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Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | concurring | Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112194/texas-monthly-inc-v-bullock/ | The Texas law at issue here discriminates on the basis of the content of publications: it provides that "[p]eriodicals that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of (a religious faith) are exempted" from the burdens of the sales tax law. (1982). Thus, *26A the content of a publication determines whether its publisher is exempt or nonexempt. Appellant is subject to the tax, but other publications are not because of the message they carry. This is plainly forbidden by the Press Clause of the First Amendment. Writers' Project, our most recent decision to this effect, is directly applicable here, and is the proper basis for reversing the judgment below. *26B JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring in the judgment. The Texas statute at issue touches upon values that underlie three different Clauses of the First Amendment: the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Press Clause. As indicated by the number of opinions issued in this case today, harmonizing these several values is not an easy task. The Free Exercise Clause value suggests that a State may not impose a tax on spreading the gospel. See and The Establishment Clause value suggests that a State may not give a tax break to those who spread the gospel that it does not also give to others who actively might advocate disbelief in religion. See ; The Press Clause value suggests that a State may not tax the sale of some publications, but not others, based on their content, absent a compelling reason for doing so. See Writers' Project, It perhaps is fairly easy to reconcile the Free Exercise and Press Clause values. If the Free Exercise Clause suggests that a State may not tax the sale of religious literature by a religious organization, this fact alone would give a State a compelling reason to exclude this category of sales from an otherwise general sales tax. In this respect, I agree generally *27 with what JUSTICE SCALIA says in Part II of his dissenting opinion. I find it more difficult to reconcile in this case the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause values. The Free Exercise Clause suggests that a special exemption for religious books is required. The Establishment Clause suggests that a special exemption for religious books is forbidden. This tension between mandated and prohibited religious exemptions is well recognized. See, e. g., Of course, identifying the problem does not resolve it. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion, in its Part IV, would resolve the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause values simply by subordinating the Free Exercise value, even, |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | concurring | Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112194/texas-monthly-inc-v-bullock/ | Clause values simply by subordinating the Free Exercise value, even, it seems to me, at the expense of longstanding precedents. See ante, at 21-25 (repudiating Follett and Murdock to the extent inconsistent with the newfound proposition that a State generally may tax the sale of a Bible by a church). JUSTICE SCALIA'S opinion, conversely, would subordinate the Establishment Clause value. This position, it seems to me, runs afoul of the previously settled notion that government may not favor religious belief over disbelief. See, e. g., ; ; ; Abington School ; 367 U. S., at Perhaps it is a vain desire, but I would like to decide the present case without necessarily sacrificing either the Free Exercise Clause value or the Establishment Clause value. It is possible for a State to write a tax-exemption statute consistent with both values: for example, a state statute might exempt the sale not only of religious literature distributed by a religious organization but also of philosophical literature distributed by nonreligious organizations devoted to such matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being *28 and nonbeing, right and wrong. Such a statute, moreover, should survive Press Clause scrutiny because its exemption would be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interests that underlie both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. To recognize this possible reconciliation of the competing First Amendment considerations is one thing; to impose it upon a State as its only legislative choice is something else. JUSTICE SCALIA rightly points out, post, at 42, that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses often appear like Scylla and Charybdis, leaving a State little room to maneuver between them. The Press Clause adds yet a third hazard to a State's safe passage through the legislative waters concerning the taxation of books and journals. We in the Judiciary must be wary of interpreting these three constitutional Clauses in a manner that negates the legislative role altogether. I believe we can avoid most of these difficulties with a narrow resolution of the case before us. We need not decide today the extent to which the Free Exercise Clause requires a tax exemption for the sale of religious literature by a religious organization; in other words, defining the ultimate scope of Follett and Murdock may be left for another day. We need decide here only whether a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature by religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause. I conclude that it does. In this case, by confining the tax exemption exclusively to the sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | concurring | Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112194/texas-monthly-inc-v-bullock/ | to the sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of religious messages. Although some forms of accommodating religion are constitutionally permissible, see Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day this one surely is not. A statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment Clause is all about and hence is constitutionally intolerable. See Wallace *29 v. -70 ; 393 U. S., at Accordingly, whether or not Follett and Murdock prohibit taxing the sale of religious literature, the Establishment Clause prohibits a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature. Cf. Estate of and At oral argument, appellees suggested that the statute at issue here exempted from taxation the sale of atheistic literature distributed by an atheistic organization. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. If true, this statute might survive Establishment Clause scrutiny, as well as Free Exercise and Press Clause scrutiny. But, as appellees were quick to concede at argument, the record contains nothing to support this facially implausible interpretation of the statute. Thus, constrained to construe this Texas statute as exempting religious literature alone, I concur in the holding that it contravenes the Establishment Clause, and in remanding the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this holding. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | A California statute known as “Assembly Bill 1889” (AB 1889) prohibits several classes of employers that receive state funds from using the funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (West Supp. 2008). The question pre- sented to us is whether two of its applicable to grant recipients, and applicable to private employers receiving more than $10,000 in program funds in any year—are pre-empted by federal law mandat- ing that certain zones of labor activity be unregulated. I As set forth in the preamble, the State of California enacted AB 1889 for the following purpose: “It is the policy of the state not to interfere with an employee’s choice about whether to join or to be repre- sented by a labor union. For this reason, the state should not subsidize efforts by an employer to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to prohibit an em- 2 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court ployer from using state funds and facilities for the purpose of influencing employees to support or oppose unionization and to prohibit an employer from seeking to influence employees to support or oppose unioniza- tion while those employees are performing work on a state contract.” 2000 Cal. Stats. ch. 872, AB 1889 forbids certain employers that receive state funds—whether by reimbursement, grant, contract, use of state property, or pursuant to a state program—from using such funds to “assist, promote, or deter union orga- nizing.” See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. to 16645.7. This prohibition encompasses “any attempt by an em- ployer to influence the decision of its employees” regarding “[w]hether to support or oppose a labor organization” and “[w]hether to become a member of any labor organization.” The statute specifies that the spending restric- tion applies to “any expense, including legal and consult- ing fees and salaries of supervisors and employees, in- curred for an activity to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” Despite the neutral statement of policy quoted above, AB 1889 expressly exempts “activit[ies] performed” or “expense[s] incurred” in connection with certain undertak- ings that promote unionization, including “[a]llowing a labor organization or its representatives access to the employer’s facilities or property,” and “[n]egotiating, enter- ing into, or carrying out a voluntary recognition agree- ment with a labor organization.” (d). To ensure compliance with the grant and program re- strictions at issue in this case, AB 1889 establishes a formidable enforcement scheme. Covered employers must certify that no state funds will be used for prohibited expenditures; |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | that no state funds will be used for prohibited expenditures; the employer must also maintain and pro- vide upon request “records sufficient to show that no state funds were used for those expenditures.” Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 3 Opinion of the Court 16645.7(b)–(c). If an employer commingles state and other funds, the statute presumes that any expenditures to assist, promote, or deter union organizing derive in part from state funds on a pro rata basis. Violators are liable to the State for the amount of funds used for prohibited purposes plus a civil penalty equal to twice the amount of those funds. 16645.7(d). Sus- pected violators may be sued by the state attorney general or any private taxpayer, and prevailing plaintiffs are “entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” II In April several organizations whose members do business with the State of California (collectively, Cham- ber of Commerce), brought this action against the Califor- nia Department of Health Services and appropriate state officials (collectively, the State) to enjoin enforcement of AB 1889. Two labor unions (collectively, AFL–CIO) inter- vened to defend the statute’s validity. The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Chamber of Commerce,1 holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. et seq. pre-empts Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (concerning grants) and (concerning program funds) because those provisions “regulat[e] employer speech about union organizing under specified circumstances, even though Congress intended free debate.” Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after twice affirming the District Court’s judgment, granted rehearing en banc and —————— 1 The District Court held that the Chamber of Commerce lacked standing to challenge several provisions of AB 1889 concerning state contractors and public employers. See Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 4 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court reversed. See Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1082 (2006). While the en banc majority agreed that California enacted § and 16645.7 in its capacity as a regulator, and not as a mere proprietor or market participant, see at 1082–1085, it concluded that Con- gress did not intend to preclude States from imposing such restrictions on the use of their own funds, see at 1085– 1096. We granted certiorari, U. S. (2007), and now reverse. Although the NLRA itself contains no express pre- emption provision, we have held that Congress implicitly mandated two types of pre-emption as necessary to im- plement federal labor policy. The first, known |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | necessary to im- plement federal labor policy. The first, known as pre-emption, see San Diego Building Trades Council v. “is intended to preclude state interference with the National Labor Relations Board’s interpretation and active enforcement of the ‘inte- grated scheme of regulation’ established by the ” Golden State Transit 613 (1986) (Golden State I). To this end, pre- emption forbids States to “regulate activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.” Wisconsin Dept. of 286 (1986). The second, known as Machinists pre- emption, forbids both the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and States to regulate conduct that Congress intended “be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” (quoting (1971)). Machinists pre-emption is based on the premise that “ ‘Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collec- tive bargaining, and labor disputes.’ ” 427 U.S., at n. 4 (quoting Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1337, 1352 (1972)). Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 5 Opinion of the Court Today we hold that § and 16645.7 are pre- empted under Machinists because they regulate within “a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.” Build- ing & Constr. Trades (Boston ). We do not reach the question whether the provisions would also be pre-empted under III As enacted in 1935, the NLRA, which was commonly known as the Wagner Act, did not include any provision that specifically addressed the intersection between em- ployee organizational rights and employer speech rights. See Rather, it was left to the NLRB, subject to review in federal court, to reconcile these interests in its construction of and 8. Section 7, now codified at 29 U.S. C. provided that workers have the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage in con- certed activity for their mutual aid and protection. Sec- tion 8(1), now codified at 29 U.S. C. made it an “unfair labor practice” for employers to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by section 7.” Among the frequently litigated issues under the Wagner Act were charges that an employer’s attempts to persuade employees not to join a union—or to join one favored by the employer rather than a rival—amounted to a form of coercion prohibited by The NLRB took the position that demanded complete employer neutrality during organizing campaigns, reasoning that any partisan em- ployer speech about unions would interfere with the rights of employees. See 1 J. Higgins, The Developing Labor Law 94 (5th ed. 2006). In |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | Higgins, The Developing Labor Law 94 (5th ed. 2006). In 1941, this Court curtailed the NLRB’s aggressive interpretation, clarifying that nothing in the NLRA prohibits an employer “from express- ing its view on labor policies or problems” unless the em- 6 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court ployer’s speech “in connection with other circumstances [amounts] to coercion within the meaning of the Act.” (1941). We subsequently characterized Virginia Electric as recognizing the First Amendment right of employers to engage in noncoercive speech about unionization. Thomas v. Collins, Notwithstand- ing these decisions, the NLRB continued to regulate em- ployer speech too restrictively in the eyes of Congress. Concerned that the Wagner Act had pushed the labor relations balance too far in favor of unions, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft- Hartley Act). The Taft-Hartley Act amended and 8 in several key respects. First, it emphasized that employees “have the right to refrain from any or all” activities. 29 U.S. C. Second, it added (b), which prohibits unfair labor practices by unions. 29 U.S. C. Third, it added (c), which protects speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the NLRB. 29 U.S. C. Specifically, (c) provides: “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” From one vantage, (c) “merely implements the First Amendment,” 617 (1969), in that it responded to particular constitu- tional rulings of the NLRB. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, pp. 23–24 (1947). But its enact- ment also manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 7 Opinion of the Court It is indicative of how important Congress deemed such “free debate” that Congress amended the NLRA rather than leaving to the courts the task of correcting the NLRB’s decisions on a case-by-case basis. We have characterized this policy judgment, which suffuses the NLRA as a whole, as “favoring uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes,” stressing that “freewheeling use of the written and spoken word has been expressly fostered by Congress and approved by the NLRB.” Letter v. Austin, Congress’ express protection of free debate forcefully buttresses the pre-emption analysis in this case. Under Machinists, congressional intent to shield a zone of activ- ity |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | Machinists, congressional intent to shield a zone of activ- ity from regulation is usually found only “implicit[ly] in the structure of the Act,” v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 117, n. 11 (1994), drawing on the notion that “ ‘[w]hat Congress left unregulated is as important as the regula- tions that it imposed,’ ” Golden State Transit ). In the case of noncoercive speech, however, the protection is both implicit and explicit. Sections 8(a) and 8(b) dem- onstrate that when Congress has sought to put limits on advocacy for or against union organization, it has ex- pressly set forth the mechanisms for doing so. Moreover, the amendment to calls attention to the right of em- ployees to refuse to join unions, which implies an underly- ing right to receive information opposing unionization. Finally, the addition of (c) expressly precludes regula- tion of speech about unionization “so long as the communi- cations do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’ ” Gissel The explicit direction from Congress to leave noncoer- cive speech unregulated makes this case easier, in at least 8 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court one respect, than previous NLRA cases because it does not require us “to decipher the presumed intent of Congress in the face of that body’s steadfast silence.” Sears, Roebuck & California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily “interfere[s] with an employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union,” 2000 Cal. Stats. ch. 872, is the same policy judgment that the NLRB advanced under the Wagner Act, and that Congress renounced in the Taft-Hartley Act. To the extent § and 16645.7 actually further the express goal of AB 1889, the provisions are unequivocally pre-empted. IV The Court of Appeals concluded that Machinists did not pre-empt § and 16645.7 for three reasons: (1) the spending restrictions apply only to the use of state funds, (2) Congress did not leave the zone of activity free from all regulation, and (3) California modeled AB 1889 on federal statutes. We find none of these arguments persuasive. Use of State Funds In NLRA pre-emption cases, “ ‘judicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted.’ ” Golden State I, 475 U.S., at 614, n. 5 (quoting ; brackets omitted); see also (“Pre-emption analysis turns on the actual content of [the State’s] policy and its real effect on federal rights”). California plainly could not directly regulate noncoercive |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | on federal rights”). California plainly could not directly regulate noncoercive speech about unionization by means of an express prohibition. It is equally clear that California may not indirectly regulate such conduct by imposing spending restrictions on the use of state funds. Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 9 Opinion of the Court In we held that Wisconsin’s policy of refusing to purchase goods and services from three-time NLRA viola- tors was pre-empted under because it imposed a “supplemental sanction” that conflicted with the NLRA’s “ ‘integrated scheme of regulation.’ ” –289. Wisconsin protested that its debarment statute was “an exercise of the State’s spending power rather than its regulatory power,” but we dismissed this as “a distinction without a difference.” “[T]he point of the statute [was] to deter labor law violations,” and “for all practical purposes” the spending restriction was “tanta- mount to regulation.” –289. Wisconsin’s choice “to use its spending power rather than its police power d[id] not significantly lessen the inherent potential for conflict” between the state and federal schemes; hence the statute was pre-empted. We distinguished in Boston holding that the NLRA did not preclude a state agency supervising a construction project from requiring that contractors abide by a labor agreement. We explained that when a State acts as a “market participant with no interest in setting policy,” as opposed to a “regulator,” it does not offend the pre-emption principles of the In finding that the state agency had acted as a market par- ticipant, we stressed that the challenged action “was specifically tailored to one particular job,” and aimed “to ensure an efficient project that would be completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the lowest cost.” at 232. It is beyond dispute that California enacted AB 1889 in its capacity as a regulator rather than a market partici- pant. AB 1889 is neither “specifically tailored to one particular job” nor a “legitimate response to state pro- curement constraints or to local economic needs.” As the statute’s preamble candidly acknowledges, the legislative purpose is not the efficient 10 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court procurement of goods and services, but the furtherance of a labor policy. See 2000 Cal. Stats. ch. 872, Although a State has a legitimate proprietary interest in ensuring that state funds are spent in accordance with the purposes for which they are appropriated, this is not the objective of AB 1889. In contrast to a neutral affirmative requirement that funds be spent solely for the purposes of the relevant grant or program, AB 1889 imposes |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | purposes of the relevant grant or program, AB 1889 imposes a targeted negative restriction on employer speech about unionization. Fur- thermore, the statute does not even apply this constraint uniformly. Instead of forbidding the use of state funds for all employer advocacy regarding unionization, AB 1889 permits use of state funds for select employer advocacy activities that promote unions. Specifically, the statute exempts expenses incurred in connection with, inter alia, giving unions access to the workplace, and voluntarily recognizing unions without a secret ballot election. (d). The Court of Appeals held that although California did not act as a market participant in enacting AB 1889, the NLRA did not pre-empt the statute. It purported to dis- tinguish on the theory that AB 1889 does not make employer neutrality a condition for receiving funds, but instead restricts only the use of funds. According to the Court of Appeals, this distinction matters because when a State imposes a “use” restriction instead of a “receipt” restriction, “an employer has and retains the freedom to spend its own funds however it wishes.” 463 F.3d, at 1088. California’s reliance on a “use” restriction rather than a “receipt” restriction is, at least in this case, no more conse- quential than Wisconsin’s reliance on its spending power rather than its police power in As explained below, AB 1889 couples its “use” restriction with compliance costs and litigation risks that are calculated to make union- related advocacy prohibitively expensive for employers Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 11 Opinion of the Court that receive state funds. By making it exceedingly diffi- cult for employers to demonstrate that they have not used state funds and by imposing punitive sanctions for non- compliance, AB 1889 effectively reaches beyond “the use of funds over which California maintains a sovereign inter- est.” Brief for State Respondents 19. Turning first to the compliance burdens, AB 1889 re- quires recipients to “maintain records sufficient to show that no state funds were used” for prohibited expendi- tures, 16645.7(c), and conclusively presumes that any expenditure to assist, promote, or deter union organizing made from “commingled” funds constitutes a violation of the statute, Maintaining “suffi- cient” records and ensuring segregation of funds is no small feat, given that AB 1889 expansively defines its prohibition to encompass “any expense” incurred in “any attempt” by an employer to “influence the decision of its employees.” 16646(a). Prohibited expendi- tures include not only discrete expenses such as legal and consulting fees, but also an allocation of overhead, includ- ing “salaries of supervisors and employees,” for any time and resources spent on |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | supervisors and employees,” for any time and resources spent on union-related advocacy. See The statute affords no clearly defined safe harbor, save for expenses incurred in connection with activities that either favor unions or are required by fed- eral or state law. See The statute also imposes deterrent litigation risks. Significantly, AB 1889 authorizes not only the California Attorney General but also any private taxpayer— including, of course, a union in a dispute with an em- ployer—to bring a civil action against suspected violators for “injunctive relief, damages, civil penalties, and other appropriate equitable relief.” Violators are liable to the State for three times the amount of state funds deemed spent on union organizing. 16645.7(d), 16645.8(a). Prevailing plaintiffs, and certain 12 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court prevailing taxpayer intervenors, are entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs, which may well dwarf the treble damages award. Consequently, a trivial violation of the statute could give rise to substantial liabil- ity. Finally, even if an employer were confident that it had satisfied the recordkeeping and segregation require- ments, it would still bear the costs of defending itself against unions in court, as well as the risk of a mistaken adverse finding by the factfinder. In light of these burdens, California’s reliance on a “use” restriction rather than a “receipt” restriction “does not significantly lessen the inherent potential for conflict” between AB 1889 and the 475 U.S., at 289. AB 1889’s enforcement mechanisms put considerable pressure on an employer either to forgo his “free speech right to communicate his views to his employees,” Gissel or else to refuse the receipt of any state funds. In so doing, the statute impermissibly “predicat[es] benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law,” and chills one side of “the robust debate which has been protected under the NLRA,” Letter Resisting this conclusion, the State and the AFL–CIO contend that AB 1889 imposes less onerous recordkeeping restrictions on governmental subsidies than do federal restrictions that have been found not to violate the First Amendment. See ; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). The question, however, is not whether AB 1889 violates the First Amendment, but whether it “ ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu- tion of the full purposes and objectives’ ” of the ). Constitutional stan- dards, while sometimes analogous, are not tailored to address the object of labor pre-emption analysis: giving Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 13 Opinion of the Court effect to Congress’ intent in enacting the |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | of the Court effect to Congress’ intent in enacting the Wagner and Taft- Hartley Acts. See (distinguish- ing standards applicable to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); (Commerce Clause); Al- though a State may “choos[e] to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals,” Rust, 400 U.S., at 194, it is not “permissible” for a State to use its spending power to advance an interest that—even if legitimate “in the absence of the NLRA,” — frustrates the comprehensive federal scheme established by that Act. NLRB Regulation We have characterized Machinists pre-emption as “creat[ing] a zone free from all regulations, whether state or federal.” Boston Stressing that the NLRB has regulated employer speech that takes place on the eve of union elections, the Court of Appeals deemed Machinists inapplicable because “employer speech in the context of organizing” is not a zone of activity that Congress left free from “all regulation.” See 463 F.3d, at 1089 (citing Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N. L. R. B. 545, 547– 548 (1957) (barring employer interviews with employees in their homes immediately before an election); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N. L. R. B. 427, 429 (1953) (barring employers and unions alike from making election speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within the 24-hour period before an election)). The NLRB has policed a narrow zone of speech to en- sure free and fair elections under the aegis of of the NLRA, 29 U.S. C. Whatever the NLRB’s regulatory authority within special settings such as imminent elec- tions, however, Congress has clearly denied it the author- ity to regulate the broader category of noncoercive speech encompassed by AB 1889. It is equally obvious that the 14 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES v. BROWN Opinion of the Court NLRA deprives California of this authority, since “ ‘[t]he States have no more authority than the Board to upset the balance that Congress has struck between labor and man- agement.’ ” Metropolitan Ins. Federal Statutes Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress could not have intended to pre-empt AB 1889 because Congress itself has imposed similar restrictions. See 463 F. 3d, at 1090–1091. Specifically, three federal statutes include provisions that forbid the use of particular grant and program funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.”2 We are not persuaded that these few iso- lated restrictions, plucked from the multitude of federal spending programs, were either intended to alter or did in fact alter the “ ‘wider contours of federal labor policy.’ ” Metropolitan A federal statute will contract the pre-emptive scope of the |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145790/chamber-of-commerce-of-united-states-v-brown/ | A federal statute will contract the pre-emptive scope of the NLRA if it demonstrates that “Congress has decided to tolerate a substantial measure of diversity” in the particu- lar regulatory sphere. New York Telephone, 440 U.S., at 546 (plurality opinion). In New York Telephone, an em- ployer challenged a state unemployment system that provided benefits to employees absent from work during lengthy strikes. The employer argued that the state sys- tem conflicted with the federal labor policy “of allowing the free play of economic forces to operate during the bargain- —————— 2 See 29 U.S. C. (“Each recipient of funds under [the Workforce Investment Act] shall provide to the Secretary assurances that none of such funds will be used to assist, promote, or deter union organizing”); 42 U.S. C. 839(e) (“Funds appropriated to carry out [the Head Start Programs Act] shall not be used to assist, promote, or deter union organizing”); (“Assistance provided under [the National Community Service Act] shall not be used by program par- ticipants and program staff to assist, promote, or deter union organizing”). Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 15 Opinion of the Court ing process.” We upheld the statute on the basis that the legislative histories of the NLRA and Social Security Act, which were enacted within six weeks of each other, confirmed that “Congress intended that the States be free to authorize, or to prohibit, such payments.” at 544; see also ; In- deed, the tension between the Social Security Act and the NLRA suggested that the case could “be viewed as pre- senting a potential conflict between two federal statutes rather than between federal and state regulatory statutes.” at 539–540, n. 32. The three federal statutes relied on by the Court of Appeals neither conflict with the NLRA nor otherwise establish that Congress “decided to tolerate a substantial measure of diversity” in the regulation of employer speech. Unlike the States, Congress has the authority to create tailored exceptions to otherwise applicable federal policies, and (also unlike the States) it can do so in a manner that preserves national uniformity without opening the door to a 50-state patchwork of inconsistent labor policies. Con- sequently, the mere fact that Congress has imposed tar- geted federal restrictions on union-related advocacy in certain limited contexts does not invite the States to over- ride federal labor policy in other settings. Had Congress enacted a federal version of AB 1889 that applied analogous spending restrictions to all federal grants or expenditures, the pre-emption question would be closer. Cf. Metropolitan (citing federal minimum labor standards as evidence that Con- gress |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | * When a third party injures a participant in an employee benefits plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. et seq., the plan frequently pays covered medical expenses. The terms of these plans often include a subrogation clause requiring a participant to reimburse the plan if the participant later recovers money from the third party for his injuries. And under ERISA 29 U.S. C. plan fiduciaries can file civil suits “to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the terms of the plan.”1 In this case, we consider what happens when a partici- pant obtains a settlement fund from a third party, but —————— * JUSTICE ALITO joins this opinion, except for Part III–C. 1 In full, the provision states: “A civil action may be brought— (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or () to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S. C. 2 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court spends the whole settlement on nontraceable items (for instance, on services or consumable items like food). We evaluate in particular whether a plan fiduciary can sue under to recover from the participant’s remain- ing assets the medical expenses it paid on the participant’s behalf. We hold that, when a participant dissipates the whole settlement on nontraceable items, the fiduciary cannot bring a suit to attach the participant’s general assets under because the suit is not one for “appropriate equitable relief.” In this case, it is unclear whether the participant dissipated all of his settlement in this manner, so we remand for further proceedings. I Petitioner Robert Montanile was a participant in a health benefits plan governed by ERISA and administered by respondent, the oard of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health enefit Plan (oard of Trustees or oard). The plan must pay for certain medical ex- penses that beneficiaries or participants incur. The plan may demand reimbursement, however, when a participant recovers money from a third party for medical expenses. The plan states: “Amounts that have been recovered by a [ participant] from another party are assets of the Plan and are not distributable to any person or entity without the Plan’s written release of its subrogation interest.” App. 45. The plan also provides that “any amounts” that a |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | 45. The plan also provides that “any amounts” that a participant “recover[s] from another party by award, judgment, settlement or otherwise will promptly be applied first to reimburse the Plan in full for benefits advanced by the Plan and without reduction for attor- neys’ fees, costs, expenses or damages claimed by the covered person.” Participants must notify the plan and obtain its consent before settling claims. In December a drunk driver ran through a stop sign and crashed into Montanile’s vehicle. The accident Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court severely injured Montanile, and the plan paid at least $121,044.02 for his initial medical care. Montanile signed a reimbursement agreement reaffirming his obligation to reimburse the plan from any recovery he obtained “as a result of any legal action or settlement or otherwise.” at 51 (emphasis deleted). Thereafter, Montanile filed a negligence claim against the drunk driver and made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under Montanile’s car insurance. He obtained a $500,000 settlement. Montanile then paid his attorneys $200,000 and repaid about $60,000 that they had ad- vanced him. Thus, about $240,000 remained of the set- tlement. Montanile’s attorneys held most of that sum in a client trust account. This included enough money to satisfy Montanile’s obligations to the plan. The oard of Trustees sought reimbursement from Montanile on behalf of the plan, and Montanile’s attorney argued that the plan was not entitled to any recovery. The parties attempted but failed to reach an agreement about reimbursement. After discussions broke down, Mon- tanile’s attorney informed the oard that he would dis- tribute the remaining settlement funds to Montanile unless the oard objected within 14 days. The oard did not respond within that time, so Montanile’s attorney gave Montanile the remainder of the funds. Six months after negotiations ended, the oard sued Montanile in District Court under ERISA 29 U.S. C. seeking repayment of the $121,044.02 the plan had expended on his medical care. The oard asked the court to enforce an equitable lien upon any settlement funds or any property which are “ ‘in [ Mon- tanile’s] actual or constructive possession.’ ” 593 Fed. Appx. 903, 906 (CA11 2014) (quoting complaint). ecause Montanile had already taken possession of the settlement funds, the oard also sought an order enjoining Montanile from dissipating any such funds. Montanile then stipulated 4 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court that he still possessed some of the settlement proceeds. The District Court granted summary judgment to the oard. No. 12–80746–Civ. |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | District Court granted summary judgment to the oard. No. 12–80746–Civ. (SD Fla., Apr. 18, 2014), 2014 WL 8514011, *1. The court rejected Montanile’s argument that, because he had by that time spent almost all of the settlement funds, there was no specific, identifiable fund separate from his general assets against which the oard’s equitable lien could be enforced. at *8–*11. The court held that, even if Montanile had dissipated some or all of the settlement funds, the oard was entitled to reim- bursement from Montanile’s general assets. at *10– *11. The court entered judgment for the oard in the amount of $121,044.02. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that a plan can always enforce an equitable lien once the lien attaches, and that dissipation of the specific fund to which the lien attached cannot destroy the underlying reimbursement obligation. The court therefore held that the plan can recover out of a participant’s gen- eral assets when the participant dissipates the specifically identified We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether an ERISA fiduciary can enforce an equitable lien against a defendant’s general assets under these circumstances.2 575 U. S. (2015). We hold that it cannot, and accordingly reverse the judg- ment of the Eleventh Circuit and remand for further proceedings. —————— 2 Longaberger and with Treasurer, Trustees of Drury Industries, Inc. Health Care Plan & Trust v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888 and Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court II A As previously stated, of ERISA authorizes plan fiduciaries like the oard of Trustees to bring civil suits “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to enforce the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S. C. Our cases explain that the term “equitable relief ” in is limited to “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity” during the days of the divided bench (meaning, the period before 1938 when courts of law and equity were separate). Under this Court’s prece- dents, whether the remedy a plaintiff seeks “is legal or equitable depends on [(1)] the basis for [the plaintiff ’s] claim and [(2)] the nature of the underlying remedies sought.” (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Our precedents also prescribe a framework for re- solving this inquiry. To determine how to characterize the basis of a plaintiff ’s claim and the nature of the remedies sought, we turn to standard treatises on equity, which establish the “basic contours” of what equitable relief was typically available in premerger equity courts. Great- Life & Annuity Ins. (2002). |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | in premerger equity courts. Great- Life & Annuity Ins. (2002). We have employed this approach in three earlier cases where, as here, the plan fiduciary sought reimbursement for medical expenses after the plan beneficiary or partici- pant recovered money from a third party. Under these precedents, the basis for the oard’s claim is equitable. ut our cases do not resolve whether the remedy the oard now seeks—enforcement of an equitable lien by agreement against the defendant’s general assets—is equitable in nature. First, in Great-, we held that a plan with a claim for an equitable lien was—in the circumstances presented— 6 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court seeking a legal rather than an equitable remedy. In that case, a plan sought to enforce an equitable lien by obtain- ing a money judgment from the defendants. The plan could not enforce the lien against the third-party settle- ment that the defendants had obtained because the de- fendants never actually possessed that fund; the fund went directly to the defendants’ attorneys and to a re- stricted trust. We held that the plan sought a legal rem- edy, not an equitable one, even though the plan claimed that the money judgment was a form of restitution. at 208–209, 213–214. We explained that restitution in equity typically involved enforcement of “a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defend- ant’s possession.” ut the restitution sought in Great- was legal—not equitable—because the specific funds to which the fiduciaries “claim[ed] an enti- tlement [we]re not in [the defendants’] possession.” Since both the basis for the claim and the particular remedy sought were not equitable, the plan could not sue under Next, in Sereboff, we held that both the basis for the claim and the remedy sought were equitable. The plan there sought reimbursement from beneficiaries who had retained their settlement fund in a separate account. 547 U.S., at 359–360. We held that the basis for the plan’s claim was equitable because the plan sought to enforce an equitable lien by agreement, a type of equitable lien created by an agreement to convey a particular fund to another party. See at –364. The lien existed in Sereboff because of the beneficiaries’ agreement with the plan to convey the proceeds of any third-party settlement. We explained that a claim to enforce such a lien is equitable because the plan “could rely on a familiar |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | is equitable because the plan “could rely on a familiar rul[e] of equity” to collect—specifically, the rule “that a contract to convey Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court a specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the thing.” (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). The underlying remedies that the plan sought also were equitable, because the plan “sought specifically identifiable funds that were within the possession and control” of the beneficiaries—not recovery from the benefi- ciaries’ “assets generally.” at 362– (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Finally, in US Airways, Inc. v. 569 U. S. we reaffirmed our analysis in Sereboff and again concluded that a plan sought to enforce an equitable claim by seeking equitable remedies. As in Sereboff, “the basis for [the plan’s] claim was equitable” because the plan’s terms created an equitable lien by agreement on a third- party settlement. See 569 U. S., at (slip op., at 5) And, as in Sereboff, “[t]he nature of the recovery requested” by the plan “was equitable because [it] claimed specifically identifiable funds within the [beneficiaries’] control—that is, a portion of the settlement they had gotten.” 569 U. S., at (slip op., at 5) Under these principles, the basis for the oard’s claim here is equitable: The oard had an equitable lien by agreement that attached to Montanile’s settlement fund when he obtained title to that And the nature of the oard’s underlying remedy would have been equitable had it immediately sued to enforce the lien against the settle- ment fund then in Montanile’s possession. That does not resolve this case, however. Our prior cases do not address whether a plan is still seeking an equitable remedy when the defendant, who once possessed the settlement fund, has dissipated it all, and the plan then seeks to recover out of the defendant’s general assets. 8 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court To resolve this issue, we turn to standard equity trea- tises. As we explain below, those treatises make clear that a plaintiff could ordinarily enforce an equitable lien only against specifically identified funds that remain in the defendant’s possession or against traceable items that the defendant purchased with the funds (e.g., identifiable property like a car). A defendant’s expenditure of the entire identifiable fund on nontraceable items (like food or travel) destroys an equitable lien. The plaintiff then may have a personal claim against the defendant’s general assets—but recovering out |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | a personal claim against the defendant’s general assets—but recovering out of those assets is a legal remedy, not an equitable one. Equitable remedies “are, as a general rule, directed against some specific thing; they give or enforce a right to or over some particular thing rather than a right to recover a sum of money generally out of the defendant’s assets.” 4 S. Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence p. 694 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy). Equitable liens thus are ordinarily enforceable only against a specifically identified fund because an equitable lien “is simply a right of a special nature over the thing so that the very thing itself may be proceeded against in an equitable action.” at 692; see also Restatement of Restitution Comment a, p. 866 (1936) (Restatement) (enforce- ment of equitable lien requires showing that the defendant “still holds the property or property which is in whole or in part its product”); 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies p. 19 (Dobbs) (similar). This general rule’s appli- cation to equitable liens includes equitable liens by agreement, which depend on “the notion that the contract creates some right or interest in or over specific property,” and are enforceable only if “the decree of the court can lay hold of ” that specific property. 4 Pomeroy at 694–695. If, instead of preserving the specific fund subject to the Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of the Court lien, the defendant dissipated the entire fund on nontrace- able items, that complete dissipation eliminated the lien. Even though the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, the plaintiff could not attach the defendant’s general assets instead. Absent specific exceptions not relevant here, “where a person wrongfully dispose[d] of the property of another but the property cannot be traced into any prod- uct, the other cannot enforce a constructive trust or lien upon any part of the wrongdoer’s property.” Restate- ment at 866 (emphasis added); see also Great- 534 U.S., –214 (citing Restatement The plaintiff had “merely a personal claim against the wrongdoer”—a quintessential action at law. at 866. In sum, at equity, a plaintiff ordinarily could not enforce any type of equitable lien if the defendant once possessed a separate, identifiable fund to which the lien attached, but then dissipated it all. The plaintiff could not attach the defendant’s general assets instead because those assets were not part of the specific thing to which the lien attached. This rule applied to equitable liens by agree- ment as well as other types of equitable liens. III The oard of Trustees nonetheless maintains that it can enforce its |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | oard of Trustees nonetheless maintains that it can enforce its equitable lien against Montanile’s general assets. We consider the oard’s arguments in turn. A First, the oard argues that, while equity courts ordi- narily required plaintiffs to trace a specific, identifiable fund in the defendant’s possession to which the lien at- tached, there is an exception for equitable liens by agree- ment. The oard asserts that equitable liens by agree- ment require no such tracing, and can be enforced against a defendant’s general assets. According to the oard, we 10 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court recognized this exception in Sereboff by distinguishing between equitable restitution (where a lien attaches be- cause the defendant misappropriated property from the plaintiff ) and equitable liens by agreement. The oard misreads Sereboff, which left untouched the rule that all types of equitable liens must be enforced against a specifically identified fund in the defendant’s possession. See 1 Dobbs at 601, 603. The question we faced in Sereboff was whether plaintiffs seeking an equitable lien by agreement must “identify an asset they originally possessed, which was improperly acquired and converted into property the defendant held.” 547 U.S., at 365. We observed that such a requirement, although characteristic of restitutionary relief, does not “appl[y] to equitable liens by agreement or assignment.” ). That is because the basic premise of an equitable lien by agreement is that, rather than physically taking the plain- tiff ’s property, the defendant constructively possesses a fund to which the plaintiff is entitled. ut the plaintiff must still identify a specific fund in the defendant’s pos- session to enforce the lien. See (“Having a lien upon the fund, as soon as it was identified they could follow it into the hands of the appellant”). Second, the oard contends that historical equity prac- tice supports enforcement of its equitable lien against Montanile’s general assets. The oard identifies three methods that equity courts purportedly employed to effec- tuate this principle: substitute money decrees, deficiency judgments, and the swollen assets doctrine. This argu- ment also fails. We have long rejected the argument that “equitable relief ” under means “whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court issue,” including ancillary legal remedies. 508 U.S., at In “many situations an equity court could establish purely legal rights and grant legal reme- dies which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority.” ut these legal remedies were |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | the scope of its authority.” ut these legal remedies were not relief “typically available in equity,” and interpreting them as such would eliminate any limit on the meaning of “equitable relief ” and would “render the modifier superfluous.” at 258 (em- phasis deleted); see also Great-, As we have explained—and as the oard conceded at oral argu- ment—as a general rule, plaintiffs cannot enforce an equitable lien against a defendant’s general assets. See Part II–, The oard contends that there is an exception if the defendant wrongfully dissipates the equi- table lien to thwart its enforcement. ut none of the oard’s examples show that such relief was “typically available” in equity.3 The specific methods by which equity courts might have awarded relief from a defendant’s general assets only confirm that the oard seeks legal, not equitable, reme- dies. While equity courts sometimes awarded money —————— 3 The oard also interprets CIGNA as all but overruling and Great- Life & Annuity Ins. 534 U.S. 204 (2002), in favor of the oard’s broad interpretation of “equitable relief ” under ut CIGNA reaffirmed that “traditionally speaking, relief that sought a lien or a constructive trust was legal relief, not equitable relief, unless the funds in question were ‘particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.’ ” 563 U. S, at 439 (quoting Great-, ; emphasis deleted). In any event, the Court’s discussion of in CIGNA was not essential to resolving that case, and—as our later analysis in US Airways, Inc. v. 569 U. S. reinforces—our interpretation of “equitable relief” in Great-, and remains unchanged. See at – (slip op., at 5–6). 12 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court decrees as a substitute for the value of the equitable lien, they were still legal remedies, because they were “wholly pecuniary and personal.” 4 Pomeroy at 694. The same is true with respect to deficiency judgments. Equity courts could award both of these remedies as part of their ancillary jurisdiction to award complete relief. ut the treatises make clear that when equity courts did so, “the rights of the parties are strictly legal, and the final remedy granted is of the kind which might be conferred by a court of law.” 1 at 410; see also 1 Dobbs at 180– 181, and at 602 (similar); New Federal Equity Rules 10 (rev. 5th ed. 1925) (authorizing equity courts to award such relief). ut legal remedies—even legal reme- dies that a court of equity could sometimes award—are not “equitable relief ” under See at –258. The |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | award—are not “equitable relief ” under See at –258. The swollen assets doctrine also does not establish that the relief the oard seeks is equitable. Under the oard’s view of this doctrine, even if a defendant spends all of a specifically identified fund, the mere fact that the defend- ant wrongfully had assets that belonged to another in- creased the defendant’s available assets, and justifies recovery from his general assets. ut most equity courts and treatises rejected that theory. See Taft, Note, A Defense of a Limited Use of the Swollen Assets Theory Where Money Has Wrongfully een Mingled With Other Money, (describing the swollen assets doctrine as “often rejected by the courts”); see also Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitution- ary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC and n. 33 (1983) (similar). To the extent that courts endorsed any version of the swollen assets theory, they adopted a more limited rule: that commingling a specifically identified fund—to which a lien attached—with a different fund of the defendant’s did not destroy the lien. Instead, that Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 13 Opinion of the Court commingling allowed the plaintiff to recover the amount of the lien from the entire pot of money. See Restatement at 844; Scott, The Right To Follow Money Wrong- fully Mingled With Other Money, 125–126 (1913). Thus, even under the version of the swollen assets doctrine adopted by some courts, recovery out of Montanile’s general assets—in the absence of commin- gling—would not have been “typically available” relief. C Finally, the oard argues that ERISA’s objectives—of enforcing plan documents according to their terms and of protecting plan assets—would be best served by allowing plans to enforce equitable liens against a participant’s general assets. The oard also contends that, unless plans can enforce reimbursement provisions against a defendant’s general assets, plans will lack effective or cost- efficient remedies, and participants will dissipate any settlement as quickly as possible, before fiduciaries can sue. We have rejected these arguments before, and do so again. “[ V ]ague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration.” at 261. Had Congress sought to prioritize the oard’s policy arguments, it could have drafted to mirror ERISA provisions governing civil actions. One of those provisions, for instance, allows participants and benefi- ciaries to bring civil actions “to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the plan” and does not limit them to equitable relief. Great-, (quoting 29 U.S. C. §1132(a)(1)() (1994 ed.)). In any event, our interpretation |
Justice Thomas | 2,016 | 1 | majority | Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3170727/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-nat-elevator-industry-health-benefit/ | U.S. C. §1132(a)(1)() (1994 ed.)). In any event, our interpretation of promotes ERISA’s purposes by “allocat[ing] liability for plan-related misdeeds in reasonable proportion to respective actors’ power to control and prevent the misdeeds.” 14 MONTANILE v. OARD OF TRUSTEES OF NAT. ELE- VATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH ENEFIT PLAN Opinion of the Court More than a decade has passed since we decided Great-, and plans have developed safeguards against participants’ and beneficiaries’ efforts to evade reimbursement obligations. Plans that cover medical expenses know how much medical care that participants and beneficiaries require, and have the incentive to inves- tigate and track expensive claims. Plan provisions—like the ones here—obligate participants and beneficiaries to notify the plan of legal process against third parties and to give the plan a right of subrogation. The oard protests that tracking and participating in legal proceedings is hard and costly, and that settlements are often shrouded in secrecy. The facts of this case un- dercut that argument. The oard had sufficient notice of Montanile’s settlement to have taken various steps to preserve those funds. Most notably, when negotiations broke down and Montanile’s lawyer expressed his intent to disburse the remaining settlement funds to Montanile unless the plan objected within 14 days, the oard could have—but did not—object. Moreover, the oard could have filed suit immediately, rather than waiting half a year. IV ecause the lower courts erroneously held that the plan could recover out of Montanile’s general assets, they did not determine whether Montanile kept his settlement fund separate from his general assets or dissipated the entire fund on nontraceable assets. At oral argument, Montanile’s counsel acknowledged “a genuine issue of material fact on how much dissipation there was” and a lack of record evidence as to whether Montanile mixed the settlement fund with his general assets. A remand is necessary so that the District Court can make that determination. Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 15 Opinion of the Court * * * We reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 1 GINSURG, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 14–723 ROERT MONTANILE, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | Teleflex Incorporated and its subsidiary Technology Holding Companyboth referred to here as Teleflexsued KSR International Company for patent infringement. The patent at issue, United States Patent No. 6,237,565 B1, is entitled "Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control." Supplemental App. 1. The patentee is Steven J. Engelgau, and the patent is referred to as "the Engelgau patent." Teleflex holds the exclusive license to the patent. Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent describes a mechanism for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so the pedal's position can be transmitted to a computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle's engine. When Teleflex accused KSR of infringing the Engelgau patent by adding an electronic sensor to one of KSR's previously designed pedals, KSR countered that claim 4 was invalid under the Patent Act, because its subject matter was obvious. Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." In the Court set out a framework for applying the statutory language of 103, language itself based on the logic of the earlier decision in and its progeny. See -17, The analysis is objective: "Under 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the factors continue to define the inquiry that controls. If a court, or patent examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed subject matter was obvious, the claim is invalid under 103. Seeking to resolve the question of obviousness with more uniformity and consistency, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has employed an approach referred to by the parties as the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test (TSM test), under which a patent claim is only proved obvious if "some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings" can be found in the prior art, the nature |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | teachings" can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Al-Site (C.A.Fed.1999). KSR challenges that *1735 test, or at least its application in this case. See (C.A.Fed.2005). Because the Court of Appeals addressed the question of obviousness in a manner contrary to 103 and our precedents, we granted certiorari, 547 U.S. We now reverse. I A In car engines without computer-controlled throttles, the accelerator pedal interacts with the throttle via cable or other mechanical link. The pedal arm acts as a lever rotating around a pivot point. In a cable-actuated throttle control the rotation caused by pushing down the pedal pulls a cable, which in turn pulls open valves in the carburetor or fuel injection unit. The wider the valves open, the more fuel and air are released, causing combustion to increase and the car to accelerate. When the driver takes his foot off the pedal, the opposite occurs as the cable is released and the valves slide closed. In the 1990's it became more common to install computers in cars to control engine operation. Computer-controlled throttles open and close valves in response to electronic signals, not through force transferred from the pedal by a mechanical link. Constant, delicate adjustments of air and fuel mixture are possible. The computer's rapid processing of factors beyond the pedal's position improves fuel efficiency and engine performance. For a computer-controlled throttle to respond to a driver's operation of the car, the computer must know what is happening with the pedal. A cable or mechanical link does not suffice for this purpose; at some point, an electronic sensor is necessary to translate the mechanical operation into digital data the computer can understand. Before discussing sensors further we turn to the mechanical design of the pedal itself. In the traditional design a pedal can be pushed down or released but cannot have its position in the footwell adjusted by sliding the pedal forward or back. As a result, a driver who wishes to be closer or farther from the pedal must either reposition himself in the driver's seat or move the seat in some way. In cars with deep footwells these are imperfect solutions for drivers of smaller stature. To solve the problem, inventors, beginning in the 1970's, designed pedals that could be adjusted to change their location in the footwell. Important for this case are two adjustable pedals disclosed in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1989) (Asano) and 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17, 1993) (Redding). The Asano |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | (Asano) and 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17, 1993) (Redding). The Asano patent reveals a support structure that houses the pedal so that even when the pedal location is adjusted relative to the driver, one of the pedal's pivot points stays fixed. The pedal is also designed so that the force necessary to push the pedal down is the same regardless of adjustments to its location. The Redding patent reveals a different, sliding mechanism where both the pedal and the pivot point are adjusted. We return to sensors. Well before Engelgau applied for his challenged patent, some inventors had obtained patents involving electronic pedal sensors for computer-controlled throttles. These inventions, such as the device disclosed in ('936), taught that it was preferable to detect the pedal's position in the pedal assembly, not in the engine. The '936 patent disclosed a pedal with an electronic sensor on a pivot point in the pedal assembly. (Smith) taught that to prevent the *1736 wires connecting the sensor to the computer from chafing and wearing out, and to avoid grime and damage from the driver's foot, the sensor should be put on a fixed part of the pedal assembly rather than in or on the pedal's footpad. In addition to patents for pedals with integrated sensors inventors obtained patents for self-contained modular sensors. A modular sensor is designed independently of a given pedal so that it can be taken off the shelf and attached to mechanical pedals of various sorts, enabling the pedals to be used in automobiles with computer-controlled throttles. One such sensor was disclosed in ('068). In 1994, Chevrolet manufactured a line of trucks using modular sensors "attached to the pedal support bracket, adjacent to the pedal and engaged with the pivot shaft about which the pedal rotates in operation." (E.D.Mich.2003). The prior art contained patents involving the placement of sensors on adjustable pedals as well. For example, (Rixon) discloses an adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic sensor for detecting the pedal's position. In the Rixon pedal the sensor is located in the pedal footpad. The Rixon pedal was known to suffer from wire chafing when the pedal was depressed and released. This short account of pedal and sensor technology leads to the instant case. B KSR, a Canadian company, manufactures and supplies auto parts, including pedal systems. Ford Motor Company hired KSR in 1998 to supply an adjustable pedal system for various lines of automobiles with cable-actuated throttle controls. KSR developed an adjustable mechanical pedal for Ford and obtained ('976) for the design. In 2000, KSR was chosen by General Motors Corporation (GMC |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | In 2000, KSR was chosen by General Motors Corporation (GMC or GM) to supply adjustable pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC light trucks that used engines with computer-controlled throttles. To make the '976 pedal compatible with the trucks, KSR merely took that design and added a modular sensor. Teleflex is a rival to KSR in the design and manufacture of adjustable pedals. As noted, it is the exclusive licensee of the Engelgau patent. Engelgau filed the patent application on August 22, 2000 as a continuation of a previous application for which was filed on January 26, 1999. He has sworn he invented the patent's subject matter on February 14, 1998. The Engelgau patent discloses an adjustable electronic pedal described in the specification as a "simplified vehicle control pedal assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer parts and is easier to package within the vehicle." Engelgau, col. 2, lines 2-5, Supplemental App. 6. Claim 4 of the patent, at issue here, describes: "A vehicle control pedal apparatus comprising: a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure; an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm moveable in for[e] and aft directions with respect to said support; a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal assembly with respect to said support and defining a pivot axis; and an electronic control attached to said support for controlling a vehicle system; said apparatus characterized by said electronic control being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal that corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal arm pivots about said pivot *1737 axis between rest and applied positions wherein the position of said pivot remains constant while said pedal arm moves in fore and aft directions with respect to said pivot." col. 6, lines 17-36, Supplemental App. 8 (diagram numbers omitted). We agree with the District Court that the claim discloses "a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal assembly. Attaching the sensor to the support member allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position while the driver adjusts the pedal." -587. Before issuing the Engelgau patent the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected one of the patent claims that was similar to, but broader than, the present claim The claim did not include the requirement that the sensor be placed on a fixed pivot point. The PTO concluded the claim was an obvious combination of the prior art disclosed in Redding and Smith, explaining: "`Since the prior ar[t] references are from the field of endeavor, the purpose disclosed |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | references are from the field of endeavor, the purpose disclosed would have been recognized in the pertinent art of Redding. Therefore it would have been obvious. to provide the device of Redding with the means attached to a support member as taught by Smith.'" In other words Redding provided an example of an adjustable pedal and Smith explained how to mount a sensor on a pedal's support structure, and the rejected patent claim merely put these two teachings together. Although the broader claim was rejected, claim 4 was later allowed because it included the limitation of a fixed pivot point, which distinguished the design from Redding's. Engelgau had not included Asano among the prior art references, and Asano was not mentioned in the patent's prosecution. Thus, the PTO did not have before it an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point. The patent issued on May 29, 2001 and was assigned to Teleflex. Upon learning of KSR's design for GM, Teleflex sent a warning letter informing KSR that its proposal would violate the Engelgau patent. "`Teleflex believes that any supplier of a product that combines an adjustable pedal with an electronic throttle control necessarily employs technology covered by one or more'" of Teleflex's patents. KSR refused to enter a royalty arrangement with Teleflex; so Teleflex sued for infringement, asserting KSR's pedal infringed the Engelgau patent and two other patents. Teleflex later abandoned its claims regarding the other patents and dedicated the patents to the public. The remaining contention was that KSR's pedal system for GM infringed claim 4 of the Engelgau patent. Teleflex has not argued that the other three claims of the patent are infringed by KSR's pedal, nor has Teleflex argued that the mechanical adjustable pedal designed by KSR for Ford infringed any of its patents. C The District Court granted summary judgment in KSR's favor. After reviewing the pertinent history of pedal design, the scope of the Engelgau patent, and the relevant prior art, the court considered the validity of the contested claim. By direction of 35 U.S.C. 282, an issued patent is presumed valid. The District Court applied 's framework to determine whether under summary-judgment standards KSR had overcome the presumption and demonstrated that claim 4 was obvious in light of the prior art in existence when *1738 the claimed subject matter was invented. See 102(a). The District Court determined, in light of the expert testimony and the parties' stipulations, that the level of ordinary skill in pedal design was "`an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering (or an equivalent amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity with |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | (or an equivalent amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity with pedal control systems for vehicles.'" The court then set forth the relevant prior art, including the patents and pedal designs described above. Following 's direction, the court compared the teachings of the prior art to the claims of Engelgau. It found "little difference." Asano taught everything contained in claim 4 except the use of a sensor to detect the pedal's position and transmit it to the computer controlling the throttle. That additional aspect was revealed in sources such as the '068 patent and the sensors used by Chevrolet. Under the controlling cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, the District Court was not permitted to stop there. The court was required also to apply the TSM test. The District Court held KSR had satisfied the test. It reasoned (1) the state of the industry would lead inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon provided the basis for these developments, and (3) Smith taught a solution to the wire chafing problems in Rixon, namely locating the sensor on the fixed structure of the pedal. This could lead to the combination of Asano, or a pedal like it, with a pedal position sensor. The conclusion that the Engelgau design was obvious was supported, in the District Court's view, by the PTO's rejection of the broader version of claim Had Engelgau included Asano in his patent application, it reasoned, the PTO would have found claim 4 to be an obvious combination of Asano and Smith, as it had found the broader version an obvious combination of Redding and Smith. As a final matter, the District Court held that the secondary factor of Teleflex's commercial success with pedals based on Engelgau's design did not alter its conclusion. The District Court granted summary judgment for KSR. With principal reliance on the TSM test, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled the District Court had not been strict enough in applying the test, having failed to make "`finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention' to attach an electronic control to the support bracket of the Asano assembly." (quoting In re Kotzab, (C.A.Fed.2000)). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be solved satisfied this requirement because unless the "prior art references address[ed] the precise problem that the patentee was trying to solve," the problem would not motivate an inventor |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | trying to solve," the problem would not motivate an inventor to look at those Here, the Court of Appeals found, the Asano pedal was designed to solve the "`constant ratio problem'"that is, to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is the same no matter how the pedal is adjustedwhereas Engelgau sought to provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. As for Rixon, the court explained, that pedal suffered from the problem of wire chafing but was not designed to solve it. In the court's view Rixon did not teach anything helpful to Engelgau's purpose. Smith, in turn, did not relate to adjustable pedals and did not "necessarily go to the issue of motivation *1739 to attach the electronic control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly." When the patents were interpreted in this way, the Court of Appeals held, they would not have led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on the sort of pedal described in Asano. That it might have been obvious to try the combination of Asano and a sensor was likewise irrelevant, in the court's view, because "`"[o]bvious to try" has long been held not to constitute obviousness.'" (quoting In re Deuel, (C.A.Fed.1995)). The Court of Appeals also faulted the District Court's consideration of the PTO's rejection of the broader version of claim The District Court's role, the Court of Appeals explained, was not to speculate regarding what the PTO might have done had the Engelgau patent mentioned Asano. Rather, the court held, the District Court was obliged first to presume that the issued patent was valid and then to render its own independent judgment of obviousness based on a review of the prior art. The fact that the PTO had rejected the broader version of claim 4, the Court of Appeals said, had no place in that analysis. The Court of Appeals further held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Teleflex had proffered statements from one expert that claim 4 "`was a simple, elegant, and novel combination of features,'" compared to Rixon, and from another expert that claim 4 was nonobvious because, unlike in Rixon, the sensor was mounted on the support bracket rather than the pedal itself. This evidence, the court concluded, sufficed to require a trial. II A We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court's engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. To be sure, recognized the need for "uniformity and definiteness." Yet the principles laid down in reaffirmed the "functional approach" of Hotchkiss, See To this end, set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that would prove instructive. Neither the enactment of 103 nor the analysis in disturbed this Court's earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held that a "patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions obviously withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men." Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea This is a principal reason for declining to allow patents for what is obvious. The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. Three cases decided after illustrate the application of this doctrine. In United a companion case to the Court considered the obviousness of a "wet battery" that varied from prior designs in two ways: *17 It contained water, rather than the acids conventionally employed in storage batteries; and its electrodes were magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather than zinc and silver chloride. The Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable -51, It nevertheless rejected the Government's claim that Adams's battery was obvious. The Court relied upon the corollary principle that when the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious. When Adams designed his battery, the prior art warned that risks were involved in using the types of electrodes he employed. The fact that the elements worked together in an unexpected and fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams's design was not obvious to those skilled in the art. In Anderson's-Black Rock, the Court elaborated on this approach. The subject matter of the patent before the Court was a device combining two pre-existing elements: a radiant-heat burner and a paving machine. The device, the Court concluded, did not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat burner functioned just as a burner was expected to function; and |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | functioned just as a burner was expected to function; and the paving machine did the same. The two in combination did no more than they would in separate, sequential operation. In those circumstances, "while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented," and the patent failed under 103. (footnote omitted). Finally, in the Court derived from the precedents the conclusion that when a patent "simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform" and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious. The principles underlying these cases are instructive when the question is whether a patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious. When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida and Anderson's-Black Rock are illustrativea court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having *1741 ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness"). As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. B When it first established the requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements in order to show that the combination is obvious, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals captured a helpful insight. See Application of Bergel, As is clear from cases such as Adams, a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known. Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends. Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility. In the years since the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals set forth the essence of the TSM test, the Court of Appeals no doubt has applied the test in accord with these principles in many cases. There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the analysis. But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs. C The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the most part to the court's narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry reflected in its application of the TSM test. In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the *1742 patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under 103. One of the ways in which a patent's subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent's claims. The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent's subject matter. The question is not whether the combination was obvious to the patentee but whether the combination was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem. The primary purpose of Asano was solving the constant ratio problem; so, the court concluded, an inventor considering how to put a sensor on an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider putting it on the Asano pedal. Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. Regardless of Asano's primary purpose, the design provided an obvious example of an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point; and the prior art was replete with patents indicating that a fixed pivot point was an ideal mount for a sensor. The idea that a designer hoping to make an |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | sensor. The idea that a designer hoping to make an adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was designed to solve the constant ratio problem makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was "obvious to try." When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under 103. The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias. A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. See )). Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are *1743 neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it. We note the Court of Appeals has since elaborated a broader conception of the TSM test than was applied in the instant matter. See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland ; Alza Those decisions, of course, are not now before us and do not correct the errors of law made by the Court of Appeals in this case. The extent to which they may describe an analysis more consistent with our earlier precedents and our decision here is a matter for the Court of Appeals to consider in its future cases. What we hold is that the fundamental misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent with our patent law decisions. III When we apply the standards we have explained to the instant facts, claim 4 must be found obvious. We agree with and adopt the District Court's recitation of the relevant prior art and its determination of the level of ordinary skill in the field. As did the District Court, we see little difference between the teachings of Asano and Smith and the adjustable electronic pedal disclosed in claim 4 of the Engelgau patent. A person having |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | in claim 4 of the Engelgau patent. A person having ordinary skill in the art could have combined Asano with a pedal position sensor in a fashion encompassed by claim 4, and would have seen the benefits of doing so. A Teleflex argues in passing that the Asano pedal cannot be combined with a sensor in the manner described by claim 4 because of the design of Asano's pivot mechanisms. See Brief for Respondents 48-49, and n. 17. Therefore, Teleflex reasons, even if adding a sensor to Asano was obvious, that does not establish that claim 4 encompasses obvious subject matter. This argument was not, however, raised before the District Court. There Teleflex was content to assert only that the problem motivating the invention claimed by the Engelgau patent would not lead to the solution of combining of Asano with a sensor. See Teleflex's Response to KSR's Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity in No. 02-74586 (ED Mich.), pp. 18-20, App. 144a-146a. It is also unclear whether the current argument was raised before the Court of Appeals, where Teleflex advanced the nonspecific, conclusory contention that combining Asano with a sensor would not satisfy the limitations of claim See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 04-1 (CA Fed.), pp. 42-4 Teleflex's own expert declarations, moreover, do not support the point Teleflex now raises. See Declaration of Clark J. Radcliffe, Ph.D., Supplemental App. 204-207; Declaration of Timothy L. Andresen, The only statement in either declaration that might bear on the argument is found in the Radcliffe declaration: "Asano and Rixon are complex mechanical linkage-based devices that are expensive to produce and assemble and difficult to package. It is exactly these difficulties with prior art designs that [Engelgau] resolves. The use of an adjustable pedal with a single pivot reflecting pedal position combined with an electronic control mounted between the *1744 support and the adjustment assembly at that pivot was a simple, elegant, and novel combination of features in the Engelgau '565 patent." Read in the context of the declaration as a whole this is best interpreted to mean that Asano could not be used to solve "[t]he problem addressed by Engelgau '565[:] to provide a less expensive, more quickly assembled, and smaller package adjustable pedal assembly with electronic control." The District Court found that combining Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within the scope of claim -593. Given the sigificance of that finding to the District Court's judgment, it is apparent that Teleflex would have made clearer challenges to it if it intended to preserve this claim. In light of Teleflex's |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | it intended to preserve this claim. In light of Teleflex's failure to raise the argument in a clear fashion, and the silence of the Court of Appeals on the issue, we take the District Court's conclusion on the point to be correct. B The District Court was correct to conclude that, as of the time Engelgau designed the subject matter in claim 4, it was obvious to a person of ordinary skill to combine Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor. There then existed a marketplace that created a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art taught a number of methods for achieving this advance. The Court of Appeals considered the issue too narrowly by, in effect, asking whether a pedal designer writing on a blank slate would have chosen both Asano and a modular sensor similar to the ones used in the Chevrolet truckline and disclosed in the '068 patent. The District Court employed this narrow inquiry as well, though it reached the correct result nevertheless. The proper question to have asked was whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs created by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor. In automotive design, as in many other fields, the interaction of multiple components means that changing one component often requires the others to be modified as well. Technological developments made it clear that engines using computer-controlled throttles would become standard. As a result, designers might have decided to design new pedals from scratch; but they also would have had reason to make pre-existing pedals work with the new engines. Indeed, upgrading its own pre-existing model led KSR to design the pedal now accused of infringing the Engelgau patent. For a designer starting with Asano, the question was where to attach the sensor. The consequent legal question, then, is whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill starting with Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on a fixed pivot point. The prior art discussed above leads us to the conclusion that attaching the sensor where both KSR and Engelgau put it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. The '936 patent taught the utility of putting the sensor on the pedal device, not in the engine. Smith, in turn, explained to put the sensor not on the pedal's footpad but instead on its support structure. And from the known wire-chafing problems of Rixon, and Smith's teaching that "the pedal assemblies must not precipitate |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | and Smith's teaching that "the pedal assemblies must not precipitate any motion in the connecting wires," Smith, col. 1, lines 35-37, Supplemental App. 274, the designer would know to place the sensor on a nonmoving part of the pedal structure. The most obvious nonmoving point on the structure from which a sensor can *1745 easily detect the pedal's position is a pivot point. The designer, accordingly, would follow Smith in mounting the sensor on a pivot, thereby designing an adjustable electronic pedal covered by claim Just as it was possible to begin with the objective to upgrade Asano to work with a computer-controlled throttle, so too was it possible to take an adjustable electronic pedal like Rixon and seek an improvement that would avoid the wire-chafing problem. Following similar steps to those just explained, a designer would learn from Smith to avoid sensor movement and would come, thereby, to Asano because Asano disclosed an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot. Teleflex indirectly argues that the prior art taught away from attaching a sensor to Asano because Asano in its view is bulky, complex, and expensive. The only evidence Teleflex marshals in support of this argument, however, is the Radcliffe declaration, which merely indicates that Asano would not have solved Engelgau's goal of making a small, simple, and inexpensive pedal. What the declaration does not indicate is that Asano was somehow so flawed that there was no reason to upgrade it, or pedals like it, to be compatible with modern engines. Indeed, Teleflex's own declarations refute this conclusion. Dr. Radcliffe states that Rixon suffered from the same bulk and complexity as did Asano. See Teleflex's other expert, however, explained that Rixon was itself designed by adding a sensor to a pre-existing mechanical pedal. See If Rixon's base pedal was not too flawed to upgrade, then Dr. Radcliffe's declaration does not show Asano was either. Teleflex may have made a plausible argument that Asano is inefficient as compared to Engelgau's preferred embodiment, but to judge Asano against Engelgau would be to engage in the very hindsight bias Teleflex rightly urges must be avoided. Accordingly, Teleflex has not shown anything in the prior art that taught away from the use of Asano. Like the District Court, finally, we conclude Teleflex has shown no secondary factors to dislodge the determination that claim 4 is obvious. Proper application of and our other precedents to these facts therefore leads to the conclusion that claim 4 encompassed obvious subject matter. As a result, the claim fails to meet the requirement of 103. We need not reach the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145737/ksr-intern-co-v-teleflex-inc/ | meet the requirement of 103. We need not reach the question whether the failure to disclose Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is obvious despite the presumption. We nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the presumptionthat the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim seems much diminished here. IV A separate ground the Court of Appeals gave for reversing the order for summary judgment was the existence of a dispute over an issue of material fact. We disagree with the Court of Appeals on this point as well. To the extent the court understood the approach to exclude the possibility of summary judgment when an expert provides a conclusory affidavit addressing the question of obviousness, it misunderstood the role expert testimony plays in the analysis. In considering summary judgment on that question the district court can and should take into account expert testimony, which may resolve or keep open certain questions of fact. That is not the end of the issue, however. The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination. 383 U.S., Where, as here, the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent *1746 claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the claim is apparent in light of these factors, summary judgment is appropriate. Nothing in the declarations proffered by Teleflex prevented the District Court from reaching the careful conclusions underlying its order for summary judgment in this case. * * * We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality around us new works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more. And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts. See U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 8. These premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject matter established in Hotchkiss and codified in 103. Application of the bar must not be confined within a test or formulation too constrained to serve its purpose. KSR provided convincing evidence that mounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal was a design step well within the grasp of |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | In this case we consider whether the Commonwealth of Virginia's statute banning cross burning with "an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons" violates the First Amendment. Va. Code Ann. ง 18.2-23 (1996). We conclude that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any *38 cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form. I Respondents Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating Virginia's cross-burning statute, ง 18.2-23. That statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. "Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons." On August 22, 1998, Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally in Carroll County, Virginia. Twenty-five to thirty people attended this gathering, which occurred on private property with the permission of the owner, who was in attendance. The property was located on an open field just off Brushy Fork Road (State Highway 690) in Cana, Virginia. When the sheriff of Carroll County learned that a Klan rally was occurring in his county, he went to observe it from the side of the road. During the approximately one hour that the sheriff was present, about 0 to 50 cars passed the site, a "few" of which stopped to ask the sheriff what was happening on the property. App. 71. Eight to ten houses were located in the vicinity of the rally. Rebecca Sechrist, who was related to the owner of the property where the rally took place, "sat and watched to see wha[t] [was] going on" from the lawn of her in-laws' house. She looked on as the Klan prepared for the gathering and subsequently conducted the rally itself. During the rally, Sechrist heard Klan members speak about "what they were" and "what they believed in." *39 at 106. The speakers "talked real bad about the blacks and the Mexicans." One speaker told the assembled gathering that "he would love to take a30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks." The speakers also talked about "President Clinton and Hillary Clinton," and about how their tax |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | "President Clinton and Hillary Clinton," and about how their tax money "goes to the black people." Sechrist testified that this language made her "very scared." At the conclusion of the rally, the crowd circled around a 25- to 30-foot cross. The cross was between 300 and 350 yards away from the road. According to the sheriff, the cross "then all of a sudden went up in a flame." As the cross burned, the Klan played Amazing Grace over the loudspeakers. Sechrist stated that the cross burning made her feel "awful" and "terrible." When the sheriff observed the cross burning, he informed his deputy that they needed to "find out who's responsible and explain to them that they cannot do this in the State of Virginia." The sheriff then went down the driveway, entered the rally, and asked "who was responsible for burning the cross." Black responded, "I guess I am because I'm the head of the rally." The sheriff then told Black, "[T]here's a law in the State of Virginia that you cannot burn a cross and I'll have to place you under arrest for this." Black was charged with burning a cross with the intent of intimidating a person or group of persons, in violation of ง 18.2-23. At his trial, the jury was instructed that "intent to intimidate means the motivation to intentionally put a person or a group of persons in fear of bodily harm. Such fear must arise from the willful conduct of the accused rather than from some mere temperamental timidity of the victim." The trial court also instructed the jury that "the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent." When Black objected to this last instruction on First Amendment grounds, *350 the prosecutor responded that the instruction was "taken straight out of the [Virginia] Model Instructions." The jury found Black guilty, and fined him $2,500. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed Black's conviction. Rec. No. 1581-99-3 App. 1. On May 2, 1998, respondents Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara, as well as a third individual, attempted to burn a cross on the yard of James Jubilee. Jubilee, an African-American, was Elliott's next-door neighbor in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Four months prior to the incident, Jubilee and his family had moved from California to Virginia Beach. Before the cross burning, Jubilee spoke to Elliott's mother to inquire about shots being fired from behind the Elliott home. Elliott's mother explained to Jubilee that her son shot firearms as a hobby, and that he used the backyard as |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | as a hobby, and that he used the backyard as a firing range. On the night of May 2, respondents drove a truck onto Jubilee's property, planted a cross, and set it on fire. Their apparent motive was to "get back" at Jubilee for complaining about the shooting in the backyard. Respondents were not affiliated with the Klan. The next morning, as Jubilee was pulling his car out of the driveway, he noticed the partially burned cross approximately feet from his house. After seeing the cross, Jubilee was "very nervous" because he "didn't know what would be the next phase," and because "a cross burned in your yard tells you that it's just the first round." Elliott and O'Mara were charged with attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross burnin O'Mara pleaded guilty to both counts, reserving the right to challenge the constitutionality of the cross-burning statute. The judge sentenced O'Mara to 90 days in jail and fined him $2,500. The judge also suspended 5 days of the sentence and $1,000 of the fine. At Elliott's trial, the judge originally ruled that the jury would be instructed "that the burning of a cross by itself is *351 sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent." At trial, however, the court instructed the jury that the Commonwealth must prove that "the defendant intended to commit cross burning," that "the defendant did a direct act toward the commission of the cross burning," and that "the defendant had the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons." The court did not instruct the jury on the meaning of the word "intimidate," nor on the prima facie evidence provision of ง 18.2-23. The jury found Elliott guilty of attempted cross burning and acquitted him of conspiracy to commit cross burnin It sentenced Elliott to 90 days in jail and a $2,500 fine. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions of both Elliott and O'Mara. Each respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that ง 18.2-23 is facially unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated all three cases, and held that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. It held that the Virginia cross-burning statute "is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found unconstitutional in R. A. V. [v. St. ]." 553 S.E.2d, 2. The Virginia statute, the court held, discriminates on the basis of content since it "selectively chooses only cross burning because of its distinctive message." 553 S.E.2d, The court also held that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because "[t]he enhanced probability |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because "[t]he enhanced probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech." 553 S.E.2d, 6. Three justices dissented, concluding that the Virginia cross-burning statute passes constitutional muster because it proscribes only conduct that constitutes a true threat. The justices noted that unlike the ordinance found unconstitutional in R. A. V. v. St. the Virginia *352 statute does not just target cross burning "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 553 S. E. 2d, at 753. Rather, "the Virginia statute applies to any individual who burns a cross for any reason provided the cross is burned with the intent to intimidate." The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's analysis of the prima facie provision because the inference alone "is clearly insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant burned a cross with the intent to intimidate." The dissent noted that the burden of proof still remains on the Commonwealth to prove intent to intimidate. We granted certiorari.[1] Cross burning originated in the 1th century as a means for Scottish tribes to signal each other. See M. Newton & J. Newton, The Ku Klux Klan: An Encyclopedia 15 (1991). Sir Walter Scott used cross burnings for dramatic effect in The Lady of the Lake, where the burning cross signified both a summons and a call to arms. See W. Scott, The Lady of The Lake, canto third. Cross burning in this country, however, long ago became unmoored from its Scottish ancestry. Burning a cross in the United is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan. The first Ku Klux Klan began in Pulaski, Tennessee, in the spring of 1866. Although the Ku Klux Klan started as a social club, it soon changed into something far different. The Klan fought Reconstruction and the corresponding drive to allow freed blacks to participate in the political process. *353 Soon the Klan imposed "a veritable reign of terror" throughout the South. S. Kennedy, Southern Exposure 31 (1991) (hereinafter Kennedy). The Klan employed tactics such as whipping, threatening to burn people at the stake, and murder. W. Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America 8-9 (1987) (hereinafter Wade). The Klan's victims included blacks, southern whites who disagreed with the Klan, and "carpetbagger" northern whites. The activities of the Ku Klux Klan prompted legislative action at the national level. In 1871, "President Grant sent a message to Congress indicating that the Klan's reign of terror in the Southern had rendered life and property insecure." In response, Congress passed |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | had rendered life and property insecure." In response, Congress passed what is now known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. See "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United and for other Purposes," President Grant used these new powers to suppress the Klan in South Carolina, the effect of which severely curtailed the Klan in other as well. By the end of Reconstruction in 1877, the first Klan no longer existed. The genesis of the second Klan began in 1905, with the publication of Thomas Dixon's The Clansmen: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan. Dixon's book was a sympathetic portrait of the first Klan, depicting the Klan as a group of heroes "saving" the South from blacks and the "horrors" of Reconstruction. Although the first Klan never actually practiced cross burning, Dixon's book depicted the Klan burning crosses to celebrate the execution of former slaves. ; see also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Cross burning thereby became associated with the first Ku Klux Klan. When D. W. Griffith turned Dixon's book into the movie The Birth of a Nation in 1915, *35 the association between cross burning and the Klan became indelible. In addition to the cross burnings in the movie, a poster advertising the film displayed a hooded Klansman riding a hooded horse, with his left hand holding the reins of the horse and his right hand holding a burning cross above his head. Wade 127. Soon thereafter, in November 1915, the second Klan began. From the inception of the second Klan, cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology. The first initiation ceremony occurred on Stone Mountain near Atlanta, Georgia. While a 0-foot cross burned on the mountain, the Klan members took their oaths of loyalty. See Kennedy 163. This cross burning was the second recorded instance in the United The first known cross burning in the country had occurred a little over one month before the Klan initiation, when a Georgia mob celebrated the lynching of Leo Frank by burning a "gigantic cross" on Stone Mountain that was "visible throughout" Atlanta. Wade 1 The new Klan's ideology did not differ much from that of the first Klan. As one Klan publication emphasized, "We avow the distinction between [the] races, and we shall ever be true to the faithful maintenance of White Supremacy and will strenuously oppose any compromise thereof in any and all things." Violence was also an elemental part of this new Klan. By September 1921, the New |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | part of this new Klan. By September 1921, the New York World newspaper documented 152 acts of Klan violence, including murders, 1 floggings, and 27 tar-and-featherings. Wade 160. Often, the Klan used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending violence. For example, in 1939 and 190, the Klan burned crosses in front of synagogues and churches. See Kennedy 175. After one cross burning at a synagogue, a Klan member noted that if the cross burning did not "shut the Jews up, we'll cut a few *355 throats and see what happens." In Miami in 191, the Klan burned four crosses in front of a proposed housing project, declaring, "We are here to keep niggers out of your town. When the law fails you, call on us." And in Alabama in 192, in "a whirlwind climax to weeks of flogging and terror," the Klan burned crosses in front of a union hall and in front of a union leader's home on the eve of a labor election. These cross burnings embodied threats to people whom the Klan deemed antithetical to its goals. And these threats had special force given the long history of Klan violence. The Klan continued to use cross burnings to intimidate after World War In one incident, an African-American "school teacher who recently moved his family into a block formerly occupied only by whites asked the protection of city police after the burning of a cross in his front yard." Richmond News Leader, Jan. 21, 199, p. 19, App. 312. And after a cross burning in Suffolk, Virginia, during the late 190's, the Virginia Governor stated that he would "not allow any of our people of any race to be subjected to terrorism or intimidation in any form by the Klan or any other organization." D. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan 333 (1980) (hereinafter Chalmers). These incidents of cross burning, among others, helped prompt Virginia to enact its first version of the cross-burning statute in 1950. The decision of this Court in along with the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's, sparked another outbreak of Klan violence. These acts of violence included bombings, beatings, shootings, stabbings, and mutilations. See, e. Chalmers 39-350; Wade 302-303. Members of the Klan burned crosses on the lawns of those associated with the civil rights movement, assaulted the Freedom Riders, bombed churches, and murdered blacks as well as whites *356 whom the Klan viewed as sympathetic toward the civil rights movement. Throughout the history of the Klan, cross burnings have also |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | Throughout the history of the Klan, cross burnings have also remained potent symbols of shared group identity and ideology. The burning cross became a symbol of the Klan itself and a central feature of Klan gatherings. According to the Klan constitution (called the kloran), the "fiery cross" was the "emblem of that sincere, unselfish devotedness of all klansmen to the sacred purpose and principles we have espoused." The Ku Klux Klan Hearings before the House Committee on Rules, 67th Con, 1st Sess., 11, Exh. G (1921); see also Wade 19. And the Klan has often published its newsletters and magazines under the name The Fiery Cross. See At Klan gatherings across the country, cross burning became the climax of the rally or the initiation. Posters advertising an upcoming Klan rally often featured a Klan member holding a cross. See N. MacLean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan 12-13 Typically, a cross burning would start with a prayer by the "Klavern" minister, followed by the singing of Onward Christian Soldiers. The Klan would then light the cross on fire, as the members raised their left arm toward the burning cross and sang The Old Rugged Cross. Wade 185. Throughout the Klan's history, the Klan continued to use the burning cross in their ritual ceremonies. For its own members, the cross was a sign of celebration and ceremony. During a joint Nazi-Klan rally in 190, the proceeding concluded with the wedding of two Klan members who "were married in full Klan regalia beneath a blazing cross." In response to antimasking bills introduced in state legislatures after World War the Klan burned crosses in protest. See Chalmers 30. On March 26, 1960, the Klan engaged in rallies and cross burnings throughout the South in an attempt to recruit 10 million members. See Wade 305. Later in 1960, the Klan became *357 an issue in the third debate between Richard Nixon and John Kennedy, with both candidates renouncing the Klan. After this debate, the Klan reiterated its support for Nixon by burning crosses. See And cross burnings featured prominently in Klan rallies when the Klan attempted to move toward more nonviolent tactics to stop integration. See ; cf. Chalmers 368-369, 371-372, 380, 38. In short, a burning cross has remained a symbol of Klan ideology and of Klan unity. To this day, regardless of whether the message is a political one or whether the message is also meant to intimidate, the burning of a cross is a "symbol of hate." Capitol Square Review and Advisory And while |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | "symbol of hate." Capitol Square Review and Advisory And while cross burning sometimes carries no intimidating message, at other times the intimidating message is the only message conveyed. For example, when a cross burning is directed at a particular person not affiliated with the Klan, the burning cross often serves as a message of intimidation, designed to inspire in the victim a fear of bodily harm. Moreover, the history of violence associated with the Klan shows that the possibility of injury or death is not just hypothetical. The person who burns a cross directed at a particular person often is making a serious threat, meant to coerce the victim to comply with the Klan's wishes unless the victim is willing to risk the wrath of the Klan. Indeed, as the cases of respondents Elliott and O'Mara indicate, individuals without Klan affiliation who wish to threaten or menace another person sometimes use cross burning because of this association between a burning cross and violence. In sum, while a burning cross does not inevitably convey a message of intimidation, often the cross burner intends that the recipients of the message fear for their lives. And when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful. *358 I A The First Amendment, applicable to the through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech." The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow "free trade in ideas" โ even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomfortin ; see also Thus, the First Amendment "ordinarily" denies a State "the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence." The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech. See, e. R. A. V. v. City of St. ; ; United ; The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution. See, e. The First Amendment permits "restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are `of such slight social value *359 as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" R. A. V. v. City of St. (quoting ). Thus, for example, a State may punish those words "which by their very |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | a State may punish those words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." ; see also R. A. V. v. City of St. We have consequently held that fighting words โ "those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction" โ are generally proscribable under the First Amendment. ; see also Furthermore, "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." And the First Amendment also permits a State to ban a "true threat." ; accord, R. A. V. v. City of St. ; ; "True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. See at ; R. A. V. v. City of St. U. S., The *360 speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats "protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders," in addition to protecting people "from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. Respondents do not contest that some cross burnings fit within this meaning of intimidating speech, and rightly so. As noted in Part the history of cross burning in this country shows that cross burning is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of violence. B The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that in light of R. A. V. v. City of St. even if it is constitutional to ban cross burning in a content-neutral manner, the Virginia cross-burning statute is unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis of content and -776, 553 S. E. 2d, 2-75. It is true, as the Supreme Court of Virginia held, that the burning of a cross is symbolic expression. The reason why the Klan burns a cross at its rallies, or individuals place a burning cross on someone else's lawn, is that the |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | a burning cross on someone else's lawn, is that the burning cross represents the message that the speaker wishes to communicate. Individuals burn crosses as opposed to other means of communication because cross burning carries a message in an effective and dramatic manner.[2] *361 The fact that cross burning is symbolic expression, however, does not resolve the constitutional question. The Supreme Court of Virginia relied upon R. A. V. v. City of St. to conclude that once a statute discriminates on the basis of this type of content, the law is unconstitutional. We disagree. In R. A. V., we held that a local ordinance that banned certain symbolic conduct, including cross burning, when done with the knowledge that such conduct would "`arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender'" was unconstitutional. (quoting the St. Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Minn., Legis. Code ง 292.02 (1990)). We held that the ordinance did not pass constitutional muster because it discriminated on the basis of content by targeting only those individuals who "provoke violence" on a basis specified in the law. U.S., The ordinance did not cover "[t]hose who wish to use `fighting words' in connection with other ideas โ to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality." This content-based discrimination was unconstitutional because it allowed the city "to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." We did not hold in R. A. V. that the First Amendment prohibits all forms of content-based discrimination within a proscribable area of speech. Rather, we specifically stated that some types of content discrimination did not violate the First Amendment: "When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or *362 viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class." Indeed, we noted that it would be constitutional to ban only a particular type of threat: "[T]he Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment have special force when applied to the person of the President." And a State may "choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience โ i. e., that which involves the |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | in its prurience โ i. e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity." Consequently, while the holding of R. A. V. does not permit a State to ban only obscenity based on "offensive political messages," ib or "only those threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities," ib the First Amendment permits content discrimination "based on the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue is proscribable," Similarly, Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate. Unlike the statute at issue in R. A. V., the Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward "one of the specified disfavored topics." It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim's race, gender, or religion, or because of the victim's "political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality." Moreover, as a factual matter it is not true that cross burners direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities. See, e. ; Indeed, in the case of Elliott and O'Mara, it is at least unclear whether the respondents burned a cross due to racial animus. See (noting that "these defendants burned a cross because they were angry that their neighbor had complained about the presence of a firearm shooting range in the Elliott's yard, not because of any racial animus"). The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. Thus, just as a State may regulate only that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm. A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our holding in R. A. V. and is proscribable under the First Amendment. IV The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in the alternative that Virginia's cross-burning statute was unconstitutionally overbroad due to its provision stating that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons." Va. Code Ann. ง 18.2-23 (1996). The Commonwealth added the prima facie provision |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | ง 18.2-23 (1996). The Commonwealth added the prima facie provision to the statute in 1968. The court below did not reach whether this provision is severable from the rest of the cross-burning statute under Virginia law. See ง 1-17.1 ("The provisions of all statutes are severable unless it is *36 apparent that two or more statutes or provisions must operate in accord with one another"). In this Court, as in the Supreme Court of Virginia, respondents do not argue that the prima facie evidence provision is unconstitutional as applied to any one of them. Rather, they contend that the provision is unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court of Virginia has not ruled on the meaning of the prima facie evidence provision. It has, however, stated that "the act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to intimidate, will nonetheless suffice for arrest and prosecution and will insulate the Commonwealth from a motion to strike the evidence at the end of its case-in-chief." 553 S. E. 2d, 6. The jury in the case of Richard Elliott did not receive any instruction on the prima facie evidence provision, and the provision was not an issue in the case of Jonathan O'Mara because he pleaded guilty. The court in Barry Black's case, however, instructed the jury that the provision means: "The burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent." App. 196. This jury instruction is the same as the Model Jury Instruction in the Commonwealth of Virginia. See Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal, Instruction No. 10.250 The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruction, renders the statute unconstitutional. Because this jury instruction is the Model Jury Instruction, and because the Supreme Court of Virginia had the opportunity to expressly disavow the jury instruction, the jury instruction's construction of the prima facie provision "is a ruling on a question of state law that is as binding on us as though the precise words had been written into" the statute. E. ; see also New 58 U.S. 77, ; Secretary of State *365 of 67 U.S. 97, (198); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 8, 85-86, n. 8 ; Monaghan, Overbreadth, S. Ct. Rev. 1, 10-12; Blakey & Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 02 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 829, 883, n. 133. As construed by the jury instruction, the prima facie provision strips away the very reason why a State may ban cross burning with the intent |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | why a State may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate. The prima facie evidence provision permits a jury to convict in every cross-burning case in which defendants exercise their constitutional right not to put on a defense. And even where a defendant like Black presents a defense, the prima facie evidence provision makes it more likely that the jury will find an intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case. The provision permits the Commonwealth to arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning itself. It is apparent that the provision as so interpreted "`would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.'" Secretary of State of at (quoting Members of City Council of Los 66 U.S. 789, (198)). The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech. The prima facie evidence provision in this statute blurs the line between these two meanings of a burning cross. As interpreted by the jury instruction, the provision chills constitutionally protected political speech because of the possibility that the Commonwealth will prosecute โ and potentially convict โ somebody engaging only in lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect. As the history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is not always intended to intimidate. Rather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group *366 solidarity. It is a ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the Klan itself. Thus, "[b]urning a cross at a political rally would almost certainly be protected expression." R. A. V. v. St. U. S., at 02, n. (citing 395 U. S., at 5). Cf. National Socialist Party of 32 U.S. 3 Indeed, occasionally a person who burns a cross does not intend to express either a statement of ideology or intimidation. Cross burnings have appeared in movies such as Mississippi Burning, and in plays such as the stage adaptation of Sir Walter Scott's The Lady of the Lake. The prima facie provision makes no effort to distinguish among these different types of cross burnings. It does not distinguish between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim. It does not distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally or a cross burning on a neighbor's lawn. |
Justice O'Connor | 2,003 | 14 | majority | Virginia v. Black | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127908/virginia-v-black/ | public rally or a cross burning on a neighbor's lawn. It does not treat the cross burning directed at an individual differently from the cross burning directed at a group of like-minded believers. It allows a jury to treat a cross burning on the property of another with the owner's acquiescence in the same manner as a cross burning on the property of another without the owner's permission. To this extent I agree with JUSTICE SOUTER that the prima facie evidence provision can "skew jury deliberations toward conviction in cases where the evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason for burnin" Post, at 385 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political rally, arouses a sense of anger or hatred among the vast majority of citizens who see a burning cross. But this sense of anger or hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings. As Gerald Gunther has stated, "The lesson I have drawn *367 from my childhood in Nazi Germany and my happier adult life in this country is the need to walk the sometimes difficult path of denouncing the bigot's hateful ideas with all my power, yet at the same time challenging any community's attempt to suppress hateful ideas by force of law." Casper, Gerry, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 69 The prima facie evidence provision in this case ignores all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut. For these reasons, the prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted through the jury instruction and as applied in Barry Black's case, is unconstitutional on its face. We recognize that the Supreme Court of Virginia has not authoritatively interpreted the meaning of the prima facie evidence provision. Unlike JUSTICE SCALIA, we refuse to speculate on whether any interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision would satisfy the First Amendment. Rather, all we hold is that because of the interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision given by the jury instruction, the provision makes the statute facially invalid at this point. We also recognize the theoretical possibility that the court, on remand, could interpret the provision in a manner different from that so far set forth in order to avoid the constitutional objections we have described. We leave open that possibility. We also leave open the possibility that the provision is severable, and if so, whether Elliott |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | Appellants in this litigation are 13 major oil companies that do business in the State of New Jersey. They are subject to New Jersey's Corporation Business Tax. They also are subject to the federal windfall profit tax imposed on producers of crude oil. None of appellants' oil production takes place in New Jersey. Each appellant has sought to deduct its federal windfall profit tax in calculating "entire net income" for purposes of the New Jersey Corporation Business Tax. Under the applicable New Jersey statute, however, a corporation may not deduct a federal tax that is "on or measured by profits or income." The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the windfall profit tax is a tax "on or measured by profits or income." The question before us is whether, as so construed, the New Jersey provision runs afoul of the Commerce Clause or of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. I A In conjunction with the decontrol of oil prices, Congress enacted the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Tit. I, now codified as 26 U.S. C. *69 4986-4998 (Act).[1] The Act imposes a tax on the "windfall profit" that a crude-oil producer receives from the oil it produces. The "windfall profit" for each barrel of oil is essentially the difference between (a) the deregulated price for the oil (that is, its actual sales price)[2] and (b) the regulated price that would have applied had decontrol not taken place.[3] One significant provision of the Act, known as the "net income limitation," places a cap on the amount of a producer's windfall profit that may be taxed each year: "The windfall profit on any barrel of crude oil shall not exceed 90 percent of the net income attributable to such barrel." 4988(b)(1). The net income attributable to each barrel is the taxable income derived from the oil removed from a particular property for a given year divided by the number of barrels from that property taken into account for that year. 4988(b)(2).[4] Congress specifically has provided that, for federal income tax purposes, the windfall profit tax is deductible. 26 *70 U. S. C. 164(a)(4) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Although Congress may have assumed that "the windfall profit tax generally would be deductible under State income taxes," see H. R. Rep. No. 96-304, p. 9 the Act does not require a State, in imposing a tax, to allow the deduction. B New Jersey's Corporation Business Tax Act, N. J. Stat. Ann. 54:10A-1 et seq. imposes a tax on a portion of the "entire net income" of a |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | on a portion of the "entire net income" of a corporation "for the privilege of doing business, employing or owning capital or property, or maintaining an office in this State." 54:10A-2. For a corporation doing business both within and outside New Jersey, the portion of the "entire net income" to be taxed is determined according to a three-factor formula concerning property, receipts, and payroll. The formula calls for the average of three ratios: in-state property to total property; in-state to total receipts; and in-state to total wages, salaries, and other forms of employee compensation. 54:10A-6. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Under the Corporation Business Tax Act, a corporation's "entire net income" is presumptively the same as its federal taxable income "before net operating loss deduction and special deductions." 54:10A-4(k). The statute also provides: "Entire net income shall be determined without the exclusion, deduction, or credit of [t]axes paid or accrued to the United States on or measured by profits or income." The New Jersey Legislature adopted this "add-back" provision in 1958, long before Congress enacted the windfall profit tax in 1980. 1958 N. J. Laws, ch. 63. See 107 N. J. 307, C In reporting to New Jersey its "entire net income" for 1980 and 1981, each of the appellants did not "add back" the *71 amount of its federal windfall profit tax. In effect, then, each appellant claimed a deduction for that tax from its "entire net income." As a result, appellee, the Director of the New Jersey Division of Taxation, assessed deficiencies.[5] Appellants then brought suit against appellee in the Tax Court of New Jersey.[6] They contended, first, that the windfall profit tax was not a "tax on or measured by profits or income," within the meaning of the add-back provision, and, second, that a contrary construction of the add-back provision would contravene the Federal Constitution. The Tax Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the deficiency assessments. 7 N. J. Tax 51 A consolidated motion for reconsideration was denied. 7 N. J. Tax 275 The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed, holding that the windfall profit tax was not a tax on or measured by profits or income, and, therefore, that it could be deducted from entire net income. 208 N. J. Super. 201, The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its turn, reversed and reinstated the Tax Court's judgment. 107 N. J. 307, The five participating justices in a unanimous opinion held that the windfall profit tax is a tax measured by "profits or income" for the purposes of the add-back provision. The court first |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | for the purposes of the add-back provision. The court first observed that there obviously was no significant legislative intent on the point, given the fact that the add-back provision predated the windfall profit tax by over 20 years. 526 A.2d, at Lacking evidence of legislative intent, the court went on to reason that the windfall profit tax was a tax on "income" or "profits" as a matter of both ordinary usage and "economic sense." * 1042. The court noted that the windfall profit tax, by its terms, is limited to "that increment of [an oil producer's] income representing the excess of the uncontrolled price of oil over the controlled price." Also, because of the net income limitation provision, the court concluded that the amount taxed under the windfall profit tax cannot exceed a producer's "net income per barrel." For these reasons, the court found it appropriate to classify the windfall profit tax as measured by income or profits. Having determined that the add-back provision applied to the windfall profit tax, the court rejected appellants' federal constitutional challenge. "Because the denial of a deduction for the [windfall profit tax] was not based on the interstate nature of [appellants'] businesses and did not burden out-of-state companies, consumers, or transactions while favoring in-state activities, the disallowance did not discriminate against interstate commerce." Appellants now press their federal constitutional claims in this Court. After first seeking the views of the Solicitor General of the United States, we noted probable jurisdiction. II In Complete Auto Transit, this Court sustained a state tax "against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." We repeatedly have applied this principle in subsequent cases, most recently this Term in See also n. 12 (citing other applications of the principle). Appellants do not dispute the soundness of *73 the Complete Auto standard or the propriety of its application here. See Brief for Appellants 21. Rather, they argue that the New Jersey Corporation Business Tax, in denying them a deduction for windfall profit tax payments, fails each of the four prongs of the Complete Auto test. We disagree. A There can be no doubt that New Jersey has "a substantial nexus" with the activities that generate appellants' "entire net income," including oil production occurring entirely outside the State. Each appellant's New Jersey operations are part of an integrated "unitary business," which includes the appellant's crude-oil production. Reply Brief for Appellants |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | which includes the appellant's crude-oil production. Reply Brief for Appellants 3. Consequently, there exists a "clear and sufficient nexus between [each] appellant's interstate activities and the taxing State." Exxon That New Jersey denies a deduction for windfall profit tax does not change this conclusion. Denying a deduction for a cost associated with the production of oil cannot alter the fact that New Jersey has a substantial connection to the oil-producing activity, by virtue of the determination that this activity is conducted by a unitary business. B Nor has New Jersey imposed upon appellants an unfairly apportioned tax. New Jersey employs an apportionment formula that averages the percentages of in-state property, receipts, and payroll. See Part We have expressly approved this apportionment formula in the past. See, e. g., Container of Indeed, this three-factor formula "has become something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas are judged." The use of this formula is not invalid as applied to appellants simply because New Jersey denies a deduction for windfall profit tax payments. Appellants contend otherwise, *74 asserting that the windfall profit tax is an exclusively out-of-state expense because it is associated with the production of oil outside New Jersey. They argue that the denial of a deduction for an out-of-state expense causes a State to tax more than its fair share of a unitary business' income. Brief for Appellants 4, 15. Appellants, however, underestimate the fact that, for apportionment purposes, it is inappropriate to consider the windfall profit tax as an out-of-state expense. Rather, just as each appellant's oil-producing revenue as part of a unitary business is not confined to a single State, Exxon ; Brief for Appellants 3, so too the costs of producing this revenue are unitary in nature. See Container Thus, when a State denies a deduction for a cost of a unitary business, the resulting net figure is still a unitary one, which a State may legitimately decide to apportion according to the standard three-factor apportionment formula.[7] It may be that the application of this formula to appellants results in a somewhat "imperfect" measure of the New Jersey component of their unitary net income. But this fact alone does not render the tax on appellants unlawful. "The Constitution does not `invalidat[e] an apportionment formula whenever it may result in taxation of some income that did not have its source in the taxing State.' " *75 at 169-, quoting Moorman Mfg. (emphasis added in Container ). On the contrary, as we have said repeatedly, in order to show unfair apportionment, a taxpayer "must demonstrate that there |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | to show unfair apportionment, a taxpayer "must demonstrate that there is no rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise" (internal quotation marks omitted). Container Given the unitary nature of appellants' oil-producing activities, coupled with New Jersey's use of the bench-mark apportionment formula, appellants have not met this burden.[8] C Even if a tax is fairly apportioned, it may discriminate against interstate commerce. Westinghouse Electric v. Tully, As our precedents show, a tax may violate the Commerce Clause if it is facially discriminatory, has a discriminatory intent, or has the effect of unduly burdening interstate commerce. See generally Smith, State Discriminations against Interstate Commerce, In Tully, for example, we considered a New York income tax provision that expressly provided a tax credit for shipping products from New York rather than other States. Although the tax was fairly apportioned, the tax credit, "on its face, [was] designed to have discriminatory economic effects" and thus was invalid under the Commerce -407. Of course, a tax provision need not be facially discriminatory in the Tully sense in order to violate the Commerce For example, in Bacchus Imports, a Hawaii statute exempted from the State's liquor tax a brandy distilled from the root of a shrub indigenous to Hawaii. Because this was a local product, the tax exemption did not need to be drafted explicitly along state lines in order to demonstrate its discriminatory design. Bacchus Imports also involved a tax exemption for fruit wine. Although this exemption was general in nature and did not specify an indigenous product, there was evidence that it was enacted to promote the local pineapple-wine industry. Thus, because the exemption was motivated by an intent to confer a benefit upon local industry not granted to out-of-state industry, the exemption was invalid. Finally, American Trucking Assns., concerned, among other things, an unapportioned Pennsylvania axle tax on the use of Pennsylvania highways by trucks over 26,000 pounds. Although this "flat" tax applied to both in-state and out-of-state trucks, it nonetheless had a discriminatory effect by exerting "an inexorable hydraulic pressure on interstate businesses to ply their trade within the State that enacted the measure rather than `among the several States,' " quoting U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. See also Halliburton Oil Well New Jersey's add-back provision, however, does not contravene any of the principles articulated in these cases. It obviously is not facially discriminatory in the Tully sense, as there is no explicit discriminatory design to the tax. Nor does it apply exclusively to a localized industry, as in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | does it apply exclusively to a localized industry, as in Bacchus Imports. Instead, the add-back provision applies generally to any federal tax "on or measured by income or profits." *77 Thus, it includes the federal income tax, as well as the windfall profit tax.[9] The federal income tax, of course, applies to corporate activity throughout the Nation. Consequently, what could be said of the statute in Bacchus Imports cannot be said of the add-back provision: that it discriminates on the basis of geographic location. See Appellants, it seems to us, miss this essential point. They argue: "The question here is whether a state may single out for special tax burdens a form of business activity that is conducted only in other jurisdictions." Brief for Appellants 44. But this question is not presented in this litigation. The add-back provision does not single out the windfall profit tax for a deduction denial, and we need not consider here whether a statute that did so would impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce. Moreover, appellants concede that no discriminatory motive underlies the add-back provision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. Nor does the add-back provision exert a pressure on an interstate *78 business to conduct more of its activities in New Jersey. Denying a deduction for windfall profit tax payments cannot create oil reserves where none exist and therefore cannot be considered an incentive for oil producers to move their oil-producing activities to New Jersey. Given these attributes of the add-back provision, it is difficult to see how it unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce. Appellants nonetheless claim that the add-back provision, by denying a deduction for windfall profit tax payments, discriminates against oil producers who market their oil in favor of independent retailers who do not produce oil. But whatever disadvantage this deduction denial might impose on integrated oil companies does not constitute discrimination against interstate commerce. Appellants operate both in New Jersey and outside New Jersey. Similarly, nonproducing retailers may operate both in New Jersey and outside the State. Whatever different effect the add-back provision may have on these two categories of companies results solely from differences between the nature of their businesses, not from the location of their activities. See Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, In this respect, we agree with the analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 107 N. J., at 337-,[10] *79 For all these reasons, we conclude that the add-back provision does not discriminate against interstate commerce. D There is also no doubt that New Jersey's Corporation Business Tax is "fairly related" to the benefits that New Jersey provides appellants, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | majority | Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, NJ Dept. of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112242/amerada-hess-corp-v-director-div-of-taxation-nj-dept-of-treasury/ | "fairly related" to the benefits that New Jersey provides appellants, "which include police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and `the advantages of a civilized society.' " Exxon quoting Japan Line, Appellants acknowledge, as they must, that New Jersey may impose a reasonable tax on a portion of their "unitary business" income. Brief for Appellants 3. That New Jersey denies a deduction for windfall profit tax payments "does not alter the fact that the tax paid by [appellants] is related to the advantages provided by the State which aid [each] appellant's business." D. H. Holmes In sum, then, the Corporation Business Tax imposed on appellants satisfies all four elements of the Complete Auto test, even considering that the add-back provision denies a deduction for windfall profit tax payments. III Appellants also contend that, by denying a deduction for windfall profit tax payments, the add-back provision violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the foregoing discussion, this contention is plainly meritless. First, appellants recognize that the Complete Auto test encompasses due process standards. Brief for Appellants 21; see also 1 J. Hellerstein, *80 State Taxation ¶ 4.8, p. 123 Accordingly, having determined that the Corporation Business Tax passes all four prongs of the Complete Auto test, we also conclude that it does not violate due process. Second, although some forms of discriminatory state taxation may violate the Equal Protection Clause even when they pose no Commerce Clause problem, see Metropolitan Life Ins. the add-back provision is not among them. In contrast to Ward, there is no discriminatory classification underlying the add-back provision. Moreover, there is unquestionably a rational basis for the State's refusal to allow a deduction for federal windfall profit tax. IV There being no constitutional infirmity to the add-back provision as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the judgment of that court is affirmed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | dissenting | O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110319/obannon-v-town-court-nursing-center/ | Respondents have a constitutionally protected property interest in their "`legitimate entitlement to continued residency at the home of [their] choice absent specific cause for transfer.'" Town Court Nursing Center, quoting The statutory and regulatory scheme gives a patient the right to choose any qualified nursing home. 42 U.S. C. 1395a and 1396a (a) (23) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Once a patient has chosen a facility, the scheme carefully protects against undesired transfers by limiting the circumstances under which a home may transfer patients. (1979). And a qualified nursing home, which must have met detailed federal requirements to gain certification, 42 U.S. C. 1395x (j) (1976 ed. and Supp. II) and 1396a (a) (28), cannot be decertified unless the Government can show good cause. See 42 U.S. C. 1395cc (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Thus the scheme is designed to enable a patient to stay in the chosen home unless there is a specific reason to justify a transfer. Respondent patients chose a home which was, at the time, qualified. They moved into the home reasonably expecting that they would not be forced to move unless, for some sufficient reason, the home became unsuitable for them. The Government's disqualification of the home is, of course, one such reason. Respondents have no right to receive benefits if they choose to live in an unqualified home. That does not mean, however, that they have no right to be heard on the question whether the home is qualifiedthe answer to which will determine whether they must move to another home and suffer the allegedly great ills encompassed by the term "transfer trauma." See ante, at 784-785,n. 16. The Government's *806 action in withdrawing the home's certification deprives them of the expectation of continued residency created by the statutes and regulations. Under our precedents, they are certainly "entitled to the benefits of appropriate procedures" in connection with the decertification. ;[*] The requirements of due process, to be sure, are flexible and are meant to be practical. See ; Here, the provider is entitled to formal proceedings in connection with the disqualification of the home. To the extent that patients want to remain in a home, their interests very nearly coincide with the home's own interests. The patients can count on the home to argue that it should not be disqualified. Nevertheless, the patients have some interests which are separate from the interests of the provider, and they could contribute some information relevant to the decertification decision if they were given an opportunity. See ante, at 784, n. 15. There is no indication that the |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | DelCostello v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110956/delcostello-v-teamsters/ | For the past century federal judges have "borrowed" state statutes of limitations, not because they thought it was a sensible *173 form of "interstitial law making," but rather because they were directed to do so by the Congress of the United States.[1] Today the Court holds that the Rules of Decision Act does not determine the result in these cases, because it believes that a separate federal law, growing out of "the policies and requirements of the underlying cause of action," ante, at 159, n. 13, "otherwise require[s] or provide[s]." The Court's opinion sets forth a number of reasons why it may make good sense to adopt a 6-month statute of limitations, but nothing in that opinion persuades me that the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States "require or provide" that this particular limitations period must be applied to this case.[2] *174 Congress has given us no reason to depart from our settled practice, grounded in the Rules of Decision Act, of borrowing analogous state statutes of limitation in cases such as this. For the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United Parcel Service, I believe that in a suit for a breach of the duty of fair representation, the appropriate "laws of the several states" are the statutes of limitations governing malpractice suits against attorneys. I would apply those laws to resolve the worker-union disputes in these two cases. And I would continue to abide by our holding in Mitchell in resolving the employee-employer dispute presented in No. 81-2386. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,990 | 14 | majority | Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112423/port-authority-trans-hudson-corp-v-feeney/ | These cases call upon the Court to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars respondents' suits in federal *301 court against an entity created by New York and New Jersey to operate certain transportation and other facilities. I In 1921, New York and New Jersey entered a bistate compact creating the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Authority). 1921 N. J. Laws, chs. 151, 1; see N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-1 et seq. (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6401 et seq. (McKinney 1979). In accord with the Constitution's Compact Clause, Art. I, 10, cl. 3, Congress consented to the compact. (1921). Through the compact, the States created the Authority to achieve "a better co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York," N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-1 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6401 (McKinney 1979), and lodged in the Authority "full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within [the port] district." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-7 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6407 (McKinney 1979). See generally United States Trust of N. ; E. Bard, The Port of New York Authority (1942). The Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (PATH), petitioner in these consolidated cases, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Authority that operates an interstate railway system and other facilities. PATH is entitled to "all of the privileges, immunities, tax exemptions and other exemptions of the port authority" and is subject to suit to the same extent as the Authority. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-35.61 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6612 (McKinney 1979). Respondents Patrick Feeney and Charles Foster alleged injuries incurred during their employment with PATH. Both filed separate complaints against PATH in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover damages pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability *302 Act (FELA), as amended, 45 U.S. C. 51 et seq. (1982 ed.), the Boiler Inspection Act, as amended, 45 U.S. C. 22 (1982 ed.), and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S. C. 1 (1982 ed.). PATH moved to dismiss both complaints, asserting that PATH enjoyed New York and New Jersey's sovereign immunity and thus that the Eleventh Amendment deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over the suits. Relying in part on Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., (CA3), cert. denied, the District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment deprived it of jurisdiction and dismissed respondents' complaints. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27, A-46. In Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., the Court of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,990 | 14 | majority | Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112423/port-authority-trans-hudson-corp-v-feeney/ | A-46. In Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that because the States had established the Authority as a state agency and continued to exercise extensive control over its operations, the Authority was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also found no waiver of that immunity. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar Feeney's suit because "the Eleventh Amendment immunity either does not extend to [PATH] or has been waived." The court concluded that PATH did not enjoy the States' sovereign immunity, principally because the treasuries of New York and New Jersey are largely insulated from PATH's liabilities. In reaching its conclusion that the States had waived any immunity that PATH possessed, the court relied upon two provisions of an Act governing suits against the Authority and its subsidiaries and passed by New York (in 1950) and New Jersey (in 1951). 1951 N. J. Laws, ch. 204; 1950 N. Y. Laws, ch. 301; see N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 et seq. (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 et seq. (McKinney 1979). The first section provided that the States "consent to suits, actions or proceedings of any form *303 or nature at law, in equity or otherwise against the Port of New York Authority." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 (McKinney 1979). Another section provided in part: "The foregoing consent [of N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157; N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101] is granted upon the condition that venue in any suit, action or proceeding against the Port Authority shall be laid within a county or a judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New York District. The Port Authority shall be deemed to be a resident of each such county or judicial district for the purpose of such suits, actions, or proceedings." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7106 (McKinney 1979). The court concluded that, despite the "somewhat anomalous" location of an indication of waiver in a venue provision, the statutory provisions demonstrated "an intent to allow the Port Authority to be sued in the designated federal courts and is thus an explicit waiver, albeit partial, of the Eleventh Amendment [immunity]." The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of Foster's complaint on identical Two days before the Second Circuit issued these decisions, the Third Circuit had reaffirmed and elaborated its conclusion that the States had not |
Justice O'Connor | 1,990 | 14 | majority | Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112423/port-authority-trans-hudson-corp-v-feeney/ | reaffirmed and elaborated its conclusion that the States had not waived the sovereign immunity that extended to PATH. See cert. pending, No. 89-479. That court acknowledged that "[i]t is certainly arguable that the consent to suit statutes, read in light of this venue provision, create the `overwhelming implication' of consent to suit in federal court," but held that "[n]to without some unease, we conclude that the venue provision fails to constitute the requisite showing that the states intended to waive P. A. T. H.'s [E]leventh [A]mendment immunity." To resolve this conflict, we granted certiorari to *304 review the consolidated decisions of the Second Circuit, and we now affirm. II The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." This Court has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to "establish that `an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.' " Pennhurst State School and ; see also ; The Eleventh Amendment bar to suit is not absolute. States may consent to suit in federal court, see, e. g., Atascadero State ; and, in certain cases, Congress may abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. See, e. g., Respondents challenge PATH's claim that it is a state agency entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity of New York and New Jersey. guides our resolution of this issue. In Petty, the Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from entertaining an action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. 688 (1958 ed.), brought against the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission. Similar to the Authority, the Commission constructed and operated transportation facilities pursuant to a *305 bistate compact entered by Tennessee and Missouri and ratified by Congress. The Court "assume[d] arguendo that this suit must be considered as one against the States since this bi-state corporation is a joint or common agency of Tennessee and Missouri," but concluded that the States had waived any immunity that the Commission possessed. Because we find that the States of New York and New Jersey have consented to suit against PATH in federal court, we conclude that a similar course is appropriate in this case. Well-established law governs abrogation and waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because "abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets `the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States,' " (quoting |
Justice O'Connor | 1,990 | 14 | majority | Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112423/port-authority-trans-hudson-corp-v-feeney/ | balance between the Federal Government and the States,' " (quoting Atascadero State ), and because States are unable directly to remedy a judicial misapprehension of that abrogation, the Court has adopted a particularly strict standard to evaluate claims that Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. See Respondents do not assert that Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity through any of the statutes that underlie their claims against PATH, and such arguments would be unavailing. See ; 5 Similar solicitude for States' sovereign immunity underlies the standard that this Court employs to determine whether a State has waived that immunity. The Court will give effect to a State's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity " `only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' " Atascadero State at 239-240 *306 ). A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts, see, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative and "[t]hus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Atascadero State at New York and New Jersey have expressly consented to suit in expansive terms. The statutory consent to suit provision, which provides that the States "consent to suits, actions, or proceedings of any form or nature at law, in equity or otherwise against the Port of New York Authority," N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 (McKinney 1979), might be interpreted to encompass the States' consent to suit in federal court as well as state court. But such a broadly framed provision may also reflect only a State's consent to suit in its own courts. See, e. g., Atascadero State at Sensitive to the values underlying the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has required that consent to suit in federal court be express and thus has construed such ambiguous and general consent to suit provisions, standing alone, as insufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 473 U.S., at ; Great Northern Life Ins. Other textual evidence of consent to suit in federal courts may resolve that ambiguity and sufficiently *307 clearly establish the scope of the State's more general consent to suit. In such circumstances, the Court must give effect to that clearly indicated consent to suit in federal court. In this case, the statutory venue provision suffices to resolve any ambiguity contained in the States' |
Justice O'Connor | 1,990 | 14 | majority | Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112423/port-authority-trans-hudson-corp-v-feeney/ | provision suffices to resolve any ambiguity contained in the States' general consent to suit provision by expressly indicating that the States' consent to suit extends to suit in federal court. The section provides that "[t]he foregoing consent [of N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 (McKinney 1979)] is granted on the condition that venue shall be laid within a county or judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New York District." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7106 (McKinney 1979). This provision eliminates the danger, identified in Atascadero State and Great Northern Life Ins. that federal courts may mistake a provision intended to allow suit in a State's own courts for a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Petitioner does not deny that the phrase "judicial district, established. by the United States" refers to the United States District Courts, but rather argues that the reference to venue cannot shape our construction of the general consent to suit provision. Although one might not look first to a venue provision to find evidence of waiver of sovereign immunity, we believe that the provision directly indicates the extent of the States' waiver embodied in the consent provision. The States passed the venue and consent to suit provisions as portions of the same Acts that set forth the nature, timing, and extent of the States' consent to suit. The venue provision expressly refers to and qualifies the more general consent to suit provision. Additionally, issues of venue are closely related to those concerning sovereign immunity, as this Court has indicated by emphasizing that "[a] State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued." Pennhurst State School *308 and Petitioner's related argument that a venue provision cannot broaden the consent to suit provision begs the question what the States intended through the consent provision. The venue provision elucidates rather than broadens the consent to suit provision: It provides persuasive textual evidence that the consent to suit provision encompasses suits in federal court, and broadens the effect of the consent provision only to the extent of removing an ambiguity that called forth this Court's prudential canon of construction. The venue provision would hardly qualify "[t]he foregoing consent" unless the States intended that consent to include suits in federal court. Finally, petitioner suggests no "reasonable construction," Atascadero State 473 U. S., at that might be given to the venue provision's phrase, "judicial district, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,990 | 14 | majority | Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112423/port-authority-trans-hudson-corp-v-feeney/ | might be given to the venue provision's phrase, "judicial district, established. by the United States," other than that the States consented to suit in federal court. See Brief for Petitioner 36-38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16. We agree with the court below that the phrase cannot reasonably be construed as an ineffectual attempt to limit venue for suits for which Congress has abrogated the States' immunity. See ; see also Leadbeater, 873 F. 2d, (declining to accept similar construction). Amici curiae supporting petitioner also confess their inability to provide any reasonable alternative construction of the phrase. Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 17. The Third Circuit, in the course of upholding petitioner's immunity defense in a similar suit, professed similar bafflement regarding the import of the venue provision. See Leadbeater, 873 F. 2d, ; Petitioner essentially presents the choice between giving the venue provision its natural meaning and giving the provision no meaning at all. Charged with giving effect to the statute, we do not find the choice to be a difficult one. We conclude that the statutory consent to suit provision, elucidated by the venue provision, establishes the States' *309 waiver of any Eleventh Amendment immunity that might otherwise bar respondents' suits against petitioner. The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are therefore Affirmed. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | The Court today concludes that the Government through the use of an informant "deliberately elicited" information from respondent after formal criminal had begun, and thus the statements made by respondent to the informant are inadmissible because counsel was not present. The exclusion of respondent's statements has no relationship whatsoever to the reliability of the evidence, and it rests on a prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that in my view entirely ignores the doctrinal foundation of that right. The Court's ruling is based on which held that a postindictment confrontation between the accused and his accomplice, who had turned State's evidence and was acting under the direction of the Government, was a "critical" stage of the criminal at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. While the decision today sets forth the factors that are "important" in determining whether there *290 has been a Massiah violation, ante, at 270, I think that Massiah constitutes such a substantial departure from the traditional concerns that underlie the Sixth Amendment guarantee that its language, if not its actual holding, should be re-examined. I The doctrinal underpinnings of Massiah have been largely left unexplained, and the result in this case, as in Massiah, is difficult to reconcile with the traditional notions of the role of an attorney. Here, as in Massiah, the accused was not prevented from consulting with his counsel as often as he wished. No meetings between the accused and his counsel were disturbed or spied upon. And preparation for trial was not obstructed. See In short, as MR. JUSTICE WHITE aptly observed in Massiah: "It is only a sterile syllogisman unsound one, besides to say that because [the accused] had a right to counsel's aid before and during the trial, his out-of-court conversations and admissions must be excluded if obtained without counsel's consent or presence. The right to counsel has never meant as much before, ; and its extension in this case requires some further explanation, so far unarticulated by the Court." A Our decisions recognize that after formal have commenced an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal See, e. g., ante, at 269. This principle derives from which held that a trial court's failure to appoint counsel until the trial began violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell referred to the "critical period" as being "from the time of [the defendants'] arraignment until the beginning of *291 their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important." During that period, the defendants in Powell |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | were vitally important." During that period, the defendants in Powell "did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself." They thus were deprived of the opportunity to consult with an attorney, and to have him investigate their case and prepare a defense for trial. After observing that the duty to assign counsel "is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case," this Court held that the defendants had been unconstitutionally denied effective assistance of counsel.[1] Powell was based on the rationale that an unaided layman, who has little or no familiarity with the law, requires assistance in the preparation and presentation of his case and in coping with procedural complexities in order to assure a fair trial. The Court in Powell stated: "Historically and in practice, in our country at least, [a hearing] has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be *292 heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel every step in the against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."[2] More recently this Court has again observed that the concerns underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are to provide aid to the layman in arguing the law and in coping with intricate legal procedure, United and to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system that otherwise resulted with the creation of the *293 professional prosecuting official.[3] Thus, in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | the creation of the *293 professional prosecuting official.[3] Thus, in examining whether a stage of the is a "critical" one at which the accused is entitled to legal representation, it is important to recognize that the theoretical foundation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is based on the traditional role of an attorney as a legal expert and strategist.[4] "Deliberate elicitation" after formal have begun is thus not by itself determinative. Ash held that an accused has no right to be present at a photo display because there is no possibility that he "might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary." See also If the event is not one that requires knowledge of legal procedure, involves a communication between the accused and his attorney concerning investigation of the case or the preparation of a defense, or otherwise interferes with the attorney-client relationship, there is in my view simply no constitutional prohibition against the use of incriminating *294 information voluntarily obtained from an accused despite the fact that his counsel may not be present. In such circumstances, the accused at the least has been informed of his rights as required by and often will have received advice from his counsel not to disclose any information relating to his case, see, e. g., Once the accused has been made aware of his rights, it is his responsibility to decide whether or not to exercise them. If he voluntarily relinquishes his rights by talking to authorities, or if he decides to disclose incriminating information to someone whom he mistakenly believes will not report it to the authorities, cf. he is normally accountable for his actions and must bear any adverse consequences that result. Such information has not in any sense been obtained because the accused's will has been overborne, nor does it result from any "unfair advantage" that the State has over the accused: the accused is free to keep quiet and to consult with his attorney if he so chooses. In this sense, the decision today and the result in Massiah are fundamentally inconsistent with traditional notions of the role of the attorney that underlie the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To the extent that Massiah relies on in concluding that the confrontation in that case was a "critical" stage of the Massiah reads the language of Powell out of context. In Powell, the period between arraignment and trial was critical because the defendants had no opportunity whatsoever to consult with an attorney during that time, and thus they were altogether deprived |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | attorney during that time, and thus they were altogether deprived of legal assistance in the investigation of their case and the preparation of a defense. The Court today similarly takes an overly broad view of the stages after the commencement of formal criminal that should be viewed as "critical" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. And it is not amiss to point out that Powell was decided solely *295 on the basis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment long before the Court selected the Sixth Amendment as one that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" and made applicable against the as well as the United See B Massiah also relied heavily on a concurring opinion of its author in which expressed the notion that the adversary system commences with indictment, and should be followed by arraignment and trial. Spano, however, was a coerced confession case in which the accused was interrogated for eight hours after he had been indicted until he confessed. While it is true that both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments reflect the Framers' intent to establish essentially an accusatory rather than an inquisitorial system of justice, neither suggests by its terms a rigid dichotomy between the types of police activities that are permissible before commencement of formal criminal and those that are subsequently permissible. More specifically, there is nothing in the Sixth Amendment to suggest, nor does it follow from the general accusatory nature of our criminal scheme, that once the adversary process formally begins the government may not make any effort to obtain incriminating evidence from the accused when counsel is not present. The role of counsel in an adversary system is to offer advice and assistance in the preparation of a defense and to serve as a spokesman for the accused in technical legal And the Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between the accused and his attorney. But there is no constitutional or historical support for concluding that an accused has a right to have his attorney serve as a sort of guru who must be present whenever an accused has an inclination to reveal incriminating information to anyone who acts to elicit such information at the *296 behest of the prosecution. To the extent the accused is protected from revealing evidence that may be incriminatory, the focus must be on the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See, e. g., ;[5] C The objectives that underlie the exclusionary rule also suggest that the results reached in Massiah and the decision today are incorrect. Although the exclusion of reliable, probative |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | decision today are incorrect. Although the exclusion of reliable, probative evidence imposes tremendous costs on the judicial process and on society, see, e. g., this Court has nonetheless imposed a rule for the exclusion of such evidence in some contexts in order to deter unlawful police activity. See, e. g., ; In cases in which incriminating statements made by the accused are entirely voluntary, however, and the government has merely encouraged a third party to talk to the accused and report any incriminating information that the accused might reveal, there is in my view no valid justification for the exclusion of such evidence from trial.[6] *297 Ordinary citizens are expected to report any criminal activity they might observe, and they are often required under pain of compulsory process to reveal information that may incriminate others, even their friends and relatives. It generally does not matter that the information was obtained as a result of trust or confidence that develops from friendship or family ties. The incriminating information may still be obtained through use of the subpoena power, and in many instances of course it will be voluntarily revealed by the citizen interested in the enforcement of the laws. In cases such as this one and Massiah, the effect of the governmental action is to encourage an informant to reveal information to the authorities that the ordinary citizen most likely would reveal voluntarily. While it is true that the informants here and in Massiah were encouraged to "elicit" the information from the accused, I doubt that most people would find this type of elicitation reprehensible. It involves merely engaging the accused in conversation about his criminal activity and thereby encouraging him voluntarily to make incriminating remarks. There is absolutely no element of coercion, nor is there any interference whatsoever with the attorney-client relationship. Anything the accused might reveal to the informant should, as with revelations he might make to the ordinary citizen, be available for use at trial. This Court has never held that an accused is constitutionally protected from his inability to keep quiet, whether or not he has been encouraged by third-party citizens to voluntarily make incriminating remarks. I do not think the result should be different merely because the government has encouraged a third-party informant to report remarks obtained in this fashion. When an accused voluntarily chooses to make an incriminatory remark *298 in these circumstances, he knowingly assumes the risk that his confidant may be untrustworthy.[7] II In holding that the Government has "deliberately elicited" information from the accused here, the Court considers the following factors to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | the accused here, the Court considers the following factors to be relevant: "First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols." Ante, at 270. I disagree with the Court's evaluation of these factors, and would conclude that no deliberate elicitation has taken place. A The Court acknowledges that the use of undercover policework is an important and constitutionally permissible method of law enforcement. Ante, at 272. As the Court observes, for example, recognizes that the Constitution affords no protection to "a wrong-doer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it," even if that person is an undisclosed informer. And in we acknowledged the "necessity of undercover work" and "the value it often is to effective law enforcement." See also, e. g., United v. Russell, ; United v. White, *299 The Court nonetheless holds that once formal criminal have commenced, such undercover activity in some circumstances may not be constitutionally permissible even though it leads to incriminating statements by an accused that are entirely voluntary and inherently reliable. The reason for this conclusion is not readily apparent from the Court's opinion. The fact that police carry on undercover activities should not automatically be transmuted because formal criminal have begun. It is true that once such have commenced, there is an "adversary" relationship between the government and the accused. But an adversary relationship may very well exist prior to the commencement of formal And, as this Court has previously recognized, many events, while perhaps "adversarial," are not of such a nature that an attorney can provide any special knowledge or assistance to the accused as a result of his legal expertise. See, e. g., United ; 388 U. S., at When an attorney has no such special knowledge or skill, the Sixth Amendment does not give the accused a right to have an attorney present. In addition, the mere bringing of formal does not necessarily mean that an undercover investigation or the need for it has terminated. A person may be arrested on the basis of probable cause arising in the immediate aftermath of an offense and during early stages of investigation, but before the authorities have had an opportunity to investigate fully his connection with the crime. And for the criminal, there is no rigid dichotomy between the time before commencement of formal criminal and the time after |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | time before commencement of formal criminal and the time after such have begun. Once out on bail the accused remains free to continue his criminal activity, and very well may decide to do so. See, e. g., Rogers v. United 325 * cited in Indeed, in Massiah itself there was evidence that after indictment one of the defendants attempted to persuade a Government agent to go into the narcotics business with him. As the Court stated in Massiah: "We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted." I would hold that the Government's activity here is merely a continuation of its lawful authority to use covert operations in investigating a criminal case after formal have commenced.[8] B The Court secondly states that here the informant ostensibly was no more than a fellow inmate, and thus the conversation "stimulated" by him may lead the accused to communicate information that he would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be government agents, who are "arm's-length" adversaries. While the Court deems relevant the question whether the informant took active steps as a result of a prearranged deal with the Government to elicit incriminating information from the accused, ante, at 273,[9] I do not think this *301 type of encounter is one that is properly viewed as a critical stage at which counsel is necessary to provide guidance or protection to the accused to enable him to cope with unfamiliar legal or to counterbalance the expertise of a professional prosecutor. Rather, as previously discussed, when the accused voluntarily reveals incriminating information to a third party in this context, I do not think there is any justification for excluding his admissions from trial, whether or not the third party was acting at the behest of the prosecution. C Finally, the Court considers relevant the fact that because the accused is confined and in custody, "subtle influences" are present "that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover agents." Ante, at 274. An appeal to an accused's conscience or willingness to talk, however, does not in my view have a sufficiently overbearing impact on the accused's will to warrant special constitutional protection. In the instant case, for example, if the informant had been in the cell next to respondent and overheard him make incriminating statements to his cellmate, no Sixth Amendment violation would have occurred. See, e. g., United v. Hearst, cert. denied, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | second_dissenting | United States v. Henry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110300/united-states-v-henry/ | have occurred. See, e. g., United v. Hearst, cert. denied, In such circumstances it would be clear that the Government had engaged in no affirmative conduct specifically *302 designed to extract incriminating statements from the accused. The same would be true if the accused made a statement that a prison guard happened to overhear. See, e. g., United v. Barfield, I think there likewise is no Sixth Amendment violation when the accused's cellmate initiates conversation with him, and the accused makes incriminatory admissions. The fact that the cellmate is an informant has no impact on the accused, because the informant appears to him to be an ordinary cellmate. Whether the accused makes any statements is therefore dependent on his own disposition to do so, despite the fact that he is confined in a cell. III Finally, I disagree with the Court's reading of the facts, though that reading obviously narrows the scope of its holding. Here the District Court found that the Government did not employ Nichols to question respondent or to seek information from him, but merely to report what he heard. The Government had no part in having Nichols placed in the jail cell with respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. And the record in my view fails to support the conclusion that Nichols engaged in any affirmative conduct to elicit information from respondent. The Court of Appeals did not either explicitly or implicitly find to the contrary. Thus, this Court's factual conclusions are not supported by the findings of the District Court. I consequently would conclude, as did the District Court, that here respondent has not been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | The basic question presented by these complicated cases is whether “the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) must presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the ‘just and reasonable’ requirement imposed by law.” Ante, at 1. The opening sentence of the Court’s opinion tells us that the “- doctrine”—a term that makes its first appearance in the United States Reports today— mandates an affirmative answer. This holding finds no support in either case that lends its name to the doctrine. Nevertheless, in the interest of guarding against “disfig- urement of the venerable - doctrine,” ante, at 19, the Court mangles both the governing statute and 2 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting precedent. I Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S. C. et seq., wholesale electricity prices are established in the first instance by public utilities, either via tariffs or in contracts with purchasers. Whether set by tariff or contract, all rates must be filed with the Commission. See Section 205(a) of the FPA provides, “All rates and charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.” 16 U.S. C. Pursuant to if FERC deter- mines “that any rate or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affect[ing] such rate is unjust [or] unreasonable the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” 16 U.S. C. These provi- sions distinguish between the rate-setting roles of utilities (which initially set rates) and the Commission (which may override utility-set rates that are not just and reasonable), but they do not distinguish between rates set unilaterally by tariff and rates set bilaterally by contract. However the utility sets its prices, the standard of review is the same— rates must be just and reasonable. The Court purports to acknowledge that “[t]here is only one statutory standard for assessing wholesale electricity rates, whether set by contract or tariff—the just-and- reasonable standard.” Ante, at 16. Unlike rates set by tariff, however, the Court holds that any “freely negoti- ated” contract rate is presumptively just and reasonable unless it “seriously harms” the public interest. Ante, at 1. According to the Court, this presumption represents a “differing application of [the] just-and-reasonable stan- dard,” but not a different standard altogether. Ante, at 6. Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 3 STEVENS, J., dissenting I disagree. There |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | U. S. (2008) 3 STEVENS, J., dissenting I disagree. There is no significant difference between requiring a heightened showing to overcome an otherwise conclusive presumption and imposing a heightened stan- dard of review. I agree that applying a separate standard of review to contract rates is “obviously indefensible,” but that is also true with respect to the Court’s presumption. Even if the “- presumption” were not tan- tamount to a separate standard, nothing in the statute mandates “differing application” of the statutory standard to rates set by contract. Section 206(a) of the FPA provides, “without qualification or exception,” that FERC may replace any unjust or unreasonable contract with a lawful contract. Permian Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 783– : “ ‘The power of an administrative agency to admin- ister a congressionally created program necessar- ily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’ 4 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capri- cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Some- times the legislative delegation to an agency on a par- ticular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own con- struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable in- terpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (Footnote omitted.) Consistent with this understanding of administrative law, our cases interpreting the FPA have invariably “em- phasized that courts are without authority to set aside any rate adopted by the Commission which is within a ‘zone of reasonableness.’ ” Permian But see ante, at 19 (asserting that “a ‘zone of reasonableness’ test fails to accord an adequate level of protection to contracts”). This deference makes eminent sense because “rate-making agencies are not bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted, unless their statutory authority otherwise plainly indicates, ‘to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.’ ” Permian 390 U.S., at 776–777. Despite paying lipservice to this principle, see ante, the Court binds the Commission to a rigid formula of the Court’s own making. Having found no statutory text that supports its vision of the - doctrine, the Court invokes the “im- portant role of contracts in the FPA.” |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | invokes the “im- portant role of contracts in the FPA.” Ante, at 22. But contracts play an “important role” in the FPA only insofar as the statute “departed from the scheme of purely tariff- based regulation.” Verizon Communications In allowing parties to establish Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 5 STEVENS, J., dissenting rates by contract, Congress did not intend to immunize such rates from just-and-reasonable review. Both United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and FPC v. Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), the supposed progenitors of the “- presumption,” make this point in no uncertain terms. See (“The Commission has undoubted power under to prescribe a change in contract rates whenever it determines such rates to be unlawful”); (“[C]ontracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest”).1 Accord- ingly, the fact that the FPA tolerates contracts does not make it subservient to contracts. II Neither of the eponymous cases in the “- presumption,” nor any of our subsequent decisions, sub- stantiates the Court’s atextual reading of and 206. As the Court acknowledges, itself says nothing about what standard of review applies to rates established by contract. See ante, –4. Rather, merely held that utilities cannot unilaterally abrogate contracts with purchasers by filing new rate schedules with the Commis- sion. See –341. The Court neglects to mention, however, that although had no occasion to comment on the standard of review, it did imply that Congress would not have permitted parties to establish rates by contract but for “the protection of the public —————— 1 See also, e.g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas (Arkla) (“[T]he clear purpose of the congressional scheme” for rate filing is to “gran[t] the Commission an opportunity in every case to judge the reasonableness of the rate”); Permian Area Rate Cases, (“[T]he Commission has plenary authority to limit or to proscribe contractual arrangements that contra- vene the relevant public interests”). 6 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting interest being afforded by supervision of the individual contracts, which to that end must be filed with the Com- mission and made public.” In a public utility entered into a long-term con- tract to sell electricity “at a special low rate” in order to forestall potential competition. See –352. Several years later the utility complained that the rate provided too little profit and was therefore not “just and reasonable.” The Commission agreed and set aside the rate “solely because it yield[ed] less |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | and set aside the rate “solely because it yield[ed] less than a fair return on the net invested capital.” See 54–355. The Court vacated and remanded on the ground that the Commission had applied an erroneous standard. “[W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return,” the Court reasoned, “it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain.” at 355. When the seller has agreed to a rate that it later challenges as too low, “the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to ad- versely affect the public interest—as where it might im- pair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive bur- den, or be unduly discriminatory.” The Court fur- ther elaborated on what it meant by the “public interest”: “That the purpose of the power given the Commission by is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests of the utili- ties, is evidenced by the recital in of the Act that the scheme of regulation imposed ‘is necessary in the public interest.’ When is read in the light of this purpose, it is clear that a contract may not be said to be either ‘unjust’ or ‘unreasonable’ simply be- Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 7 STEVENS, J., dissenting cause it is unprofitable to the public utility.” therefore held that, in accordance with the statement of policy in the FPA, 16 U.S. C. whether a rate is “just and reasonable” is measured against the public interest, not the private interests of regulated sellers. Contrary to the opinion of the Court, see ante, at 23, n. 6, instructs that the public inter- est is the touchstone for just-and-reasonable review of all rates, not just contract rates. drew a distinction between the Commission’s authority to impose low rates on utilities and its authority to abrogate low rates agreed to by utilities because these actions impact the public interest differently, not because the public interest gov- erns rates set bilaterally but not rates set unilaterally. When the Commission imposes rates that afford less than a fair return, it compromises the public’s interest in at- tracting necessary capital. The impact is different, how- ever, if a utility has agreed to a low |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | how- ever, if a utility has agreed to a low rate because investors recognize that the utility, not the regulator, is responsible for the unattractive rate of return. used “public interest” as shorthand for the inter- est of consumers in paying “ ‘the lowest possible reason- able rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in the public interest.’ ” Permian 390 U.S., at 793 ). Whereas high rates directly implicate this interest, low rates do so only indirectly, such as when the rate is so low that it “might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an exces- sive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.” 350 U.S., 55. Nothing in purports to mandate a “serious harm” standard of review, or to require any as- sumption that high rates and low rates impose symmetric burdens on the public interest. Cf. ante, at 19–20. As we 8 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting later explained in the Commission cannot ignore even “a small dent in the consumer’s pocket” because “the Act makes unlaw- ful all rates which are not just and reasonable, and does not say a little unlawfulness is permitted.” Brushing aside the text of the FPA, as well as the hold- ings in and themselves, the Court cherry picks language from Verizon, Arkla, and Permian Both Verizon and Arkla mentioned the - line of cases only in passing, and neither case had anything to do with just-and-reasonable review of rates. See Verizon, 535 U.S., at ; Arkla, Fur- thermore, the statement in Permian about “un- equivocal public necessity,” speaks to the difficulty of establishing injury to the public interest in the context of a low-rate challenge, not a high-rate challenge.2 —————— 2 The Court repeatedly quotes the following snippet from the 75-page opinion in Permian : “The regulatory system created by the Act is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily devised by the regu- lated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.” (cited ante, at 5, 22, 24). Like FPC v. Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), however, Permian made this statement in the course of rejecting a low-rate challenge. Read in context, the Court’s reference to “unequivocal public necessity” is a loose restatement of which required “evidence of injury to the public interest,” and which underscored how rarely a utility will be able to demonstrate that a “contract price is so ‘low as to adversely affect the public interest.’ ” –821 (quoting |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | as to adversely affect the public interest.’ ” –821 (quoting ). The Court’s expansive reading of the “unequivocal public necessity” statement cannot be squared with Permian ’s discussion of the Commission’s authority to review rates set by contract: “Although the Natural Gas Act is premised upon a continuing system of private contracting, the Commission has plenary authority to limit or to proscribe contractual arrangements that contravene the relevant public interests.” 390 U.S., at (citation omitted). Nor can it be reconciled with Permian ’s rejection of the producers’ arguments (1) that the Commission “wrongly invalidated existing contracts” by imposing a ceiling on rates, see at 781–, and (2) that the Commission was compelled to adopt contract Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 9 STEVENS, J., dissenting The Court’s reliance on these few stray sentences calls to mind our admonishment in Permian : “The Commis- sion’s exercise of its regulatory authority must be assessed in light of its purposes and consequences, and not by references to isolated phrases from previous cases.” at 791, n. 60. III Lacking any grounding in the FPA or precedent, the Court concludes, as a matter of policy, that the - presumption is necessary to ensure stability in volatile energy markets and to reduce regulatory costs. See ante, at 22–23. Of course, “the desirability of fostering market-stabilizing long-term contracts,” ante, at 25, plays into the public interest insofar as the “Commission’s re- sponsibilities include the protection of future, as well as present, consumer interests,” Permian 390 U.S., at 798; see also United Gas Pipe Line (“It seems plain that Congress was not only expressing its convic- tion that the public interest requires the protection of consumers from excessive prices for natural gas, but was also manifesting its concern for the legitimate interests of natural gas companies in whose financial stability the gas- consuming public has a vital stake”). But under the FPA, Congress has charged FERC, not the courts, with balanc- ing the short-term and long-term interests of consumers. See Permian (“The court’s respon- sibility is not to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors”). Moreover, not even FERC has the authority to endorse the rule announced by the Court today. The FPA does not —————— prices as the basis for computing area rates, see at 792–795. 10 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting indulge, much less require, a “practically insurmountable” presumption, |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | J., dissenting indulge, much less require, a “practically insurmountable” presumption, see Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (CADC 1983) (opinion for the court by Scalia, J.), that all rates set by contract comport with the public interest and are therefore just and reasonable. Congress enacted the FPA precisely because it concluded that regulation was necessary to protect consumers from deficient markets. It follows, then, that “the Commission lacks the authority to place exclusive reliance on market prices.” ; see also at (“In subjecting producers to regulation because of anticompeti- tive conditions in the industry, Congress could not have assumed that ‘just and reasonable’ rates could conclu- sively be determined by reference to market price”). For this reason, we have already rejected the policy rationale proffered by the Court today: “It may be, as some economists have persuasively ar- gued, that the assumptions of the 1930’s about the competitive structure of the natural gas industry, if true then, are no longer true today. It may also be that control of prices in this industry, in a time of shortage, if such there be, is counterproductive to the interests of the consumer in increasing the production of natural gas. It is not the Court’s role, however, to overturn congressional assumptions embedded into the framework of regulation established by the Act. This is a proper task for the Legislature where the public interest may be considered from the multifac- eted points of view of the representational process.” Balancing the short-term and long-term interests of consumers entails difficult judgment calls, and to the extent FERC actually engages in this balancing, its rea- soned determination is entitled to deference. But FERC cannot abdicate its statutory responsibility to ensure just Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 11 STEVENS, J., dissenting and reasonable rates through the expedient of a heavy- handed presumption. This is not to say that the Commis- sion should abrogate any contract that increases rates, but to underscore that the agency is “obliged at each step of its regulatory process to assess the requirements of the broad public interests entrusted to its protection by Congress.” Permian IV Even if, as the Court holds today, the “- presumption” is merely a “differing application” of the statutory just-and-reasonable standard, FERC’s orders must be set aside because they were not decided on this basis. The FERC orders repeatedly aver that the agency is applying a “public interest” standard different from and distinctly more demanding than the statutory standard. See, e.g., App. 1198a (“[T]he burden of showing that a contract is contrary to the |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | burden of showing that a contract is contrary to the public interest is a higher bur- den than showing that a contract is not just and reason- able. The fact that a contract may be found to be un- just and unreasonable under [ and 206] does not in and of itself demonstrate that the contract is contrary to the public interest under the Supreme Court cases”). Indeed, the Commission’s misunderstanding of our cases is so egregious that the sellers, concerned that the orders would be overturned, asked the Commission for “clarifica- tion that the public interest standard of review does not authorize unjust and unreasonable rates.” at 1506a, 1567a. FERC clarified as follows: “[I]f rates become unjust and unreasonable and the contract at issue is subject to the - standard of review, the Commission under court precedent may not change the contract simply because it is no longer just and reasonable. If parties’ market- based rate contracts provide for the public interest 12 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting standard of review, the Commission is bound to a higher burden to support modification of such con- tracts.” at 1506a, 1567a. Whereas in we faulted the Commission for failing to “expressly mention the just-and-reasonable standard,” in these cases FERC refused outright to apply that standard.3 In addition to misrepresenting FERC’s understanding of the - doctrine as a presumption rather than a separate standard, the Court overstates the extent to which FERC considered the lawfulness of the rates. The Court recognizes, as it must, that the three factors identi- fied in are neither exclusive nor “precisely applica- ble to the high-rate challenge of a purchaser.” See ante, at 20; Brief for Respondent –42. Although FERC applied what it termed the “ Three-Prong Test,” App. 1276a, the Court contends the agency did not err because it also evaluated the “ ‘totality of the circum- stances,’ ” see ante, at 20. But FERC’s totality-of-the- circumstances review was infected by its misapprehension of the standard “dictated by the U. S. Supreme Court under the - doctrine.” App. 1229a. Whereas the focus of (a) and 206(a) is on the rea- sonableness of the rates charged, not the conduct of the contracting parties, FERC restricted its review to the contracting parties’ behavior around the time of formation. See at 1280a–1284a. FERC seems to have thought it was powerless to conduct just-and-reasonable review unless the contract was already subject to abrogation —————— 3 The Court contends that FERC’s application of the - doctrine “should be honored” |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | that FERC’s application of the - doctrine “should be honored” because it represents the “settled under- standing of the FPA.” Ante, at 23, n. 6. As explained above, however, FERC’s interpretation of the FPA (and of our cases construing the FPA) is “ ‘obviously indefensible,’ ” and is therefore not entitled to any deference. Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 13 STEVENS, J., dissenting based on contract defenses such as fraud or duress. By including contracts within the scope of however, Congress must have concluded that contract defenses are insufficient to protect the public interest. But see ante, at 19 (holding that the “- presumption” applies in all circumstances absent “traditional grounds for abrogation” or “illegal action” by a contracting party).4 Indeed, nothing in the FPA or this Court’s cases precludes FERC from considering circumstances exogenous to con- tract negotiations, including natural disasters and market manipulation by entities not parties to the challenged contract.5 FERC’s error is obvious from the face of the orders, which repeatedly state the Commission’s belief that it could not consider evidence relevant to the reason- ableness of the contract rates.6 —————— 4 The Court quite sensibly instructs FERC that “if it is clear that one party to a contract engaged in such extensive unlawful market manipu- lation as to alter the playing field for contract negotiations, the Com- mission should not presume that the contract is just and reasonable”; and that the “mere fact that the unlawful activity occurred in a differ- ent (but related) market does not automatically establish that it had no effect upon the contract—especially given the Staff Report’s (unsurpris- ing) finding that high prices in the one market produced high prices in the other.” Ante, at 25. I disagree, however, with the Court’s sugges- tion that the FPA restricts FERC’s review of contract rates to these limited criteria. 5 The FPA does not specify how market deficiencies should weigh in FERC’s review of contract rates. Depending on the circumstances and how one balances the short-term and long-term interests of consumers, evidence of “market turmoil” may, as the Court argues, support rather detract from a finding that contract rates are just and reasonable. See ante, at 18. Whether any given contract rate “ultimately benefits consumers,” ante, at 22, however, is a determination that Congress has vested in FERC, not this Court. 6 See, e.g., App. 1275a (“[A] finding that the unjust and unreasonable spot market prices caused forward bilateral prices to be unjust and unreasonable would be relevant to contract modification only where there is a ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | where there is a ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review. As we have previ- ously concluded, the contracts at issue in this proceeding do not provide 14 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. DIST. NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH CTY. STEVENS, J., dissenting Although the Court and the Commission attempt to recast FERC’s orders as applying the statutory standard, see ante, at 13–14; Brief for Respondent under the doctrine set forth in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), “we cannot accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action; for an agency’s order must be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself,” 417 U.S., 97 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, even assuming FERC subjectively believed that it was applying the just-and-reasonable standard despite its repeated declarations to the contrary, each order must be deemed “so ambiguous that it falls short of that standard of clarity that administrative orders must exhibit.” 95–396. In order to get around the Chenery doctrine, the Court not only mischaracterizes FERC’s orders, but also takes a more radical tack: It concludes that whatever the rationale set forth in FERC’s orders, Chenery does not apply be- cause “the Commission was required, under our decision in to apply the - presumption in its evaluation of the contracts here.” Ante, at 16. This point prompts the Court to comment that “FERC has lucked out.” If the Commission has “lucked out,” it is not only a purely fortuitous victory, but also a Pyrrhic one. —————— for such a standard but rather evidence an intent that the contracts may be changed only pursuant to the ‘public interest’ standard of review. Under the ‘public interest’ standard, to justify contract modifi- cation it is not enough to show that forward prices became unjust and unreasonable due to the impact of spot market dysfunctions” (footnote omitted)); at 1527a (“Complainants were required to meet the public interest standard of review, not the just and reasonable standard of review which could have taken into account the causal connection between the spot market prices and forward bilateral market prices”); at 1534a (“The Staff Report did not make any findings regarding the justness and reasonableness of any contract rates and any such findings would not be relevant here because the just and reasonable standard is not applicable”). Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 15 STEVENS, J., dissenting Although FERC prevails in these cases despite having “offered a justification in court different from what it provided in its opinion,” it has paid a tremendous price. The Court |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | dissenting | Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145778/morgan-stanley-capital-group-inc-v-public-util-dist-no-1-of-snohomish/ | its opinion,” it has paid a tremendous price. The Court has curtailed the agency’s authority to interpret the terms “just and reasonable” and thereby substantially narrowed FERC’s discretion to protect the public interest by the means it thinks best. Contrary to congressional intent, FERC no longer has the flexibility to adjust its review of contractual rates to account for chang- ing conditions in the energy markets or among consumers. Cf. Permian 390 U.S., at (“[A]dministrative authorities must be permitted, consistently with the obli- gations of due process, to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances”). V The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- cuit deserves praise for its efforts to bring the freewheel- ing - doctrine back in line with the FPA and this Court’s cases. I cannot endorse the opinion in its entirety, however, because it verges into the same sort of improper policymaking that I have criticized in the Court’s opinion. Both decisions would hobble the Commission, albeit from different sides. Congress has not authorized courts to prescribe energy policy by imposing presump- tions or prerequisites, or by making marginal cost the sole concern or no concern at all. I would therefore vacate and remand the cases in order to give the Commission an opportunity to evaluate the contract rates in light of a proper understanding of its discretion. I respectfully dissent |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA or Act), 21 U.S. C. et seq., regulates the inspection, handling, and slaughter of livestock for human We consider here whether the FMIA expressly preempts a California law dictating what slaughterhouses must do with pigs that cannot walk, known in the trade as nonam- bulatory pigs. We hold that the FMIA forecloses the chal- lenged applications of the state statute. I A The FMIA regulates a broad range of activities at slaughterhouses to ensure both the safety of meat and the humane handling of animals.1 First enacted in 1906, after —————— 1 The FMIA applies to all slaughterhouses producing meat for in- terstate and foreign commerce. See 21 U.S. C. §(h), 603(a). The FMIA also regulates slaughterhouses serving an exclusively intrastate market in any State that does not administer an inspection system with “requirements at least equal to those” of the Act. Because California has chosen not to adopt such an inspection program, 2 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court Upton Sinclair’s muckraking novel The Jungle sparked an uproar over conditions in the meatpacking industry, the Act establishes “an elaborate system of inspecti[ng]” live animals and carcasses in order “to prevent the shipment of impure, unwholesome, and unfit meat and meat-food products.” Pittsburgh Melting 4–5 (1918). And since amended in 1978, see the FMIA requires all slaughterhouses to comply with the standards for humane handling and slaughter of animals set out in the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, (HMSA), 7 U.S. C. et seq., which originally applied only to slaughterhouses selling meat to the Federal Government. The Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and In- spection Service (FSIS) has responsibility for administer- ing the FMIA to promote its dual goals of safe meat and humane slaughter. Over the years, the FSIS has issued extensive regulations to govern the inspection of animals and meat, as well as other aspects of slaughterhouses’ operations and facilities. See et seq. (2011). The FSIS employs about 9,000 inspectors, veterinarians, and investigators to implement its inspection regime and enforce its humane-handling requirements. See Hearings on 2012 Appropriations before the Subcommittee on Agri- culture of the House Committee on Appropriations, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1B, p. 921 (2011). In fiscal year 2010, those personnel examined about 147 million head of live- stock and carried out more than 126,000 “humane han- dling verification procedures.” at 942–943. The FSIS’s inspection procedure begins with an “ante- mortem” examination of each animal brought to a slaugh- terhouse. See If the inspector finds no —————— the FMIA governs all slaughterhouses in |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | inspector finds no —————— the FMIA governs all slaughterhouses in the State (except for any limited to “custom slaughtering for personal, household, guest, and employee uses,” Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court evidence of disease or injury, he approves the animal for slaughter. If, at the other end of the spectrum, the inspec- tor sees that an animal is dead or dying, comatose, suffer- ing from a high fever, or afflicted with a serious disease or condition, he designates the animal as “U. S. Condemned.” See et seq. (listing diseases requiring con- demnation). A condemned animal (if not already dead) must be killed apart from the slaughtering facilities where food is produced, and no part of its carcass may be sold for human See 21 U.S. C. The inspector also has an intermediate option: If he determines that an animal has a less severe condition—or merely suspects the animal of having a disease meriting condemnation—he classifies the animal as “U. S. Suspect.” See That category includes all nonambula- tory animals not found to require condemnation.2 See Suspect livestock must be “set apart,” specially monitored, and (if not reclassified because of a change in condition) “slaughtered separately from other livestock.” Following slaughter, an inspector decides at a “post-mortem” examination which parts, if any, of the suspect animal’s carcass may be processed into food for humans. See 9 CFR pts. 310, 311. The regulations implementing the FMIA additionally prescribe methods for handling animals humanely at all stages of the slaughtering process. Those rules apply from the moment a truck carrying livestock “enters, or is in line to enter,” a slaughterhouse’s premises. Humane Handling and Slaughter of Livestock, FSIS Directive 6900.2, ch. II(I) (rev. Aug. 15, 2011). And they include specific provisions for the humane treatment of animals that cannot walk. —————— 2 The FSIS’s regulations define “non-ambulatory disabled livestock” as “livestock that cannot rise from a recumbent position or that cannot walk, including, but not limited to, those with broken appendages, severed tendons or ligaments, nerve paralysis, fractured vertebral column, or metabolic conditions.” 4 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court See (d). Under the regulations, slaughter- house employees may not drag conscious, nonambulatory animals, see and may move them only with “equipment suitable for such purposes,” Similarly, employees must place nonambulatory animals, as well as other sick and disabled livestock, in covered pens sufficient to protect the animals from “adverse cli- matic conditions.” See The FMIA contains an express preemption provision, at issue here, addressing state laws on these and similar matters. That provision’s |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | addressing state laws on these and similar matters. That provision’s first sentence reads: “Requirements within the scope of this [Act] with re- spect to premises, facilities and operations of any es- tablishment at which inspection is provided under this [Act] which are in addition to, or different than those made under this [Act] may not be imposed by any State.” 21 U.S. C. B In 2008, the Humane Society of the United States released an undercover video showing workers at a slaugh- terhouse in California dragging, kicking, and electro- shocking sick and disabled cows in an effort to move them. The video led the Federal Government to institute the largest beef recall in U. S. history in order to prevent consumption of meat from diseased animals. Of greater relevance here, the video also prompted the California legislature to strengthen a pre-existing statute governing the treatment of nonambulatory animals and to apply that statute to slaughterhouses regulated under the FMIA. See National Meat —————— 3 The preemption provision also includes a saving clause, which states that the Act “shall not preclude any State from making require- ment[s] or taking other action, consistent with this [Act], with respect to any other matters regulated under this [Act].” 21 U.S. C. see n. 10, infra. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court (CA9 2010). As amended, the California of the state penal code—provides in relevant part: “(a) No slaughterhouse, stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer shall buy, sell, or receive a nonam- bulatory animal. “(b) No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher, or sell meat or products of nonambulatory animals for human “(c) No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without taking immediate action to humanely euthanize the animal.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. (West 2010). The maximum penalty for violating any of these prohibi- tions is one year in jail and a $20,000 fine. See (h). Petitioner National Meat Association (NMA) is a trade association representing meatpackers and processors, in- cluding operators of swine slaughterhouses. It sued to enjoin the enforcement of against those slaughter- houses, principally on the ground that the FMIA preempts application of the state law.4 The District Court granted the NMA’s motion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that is expressly preempted because it requires swine “to be handled in a manner other than that pre- scribed by the FMIA” and its regulations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction. According to that court, the FMIA does not expressly preempt because the state law regulates only |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | does not expressly preempt because the state law regulates only “the kind of animal that may be slaughtered,” and not the inspection or slaughtering process We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. (2011), and now —————— 4 The Humane Society intervened to defend in the District Court. See Motion to Intervene in No. 08–1963 (ED Cal.), Record, Doc. 46. The organization continues as a respondent in this Court. 6 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court reverse. II The FMIA’s preemption clause sweeps widely—and in so doing, blocks the applications of challenged here. The clause prevents a State from imposing any additional or different—even if non-conflicting—requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and concern a slaughter- house’s facilities or operations. And at every turn imposes additional or different requirements on swine slaughterhouses: It compels them to deal with nonambula- tory pigs on their premises in ways that the federal Act and regulations do not. In essence, California’s statute substitutes a new regulatory scheme for the one the FSIS uses. Where under federal law a slaughterhouse may take one course of action in handling a nonambulatory pig, under state law the slaughterhouse must take another. Consider first what the two statutes tell a slaughter- house to do when (as not infrequently occurs) a pig be- comes injured and thus nonambulatory sometime after delivery to the slaughterhouse.5 Section 599f(c) prohibits the slaughterhouse from “hold[ing]” such an animal “with- out taking immediate action to humanely euthanize” it. And (b) provides that no part of the animal’s carcass may be “process[ed]” or “butcher[ed]” to make food. By contrast, under the FMIA and its regulations, a slaugh- terhouse may hold (without euthanizing) any nonambula- tory pig that has not been condemned. See And the slaughterhouse may process or butcher such an —————— 5 The percentage of pigs becoming nonambulatory after delivery var- ies by slaughterhouse from 0.1 percent to over 1 percent. See McGlone, Fatigued Pigs: The Final Link, Pork Magazine 14 (Mar. 2006). About 100 million pigs are slaughtered each year in the United States, see Dept. of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Livestock Slaughter 13 (Jan. 2011), so those percentages work out to between 100,000 and 1,000,000 pigs. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court animal’s meat for human consumption, subject to an FSIS official’s approval at a post-mortem inspection. See The State’s proscriptions thus exceed the FMIA’s. To be sure, nothing in the federal Act requires what the state law forbids (or forbids what the state law requires); Cali- fornia is right to note that |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | state law requires); Cali- fornia is right to note that “[t]he FMIA does not mandate that ‘U. S. Suspect’ [nonambulatory] animals be placed into the human food production process.” Brief for State Respondents 31. But that is irrelevant, because the FMIA’s preemption clause covers not just conflicting, but also different or additional state requirements. It there- fore precludes California’s effort in §(b) and (c) to im- pose new rules, beyond any the FSIS has chosen to adopt, on what a slaughterhouse must do with a pig that be- comes nonambulatory during the production process. Similarly, consider how the state and federal laws ad- dress what a slaughterhouse should do when a pig is non- ambulatory at the time of delivery, usually because of harsh transportation conditions.6 Section 599f(a) of the California law bars a slaughterhouse from “receiv[ing]” or “buy[ing]” such a pig, thus obligating the slaughterhouse to refuse delivery of the animal.7 But that directive, too, deviates from any imposed by federal law. A regulation issued under the FMIA specifically authorizes slaughter- houses to buy disabled or diseased animals (including nonambulatory swine), by exempting them from a general prohibition on such purchases. See (c). —————— 6 According to one estimate, almost half of one percent of the pigs slaughtered annually in the United States become nonambulatory during the trip from farm to slaughterhouse. See National Pork Board, Transport Quality Assurance Handbook 25 (Version 4, 2010). About half that many die during transport. See 7 Section 599f(a) also bans “sell[ing]” nonambulatory animals. But because slaughterhouses (unlike other entities referenced in the provi- sion) do not typically sell live animals, that prohibition is not at issue in this case. The statute’s distinct ban on selling meat from nonambula- tory animals that have been slaughtered is discussed infra, at 9–10. 8 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court And other regulations contemplate that slaughterhouses will in fact take, rather than refuse, receipt of nonambula- tory swine. Recall that the FMIA’s regulations provide for the inspection of all pigs at delivery, see at 2—in the case of nonambulatory pigs, often right on the truck, see Humane Handling and Slaughter of Livestock, FSIS Directive 6900.2, ch. II(I). They further instruct slaugh- terhouses to kill and dispose of any nonambulatory pigs labeled “condemned,” and to slaughter separately those marked “suspect.” See In short, federal law establishes rules for handling and slaughtering nonam- bulatory pigs brought to a slaughterhouse, rather than ordering them returned to sender. So (a) and the FMIA require different things of a slaughterhouse con- fronted with a delivery truck containing nonambula- |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | a slaughterhouse con- fronted with a delivery truck containing nonambula- tory swine. The former says “do not receive or buy them”; the latter does not. The Humane Society counters that at least (a)’s ban on buying nonambulatory animals escapes preemp- tion because that provision applies no matter when or where a purchase takes place. The argument proceeds in three steps: (1) (a)’s ban covers purchases of non- ambulatory pigs made prior to delivery, away from the slaughterhouse itself (say, at a farm or auction); (2) the State may regulate such offsite purchases because they do not involve a slaughterhouse’s “premises, facilities and operations,” which is a condition of preemption under the FMIA; and (3) no different result should obtain just be- cause a slaughterhouse structures its swine purchases to occur at delivery, on its own property. See Brief for Non- State Respondents 43–45. But this argument fails on two grounds. First, its pre- liminary steps have no foundation in the record. Until a stray comment at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 50, neither the State nor the Humane Society had disputed the NMA’s assertion that slaughterhouses buy pigs at Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court delivery (or still later, upon successful ante-mortem in- spection). See Brief for Petitioner 46, n. 18; Brief for Non- State Respondents 44; Brief for State Respondents 16, n. 5. Nor had the parties presented evidence that a signif- icant number of pigs become nonambulatory before ship- ment, when any offsite purchases would occur. The record therefore does not disclose whether (a)’s ban on purchase ever applies beyond the slaughterhouse gate, much less how an application of that kind would affect a slaughterhouse’s operations. And because that is so, we have no basis for deciding whether the FMIA would preempt it. Second, even assuming that a State could regulate offsite purchases, the concluding step of the Humane Society’s argument would not follow. The FMIA’s preemption clause expressly focuses on “premises, facili- ties and operations”—at bottom, the slaughtering and processing of animals at a given location. So the distinc- tion between a slaughterhouse’s site-based activities and its more far-flung commercial dealings is not, as the Hu- mane Society contends, an anomaly that courts should strain to avoid. It is instead a fundamental feature of the FMIA’s preemption clause. For that reason, the Humane Society’s stronger argu- ment concerns California’s effort to regulate the last stage of a slaughterhouse’s business—the ban in (b) on “sell[ing] meat or products of nonambulatory animals for human ” The Government acknowledges that the FMIA’s preemption |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | for human ” The Government acknowledges that the FMIA’s preemption clause does not usually fore- close “state regulation of the commercial sales activities of slaughterhouses.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. And the Humane Society asserts, in line with that general rule, that (b)’s ban on sales does not regulate a slaughterhouse’s “operations” because it kicks in only after they have ended: Once meat from a slaugh- tered pig has passed a post-mortem inspection, the Act “is not concerned with whether or how it is ever actually 10 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court sold.” Brief for Non-State Respondents 45. At most, the Humane Society claims, (b)’s ban on sales offers an “incentiv[e]” to a slaughterhouse to take nonambulatory pigs out of the meat production process. And California may so “motivate[]” an operational choice with- out running afoul of the FMIA’s preemption provision. (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005)). But this argument mistakes how the prohibition on sales operates within as a whole. The sales ban is a criminal proscription calculated to help implement and enforce each of the section’s other regulations—its prohibi- tion of receipt and purchase, its bar on butchering and processing, and its mandate of immediate euthanasia. The idea—and the inevitable effect—of the provision is to make sure that slaughterhouses remove nonambulatory pigs from the production process (or keep them out of the process from the beginning) by criminalizing the sale of their meat. That, we think, is something more than an “incentive” or “motivat[or]”; the sales ban instead func- tions as a command to slaughterhouses to structure their operations in the exact way the remainder of man- dates. And indeed, if the sales ban were to avoid the FMIA’s preemption clause, then any State could impose any regulation on slaughterhouses just by framing it as a ban on the sale of meat produced in whatever way the State disapproved. That would make a mockery of the FMIA’s preemption provision. Cf. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 255 (2004) (stating that it “would make no sense” to allow state regulations to escape preemption because they ad- dressed the purchase, rather than manufacture, of a fed- erally regulated product). Like the rest of the sales ban regulates how slaughterhouses must deal with non- ambulatory pigs on their premises. The FMIA therefore preempts it for all the same reasons. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court III California’s and the Humane Society’s broadest argu- ment against preemption maintains that all of |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | Society’s broadest argu- ment against preemption maintains that all of ’s challenged provisions fall outside the “scope” of the FMIA because they exclude a class of animals from the slaugh- tering process. See 21 U.S. C. (preempting certain requirements “within the scope of this [Act]”). According to this view, the Act (and the FSIS’s authority under it) extends only to “animals that are going to be turned into meat,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28—or to use another phrase, animals that will “be slaughtered for purposes of human food production,” Brief for State Respondents 19 (emphasis deleted). Section 599f avoids the scope of the Act, respondents claim, by altogether removing nonambu- latory pigs from the slaughtering process.8 The Ninth Circuit accepted this argument, analogizing to state laws upheld in two other Circuits banning the slaughter of horses for human and Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S. A. de ). According to the Court of Appeals, “states are free to decide which animals may be turned into meat.” 1099. We think not. The FMIA’s scope includes not only “animals that are going to be turned into meat,” but ani- —————— 8 California’sbrief sometimes casts its argument in terms of the “op- erations” language of the FMIA’s preemption clause (although the State appeared to abandon this phrasing at oral argument). In this version of the claim, California contends that the “operations” of a slaughterhouse are only those “of federal concern,” and that excluding a class of ani- mals from the slaughtering process does not impinge on such opera- tions. Brief for State Respondents 20, n. 9; see also at 20–21. We see no real difference between saying that a categorical exclusion of animals does not implicate “operations of federal concern” and saying that it does not fall within the scope of the Act. Accordingly, our answer to both forms of the argument is the same. 12 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court mals on a slaughterhouse’s premises that will never suffer that fate. The Act’s implementing regulations themselves exclude many classes of animals from the slaughtering process. Swine with hog cholera, for example, are disqual- ified, see (a); so too are swine and other livestock “affected with anthrax,” Indeed, the federal regulations prohibit the slaughter of any nonam- bulatory cattle for human See As these examples demonstrate, one vital function of the Act and its regulations is to ensure that some kinds of live- stock delivered to a slaughterhouse’s gates will not be turned into meat. Under federal law, nonambulatory pigs are not among those excluded animals. But that is |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | pigs are not among those excluded animals. But that is to say only that ’s requirements differ from those of the FMIA—not that ’s requirements fall outside the FMIA’s scope. Nor are respondents right to suggest that ’s exclu- sion avoids the FMIA’s scope because it is designed to ensure the humane treatment of pigs, rather than the safety of meat. See, e.g., Brief for State Respondents 29; Brief for Non-State Respondents 39–40. That view mis- understands the authority—and indeed responsibility— that the FMIA gives to federal officials. Since 1978, when Congress incorporated the HMSA’s standards, the FMIA has required slaughterhouses to follow prescribed methods of humane handling, so as to minimize animals’ pain and suffering. See 21 U.S. C. 610(b); at 2–4. A violation of those standards is a crime, see and the Secretary of Agriculture can suspend inspections at—and thus effectively shut down—a slaughterhouse that dis- obeys them, see 610(c). To implement the Act’s humane-handling provisions, the FSIS has issued detailed regulations, see 9 CFR pt. 313, including some specifically addressing animals that cannot walk, see 313.1(c). Those rules, as earlier noted, apply throughout the time an animal is on a slaughterhouse’s premises, Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 13 Opinion of the Court from the moment a delivery truck pulls up to the gate. See –4. So the FMIA addresses not just food safety, but humane treatment as well. Even California conceded at oral argument that the FSIS could issue regulations under the FMIA, similar to mandating the euthanasia of nonambulatory swine.9 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46–47. If that is so—and it is, because of the FSIS’s authority over humane-handling methods—then ’s requirements must fall within the FMIA’s scope. The Circuit decisions upholding state bans on slaughter- ing horses, on which the Ninth Circuit relied, do not de- mand any different conclusion. We express no view on those decisions, except to say that the laws sustained there differ from in a significant respect. A ban on butchering horses for human consumption works at a remove from the sites and activities that the FMIA most directly governs. When such a ban is in effect, no horses will be delivered to, inspected at, or handled by a slaugh- terhouse, because no horses will be ordered for purchase in the first instance. But does not and cannot work in that way. As earlier noted, many nonambulatory pigs become disabled either in transit to or after arrival at a slaughterhouse. See at 6–9, and nn. 5–6. So even with in effect, a swine slaughterhouse will encounter nonambulatory pigs. In that |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | National Meat Assn. v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621293/national-meat-assn-v-harris/ | effect, a swine slaughterhouse will encounter nonambulatory pigs. In that circumstance, tells the slaughterhouse what to do with those animals. Unlike a horse slaughtering ban, the statute thus reaches into the slaughterhouse’s facilities and affects its daily activities. And in so doing, the California law runs smack into the FMIA’s regulations. So whatever might be said of other bans on slaughter, imposes requirements within— —————— 9 Indeed, the FSIS recently solicited comment on a rulemaking peti- tion that would require all nonambulatory disabled livestock, including swine, to be humanely euthanized. See (2011). The FSIS has taken no further action on that petition. 14 NATIONAL MEAT ASSN. v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court and indeed at the very heart of—the FMIA’s scope.10 IV The FMIA regulates slaughterhouses’ handling and treatment of nonambulatory pigs from the moment of their delivery through the end of the meat production process. California’s endeavors to regulate the same thing, at the same time, in the same place—except by imposing different requirements. The FMIA expressly preempts such a state law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, and remand this case for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— 10 We finally reject California’s argument, see Brief for State Re- spondents 20, that our reading of the FMIA’s preemption provision renders its saving clause insignificant. That clause provides that States may regulate slaughterhouses as to “other matters,” not ad- dressed in the express preemption clause, as long as those laws are “consistent with” the FMIA. 21 U.S. C. So, for example, the Government acknowledges that state laws of general application (workplace safety regulations, building codes, etc.) will usually apply to slaughterhouses. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. Moreover, because the FMIA’s express preemption provision prevents States from imposing only “addition[al]” or “different” requirements, States may exact civil or criminal penalties for animal cruelty or other conduct that also violates the FMIA. See cf. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005) (holding that a preemption clause barring state laws “in addition to or different” from a federal Act does not interfere with an “equivalent” state provision). Although the FMIA preempts much state law involving slaughterhouses, it thus leaves some room for the States to regulate |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | The Court begins by posing the wrong question. The issue in this case is not whether petitioner must be released because he has been hospitalized for longer than the prison sentence he might have served had he been convicted, any more than the question in a motion to suppress an allegedly coerced confession at a murder trial is whether the murderer should go free.[1] The question before us is whether the fact that an individual has been found "not guilty by reason of insanity," by itself, provides a constitutionally adequate basis for involuntary, indefinite commitment to psychiatric hospitalization. None of our precedents directly addresses the meaning of due process in the context of involuntary commitments of persons who have been acquitted by reason of insanity. Petitioner's argument rests primarily on two cases dealing with civil commitments: and O'Connor held that a mentally ill individual has a "right to liberty" that a State may not abridge by confining him to a mental institution, even for the purpose of treating his illness, unless in addition to being mentally ill he is likely to harm himself or others if -576; see Then, in Addington, we carefully evaluated the standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings. Applying the due process analysis of *372 we held that "due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence," specifically "clear and convincing evidence,"[2] The core of both cases is a balance of three factors: the governmental interest in isolating and treating those who may be mentally ill and dangerous; the difficulty of proving or disproving mental illness and dangerousness in court; and the massive intrusion on individual liberty that involuntary psychiatric hospitalization entails. Petitioner contends that the same balance must be struck in this case, and that the Government has no greater interest in committing him indefinitely than it has in ordinary civil commitment cases governed by the standards of O'Connor and Addington. While conceding that the Government may have legitimate reasons to commit insanity acquittees for some definite period without carrying the burden of proof prescribed in Addington,[3]*373 he argues that he cannot be confined indefinitely unless the Government accords him the minimum due process protections required for civil commitment. A The obvious difference between insanity acquittees and other candidates for civil commitment is that, at least in the District of Columbia, an acquittal by reason of insanity implies a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact committed the criminal act with which he was charged. See ; D. C. Code 24-301(c) Conceivably, |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | he was charged. See ; D. C. Code 24-301(c) Conceivably, the Government may have an interest in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts, but the Government disclaims any such interest, and the Court does not rely on it.[4] In any event, we have held that the Government *374 may not impose psychiatric commitment as an alternative to penal sentencing for longer than the maximum period of incarceration the legislature has authorized as punishment for the crime committed. Once Congress has defined a crime and the punishment for that crime, additional confinement can be justified only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of additional facts, subject to the limits of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and upon notice to defendants that they are subject to such additional punishment. See ; In re Winship, B Instead of relying on a punishment rationale, the Court holds that a finding of insanity at a criminal trial "is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment." Ante, at 363. First, it declares that "[t]he fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness." Ante, at 364. Second, the Court decides that "[i]t comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." Ante, at 366. Despite their superficial appeal, these propositions cannot support the decision necessary to the Court's disposition of this case that the Government may be excused from carrying the Addington burden of proof with respect to each of the O'Connor elements of mental illness and dangerousness in committing petitioner for an indefinite period. *375 1. Our precedents in other commitment contexts are inconsistent with the argument that the mere facts of past criminal behavior and mental illness justify indefinite commitment without the benefits of the minimum due process standards associated with civil commitment, most importantly proof of present mental illness and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.[5] In Addington itself, the petitioner did not dispute that he had engaged in a wide variety of assaultive conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute him. See -421. Similarly, the petitioner in had been charged with two robberies, yet we required the State to follow its civil commitment procedures if it wished to commit him for more than a strictly limited period. As the Court indicates, see ante, at 364, n. 12, these cases are perhaps distinguishable on |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | at 364, n. 12, these cases are perhaps distinguishable on the ground that there was never proof that a crime had been committed, although in Addington the petitioner's violent acts were before the jury. That objection, however, cannot be leveled at or The petitioner in Baxstrom had been convicted of assault and sentenced to a term in prison, during which he was certified as insane by a prison physician. At the expiration of his criminal sentence, he was committed involuntarily to a state mental hospital under procedures substantially less protective than those used for civil commitment. 383 U. S., at *376 108-110. We held that, once he had served his sentence, Baxstrom could not be treated differently from other candidates for civil commitment. The principal difference between this case and Baxstrom is petitioner's admission, intrinsic to an insanity plea in the District of Columbia at the time of his trial, that his crime was "the product" of his mental illness. Humphrey, however, indicates the limited importance of that distinction. In Humphrey, the petitioner had been convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, the court had determined that his crime was "probably directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement," and the State had established his "need" for psychiatric treatment by a preponderance of the evidence at a special -507. He was committed for treatment for the maximum period for which he could have been incarcerated as punishment for his crime as in this case, one year and at the end of that period his commitment was renewed for five more years after a judicial hearing on his present mental illness and dangerousness. See Thus, the situation was almost precisely identical to that in this case after petitioner's February 1977 hearing the defendant had been found to have committed a criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt, a connection between that act and a mental disorder had been established by a preponderance of the evidence, and he had been confined for longer than the maximum sentence he could have received. If anything, Humphrey had received more protections than Michael Jones; the State had borne the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at his "release hearing," ib and his recommitment was for a strictly limited time. Nevertheless, we held that Humphrey's constitutional challenge to the renewal order had substantial merit, because Humphrey had not received the procedural protections given persons subject to civil commitment.[6] *377 2. The Government's interests in committing petitioner are the same interests involved in Addington, O'Connor, Baxstrom, and Humphrey isolation, |
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