are private or commercial in character (jure gestionis). Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of 461 U. S., 87; Alfred of London, ; see 28 U.S. C. 1602; see also (Letter to the Attorney General from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, May 19, 1952); Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 Ford. L. Rev. 155, 168 We explained in (quoting ), that a state engages in commercial activity under the restrictive theory where it exercises "`only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens,' " as distinct from those "`powers peculiar to sovereigns.' " Put |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | as distinct from those "`powers peculiar to sovereigns.' " Put differently, a foreign state engages in commercial activity for purposes of the restrictive theory only where it acts "in the manner of a private player within" the 504 U.S., ; see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 451 (1987) ("Under international law, a state or state instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private persons"). We emphasized in that whether a state acts "in the manner of" a private party is a question of behavior, not motivation: "[B]ecause the Act provides that the commercial character of an act is to be determined by reference to its `nature' rather than its `purpose,' the question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever *61 the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private party engages in `trade and traffic or commerce.' " We did not ignore the difficulty of distinguishing "`purpose' (i. e., the reason why the foreign state engages in the activity) from `nature' (i. e., the outward form of the conduct that the foreign state performs or agrees to perform)," but recognized that the Act "unmistakably commands" us to observe the Because Argentina had merely dealt in the bond market in the manner of a private player, we held, its refinancing of the bonds qualified as a commercial activity for purposes of the Act despite the apparent governmental motivation. Unlike Argentina's activities that we considered in the intentional conduct alleged here (the Saudi Government's wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture of Nelson) could not qualify as commercial under the restrictive theory. The conduct boils down to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has long been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature. See 621 F.2d 171, 179 ; Victory Transport 6 F.2d 54, 60 cert. denied, 81 U.S. 94 ; affirmance order, 292 U. S. App. D. C. 84, ; K. Randall, Federal Courts and the International Human Rights Paradigm 9 (the Act's commercial-activity exception is irrelevant to cases alleging *62 that a foreign state has violated human rights).[5] Exercise of the powers |
Justice Souter | 1,993 | 20 | majority | Saudi Arabia v. Nelson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112834/saudi-arabia-v-nelson/ | foreign state has violated human rights).[5] Exercise of the powers of police and penal officers is not the sort of action by which private parties can engage in commerce. "[S]uch acts as legislation, or the expulsion of an alien, or a denial of justice, cannot be performed by an individual acting in his own name. They can be performed only by the state acting as such." Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 220, 225 (1952); see also at 27. The Nelsons and their amici urge us to give significance to their assertion that the Saudi Government subjected Nelson to the abuse alleged as retaliation for his persistence in reporting hospital safety violations, and argue that the character of the mistreatment was consequently commercial. One amicus, indeed, goes so far as to suggest that the Saudi Government "often uses detention and torture to resolve commercial disputes." Brief for Human Rights Watch as *6 Amicus Curiae 6. But this argument does not alter the fact that the powers allegedly abused were those of police and penal officers. In any event, the argument is off the point, for it goes to purpose, the very fact the Act renders irrelevant to the question of an activity's commercial character. Whatever may have been the Saudi Government's motivation for its allegedly abusive treatment of Nelson, it remains the case that the Nelsons' action is based upon a sovereign activity immune from the subject-matter jurisdiction of United States courts under the Act. In addition to the intentionally tortious conduct, the Nelsons claim a separate basis for recovery in petitioners' failure to warn Scott Nelson of the hidden dangers associated with his employment. The Nelsons allege that, at the time petitioners recruited Scott Nelson and thereafter, they failed to warn him of the possibility of severe retaliatory action if he attempted to disclose any safety hazards he might discover on the job. See at 54. In other words, petitioners bore a duty to warn of their own propensity for tortious conduct. But this is merely a semantic ploy. For aught we can see, a plaintiff could recast virtually any claim of intentional tort committed by sovereign act as a claim of failure to warn, simply by charging the defendant with an obligation to announce its own tortious propensity before indulging it. To give jurisdictional significance to this feint of language would effectively thwart the Act's manifest purpose to codify the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Cf. United 47 U.S. 52, III The Nelsons' action is not "based upon |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | I write separately to emphasize the Court's statement that "we have no occasion in this case to consider the pre-emptive effect of a specific agency regulation bearing the force of law." Ante, at 1203. State tort law will sometimes help the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) "uncover unknown drug hazards and [encourage] drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks." Ante, at 1202. But it is possible that state tort law will sometimes interfere with the FDA's desire to create a drug label containing a specific set of cautions and instructions. I note that some have argued that state tort law can sometimes raise prices to the point where those who are sick are unable to obtain the drugs they need. See Lasagna, he Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in he Liability Maze 334, 335-33 he FDA may seek to determine whether and when state tort law acts as a help or a hindrance to achieving the safe drug-related medical care that Congress sought. Medtronic, ; cf. It may seek to embody those determinations in lawful specific regulations describing, for example, when labeling requirements serve as a ceiling as well as a floor. And it is possible that such determinations would have pre-emptive effect. See (opinion of BREYER, J.) ). I agree with the Court, however, that such a regulation is not at issue in this case. Justice HOMAS, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court that the fact that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the label for petitioner Wyeth's drug Phenergan does not pre-empt the state-law judgment before the Court. hat judgment was based on a jury finding that the label did not adequately warn of the risk involved in administering Phenergan through the IV-push injection method. Under federal law, without prior approval from the FDA, Wyeth could have "add[ed] or strengthen[ed]" information on its label about "a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction," 21 CFR *1205 314.70(c)()(iii)(A) (2008), or "about dosage and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product," 314.70(c)()(iii)(C), in order to "reflect newly acquired information," including "new analyses of previously submitted data," about the dangers of IV-push administration of Phenergan, 73 Fed.Reg. 4903, 4909 (2008). It thus was possible for Wyeth to label and market Phenergan in compliance with federal law while providing additional warning information on its label beyond that previously approved by the FDA. In addition, federal law does not give drug manufacturers an unconditional right to market their federally approved drug at all times with the precise label initially approved by |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | at all times with the precise label initially approved by the FDA. he Vermont court's judgment in this case, therefore, did not directly conflict with federal law and is not pre-empted. I write separately, however, because I cannot join the majority's implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines. In particular, I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court's "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence. Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law. Because implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitution, I concur only in the judgment. I A In order "to ensure the protection of our fundamental liberties," Atascadero State the "Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the and the Federal Government." he Framers adopted this "`constitutionally mandated balance of power,'" Atascadero State at to "reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front," because a "federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages," such as "a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society" and "increase[d] opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes," Furthermore, as the Framers observed, the "compound republic of America" provides "a double security to the rights of the people" because "the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments." he Federalist No. 51, p. 2 (M. Beloff ed., 2d ed.17). Under this federalist system, "the possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause." In this way, the Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government "a decided advantage in [a] delicate balance" between federal and state sovereigns. "As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the" hat is an "extraordinary power in a federalist system." Nonetheless, the retain substantial sovereign authority. U.S. Const., Amdt. 10 ("he powers not delegated to *120 the United by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the are reserved to the respectively, or to the people"); see ; ; New ; at -, ; In accordance with the text and structure of the Constitution, "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined" and "[t]hose which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite." he Federalist |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite." he Federalist No. 45, at 237-238. Indeed, in protecting our constitutional government, "the preservation of the and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government." quoted in New As a result, in order to protect the delicate balance of power mandated by the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause must operate only in accordance with its terms. he clause provides: "his Constitution, and the Laws of the United which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all reaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any hing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2. With respect to federal laws, then, the Supremacy Clause gives "supreme" status only to those that are "made in Pursuance" of "[t]his Constitution." ; see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 31, p. 94 (33) (hereinafter Story) ("It will be observed, that the supremacy of the laws is attached to those only, which are made in pursuance of the constitution"). Federal laws "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution must comply with two key structural limitations in the Constitution that ensure that the Federal Government does not amass too much power at the expense of the he first structural limitation, which the parties have not raised in this case, is "the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones." ; see United v. Morrison, ; New[1] he second structural limitation is the complex set of procedures that Congress *1207 and the President must follow to enact "Laws of the United" See (setting forth the Constitution's Bicameral and Presentment Clauses, Art. I, 7, cls. 2-3, which "prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process"). "[]he Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions," by allowing the passage of legislation only after it has proceeded through "a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process," that was "finely wrought and exhaustively considered" by the Framers, he Supremacy Clause thus requires that pre-emptive effect be given only those to federal standards and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text that was produced through the constitutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures. |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | was produced through the constitutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures. See 3 J. Story 31, at 94 (Actions of the Federal Government "which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies," are not "the supreme law of the land. hey will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such"). B In light of these constitutional principles, I have become "increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption." My review of this Court's broad implied pre-emption precedents, particularly its "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence, has increased my concerns that implied pre-emption doctrines have not always been constitutionally applied. Under the vague and "potentially boundless" doctrine of "purposes and objectives" pre-emption, for example, the Court has pre-empted state law based on its interpretation of broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of (referring to the "concomitant danger of invoking obstacle pre-emption based on the arbitrary selection of one purpose to the exclusion of others"); (criticizing the majority's reliance on legislative history to discern statutory intent when that intent was "perfectly obvious on the face of th[e] statute"); (relying on regulatory history, agency comments, and the Government's litigating position to determine that federal law pre-empted state law). Congressional and agency musings, however, do not satisfy the Art. I, 7 requirements for enactment of federal law and, therefore, do not pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause. When analyzing the pre-emptive effect of federal statutes or regulations validly promulgated thereunder, "[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose [must be] sought in the text and structure of the [provision] at issue" to comply with the Constitution. CSX ransp., ; see New ("[A] federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressional delegated authority. [for] an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it" (internal quotation marks omitted; second alteration in original)); Camps /Owatonna, (noting that "treating unenacted congressional intent as if it were law would be constitutionally dubious"). Pre-emption analysis should not be "a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives, but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict." Bates, at (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see ("[P]re-emption analysis is, or at least |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | and citation omitted); see ("[P]re-emption analysis is, or at least should be, a matter of precise statutory [or regulatory] construction rather than an exercise in free-form judicial policymaking" ). Pre-emption must turn on whether state law conflicts with the text of the relevant federal statute or with the federal regulations authorized by that text. See 1 S. Ct. ; see New II his Court has determined that there are two categories of conflict pre-emption, both of which Wyeth contends are at issue in this case. First, the Court has found pre-emption "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce." Florida Lime & Avocado Second, the Court has determined that federal law pre-empts state law when, "under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."[2] A Wyeth first contends that "it would have been impossible for it to comply with the state-law duty to modify Phenergan's labeling without violating federal law." Ante, at 1193 (opinion for the Court by SEVENS, J.). But, as the majority explains, the text of the relevant federal statutory provisions and the corresponding regulations do not directly conflict with the state-law judgment before us. his Court has used different formulations of the standard to be used in deciding *1209 whether state and federal law conflict, and thus lead to pre-emption, under the "impossibility" doctrine. See, e.g., ("a case in which state law penalizes what federal law requires"); American elephone & elegraph 1 S. Ct. 195, (when state-law claims "directly conflict" with federal law), cited in (describing A & as a "cas[e] involving impossibility"); Florida Lime & Avocado at ("where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility"). he Court has generally articulated a very narrow "impossibility standard," see -373, (citing Florida Lime & Avocado at ); see 123 S. Ct. 5, ; United v. Locke, in part because the overly broad sweep of the Court's "purposes and objectives" approach, see infra, at 1-7, has rendered it unnecessary for the Court to rely on "impossibility" pre-emption. he Court, in fact, has not explained why a narrow "physical impossibility" standard is the best proxy for determining when state and federal laws "directly conflict" for purposes of the Supremacy Clause. here could be instances where it is not "physically impossible" to comply with both state and federal law, even when the state and federal laws give directly conflicting commands. See Nelson, Preemption, 8 Va. L.Rev. 225, 20-21 For example, if |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | Nelson, Preemption, 8 Va. L.Rev. 225, 20-21 For example, if federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain behavior that state law prohibits, the laws would give contradictory commands notwithstanding the fact that an individual could comply with both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior. herefore, "physical impossibility" may not be the most appropriate standard for determining whether the text of state and federal laws directly conflict. See ; see A & at 1 S. Ct. 195 (requiring that the state-law claims "directly conflict" with federal law); 3 Story 3, 1 (suggesting instead that a state law is pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause when it is "repugnant to the constitution of the United " (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, whatever the precise constitutional contours of implied pre-emption may be, I am satisfied that it does not operate against respondent's judgment below. he text of the federal laws at issue do not require that the state-court judgment at issue be pre-empted, under either the narrow "physical impossibility" standard, Florida Lime & Avocado at or a more general "direc[t] conflict" standard, A & at 1 S. Ct. 195. Under the FDA's "changes being effected" regulation, 21 CFR 314.70(c)()(iii), which was promulgated pursuant to the FDA's statutory authority, it is physically possible for Wyeth to market Phenergan in compliance with federal and Vermont law. As the majority explains, Wyeth could have changed the warning on its label regarding IV-push without violating federal law. See ante, at 119-1197. he "changes being effected" regulation allows drug manufacturers to change their labels without the FDA's preapproval if the changes "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse *0 reaction," 314.70(c)()(iii)(A), or "add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product," 314.70(c)()(iii)(C), in order to "reflect newly acquired information," including "new analyses of previously submitted data," 73 Fed.Reg. 4903, 4909. Under the terms of these regulations, after learning of new incidences of gangrene-induced amputation resulting from the IV-push administration of Phenergan, see ante, at 119-1197, federal law gave Wyeth the authority to change Phenergan's label to "strengthen a warning," "strengthen a. precaution," 314.70(c)()(iii)(A), or to "strengthen an instruction about administration [of the IV-push method] to increase the safe use of the drug product," 314.70(c)()(iii)(C). hus, it was physically possible for Wyeth to comply with a state-law requirement to provide stronger warnings on Phenergan about the risks of the IV-push administration method while continuing to market Phenergan in compliance with federal law. In addition, the text of the statutory provisions governing FDA |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | In addition, the text of the statutory provisions governing FDA drug labeling, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, do not give drug manufacturers an unconditional right to market their federally approved drug at all times with the precise label initially approved by the FDA. hus, there is no "direct conflict" between the federal labeling law and the state-court judgment. he statute prohibits the interstate marketing of any drug, except for those that are federally approved. See 21 U.S.C. 355(a) o say, as the statute does, that Wyeth may not market a drug without federal approval (i.e., without an FDA-approved label) is not to say that federal approval gives Wyeth the unfettered right, for all time, to market its drug with the specific label that was federally approved. Initial approval of a label amounts to a finding by the FDA that the label is safe for purposes of gaining federal approval to market the drug. It does not represent a finding that the drug, as labeled, can never be deemed unsafe by later federal action, or as in this case, the application of state law. Instead, FDA regulations require a drug manufacturerafter initial federal approval of a drug's labelto revise the federally approved label "to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug." 21 CFR 201.80(e). Drug manufacturers are required to "establish and maintain records and make reports" to the FDA about "[a]ny adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug related," after it has received federal approval. 314.80(a), (c), (j). In addition, the manufacturer must make periodic reports about "adverse drug experience[s]" associated with its drug and include "a history of actions taken since the last report because of adverse drug experiences (for example, labeling changes or studies initiated)." 314.80(c)(2)(i)-(ii). When such records and reports are not made, the FDA can withdraw its approval of the drug. 314.80(j); see 21 U.S.C. 355(e) ("he Secretary may withdraw the approval of an application if the Secretary finds that the applicant has failed to establish a system for maintaining required records, or has repeatedly or deliberately failed to maintain such records or to make required reports"). he FDA may determine that a drug is no longer safe for use based on "clinical or other experience, tests, or other scientific *1 data." he text of the statutory provisions and the accompanying regulatory scheme governing the FDA drug approval process, therefore, establish that the FDA's initial approval of a drug is not a guarantee that the |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | approval of a drug is not a guarantee that the drug's label will never need to be changed. And nothing in the text of the statutory or regulatory scheme necessarily insulates Wyeth from liability under state law simply because the FDA has approved a particular label. In sum, the relevant federal law did not give Wyeth a right that the state-law judgment took away, and it was possible for Wyeth to comply with both federal law and the Vermont-law judgment at issue here. he federal statute and regulations neither prohibited the stronger warning label required by the state judgment, nor insulated Wyeth from the risk of state-law liability. With no "direct conflict" between the federal and state law, then, the state-law judgment is not pre-empted. Cf. A & -22, 1 S. Ct. 195 (finding pre-emption where federal law forbade common carriers from extending communications privileges requested by state-law claims); -9, 1 S. Ct. (finding pre-emption where the federal statute required congressional elections on a particular date different from that provided by state statute). B Wyeth contends that state and federal law conflict because "recognition of [this] state tort action creates an unacceptable `obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,' because it substitutes a lay jury's decision about drug labeling for the expert judgment of the FDA." Ante, at 1193-1. his Court's entire body of "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence is inherently flawed. he cases improperly rely on legislative history, broad atextual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional inaction in order to pre-empt state law. See I, therefore, cannot join the majority's analysis of this claim, see ante, at 1199-1204, or its reaffirmation of the Court's "purposes and objectives" jurisprudence, ante, at 1199-1200 (analyzing congressional purposes); ante, at 1201 and ); ante, at 1202-1203, and nn. 13-14 (analyzing this case in light of ). 1 he Court first formulated its current "purposes and objectives" pre-emption standard in when it considered whether the federal Alien Registration Act pre-empted an Alien Registration Act adopted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. he Court did not find that the two statutes, by their terms, directly conflicted. See and n. 1, (citing Pa. Stat. Ann., it. 35, 01-0 (Purdon Supp.0)); and n. 5, (citing Act of June 28, 0, 54 Stat. 0); -74, (analyzing numerous extratextual sources and finding pre-emption without concluding that the terms of the federal and state laws directly conflict); see (noting that "[i]t is conceded that the federal *2 act in operation does not at any point conflict with the state statute" (Stone, J., dissenting)).[3] |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | any point conflict with the state statute" (Stone, J., dissenting)).[3] Nonetheless, the Court determined that it was not confined to considering merely the terms of the relevant federal law in conducting its pre-emption analysis. Rather, it went on to ask whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." at In so doing, the Court looked far beyond the relevant federal statutory text and instead embarked on its own freeranging speculation about what the purposes of the federal law must have been. See In addition to the meaning of the relevant federal text, the Court attempted to discern "[t]he nature of the power exerted by Congress, the object sought to be attained, and the character of the obligations imposed by the law." o do so, the Court looked in part to public sentiment, noting that "[o]pposition to laws. singling out aliens as particularly dangerous and undesirable groups, is deep-seated in this country." he Court relied on statements by particular Members of Congress and on congressional inaction, finding it pertinent that numerous bills with requirements similar to Pennsylvania's law had failed to garner enough votes in Congress to become law. at -73, and nn. 32-34, Concluding that these sources revealed a federal purpose to "protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system," the Court held that the Pennsylvania law was pre-empted. Justice Stone, in dissent, questioned the majority's decision to read an exclusive registration system for aliens into a statute that did not specifically provide such exclusivity. See He noted his concern that state power would be improperly diminished through a pre-emption doctrine driven by the Court's "own conceptions of a policy which Congress ha[d] not expressed and which is not plainly to be inferred from the legislation which it ha[d] enacted." In his view, nothing that Congress enacted had "denie[d] the states the practicable means of identifying their alien residents and of recording their whereabouts." Yet, the majority employed pre-emption to override numerous state alien-registration laws even though enacted federal law "at no point conflict[ed] with the state legislation and [was] *3 harmonious with it."[4] 2 he consequences of this Court's broad approach to "purposes and objectives" pre-emption are exemplified in this Court's decision in which both the majority and the dissent incorporate into their analysis today. See ante, at 1202-1203, and nn. 13-14; post, at 1220-1222 (opinion of ALIO, J.). In pursuant to the National raffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 19 (Safety Act), 80 Stat. 7, 15 U.S.C. 1381 et |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | 19 (Safety Act), 80 Stat. 7, 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. the Department of ransportation (DO) had promulgated a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that "required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their 17 vehicles with passive restraints." -, he case required this Court to decide whether the Safety Act pre-empted a state common-law tort action in which the plaintiff claimed that an auto manufacturer, though in compliance with the federal standard, should nonetheless have equipped a 17 automobile with airbags. he Court first concluded that the Safety Act's express pre-emption provision and its saving clause, read together, did not expressly pre-empt state common-law claims. See at 8-88,[5] he Court then proceeded to consider whether the state action was nonetheless pre-empted as an "obstacle" to the purposes of the federal law. he Court held that the state tort claim was pre-empted, relying in large part on comments that DO made when promulgating its regulation, statements that the Government made in its brief to the Court, and regulatory history that related to the federal regulation of passive restraints. See -88, In particular, the majority found that DO intended to "deliberately provid[e] the manufacturer[s] with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices" and to "bring about a mix of different devices introduced gradually over time," based on comments that DO made when promulgating its regulation, rather *4 than the Safety Act's text. he majority embarked on a judicial inquiry into "why and how DO sought these objectives," ib by considering regulatory history and the Government's brief, which described DO's safety standard as "`embod[ying] the Secretary's policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car,'" (quoting Brief for United as Amicus Curiae in O., No. -11, p. 25); see -884, Based on this "ex post administrative litigating position and inferences from regulatory history and final commentary," the Court found that the state action was pre-empted because it would have required manufacturers of all cars similar to that in which the plaintiff was injured to "install airbags rather than other passive restraint systems" and would have, therefore, "presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought" to phase in gradually, he Court's decision in to apply "purposes and objectives" pre-emption based on agency comments, regulatory history, and agency litigating positions was especially flawed, given that it conflicted with the plain statutory text of the saving clause within the Safety Act, which explicitly preserved state common-law actions by |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | the Safety Act, which explicitly preserved state common-law actions by providing that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law," 15 U.S.C. 1397(k)[] See Engine Mfrs. ("Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose" ); West Virginia Univ. s, ("he best evidence of th[e] purpose [of a statute] is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President"). In addition, the Court's reliance on its divined purpose of the federal lawto gradually phase in a mix of passive restraint systemsin order to invalidate *5 a State's imposition of a greater safety standard was contrary to the more general express statutory goal of the Safety Act "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents," 15 U.S.C. 1381 his Court has repeatedly stated that when statutory language is plain, it must be enforced according to its terms. See ; see e.g., Dodd v. United ; Lamie v. United rustee, ; Hartford Underwriters Ins. he text in "directly addressed the precise question at issue" before the Court, so that should have been "the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." National Assn. of Home 551 U.S. 127 S. Ct. 25, 2, 18 L. Ed. 2d 4 With text that allowed state actions like the one at issue in the Court had no authority to comb through agency commentaries to find a basis for an alternative conclusion. Applying "purposes and objectives" pre-emption in as in any case, allowed this Court to vacate a judgment issued by another sovereign based on nothing more than assumptions and goals that were untethered from the constitutionally enacted federal law authorizing the federal regulatory standard that was before the Court. See 1 L. Ed. 2d 389 (noting that pre-emption "affects the allocation of powers among sovereigns"). "`[A]n agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the [law] of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.'" New 535 U.S., at (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. 47 U.S. 355, 10 S. Ct. 90, 90 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1)). hus, no agency or individual Member of Congress can pre-empt a State's judgment by merely musing about goals or intentions not found within or authorized by the statutory text. See at 120-1208. he Court's "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | See at 120-1208. he Court's "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence is problematic because it encourages an overly expansive reading of statutory text. he Court's desire to divine the broader purposes of the statute before it inevitably leads it to assume that Congress wanted to pursue those policies "at all costs"even when the text reflects a different balance. See (finding no evidence to support the notion that the DO Secretary intended to advance the purposes of the safety standard "at all costs"); Nelson, 8 Va. L.Rev., at 279-280. As this Court has repeatedly noted, "`it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law.'" E.g., Norfolk Southern R. 1, 1 L. Ed. 2d 38 (quoting Rodriguez v. United 52, (17) ). Federal legislation is often the result of compromise between legislators and "groups with marked but divergent interests." See 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 hus, a statute's text might reflect a compromise between parties who wanted to pursue a particular goal to different extents. See, e.g., (noting that the Family and Medical Leave Act's provision of only 12 work-weeks * of yearly leave "was the result of compromise" that must be given effect by courts); U.S. 238, S. Ct. 15, 78 L. Ed. 2d 3 (14) (finding that a state law was not pre-empted though it allegedly frustrated a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act because the Act provided that its purpose was to be furthered only "to the extent it is consistent `with the health and safety of the public'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2013(d) (12 ed.))); see Manning, What Divides extualists from Purposivists? 10 Colum. L.Rev. 70, (200) ("Legislators may compromise on a statute that does not fully address a perceived mischief, accepting half a loaf to facilitate a law's enactment"). herefore, there is no factual basis for the assumption underlying the Court's "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence that every policy seemingly consistent with federal statutory text has necessarily been authorized by Congress and warrants preemptive effect. Instead, our federal system in general, and the Supremacy Clause in particular, accords pre-emptive effect to only those policies that are actually authorized by and effectuated through the statutory text. 3 he majority, while reaching the right conclusion in this case, demonstrates once again how application of "purposes and objectives" pre-emption requires inquiry into matters beyond the scope of proper judicial review. For example, the majority relies heavily on Congress' failure "during the 70-year history" of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to enact an express pre-emption provision that addresses |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | Cosmetic Act to enact an express pre-emption provision that addresses approval of a drug label by the FDA. Ante, at 1200. hat "silence on the issue, coupled with [Congress'] certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation," the majority reasons, is evidence that Congress did not intend for federal approval of drug labels to pre-empt state tort judgments. ; see ante, at 1199-1200 (construing from inaction that Congress "[e]vidently [had] determined that widely available state rights of action provided appropriate relief"). Certainly, the absence of a statutory provision pre-empting all state tort suits related to approved federal drug labels is pertinent to a finding that such lawsuits are not pre-empted. But the relevance is in the fact that no statute explicitly pre-empts the lawsuits, and not in any inferences that the Court may draw from congressional silence about the motivations or policies underlying Congress' failure to act. See 130 L. Ed. 2d 42 ("[C]ongressional silence lacks persuasive significance" ); O'Melveny & 129 L. Ed. 2d ; Camps 520 U.S., at 1, ("[O]ur pre-emption jurisprudence explicitly rejects the notion that mere congressional silence on a particular issue may be read as pre-empting state law"). In this case, the majority has concluded from silence that Congress believed state lawsuits pose no obstacle to federal drug-approval objectives. See ante, at 1200. hat is the required conclusion, but only because it is compelled by the text of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, not judicial suppositions about Congress' unstated goals. he fact that the Court reaches the proper conclusion does not justify its speculation about the reasons for congressional inaction. In this case, the Court has relied on the perceived congressional policies underlying inaction *7 to find that state law is not pre-empted. But once the Court shows a willingness to guess at the intent underlying congressional inaction, the Court could just as easily rely on its own perceptions regarding congressional inaction to give unduly broad pre-emptive effect to federal law. See, e.g., American Ins. 539 U.S. 39, 401, -408, 429, 123 S. Ct. 2, 15 L. Ed. 2d 37 Either approach is illegitimate. Under the Supremacy Clause, state law is pre-empted only by federal law "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2not by extratextual considerations of the purposes underlying congressional inaction. See 492 U.S. 9, S. Ct. 28, 10 L. Ed. 2d 7 (19) (finding that policy arguments that "are not based in the text of the statute. are not helpful"); VA v. Hill, S. Ct. 9, Our role, then, is merely "to interpret the language of the statute[s] |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | concurring | Wyeth v. Levine | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145902/wyeth-v-levine/ | then, is merely "to interpret the language of the statute[s] enacted by Congress." U.S. 438, 41, III he origins of this Court's "purposes and objectives" pre-emption jurisprudence in and its broad application in cases like illustrate that this brand of the Court's pre-emption jurisprudence facilitates freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluations of the "purposes and objectives" embodied within federal law. his, in turn, leads to decisions giving improperly broad pre-emptive effect to judicially manufactured policies, rather than to the statutory text enacted by Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the agency actions authorized thereby. Because such a sweeping approach to pre-emption leads to the illegitimateand thus, unconstitutionalinvalidation of state laws, I can no longer assent to a doctrine that pre-empts state laws merely because they "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of federal law, 312 U.S., at as perceived by this Court. I therefore respectfully concur only in the judgment. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | This case presets the Court oce agai with a questio cocerig a State's ability to regulate the activities of atural gas compaies. *295 I Respodets ANR Pipelie Compay (Pipelie) ad ANR Storage Compay (Storage) are wholly owed subsidiaries of America Natural Resources Compay (Resources), a Delaware corporatio which, like Pipelie ad Storage, has its pricipal place of busiess i Michiga. Both Pipelie ad Storage are atural gas compaies, withi the meaig of the Natural Gas Act of 8 (NGA or Act), ch. 556, as ameded, 15 U.S. C. 717 et seq.[1] Thus, both are subject to the jurisdictio of the Federal Eergy Regulatory Commissio (FERC), the regulatory body charged with implemetatio of the NGA. See 1(b) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. 717(b).[2] Pipelie is a Delaware corporatio that ows ad operates a iterstate atural gas pipelie system trasportig gas, exclusively for resale, to 51 gas distributio ceters i Michiga ad eight other States, where the gas is either delivered to customers of Pipelie or stored for future delivery. Pipelie *296 purchases its atural gas from producers i Texas, Oklahoma, Kasas, Louisiaa, ad Wyomig. Storage, which operates idepedetly from Pipelie, is a Michiga corporatio orgaized by Resources i 1978 to develop ad operate gas storage reservoirs for oaffiliated customers. Storage receives gas from outside Michiga ad, o demad, redelivers it for sale outside that State. Storage operates four storage fields i Michiga. Petitioers are members of the Michiga Public Service Commissio (MPSC). Uder Michiga's Public Utilities Securities Act, 1909 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 144, as ameded (Act 144), Mich. Comp. Laws A. 460.301 et seq.[3] a public utility exercisig or claimig the right *297 to trasport atural gas i Michiga for public use[4] must obtai MPSC approval before issuig log-term securities. Act 144 directs the MPSC to approve a security issuace *298 whe it "is satisfied that the fuds derived are to be applied to lawful purposes ad that the issue ad amout is essetial to the successful carryig out of the purposes, or that the issue of the stock fairly represets accumulated ad udistributed earig ivested i capital assets ad ot previously capitalized." 460.301(3). The MPSC may coduct a ivestigatio, icludig a appraisal of the compay's property at the compay's expese, i decidig whether to allow the issue, 460.301(2), ad it "may impose as a coditio of the grat reasoable terms ad coditios that [it] cosiders proper." 460.301(3). Pipelie ad Storage filed i the Uited States District Court for the Wester District of Michiga a ameded complait agaist petitioers i their official capacities, seekig a declaratory judgmet that the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | i their official capacities, seekig a declaratory judgmet that the MPSC lacks jurisdictio over their security issuaces ad thus that they may lawfully issue ad market securities without MPSC approval.[5] Respodets argued that Act 144 was pre-empted by the NGA ad that Act 144 violates the Commerce Clause, U. S. Cost., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. The District Court cocluded that Act 144 was either pre-empted by the federal regulatory scheme or i violatio of the Commerce Clause. O the pre-emptio issue, the court cocluded that "compliace with both federal ad state regulatios is ot a physical impossibility, ad Act 144 does ot stad as a obstacle to the accomplishmet ad executio of the full purposes ad objectives of Cogress." As to the Commerce Clause, the court cocluded that Act 144 was "a evehaded ad relatively limited state regulatio which, as applied to [respodets], has historically had a idirect ad miimal effect *299 o iterstate commerce," while servig legitimate local The Uited States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holdig that both the pre-emptive effect of the federal regulatory scheme ad the Commerce Clause bar applicatio of Act 144 to respodets. The Court of Appeals cocluded that Act 144 was pre-empted because, by omittig ay requiremet of advace approval of the issuace of securities "i a otherwise `comprehesive' regulatory scheme, Cogress has implicitly determied that the States should ot impose such regulatios," -234, ad because of the possibility of a coflict betwee federal ad state regulatio of atural gas compay projects ad fiacig plas, Furthermore, the court reasoed, iasmuch as "the burdes of expese, delay, ad admiistrative hassle of `advace approval' securities regulatio far outweigh the beefits, if ay, of Michiga's iterests i protectig cosumers ad ivestors Act 144 ucostitutioally burdes iterstate commerce." Because of a coflict betwee the views of the Sixth Circuit ad those of the Michiga Supreme Court set forth i Michiga Gas Storage we grated certiorari to decide whether Michiga may require respodets to obtai MPSC approval before issuig ad marketig securities. II The circumstaces i which federal law pre-empts state regulatio are familiar. See Arkasas Elec. Coop. See also Fidelity Federal Savigs & Loa A pre-emptio questio requires a examiatio of cogressioal itet. Of course, Cogress explicitly may defie the extet to which its eactmets pre-empt state law. See, e. g., I the *300 absece of explicit statutory laguage, however, Cogress implicitly may idicate a itet to occupy a give field to the exclusio of state law. Such a purpose properly may be iferred where the pervasiveess of the federal regulatio precludes supplemetatio |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | iferred where the pervasiveess of the federal regulatio precludes supplemetatio by the States, where the federal iterest i the field is sufficietly domiat, or where "the object sought to be obtaied by the federal law ad the character of obligatios imposed by it reveal the same purpose." Fially, eve where Cogress has ot etirely displaced state regulatio i a particular field, state law is pre-empted whe it actually coflicts with federal law. Such a coflict will be foud " `whe it is impossible to comply with both state ad federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, or where the state law stads as a obstacle to the accomplishmet of the full purposes ad objectives of Cogress,' " Califoria Coastal quotig I this case we coclude that Act 144 regulates i a field the NGA has occupied to the exclusio of state law, ad that it therefore is pre-empted. III A The NGA log has bee recogized as a "comprehesive scheme of federal regulatio of `all wholesales of atural gas i iterstate commerce.' " Norther Natural Gas quotig Phillips Petroleum 347 U.S. 2,[6] The NGA cofers upo FERC exclusive *301 jurisdictio over the trasportatio ad sale of atural gas i iterstate commerce for resale. Norther Natural Gas FERC exercises authority over the rates ad facilities of atural gas compaies used i this trasportatio ad sale through a variety of powers. Sectios 4, 5, ad 7 of the NGA, as ameded, 15 U.S. C. 717c, 717d, ad 717f, give FERC a umber of tools for examiig ad cotrollig the issuace of securities of atural gas compaies i the exercise of its comprehesive authority. First, i exercisig its authority to determie a "just ad reasoable" rate for the trasportatio or sale of atural gas subject to its jurisdictio, FERC may coduct hearigs ad udertake a detailed examiatio of a compay. 4 of the NGA, as ameded, 15 U.S. C. 717c. For example, to calculate a reasoable rate of retur o ivested capital, FERC examies a compay's capital structure (the percetages of its capital that come from debt, commo stock, ad preferred stock), establishes the rate of retur allowable o each type of capital, ad determies a overall rate of retur as a weighted average, i accordace with the amout of each kid of capital. Public Service Comm' of New Thus, a atural gas compay's capital structure is related directly to the rates FERC allows it to charge. Whe a compay's "equity ratio moves beyod geerally accepted limits," however, FERC may calculate a compay's rates o a imputed "reasoable capital structure" rather tha o |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | rates o a imputed "reasoable capital structure" rather tha o the actual structure. Alabama-Teessee Natural Gas Thus, FERC exercises its ratemakig authority to limit the burde o ratepayers of abormally high equity ratios. See, e. g., Tarpo Trasmissio I additio, this power effectively permits FERC to cotrol, albeit idirectly, a atural gas compay's capital structure. FERC's power to prevet a overcapitalized compay from fiacig its equity through iflated rates presumably acts as a strog deterret to the developmet of such a capital structure. Secod, a atural gas compay must obtai from FERC a "certificate of public coveiece ad ecessity" before it costructs, exteds, acquires, or operates ay facility for the trasportatio or sale of atural gas i iterstate commerce. 7(c)(1)(A) of the NGA, as ameded, 15 U.S. C. 717f (c)(1)(A). FERC will grat the certificate oly if it fids the compay able ad willig to udertake the project i compliace with the rules ad regulatios of the federal regulatory scheme. 7(e), as ameded, 15 U.S. C. 717f(e). FERC may attach "to the issuace of the certificate ad to the exercise of the rights grated thereuder such reasoable terms ad coditios as the public coveiece ad ecessity may require." I fulfillig this statutory duty, FERC has promulgated extesive regulatios that require a statemet of the plas for fiacig a proposed facility ad a detailed descriptio of ay proposed securities issuace. 18 CFR 157.14(14)[7] FERC, like the Federal Power Commissio, *303 its predecessor, has ot hesitated to use its certificatio power to esure that a project is fiaced i accordace with the public iterest.[8] *304 Third, FERC has various powers ad obligatios that both allow ad require it to protect agaist the deleterious effects of ill-cosidered or improper securities issuaces i this area. For example, officers ad directors of atural gas compaies are prohibited from profitig from the compay's securities issues. See 12, 15 U.S. C. 717k. No compay may abado ay service or facility without FERC approval, icludig a fidig by FERC that either the available gas supply is depleted, or "the preset or future public coveiece or ecessity permit such abadomet." 7(b), 15 U.S. C. 717f(b). A compay must keep its accouts i accordace with FERC's Uiform System of Accouts ad must submit those accouts for review as FERC deems ecessary. 8 ad 10, 15 U.S. C. 717g ad 717i; 18 CFR pt. 201 Fially, FERC has the authority to examie ad to chage "ay rule, regulatio, practice, or cotract affectig [rates that] is ujust, ureasoable, uduly discrimiatory, or preferetial." 5(a), 15 U.S. C. 717d(a). Although the NGA gives FERC |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | 5(a), 15 U.S. C. 717d(a). Although the NGA gives FERC these substatial powers ad obligatios, it is also true, as petitioers remid us, that FERC is ot expressly authorized to regulate the issuace of securities by atural gas compaies. Of course, if such express authority were grated, pre-emptio would be more apparet, give the comprehesive ature of FERC's authority. I the absece of a express provisio, however, we must examie whether the preissuace review of securities i which Michiga egages amouts to a regulatio i the field of gas trasportatio ad sales for resale that Cogress iteded FERC to occupy. B As a iitial matter, respodets argue that Act 144 is pre-empted by the NGA because "[s]ecurities issuaces used to fiace the iterstate sale ad trasportatio of atural gas were clearly beyod the power of the states to cotrol i 8." Brief for Respodets 12. They premise this argumet o this Court's statemets that Cogress iteded, by *305 eactig the NGA, to cover areas of atural gas regulatio that the States could ot reach uder the Court's "dormat" Commerce Clause decisios. See, e. g., Pahadle Easter Pipe Lie v. Public Service Comm' of Idiaa, Thus, if the Commerce Clause barred the States from a certai method of regulatio whe the NGA was eacted i 8, respodets argue, that type of regulatio was covered by the NGA ad is ow pre-empted. Our iquiry, however, is ot so easily aswered. Eve if Commerce Clause jurisprudece would have barred Act 144's regulatio at the time of the eactmet of the NGA, a issue ever directly settled by the Court, that would ot decide this case. The authorities o which respodets rely state oly what is ow well settled: Cogress occupied the field of matters relatig to wholesale sales ad trasportatio of atural gas i iterstate commerce. See, e. g., Illiois Gas v. Cetral Illiois Public Service The questio remais, however, whether Act 144 regulates withi this exclusively federal domai. Furthermore, i the absece of a express statemet i the NGA of a itet to pre-empt this kid of state law, respodets' syllogism may be flawed. "To the extet that Cogress sought to freeze its perceptio of [the scope of costitutioally permissible state regulatio] ito law it did so oly as a meas to accomplishig the ed of workable federal regulatio, ot as a ed i itself." Arkasas Elec. Coop. 8. If Cogress did ot ited a particular kid of federal regulatio, pre-emptig state regulatio of that kid would ot ecessarily have served Cogress' purpose. A itet to pre-empt state regulatio thus caot be |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | purpose. A itet to pre-empt state regulatio thus caot be iferred from the mere fact that States were *306 precluded from such regulatio at the time of the NGA's eactmet. Similarly, petitioers' reliace o Cogress' subsequet failure to eact proposed legislatio that would have give FERC explicit authority to regulate the issuace of securities of atural gas compaies[9] deserves oly passig metio. This Court geerally is reluctat to draw ifereces from Cogress' failure to act. See, e. g., America Truckig Asss., Ic. v. Atchiso, T. & S. F. R. (19); Red Lio Broadcastig v. FCC, 395 U.S. 3, 381, 11 Ideed, those Members of Cogress who did ot support these bills may have bee as coviced by testimoy that the NGA already provided "broad ad complete jurisdictio ad cotrol over the issuace of securities" as by argumets that the matter was best left to the States. See Hearigs o H. R. 5306 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee o Iterstate ad Foreig Commerce, 81st Cog., 2d Sess., 53 (1950). Furthermore, eve if, i eactig the NGA, Cogress had decided to dey FERC access to a particular regulatory tool, it would ot ecessarily follow that Cogress iteded to allow the States the use of that tool. Cogress may have determied that this particular form of regulatio simply should ot be employed. That authoritative federal determiatio would have full pre-emptive force. Trascotietal Gas Pipe Lie Corp. v. State Oil ad Gas Bd. of C We tur the, to the crux of the issue: whether Act 144 is a regulatio of the rates ad facilities of atural gas compaies used i trasportatio ad sale for resale of atural gas i iterstate commerce. Sice we fid that it is, we coclude that it is pre-empted. *307 As oted earlier, Act 144 allows the MPSC to examie a security issuace of a atural gas compay to determie whether it is "to be applied to lawful purposes ad is essetial to the successful carryig out of the purposes, [or] represets accumulated ad udistributed earigs ivested i capital assets ad ot previously capitalized." Mich. Comp. Laws A. 460.301(3) The Michiga Supreme Court has authoritatively costrued Act 144 as desiged to protect ivestors i the gas compay's securities ad to protect ratepayers. Attorey Geeral v. MPSC, By guardig agaist the "evils ad ijurious effects o the public of overcapitalizatio," Idiaa & Michiga Power v. Public Service Comm', Act 144 both protects ivestors ad esures "efficiet ad uiterrupted service at reasoable rates." It is our view, however, that whe applied to atural gas compaies, Act 144 amouts to |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | whe applied to atural gas compaies, Act 144 amouts to a regulatio of rates ad facilities, a field occupied by federal regulatio. The objectives sought by Act 144 are the same as those sought by the NGA. Petitioers argue that, without Act 144, a compay could take o so much debt through securities issuaces that it would lack the resources to maitai its Michiga facilities properly. This could threate the supply of gas to Michiga cosumers, petitioers argue, lead to a rate icrease, or hurt ivestors i the compay. I aother sceario, a compay might take o more equity tha it eeds, requirig it to charge higher rates (because equity usually requires a higher rate of retur). Petitioers also explai that Act 144 protects agaist overcapitalizatio i the sese of a lack of correlatio betwee a compay's capital stock ad the value of its property. A imbalace i this respect, petitioers argue, could also threate the supply of gas at reasoable rates.[10] *308 Each of these uses of Act 144, however, is a attempt to regulate matters withi FERC's exclusive jurisdictio. By keepig a atural gas compay from raisig its equity levels above a certai poit, Michiga seeks to esure that the compay will charge oly what Michiga cosiders to be a "reasoable rate." This is regulatio of rates. The other aim of Act 144, seekig to esure that a compay is fiaced i a way that will allow proper maiteace of its facilities ad cotiuace of its services, for the beefit of both ratepayers ad ivestors, also falls withi FERC's exclusive purview sice those facilities are a critical part of the trasportatio of atural gas ad sale for resale i iterstate commerce. I short, the thigs Act 144 regulatio is directed at, the cotrol of rates ad facilities of atural gas compaies, are precisely the thigs over which FERC has comprehesive authority.[11] Of course, every state statute that has some idirect effect o rates ad facilities of atural gas compaies is ot pre-empted. Cf. Metropolita Life Is. v. Massachusetts, Act 144's effect, however, is ot "idirect." I this case we are preseted with a state *309 law whose cetral purpose is to regulate matters that Cogress iteded FERC to regulate. Not oly is such regulatio the fuctio of the federal regulatory scheme, but the NGA has equipped FERC adequately to address the precise cocers Act 144 purports to maage. As reviewed above, FERC ca cotrol potetial istaces of overcapitalizatio, ad its effects o both ratepayers ad ivestors, by its regulatio of rates. To the extet that Act 144 is |
Justice Blackmun | 1,988 | 11 | majority | Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112026/schneidewind-v-anr-pipeline-co/ | regulatio of rates. To the extet that Act 144 is directed at "overcapitalizatio" i the sese of a lack of correlatio betwee a compay's capital stock ad the value of its property, FERC directly moitors the same matter through its accoutig requiremets. As to atural gas compaies that threate the cotiued supply of gas by seekig to fiace their operatios through excessive debt, FERC may prevet such problems through its certificatio power. Ideed, as discussed above, FERC's detailed examiatio of a compay's fiaces icludes review of security issuaces ivolved i fiacig ew facilities.[12] I additio, FERC has its power to prevet abadomets. Fially, FERC's authority to regulate ad fix practices affectig rates allows the agecy to address directly ay uduly leveraged, uduly risky, or uduly capitalized ivestmets. Thus, while the NGA does ot expressly grat FERC preissuace authority over the securities of atural gas compaies, FERC achieves the regulatory eds of such review with regard to rates ad facilities through the exercise of its express regulatory resposibilities. *310 D Our coclusio that Act 144 seeks to regulate a field that the NGA has occupied also is supported by the immiet possibility of collisio betwee Act 144 ad the NGA. See Norther Natural Gas 372 U. S., at -93; Marylad v. Louisiaa, If the MPSC ever deied a atural gas compay authority to issue a security uder Act 144 for a FERC-approved project, the disagreemet betwee state ad federal authorities over the wisdom of the project ad its proposed fiacig would iterfere with the federal regulatory scheme. Furthermore, ay state-ordered alteratio i a compay's capital structure would impige o the federal ratemakig authority. Whe a state regulatio "affect[s] the ability of [FERC] to regulate comprehesively the trasportatio ad sale of atural gas, ad to achieve the uiformity of regulatio which was a objective of the Natural Gas Act" or presets the "prospect of iterferece with the federal regulatory power," the the state law may be pre-empted eve though "collisio betwee the state ad federal regulatio may ot be a ievitable cosequece." Norther Natural Gas 372 U. S., at -92. Although hypothetical coflicts will ot always show a itet to pre-empt state authority, see this "immiet possibility" further demostrates the NGA's complete occupatio of the field that Act 144 seeks to regulate. We therefore coclude that the MPSC regulatio of respodets through Act 144 impiges o a field that the federal regulatory scheme has occupied ad, cosequetly, that Act 144 is pre-empted.[13] *311 IV Because we have cocluded that Act 144 is pre-empted by the NGA, we eed ot decide whether, abset |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | In the early morning hours of August 26, 976, respondents Clifford Bailey, James T. Cogdell, Ronald C. Cooley, and Ralph Walker, federal prisoners at the District of Columbia jail, crawled through a window from which a bar had been removed, slid down a knotted bedsheet, and escaped from custody. Federal authorities recaptured them after they had remained at large for a period of time ranging from one month to three and one-half months. Upon their apprehension, they were charged with violating 8 U.S. C. 75 (a), which governs escape from federal custody.[] At their trials, each of the *97 respondents adduced or offered to adduce evidence as to various conditions and events at the District of Columbia jail, but each was convicted by the jury. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the convictions by a divided vote, holding that the District Court had improperly precluded consideration by the respective juries of respondents' tendered evidence. We granted certiorari, and now reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. In reaching our conclusion, we must decide the state of mind necessary for violation of 75 (a) and the elements that constitute defenses such as duress and necessity. In explaining the reasons for our decision, we find ourselves in a position akin to that of the mother crab who is trying to teach her progeny to walk in a straight line, and finally in desperation exclaims: "Don't do as I do, do as I say." The Act of Congress we construe consists of one sentence set forth in the margin, n. our own pragmatic estimate, expressed infra, at 47, is that "[i]n general, trials for violations of 75 (a) should be simple affairs." Yet we have written, reluctantly but we believe necessarily, a somewhat lengthy opinion supporting our conclusion, because in enacting the Federal Criminal Code Congress legislated in the light of a long history of case law that is frequently relevant in fleshing out the bare bones of a crime that Congress may have proscribed in a single sentence. See (952). *98 I All respondents requested jury trials and were initially scheduled to be tried jointly. At the last minute, however, respondent Cogdell secured a severance. Because the District Court refused to submit to the jury any instructions on respondents' defense of duress or necessity and did not charge the jury that escape was a continuing offense, we must examine in some detail the evidence brought out at trial. The prosecution's case in chief against Bailey, Cooley, and Walker was brief. The Government introduced evidence that each |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | and Walker was brief. The Government introduced evidence that each of the respondents was in federal custody on August 26, 976, that they had disappeared, apparently through a cell window, at approximately 5:5 a. m. on that date, and that they had been apprehended individually between September 27 and December 976. Respondents' defense of duress or necessity centered on the conditions in the jail during the months of June, July, and August 976, and on various threats and beatings directed at them during that period. In describing the conditions at the jail, they introduced evidence of frequent fires in "Northeast One," the maximum-security cellblock occupied by respondents prior to their escape. Construed in the light most favorable to them, this evidence demonstrated that the inmates of Northeast One, and on occasion the guards in that unit, set fire to trash, bedding, and other objects thrown from the cells. According to the inmates, the guards simply allowed the fires to burn until they went out. Although the fires apparently were confined to small areas and posed no substantial threat of spreading through the complex, poor ventilation caused smoke to collect and linger in the cellblock. Respondents Cooley and Bailey also introduced testimony that the guards at the jail had subjected them to beatings and to threats of death. Walker attempted to prove that he was an epileptic and had received inadequate medical attention for his seizures. *99 Consistently during the trial, the District Court stressed that, to sustain their defenses, respondents would have to introduce some evidence that they attempted to surrender or engaged in equivalent conduct once they had freed themselves from the conditions they described. But the court waited for such evidence in vain. Respondent Cooley, who had eluded the authorities for one month, testified that his "people" had tried to contact the authorities, but "never got in touch with anybody." App. 9. He also suggested that someone had told his sister that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would kill him when he was apprehended. Respondent Bailey, who was apprehended on November 9, 976, told a similar story. He stated that he "had the jail officials called several times," but did not turn himself in because "I would still be under the threats of death." Like Cooley, Bailey testified that "the FBI was telling my people that they was going to shoot me." at 69, 75-76. Only respondent Walker suggested that he had attempted to negotiate a surrender. Like Cooley and Bailey, Walker testified that the FBI had told his "people" that they would kill him when they recaptured |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | his "people" that they would kill him when they recaptured him. Nevertheless, according to Walker, he called the FBI three times and spoke with an agent whose name he could not remember. That agent allegedly assured him that the FBI would not harm him, but was unable to promise that Walker would not be returned to the D. C. jail. at 95-200.[2] Walker testified that he last called the FBI in mid-October. He was finally apprehended on December 976. At the close of all the evidence, the District Court rejected respondents' proffered instruction on duress as a defense to *400 prison escape.[] The court ruled that respondents had failed as a matter of law to present evidence sufficient to support such a defense because they had not turned themselves in after they had escaped the allegedly coercive conditions. After receiving instructions to disregard the evidence of the conditions in the jail, the jury convicted Bailey, Cooley, and Walker of violating 75 (a). Two months later, respondent Cogdell came to trial before the same District Judge who had presided over the trial of his co-respondents. When Cogdell attempted to offer testimony concerning the allegedly inhumane conditions at the D. C. jail, the District Judge inquired into Cogdell's conduct between his escape on August 26 and his apprehension on September 28. In response to Cogdell's assertion that he "may have written letters," the District Court specified that Cogdell could testify only as to "what he did [n]ot what he may have done." App. 20. Absent such testimony, however, the District Court ruled that Cogdell could not present evidence of conditions at the jail. Cogdell subsequently chose not to testify on his own behalf, and was convicted by the jury of violating 75 (a). By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals reversed each respondent's conviction and remanded for new trials. See 90 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 585 F.2d 087 (978); 90 U. S. *40 App. D. C. 85, 585 F.2d 0 (978). The majority concluded that the District Court should have allowed the jury to consider the evidence of coercive conditions in determining whether the respondents had formulated the requisite intent to sustain a conviction under 75 (a). According to the majority, 75 (a) required the prosecution to prove that a particular defendant left federal custody voluntarily, without permission, and "with an intent to avoid confinement." 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 48, 585 F.2d, at 09. The majority then defined the word "confinement" as encompassing only the "normal aspects" of punishment prescribed by our legal system. Thus, where |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | aspects" of punishment prescribed by our legal system. Thus, where a prisoner escapes in order to avoid "non-confinement" conditions such as beatings or homosexual attacks, he would not necessarily have the requisite intent to sustain a conviction under 75 (a). According to the majority: "When a defendant introduces evidence that he was subject to such `non-confinement' conditions, the crucial factual determination on the intent issue is whether the defendant left custody only to avoid these conditions or whether, in addition, the defendant also intended to avoid confinement. In making this determination the jury is to be guided by the trial court's instructions pointing out those factors that are most indicative of the presence or absence of an intent to avoid confinement." 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 48, n. 7, 585 F.2d, at 09, n. 7 Turning to the applicability of the defense of duress or necessity, the majority assumed that escape as defined by 75 (a) was a "continuing offense" as long as the escapee was at large. Given this assumption, the majority agreed with the District Court that, under normal circumstances, an escapee must present evidence of coercion to justify his continued absence from custody as well as his initial departure. Here, however, respondents had been indicted for "flee[ing] *402 and escap[ing]" "[o]n or about August 26, 976," and not for "leaving and staying away from custody." 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 55, 585 F.2d, at 00 Similarly, "[t]he trial court's instructions when read as a whole clearly give the impression that [respondents] were being tried only for leaving the jail on August 26, and not for failing to return at some later date." at 55, n. 585 F.2d, at 00, n. Under these circumstances, the majority believed that neither respondents nor the juries were acquainted with the proposition that the escapes in question were continuing offenses. This failure, according to the majority, constituted "an obvious violation of [respondents'] constitutional right to jury trial." at 56, 585 F.2d, at 0. The dissenting judge objected to what he characterized as a revolutionary reinterpretation of criminal law by the majority. He argued that the common-law crime of escape had traditionally required only "general intent," a mental state no more sophisticated than an "intent to go beyond permitted limits." at 77, 585 F.2d, at 22 The dissent concluded that the District Court had properly removed from consideration each respondent's contention that conditions and events at the D. C. jail justified his escape, because each respondent had introduced no evidence whatsoever justifying his continued absence from jail following that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | evidence whatsoever justifying his continued absence from jail following that escape. II Criminal liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, "an evil-meaning mind [and] an evil-doing hand." 42 U. S., at 25. In the present case, we must examine both the mental element, or mens rea, required for conviction under 75 (a) and the circumstances under which the "evil-doing hand" can avoid liability under that section because coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was present. *40 A Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime. In 970, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws decried the "confused and inconsistent ad hoc approach" of the federal courts to this issue and called for "a new departure." See Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 2 (hereinafter Working Papers). Although the central focus of this and other reform movements has been the codification of workable principles for determining criminal culpability, see, e. g., American Law Institute, Model Penal Code 2.0-2. (Prop. Off. Draft 962) (hereinafter Model Penal Code); S. 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 0-0 (976), a byproduct has been a general rethinking of traditional mens rea analysis. At common law, crimes generally were classified as requiring either "general intent" or "specific intent." This venerable distinction, however, has been the source of a good deal of confusion. As one treatise explained: "Sometimes `general intent' is used in the same way as `criminal intent' to mean the general notion of mens rea, while `specific intent' is taken to mean the mental state required for a particular crime. Or, `general intent' may be used to encompass all forms of the mental state requirement, while `specific intent' is limited to the one mental state of intent. Another possibility is that `general intent' will be used to characterize an intent to do something on an undetermined occasion, and `specific intent' to denote an intent to do that thing at a particular time and place." W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 28, pp. 20-202 (972) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter LaFave & Scott). This ambiguity has led to a movement away from the traditional dichotomy of intent and toward an alternative analysis of mens rea. See This new approach, exemplified *404 in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, is based on two principles. First, the ambiguous and elastic term "intent" is replaced with a hierarchy of culpable states of mind. The different levels in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | hierarchy of culpable states of mind. The different levels in this hierarchy are commonly identified, in descending order of culpability, as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.[4] See LaFave & Scott 94; Model Penal Code 2.02. Perhaps the most significant, and most esoteric, distinction drawn by this analysis is that between the mental states of "purpose" and "knowledge." As we pointed out in United v. United Gypsum (978), a person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if "`he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct,'" while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware "`that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.'"[5] In the case of most crimes, "the limited distinction between knowledge and purpose has not been considered important since `there is good reason for imposing liability whether the defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the results.'" United v. United Gypsum at quoting LaFave & Scott 97. Thus, in Gypsum we held that a person could be held criminally liable under of the Sherman Act if that person exchanged price *405 information with a competitor either with the knowledge that the exchange would have unreasonable anticompetitive effects or with the purpose of producing those -, and n. 2. In certain narrow classes of crimes, however, heightened culpability has been thought to merit special attention. Thus, the statutory and common law of homicide often distinguishes, either in setting the "degree" of the crime or in imposing punishment, between a person who knows that another person will be killed as the result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another's life. See LaFave & Scott 96-97. Similarly, where a defendant is charged with treason, this Court has stated that the Government must demonstrate that the defendant acted with a purpose to aid the enemy. See Haupt v. United 0 U.S. 6, 64 (947). Another such example is the law of inchoate offenses such as attempt and conspiracy, where a heightened mental state separates criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior. See Model Penal Code 2.02, Comments, p. 25 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 955) (hereinafter MPC Comments). In a general sense, "purpose" corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while "knowledge" corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent. See ibid.; LaFave & Scott 20-202. Were this substitution of terms the only innovation offered by the reformers, it would hardly be dramatic. But there is another |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | reformers, it would hardly be dramatic. But there is another ambiguity inherent in the traditional distinction between specific intent and general intent. Generally, even time-honored common-law crimes consist of several elements, and complex statutorily defined crimes exhibit this characteristic to an even greater degree. Is the same state of mind required of the actor for each element of the crime, or may some elements require one state of mind and some another? In United v. Feola, 420 U.S. 67 (975), for example, we were asked to decide *406 whether the Government, to sustain a conviction for assaulting a federal officer under 8 U.S. C. had to prove that the defendant knew that his victim was a federal officer. After looking to the legislative history of we concluded that Congress intended to require only "an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a federal officer." What Feola implied, the American Law Institute stated: "[C]lear analysis requires that the question of the kind of culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately with respect to each material element of the crime." MPC Comments 2. See also Working Papers ; LaFave & Scott 94. Before dissecting 75 (a) and assigning a level of culpability to each element, we believe that two observations are in order. First, in performing such analysis courts obviously must follow Congress' intent as to the required level of mental culpability for any particular offense. Principles derived from common law as well as precepts suggested by the American Law Institute must bow to legislative mandates. In the case of 75 (a), however, neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history mentions the mens rea required for conviction.[6] Second, while the suggested element-by-element analysis is a useful tool for making sense of an otherwise opaque concept, it is not the only principle to be considered. The administration of the federal system of criminal justice is confided to ordinary mortals, whether they be lawyers, judges, or jurors. This system could easily fall of its own weight if courts or *407 scholars become obsessed with hair-splitting distinctions, either traditional or novel, that Congress neither stated nor implied when it made the conduct criminal. As relevant to the charges against Bailey, Cooley, and Walker, 75 (a) required the prosecution to prove () that they had been in the custody of the Attorney General, (2) as the result of a conviction, and () that they had escaped from that custody. As for the charges against respondent Cogdell, 75 (a) required the same proof, with the exception that his |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | (a) required the same proof, with the exception that his confinement was based upon an arrest for a felony rather than a prior conviction. Although 75 (a) does not define the term "escape," courts and commentators are in general agreement that it means absenting oneself from custody without permission. See, e. g., 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 48, 585 F.2d, at 09; at 77, 585 F.2d, at 22 ; United v. Wilke, 4 F.2d 877 (CA9 97), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 98 (972). See also 2 J. Bishop, Criminal Law 0, p. 89 (9th ed. 92); W. Burdick, Law of Crime 462-46 (946); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 429 (957); F. Wharton, Criminal Law 200, p. 278 (th ed. 92). Respondents have not challenged the District Court's instructions on the first two elements of the crime defined by 75 (a). It is undisputed that, on August 26, 976, respondents were in the custody of the Attorney General as the result of either arrest on charges of felony or conviction. As for the element of "escape," we need not decide whether a person could be convicted on evidence of recklessness or negligence with respect to the limits on his freedom. A court may someday confront a case where an escapee did not know, but should have known, that he was exceeding the bounds of his confinement or that he was leaving without permission. Here, the District Court clearly instructed the juries that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that respondents "knowingly committed an act which the law makes a crime" and that they *408 acted "knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately." App. 22-22, 2-2. At a minimum, the juries had to find that respondents knew they were leaving the jail and that they knew they were doing so without authorization. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the juries' verdicts under this charge has never seriously been questioned, nor could it be. The majority of the Court of Appeals, however, imposed the added burden on the prosecution to prove as a part of its case in chief that respondents acted "with an intent to avoid confinement." While, for the reasons noted above, the word "intent" is quite ambiguous, the majority left little doubt that it was requiring the Government to prove that the respondents acted with the purposethat is, the conscious objectiveof leaving the jail without authorization. In a footnote explaining their holding, for example, the majority specified that an escapee did not act with the requisite intent if he escaped in order to avoid "`non-confinement' conditions" as opposed to "normal |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | in order to avoid "`non-confinement' conditions" as opposed to "normal aspects of `confinement.'" 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 48, n. 7, 585 F.2d, at 09, n. 7. We find the majority's position quite unsupportable. Nothing in the language or legislative history of 75 (a) indicates that Congress intended to require either such a heightened standard of culpability or such a narrow definition of confinement. As we stated earlier, the cases have generally held that, except in narrow classes of offenses, proof that the defendant acted knowingly is sufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly, we hold that the prosecution fulfills its burden under 75 (a) if it demonstrates that an escapee knew his actions would result in his leaving physical confinement without permission. Our holding in this respect comports with parallel definitions of the crime of escape both in the Model Penal Code and in a proposed revision of the Federal Criminal Code. See Model Penal Code 2.02 (), 242.6 (); Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany S. S. Rep. No. 94-00, pp. -4 (Comm. *409 Print 976).[7] Moreover, comments accompanying the proposed revision of the Federal Criminal Code specified that the new provision covering escape "substantially carrie[d] forward existing law." B Respondents also contend that they are entitled to a new trial because they presented (or, in Cogdell's case, could have presented) sufficient evidence of duress or necessity to submit such a defense to the jury. The majority below did not confront this claim squarely, holding instead that, to the extent that such a defense normally would be barred by a prisoner's failure to return to custody, neither the indictment nor the jury instructions adequately described such a requirement. See 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 55-56, 585 F.2d, at 00-0. Common law historically distinguished between the defenses of duress and necessity. Duress was said to excuse criminal conduct where the actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law. While the defense of duress covered the situation where the coercion had its source in the *40 actions of other human beings, the defense of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils. Thus, where A destroyed a dike because B threatened to kill him if he did not, A would argue that he acted under duress, whereas if A destroyed the dike in order to protect |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | whereas if A destroyed the dike in order to protect more valuable property from flooding, A could claim a defense of necessity. See generally LaFave & Scott 74-84. Modern cases have tended to blur the distinction between duress and necessity. In the court below, the majority discarded the labels "duress" and "necessity," choosing instead to examine the policies underlying the traditional defenses. See 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 52, 585 F.2d, at 097. In particular, the majority felt that the defenses were designed to spare a person from punishment if he acted "under threats or conditions that a person of ordinary firmness would have been unable to resist," or if he reasonably believed that criminal action "was necessary to avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense." at 52-5, 585 F.2d, at 097-098. The Model Penal Code redefines the defenses along similar lines. See Model Penal Code 2.09 (duress) and02 (choice of evils). We need not speculate now, however, on the precise contours of whatever defenses of duress or necessity are available against charges brought under 75 (a). Under any definition of these defenses one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, "a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm," the defenses will fail. LaFave & Scott 79.[8] Clearly, in the context of prison escape, the escapee is *4 not entitled to claim a defense of duress or necessity unless and until he demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, violation of 75 (a) was his only reasonable alternative. See United v. Boomer, 57 F.2d 54, (CA0), cert. denied sub nom. Heft v. United 46 U.S. 9 (978); (969). In the present case, the Government contends that respondents' showing was insufficient on two grounds. First, the Government asserts that the threats and conditions cited by respondents as justifying their escape were not sufficiently immediate or serious to justify their departure from lawful custody. Second, the Government contends that, once the respondents had escaped, the coercive conditions in the jail were no longer a threat and respondents were under a duty to terminate their status as fugitives by turning themselves over to the authorities. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the evidence of coercion and conditions in the jail was at least sufficient to go to the jury as an affirmative defense to the crime charged. As for their failure to return to custody after gaining their freedom, respondents assert that this |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | to custody after gaining their freedom, respondents assert that this failure should be but one factor in the overall determination whether their initial departure was justified. According to respondents, their failure to surrender "may reflect adversely on the bona fides of [their] motivation" in leaving the jail, but should not withdraw *42 the question of their motivation from the jury's consideration. Brief for Respondents 67. See also n. We need not decide whether such evidence as that submitted by respondents was sufficient to raise a jury question as to their initial departures. This is because we decline to hold that respondents' failure to return is "just one factor" for the jury to weigh in deciding whether the initial escape could be affirmatively justified. On the contrary, several considerations lead us to conclude that, in order to be entitled to an instruction on duress or necessity as a defense to the crime charged, an escapee must first offer evidence justifying his continued absence from custody as well as his initial departure[9] and that an indispensable element of such an offer *4 is testimony of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force. First, we think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody as defined in 75 (a) is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure. Given the continuing threat to society posed by an escaped prisoner, "the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one." Toussie v. United 97 U.S. 2, 5 (970). Moreover, every federal court that has considered this issue has held, either explicitly or implicitly, that 75 (a) defines a continuing offense. See, e. g., United v. Michelson, (CA9 977); United v. Cluck, (CA8), cert. denied, (976); United v. Joiner, 496 F.2d 4 (CA5), cert. denied, 49 U.S. 002 (974); United v. Chapman, (CA5 972). Respondents point out that Toussie calls for restraint in labeling crimes as continuing offenses. The justification for that restraint, however, is the tension between the doctrine of continuing offenses and the policy of repose embodied in statutes *44 of limitations. See 97 U.S., at 4-5. This tension is wholly absent where, as in the case of 75 (a), the statute of limitations is tolled for the period that the escapee remains at large.[0] The remaining considerations leading to our conclusion are, perhaps ironically, derived from the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | leading to our conclusion are, perhaps ironically, derived from the same concern for the statutory and constitutional right of jury trial upon which the majority of the Court of Appeals based its reasoning. There was no significant "variance" in the indictment merely because respondents had not been indicted under a theory of escape as a continuing offense and because the District Court did not explain this theory to the juries. We have held on several occasions that "an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." Hamling v. United 48 U.S. 87, 7 (974). These indictments, which track closely the language of 75 (a), were undoubtedly sufficient under this standard. See 48 U.S., at 7. As for the alleged failure of the District Court to elaborate for the benefit of the jury on the continuing nature of the charged offense, we believe that such elaboration was unnecessary where, as here, the evidence failed as a matter of law in a crucial particular to reach the minimum threshold that would have required an instruction on respondents' theory of the case generally. The Anglo-Saxon tradition of criminal justice, embodied in the United Constitution and in federal statutes, makes jurors the judges of the credibility of testimony offered by witnesses. It is for them, generally, and not for appellate *45 courts, to say that a particular witness spoke the truth or fabricated a cock-and-bull story. An escapee who flees from a jail that is in the process of burning to the ground may well be entitled to an instruction on duress or necessity, "`for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'" United v. Kirby, (869). And in the federal system it is the jury that is the judge of whether the prisoner's account of his reason for flight is true or false. But precisely because a defendant is entitled to have the credibility of his testimony, or that of witnesses called on his behalf, judged by the jury, it is essential that the testimony given or proffered meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that, if a jury finds it to be true, it would support an affirmative defensehere that of duress or necessity. We therefore hold that, where a criminal defendant is charged with escape and claims that he is entitled to an |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Bailey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110175/united-states-v-bailey/ | with escape and claims that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, he must proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force. We have reviewed the evidence examined elaborately in the majority and dissenting opinions below, and find the case not even close, even under respondents' versions of the facts, as to whether they either surrendered or offered to surrender at their earliest possible opportunity. Since we have determined that this is an indispensable element of the defense of duress or necessity, respondents were not entitled to any instruction on such a theory. Vague and necessarily self-serving statements of defendants or witnesses as to future good intentions or ambiguous conduct simply do not support a finding of this element of the defense.[] *46 III In reversing the judgments of the Court of Appeals, we believe that we are at least as faithful as the majority of that court to its expressed policy of "allowing the jury to perform its accustomed role" as the arbiter of factual disputes. 90 U. S. App. D. C., at 5, 585 F.2d, at 096. The requirement of a threshold showing on the part of those who assert an affirmative defense to a crime is by no means a derogation of the importance of the jury as a judge of credibility. Nor is it based on any distrust of the jury's ability to separate fact from fiction. On the contrary, it is a testament to the importance of trial by jury and the need to husband the resources necessary for that process by limiting evidence in a trial to that directed at the elements of the crime or at affirmative defenses. If, as we here hold, an affirmative defense consists of several elements and testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain it even if believed, the trial court and jury need not be burdened with testimony supporting other elements of the defense. *47 These cases present a good example of the potential for wasting valuable trial resources. In general, trials for violations of 75 (a) should be simple affairs. The key elements are capable of objective demonstration; the mens rea, as discussed above, will usually depend upon reasonable inferences from those objective facts. Here, however, the jury in the trial of Bailey, Cooley, and Walker heard five days of testimony. It was presented with evidence of every unpleasant aspect of prison life from the amount of garbage on the cellblock floor, |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | A number of growers, handlers, and processors of California tree fruits (respondents) brought this proceeding to challenge the validity of various regulations contained in marketing orders promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture. The orders impose assessments on respondents that cover the expenses of administering the orders, including the cost of generic advertising of California nectarines, plums, and peaches. The question presented to us is whether the requirement that respondents finance such generic advertising *461 is a law "abridging the freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment. I Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), ch. 296, as amended, 7 U.S. C. 601 et seq., in order to establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural commodities. 602(1). Marketing orders promulgated pursuant to the AMAA are a species of economic regulation that has displaced competition in a number of discrete markets; they are expressly exempted from the antitrust laws. 608b. Collective action, rather than the aggregate consequences of independent competitive choices, characterizes these regulated markets. In order "to avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices," 602(4), these orders may include mechanisms that provide a uniform price to all producers in a particular market,[1] that limit the quality and the quantity of the commodity that may be marketed, 608c(6)(A), (7), that determine the grade and size of the commodity, 608c(6)(A), and that make an orderly disposition of any surplus that might depress market prices, Pursuant to the policy of collective, rather than competitive, marketing, the orders also authorize joint research and development projects, inspection procedures that ensure uniform quality, and even certain standardized packaging requirements. 608c(6)(D), (H), (I). The expenses of administering such orders, including specific projects undertaken to serve the economic interests of the cooperating producers, are "paid from funds collected pursuant to the marketing order." 608c(6)(I), 610(b)(2)(ii). Marketing orders must be approved by either two-thirds of the affected producers or by producers who market at *462 least two-thirds of the volume of the commodity. 608c(9)(B). The AMAA restricts the marketing orders "to the smallest regional production areas practicable." 608c(11)(b). The orders are implemented by committees composed of producers and handlers of the regulated commodity, appointed by the Secretary, who recommend rules to the Secretary governing marketing matters such as fruit size and maturity levels. 7 CFR 916.23, 916.62, 917.25, 917.30 (1997). The committees also determine the annual rate of assessments to cover the expenses of administration, inspection services, research, and advertising and promotion. 916.31(c), 917.35(f). Among the collective activities that Congress authorized for certain specific commodities is "any form of marketing |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | authorized for certain specific commodities is "any form of marketing promotion including paid " 7 U.S. C. 608c(6) (I).[2] The authorized promotional activities, like the marketing orders themselves, are intended to serve the producers' common interest in disposing of their output on favorable terms. The central message of the generic advertising at issue in this case is that "California Summer Fruits" are wholesome, delicious, and attractive to discerning shoppers. See App. 530. All of the relevant advertising, insofar as it is authorized by the statute and the Secretary's regulations, is designed to serve the producers' and handlers' common interest in promoting the sale of a particular product.[3] *463 II The regulations at issue in this litigation are contained in Marketing Order 916, which regulates nectarines grown in California, and Marketing Order 917, which originally regulated peaches, pears, and plums grown in California.[4] A 1966 amendment to the former expressly authorized generic advertising of nectarines, see and a series of amendments, beginning in 1971, to the latter authorized advertising of each of the regulated commodities, see (1971); 17528 (1976).[5] The advertising provisions relating to pears are not now being challenged, thus we limit our discussion to generic advertising of California nectarines, plums, and peaches. Respondent Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., is a large producer of these fruits that packs and markets its own output as well as that grown by other farmers. In 1987, after encountering problems with some fruit varieties under the maturity and minimum size standards in the orders, it refused to pay its assessments and filed a petition with the Secretary challenging those standards. In 19, it filed a second petition challenging amendments to the maturity standards as well as the generic advertising regulations. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in two separate decisions that are explained in a total of 769 pages, ruled in favor of Wileman on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) issues, without resolving respondents' First Amendment claims. App. to *464 Brief in Opposition 393a.[6] In a comparably detailed decision, the Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture entirely reversed the ALJ. Wileman, along with 15 other handlers, then sought review of the Judicial Officer's decision by filing this action in the District Court pursuant to 7 U.S. C. 608c(15)(B). A number of enforcement actions brought by the Secretary to collect withheld assessments were consolidated with the review proceeding. Acting on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld both marketing orders and entered judgment of $3.1 million in past due assessments against the handlers. In the Court of Appeals the handlers challenged the generic advertising |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | the Court of Appeals the handlers challenged the generic advertising provisions of the orders as violative of both the APA and the First Amendment. The court rejected the statutory challenge, concluding that the record contained substantial evidence justifying both the original decision to engage in generic advertising[7] and the continuation of the program. It explained: *465 "The Nectarine Administrative Committee and the Peach Commodity Committee engage in a careful process each year prior to and during their annual spring meetings in approving the advertising program for the upcoming season. Prior to the full committee meeting, the Subcommittee on Advertising and Promotion meets to review in detail the program developed by its staff. The staff in turn uses monthly reports on price trends, consumer interests, and general market conditions in the formation of the proposed advertising program. "[I]t is only because the handlers themselves, through the committees, recommend a budget with a generic advertising component that the program is renewed by the Secretary every year. In fact, in most years the recommendations have been unanimous. We cannot assume that the handlersthe parties with firsthand knowledge of the state of their industrywould make recommendations that have an adverse effect on their businesses. Of course, the interests of the voting committee members may not always coincide with those of every handler in the industry. However, this court has previously noted that the Supreme Court `upheld the constitutionality of the system despite the fact that it may produce results with which some growers or handlers will disagree.' Saulsbury Orchards and Almond Processing," Wileman Bros. & Elliott, The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that Government enforced contributions to pay for generic advertising violated the First Amendment rights of the handlers. Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision that had cited our *466 decision in see Cal-Almond, the court began by stating that the "First Amendment right of freedom of speech includes a right not to be compelled to render financial support for others' speech." It then reviewed the generic advertising regulations under "the test for restrictions on commercial speech set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 566" Although it was satisfied that the Government interest in enhancing returns to peach and nectarine growers was substantial, it was not persuaded that the generic advertising passed either the second or third "prongs" of Central Hudson. With respect to the former, even though the generic advertising "undoubtedly" has increased peach and nectarine sales, the Government failed to prove that it did so more effectively than individualized The court also concluded that the program was not "narrowly tailored" |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | court also concluded that the program was not "narrowly tailored" because it did not give the handlers any credit for their own advertising and because California was the only State in which such programs were in place.[8] The Court of Appeals' disposition of the First Amendment claim is in conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that rejected a challenge to generic advertising of beef authorized by the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S. C. 2901-2911. United Characterizing that statute as "legislation in furtherance of an ideologically neutral compelling state interest," and noting that the "Cattlemen's Board is authorized only to develop *467 a campaign to promote the product that the defendant himself has chosen to market," despite the plaintiff's objections to the content of the advertising,[9] the court found no violation of his First Amendment rights. We granted the Secretary's petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict, and now reverse. III In challenging the constitutionality of the generic advertising program in the Court of Appeals, respondents relied, in part, on their claimed disagreement with the content of some of the generic n. 6. The District Court had found no merit to this aspect of their claim,[10] and the Court of Appeals did not rely on it for its conclusion that the program was unconstitutional. Rather, the Court of Appeals invalidated the entire program on the theory that the program could not survive Central Hudson because the Government had failed to prove that generic advertising was more effective than individual advertising in increasing consumer demand for California nectarines, plums, and peaches. That holding did not depend at all on either the content of the advertising, or on the respondents' claimed disagreement with any particular message. Although *468 respondents have continued in this Court to argue about their disagreement with particular messages, those arguments, while perhaps calling into question the administration of portions of the program, have no bearing on the validity of the entire program.[11] For purposes of our analysis, we neither accept nor reject the factual assumption underlying the Court of Appeals' invalidation of the programnamely, that generic advertising may not be the most effective method of promoting the sale of these commodities. The legal question that we address is whether being compelled to fund this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve. *469 In answering that question we stress the importance of the statutory context in which it arises. California |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | importance of the statutory context in which it arises. California nectarines and peaches are marketed pursuant to detailed marketing orders that have displaced many aspects of independent business activity that characterize other portions of the economy in which competition is fully protected by the antitrust laws. The business entities that are compelled to fund the generic advertising at issue in this litigation do so as a part of a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act independently is already constrained by the regulatory scheme. It is in this context that we consider whether we should review the assessments used to fund collective advertising, together with other collective activities, under the standard appropriate for the review of economic regulation or under a heightened standard appropriate for the review of First Amendment issues. IV Three characteristics of the regulatory scheme at issue distinguish it from laws that we have found to abridge the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience.[12] Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech.[13] Third, they do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political *470 or ideological views.[14] Indeed, since all of the respondents are engaged in the business of marketing California nectarines, plums, and peaches, it is fair to presume that they agree with the central message of the speech that is generated by the generic program. Thus, none of our First Amendment jurisprudence provides any support for the suggestion that the promotional regulations should be scrutinized under a different standard from that applicable to the other anti competitive features of the marketing orders. Respondents advance several arguments in support of their claim that being required to fund the generic advertising program violates the First Amendment. Respondents argue that the assessments for generic advertising impinge on their First Amendment rights because they reduce the amount of money that producers have available to conduct their own This is equally true, however, of assessments to cover employee benefits, inspection fees, or any other activity that is authorized by a marketing order. The First Amendment has never been construed to require heightened scrutiny of any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the size of a firm's advertising budget. The fact that an economic regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a handler's individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a restriction on speech. The Court of Appeals, perhaps recognizing the expansive |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | on speech. The Court of Appeals, perhaps recognizing the expansive nature of respondents' argument, did not rely on the claim that the assessments for generic advertising indirectly limit the extent of the handlers' own Rather, the Court of Appeals apparently accepted respondents' argument that the assessments infringe First Amendment rights because they constitute compelled speech. Our compelled speech case law, however, is clearly inapplicable to the regulatory scheme at issue here. The use of assessments to pay *471 for advertising does not require respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own mouths, cf. West Virginia Bd. of require them to use their own property to convey an antagonistic ideological message, cf. ; Pacific Gas & Elec. force them to respond to a hostile message when they "would prefer to remain silent," see or require them to be publicly identified or associated with another's message, cf. PruneYard Shopping Respondents are not required themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for With trivial exceptions on which the court did not rely,[15] none of the generic advertising conveys any message with which respondents disagree. Furthermore, the advertising is attributed not to them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or "California Summer Fruits." See, e. g., App. 530. Although this regulatory scheme may not compel speech as recognized by our case law, it does compel financial contributions that are used to fund As the Court of Appeals read our decision in Abood, just as the First Amendment prohibits compelled speech, it prohibitsat least without sufficient justification by the governmentcompelling an individual to "render financial support for others' speech." However, Abood, and the cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First Amendment right not to be compelled to provide financial support for any organization that conducts expressive activities. Rather, Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's "freedom of belief." We considered, in Abood, whether it was constitutional *472 for the State of Michigan to require government employees who objected to unions or union activities to contribute to an "agency shop" arrangement requiring all employees to pay union dues as a condition of employment. We held that compelled contributions to support activities related to collective bargaining were "constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop" to labor relations. Relying on our compelled-speech cases, however, the Court found that compelled contributions for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining implicated First Amendment interests because they interfere with the values |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | implicated First Amendment interests because they interfere with the values lying at the "heart of the First Amendment[]the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State." ; see also Here, however, requiring respondents to pay the assessments cannot be said to engender any crisis of conscience. None of the advertising in this record promotes any particular message other than encouraging consumers to buy California tree fruit. Neither the fact that respondents may prefer to foster that message independently in order to promote and distinguish their own products, nor the fact that they think more or less money should be spent fostering it, makes this case comparable to those in which an objection rested on political or ideological disagreement with the content of the message. The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being well spent "does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment complaint." Moreover, rather than suggesting that mandatory funding of expressive activities always constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment, our cases provide affirmative support for the proposition that assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members of the *473 group. Thus, in while we held that the cost of certain publications that were not germane to collective-bargaining activities could not be assessed against dissenting union members, we squarely held that it was permissible to charge them for those portions of "the Teachers' Voice that concern teaching and education generally, professional development, unemployment, job opportunities, award programs and other miscellaneous matters." That holding was an application of the rule announced in Abood and further refined in a case involving bar association activities. As we pointed out in Keller, "Abood held that a union could not expend a dissenting individual's dues for ideological activities not `germane' to the purpose for which compelled association was justified: collective bargaining. Here the compelled association and integrated bar are justified by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity." This test is clearly satisfied in this case because (1) the generic advertising of California peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | generic advertising of California peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane to the purposes of the marketing orders and, (2) in any event, the assessments are not used to fund ideological activities.[16] *474 We are not persuaded that any greater weight should be given to the fact that some producers do not wish to foster generic advertising than to the fact that many of them may well object to the marketing orders themselves because they might earn more money in an unregulated market. Respondents' criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgment of anybody's right to speak freely. Similar criticisms might be directed at other features of the regulatory orders that impose restraints on competition that arguably disadvantage particular producers for the benefit of the entire market.[17] Although one may indeed question the wisdom of such a program, its debatable features are insufficient to warrant special First Amendment scrutiny. It was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to rely on Central Hudson for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of market order assessments for promotional [] V The Court of Appeals' decision to apply the Central Hudson test is inconsistent with the very nature and purpose of the collective action program at issue here. The Court of *475 Appeals concluded that the advertising program does not "directly advance" the purposes of the marketing orders because the Secretary had failed to prove that generic advertising is any more effective in stimulating consumer demand for the commodities than the advertising that might otherwise be undertaken by producers acting independently. We find this an odd burden of proof to assign to the administrator of marketing orders that reflect a policy of displacing unrestrained competition with Government supervised cooperative marketing programs. If there were no marketing orders at all to set maturity levels, size, quantity, and other features, competition might well generate greater production of nectarines, peaches, and plums. It may also be true that if there were no generic advertising, competition would generate even more advertising and an even larger consumer demand than does the cooperative program. But the potential benefits of individual advertising do not bear on the question whether generic advertising directly advances the statute's collectivist goals. Independent advertising would be primarily motivated by the individual competitor's interest in maximizing its own sales, rather than in increasing the overall consumption of a particular commodity. While the First Amendment unquestionably protects the individual producer's right to advertise its own brands, the statute is designed to further the economic interests of the producers as a |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118139/glickman-v-wileman-brothers-elliott-inc/ | to further the economic interests of the producers as a group. The basic policy decision that underlies the entire statute rests on an assumption that in the volatile markets for agricultural commodities the public will be best served by compelling cooperation among producers in making economic decisions that would be made independently in a free market. It is illogical, therefore, to criticize any cooperative program authorized by this statute on the ground that competition would provide greater benefits than joint action. On occasion it is appropriate to emphasize the difference between policy judgments and constitutional adjudication. *476 Judges who have endorsed the view that the Sherman Act is a charter of economic liberty[19] naturally approach laws that command competitors to participate in joint ventures with a jaundiced eye. Doubts concerning the policy judgments that underlie many features of this legislation do not, however, justify reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for reviewing economic regulations. Appropriate respect for the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States provides abundant support for the constitutionality of these marketing orders on the following reasoning. Generic advertising is intended to stimulate consumer demand for an agricultural product in a regulated market. That purpose is legitimate and consistent with the regulatory goals of the overall statutory scheme. See 602(1). At least a majority of the producers in each of the markets in which such advertising is authorized must be persuaded that it is effective, or presumably the programs would be discontinued.[20] Whether the benefits from the advertising justify its cost is a question that not only might be answered differently in different markets, but also involves the exercise of policy judgments that are better made by producers and administrators than by judges. As with other features of the marketing orders, individual producers may not share the views or the interests of others in the same market. But decisions that are made by the majority, if acceptable for other regulatory programs, should be equally so for promotional Perhaps more money may be at stake when a generic advertising program *477 is adopted than for other features of the cooperative endeavor, but that fact does not transform this question of business judgment into a constitutional issue. In sum, what we are reviewing is a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress. The mere fact that one or more producers "do not wish to foster" generic advertising of their product is not a sufficient reason for overriding the judgment of |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Sullivan v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112868/sullivan-v-louisiana/ | The question presented is whether a constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt instruction may be harmless error. I Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder in the course of committing an armed robbery at a New Orleans bar. His alleged accomplice in the crime, a convicted felon named Michael Hillhouse, testifying at the trial pursuant to a grant of immunity, identified petitioner as the murderer. Although several other people were in the bar at the time of the robbery, only one testified at trial. This witness, who had been unable to identify either Hillhouse or petitioner at a physical lineup, testified that they committed the robbery, and that she saw petitioner hold a gun to the victim's head. There was other circumstantial evidence supporting the conclusion that petitioner was the triggerman. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that there was reasonable doubt as to both the identity of the murderer and his intent. *277 In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge gave a definition of "reasonable doubt" that was, as the State conceded below, essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in See and n. 3. The jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and subsequently recommended that he be sentenced to death. The trial court agreed. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of held, consistent with its opinion on remand from our decision in Cage, that the erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable It therefore upheld the conviction, though remanding for a new sentencing hearing because of ineffectiveness of counsel in the sentencing phase. We granted certiorari, II The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" In we found this right to trial by jury in serious criminal cases to be "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and therefore applicable in state proceedings. The right includes, of course, as its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of "guilty." See Thus, although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence. See also United ; What the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is prescribed by the Due Process Clause. The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense *278 charged, see, e. g., ; and must persuade the factfinder "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the facts necessary to establish each of |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Sullivan v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112868/sullivan-v-louisiana/ | reasonable doubt" of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements, see, e. g., In re ; This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement, which was adhered to by virtually all common-law jurisdictions, applies in state as well as federal proceedings. It is self-evident, we think, that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable In other words, the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable Our per curiam opinion in Cage, which we accept as controlling, held that an instruction of the sort given here does not produce such a verdict.[*] Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was therefore denied. III In we rejected the view that all federal constitutional errors in the course of a criminal trial require reversal. We held that the *279 Fifth Amendment violation of prosecutorial comment upon the defendant's failure to testify would not require reversal of the conviction if the State could show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." The standard recognizes that "certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been `harmless' in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial." Although most constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis, see (collecting examples), some will always invalidate the conviction. at 309-310 ; ; ). The question in the present case is to which category the present error belongs. itself suggests the answer. Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question it instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. See Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the jury actually rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact renderedno matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might bewould violate the jury-trial guarantee. See ; |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Sullivan v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112868/sullivan-v-louisiana/ | that verdict might bewould violate the jury-trial guarantee. See ; ; Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-error review in the present case becomes evident. Since, for the reasons described above, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of review is simply absent. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-areasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubtnot that the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough. See The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty. See Insofar as the possibility of harmless-error review is concerned, the jury-instruction error in this case is quite different from the jury-instruction error of erecting a presumption regarding an element of the offense. A mandatory presumptionfor example, the presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary actsviolates the Fourteenth Amendment, because it may relieve the State of its burden of proving all elements of the offense. ; But "[w]hen a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must *281 find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable " v. And when the latter facts "are so closely related to the ultimate fact to be presumed that no rational jury could find those facts without also finding that ultimate fact, making those findings is functionally equivalent to finding the element required to be presumed." See also A reviewing court may thus be able to conclude that the presumption played no significant role in the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable But the essential connection to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" factual finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings. A reviewing court can only engage in pure speculationits view of what a reasonable jury would have done. And when it does that, "the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty." at Another mode of analysis leads to the same conclusion that harmless-error analysis does not apply: In |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Sullivan v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112868/sullivan-v-louisiana/ | the same conclusion that harmless-error analysis does not apply: In Fulminante, we distinguished between, on the one hand, "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by `harmless-error' standards," and, on the other hand, trial errors which occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented," Denial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is certainly an error of the former sort, the jury guarantee being a "basic protectio[n]" whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function, The right to trial by jury reflects, we have said, "a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." The deprivation of that right, *282 with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as "structural error." The judgment of the Supreme Court of is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | In this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, is "Indian " We conclude that it is not, and we therefore reverse the judgment below. I The Village of Venetie, which is located in Alaska above the Arctic Circle, is home to the Neets'aii Gwich'in In 1943, the Secretary of the Interior created a reservation for the Neets'aii Gwich'in out of the land surrounding Venetie and another nearby tribal village, Arctic Village. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. This land, which is about the size of Delaware, remained a reservation until 1971, when Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), a comprehensive statute designed to settle all land claims by Alaska Natives. See as amended, 43 U.S. C. 1601 et seq. In enacting ANCSA, Congress sought to end the sort of federal supervision over Indian affairs that had previously *524 marked federal Indian policy. ANCSA's text states that the settlement of the land claims was to be accomplished "without litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property, without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, [and] with- out creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship. " 1601(b) To this end, ANCSA revoked "the various reserves set aside for Native use" by legislative or Executive action, except for the Annette Island Reserve inhabited by the Metlakatla Indians, and completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. 1603, 1618(a). In return, Congress authorized the transfer of $962.5 million in state and federal funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to state-chartered private business corporations that were to be formed pursuant to the statute; all of the shareholders of these corporations were required to be Alaska Natives. 1605, 1607, 1613. The ANCSA corporations received title to the transferred land in fee simple, and no federal restrictions applied to subsequent land transfers by them. Pursuant to ANCSA, two Native corporations were established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in, one in Venetie, and one in Arctic Village. In 1973, those corporations elected to make use of a provision in ANCSA allowing Native corporations to take title to former reservation lands set aside for Indians prior to 1971, in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. See 1618(b). The United States conveyed fee simple title to the land constituting the former Venetie Reservation to the two corporations as tenants in common; |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | Venetie Reservation to the two corporations as tenants in common; thereafter, the corporations transferred title to the land to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). *525 In 1986, the State of Alaska entered into a joint venture agreement with a private contractor for the construction of a public school in Venetie, financed with state funds. In December 1986, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on the Tribe's land. When both the contractor and the State, which under the joint venture agreement was the party responsible for paying the tax, refused to pay, the Tribe attempted to collect the tax in tribal court from the State, the school district, and the contractor. The State then filed suit in Federal District Court for the District of Alaska and sought to enjoin collection of the tax. The Tribe moved to dismiss the State's complaint, but the District Court denied the motion. It held that the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not Indian country within the meaning of 18 U.S. C. 1151(b), which provides that Indian country includes all "dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States"; as a result, "the Trib[e] [did] not have the power to impose a tax upon non-members of the tribe such as the plaintiffs." Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, No. F87-0051 CV (HRH) (D. Alaska, Aug. 2, 1995), App. to Pet. for Cert. 79a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court held that a six-factor balancing test should be used to interpret the term "dependent Indian communities" in 1151(b), see and it summarized the requirements of that test as follows: "[A] dependent Indian community requires a showing of federal set aside and federal superintendence. These requirements are to be construed broadly and should be informed in the particular case by a consideration of the following factors: "(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government; (3) the established practice of government agencies *526 toward that area; (4) the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples." Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "federal set aside" and "federal superintendence" requirements were met and that the Tribe's land was therefore Indian Judge Fernandez wrote separately. |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | the Tribe's land was therefore Indian Judge Fernandez wrote separately. In his view, ANCSA was intended to be a departure from traditional Indian policy: "It attempted to preserve Indian tribes, but simultaneously attempted to sever them from the land; it attempted to leave them as sovereign entities for some purposes, but as sovereigns without territorial reach." Noting that the majority's holding called into question the status of all 44 million acres of land conveyed by ANCSA, he wrote that "[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, I would eschew the tribe's request and would avoid creating the kind of chaos that the 92nd Congress wisely sought to avoid." He nonetheless concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent required him to concur in the result. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Tribe's land is Indian II A "Indian country" is currently defined at 18 U.S. C. 1151. In relevant part, the statute provides: "[T]he term `Indian country' means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of *527 the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same." Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal criminal jurisdiction, we have recognized that it also generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction such as the one at issue here. See[1] Because ANCSA revoked the Venetie Reservation, and because no Indian allotments are at issue, whether the Tribe's land is Indian country depends on whether it falls within the "dependent Indian communities" prong of the statute, 1151(b).[2] Since 18 U.S. C. 1151 was enacted in 1948, we have not had an occasion to interpret the term "dependent Indian communities." We now hold that it refers to a limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirementsfirst, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence. Our holding is based on our conclusion that in enacting 1151, Congress codified these two requirements, which previously we had held necessary for a finding of "Indian country" generally. *528 Before 1151 was enacted, we held in three cases that Indian lands that were not reservations could be Indian country and that the Federal Government could |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | could be Indian country and that the Federal Government could therefore exercise jurisdiction over them. See United ; United ; United[3] The first of these cases, United posed the question whether the Federal Government could constitutionally proscribe the introduction of "intoxicating liquor" into the lands of the Pueblo We rejected the contention that federal power could not extend to the Pueblo lands because, unlike Indians living on reservations, the Pueblos owned their lands in fee simple. We indicated that the Pueblos' title was not fee simple title in the commonly understood sense of the term. Congress had recognized the Pueblos' title to their ancestral lands by statute, and Executive orders had reserved additional public lands "for the [Pueblos'] use and occupancy." In addition, Congress had enacted legislation with respect to the lands "in the exercise of the Government's guardianship over th[e] [Indian] tribes and their affairs," including federal restrictions on the lands' alienation.[4] Congress therefore could exercise jurisdiction over the Pueblo lands, under its general power over "all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a State." *529 In United we held that Indian allotmentsparcels of land created out of a diminished Indian reservation and held in trust by the Federal Government for the benefit of individual Indianswere Indian We stated that the original reservation was Indian country "simply because it had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government. " After the reservation's diminishment, the allotments continued to be Indian country, as "the lands remained Indian lands set apart for Indians under governmental care; we are unable to find ground for the conclusion that they became other than Indian country through the distribution into separate holdings, the Government retaining control." In United we held that the Reno Indian Colony in Reno, Nevada, was Indian country even though it was not a We reasoned that, like Indian reservations generally, the colony had been "`validly set apart for the use of the Indians under the superintendence of the Government.' " (quoting United ) (emphasis deleted). We noted that the Federal Government had created the colony by purchasing the land with "funds appropriated by Congress" and that the Federal Government held the colony's land in trust for the benefit of the Indians residing and n. 4. We also emphasized that the Federal Government possessed the authority to enact "regulations and protective laws respecting th[e] [colony's] territory," which it had exercised in retaining title to the land |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | which it had exercised in retaining title to the land and permitting the Indians to live For these reasons, a federal statute requiring the forfeiture of automobiles carrying "intoxicants" into the Indian country applied to the colony; we noted that the law was an example of the protections that Congress had extended to all "`dependent Indian communities' " within the territory of the United *530 States. (quoting United ) (emphasis deleted). In each of these cases, therefore, we relied upon a finding of both a federal set-aside and federal superintendence in concluding that the Indian lands in question constituted Indian country and that it was permissible for the Federal Government to exercise jurisdiction over them. Section 1151 does not purport to alter this definition of Indian country, but merely lists the three different categories of Indian country mentioned in our prior cases: Indian reservations, see Donnelly v.United States, ; dependent Indian communities, see United -539; United ; and allotments, see United The entire text of 1151(b),and not just the term "dependent Indian communities," is taken virtually verbatim from which language we later quoted in See United ; United Moreover, the Historical and Revision Notes to the statute that enacted 1151 state that 1151's definition of Indian country is based "on [the] latest construction of the term by the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. following U. S. v. (See also Donnelly v. U. S. ) Indian allotments were included in the definition on authority of the case of U. S. v. " See Notes to 1948 Act, following 18 U.S. C. 1151, p. 276 (citations omitted). We therefore must conclude that in enacting 1151(b), Congress indicated that a federal set-aside and a federal superintendence requirement must be satisfied for a finding of a "dependent Indian community"just as those requirements had to be met for a finding of Indian country before 18 U.S. C. 1151 was enacted.[5] These requirements are reflected *531 in the text of 1151(b): The federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an "Indian community";[6] the federal superintendence requirement guarantees that the Indian community is sufficiently "dependent" on the Federal Government that the Federal Government and the Indians involved, rather than the States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land in question.[7] *532 B The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements. After the enactment of ANCSA, the Tribe's lands are neither "validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such," nor are they under the superintendence of the Federal Government. With respect to the |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | the superintendence of the Federal Government. With respect to the federal set-aside requirement, it is significant that ANCSA, far from designating Alaskan lands for Indian use, revoked the existing Venetie Reservation, and indeed revoked all existing reservations in Alaska "set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial Order for Native use, " save one. 43 U.S. C. 1618(a) In no clearer fashion could Congress have departed from its traditional practice of setting aside Indian lands. Cf. The Tribe arguesand the Court of Appeals majority agreed, see -1302that the ANCSA lands were set apart for the use of the Neets'aii Gwich'in, "as such," because the Neets'aii Gwich'in acquired the lands pursuant to an ANCSA provision allowing Natives to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing all other ANCSA transfers. Brief for Respondents 40-41 (citing 43 U.S. C. 1618(b)). The difficulty with this contention is that ANCSA transferred reservation lands to private, statechartered Native corporations, without any restraints on alienation or significant use restrictions, and with the goal of avoiding "any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, *533 privileges, or obligations." 1601(b); see also 1607, 1613. By ANCSA's very design, Native corporations can immediately convey former reservation lands to non-Natives, and such corporations are not restricted to using those lands for Indian purposes. Because Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian purposes, we must conclude that the federal set-aside requirement is not met. Cf. United 302 U. S., ; see also United Equally clearly, ANCSA ended federal superintendence over the Tribe's lands. As noted above, ANCSA revoked the Venetie Reservation along with every other reservation in Alaska but one, see 43 U.S. C. 1618(a), and Congress stated explicitly that ANCSA's settlement provisions were intended to avoid a "lengthy wardship or trusteeship." 1601(b). After ANCSA, federal protection of the Tribe's land is essentially limited to a statutory declaration that the land is exempt from adverse possession claims, real property taxes, and certain judgments as long as it has not been sold, leased, or developed. See 1636(d). These protections, if they can be called that, simply do not approach the level of superintendence over the Indians' land that existed in our prior cases. In each of those cases, the Federal Government actively controlled the lands in question, effectively acting as a guardian for the See United ; United ; United States *534 v. n. 1 (citing federal statute placing the Pueblos' land under the "`absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States' "). Finally, |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118175/alaska-v-native-village-of-venetie-tribal-government/ | control of the Congress of the United States' "). Finally, it is worth noting that Congress conveyed ANCSA lands to state-chartered and state-regulated private business corporations, hardly a choice that comports with a desire to retain federal superintendence over the land. The Tribe contends that the requisite federal superintendence is present because the Federal Government provides "desperately needed health, social, welfare, and economic programs" to the Tribe. Brief for Respondents 28. The Court of Appeals majority found this argument Our Indian country precedents, however, do not suggest that the mere provision of "desperately needed" social programs can support a finding of Indian Such health, education, and welfare benefits are merely forms of general federal aid; considered either alone or in tandem with ANCSA's minimal land-related protections, they are not indicia of active federal control over the Tribe's land sufficient to support a finding of federal superintendence. The Tribe's federal superintendence argument, moreover, is severely undercut by its view of ANCSA's primary purposes, namely, to effect Native self-determination and to end paternalism in federal Indian relations. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 44 (noting that ANCSA's land transfers "foster[ed] greater tribal self-determination" and "renounc[ed] [Bureau of Indian Affairs] paternalism"). The broad federal superintendence requirement for Indian country cuts against these objectives, but we are not free to ignore that requirement as codified in 18 U.S. C. 1151. Whether the concept of Indian country should be modified is a question entirely for Congress. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
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