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Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | interests involved in Addington, O'Connor, Baxstrom, and Humphrey isolation, protection, and treatment of a person who may, through no fault of his own, cause harm to others or to himself. Whenever involuntary commitment is a possibility, the Government has a strong interest in accurate, efficient commitment decisions. Nevertheless, Addington held both that the government's interest in accuracy was not impaired by a requirement that it bear the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence, and that the individual's interests in liberty and autonomy required the government to bear at least that burden. An acquittal by reason of insanity of a single, nonviolent misdemeanor is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for the due process protections of Addington and O'Connor, i. e., proof by clear and convincing evidence of present mental illness or dangerousness, with the government bearing the burden of persuasion. A "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict is backward-looking, focusing on one moment in the past, while commitment requires a judgment as to the present and future. In some jurisdictions, most notably in federal criminal trials, an acquittal by reason of insanity may mean only that a jury found a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's sanity and as to the causal relationship between his mental condition and his crime. See As we recognized in Addington, "[t]he subtleties and nuances *378 of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations." The question is not whether "government may not act in the face of this uncertainty," ante, at 365, n. 13; everyone would agree that it can. Rather, the question is whether in light of the uncertainty about the relationship between petitioner's crime, his present dangerousness, and his present mental condition the Government can force him for the rest of his life "to share equally with society the risk of error,"[7] It is worth examining what is known about the possibility of predicting dangerousness from any set of facts. Although a substantial body of research suggests that a consistent pattern of violent behavior may, from a purely statistical standpoint, indicate a certain likelihood of further violence in the future,[8] mere statistical validity is far from perfect for purposes of predicting which individuals will be dangerous. Commentators and researchers have long acknowledged that even the best attempts to identify dangerous individuals on the basis of specified facts have been inaccurate roughly two-thirds of the time, almost always on the side of overprediction.[9] On a clinical basis, mental health professionals *379 can diagnose past or present mental condition with some confidence, but strong institutional biases lead |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | mental condition with some confidence, but strong institutional biases lead them to err when they attempt to determine an individual's dangerousness, especially when the consequence of a finding of dangerousness is that an obviously mentally ill patient will remain within their control.[10] Research is practically nonexistent on the relationship of nonviolent criminal behavior, such as petitioner's attempt to shoplift, to future dangerousness. We do not even know whether it is even statistically valid as a predictor of similar nonviolent behavior, much less of behavior posing more serious risks to self and others. Even if an insanity acquittee remains mentally ill, so long as he has not repeated the same act since his offense the passage of time diminishes the likelihood that he will repeat it.[11] Furthermore, the frequency of prior violent behavior is an important element in any attempt to predict future violence.[12] Finally, it cannot be gainsaid that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness than others. Subject to the limits of O'Connor, a State may consider nonviolent misdemeanors "dangerous," but there is room for doubt whether a single attempt to shoplift and a string of brutal murders are equally *380 accurate and equally permanent predictors of dangerousness.[13] As for mental illness, certainly some conditions that satisfy the "mental disease" element of the insanity defense do not persist for an extended period thus the traditional inclusion of "temporary insanity" within the insanity defense. Close reading of the Court's opinion reveals the utter emptiness of the legislative judgment it finds so unproblematic. Today's decision may overrule Humphrey by implication. It does not, however, purport to overrule Baxstrom or any of the cases which have followed Baxstrom.[14] It is clear, therefore, that the separate facts of criminality and mental illness cannot support indefinite psychiatric commitment, for both were present in Baxstrom. The Court's careful phrasing indicates as much: "someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." Ante, at 366 (emphasis added). The Court relies on a connection between mental condition and criminal conduct that is unique to verdicts of "not guilty by reason of insanity." Yet the relevance of that connection, as opposed to each of its separate components, is far from a matter of obvious "common sense." None of the available evidence that criminal behavior by the mentally ill is likely to repeat itself distinguishes between behaviors that were "the product" of mental illness and those that were not.[15] It is *381 completely unlikely that persons acquitted by reason of insanity display a |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | unlikely that persons acquitted by reason of insanity display a rate of future "dangerous" activity higher than civil committees with similar arrest records, or than persons convicted of crimes who are later found to be mentally The causal connection between mental condition and criminal behavior that "not guilty by reason of insanity" formulations universally include is more a social judgment than a sound basis for determining dangerousness. Given the close similarity of the governmental interests at issue in this case and those at issue in Addington, and the highly imperfect "fit" between the findings required for an insanity acquittal and those required under O'Connor to support an indefinite commitment, I cannot agree that the Government should be excused from the burden that Addington held was required by due process.[16] 3. In considering the requirements of due process, we have often inquired whether alternative procedures more protective of individual interests, at a reasonable cost, were likely to accomplish the State's legitimate objectives. See, *382 e. g., 424 U. S., at ; ; There are many ways to take into account criminal behavior and past mental condition, and thereby to vindicate the government's legitimate interest in accurate commitment decisions, without depriving insanity acquittees of the Addington protections. Certain aspects of the District of Columbia's commitment procedures already embody less restrictive alternatives: all insanity acquittees are committed automatically for 50 days before an initial release hearing, 24-301(d), and the testimony of mental health professionals at all hearings may be informed by their experience with mentally ill patients and by their familiarity with current research. The fact of an insanity acquittal and the evidence on insanity adduced at trial are clearly admissible in all commitment and release hearings. In addition, an insanity acquittal might conceivably justify commitment for a reasonably limited period without requiring the Government to meet its Addington burden. See United ; American Psychiatric Assn., Statement on the Insanity Defense 15 ; cf. ; In this case, petitioner submits that such a reasonable period extends no longer than the maximum sentence that could have been imposed had he been found guilty of the crime charged. But at some point the Government must be required to justify further commitment under the standards of Addington.[17] *383 4. If the Government's interests were the only ones at stake, an insanity acquittal would furnish a reasonable basis for indefinite commitment. Under the Constitution, however, the Government's interests must be considered in light of the liberty interests of the individual who is subject to commitment. In the final analysis, the Court disregards Addington not on the ground |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | final analysis, the Court disregards Addington not on the ground that the Government's interests in committing insanity acquittees are different from or stronger than its interests in committing criminals who happen to be mentally ill, or mentally ill individuals who have done violent, dangerous things, but on the theory that "there is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of error" when a person is committed indefinitely on the basis of an insanity acquittal. See ante, at 367. The "risk of error" that, according to the Court, is diminished in this context subsumes two separate risks. First, the Court notes that in Addington we were concerned, at least in part, that individuals might be committed for mere idiosyncratic behavior, see and it observes that criminal acts are outside the " `range of conduct that is generally acceptable.' " Ante, at 367, -427. O'Connor, however, requires that a person be proved dangerous, not merely "unacceptable," before he may *384 be subjected to the massive curtailment of individual freedom and autonomy that indefinite commitment entails. In Addington itself, the State had clearly proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner had engaged repeatedly in conduct far beyond the pale of acceptable behavior, yet we did not regard that level of proof as furnishing adequate protection for the individual interests at stake.[18] Second, the Court reasons that "[a] criminal defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself," and therefore that committing him does not involve the same risk of stigmatization a civil commitment may entail. Ante, at 367, n. 16. This is perhaps the Court's most cynical argument. It is true that in Addington and in we recognized that individuals have an interest in not being stigmatized by society at large on account of being labeled mentally ; Avoiding stigma, however, is only one of the reasons for recognizing a liberty interest in avoiding involuntary commitment. We have repeatedly acknowledged that persons who have already been labeled as mentally ill nonetheless retain an interest in avoiding involuntary commitment. See, e. g., ; Other aspects of involuntary commitment affect them in far more immediate ways. In many respects, confinement in a mental institution is even more intrusive than incarceration in a prison. Inmates of mental institutions, like prisoners, are deprived of unrestricted association with friends, family, and community; *385 they must contend with locks, guards, and detailed regulation of their daily activities. In addition, a person who has been hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant extent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | dissenting | Jones v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111002/jones-v-united-states/ | significant extent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to medical treatment. See The treatments to which he may be subjected include physical restraints such as straightjacketing, as well as electroshock therapy, aversive conditioning, and even in some cases psychosurgery. Administration of psychotropic medication to control behavior is common. See American Psychiatric Assn., Statement on the Insanity Defense 15 ("Greater emphasis is now placed upon psychopharmacological management of the hospitalized person"). Although this Court has never approved the practice, it is possible that an inmate will be given medication for reasons that have more to do with the needs of the institution than with individualized therapy.[19] See ; We should not presume that he lacks a compelling interest in having the decisions to commit *386 him and to keep him institutionalized made carefully, and in a manner that preserves the maximum degree of personal autonomy. Therefore, I cannot agree with the Court that petitioner in this case has any less interest in procedural protections during the commitment process than the petitioners in Addington, O'Connor, or Baxstrom, and I cannot agree that the risks of error which an indefinite commitment following an insanity acquittal entails are sufficiently diminished to justify relieving the Government of the responsibilities defined in Addington. C Indefinite commitment without the due process protections adopted in Addington and O'Connor is not reasonably related to any of the Government's purported interests in confining insanity acquittees for psychiatric treatment. The rationales on which the Court justifies 24-301's departures from Addington at most support deferring Addington's due process protections specifically, its requirement that the Government carry the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence for a limited period only, not indefinitely. The maximum sentence for attempted petit larceny in the District of Columbia is one year. Beyond that period, petitioner should not have been kept in involuntary confinement unless he had been committed under the standards of Addington and O'Connor. Petitioner had been in custody for 17 months at the time of his February 1977 hearing, either in St. Elizabeths or in the District of Columbia Correctional Center. At that time he should have received the benefit of the Addington due process standards, and, because he did not, the findings at that hearing cannot provide constitutionally adequate support for his present commitment. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | concurring | INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/ | I join the Court's opinion and judgment. Thus, I accept its "narrow" conclusion that "the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the [standards for withholding of deportation and granting asylum] are identical." Ante, at 448. In accordance with this holding, the Court eschews any attempt to give substance to the term "well-founded fear" and leaves that task to the "process of case-by-case adjudication" by the INS, the agency in charge of administering the immigration laws. I write separately and briefly to emphasize my understanding that, in its opinion, the court has directed the INS to the appropriate sources from which the agency should derive the meaning of the "well-founded fear" standard, a meaning that will be refined in later adjudication. This emphasis, I believe, is particularly needed where, as here, an agency's previous interpretation of the statutory term is so strikingly contrary to plain language and legislative history. Thus, as the Court observes, ante, at 430-431, the very language of the term "well-founded fear" demands a particular type of analysis an examination of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum coupled with an inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear. Moreover, in describing how, in the 1980 Act, Congress was attempting to bring this country's refugee laws into conformity with the United Nations Protocol, the Court notes that the Act's definition of refugee, wherein the "well-founded fear" term appears, ante, at 427, tracks the language of the *451 Protocol. See ante, at 436-437. Such language has a rich history of interpretation in international law and scholarly commentaries. See ante, at 437-440, and nn. 20, 24. While the INS need not ignore other sources of guidance, the above directions by the Court should be significant in the agency's formulation of the "well-founded fear" standard. Finally, in my view, the well-reasoned opinions of the Courts of Appeals, that almost uniformly have rejected the INS's misreading of statutory language and legislative history, provide an admirable example of the very "case-by-case adjudication' needed for the development of the standard. Although the Court refers to a conflict among these courts, see ante, at 426, n. 2, with one exception, see ib all the Courts of Appeals that have addressed this question have concluded that the standards for withholding of deportation and granting asylum are not the same. Rather, differences in opinion have arisen as to the precise formulation of the "well-founded fear" standard.[*] Such differences can arise only when courts or agencies seriously grapple with the problems of developing a standard, whose form is |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | concurring | INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/ | with the problems of developing a standard, whose form is at first given by the statutory language and the intimations of the legislative *452 history, but whose final contours are shaped by the application of the standard to the facts of specific cases. The efforts of these courts stand in stark contrast to but, it is sad to say, alone cannot make up for the years of seemingly purposeful blindness by the INS, which only now begins its task of developing the standard entrusted to its care. JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court that the plain meaning of "well-founded fear" and the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) clearly demonstrate that the "well-founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard are not equivalent. I concur in the judgment rather than join the Court's opinion, however, for two reasons. First, despite having reached the above conclusion, the Court undertakes an exhaustive investigation of the legislative history of the Act. Ante, at 432-443. It attempts to justify this inquiry by relying upon the doctrine that if the legislative history of an enactment reveals a " `clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to [the enactment's] language," the Court is required to "question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses." Ante, at 432, n. 12. Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of this doctrine, that is to my mind an ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect at least in the absence of a patent absurdity. See, e. g., United ; United ; Bate Refrigerating ; ; Packard Motor Car 330 U.S. ; United ; Unexcelled Chemical 5 U.S. 59, Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct *453 legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent. Even by its own lights, however, the Court's explication of the legislative history of the Act is excessive. The INS makes a number of specific arguments based upon the legislative history of the Act. It would have sufficed, it seems to me, for the Court to determine whether these specific arguments establish a "clearly expressed legislative intent" that the two standards be equivalent. I think it obvious that they do not, as apparently does the Court. That being so, there is simply no need for the lengthy effort to ascertain the import of the entire legislative history. And that |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | concurring | INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111838/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca/ | ascertain the import of the entire legislative history. And that effort is objectionable not only because it is gratuitous. I am concerned that it will be interpreted to suggest that similarly exhaustive analyses are generally appropriate (or, worse yet, required) in cases where the language of the enactment at issue is clear. I also fear that in this case the Court's conduct of that inquiry will be interpreted as a betrayal of its assurance that it does "not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-founded fear test should be applied," ante, at 448. See, e. g., ante, at 438-440 (appearing to endorse a particular interpretation of "well-founded fear"). I am far more troubled, however, by the Court's discussion of the question whether the INS's interpretation of "well-founded fear" is entitled to deference. Since the Court quite rightly concludes that the INS's interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of that phrase and the structure of the Act, see ante, at 431-432, 449, and n. 12, there is simply no need and thus no justification for a discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled to deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Even more *454 unjustifiable, however, is the Court's use of this superfluous discussion as the occasion to express controversial, and I believe erroneous, views on the meaning of this Court's decision in Chevron. Chevron stated that where there is no "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency," This Court has consistently interpreted Chevron which has been an extremely important and frequently cited opinion, not only in this Court but in the Courts of Appeals as holding that courts must give effect to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent. See, e. g., Japan Whaling 233-2 ; United ; Hillsborough County, ; Chemical Manufacturers The Court's discussion is flatly inconsistent with this well-established interpretation. The Court first implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever, "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction," they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute. Ante, at 446. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron. The Court also implies that courts may substitute |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109195/garment-workers-v-quality-mfg-co/ | We set this case for argument with No. 73-1363, The National Labor Relations Board held in this case, as it held in Weingarten, that the denial by respondent employer (hereinafter respondent) of an employee's request that her union representative be present at an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action, constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 158 (a) (1), because it interfered with, restrained, and coerced the individual right of the employee, protected by 7 of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 157, "to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection." 195 N. L. R. B. 197 (1972). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Weingarten, that this was an impermissible construction of 7 and denied enforcement of so much of the Board's order as directed respondent to cease and desist from requiring an employee requesting such representation to take part in such an interview without that representation if the employee reasonably feared disciplinary action, and also refused enforcement of provisions that directed respondent to offer reinstatement, with backpay, to the employees who were discharged for asserting this right. We reverse. Respondent, a manufacturer of women's clothing, discharged Catherine King on October 16, 1969, after she refused to attend an interview with the company president without union representation. That same day, the company discharged shop chairlady Delila Mulford for her persistence in seeking to represent King at the interview, *278 and assistant chairlady Martha Cochran for filing grievances on behalf of King and Mulford. The events leading to the discharges began on October 10, 1969, when Mulford, King, and two other employees met with Lawrence Gerlach, Sr., the company president; Mary Kathryn Gerlach, his wife and company production manager; and Lawrence Gerlach, Jr., their son and general manager, to complain that they were unable to make a satisfactory wage under the piecework system then in effect. The meeting ended on an acrimonious note when Gerlach, Jr., ordered the employees to return to work and told them that they were free to "go elsewhere" if they were dissatisfied with the company. Later that day, Mrs. Gerlach noticed that King had shut off her machine and was speaking to several other workers who had also stopped their machines. When ordered to resume production, King told Mrs. Gerlach to mind her own business. Thereupon Mrs. Gerlach directed King to report to Gerlach, Sr.'s office. King complied, but on |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109195/garment-workers-v-quality-mfg-co/ | to report to Gerlach, Sr.'s office. King complied, but on her way to the office asked union chairlady Mulford to accompany her. Gerlach, Sr., met King and Mulford in the anteroom to his office. He told Mulford to return to work, and ordered King into his office alone. Neither woman complied, and King stated that she would not submit to an interview in the absence of her union representative. At this, Gerlach, Sr., told both women to return to their work stations. That Sunday, October 12, Mrs. Gerlach phoned Mulford and told her that she was suspended for two days. The Board found that the suspension was motivated by Mulford's attempt to represent King at the interview with Gerlach, Sr. 195 N. L. R. B., at 199. On Monday, October 13, when King reported for work her timecard was missing from the rack, indicating under plant practice that she was wanted in the president's office. *279 Before going to the office, however, King asked assistant chairlady Cochran to accompany her. They were met at the president's office by Mrs. Gerlach who told Cochran to go directly to work if she wanted to keep her job because the president wanted to take up with King where they left off on Friday. Cochran replied: "Well, Mrs. Gerlach, I'm sorry, but if that's what you want to talk to her about, that is Union business and she has asked me to represent her." Gerlach, Sr., told King he would not return her timecard until she met with him alone in his office. King and Cochran then waited outside the president's office all day, and during this time Cochran's timecard was also removed from the rack. Again on the morning of October 14, Gerlach, Sr., told King he would not return her timecard until she agreed to meet with him alone. When Cochran asked about her timecard, Gerlach replied that she was suspended for two days for being away from her machine. The Board termed this reason "pretextual," and found that in fact Cochran's attempt to represent King was the reason for the suspension. Neither King nor Cochran worked that day. Much the same transpired the next day, but this time Mulford, whose two-day suspension had expired, was also present. After King refused to meet in private with Gerlach, Sr., she and Cochran left the plant, and Mulford returned to work. Finally, on October 16, all three women went to the president's office. Mrs. Gerlach gave Cochran her timecard and she returned to work. Gerlach, Sr., told King if she refused again to meet |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109195/garment-workers-v-quality-mfg-co/ | Gerlach, Sr., told King if she refused again to meet with him alone she would be fired. King walked out. Mulford then asked if she could return to work, and Gerlach, Sr., replied: "No, you've abandoned your job. You're finished." Later that same day, Cochran attempted to present grievances on behalf of King, Mulford, and herself to Gerlach, Jr. He stated *280 he was about to leave town and had no time for such things. When she put the list of grievances on his desk, he picked them up and threw them into the wastebasket. He then pulled Cochran's timecard and told her: "You worked this morning, but you're not working this afternoon." When Cochran asked Gerlach, Sr., if she had been fired he replied: "Just go home. You wanted to draw unemployment now go on and draw it."[1] The Board found that "[t]here can be no doubt that under the facts and circumstances of this case King had reasonable grounds to believe that disciplinary action might result from the Employer's investigation of her conduct." 195 N. L. R. B., at 199. King, therefore, had a reasonable basis for desiring union representation, and the Board found that respondent discharged her for insisting on that right. The Board found further that Mulford and Cochran were suspended, and Mulford discharged, because they insisted on representing King at the interview. Since Mulford and Cochran were engaging in a protected concerted activity, the suspensions and Mulford's discharge violated 8 (a) (1). Finally, the Board determined that respondent discharged Cochran because she sought to file grievances on behalf of King, Mulford, and herself, and that this discharge was in violation of 8 (a) (1) and (3).[2] *281 On these facts, our decision today in No. 73-1363, clearly requires reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as enforcement of the Board's order was denied.[3] The judgment is accordingly reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction to enter a new judgment enforcing the Board's order in its entirety. It is so ordered. [For dissenting opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, see ante, p. 268.] *282 MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Ferguson v. Charleston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118414/ferguson-v-charleston/ | I agree that the search procedure in issue cannot be sustained under the Fourth Amendment. My reasons for this conclusion differ somewhat from those set forth by the Court, however, leading to this separate opinion. I The Court does not dispute that the search policy at some level serves special needs, beyond those of ordinary law enforcement, such as the need to protect the health of mother and child when a pregnant mother uses cocaine. Instead, the majority characterizes these special needs as the "ultimate goal[s]" of the policy, as distinguished from the policy's "immediate purpose," the collection of evidence of drug use, which, the Court reasons, is the appropriate inquiry for the special needs analysis. Ante, at 81-84. The majority views its distinction between the ultimate goal and immediate purpose of the policy as critical to its *87 analysis. Ante, at 83-84. The distinction the Court makes, however, lacks foundation in our special needs cases. All of our special needs cases have turned upon what the majority terms the policy's ultimate goal. For example, in had we employed the majority's distinction, we would have identified as the relevant need the collection of evidence of drug and alcohol use by railway employees. Instead, we identified the relevant need as "[t]he Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure [railroad] safety." In Treasury the majority's distinction should have compelled us to isolate the relevant need as the gathering of evidence of drug abuse by would-be drug interdiction officers. Instead, the special needs the Court identified were the necessities "to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the [United States Customs] Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions." In Vernonia School Dist. the majority's distinction would have required us to identify the immediate purpose of gathering evidence of drug use by student-athletes as the relevant "need" for purposes of the special needs analysis. Instead, we sustained the policy as furthering what today's majority would have termed the policy's ultimate goal: "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren," and particularly by student-athletes, because "the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high." It is unsurprising that in our prior cases we have concentrated on what the majority terms a policy's ultimate goal, rather than its proximate purpose. By very definition, in almost every case the immediate purpose of a search policy will be to obtain evidence. The circumstance that a particular search, like all searches, is designed |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Ferguson v. Charleston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118414/ferguson-v-charleston/ | circumstance that a particular search, like all searches, is designed to collect evidence *88 of some sort reveals nothing about the need it serves. Put a different way, although procuring evidence is the immediate result of a successful search, until today that procurement has not been identified as the special need which justifies the search. II While the majority's reasoning seems incorrect in the respects just discussed, I agree with the Court that the search policy cannot be sustained. As the majority demonstrates and well explains, there was substantial law enforcement involvement in the policy from its inception. None of our special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design of the policy and in using arrests, either threatened or real, to implement the system designed for the special needs objectives. The special needs cases we have decided do not sustain the active use of law enforcement, including arrest and prosecutions, as an integral part of a program which seeks to achieve legitimate, civil objectives. The traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our previous cases on the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the search is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes. Most of those tested for drug use under the policy at issue here were not brought into direct contact with law enforcement. This does not change the fact, however, that, as a systemic matter, law enforcement was a part of the implementation of the search policy in each of its applications. Every individual who tested positive was given a letter explaining the policy not from the hospital but from the solicitor's office. Everyone who tested positive was told a second positive test or failure to undergo substance abuse treatment would result in arrest and prosecution. As the Court holds, the hospital acted, in some respects, as an institutional arm of law enforcement for purposes of the policy. Under these circumstances, while the policy may well have served legitimate needs unrelated to law enforcement, it had *89 as well a penal character with a far greater connection to law enforcement than other searches sustained under our special needs rationale. In my view, it is necessary and prudent to be explicit in explaining the limitations of today's decision. The beginning point ought to be to acknowledge the legitimacy of the State's interest in fetal life and of the grave risk to the life and health of the fetus, and later the child, caused by cocaine ingestion. Infants whose mothers abuse cocaine during pregnancy are born with a wide |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Ferguson v. Charleston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118414/ferguson-v-charleston/ | mothers abuse cocaine during pregnancy are born with a wide variety of physical and neurological abnormalities. See Chiriboga, Brust, Bateman, & Hauser, Dose-Response Effect of Fetal Cocaine Exposure on Newborn Neurologic Function, 103 Pediatrics 79 (1999) (finding that, compared with unexposed infants, cocaineexposed infants experienced higher rates of intrauterine growth retardation, smaller head circumference, global hypertonia, coarse tremor, and extensor leg posture). Prenatal exposure to cocaine can also result in developmental problems which persist long after birth. See Arendt, Angelopoulos, Salvator, & Singer, Motor Development of Cocaine-exposed Children at Age Two Years, 103 Pediatrics 86 (1999) (concluding that, at two years of age, children who were exposed to cocaine in utero exhibited significantly less fine and gross motor development than those not so exposed); Chasnoff et al., Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine and Other Drugs: Outcome at Four to Six Years, 846 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 314, 319-320 (J. Harvey and B. Kosofsky eds. 1998) (finding that 4- to 6-year-olds who were exposed to cocaine in utero exhibit higher instances of depression, anxiety, social, thought, and attention problems, and delinquent and aggressive behaviors than their unexposed counterparts). There can be no doubt that a mother's ingesting this drug can cause tragic injury to a fetus and a child. There should be no doubt that South Carolina can impose punishment upon an expectant mother who has so little regard for her own unborn that she risks causing him *90 or her lifelong damage and suffering. The State, by taking special measures to give rehabilitation and training to expectant mothers with this tragic addiction or weakness, acts well within its powers and its civic obligations. The holding of the Court, furthermore, does not call into question the validity of mandatory reporting laws such as child abuse laws which require teachers to report evidence of child abuse to the proper authorities, even if arrest and prosecution is the likely result. That in turn highlights the real difficulty. As this case comes to us, and as reputable sources confirm, see K. Farkas, Training Health Care and Human Services Personnel in Perinatal Substance Abuse, in Drug & Alcohol Abuse Reviews, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy and Childhood 13, 27-28 ; U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Pregnant, Substance-Using Women 48 (1993), we must accept the premise that the medical profession can adopt acceptable criteria for testing expectant mothers for cocaine use in order to provide prompt and effective counseling to the mother and to take proper medical steps to protect the child. If prosecuting |
Justice Kennedy | 2,001 | 4 | concurring | Ferguson v. Charleston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118414/ferguson-v-charleston/ | take proper medical steps to protect the child. If prosecuting authorities then adopt legitimate procedures to discover this information and prosecution follows, that ought not to invalidate the testing. One of the ironies of the case, then, may be that the program now under review, which gives the cocaine user a second and third chance, might be replaced by some more rigorous system. We must, however, take the case as it comes to us; and the use of handcuffs, arrests, prosecutions, and police assistance in designing and implementing the testing and rehabilitation policy cannot be sustained under our previous cases concerning mandatory testing. III An essential, distinguishing feature of the special needs cases is that the person searched has consented, though the usual voluntariness analysis is altered because adverse consequences *91 (e. g., dismissal from employment or disqualification from playing on a high school sports team) will follow from refusal. The person searched has given consent, as defined to take into account that the consent was not voluntary in the full sense of the word. See ; Von -661; -651. The consent, and the circumstances in which it was given, bear upon the reasonableness of the whole special needs program. Here, on the other hand, the question of consent, even with the special connotation used in the special needs cases, has yet to be decided. Indeed, the Court finds it necessary to take the unreal step of assuming there was no voluntary consent at all. Thus, we have erected a strange world for deciding the case. My discussion has endeavored to address the permissibility of a law enforcement purpose in this artificial context. The role played by consent might have affected our assessment of the issues. My concurrence in the judgment, furthermore, should not be interpreted as having considered or resolved the important questions raised by Justice Scalia with reference to whether limits might be imposed on the use of the evidence if in fact it were obtained with the patient's consent and in the context of the special needs program. Had we the prerogative to discuss the role played by consent, the case might have been quite a different one. All are in agreement, of course, that the Court of Appeals will address these issues in further proceedings on remand. With these remarks, I concur in the judgment. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | In 1837, the United entered into a Treaty with several Bands of Chippewa Indians. Under the terms of this Treaty, the Indians ceded land in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota to the United and the United guaranteed *176 to the Indians certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. We must decide whether the Chippewa Indians retain these usufructuary rights today. The State of Minnesota argues that the Indians lost these rights through an Executive Order in 1850, an 1855 Treaty, and the admission of Minnesota into the Union in 1858. After an examination of the historical record, we conclude that the Chippewa retain the usufructuary rights guaranteed to them under the 1837 Treaty. I A In 1837, several Chippewa Bands, including the respondent Bands here, were summoned to Fort Snelling (near present-day St. Paul, Minnesota) for the negotiation of a treaty with the United The United representative at the negotiations, Wisconsin Territorial Governor Henry Dodge, told the assembled Indians that the United wanted to purchase certain Chippewa lands east of the Mississippi River, lands located in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota. App. 46 (1837 Journal of Treaty Negotiations). The Chippewa agreed to sell the land to the United but they insisted on preserving their right to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory. See, e. g., In response to this request, Governor Dodge stated that he would "make known to your Great Father, your request to be permitted to make sugar, on the lands; and you will be allowed, during his pleasure, to hunt and fish on them." To these ends, the parties signed a treaty on July 29, 1837. In the first two articles of the 1837 Treaty, the Chippewa ceded land to the United in return for 20 annual payments of money and goods. The United in the fifth article of the Treaty, guaranteed to the Chippewa the right to hunt, fish, and gather on the ceded lands: *177 "The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guarantied [sic] to the Indians, during the pleasure of the President of the United" 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa, In 1842, many of the same Chippewa Bands entered into another Treaty with the United again ceding additional lands to the Federal Government in return for annuity payments of goods and money, while reserving usufructuary rights on the ceded lands. 1842 Treaty with the Chippewa, This Treaty, however, contained a provision providing that the Indians would be "subject to removal therefrom at the pleasure |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | Indians would be "subject to removal therefrom at the pleasure of the President of the United" Art. 6, In the late 1840's, pressure mounted to remove the Chippewa to their unceded lands in the Minnesota Territory. On September 4, 1849, Minnesota Territorial Governor Alexander Ramsey urged the Territorial Legislature to ask the President to remove the Chippewa from the ceded land. App. 878 (Report and Direct Testimony of Dr. Bruce M. White) (hereinafter White Report). The Territorial Legislature complied by passing, in October 1849, "Joint Resolutions relative to the removal of the Chippewa Indians from the ceded lands within the Territory of Minnesota." App. to Pet. for Cert. 567 (hereinafter Joint Resolution). The Joint Resolution urged: "[T]o ensure the security and tranquility of the white settlements in an extensive and valuable district of this Territory, the Chippewa Indians should be removed from all lands within the Territory to which the Indian Title has been extinguished, and that the privileges given to them by Article Fifth [of the 1837 Treaty] and Article Second [of the 1842 Treaty] be revoked." *178 The Territorial Legislature directed its resolution to Congress, but it eventually made its way to President Zachary Taylor. App. 674 (Report and Direct Testimony of Professor Charles E. Cleland) (hereinafter Cleland Report). It is unclear why the Territorial Legislature directed this resolution to Congress and not to the President. One possible explanation is that, although the 1842 Treaty gave the President authority to remove the Chippewa from that land area, see 1842 Treaty with the Chippewa, Art. 6, the 1837 Treaty did not confer such authority on the President. Therefore, any action to remove the Chippewa from the 1837 ceded lands would require congressional approval. See App. 674 The historical record provides some clues into the impetus behind this push to remove the Chippewa. In his statement to the Territorial Legislature, Governor Ramsey asserted that the Chippewa needed to be removed because the white settlers in the Sauk Rapids and Swan River area were complaining about the privileges given to the Chippewa Indians. Similarly, the Territorial Legislature urged removal of the Chippewa "to ensure the security and tranquility of the white settlements" in the area. App. to Pet. for Cert. 567 (Joint Resolution). The historical evidence suggests, however, that the white settlers were complaining about the Winnebago Indians, not the Chippewa, in the Sauk Rapids area. See App. 671-672 There is evidence that Minnesotans wanted Indians moved from Wisconsin and Michigan to Minnesota because a large Indian presence brought economic benefits with it. Specifically, an Indian presence provided opportunities to trade |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | with it. Specifically, an Indian presence provided opportunities to trade with Indians in exchange for their annuity payments, and to build and operate Indian agencies, schools, and farms in exchange for money. The presence of these facilities in an area opened opportunities for patronage jobs to staff these facilities. See ; See ("Minnesota would reap the benefit [from the Chippewa's removal]whereas now their annuities pass via Detroit and not one dollar do our inhabitants get"). The District Court concluded in this case that "Minnesota politicians, including Ramsey, advocated removal of the Wisconsin Chippewa to Minnesota because they wanted to obtain more of the economic benefits generated by having a large number of Indians residing in their territory." Whatever the impetus behind the removal effort, President Taylor responded to this pressure by issuing an Executive Order on February 6, 1850. The order provided: "The privileges granted temporarily to the Chippewa Indians of the Mississippi, by the Fifth Article of the Treaty made with them on the 29th of July 1837, `of hunting, fishing and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded' by that treaty to the United ; and the right granted to the Chippewa Indians of the Mississippi and Lake Superior, by the Second Article of the treaty with them of October 4th 1842, of hunting on the territory which they ceded by that treaty, `with the other usual privileges of occupancy until required to remove by the President of the United' are hereby revoked; and all of the said Indians remaining on the lands ceded as aforesaid, are required to remove to their unceded lands." App. to Pet. for Cert. 565. The officials charged with implementing this order understood it primarily as a removal order, and they proceeded to implement it accordingly. See Record, Doc. No. 311, Plaintiffs' Exh. 88 (letter from Brown to Ramsey, Feb. 6, 1850); App. 161 (letter from Ramsey to Livermore, Mar. 4, 1850). See (citing Plaintiffs' Exh. 201 (letter from Livermore to Ramsey, Apr. 2, 1850)) (describing circular prepared to notify Indians of Executive Order); App. *180 1101-1102 (describing circular and stating that "the entire thrust" of the circular had to do with removal). The Government hoped to entice the Chippewa to remove to Minnesota by changing the location where the annuity paymentsthe payments for the land cessionswould be made. The Chippewa were to be told that their annuity payments would no longer be made at La Pointe, Wisconsin (within the Chippewa's ceded lands), but, rather, would be made at Sandy Lake, on unceded |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | but, rather, would be made at Sandy Lake, on unceded lands, in the Minnesota Territory. The Government's first annuity payment under this plan, however, ended in disaster. The Chippewa were told they had to be at Sandy Lake by October 25 to receive their 1850 annuity payment. See B. White, The Regional Context of the Removal Order of 1850, 6, pp. 6-9 to 6-10 By November 10, almost 4,000 Chippewa had assembled at Sandy Lake to receive the payment, but the annuity goods were not completely distributed until December 2. In the meantime, around 150 Chippewa died in an outbreak of measles and dysentery; another 230 Chippewas died on the winter trip home to Wisconsin. App. 228-229 (letter from Buffalo to Lea, Nov. 6, 1851). The Sandy Lake annuity experience intensified opposition to the removal order among the Chippewa as well as among non-Indian residents of the area. See ; (describing opposition to the order). See Record, Doc. No. 311, Plaintiffs' Exh. 93 (Michigan and Wisconsin citizens voice their objections to the order to the President). In the face of this opposition, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea wrote to the Secretary of the Interior recommending that the President's 1850 order be modified to allow the Chippewa "to remain for the present in the country they now occupy." App. 215 According to Commissioner Lea, removal of the Wisconsin Bands "is not required *181 by the interests of the citizens or Government of the United and would in its consequences in all probability be disastrous to the Indians." Three months later, the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote to the Secretary to inform him that 1,000 Chippewa were assembled at La Pointe, but that they could not be removed from the area without the use of force. He sought the Secretary's approval "to suspend the removal of these Indians until the determination of the President upon the recommendation of the commissioner is made known to this office." Two days later, the Secretary of the Interior d the requested authorization, instructing the Commissioner "to suspend the removal of the Chippeway [sic] Indians until the final determination of the President." Commissioner Lea immediately telegraphed the local officials with instructions to "[s]uspend action with reference to the removal of Lake Superior Chippewas for further orders." As the State's own expert historian testified, "[f]ederal efforts to remove the Lake Superior Chippewa to the Mississippi River effectively ended in the summer of 1851." Although Governor Ramsey still hoped to entice the Chippewa to remove by limiting annuity payments to only those Indians who removed to unceded |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | annuity payments to only those Indians who removed to unceded lands, see this plan, too, was quickly abandoned. In 1853, Franklin Pierce became President, and he appointed George Manypenny as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The new administration reversed Governor Ramsey's policy, and in 1853, annuity payments were once again made within the ceded territory. See, e. g., Record, Doc. No. 311, Plaintiffs' Exh. 119, p. 2 (letter from Gorman to Manypenny, Oct. 8, 1853); Plaintiffs' Exh. 122 (letter from Herriman to Gorman, Nov. 10, 1853); see Plaintiffs' *182 Exh. 120 (letter from Wheeler to Parents, Oct. 20, 1853). As Indian Agent Henry Gilbert explained, the earlier "change from La Pointe to [Sandy Lake] was only an incident of the order for removal," thus suggesting that the resumption of the payments at La Pointe was appropriate because the 1850 removal order had been abandoned. App. 243 (letter from Gilbert to Manypenny, Dec. 14, 1853). In 1849, white lumbermen built a dam on the Rum River (within the Minnesota portion of the 1837 ceded Territory), and the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa protested that the dam interfered with its wild rice harvest. This dispute erupted in 1855 when violence broke out between the Chippewa and the lumbermen, necessitating a call for federal troops. In February 1855, the Governor of the Minnesota Territory, Willis Gorman, who served as the ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs for the Territory, wrote to Commissioner Manypenny about this dispute. In his letter, he noted that "[t]he lands occupied by the timbermen have been surveyed and sold by the United and the Indians have no other treaty interests except hunting and fishing. " at 295 296 (letter of Feb. 16, 1855) (emphasis added). There isno indication that Commissioner Manypenny disagreed with Governor Gorman's characterization of Chippewa treaty rights. In June of the same year, Governor Gorman wrote to Mille Lacs Chief Little Hill that even ifthe dam was located within the Mille Lacs Reservation under the 1855 Treaty, the dam "was put there long before you had any rights there except to hunt and fish." Record, Doc. No. 163, Plaintiffs' Exh. 19 (letter of June 4, 1855). Thus, as of 1855, the federal official responsible for Indian affairs in the Minnesota Territory acknowledged and recognized Chippewa rights to hunt and fish in the 1837 ceded Territory. On the other hand, there are statements by federal officials in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century that suggest that the Federal Government no longer recognized Chippewa usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty. *183 See, e. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | Chippewa usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty. *183 See, e. g., App. 536-539 (letter from Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Heatwole, Dec. 16, 1898); ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 575-578 (letter from President Roosevelt to Whitebird, Mar. 1, 1938). But see, e. g., App. 541 (letter from Meritt to Hammitt, Dec. 14, 1925) (Office of Indian Affairs noting that "[a]pparently, there is merit in the claims of the Indians" that they have hunting and fishing rights under the 1837 Treaty); Additional Brief for United in United v. Thomas, O. T. 1893, No. 668, pp. 2-3 (with respect to the 1842 Treaty, arguing that no Executive Order requiring Chippewa removal had ever been made). Although the United abandoned its removal policy, it did not abandon its attempts to acquire more Chippewa land. To this end, in the spring of 1854, Congress began considering legislation to authorize additional treaties for the purchase of Chippewa lands. The House of Representatives debated a bill "to provide for the extinguishment of the title of the Chippewa Indians to the lands owned and claimed by them in the Territory of Minnesota and State of Wisconsin." Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., 1032 (1854). This bill did not require the removal of the Indians, but instead provided for the establishment of reservations within the ceded territories on which the Indians could remain. The treaty authorization bill stalled in the Senate during 1854, but Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny began to implement it nonetheless. On August 11, he instructed Indian Agent Henry Gilbert to begin treaty negotiations to acquire more land from the Chippewa. Specifically, he instructed Gilbert to acquire "all the country" the Chippewa own or claim in the Minnesota Territory and the State of Wisconsin, except for some land that would be set aside for reservations. App. 264. Gilbert negotiated such a Treaty with several Chippewa Bands, 1854 Treaty with the Chippewa, although for reasons now lost to *184 history, the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa was not a party to this Treaty. The signatory Chippewa Bands ceded additional land to the United and certain lands were set aside as reservations for the Bands. Art. 2. In addition, the 1854 Treaty established new hunting and fishing rights in the territory ceded by the Treaty. Art. 11. When the Senate finally passed the authorizing legislation in December 1854, Minnesota's territorial delegate to Congress recommended to Commissioner Manypenny that he negotiate a treaty with the Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish Bands of Chippewa Indians. App. 286-287 (letter from Rice to Manypenny, Dec. 17, 1854). Commissioner |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | 286-287 (letter from Rice to Manypenny, Dec. 17, 1854). Commissioner Manypenny summoned representatives of those Bands to D. C., for the treaty negotiations, which were held in February 1855. See The purpose and result of these negotiations was the sale of Chippewa lands to the United To this end, the first article of the 1855 Treaty contains two sentences: "The Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish bands of Chippewa Indians hereby cede, sell, and convey to the United all their right, title, and interest in, and to, the lands now owned and claimed by them, in the Territory of Minnesota, and included within the following boundaries, viz: [describing territorial boundaries]. And the said Indians do further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere." -1166. Article 2 set aside lands in the area as reservations for the signatory tribes. The Treaty, however, makes no mention of hunting and fishing rights, whether to reserve new usufructuary rights or to abolish rights guaranteed *185 by previous treaties. The Treaty Journal reveals no discussion of hunting and fishing rights. App. 297-356 (Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of Feb. 22, 1855) (hereinafter 1855 Treaty Journal)). A little over three years after the 1855 Treaty was signed, Minnesota was admitted to the Union. See Act of May 11, 1858, The admission Act is silent with respect to Indian treaty rights. B In the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and several of its members filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota against the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, and various state officers (collectively State), seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that they retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty and an injunction to prevent the State's interference with those rights. The United intervened as a plaintiff in the suit; nine counties and six private landowners intervened as defendants.[1] The District Court bifurcated the case into two phases. Phase I of the litigation would determine whether, and to what extent, the Mille Lacs Band retained any usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty, while Phase II would determine the validity of particular state measures regulating any retained rights. In the first decision on the Phase I s, the District Court rejected numerous defenses posed by the defendants and set the matter for trial. After a bench trial on the Phase I |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | for trial. After a bench trial on the Phase I s, the District Court concluded that the Mille Lacs Band retained its usufructuary rights as guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty. Specifically, as relevant *186 here, the court rejected the State's arguments that the 1837 Treaty rights were extinguished by the 1850 Executive Order or by the 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa. With respect to the 1850 Executive Order, the District Court held, in relevant part, that the order was unlawful because the President had no authority to order removal of the Chippewa without their consent. at 823 826. The District Court concluded that the United ultimately abandoned and repealed the removal policy embodied in the 1850 order. With respect to the 1855 Treaty, the District Court reviewed the historical record and found that the parties to that agreement did not intend to abrogate the usufructuary privileges guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty. At this point in the case, the District Court permitted several Wisconsin Bands of Chippewa to intervene as plaintiffs[2] and allowed the defendants to interpose new defenses. As is relevant here, the defendants asserted for the first time that the Bands' usufructuary rights were extinguished by Minnesota's admission to the Union in 1858. The District Court rejected this new defense. No. 3-94-1226 (D. Minn., Mar. 29, 1996) (Davis, J.), App. to Pet. for Cert. 182-189. Simultaneously with this litigation, the Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians and several of its members filed a separate suit against Minnesota state officials, seeking a declaration that they retained their rights to hunt, fish, and gather pursuant to the 1837 and 1854 Treaties. Two Minnesota landowners intervened as defendants,[3] and the District *187 Court d an order, like the order in the Mille Lacs Band case, bifurcating the litigation into two phases. In March 1996, the District Court held that the Fond du Lac Band retained its hunting and fishing rights. Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, Civ. No. 5-92-159 (D. Minn., Mar. 18, 1996) (Kyle, J.), App. to Pet. for Cert. 419. In June 1996, the District Court consolidated that part of the Fond du Lac litigation concerning the 1837 Treaty rights with the Mille Lacs litigation for Phase II. In Phase II, the State and the Bands agreed to a Conservation Code and Management Plan to regulate hunting, fishing, and gathering in the Minnesota portion of the territory ceded in the 1837 Treaty. Even after this agreement, however, several resource allocation and regulation s remained unresolved; the District Court resolved these s in a final order d |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | District Court resolved these s in a final order d in See (Minn.) (Davis, J.). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Three parts of the Eighth Circuit's decision are relevant here. First, the Eighth Circuit rejected the State's argument that President Taylor's 1850 Executive Order abrogated the Indians' hunting, fishing, and gathering rights as guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty. The Court of Appeals concluded that President Taylor did not have the authority to the removal order and that the invalid removal order was inseverable from the portion of the order purporting to abrogate Chippewa usufructuary rights. Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 1855 Treaty did not extinguish the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary privileges. The court noted that the revocation of hunting and fishing rights was neither discussed during the Treaty negotiations nor mentioned in the Treaty itself. The court rejected the State's argument that this Court's decision in Oregon Dept. of Fish and *188 required a different Third, the court rejected the State's argument that, under the "equal footing doctrine," Minnesota's entrance into the Union extinguished any Indian treaty rights. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found no evidence of congressional intent in enacting the Minnesota statehood Act to abrogate Chippewa usufructuary rights, and it rejected the argument that controlled the resolution of this -927. In sum, the Court of Appeals held that the Chippewa retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty with respect to land located in the State of Minnesota. This conclusion is consistent with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision holding that the Chippewa retained those same rights with respect to the ceded land located in Wisconsin. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc. The State of Minnesota, the landowners, and the counties all filed petitions for writs of certiorari, and we granted the State's petition. II We are first asked to decide whether President Taylor's Executive Order of February 6, 1850, terminated Chippewa hunting, fishing, and gathering rights under the 1837 Treaty. The Court of Appeals began its analysis of this question with a statement of black letter law: "`The President's power, if any, to the order must stem either from an act of Congress *189 or from the Constitution itself.'" ). The court considered whether the President had authority to the removal order under the 1830 Removal Act (hereinafter Removal Act), The Removal Act authorized the President to convey land west of the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | Act authorized the President to convey land west of the Mississippi to Indian tribes that chose to "exchange the lands where they now reside, and remove there." According to the Court of Appeals, the Removal Act only allowed the removal of Indians who had consented to -916. Because the Chippewa had not consented to removal, according to the court, the Removal Act could not provide authority for the President's 1850 removal order. In this Court, no party challenges the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Removal Act did not authorize the President's removal order. The landowners argue that the Removal Act was irrelevant because it applied only to land exchanges, and that even if it required consent for such land exchanges, it did not prohibit other means of removing Indians. See Brief for Respondent Thompson et al. 22-23. We agree that the Removal Act did not forbid the President's removal order, but as noted by the Court of Appeals, it did not authorize that order. Because the Removal Act did not authorize the 1850 removal order, we must look elsewhere for a constitutional or statutory authorization for the order. In this Court, only the landowners argue for an alternative source of authority; they argue that the President's removal order was authorized by the 1837 Treaty itself. See There is no support for this proposition, however. The Treaty makes no mention of removal, and there was no discussion of removal during the Treaty negotiations. Although the United could have negotiated a treaty in 1837 providing for removal of the Chippewaand it negotiated several such removal *190 treaties with Indian tribes in 1837[4]the 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa did not contain any provisions authorizing a removal order. The silence in the Treaty, in fact, is consistent with the United ' objectives in negotiating it. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Harris explained the United ' goals for the 1837 Treaty in a letter to Governor Dodge on May 13, 1837. App. 42. In this letter, Harris explained that through this Treaty, the United wanted to purchase Chippewa land for the pinewoods located on it; the letter contains no reference to removal of the Chippewa. Based on the record before us, the proposition that the 1837 Treaty authorized the President's 1850 removal order is unfounded. Because the parties have pointed to no colorable source of authority for the President's removal order, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the 1850 removal order was unauthorized. The State argues that even if the removal portion of the order was invalid, the 1837 Treaty privileges were |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | of the order was invalid, the 1837 Treaty privileges were nevertheless revoked because the invalid removal order was severable from the portion of the order revoking Chippewa *191 usufructuary rights. Although this Court has often considered the severability of statutes, we have never addressed whether Executive Orders can be severed into valid and invalid parts, and if so, what standard should govern the inquiry. In this case, the Court of Appeals assumed that Executive Orders are severable, and that the standards applicable in statutory cases apply without modification in the context of Executive ). Because no party before this Court challenges the applicability of these standards, for purposes of this case we shall assume, arguendo, that the severability standard for statutes applies to Executive The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into legislative intent. We stated the traditional test for severability over 65 years ago: "Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining See Alaska Airlines, ; at Translated to the present context, we must determine whether the President would not have revoked the 1837 Treaty privileges if he could not the removal order. We think it is clear that President Taylor intended the 1850 order to stand or fall as a whole. The 1850 order embodied a single, coherent policy, the predominant purpose of which was removal of the Chippewa from the lands that they had ceded to the United The federal officials charged with implementing the order certainly understood it as such. As soon as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs received a copy of the order, he sent it to Governor Ramsey and placed him in charge of its implementation. The Commissioner's *192 letter to Ramsey noted in passing that the order revoked the Chippewa's usufructuary privileges, but it did not discuss implementation of that part of the order. Rather, the letter addressed the mechanics of implementing the removal order. Record, Doc. No. 311, Plaintiffs' Exh. 88 (letter from Brown to Ramsey, Feb. 6, 1850). Governor Ramsey immediately wrote to his subagent at La Pointe (on Lake Superior), noting that he had enclosed a "copy of the order of the President for the removal of the Chippewas, from the lands they have ceded." App. 161 (letter from Ramsey to Livermore, Mar. 4, 1850) (emphasis added). This letter made no mention of the revocation of Indian hunting and fishing rights. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | mention of the revocation of Indian hunting and fishing rights. The La Pointe subagent, in turn, prepared a circular to notify the Wisconsin Bands of the Executive Order, but this circular, too, focused on removal of the Chippewa. See When the 1850 order is understood as announcing aremoval policy, the portion of the order revoking Chippewa usufructuary rights is seen to perform an integral function in this policy. The order tells the Indians to "go," and tells them not to return to the ceded lands to hunt and fish. The State suggests that President Taylor might have revoked Chippewa usufructuary rights as a kind of "incentive program" to encourage the Indians to remove had he known that he could not order their removal directly. The State points to no evidence, however, that the President or his aides ever considered the abrogation of hunting and fishing rights as an "incentive program." Moreover, the State does not explain how this incentive was to operate. As the State characterizes Chippewa Treaty rights, the revocation of those rights would not have prevented the Chippewa from hunting, fishing, and gathering on the ceded territory; the revocation of treaty rights would merely have subjected Chippewa hunters, fishers, and gatherers to territorial, and, later, state regulation. Brief for Petitioners 47, n. 21. The *193 State does not explain how, if the Chippewa were still permitted to hunt, fish, and gather on the ceded territory, the revocation of the treaty rights would have encouraged the Chippewa to remove to their unceded lands. There is no evidence that the treaty privileges themselvesas opposed to the presence of the Indianscaused any problems necessitating the revocation of those privileges. In other words, there is little historical evidence that the treaty privileges would have been revoked for some other purpose. The only evidence in this regard is Governor Ramsey's statement to the Minnesota Territorial Legislature that settlers in the Sauk Rapids and Swan River area were complaining about the Chippewa Treaty privileges. But the historical record suggests that the settlers were complaining about the Winnebago Indians, and not the Chippewa, in that area. See App. 671-672 When Governor Ramsey was put in charge of enforcing the 1850 Executive Order, he made no efforts to remove the Chippewa from the Sauk Rapids area or to restrict hunting and fishing privileges there. In fact, his attempts to enforce the order consisted primarily of efforts to move the Chippewa from the Wisconsin and Michigan areas to Minnesotacloser to the Sauk Rapids and Swan River settlements. App. 1099 1100 ; More importantly, Governor Ramsey and the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | App. 1099 1100 ; More importantly, Governor Ramsey and the Minnesota Territorial Legislature explicitly tied revocation of the treaty privileges to Common sense explains the logic of this strategy: If the legislature was concerned with ensuring "the security and tranquility of the white settlements," App. to Pet. for Cert. 567 (Joint Resolution), this concern was not addressed by merely revoking Indian treaty rights; the Indians had to be removed. We conclude that President Taylor's 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Chippewa usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty. The State has pointed to no statutory or constitutional authority for the President's removal *194 order, and the Executive Order, embodying as it did one coherent policy, is inseverable.[5] We do not mean to suggest that a President, now or in the future, cannot revoke *195 Chippewa usufructuary rights in accordance with the terms of the 1837 Treaty. All we conclude today is that the President's 1850 Executive Order was insufficient to accomplish this revocation because it was not severable from the invalid removal order. III The State argues that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians relinquished its usufructuary rights under the 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa. Specifically, the State argues that the Band unambiguously relinquished its usufructuary rights by agreeing to the second sentence of Article 1 in that Treaty: "And the said Indians do further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere." This sentence, however, does not mention the 1837 Treaty, and it does not mention hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The entire 1855 Treaty, in fact, is devoid of any language expressly mentioningmuch less abrogatingusufructuary rights. Similarly, the Treaty contains no language providing money for the abrogation of previously held rights. These omissions are telling because the United treaty drafters had the sophistication and experience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights. In fact, just a few months after Commissioner Manypenny completed the 1855 Treaty, he negotiated a Treaty with the Chippewa of Sault Ste. Marie that expressly revoked fishing rights that had been reserved in an earlier Treaty. See Treaty with the Chippewa of Sault Ste. Marie, Art. 1,[6] See, e. g., Choctaw The State argues that despite any explicit reference to the 1837 Treaty rights, or to usufructuary rights more generally, the second sentence of Article 1 nevertheless abrogates those rights. But to determine whether this language abrogates Chippewa |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | those rights. But to determine whether this language abrogates Chippewa Treaty rights, we look beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including "the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties." Choctaw ; see El Al Israel Airlines, In this case, an examination of the historical record provides insight into how the parties to the Treaty understood the terms of the agreement. This insight is especially helpful to the extent that it sheds light on how the Chippewa signatories to the Treaty understood the agreement because we interpret Indian treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them. See ; United The 1855 Treaty was designed primarily to transfer Chippewa land to the United not to terminate Chippewa usufructuary rights. It was negotiated under the authority of the Act of December 19, 1854. This Act authorized treaty *197 negotiations with the Chippewa "for the extinguishment of their title to all the lands owned and claimed by them in the Territory of Minnesota and State of Wisconsin." Ch. 7, The Act is silent with respect to authorizing agreements to terminate Indian usufructuary privileges, and this silence was likely not accidental. During Senate debate on the Act, Senator Sebastian, the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, stated that the treaties to be negotiated under the Act would "reserv[e] to them [i. e., the Chippewa] those rights which are secured by former treaties." Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., 1404 (1854). In the winter of 1854-1855, Commissioner Manypenny summoned several Chippewa chiefs to D. C., to begin negotiations over the sale of Chippewa land in Minnesota to the United See App. 288 The negotiations ran from February 12 through February 22. Commissioner Manypenny opened the negotiations by telling the Chippewa chiefs that his goal for the negotiations was to buy a portion of their land, and he stayed firm to this proposed course throughout the talks, focusing the discussions on the purchase of Chippewa land. Indeed all of the participants in the negotiations, including the Indians, understood that the purpose of the negotiations was to transfer Indian land to the United The Chief of the Pillager Band of Chippewa stated: "It appears to me that I understand what you want, and your views from the few words I have heard you speak. You want land." (statement of Flat Mouth). Commissioner Manypenny confirmed that the chief correctly understood the purpose of the negotiations: "He appears to understand the object of the interview. His people had more |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | understand the object of the interview. His people had more land than they wanted or could use, and stood in need of money; and I have more money than I need, but want more land." *198 See Like the authorizing legislation, the Treaty Journal, recording the course of the negotiations themselves, is silent with respect to usufructuary rights. The journal records no discussion of the 1837 Treaty, of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights, or of the abrogation of those rights. This silence suggests that the Chippewa did not understand the proposed Treaty to abrogate their usufructuary rights as guaranteed by other treaties. It is difficult to believe that in 1855, the Chippewa would have agreed to relinquish the usufructuary rights they had fought to preserve in 1837 without at least a passing word about the relinquishment. After the Treaty was signed, President Pierce submitted it to the Senate for ratification, along with an accompanying memorandum from Commissioner Manypenny describing the Treaty he had just negotiated. Like the Treaty and the Treaty Journal, this report is silent about hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. Commissioner Manypenny's memorandum on the 1855 Treaty is illuminating not only for what it did not say, but for what it did say: The report suggests a purpose for the second sentence of Article 1. According to the Commissioner's report, the Treaty provided for the purchase of between 11 and 14 million acres of Chippewa land within the boundaries defined by the first article. In addition to this defined tract of land, the Commissioner continued, "those Indians (and especially the Pillager and Lake Winnibigoshish bands) have some right of interest in a large extent of other lands in common with other Indians in Minnesota, and which *199 right or interest is ceded to the United" This part of the Commissioner's report suggests that the second sentence of Article 1 was designed not to extinguish usufructuary rights, but rather to extinguish remaining Chippewa land claims. The "other lands" do not appear to be the lands ceded by the 1837 Treaty. The Pillager and Lake Winnibigoshish Bands did not occupy lands in the 1837 ceded territory, so it is unlikely that the Commissioner would have described the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty as belonging "especially" to those Bands. Moreover, the 1837 Treaty privileges were held in common largely with Chippewa bands in Wisconsin, not with "other Indians in Minnesota." In other words, the second sentence of Article 1 did not extinguish usufructuary privileges, but rather it extinguished Chippewa land claims that Commissioner Manypenny could not describe precisely. See |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | land claims that Commissioner Manypenny could not describe precisely. See e. g., (Pillager negotiator declines to "state precisely what our bands claim as a right"). See -817. One final part of the historical record suggests that the 1855 Treaty was a land purchase treaty and not a treaty that terminated usufructuary rights: the 1854 Treaty with the Chippewa. Most of the Chippewa Bands that resided within the territory ceded by the 1837 Treaty were signatories to the 1854 Treaty; only the Mille Lacs Band was a party to the 1855 Treaty. If the United had intended to abrogate Chippewa usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty, it almost certainly would have included a provision to that effect in the 1854 Treaty, yet that Treaty contains no such provision. To the contrary, it expressly secures new usufructuary rights to the signatory Bands on the newly ceded territory. The State proposes no explanation compelling or otherwisefor why the United would have wanted to abrogate the Mille Lacs Band's hunting and fishing rights, while leaving intact the other Bands' rights to hunt and fish on the same territory. *200 To summarize, the historical record provides no support for the theory that the second sentence of Article 1 was designed to abrogate the usufructuary privileges guaranteed under the 1837 Treaty, but it does support the theory that the Treaty, and Article 1 in particular, was designed to transfer Chippewa land to the United At the very least, the historical record refutes the State's assertion that the 1855 Treaty "unambiguously" abrogated the 1837 hunting, fishing, and gathering privileges. Given this plausible ambiguity, we cannot agree with the State that the 1855 Treaty abrogated Chippewa usufructuary rights. We have held that Indian treaties are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the Indians, 443 U. S., at ; Choctaw 318 U. S., at and that any ambiguities are to be resolved in their favor, Winters v. United See County of To attack the conclusion that the 1855 Treaty does not abrogate the usufructuary rights guaranteed under the 1837 Treaty, the State relies primarily on our decision in Oregon Dept. of Fish and Klamath required this Court to interpret two agreements. In the first agreement, an 1864 Treaty between the United and several Indian s now collectively known as the Klamath Indian the Indians conveyed their remaining lands to the United and a portion of this land was set aside as a reservation. The 1864 Treaty provided that the had the "`exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes, included in said reservation, and of gathering |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | streams and lakes, included in said reservation, and of gathering edible roots, seeds, and berries within its limits,' " but it provided for no offreservation usufructuary rights. Due to a surveying error, the reservation excluded land that, under the terms of the Treaty, should *201 have been included within the reservation. Thus, in 1901, the United and the entered into a second agreement, in which the United agreed to compensate the for those lands, and the agreed to "`cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United all their claim, right, title and interest in and to' " the lands erroneously excluded from the reservation. The contended that the 1901 agreement had not abrogated its usufructuary rights under the 1864 Treaty with respect to those lands. We rejected the 's argument and held that it had in fact relinquished its usufructuary rights to the lands at We recognized that the 1864 Treaty had secured certain usufructuary rights to the but we recognized, based on an analysis of the specific terms of the Treaty, that the 1864 Treaty restricted those rights to the lands within the reservation. Because the rights were characterized as "exclusive," this "foreclose[d] the possibility that they were intended to have existence outside of the reservation." In other words, "because the right to hunt and fish reserved in the 1864 Treaty was an exclusive right to be exercised within the reservation, that right could not consistently survive off the reservation" on the lands the had sold. This understanding of the 's usufructuary rights under the 1864 Treatythat those rights were exclusive, on-reservation rightsinformed our conclusion that the Klamath did not retain any usufructuary rights on the land that it ceded in the 1901 agreement, land that was not part of the reservation. In addition, we noted that there was nothing in the historical record of the 1901 agreement that suggested that the parties intended to change the background understanding of the scope of the usufructuary rights. Klamath does not control this case. First, the Chippewa's usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty existed independently of land ownership; they were neither tied to a *202 reservation nor exclusive. In contrast to Klamath, there is no background understanding of the rights to suggest that they are extinguished when title to the land is extinguished. Without this background understanding, there is no reason to believe that the Chippewa would have understood a cession of a particular tract of land to relinquish hunting and fishing privileges on another tract of land. More importantly, however, the State's argument that similar language in two Treaties involving |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | the State's argument that similar language in two Treaties involving different parties has precisely the same meaning reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of basic principles of treaty construction. Our holding in Klamath was not based solely on the bare language of the 1901 agreement. Rather, to reach our conclusion about the meaning of that language, we examined the historical record and considered the context of the treaty negotiations to discern what the parties intended by their choice of words. This review of the history and the negotiations of the agreements is central to the interpretation of treaties. El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U. S., at As we described above, an analysis of the history, purpose, and negotiations of this Treaty leads us to conclude that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish their 1837 Treaty rights in the 1855 Treaty. IV Finally, the State argues that the Chippewa's usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty were extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union in 1858. In making this argument, the State faces an uphill battle. Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do so. United v. ; see ; Menominee v. United There must be "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose *203 to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty." United v. There is no such "clear evidence" of congressional intent to abrogate the Chippewa Treaty rights here. The relevant statuteMinnesota's enabling Actprovides in relevant part: "[T]he State of Minnesota shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United of America, and admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original in all respects whatever." Act of May 11, 1858, This language, like the rest of the Act, makes no mention of Indian treaty rights; it provides no clue that Congress considered the reserved rights of the Chippewa and decided to abrogate those rights when it passed the Act. The State concedes that the Act is silent in this regard, Brief for Petitioners 36, and the State does not point to any legislative history describing the effect of the Act on Indian treaty rights. With no direct support for its argument, the State relies principally on this Court's decision in In Race Horse, we held that a Treaty reserving to a "`the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United so long as game may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the whites |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts' " terminated when Wyoming became a State in 1890. This case does not bear the weight the State places on it, however, because it has been qualified by later decisions of this Court. The first part of the holding in Race Horse was based on the "equal footing doctrine," the constitutional principle that all are admitted to the Union with the same attributes of sovereignty (i. e., on equal footing) as the original 13 See As relevant here, it prevents the Federal Government from impairing *204 fundamental attributes of state sovereignty when it admits new into the Union. According to the Race Horse Court, because the treaty rights conflicted irreconcilably with state regulation of natural resources "an essential attribute of its governmental existence," the treaty rights were held an invalid impairment of Wyoming's sovereignty. Thus, those rights could not survive Wyoming's admission to the Union on "equal footing" with the original But Race Horse rested on a false premise. As this Court's subsequent cases have made clear, an Indian tribe's treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state land are not irreconcilable with a State's sovereignty over the natural resources in the State. See, e. g., see Rather, Indian treaty rights can coexist with state management of natural resources. Although have important interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this authority is shared with the Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers, such as treaty making. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. See, e. g., ; ; United -384; United v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, See Menominee v. United Here, the 1837 Treaty gave the Chippewa the right to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory free of territorial, and later state, regulation, a privilege that others did not enjoy. Today, this freedom from state regulation curtails the State's ability to regulate hunting, fishing, and gathering by the Chippewa in the ceded lands. But this Court's cases have recognized that Indian treaty-based usufructuary rights do not guarantee the Indians "absolute freedom" from state regulation. Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath *205 n. 16. We have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose reasonable and necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in the interest of conservation. See Puyallup v. Department of Game of Wash., ; ; This "conservation necessity" standard accommodates both the State's interest in management of its natural resources and the Chippewa's federally |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | in management of its natural resources and the Chippewa's federally guaranteed treaty rights. Thus, because treaty rights are reconcilable with state sovereignty over natural resources, statehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on land within state boundaries.[7] We do not understand Justice Thomas to disagree with this fundamental conclusion. Race Horse rested on the premise that treaty rights are irreconcilable with state sovereignty. It is this conclusionthe conclusion undergirding the Race Horse Court's equal footing holdingthat we have consistently rejected over the years. Justice Thomas' only disagreement is as to the scope of state regulatory authority. His disagreement is premised on a purported distinction between "rights" and "privileges." This Court has never used a distinction between rights and privileges *206 to justify any differences in state regulatory authority. Moreover, as Justice Thomas acknowledges, post, at 223 (dissenting opinion), the starting point for any analysis of these questions is the treaty language itself. The Treaty must be interpreted in light of the parties' intentions, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians. Winters v. United 207 U. S., at There is no evidence that the Chippewa understood any fine legal distinctions between rights and privileges. Moreover, under Justice Thomas' view of the 1837 Treaty, the guarantee of hunting, fishing, and gathering privileges was essentially an empty promise because it gave the Chippewa nothing that they did not already have. The equal footing doctrine was only part of the holding in Race Horse, however. We announced an alternative holding: The treaty rights at were not intended to survive Wyoming's statehood. We acknowledged that Congress, in the exercise of its authority over territorial lands, has the power to secure off-reservation usufructuary rights to Indian tribes through a treaty, and that "it would be within the power of Congress to continue them in the State, on its admission into the Union." We acknowledged that if Congress intended the rights to survive statehood, there was no need for Congress to preserve those rights explicitly in the statehood Act. We concluded, however, that the particular rights in the Treaty at there "the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United "were not intended to survive statehood. ; see -515. The Chief Justice reads Race Horse to establish a rule that "temporary and precarious" treaty rights, as opposed to treaty rights "which were `of such a nature as to imply their perpetuity,' " are not intended to survive statehood. Post, at 219. But the "temporary and precarious" language in Race Horse is too broad to be |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118273/minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-of-chippewa-indians/ | precarious" language in Race Horse is too broad to be useful in distinguishing rights that survive statehood from those that do not. In Race *207 Horse, the Court concluded that the right to hunt on federal lands was temporary because Congress could terminate the right at any time by selling the lands. Under this line of reasoning, any right created by operation of federal law could be described as "temporary and precarious," because Congress could eliminate the right whenever it wished. In other words, the line suggested by Race Horse is simply too broad to be useful as a guide to whether treaty rights were intended to survive statehood. The focus of the Race Horse inquiry is whether Congress (more precisely, because this is a treaty, the Senate) intended the rights secured by the 1837 Treaty to survive statehood. -515. The 1837 Treaty itself defines the circumstances under which the rights would terminate: when the exercise of those rights was no longer the "pleasure of the President." There is no suggestion in the Treaty that the President would have to conclude that the privileges should end when a State was established in the area. Moreover, unlike the rights at in Race Horse, there is no fixed termination point to the 1837 Treaty rights. The Treaty in Race Horse contemplated that the rights would continue only so long as the hunting grounds remained unoccupied and owned by the United ; the happening of these conditions was "clearly contemplated" when the Treaty was ratified. By contrast, the 1837 Treaty does not tie the duration of the rights to the occurrence of some clearly contemplated event. Finally, we note that there is nothing inherent in the nature of reserved treaty rights to suggest that they can be extinguished by implication at statehood. Treaty rights are not impliedly terminated upon statehood. ; U.S. 422, The Race Horse Court's decision to the contrarythat Indian treaty rights were impliedly repealed by Wyoming's statehood Actwas informed by that Court's conclusion that the Indian treaty rights were inconsistent with state sovereignty *208 over natural resources and thus that Congress (the Senate) could not have intended the rights to survive statehood. But as we described above, Indian treaty-based usufructuary rights are not inconsistent with state sovereignty over natural resources. See Thus, contrary to the State's contentions, Race Horse does not compel the conclusion that Minnesota's admission to the Union extinguished Chippewa usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty. Accordingly, the judgment of the United Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | majority | Fiore v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118320/fiore-v-white/ | The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania convicted codefendants William and David of violating a provision of Pennsylvania law forbidding any person to "operate a hazardous waste" facility with a "permit." Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6018.401(a) (reprinted at Appendix A, infra ). Each codefendant appealed to a different intermediate state court, one of which affirmed 's conviction, the other of which reversed 's. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review of 's case, and his conviction became final. However, that court agreed to review 's case, and it subsequently held that the statutory provision did not apply to those who, like and possessed a permit but deviated radically *25 from the permit's terms. Consequently, it set aside 's conviction. In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in asked the Pennsylvania courts to reconsider his identical conviction. They denied his request. He then brought a federal habeas corpus petition in which he argued, among other things, that Pennsylvania's courts, either as a matter of Pennsylvania law or as a matter of federal constitutional law, must apply the interpretation of the statute to his identical case. If this proposition of law is correct, he asserted, it would follow that the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence at all with respect to one essential element of the crime (namely, the lack of a permit). On this reasoning, concluded that the Federal Constitution requires his release. See ; In re Winship, The Federal District Court granted the habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. We agreed to review the appellate court's rejection of 's claim. Before deciding whether the Federal Constitution requires that 's conviction be set aside in light of we first must know whether Pennsylvania itself considers to have explained what Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6018.401(a) always meant, or whether Pennsylvania considers to have changed the law. We invoke the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's certification procedure in order to obtain that court's view of the matter. See Appendix B, infra. I The relevant background circumstances include the following: 1. owned and operated a hazardous waste disposal facility in Pennsylvania. was the facility's general manager. Pennsylvania authorities, while conceding that *26 and possessed a permit to operate the facility, claimed that their deliberate alteration of a monitoring pipe to hide a leakage problem went so far beyond the terms of the permit that the operation took place with a permit at all. A jury convicted them both of having "operate[d] a hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility" with a "permit." Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6018.401(a) ; see CC No. |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | majority | Fiore v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118320/fiore-v-white/ | Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6018.401(a) ; see CC No. 8508740 (Ct. Common Pleas, Allegheny Cty., Pa., Jan. 19, 1988), p. 2, App. 6 (marking date of conviction as Feb. 18, 1986). The trial court upheld the conviction, despite the existence of a permit, for, in its view, the "alterations of the pipe represented such a significant departure from the terms of the existing permit that the operation of the hazardous waste facility was `un-permitted' after the alterations were undertaken" App. 44. 2. appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 742 That court affirmed the conviction "on the basis of the opinion of the court below." No. 00485 PGH 1988 (May 12, 1989), pp. 2-3, App. 99-100. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on March 13, 1990; shortly thereafter, 's conviction became final. 3. 's codefendant, appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 762(a)(2)(ii) That court noted the existence of a "valid permit," found the Commonwealth's interpretation of the statute "strained at best," and set 's conviction aside. The court wrote: "The alteration of the monitoring pipe was clearly a violation of the conditions of the permit. But to say that *27 the alteration resulted in the operation of a new facility which had not been permitted is to engage in a semantic exercise which we cannot accept. [W]e will not let [the provision's] language be stretched to include activities which clearly fall in some other subsection." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's conclusion. It wrote: "[T]he Commonwealth did not make the crime of operating a waste disposal facility with a permit Simply put, Mr. did have a permit. [T]o conclude that the alteration constituted the operation of a new facility with a permit is a bald fiction we cannot endorse. The Commonwealth Court was right in reversing Mr. 's conviction of operating with a permit when the facility clearly had one." Com- monwealth v. 4. again asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case, once after that court agreed to review 's case and twice more after it decided See Appellee's Supplemental App. in No. 97-3288 (CA3), pp. 59, 61 (including docket sheets reflecting 's filings on Jan. 30, 1992, Jan. 24, 1994, and Oct. 18, 1994). The court denied those requests. 5. then sought collateral relief in the state courts. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pa., refused to grant 's petition for collateral reliefdespite because "at the time of conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | majority | Fiore v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118320/fiore-v-white/ | of conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise," and "[t]he petitioner is not entitled to a retroactive application of the interpretation of the law set forth in " CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), p. 6. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, both because had previously litigated the claim and because 's "direct appeal was no longer pending when the Supreme *28 Court made the ruling which [] now seeks to have applied to his case." 6. sought federal habeas corpus relief. As we previously pointed he argued that Pennsylvania had imprisoned him "for conduct which was not criminal under the statutory section charged." App. 194. The Federal District Court, acting on a Magistrate's recommendation, granted the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, however, primarily because it believed that "state courts are under no constitutional obligation to apply their decisions retroactively." 7. We subsequently granted 's petition for certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that his conviction be set aside. II essentially claims that Pennsylvania produced no evidence whatsoever of one element of the crime, namely, that he lacked "a permit." The validity of his federal claim may depend upon whether the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in was always the statute's meaning, even at the time of 's trial. marked the first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the statute; previously, Pennsylvania's lower courts had been divided in their interpretation. 's and 's trial court concluded that 6018.401(a)'s "permit" requirement prohibited the operation of a hazardous waste facility in a manner that deviates from the permit's terms, and the Superior Court, in adjudicating 's direct appeal, accepted the trial court's interpretation in a summary unpublished memorandum. Then, the Commonwealth Court, in 's direct appeal, specifically rejected the interpretation adopted by the Superior Court in 's case. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in set forth *29 its authoritative interpretation of the statute, affirming the Commonwealth Court only after 's conviction became final. For that reason, we must know whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's construction of the statute in stated the correct understanding of the statute at the time 's conviction became final, or whether it changed the interpretation then applicable. Compare, e. g., with at -417, 665 A.2d, at ; CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), at 6 (refusing to apply the interpretation because "at the time of ['s] conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise"). III We certify the following question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to that court's |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | majority | Fiore v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118320/fiore-v-white/ | question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to that court's Rules Regarding Certification of Questions of Pennsylvania law: Does the interpretation of Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6018.401(a) set forth in state the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date 's conviction became final? We respectfully request that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accept our certification petition because, in our view, the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case. We recommend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court designate William (the petitioner here) as appellant and both Gregory White, Warden, and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the respondents here) as appellees. *30 The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania a copy of this opinion and the briefs and records filed with this Court in this case. Judgment and further proceedings in this case are reserved pending our receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It is so ordered. APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. 6018.401(a) provides: "No person or municipality shall store, transport, treat, or dispose of hazardous waste within this Commonwealth unless such storage, transportation, treatment, or disposal is authorized by the rules and regulations of the department; no person or municipality shall own or operate a hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility unless such person or municipality has first obtained a permit for the storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste from the department; and, no person or municipality shall transport hazardous waste within the Commonwealth unless such person or municipality has first obtained a license for the transportation of hazardous waste from the department." (Emphasis added.) Section 6018.606(f) establishes criminal penalties for a violation of 6018.401 and provides: "Any person who stores, transports, treats, or disposes of hazardous waste within the Commonwealth in violation of [ 6018.401] shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $2,500 but not more than $100,000 per day for each violation or to imprisonment for not less than two years but not more than ten years, or both." (Footnote omitted.) *31 APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT "RULES REGARDING CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW "1. This Court will accept Certification Petitions, on a trial basis, from January 1, 1999 to January 1, 2000. "2. Any of the following courts may file a Certification Petition with this Court: "a. The |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Ivan v. v. City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108575/ivan-v-v-city-of-new-york/ | The Court held in In re Winship, decided March 31, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the essentials of due process and fair treatment that must be afforded at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In this case, on January 6, before Winship was decided, petitioner was adjudged a delinquent in the Family Court of Bronx County, New York, on a finding, based on the preponderance-of-evidence standard, that, at knifepoint, he forcibly took a bicycle from another boy, an act that, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in the first degree. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed on the ground that Winship should be retroactively applied to all cases still in the appellate process, The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Winship was not to be applied retroactively,[*] On remand, the Appellate Division thereupon affirmed the delinquency adjudication, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal from that affirmance, We disagree with the holding of the Court of Appeals that Winship is not to be applied retroactively. "Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances." See ; Winship expressly held that the reasonable-doubt standard "is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence that bedrock `axiomatic and elementary' principle whose `enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law' `Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of *205 his guilt.' To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it `impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.'" -364. Plainly, then, the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Winship was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect. The motion for |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | The question presented by this case is whether respondent's suit against the United States is time barred. In 15, the Government sold respondent's interests in three Indian allotments to the United States Forest Service for inclusion in the Chippewa National Forest in Minnesota. Respondent claims that the sale was void. We hold that respondent's suit is an action "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest," within the meaning of the Quiet Title Act of 172, 28 U.S. C. 20a(a), and therefore is barred by that Act's 12-year period of limitations. See 28 U.S. C. 20a(f). I In 105, pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, as amended, 25 U.S. C. 331 et seq. (182 ed. and Supp. II), and the Nelson Act of 1, three Chippewa Indian ancestors of respondent Florence Blacketter Mottaz each received an 80-acre allotment on the Leech Lake Reservation in Cass County, Minn.[1] Title to each of these allotments was held in trust by the United States. Respondent eventually inherited a one-fifth interest in one of the allotments and a one-thirtieth interest in each of the other two. In the early 150's, some holders of fractional interests in Leech Lake allotments petitioned the Department of the Interior to permit them to sell their lands.[2] On April 30, 153, *837 the Department's Office of Indian Affairs sent respondent two forms, captioned "Consent to Sale of Inherited Lands." App. 2, 3.[3] Accompanying the forms was a letter which read in part: "As stated before, some of the owners have requested the sale of this land. Both land and timber, if any, have been appraised; and as soon as we get the consent to sell, an effort will be made to obtain a buyer by advertising for sale bids. This land will not be sold unless the high bid is equal to, or more than, the appraised value. If no reply is received from you within ten (10) days, it will be assumed that you have no objection to the sale." The consent forms indicated that one of the allotments was appraised at $20.50 and the other at $605.75. Respondent neither replied to the letter nor returned the consent forms. In 15, despite the lack of express consent from every person who held an interest in any of the three allotments, the Government sold them to the United States Forest Service. Respondent visited the regional office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in May 167 and expressed an interest in selling her inherited Indian lands. Later that month, the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | in selling her inherited Indian lands. Later that month, the realty officer sent her a letter informing her of her allotment interests. The letter did not mention the Leech Lake allotments. Respondent in 181 again requested a list of her interests. In its reply, the Bureau set forth the allotments currently held in trust for her and, in addition, noted that she once had held interests in the Leech Lake allotments which had been sold by the Secretary as part of the so-called "Secretarial Transfer" program.[] *838 II In 181, respondent filed suit against the United States in the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota. She claimed jurisdiction under 25 U.S. C. 35, 28 U.S. C. 1331, 136, 1353, and 215, and the Fifth Amendment. App. 7. She alleged that the sales of her three Leech Lake allotments "made without [her] consent or permission were, therefore, illegal sales and transfers and are void." In addition, respondent raised four other claims regarding the sale: that the United States had breached its fiduciary duty in selling lands held in trust for her without first obtaining her consent; that the United States had acted negligently in selling her lands; that she had been deprived of property without due process; and that her property had been taken for public use without just compensation. Respondent sought to represent both a nationwide and a Minnesota-based class of similarly situated Indian claimants. -. Respondent originally sought either "[d]amages in a monetary sum equal to the current fair market value of each parcel illegally transferred" or "rescission of the illegal sale or transfer and the vesting of title of each individual parcel in the names of the appropriate descendants, heirs and assigns." After a preliminary hearing, she voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, her claim requesting rescission. The District Court ruled that respondent's claims were barred by 28 U.S. C. 201(a), the general statute of limitations governing actions against the United States. That section *83 provides, in pertinent part, that "every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." The court held that respondent's cause of action first accrued when she learned of the sale of the lands. Since respondent's deposition "clearly reveal[ed] that she had knowledge of the sale in 15," App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a, her suit, filed 27 years after the sale, was barred.[5] The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. While it recognized that respondent's complaint was somewhat opaque, it rejected the Government's claim that respondent |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | was somewhat opaque, it rejected the Government's claim that respondent was seeking, not simply to establish title to the allotments, but to obtain damages for alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty: the complaint "must be read as raising the one essential claim that her land was sold without her consent, that she did not receive payment for her land, and that accordingly the sale was void and she retains title to the land." The claim for damages equal to the current fair market value of the land "must be construed as equivalent to a claim for return of the land itself." The Court of Appeals ruled that such a claim could not be time barred. This Court in had held that the sale of an allotment to a Government agent in violation of federal law is " `void and confers no *80 right upon the wrongdoer,' " quoting and had refused to apply principles of laches to bar the Indians' claim against Ewert. Although did not consider whether federal statutes of limitations apply to land claims brought by Indian allottees, the Court of Appeals found that 201(a) "does not bar claims of title to allotments because Ewert is based on the principle that, if the underlying sale of land is void, the concept that a cause of action `accrues' at some point is inapplicable because the allottee simply retains title all along." Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute of limitations question depended on the resolution of several preliminary issues. It therefore remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the Secretary lacked the authority in 15 to sell respondent's lands without her consent, and, if such a sale would have been unauthorized, whether respondent either had consented or had actually received payment following the sale, in which case her consent could be inferred. If respondent proved on remand that the sale was illegal, then, "[i]n light of the land's inclusion within the Chippewa National Forest and the thirty years which have passed since the sale, she may force the government to pay her the fair market value of the land rather than to simply return the land itself." The Government petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc. In its petition, the Government claimed, apparently for the first time, that respondent's suit to recover land currently held by the United States was barred, not by the general 6-year statute of limitations in 201(a), but rather by the 12-year limitations period established by the Quiet Title Act. 2 Record 16. In addition, the Government argued that |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | Act. 2 Record 16. In addition, the Government argued that the Court of Appeals' holding that respondent could compel the United States to pay her the fair market value of her property involved relief "of the type typically provided by the Tucker Act," ib but a Tucker Act claim would *81 clearly be barred by the 6-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals denied the Government's petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari to consider whether respondent's claim was barred under either 201(a) or 20a(f), the limitations provision governing Quiet Title Act claims. 7 U.S. III When the United States consents to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court's jurisdiction. United (11). In particular, "[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity." Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals discussed the precise source of its jurisdiction, and the parties at various times before this Court have identified the jurisdictional basis of respondent's suit as the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S. C. 136(f) and 20a; the Allotment Acts, 25 U.S. C. 35 and 28 U.S. C. 1353; and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. 136(a)(2). Thus, we must decide which, if any, of these statutes conferred jurisdiction on the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and then determine whether respondent's suit was brought within the relevant limitations period. A In this Court held that "Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States' title to real " Here, respondent contests the United States' claim that it acquired title to the allotments in 15. We think that respondent's suit falls within the scope of the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S. C. 20a(a), which governs "civil action[s] to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States *82 claims an interest." Respondent's description of her claim clearly brings it within the Act's scope: "At no time in this proceeding did respondent drop her claim for title. To the contrary, the claim for title is the essence and bottom line of respondent's case. Her position is simply that the land remains in the name of Mottaz and the other heirs of the property despite what some pieces of paper executed by petitioner without her consent and without a court hearing purport to do." Brief for Respondent 3. See 75. The relief respondent seeks confirms this characterization of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | See 75. The relief respondent seeks confirms this characterization of her suit. Respondent does not seek recovery of her share of the proceeds realized by the United States from the 15 sale but allegedly never distributed. A claim for monetary damages in that amount would involve a concession that title had passed to the United States Forest Service in 15 and that the sole issue was whether respondent was fairly compensated for the taking of her interests in the allotments. Rather, respondent demands damages in the amount of the current fair market value of her interests. What respondent seeks is a declaration that she alone possesses valid title to her interests in the allotments and that the title asserted by the United States is defective, and an order requiring the United States to pay her the value of her interest today in order properly to transfer title. Nonetheless, respondent claims that her suit is not governed by the Quiet Title Act because, by its own terms, that Act "does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands," 20a(a), such as the lands in which she asserts an interest. Respondent misconstrues this exclusion, which operates solely to retain the United States' immunity from suit by third parties challenging the United States' title to land held in trust for Indians. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 2-575, p. 6 (171); H. R. Rep. No. p. 13 ; Dispute of Titles on Public Lands, Hearing on S. 216, S. 57, and S. 721 *83 before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 2d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (171). Thus, when the United States claims an interest in real property based on that property's status as trust or restricted Indian lands, the Quiet Title Act does not waive the Government's immunity.[6] Here, however, the United States claims an interest in the Leech Lake lands, not on behalf of Indian beneficiaries of a trust, but rather on behalf of the United States Forest Service and the Chippewa National Forest. Thus, the Act provides the United States' consent to suit concerning its claim to these lands, provided, of course, that the plaintiff challenging the Government's title meets the conditions attached to the United States' waiver of immunity. The limitations period is a central condition of the consent given by the Act. See, e. g., -285; H. R. Rep. No. The Act provides: "Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it is accrued. Such action shall |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | the date upon which it is accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States." 28 U.S. C. 20a(f). The District Court expressly found that respondent knew of the sale in 15. Moreover, the list of interests provided to respondent by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 167 did not include any of the three Leech Lake allotments. Thus, by *8 167, at the very latest, respondent was on notice that the Government did not recognize her title to the allotments. Whether respondent actually knew that the allotments had been included within the Chippewa National Forest and thus were claimed by the United States, her undisputed knowledge that the Government no longer recognized her as having a valid claim to the allotments satisfies the "should have known" prong of 20a(f)'s accrual test.[7] Her claim is therefore barred. B Respondent, however, seeks to avoid the carefully crafted limitations of the Quiet Title Act by characterizing her suit as a claim for an allotment under the General Allotment Act of 1887, as amended, 25 U.S. C. 331 et seq. (182 ed. and Supp. II). That Act grants jurisdiction to the district courts over suits "involving the right to any allotment." 25 U.S. C. 35.[8] Respondent claims that the *85 general 6-year statute of limitations governing all civil actions against the Government, 28 U.S. C. 201(a), does not apply to cases brought under the General Allotment Act, and that her claim therefore cannot be time barred. We need not reach the question whether 201(a) applies to claims brought under 35 of the General Allotment Act, and, if it does, when a cause of action begins to run, since we conclude that respondent cannot use 35 for a quiet title action against the Government. Section 35 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over two types of cases: (i) proceedings "involving the right of any person, in whole or in part of Indian blood or descent, to any allotment of land under any law or treaty," and (ii) proceedings "in relation to" the claimed right of a person of Indian descent to land that was once allotted. Section 35 thus contemplates two types of suits involving allotments: suits seeking the issuance of an allotment, see, e. g., (1), and suits involving " `the interests and rights of the Indian in his allotment or patent after he has acquired it,' " (CA), cert. denied, 00 U.S. 2 quoting United The structure of 35 strongly suggests, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | U.S. 2 quoting United The structure of 35 strongly suggests, however, that 35 itself waives the Government's immunity only with respect to the former class of cases: those seeking an original *86 allotment. In those suits, 35 provides that "the parties thereto shall be the claimant as plaintiff and the United States as party defendant" while, as to the latter class of cases, no mention of the United States' participation is made.[] Accordingly, in Affiliated Ute this Court held that, to the extent that 35 involves a waiver of federal immunity, as opposed to a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to the district courts, that section "authorizes, and provides governmental consent for, only actions for allotments." See That federal courts may have general subject-matter jurisdiction over claims to quiet title to allotments brought by Indians, see n. does not therefore mean that the United States has waived its immunity in cases where an Indian challenges the United States' claim of title in its own right. As the Court already has noted, Congress intended the Quiet Title Act "to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can] challenge the United States' title to real " In the State of North sued the federal officers responsible for supervising a riverbed within the State which both the State and the Federal Government claimed to own and *87 sought an injunction barring them from exercising privileges of ownership over the bed. The Court held that such an "officer's suit" was precluded since it would circumvent the "carefully crafted provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the national public interest." To permit challenges to the Government's claim of title to be brought under other jurisdictional provisions might mean that "the QTA's 12-year statute of limitations, the one point on which the Executive Branch was most insistent, could be avoided, and, contrary to the wish of Congress, an unlimited number of suits involving stale claims might be instituted." Moreover, to permit officer's suits might thwart Congress' determination that the Government be given the option of paying just compensation and thereby keeping land even after an adverse judgment, see 20a(b), in order to avoid disruption of ongoing federal activities involving the disputed 61 U.S., To permit suits against the United States under the General Allotment Act poses similar dangers. Not only could it permit plaintiffs to avoid the Quiet Title Act's 12-year statute of limitations, but it could seriously disrupt ongoing federal programs. The remedial clause of the General Allotment Act provides that a judgment in favor of an Indian claimant "shall have the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | judgment in favor of an Indian claimant "shall have the same effect as if such allotment had been allowed and approved by [the Secretary of the Interior]." 25 U.S. C. 35. Thus, if plaintiffs were permitted to sue under the General Allotment Act, they would be entitled to actual possession of the challenged This would pose precisely the threat to ongoing federal activities on the property that the Quiet Title Act was intended to avoid. That the plaintiff in this case claims the right to elect a remedy that would not require the Government to relinquish its possession of the disputed lands is irrelevant: the Quiet Title Act expressly gives that choice to the Government, not the claimant. 28 U.S. C. 20a(b). In light of Congress' purposes in enacting the Quiet Title Act, we cannot *88 conclude that Congress intended to permit persons in respondent's position to avoid that Act's strictures.[10] C At oral argument, respondent claimed that her case is based solely on the General Allotment Act. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, 26. Nevertheless, at various times during this litigation, both parties have identified the Tucker Act as providing a source of federal jurisdiction over respondent's claims. Although respondent and the Government apparently agree that a suit based on the Tucker Act would be barred by the general 6-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S. C. 201(a), we must address the possibility that the District Court's jurisdiction rested on the Tucker Act because, if it did, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit may have lacked jurisdiction over respondent's appeal.[11] *8 Prior to the passage of the Quiet Title Act, adverse claimants had resorted to the Tucker Act to circumvent the Government's immunity from quiet title suits. Rather than seeking a declaration that they owned the property at issue, such claimants would concede that the Government possessed title and then would seek compensation for the Government's having taken the property from them. See -281; H. R. Rep. No. at 12. In *850 light of the Quiet Title Act's explicit statement that 20a(a) does not "apply to or affect actions which may be or could have been brought under sections 136 [or] 11 of this title,"[12] we cannot conclude that Tucker Act-based suits, like the officer's suit at issue in are clearly precluded by the passage of the Quiet Title Act. But regardless of whether other claimants may invoke the district courts' Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear their claims, it is clear that respondent has not brought a case falling within the scope of the Tucker Act. In 237 |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | United States v. Mottaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111691/united-states-v-mottaz/ | falling within the scope of the Tucker Act. In 237 U.S. 7, (115), Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "the plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to," and noted that "[j]urisdiction generally depends upon the case made and relief demanded by the plaintiff." Thus, since the "essential features," of Healy's case involved allegations of patent infringement and a request for the relief characteristically provided by patent law, Healy could invoke federal patent law jurisdiction despite the fact that the measure of damages was fixed by contract. Respondent now invokes federal jurisdiction only under the General Allocation Act and its jurisdictional counterpart. Moreover, the case she has made, and the relief she seeks, do not fit within the scope of the Tucker Act. A Tucker Act-based lands suit would seek damages equal to just compensation for an already completed taking of the claimant's land. See, e. g., -281; H. R. Rep. No. at 7, 12-13. As we have noted, however, respondent is not seeking whatever compensation she allegedly *851 was denied in 15. Rather, she claims she still owns her interests in the allotments, and she seeks to force the Government to buy those interests. She claims, in essence, that no legally cognizable taking has yet occurred. See Brief for Respondent 3-. Respondent and the Court of Appeals view payment rather than return of the land as an appropriate remedy because respondent's allotments now lie within the Chippewa National Forest. But neither views this payment as representing damages for the Government's past acts, the essence of a Tucker Act claim for monetary relief. See, e. g., United Since this Indian respondent's claim was not based on the Tucker Act, her appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was proper. IV Federal law rightly provides Indians with a range of special protections. But even for Indian plaintiffs, "[a] waiver of sovereign immunity `cannot be lightly implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' " United (180), quoting United 35 U.S. 1, (16). Congress has consented to a suit challenging the Federal Government's title to real property only if the action is brought within the 12-year period set by the Quiet Title Act. The limitations provision of the Quiet Title Act reflects a clear congressional judgment that the national public interest requires barring stale challenges to the United States' claim to real property, whatever the merits of those challenges. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | In response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the Department of State produced 25 documents containing information about Haitian nationals who had attempted to immigrate illegally to the United States and were involuntarily returned to Haiti. Names of individual Haitians had been deleted from 17 of the documents. The question presented is whether these deletions were authorized by FOIA Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA disclosure requirements do not apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S. C. 552(b)(6). I Haiti is a densely populated nation located about 500 nautical miles southeast of Florida on the western third of the Caribbean Island of Hispaniola. Prior to 1981, its history of severe economic depression and dictatorial government *167 motivated large numbers of its citizens to emigrate to Florida without obtaining the permission of either the Haitian Government or the Government of the United States. A small number of those undocumented aliens were eligible for asylum as political refugees,[1] but almost all of them were subject to deportation if identified and apprehended. In response to this burgeoning "illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens" from Haiti and other countries, President Reagan ordered the Coast Guard and the Secretary of State to intercept vessels carrying undocumented aliens and, except for passengers who qualified for refugee status, to return them to their point of origin. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4865, 3 CFR 50 (1981 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12324, 3 CFR 180 (1981 Comp.). The President also directed the Secretary of State to enter into "cooperative arrangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal migration to the United States by sea." Following this directive, the Secretary of State obtained an assurance from the Haitian Government that interdicted Haitians would "not be subject to *168 prosecution for illegal departure." See Agreement on MigrantsInterdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, 33 U. S. T. 3559, 3560, T. I. A. S. No. 10241. In order to monitor compliance with that assurance, State Department personnel conducted confidential interviews with a "representative sample" of unsuccessful emigrants about six months after their involuntary return. All but one or two of the emigrants reported that they had not been harassed or prosecuted since their return to Haiti. Respondents in this case are a Florida lawyer who represents undocumented Haitian nationals seeking political asylum in the United States and three of his clients. In immigration proceedings, respondents are attempting to prove that Haitians who immigrated illegally will face a |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | to prove that Haitians who immigrated illegally will face a wellfounded fear of persecution if they return to their homeland and therefore are refugees entitled to asylum in this country. Relying in part on the evidence in the reports of the interviews with former passengers on vessels interdicted by the Coast Guard, the Government has taken the position in those proceedings that respondents' fear of persecution is not well founded. In order to test the accuracy of the Government's assertion that undocumented Haitian nationals have not been persecuted upon their return to Haiti, respondents made a series of FOIA requests to three Government agencies for copies of reports of the interviews by State Department personnel with persons who had been involuntarily returned to Haiti. Insofar as relevant to the question before us, the net result of these requests was the production by the State Department of 25 documents, containing approximately 96 pages, which describe a number of interviews with specific returnees and summarize the information that had been obtained during successive periods.[2] Thus, for example, a summary *169 prepared in March 1985 reported that since the follow up program had begun 3 12 years earlier, United States embassy officials in Haiti had interviewed 812 returnees, 22.83 percent of the total migrant interdictee population.[3] During that time, the report continued, "only two interdictees have mentioned a threat or mistreatment by the authorities. In one case the claim was unverifiable as there were no witnesses present, in the second case higher authorities intervened to prevent mistreatment by a rural policeman."[4] In 17 of the documents, the information related to individual interviews, but the names and other identifying information had been redacted before the documents were delivered to respondents.[5] The only issue for us to decide is whether that redaction was lawful. *170 The District Court found that any invasion of privacy from the "mere act of disclosure of names and addresses would be de minimis and little more than speculation" and was clearly outweighed by the public interest in the "safe relocation of returned Haitians." It therefore ordered the Department to produce the redacted information. The Court of Appeals affirmed. For two reasons, however, it disagreed with the District Court's "de minimis" characterization of the privacy interest at stake. First, it noted that respondents wanted the redacted information in order to enable them to contact the interviewees directly and to question them about their treatment by the Haitian Government. Second, the Court recognized that "the returnees were promised confidentiality before they talked with U. S. government officials." Thus, the Court of Appeals |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | with U. S. government officials." Thus, the Court of Appeals began its balancing process "by acknowledging that there are significant privacy interests at stake." It nevertheless concluded that those interests were outweighed by the public interest in learning whether the Government is "adequately monitoring Haiti's compliance with its obligation not to persecute returnees" and "is honest to the public" when its officials express the opinion that Haiti is adhering to that obligation. The court recognized that the redacted information would not, in and of itself, tell respondents anything about *171 Haiti's treatment of the returnees or this Government's honesty, but it concluded that the indirect benefit of giving respondents the means to locate the Haitian returnees and to cross-examine them provided a public value that required disclosure. -1556. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' construction of Exemption 6, and now reverse. II It is appropriate to preface our evaluation of the narrow question that we must decide with an identification of certain matters that have been resolved in earlier stages of the litigation. After the District Court's initial decision, the State Department filed additional affidavits in support of a claim that the redacted information was protected from disclosure by Exemption 1, the exemption for classified documents, and also by Exemption 7(C), the exemption for law enforcement records which, if released, "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."[6] The District Court ruled that the Government had waived those claims by not raising them until after its Exemption 6 claim had been denied, 725 F. Supp., at and the Court of Appeals held that that ruling was not an abuse of discretion, *172 908 F. 2d, at 1557. We denied the Government's certiorari petition insofar as it sought review of that question, but mention it here because the Government's burden in establishing the requisite invasion of privacy to support an Exemption 6 claim is heavier than the standard applicable to Exemption 7(C). See Department of To prevail in this case under Exemption 6, the Government must establish that the invasion of the interviewees' privacy would be "clearly unwarranted." In attempting to meet its burden, the Government relies, in part, on the fact that the interviews with the Haitian returnees were conducted pursuant to assurances of confidentiality. In this Court, respondents have suggested that the texts of some of the reported interviews do not expressly mention such assurances. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals, however, questioned the fact that promises of confidentiality had actually been made; on the contrary, after finding that |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | had actually been made; on the contrary, after finding that such assurances had been made, both courts concluded as a matter of law that they did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure.[7] Insofar as the promises of confidentiality are relevant, we of course accept the factual predicate for the Court of Appeals decision. That court's conclusion rested, in part, on what it described as the public interest in learning "whether our government is honest to the public about Haiti's treatment of returnees." 908 F.2d, The Court of Appeals did not, however, suggest that there was any evidence in the *173 State Department records that was inconsistent with any public statement made by Government officials, or that there was any other factual basis for questioning the honesty of its officials. Thus, as with the assurances of confidentiality, we have no occasion to question the Government's version of the relevant facts. We note, finally, that respondents have never questioned the Government's position that the documents at issue consist of "personnel and medical files and similar files" within the meaning of Exemption 6.[8] Because the 17 reports from which identifying information was deleted unquestionably apply to the particular individuals who had been returned and interviewed, they are "similar files" within the meaning of the exemption. See Department of The only question, therefore, is whether the disclosure of the unredacted interview reports "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person's privacy." III The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to facilitate public access to Government documents. John Doe The statute was designed "`to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' " Department of Air Consistently with this purpose, as well as the plain language of the Act, the strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents. ; Department of Justice v. Reporters That burden remains with the agency when it seeks to justify the redaction of identifying information in a particular document as well as when it seeks to withhold an entire document. See 5 U.S. C. 552(a)(4)(B). *174 The redaction procedure is, however, expressly authorized by FOIA.[9] Congress thus recognized that the policy of informing the public about the operation of its Government can be adequately served in some cases without unnecessarily compromising individual interests in privacy.[10] Accordingly, *175 in the leading case interpreting Exemption 6, we held that the statute required disclosure of summaries of Air Force Academy disciplinary proceedings "with personal references or other identifying information deleted." |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | disciplinary proceedings "with personal references or other identifying information deleted." The question in this case is whether petitioner has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the disclosure of the contents of the interviews with the Haitian returnees adequately served the statutory purpose and that the release of the information identifying the particular interviewees would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of their privacy. As we held in the text of the exemption requires the Court to balance "the individual's right of privacy" against the basic policy of opening "agency action to the light of public scrutiny," The District Court and the Court of Appeals properly began their analysis by considering the significance of the privacy interest at stake. We are persuaded, however, that several factors, when considered together, make the privacy interest more substantial than the Court of Appeals recognized. First, the Court of Appeals appeared to assume that respondents sought only the names and addresses of the interviewees. But respondents soughtand the District Court ordered that the Government disclosethe unredacted interview summaries. As the Government points out, many of these summaries contain personal details about particular interviewees.[11] Thus, if the summaries are released without the names redacted, highly personal information regarding marital and employment status, children, living conditions, and attempts to enter the United States would be linked *176 publicly with particular, named individuals. Although disclosure of such personal information constitutes only a de minimis invasion of privacy when the identities of the interviewees are unknown, the invasion of privacy becomes significant when the personal information is linked to particular interviewees. Cf. In addition, disclosure of the unredacted interview summaries would publicly identify the interviewees as people who cooperated with a State Department investigation of the Haitian Government's compliance with its promise to the United States Government not to prosecute the returnees. The Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge the significance of this fact.[12] As the State Department explains, disclosure of the interviewees' identities could subject them or their families to "embarrassment in their social and community relationships." App. 43. More importantly, this group of interviewees occupies a special status: They left their homeland in violation of Haitian law and are protected from prosecution by their government's assurance to the State Department. Although the Department's monitoring program indicates that that assurance has been fulfilled, it nevertheless remains true that the State Department considered the danger of mistreatment sufficiently real to necessitate that monitoring program. How significant the danger of mistreatment may now be is, of course, impossible to measure, *177 but the privacy interest in protecting these individuals from any |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | but the privacy interest in protecting these individuals from any retaliatory action that might result from a renewed interest in their aborted attempts to emigrate must be given great weight. Indeed, the very purpose of respondents' FOIA request is to attempt to prove that such a danger is present today. We are also persuaded that the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to the fact that the interviews had been conducted pursuant to an assurance of confidentiality. We agree that such a promise does not necessarily prohibit disclosure, but it has a special significance in this case. Not only is it apparent that an interviewee who had been given such an assurance might have been willing to discuss private matters that he or she would not otherwise expose to the publicand therefore would regard a subsequent interview by a third party armed with that information as a special affront to his or her privacybut, as discussed above, it is also true that the risk of mistreatment gives this group of interviewees an additional interest in assuring that their anonymity is maintained. Finally, we cannot overlook the fact that respondents plan to make direct contact with the individual Haitian returnees identified in the reports. As the Court of Appeals properly recognized, the intent to interview the returnees magnifies the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of their identities. IV Although the interest in protecting the privacy of the redacted information is substantial, we must still consider the importance of the public interest in its disclosure. For unless the invasion of privacy is "clearly unwarranted," the public interest in disclosure must prevail. As we have repeatedly recognized, FOIA's "basic policy of `full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,' focuses on the citizens' right to be informed about `what their government is up to.' Official *178 information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose." Department of Justice v. Reporters (quoting Department of Air -) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals properly recognized that the public interest in knowing whether the State Department has adequately monitored Haiti's compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees is cognizable under FOIA. We are persuaded, however, that this public interest has been adequately served by disclosure of the redacted interview summaries and that disclosure of the unredacted documents would therefore constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the interviewees' privacy. The unredacted portions of the documents that have already been released to respondents inform the reader about the State Department's performance of |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | majority | Department of State v. Ray | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112667/department-of-state-v-ray/ | respondents inform the reader about the State Department's performance of its duty to monitor Haitian compliance with the promise not to prosecute the returnees. The documents reveal how many returnees were interviewed, when the interviews took place, the contents of individual interviews, and details about the status of the interviewees. The addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed any additional light on the Government's conduct of its obligation. The asserted public interest on which respondents rely stems not from the disclosure of the redacted information itself, but rather from the hope that respondents, or others, may be able to use that information to obtain additional information outside the Government files. The Government argues that such "derivative use" of requested documents is entirely beyond the purpose of the statute and that we should adopt a categorical rule entirely excluding the interest in such use from the process of balancing the public interest in disclosure against the interest in privacy. There is no need to adopt such a rigid rule to decide this case, however, *179 because there is nothing in the record to suggest that a second series of interviews with the already-interviewed returnees would produce any relevant information that is not set forth in the documents that have already been produced. Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably significant invasion of privacy. Accordingly, we need not address the question whether a "derivative use" theory would ever justify release of information about private individuals. We are also unmoved by respondents' asserted interest in ascertaining the veracity of the interview reports. There is not a scintilla of evidence, either in the documents themselves or elsewhere in the record, that tends to impugn the integrity of the reports. We generally accord Government records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy. If a totally unsupported suggestion that the interest in finding out whether Government agents have been telling the truth justified disclosure of private materials, Government agencies would have no defense against requests for production of private information. What sort of evidence of official misconduct might be sufficient to identify a genuine public interest in disclosure is a matter that we need not address in this case. On the record before us, we are satisfied that the proposed invasion of the serious privacy interest of the Haitian returnees is "clearly unwarranted." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112279/california-state-bd-of-equalization-v-sierra-summit-inc/ | Enmeshed in a tangled skein of procedural and state-law issues is a ruling on an important federal question that was critical to the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. The court's ultimate holding was that a Bankruptcy Court's injunction *846 against the assessment of a state sales tax upon the proceeds of a trustee's liquidation sale of an inventory of skis also barred the collection of a use tax from the purchaser's lessees. In the process of reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that a case well known to California bankruptcy lawyers as "Goggin II"[1] was wrongly decided. The three-judge panel that heard the case concluded that it was not within its power "and not within its heart to change a rule of this circuit that has been in force for over thirty years." In re China Peak Resort, Because the rule of "Goggin II" conflicts with the rule applied in other Circuits,[2] and because we have both the power and the duty to resolve the conflict, we granted certiorari.[3] *847 The Goggin cases concerned the attempt by the California State Board of Equalization, petitioner here, to assess sales and use taxes on a bankruptcy liquidation sale. In Goggin I, cert. denied, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's attempt to assess a nondiscriminatory sales tax imposed on retailers to a liquidation sale made by a bankruptcy trustee under court order. Although the court based its decision on a construction of state law that excluded the trustee from the definition of retailer, Judge Fee in concurrence wrote that the assessment constituted an unlawful tax upon court processes. Six years later, Judge Fee, writing for the Circuit panel in Goggin II, made those views law. At issue was a California law which required the bankruptcy trustee to collect and remit use taxes imposed on the use of goods from a liquidation sale on which no sales tax had been paid. The court held the tax unlawful, finding that while it was nondiscriminatory it nonetheless burdened the "essential processes" of the bankruptcy court. The Goggin opinions were based on two premises, each of which respondent argues supports the judgment here. First, the court held that a tax on liquidation sales places a burden on the federal function of the bankruptcy court and therefore violates principles of intergovernmental tax immunity first recognized in Second, it found that a federal statute specifically authorizing the States to impose taxes on business operations of the bankruptcy trustee negated by implication their power to tax |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112279/california-state-bd-of-equalization-v-sierra-summit-inc/ | the bankruptcy trustee negated by implication their power to tax bankruptcy liquidations. Neither argument is persuasive. *848 The argument that a tax on a bankruptcy liquidation sale places an undue burden on a governmental operation derives from the once established view that a state tax on income or assets an individual receives from a contract with the Federal Government constituted a tax on the contract and thereby imposed a burden on governmental operations. See, e. g., Panhandle Oil ; ; ; The Court drew a distinction between a tax imposed on a Government agent's property and a tax imposed on its operations. While the former was permissible, the latter was constitutionally proscribed. See, e. g., Railroad ; ; see also (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("No tax can be laid upon th[e] franchises or operations [of government instrumentalities], but their local property is subject to non-discriminating state taxation"). Thus, although this Court held as early as 1904 that States could impose a property tax on a bankruptcy estate, see other courts reasonably concluded that the State could not tax the operations of the bankruptcy trustee. See, e. g., In re Flatbush Gum Co., cert. denied sub nom. New In however, this Court rejected the distinction between a tax on the property of an agent and a tax on the agent's operations. With the Court's decision in Dravo Contracting, "the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity started a long path in decline and [it] has now been `thoroughly repudiated.' " Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New ante, at 174 ). "[U]nder current intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine the States can never tax the United States directly but can *849 tax any private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with whom it deals." Absolute tax immunity is appropriate only when the tax is on the United States itself "or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned." United It is evident that whatever immunity the bankruptcy estate once enjoyed from taxation on its operations has long since eroded and that there is now no constitutional impediment to the imposition of a sales tax or use tax on a liquidation sale. There is no claim, nor could there be, that the tax discriminates against bankruptcy trustees or those with whom they deal. As Judge Augustus Hand observed on similar facts in |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112279/california-state-bd-of-equalization-v-sierra-summit-inc/ | deal. As Judge Augustus Hand observed on similar facts in 1936: "The purchaser at the judicial sale was only required to pay the same tax he would have been bound to pay if he had purchased from anyone else." In re Leavy, (CA2).[4] Nor is the bankruptcy trustee so closely connected to the Federal Government that the two "cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities." United at The bankruptcy trustee is "the representative of the estate [of the debtor]," 11 U.S. C. 323(a); cf. Commodity Futures Trading not "an arm of the Government," Department of and the tax on the estate is an administrative *850 expense of the debtor, not of the Federal Government, 11 U.S. C. 503(b)(1)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Cf.[5] For the purposes of absolute tax immunity under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, there is no material distinction between those municipal and state withholding and property taxes on the bankruptcy trustee which we have upheld, see ; and the tax on the liquidation sale presented here.[6] The Goggin courts also based their proscription of state sales and use taxes on an implied prohibition that they found *851 in 28 U.S. C. 960.[7] The Goggin II court read 960 as setting forth "the sole area where the state is permitted to impose a tax of any type" and reasoned that because Congress had not specifically granted the States authority to impose sales and use taxes on liquidation, "essential sales in liquidation [were] inevitably free from such imposition." That view is contrary to our general approach to claims that the States' power to tax have been pre-empted and to the plain meaning and legislative history of this particular statutory provision. Although Congress can confer an immunity from state taxation, see ; First Agricultural Nat. 392 U.S. 9 ; United we have stated that "[a] court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from *852 state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed," Rockford Life Ins. See also Oklahoma Tax ; Section 960 is not such a clear expression of an exemption from state taxation. It was passed in at the height of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, in response to a Federal District Court decision holding that a bankruptcy receiver operating a gasoline and oil distributing business was not liable as a matter of state law for a state sales tax on motor fuel. See H. R. Rep. No. 1138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. ; S. Rep. No. 2, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.[8] Read most naturally, the statute evinces an intention that a State be permitted |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112279/california-state-bd-of-equalization-v-sierra-summit-inc/ | the statute evinces an intention that a State be permitted to tax a bankruptcy estate notwithstanding any intergovernmental immunity objection that might be interposed, cf. and that, as a matter of federal law, "a business in receivership, or conducted under court order, should be subject to the same tax liability as the owner would have been if in possession and operating the enterprise,"[9] The statute "indicates a Congressional purpose *853 to facilitate not to obstruct enforcement of state laws." Nothing in the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, or the structure of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that Congress intended to exclude taxes on the liquidation process from those taxes the States may impose on the bankruptcy estate. Eighty-five years ago, in we held that property in the hands of a bankruptcy trustee was subject to taxation by state and municipal authorities. The appellant in that case argued, in much the same manner as respondent does here, that the transfer of assets to a bankruptcy trustee vested the Federal Government with exclusive control of the bankruptcy estate and that "no other sovereignty, be it State or foreign, is permitted to exercise any power that burdens or in any manner interferes with the distribution prescribed by the act." Statement, Specification of Error and Argument for Appellant in O. T. 1902, No. 238, p. 4. We responded that "[b]y the transfer to the trustee no mysterious or peculiar ownership or qualities are given to the property," and that "there is nothing in that to withdraw it from the necessity of protection by the State and municipality, or which should exempt *854 it from its obligations to either." If Congress wished to declare otherwise, its intent would have to "be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt." The law that has intervened in the last 85 years, rejecting any distinction between a tax on property and a tax on operations, only gives force to our conclusion that the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine does not proscribe the tax sought to be assessed here. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
per_curiam | 1,984 | 200 | per_curiam | Escambia County v. McMillan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111140/escambia-county-v-mcmillan/ | This appeal presents questions as to the appropriate standards of proof and appropriate remedy in suits that allege a violation of voting rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not reach these questions, however, as it appears that the judgment under review may rest alternatively upon a statutory ground of decision. I Appellees, black voters of Escambia County, Fla., filed suit in the District Court, alleging that the at-large system for electing the five members of the Board of County Commissioners violated appellees' rights under the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1971(a)(1), and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1973.[1] Appellees contended that the at-large system operated to "dilute" their voting strength. See, e. g., The District Court entered judgment for appellees. That court found that the at-large system used by the county discriminated against black voters and had been retained at least in part for discriminatory purposes. The court concluded that the system violated appellees' rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act. The District Court ordered that the five commissioners be elected from single-member districts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that the at-large election system violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the District Court's *50 remedy was appropriate.[2] As the finding of a Fourteenth Amendment violation was adequate to support the District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals did not review the District Court's conclusion that the at-large system also violated the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.[3]Id., at 961, n. 2. We noted probable jurisdiction,[4] *51 II This appeal presents the question whether the evidence of discriminatory intent in the record before the District Court was adequate to support the finding that the at-large system violated the Fourteenth Amendment. We decline to decide this question. As the Court of Appeals noted, the District Court's judgment rested alternatively upon the Voting Rights Act. See n. 2; App. to Juris. Statement 101a. Moreover, the amendments to that Act, Pub. L. 97-205, 3, 42 U.S. C. 1973(b),[5] were not before the Court of Appeals. Affirmance on the statutory ground would moot the constitutional issues presented by the case. It is a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case. See The parties have not briefed the statutory question, and, in any event, that question should be decided |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | I agree with the Court that this case is indistinguishable from If the special trial judges in were “Officers of the United States,” Art. II, cl. 2, then so are the administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Moving forward, however, this Court will not be able to decide every Appointments Clause case by comparing it to And, as the Court acknowledges, our precedents in this area do not provide much guidance. See ante, at 6. While precedents like discuss what is sufficient to make someone an officer of the United States, our prece- dents have never clearly defined what is necessary. I would resolve that question based on the original public meaning of “Officers of the United States.” To the Found- ers, this term encompassed all federal civil officials “ ‘with responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty.’ ” NLRB v. SW Inc., 580 U. S. (2017) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 4); Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”? (Mascott).1 —————— 1 I address only the dividing line between “Officers of the United States,” who are subject to the Appointments Clause, and nonofficer 2 LUCIA v. SEC THOMAS, J., concurring The Appointments Clause provides the exclusive process for appointing “Officers of the United States.” See SW at (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 1). While principal officers must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, Congress can authorize the appointment of “inferior Officers” by “the President alone,” “the Courts of Law,” or “the Heads of Departments.” Art. II, cl. 2. This alternative process for appointing inferior officers strikes a balance between efficiency and accountability. Given the sheer number of inferior officers, it would be too burdensome to require each of them to run the gauntlet of Senate confirmation. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–510 ; 2 Records of the Federal Con- vention of 1787, pp. 627–628 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). But, by specifying only a limited number of actors who can appoint inferior officers without Senate confirmation, the Appointments Clause maintains clear lines of accountabil- ity—encouraging good appointments and giving the public someone to blame for bad ones. See The Federalist No. 76, p. 455 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); Wilson, Lec- tures on Law: Government, in 1 The Works of James Wilson 343, 359–361 (J. Andrews ed., 1896). The Founders likely understood the term “Officers of the United States” to encompass all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how im- portant or significant the duty. See Mascott 454. “Officers of the United |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | significant the duty. See Mascott 454. “Officers of the United States” was probably not a term of art that the Constitution used to signify some special type of offi- cial. Based on how the Founders used it and similar terms, the phrase “of the United States” was merely a —————— employees, who are not. I express no view on the meaning of “Office” or “Officer” in any other provision of the Constitution, or the difference between principal officers and inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. Cite as: 585 U. S. 3 THOMAS, J., concurring synonym for “federal,” and the word “Office[r]” carried its ordinary meaning. See at 471–479. The ordinary meaning of “officer” was anyone who performed a continu- ous public duty. See 4–507; e.g., United States v. Maurice, (No. 15,747) (CC Va. 1823) (defining officer as someone in “ ‘a public charge or em- ployment’ ” who performed a “continuing” duty); 8 Annals of Cong. 2304–2305 (1799) (statement of Rep. Harper) (explaining that the word officer “is derived from the Latin word officium” and “includes all persons holding posts which require the performance of some public duty”). For federal officers, that duty is “established by Law”—that is, by statute. Art. II, cl. 2. The Founders considered individuals to be officers even if they performed only ministerial statutory duties—including recordkeepers, clerks, and tidewaiters (individuals who watched goods land at a customhouse). See Mascott 484–507. Early congressional practice reflected this understanding. With exceptions not relevant here,2 Congress required all fed- eral officials with ongoing statutory duties to be appointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause. See at 507–545. Applying the original meaning here, the administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission easily qualify as “Officers of the United States.” These judges exercise many of the agency’s statutory duties, including issuing initial decisions in adversarial proceed- ings. See 15 U.S. C. 200.30– 9 (2017). As explained, the importance or significance of these statutory duties is irrelevant. All that matters is that the judges are continuously responsible for perform- —————— 2 The First Congress exempted certain officials with ongoing statu- tory duties, such as deputies and military officers, from the requirements of the Appointments Clause. But these narrow exceptions do not disprove the rule, as background principles of founding-era law explain each of them. See Mascott 480–483, 515–530. 4 LUCIA v. SEC THOMAS, J., concurring ing them. In short, the administrative law judges of the Securities Exchange Commission are “Officers of the United States” under the original meaning of the Appointments Clause. They have “ ‘responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty,’ |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | Clause. They have “ ‘responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty,’ ” which is sufficient to resolve this case. SW 580 U. S., at (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4). Be- cause the Court reaches the same conclusion by correctly applying I join its opinion. Cite as: 585 U. S. 1 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17– RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [June 21, 2018] JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join as to Part III, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not properly appoint the Administrative Law Judge who presided over petitioner Lucia’s hearing. But I disagree with the majority in respect to two matters. First, I would rest our conclusion upon statutory, not constitutional, grounds. I believe it important to do so because I cannot answer the constitutional question that the majority answers without knowing the answer to a different, embedded constitutional question, which the Solicitor urged us to answer in this case: the constitutionality of the statutory “for cause” removal protections that Congress provided for administrative law judges. Cf. Free Enterprise Second, I disagree with the Court in respect to the proper remedy. I The relevant statute here is the Administrative Proce- dure Act. That Act governs the appointment of adminis- trative law judges. It provides (as it has, in substance, since its enactment in 19) that “[e]ach agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are neces- 2 LUCIA v. SEC BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part sary for” hearings governed by the Administrative Proce- dure Act. 5 U.S. C. see also Administrative Proce- dure Act, (original version, which refers to “examiners” as administrative law judges were then called). In the case of the Securities and Exchange Com- mission, the relevant “agency” is the Commission itself. But the Commission did not appoint the Administrative Law Judge who presided over Lucia’s hearing. Rather, the Commission’s staff appointed that Administrative Law Judge, without the approval of the Commissioners them- selves. See ante, at 1; App. to Pet. for Cert. 298a–299a. I do not believe that the Administrative Procedure Act permits the Commission to delegate its power to appoint its administrative law judges to its staff. We have held that, for purposes of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, the Commission |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | that, for purposes of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, the Commission itself is a “ ‘Hea[d]’ ” of a “ ‘De- partmen[t].’ ” Free Enterprise at 512–513. Thus, reading the statute as referring to the Commission itself, and not to its staff, avoids a difficult constitutional question, namely, the very question that the Court an- swers today: whether the Commission’s administrative law judges are constitutional “inferior Officers” whose appointment Congress may vest only in the President, the “Courts of Law,” or the “Heads of Departments.” Art. II, cl. 2; see United 401 (1916) (“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitu- tional but also grave doubts upon that score”). I have found no other statutory provision that would permit the Commission to delegate the power to appoint its administrative law judges to its staff. The statute establishing and governing the Commission does allow the Commission to “delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions to a division of the Commission, an indi- vidual Commissioner, an administrative law judge, or an employee or employee board.” 15 U.S. C. But Cite as: 585 U. S. 3 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part this provision requires a “published order or rule,” and the Commission here published no relevant delegating order or rule. Rather, Lucia discovered the Commission’s ap- pointment system for administrative law judges only when the Commission’s enforcement division staff filed an affi- davit in this case describing that staff-based system. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 295a–299a. Regardless, the same constitutional-avoidance reasons that should inform our construction of the Administrative Procedure Act should also lead us to interpret the Commission’s general delega- tion authority as excluding the power to delegate to staff the authority to appoint its administrative law judges, so as to avoid the constitutional question the Court reaches in this case. See Jin Fuey The analysis may differ for other agencies that employ administrative law judges. Each agency’s governing stat- ute is different, and some, unlike the Commission’s, may allow the delegation of duties without a published order or rule. See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. (applicable to the Social Security Administration). Similarly, other agencies’ administrative law judges perform distinct functions, and their means of appointment may therefore not raise the constitutional questions that inform my reading of the relevant statutes here. The upshot, in my view, is that for statutory, not consti- tutional, reasons, the Commission did not lawfully appoint the Administrative Law Judge here at issue. And this Court should decide |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | Law Judge here at issue. And this Court should decide no more than that. II A The reason why it is important to go no further arises from the holding in a case this Court decided eight years ago, Free Enterprise The case concerned statutory provisions protecting members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board from removal 4 LUCIA v. SEC BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part without cause. The Court held in that case that the Exec- utive Vesting Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, (“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”), forbade Congress from provid- ing members of the Board with “multilevel protection from removal” by the President. Free Enterprise 561 U.S., 4; see (“Congress cannot limit the President’s authority” by providing “two levels of protec- tion from removal for those who exercise significant executive power”). But see –549 (BREYER, J., dissenting). Because, in the Court’s view, the relevant statutes (1) granted the Securities and Exchange Commis- sioners protection from removal without cause, (2) gave the Commissioners sole authority to remove Board mem- bers, and (3) protected Board members from removal without cause, the statutes provided Board members with two levels of protection from removal and consequently violated the Constitution. at 495–498. In addressing the constitutionality of the Board mem- bers’ removal protections, the Court emphasized that the Board members were “executive officers”—more specifically, “inferior officers” for purposes of the Appointments Clause. E.g., at 492–495, 504–505. The significance of that fact to the Court’s analysis is not entirely clear. The Court said: “The parties here concede that Board members are executive ‘Officers’, as that term is used in the Consti- tution. We do not decide the status of other Govern- ment employees, nor do we decide whether ‘lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States’ must be subject to the same sort of control as those who exercise ‘significant authority pursuant to the laws.’ ” (quoting Buck v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, and n. 162 (1976) (per curiam); citations omitted). Cite as: 585 U. S. 5 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part Thus, the Court seemed not only to limit its holding to the Board members themselves, but also to suggest that Gov- ernment employees who were not officers would be distin- guishable from the Board members on that ground alone. For present purposes, however, the implications of Free Enterprise ’s technical-sounding holding about “mul- tilevel protection from removal” remain potentially dra- The same statute, the Adminis- trative Procedure Act, |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | potentially dra- The same statute, the Adminis- trative Procedure Act, that provides that the “agency” will appoint its administrative law judges also protects the administrative law judges from removal without cause. In particular, the statute says that an “action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is em- ployed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board.” 5 U.S. C. As with appointments, this provision constituted an im- portant part of the Administrative Procedure Act when it was originally enacted in 19. See The Administrative Procedure Act thus allows adminis- trative law judges to be removed only “for good cause” found by the Merit Systems Protection Board. And the President may, in turn, remove members of the Merit Systems Protection Board only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 202(d). Thus, Congress seems to have provided administrative law judges with two levels of protection from removal without cause—just what Free Enterprise interpreted the Constitution to forbid in the case of the Board members. The substantial independence that the Administrative Procedure Act’s removal protections provide to adminis- trative law judges is a central part of the Act’s overall 6 LUCIA v. SEC BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part scheme. See ; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, Before the Administra- tive Procedure Act, hearing examiners “were in a depend- ent status” to their employing agency, with their classifi- cation, compensation, and promotion all dependent on how the agency they worked for rated them. Ramspeck, 345 U.S., at As a result of that dependence, “[m]any complaints were voiced against the actions of the hearing examiners, it being charged that they were mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and recommen- dations.” The Administrative Procedure Act responded to those complaints by giving administrative law judges “independence and tenure within the existing Civil Service system.” ; cf. Wong Yang Sung, at 41– (referring to removal protections as among the Administrative Procedure Act’s “safeguards in- tended to ameliorate” the perceived “evils” of commingling of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions in agencies). If the Free Enterprise Court’s holding applies equally to the administrative law judges—and I stress the “if ”—then to hold that the administrative law judges are “Officers of the United States” is, perhaps, to hold that their removal protections are unconstitutional. This would risk transforming administrative |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | their removal protections are unconstitutional. This would risk transforming administrative law judges from independent adjudicators into dependent decisionmakers, serving at the pleasure of the Commission. Similarly, to apply Free Enterprise ’s holding to high-level civil servants threatens to change the nature of our merit- based civil service as it has existed from the time of Presi- dent Chester Alan Arthur. See Free Enterprise 561 U.S., at 540–542 (BREYER, J., dissenting). I have stressed the words “if ” and “perhaps” in the previous paragraph because Free Enterprise ’s hold- ing may not invalidate the removal protections applicable Cite as: 585 U. S. 7 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part to the Commission’s administrative law judges even if the judges are inferior “officers of the United States” for pur- poses of the Appointments Clause. In my dissent in Free Enterprise I pointed out that under the majority’s analysis, the removal protections applicable to administra- tive law judges—including specifically the Commission’s administrative law judges—would seem to be unconstitu- tional. But the Court disagreed, saying that “none of the positions [my dissent] identifie[d] are similarly situated to the Board.” The Free Enterprise Court gave three reasons why administrative law judges were distinguishable from the Board members at issue in that case. First, the Court said that “[w]hether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the United States’ is disputed.” n. 10. Second, the Court said that “unlike members of the Board, many administrative law judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions, see [5 U.S. C.] 3105, or possess purely recommendatory powers.” And, third, the Court pointed out that the civil service “employees” and adminis- trative law judges to whom I referred in my dissent do not “enjoy the same significant and unusual protections from Presidential oversight as members of the Board.” at 506. The Court added that the kind of “for cause” protec- tion the statutes provided for Board members was “un- usually high.” The majority here removes the first distinction, for it holds that the Commission’s administrative law judges are inferior “Officers of the United States.” Ante, at 1. The other two distinctions remain. See, e.g., (holding that Con- gress is free to protect bodies tasked with “ ‘adjudicat[ing] according to law’ ‘from the control or coercive influ- ence, direct or indirect,’ of either the Executive or Congress”) ). But the Solicitor has nevertheless argued strongly that we should now decide the constitutionality of the administrative law judges’ removal protections as well as their means of appoint- ment. And in his view, the administrative law |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | of appoint- ment. And in his view, the administrative law judges’ statutory removal protections violate the Constitution (as interpreted in Free Enterprise ), unless we construe those protections as giving the Commission substantially greater power to remove administrative law judges than it presently has. See Merits Brief for Respondent 45–55. On the Solicitor ’s account, for the administra- tive law judges’ removal protections to be constitutional, the Commission itself must have the power to remove administrative law judges “for failure to follow lawful instructions or perform adequately.” The Merit Systems Protection Board would then review only the Commission’s factfinding, and not whether the facts (as found) count as “good cause” for removal. at 52–53. This technical-sounding standard would seem to weaken the administrative law judges’ “for cause” removal protec- tions considerably, by permitting the Commission to re- move an administrative law judge with whose judgments it disagrees—say, because the judge did not find a securities- law violation where the Commission thought there was one, or vice versa. In such cases, the law allows the Commission to overrule an administrative law judge’s findings, for the decision is ultimately the Commission’s. See 15 U.S. C. But it does not allow the Com- mission to fire the administrative law judge. See 5 U.S. C. And now it should be clear why the application of Free Enterprise to administrative law judges is im- portant. If that decision does not limit or forbid Congress’ statutory “for cause” protections, then a holding that the administrative law judges are “inferior Officers” does not conflict with Congress’ intent as revealed in the statute. Cite as: 585 U. S. 9 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part But, if the holding is to the contrary, and more particularly if a holding that administrative law judges are “inferior Officers” brings with it application of Free Enterprise ’s limitation on “for cause” protections from removal, then a determination that administrative law judges are, constitutionally speaking, “inferior Officers” would directly conflict with Congress’ intent, as revealed in the statute. In that case, it would be clear to me that Congress did not intend that consequence, and that it therefore did not intend to make administrative law judges “inferior Offi- cers” at all. B Congress’ intent on the question matters, in my view, because the Appointments Clause is properly understood to grant Congress a degree of leeway as to whether partic- ular Government workers are officers or instead mere employees not subject to the Appointments Clause. The words “by Law” appear twice in the Clause. It says that the President |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | appear twice in the Clause. It says that the President (“with the Advice and Consent of the Sen- ate”) shall appoint “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, which shall be estab- lished by Law.” Art. II, cl. 2 It then adds that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi- dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De- partments.” The use of the words “by Law” to describe the estab- lishment and means of appointment of “Officers of the United States,” together with the fact that Article I of the Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress, suggests that (other than the officers the Constitution specifically lists) Congress, not the Judicial Branch alone, must play a major role in determining who is an “Office[r] of the United States.” And Congress’ intent in this specific 10 LUCIA v. SEC BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part respect is often highly relevant. Congress’ leeway is not, of course, absolute—it may not, for example, say that positions the Constitution itself describes as “Officers” are not “Officers.” But given the constitutional language, the Court, when deciding whether other positions are “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause, should give substantial weight to Congress’ decision. How is the Court to decide whether Congress intended that the holder of a particular Government position count as an “Office[r] of the United States”? Congress might, of course, write explicitly into the statute that the employee “is an officer of the United States under the Appointments Clause,” but an explicit phrase of this kind is unlikely to appear. If it does not, then I would approach the question like any other difficult question of statutory interpreta- tion. Several considerations, among others, are likely to be relevant. First, as the Court said in and repeats today, ante, at 6, where Congress grants an appointee “ ‘signifi- cant authority pursuant to the laws to the United States,’ ” that supports the view that (but should not determinatively decide that) Congress made that appointee an “Office[r] of the United States.” at (quoting Buck- ); see also United (holding that the term “officer” “embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties”). The means of appointment that Congress chooses is also instructive. Where Congress provides a method of appointment that mimics a method the Appointments Clause allows for “Officers,” that fact too supports the view that (but does not determinatively |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | fact too supports the view that (but does not determinatively decide that) Con- gress viewed the position as one to be held by an “Officer,” and vice versa. See at 509–. And the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise suggests a third indica- tion of “Officer” status—did Congress provide the position with removal protections that would be unconstitutional if Cite as: 585 U. S. 11 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part provided for an “Officer”? See 561 U.S., That fact would support (but again not be determinative of) the opposite view—that Congress did not intend to confer “inferior Officer” status on the position. As I said, these statutory features, while highly rele- vant, need not always prove determinative. The vast number of different civil service positions, with different tasks, different needs, and different requirements for independence, mean that this is not the place to lay down bright-line rules. Rather, as this Court has said, “[t]he versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural desire for definitiveness” in this area. No case from this Court holds that Congress lacks this sort of constitutional leeway in determining whether a particular Government position will be filled by an “Of- fice[r] of the United States.” To the contrary, while we have repeatedly addressed whether particular officials are “Officers,” in all cases but one, we have upheld the ap- pointment procedures Congress enacted as consistent with the Appointments Clause. See, e.g., (holding that Congress’ appointment procedure for military court judges “is in conformity with the Appointments Clause of the Constitu- tion”); at 888–891 (same as to special trial judges of the Tax Court); (1901) (same as to district court “commissioners”); Ex parte Siebold, (same as to “supervisors of election”). But see Buck, at 124–137. The one exception was Buck, –137, in which the Court set aside Congress’ prescribed appoint- ment method for some members of the Federal Election Commission—appointment by Congress itself—as incon- sistent with the Appointments Clause. But Buck in- volved Federal Election Commission members with enor- mous powers. They had “primary and substantial 12 LUCIA v. SEC BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part responsibility for administering and enforcing the” Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, an “intricate statutory scheme to regulate federal election cam- paigns,” They had “extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers,” ; the power to enforce the law through civil lawsuits, ; and the power to disqualify a candidate from running for federal office, at 112–113. Federal Election Commissioners thus had powers akin to the “principal Officer[s]” of an Executive Department, whom the Constitution expressly refers |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | Officer[s]” of an Executive Department, whom the Constitution expressly refers to as “Officers,” see Art. II, cl. 1. It is not surprising that Congress exceeded any leeway the Appointments Clause granted when it deviated from the Clause’s appointments’ methods in respect to an office with powers very similar to those of the Officers listed in the Constitution itself. Thus, neither Buck nor any other case forecloses an interpretation of the Appointments Clause that focuses principally on whether the relevant statutes show that Congress intended that a particular Government position be held by an “Office[r] of the United States.” Adopting such an approach, I would not answer the question whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s administrative law judges are constitutional “Officers” without first decid- ing the pre-existing Free Enterprise question— namely, what effect that holding would have on the statu- tory “for cause” removal protections that Congress provided for administrative law judges. If, for example, Free Enter- prise means that saying administrative law judges are “inferior Officers” will cause them to lose their “for cause” removal protections, then I would likely hold that the administrative law judges are not “Officers,” for to say otherwise would be to contradict Congress’ enactment of those protections in the Administrative Procedure Act. In contrast, if Free Enterprise does not mean that an administrative law judge (if an “Office[r] of the United States”) would lose “for cause” protections, then it is more Cite as: 585 U. S. 13 BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part likely that interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act as conferring such status would not run contrary to Con- gress’ intent. In such a case, I would more likely hold that, given the other features of the Administrative Proce- dure Act, Congress did intend to make administrative law judges inferior “Officers of the United States.” III Separately, I also disagree with the majority’s conclu- sion that the proper remedy in this case requires a hearing before a different administrative law judge. Ante, – 13. The Securities and Exchange Commission has now itself appointed the Administrative Law Judge in ques- tion, and I see no reason why he could not rehear the case. After all, when a judge is reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered, typically the judge who rehears the case is the same judge who heard it the first time. The reversal here is based on a technical constitutional question, and the reversal implies no criticism at all of the original judge or his ability to conduct the new proceedings. For him to preside once again would |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | concurring | Lucia v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4509420/lucia-v-sec/ | the new proceedings. For him to preside once again would not violate the structural pur- poses that we have said the Appointments Clause serves, see nor would it, in any obvious way, violate the Due Process Clause. Regardless, this matter was not addressed below and has not been fully argued here. I would, at a minimum, ask the Court of Appeals to examine it on remand rather than decide it here now. That is especially so because the majority seems to state a general rule that a different “Officer” must always preside after an Appointments Clause violation. In a case like this one, that is a relatively minor imposition, because the Commission has other administrative law judges. But in other cases—say, a case adjudicated by an improperly appointed (but since reap- pointed) Commission itself—the “Officer” in question may be the only such “Officer,” so that no substitute will be 14 LUCIA v. SEC BREYER, J., concurring Opinioninofpart and, dissenting BREYER J. in part available. The majority suggests that in such cases, the “rule of necessity” may excuse compliance with its new- found different-“Officer” requirement. Ante, –13, n. 5. But that still does not explain why the Constitution would require a hearing before a different “Officer” at all. * * * The Court’s decision to address the Appointments Clause question separately from the constitutional removal question is proble By considering each question in isolation, the Court risks (should the Court later extend Free Enterprise ) unraveling, step-by-step, the foun- dations of the Federal Government’s administrative adju- dication system as it has existed for decades, and perhaps of the merit-based civil-service system in general. And the Court risks doing so without considering that potential consequence. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment in part and, with respect, I dissent in part. Cite as: 585 U. S. 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17– RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Jenkins v. Anderson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110298/jenkins-v-anderson/ | The question in this case is whether the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility violates either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. I On August 13, 1974, the petitioner stabbed and killed Doyle Redding. The petitioner was not apprehended until he turned himself in to governmental authorities about two weeks later. At his state trial for first-degree murder, the petitioner contended that the killing was in self-defense. The petitioner testified that his sister and her boyfriend were robbed by Redding and another man during the evening of August 12, 1974. The petitioner, who was nearby when the robbery occurred, followed the thieves a short distance and reported their whereabouts to the police. According to the petitioner's testimony, the next day he encountered Redding, *233 who accused him of informing the police of the robbery. The petitioner stated that Redding attacked him with a knife, that the two men struggled briefly, and that the petitioner broke away. On cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that during the struggle he had tried "[t]o push that knife in [Redding] as far as [I] could," App. 36, but maintained that he had acted solely in self-defense. During the cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the petitioner about his actions after the stabbing: "Q. And I suppose you waited for the Police to tell them what happened? "A. No, I didn't. "Q. You didn't? "A. No. "Q. I see. "And how long was it after this day that you were arrested, or that you were taken into custody?" After some discussion of the date on which petitioner surrendered, the prosecutor continued: "Q. When was the first time that you reported the things that you have told us in Court today to anybody? "A. Two days after it happened. "Q. And who did you report it to? "A. To my probation officer. "Q. Well, apart from him? "A. No one. "Q. Who? "A. No one but my "Q. (Interposing) Did you ever go to a Police Officer or to anyone else? "A. No, I didn't. "Q. As a matter of fact, it was two weeks later, wasn't it? "A. Yes." *234 In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor again referred to the petitioner's prearrest silence. The prosecutor noted that petitioner had "waited two weeks, according to the testimony at least two weeks before he did anything about surrendering himself or reporting [the stabbing] to anybody." The prosecutor contended that the petitioner had committed murder in retaliation for the robbery the night before. The petitioner was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 10 to |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Jenkins v. Anderson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110298/jenkins-v-anderson/ | petitioner was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 10 to 1 years' imprisonment in state prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, contending that his constitutional rights were violated when the prosecutor questioned him concerning prearrest silence. A Federal Magistrate concluded that the petition for habeas corpus relief should be denied. The District Court adopted the Magistrate's recommendation. The United Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We now affirm.[1] *23 II At trial the prosecutor attempted to impeach the petitioner's credibility by suggesting that the petitioner would have spoken out if he had killed in self-defense. The petitioner contends that the prosecutor's actions violated the Fifth Amendment as applied to the through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to remain silent during his criminal trial, and prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts the right. In this case, of course, the petitioner did not remain silent throughout the criminal proceedings. Instead, he voluntarily took the witness stand in his own defense. This Court's decision in recognized that the Fifth Amendment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached with his prior silence. The defendant in Raffel was tried twice. At the first trial, a Government agent testified that Raffel earlier had made an inculpatory statement. The defendant did not testify. After the first trial ended in deadlock the agent repeated his testimony at the second trial, and Raffel took the stand to deny making such a statement. Cross-examination revealed that Raffel had not testified at the first trial. n. The Court held that inquiry into prior silence was proper because "[t]he immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering himself as a witness. When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined." Thus, the Raffel Court concluded that the defendant was "subject to cross-examination *236 impeaching his credibility just like any other witness."[2] It can be argued that a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach him. But the Constitution does not forbid "every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights." See The "`threshold question |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Jenkins v. Anderson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110298/jenkins-v-anderson/ | discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights." See The "`threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.'" quoting Crampton v. Ohio, decided with[3] The Raffel Court explicitly *237 rejected the contention that the possibility of impeachment by prior silence is an impermissible burden upon the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights. "We are unable to see that the rule that [an accused who] testifies must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable embarrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify or not."[4] This Court similarly defined the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection in There the Court held that a statement taken in violation of may be used to impeach a defendant's credibility. Rejecting the contention that such impeachment violates the Fifth Amendment, the Court said: "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege *238 cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process." See also U.S. 714, ; In determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice. See and n. 20. Attempted impeachment on cross-examination of a defendant, the practice at issue here, may enhance the reliability of the criminal process. Use of such impeachment on cross-examination allows prosecutors to test the credibility of witnesses by asking them to explain prior inconsistent statements and acts. A defendant may decide not to take the witness stand because of the risk of cross-examination. But this is a choice of litigation tactics. Once a defendant decides to testify, "[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination." Thus, impeachment follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial. We conclude that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility. III The petitioner also contends that use of prearrest silence to impeach his credibility denied him the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not *239 agree. Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Jenkins v. Anderson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110298/jenkins-v-anderson/ | not *239 agree. Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 1042, p. 106 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Each jurisdiction may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative. For example, this Court has exercised its supervisory powers over federal courts to hold that prior silence cannot be used for impeachment where silence is not probative of a defendant's credibility and where prejudice to the defendant might result. See United ; ; 33 U. S., at 424.[] Only in did we find that impeachment by silence violated the Constitution. In that case, a defendant received the warnings required by when he was arrested for selling marihuana. At that time, he made no statements to the police. During his subsequent trial, the defendant testified that he had been framed. The prosecutor impeached the defendant's credibility on cross-examination by revealing that the defendant remained silent after his arrest. The State argued that the prosecutor's actions were permissible, but we concluded that "the Miranda decision compels rejection of the State's position." Miranda *240 warnings inform a person that he has the right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his subsequent decision to remain silent cannot be used against him. Accordingly, "`it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony.'" quoting United[6] In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not present in this case. We hold that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. IV Our decision today does not force any state court to allow impeachment through the use of prearrest silence. Each jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative than prejudicial. We merely conclude that the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not *241 violate the Constitution. The judgment of the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | Two women then resident in New York were married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer returned to their home in New York City. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor sought to claim the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses. She was barred from doing so, however, by a federal law, the Defense of Mar- riage Act, which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of “spouse” as that term is used in federal stat- utes. Windsor paid the taxes but filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of this provision. The United States District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this portion of the statute is unconstitutional and ordered the United States to pay Windsor a refund. This Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment in Windsor’s favor. I In 1996, as some States were beginning to consider the concept of same-sex marriage, see, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 74 2 UNITED and before any State had acted to permit it, Congress enacted the Defense of Mar- riage Act (DOMA), DOMA contains two operative sections: Section 2, which has not been chal- lenged here, allows States to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed under the laws of other States. See 28 U.S. C. Section 3 is at issue here. It amends the Dictionary Act in Title 1, of the United States Code to provide a fed- eral definition of “marriage” and “spouse.” Section 3 of DOMA provides as follows: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Con- gress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus- band and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 1 U.S. C. The definitional provision does not by its terms forbid States from enacting laws permitting same-sex marriages or civil unions or providing state benefits to residents in that status. The enactment’s comprehensive definition of marriage for purposes of all federal statutes and other regulations or directives covered by its terms, however, does control over 1,000 federal laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as a matter of federal law. See GAO, D. Shah, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report 1 Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer met in New York City in 1963 and began a long-term relationship. Windsor and Spyer registered as |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | and began a long-term relationship. Windsor and Spyer registered as domestic partners when New York City gave that right to same-sex couples in Con- cerned about Spyer’s health, the couple made the 2007 trip to Canada for their marriage, but they continued to reside Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court in New York City. The State of New York deems their Ontario marriage to be a valid one. See 177–178 (CA2 2012). Spyer died in February 2009, and left her entire estate to Windsor. Because DOMA denies federal recognition to same-sex spouses, Windsor did not qualify for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax, which excludes from taxation “any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse.” 26 U.S. C. Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought a refund. The Internal Revenue Service de- nied the refund, concluding that, under DOMA, Windsor was not a “surviving spouse.” Windsor commenced this refund suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. She contended that DOMA violates the guarantee of equal protection, as applied to the Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment. While the tax refund suit was pending, the Attorney General of the United States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U.S. C. that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA’s Noting that “the Depart- ment has previously defended DOMA against chal- lenges involving legally married same-sex couples,” App. 184, the Attorney General informed Congress that “the President has concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifi- cations based on sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.” The De- partment of Justice has submitted many letters over the years refusing to defend laws it deems unconsti- tutional, when, for instance, a federal court has rejected the Government’s defense of a statute and has issued a judgment against it. This case is unusual, however, be- cause the letter was not preceded by an adverse 4 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court judgment. The letter instead reflected the Executive’s own conclusion, relying on a definition still being debated and considered in the courts, that heightened equal pro- tection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orienta Although “the President instructed the Department not to defend the statute in Windsor,” he also decided “that Section 3 will continue to be enforced by the Execu- tive Branch” and that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | to be enforced by the Execu- tive Branch” and that the United States had an “interest in providing Congress a full and fair opportunity to partic- ipate in the litigation of those cases.” –193. The stated rationale for this dual-track procedure (determina- tion of unconstitutionality coupled with ongoing enforce- ment) was to “recogniz[e] the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.” In response to the notice from the Attorney General, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives voted to intervene in the litigation to defend the constitutionality of of DOMA. The Depart- ment of Justice did not oppose limited intervention by BLAG. The District Court denied BLAG’s motion to enter the suit as of right, on the rationale that the United States already was represented by the Department of Justice. The District Court, however, did grant intervention by BLAG as an interested party. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). On the merits of the tax refund suit, the District Court ruled against the United States. It held that of DOMA is unconstitutional and ordered the Treasury to refund the tax with interest. Both the Justice Department and BLAG filed notices of appeal, and the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari before judgment. Before this Court acted on the petition, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It applied heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, as both the Department and Windsor had Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court urged. The United States has not complied with the judg- ment. Windsor has not received her refund, and the Ex- ecutive Branch continues to enforce of DOMA. In granting certiorari on the question of the constitu- tionality of of DOMA, the Court requested argument on two additional questions: whether the United States’ agreement with Windsor’s legal position precludes further review and whether BLAG has standing to appeal the case. All parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case; and, with the case in that framework, the Court appointed Professor Vicki Jackson as amicus curiae to argue the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 568 U. S. (2012). She has ably discharged her duties. In an unrelated case, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the First Circuit has also held of DOMA to be unconstitutional. A petition for certiorari has been filed in that case. Pet. for Cert. in Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group v. Gill, O. T. 2012, No. 12–13. II It is appropriate |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | Gill, O. T. 2012, No. 12–13. II It is appropriate to begin by addressing whether either the Government or BLAG, or both of them, were entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeals and later to seek certio- rari and appear as parties here. There is no dispute that when this case was in the District Court it presented a concrete disagreement be- tween opposing parties, a dispute suitable for judicial resolu “[A] taxpayer has standing to challenge the collection of a specific tax assessment as unconstitutional; being forced to pay such a tax causes a real and immediate economic injury to the individual taxpayer.” (2007) (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). Windsor suffered a redressable injury when she was required to pay estate taxes from which, in her view, she was exempt 6 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court but for the alleged invalidity of of DOMA. The decision of the Executive not to defend the constitu- tionality of in court while continuing to deny refunds and to assess deficiencies does introduce a complica Even though the Executive’s current position was an- nounced before the District Court entered its judgment, the Government’s agreement with Windsor’s position would not have deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the refund suit; for her injury (fail- ure to obtain a refund allegedly required by law) was concrete, persisting, and unredressed. The Government’s position—agreeing with Windsor’s legal contention but refusing to give it effect—meant that there was a justicia- ble controversy between the parties, despite what the claimant would find to be an inconsistency in that stance. Windsor, the Government, BLAG, and the amicus appear to agree upon that point. The disagreement is over the standing of the parties, or aspiring parties, to take an appeal in the Court of Appeals and to appear as parties in further proceedings in this Court. The amicus’ position is that, given the Government’s concession that is unconstitutional, once the District Court ordered the refund the case should have ended; and the amicus argues the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal. The amicus submits that once the President agreed with Windsor’s legal position and the District Court issued its judgment, the parties were no longer adverse. From this standpoint the United States was a prevailing party below, just as Windsor was. Ac- cordingly, the amicus reasons, it is inappropriate for this Court to grant certiorari and proceed to rule on the merits; for the United States seeks no redress from the judgment entered against it. This position, however, elides the distinction between |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | entered against it. This position, however, elides the distinction between two principles: the jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on its exercise. See Warth v. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court Seldin, The latter are “essen- tially matters of judicial self-governance.” The Court has kept these two strands separate: “Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s case-or- controversy requirement, see ; and prudential standing, which embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exer- cise of federal jurisdiction,’ Allen [v. Wright,] 468 U. S. [737,] 751 [(1984)].” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, The requirements of Article III standing are familiar: “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural or hypothetical.” ’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not th[e] result [of] the independ- ent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘specu- lative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favor- able decision.’ ” at 560–561 (footnote and citations omitted). Rules of prudential standing, by contrast, are more flex- ible “rule[s] of federal appellate practice,” Deposit Guaranty Nat. designed to protect the courts from “decid[ing] abstract questions of wide public significance even [when] other governmental institutions may be more competent to ad- dress the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.” Warth, In this case the United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal and in pro- 8 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court ceedings before this Court. The judgment in question orders the United States to pay Windsor the refund she seeks. An order directing the Treasury to pay money is “a real and immediate economic injury,” Hein, 551 U. S., at indeed as real and immediate as an order directing an individual to pay a tax. That the Executive may wel- come this order to pay the refund if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it wants does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it is not. The judgment orders the United States to pay money that it would not disburse but for the court’s order. The Government of the United States has a valid legal argument that it |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | the United States has a valid legal argument that it is injured even if the Execu- tive disagrees with of DOMA, which results in Wind- sor’s liability for the tax. Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay thus estab- lishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdic It would be a different case if the Executive had taken the further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she was entitled under the District Court’s ruling. This Court confronted a comparable case in INS v. Chadha, A statute by its terms allowed one House of Congress to order the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deport the respondent Chadha. There, as here, the Executive determined that the statute was unconstitutional, and “the INS presented the Executive’s views on the constitutionality of the House action to the Court of Appeals.” The INS, however, continued to abide by the statute, and “the INS brief to the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency’s decision to comply with the House action ordering depor- tation of Chadha.” This Court held “that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals deci- sion prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take,” ibid., regardless of whether the agency welcomed the judgment. The necessity of a “case or controversy” to Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court satisfy Article III was defined as a requirement that the Court’s “ ‘decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be deported; if we uphold [the stat- ute], the INS will execute its order and deport him.’ ” at 939–940 ). This conclusion was not dictum. It was a necessary predicate to the Court’s holding that “prior to Congress’ intervention, there was adequate Art. III ad- verseness.” The holdings of cases are instructive, and the words of Chadha make clear its hold- ing that the refusal of the Executive to provide the relief sought suffices to preserve a justiciable dispute as re- quired by Article III. In short, even where “the Govern- ment largely agree[s] with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy,” there is sufficient adverseness and an “adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce the challenged law against that party.” It is true that “[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment afford- ing the relief and cannot appeal from it.” at see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. (2011) (slip op., at 8) (“As |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | v. Greene, 563 U.S. (2011) (slip op., at 8) (“As a matter of practice and prudence, we have generally declined to consider cases at the request of a prevailing party, even when the Constitution allowed us to do so”). But this rule “does not have its source in the jurisdictional limitations of Art. III. In an appropriate case, appeal may be permitted at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the require- ments of Art. III.” at –334. While these principles suffice to show that this case presents a justiciable controversy under Article III, the prudential problems inherent in the Executive’s unusual position require some further discussion. The Executive’s agreement with Windsor’s legal argument raises the risk 10 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court that instead of a “ ‘real, earnest and vital controversy,’ ” the Court faces a “friendly, non-adversary, proceeding [in which] ‘a party beaten in the legislature [seeks to] transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.’ ” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. 345 (1892)). Even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential considerations demand that the Court insist upon “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult consti- tutional questions.” (1962). There are, of course, reasons to hear a case and issue a ruling even when one party is reluctant to prevail in its posi Unlike Article III requirements—which must be satisfied by the parties before judicial consideration is appropriate—the relevant prudential factors that counsel against hearing this case are subject to “countervailing considerations [that] may outweigh the concerns underly- ing the usual reluctance to exert judicial power.” Warth, 422 U. S., –501. One consideration is the extent to which adversarial presentation of the issues is assured by the participation of amici curiae prepared to defend with vigor the constitutionality of the legislative act. With respect to this prudential aspect of standing as well, the Chadha Court encountered a similar situa It noted that “there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of [this case] in the absence of any participant supporting the validity of [the statute]. The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress.” Chadha was not an anomaly in this respect. The Court adopts the practice |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | an anomaly in this respect. The Court adopts the practice of entertaining arguments made by an amicus when the Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court Solicitor General confesses error with respect to a judg- ment below, even if the confession is in effect an admission that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional. See, e.g., In the case now before the Court the attorneys for BLAG present a substantial argument for the constitutionality of of DOMA. BLAG’s sharp adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies the prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree. Were this Court to hold that prudential rules require it to dismiss the case, and, in consequence, that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to dismiss it as well, extensive litigation would ensue. The district courts in 94 districts throughout the Nation would be without precedential guidance not only in tax refund suits but also in cases involving the whole of DOMA’s sweep involving over 1,000 federal statutes and a myriad of federal regulations. For instance, the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, addressing the validity of DOMA in a case involving regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services, likely would be vacated with instructions to dismiss, its ruling and guidance also then erased. See (CA1 2012). Rights and privileges of hundreds of thou- sands of persons would be adversely affected, pending a case in which all prudential concerns about justiciability are absent. That numerical prediction may not be certain, but it is certain that the cost in judicial resources and expense of litigation for all persons adversely affected would be immense. True, the very extent of DOMA’s mandate means that at some point a case likely would arise without the prudential concerns raised here; but the costs, uncertainties, and alleged harm and injuries likely would continue for a time measured in years before the issue is resolved. In these unusual and urgent circum- 12 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court stances, the very term “prudential” counsels that it is a proper exercise of the Court’s responsibility to take juris- dic For these reasons, the prudential and Article III requirements are met here; and, as a consequence, the Court need not decide whether BLAG would have stand- ing to challenge the District Court’s ruling and its affir- mance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authority. The Court’s conclusion that this petition may be heard on the merits does not imply that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | may be heard on the merits does not imply that no difficulties would ensue if this were a common practice in ordinary cases. The Executive’s failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory not yet established in judicial decisions has created a procedural dilemma. On the one hand, as noted, the Government’s agreement with Windsor raises questions about the pro- priety of entertaining a suit in which it seeks affirmance of an order invalidating a federal law and ordering the United States to pay money. On the other hand, if the Execu- tive’s agreement with a plaintiff that a law is unconsti- tutional is enough to preclude judicial review, then the Supreme Court’s primary role in determining the constitu- tionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plain- tiff who has brought a justiciable legal claim would become only secondary to the President’s. This would undermine the clear dictate of the separation-of-powers principle that “when an Act of Congress is alleged to con- flict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphatically the prov- ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. (2012) (slip op., at 7) (quoting 177 (1803)). Similarly, with respect to the legislative power, when Congress has passed a statute and a Presi- dent has signed it, it poses grave challenges to the separa- tion of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to be able to nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative and without any determination from the Court. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court The Court’s jurisdictional holding, it must be under- scored, does not mean the arguments for dismissing this dispute on prudential grounds lack substance. Yet the difficulty the Executive faces should be acknowledged. When the Executive makes a principled determination that a statute is unconstitutional, it faces a difficult choice. Still, there is no suggestion here that it is appro- priate for the Executive as a matter of course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather than making the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal. The integrity of the political process would be at risk if difficult consti- tutional issues were simply referred to the Court as a routine exercise. But this case is not routine. And the capable defense of the law by BLAG ensures that these prudential issues do not cloud the merits question, which is one of immediate importance to the Federal Govern- ment and to hundreds of thousands |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | to the Federal Govern- ment and to hundreds of thousands of persons. These cir- cumstances support the Court’s decision to proceed to the merits. III When at first Windsor and Spyer longed to marry, nei- ther New York nor any other State granted them that right. After waiting some years, in 2007 they traveled to Ontario to be married there. It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had not even con- sidered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage. For marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the history of civiliza That belief, for many who long have held it, became even more urgent, more cherished when chal- lenged. For others, however, came the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight. Accordingly some States 14 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court concluded that same-sex marriage ought to be given recognition and validity in the law for those same-sex couples who wish to define themselves by their commit- ment to each other. The limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual couples, which for centuries had been deemed both necessary and fundamental, came to be seen in New York and certain other States as an unjust exclusion. Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community. And so New York recog- nized same-sex marriages performed elsewhere; and then it later amended its own marriage laws to permit same- sex marriage. New York, in common with, as of this writ- ing, 11 other States and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of equality with all other married persons. After a statewide deliberative process that enabled its citizens to discuss and weigh arguments for and against same- sex marriage, New York acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected repre- sentatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood. See Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N. Y. Laws 749 (codified at N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | Y. Laws 749 (codified at N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law Ann. 10–b, 13 (West 2013)). Against this background of lawful same-sex marriage in some States, the design, purpose, and effect of DOMA should be considered as the beginning point in deciding whether it is valid under the Constitu By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage, as will be discussed in more detail, has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States. Yet it is further established that Congress, in enacting dis- Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court crete statutes, can make determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges. Just this Term the Court upheld the authority of the Congress to pre-empt state laws, allowing a former spouse to retain life insurance proceeds under a federal program that gave her priority, because of formal beneficiary designation rules, over the wife by a second marriage who survived the husband. Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. (2013); see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, ; Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950). This is one example of the general prin- ciple that when the Federal Government acts in the exer- cise of its own proper authority, it has a wide choice of the mechanisms and means to adopt. See Congress has the power both to ensure efficiency in the administration of its pro- grams and to choose what larger goals and policies to pursue. Other precedents involving congressional statutes which affect marriages and family status further illustrate this point. In addressing the interaction of state domestic relations and federal immigration law Congress deter- mined that marriages “entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the United States] as an immigrant” will not qualify the noncitizen for that status, even if the noncitizen’s marriage is valid and proper for state-law purposes. 8 U.S. C. (2006 ed. and Supp. V). And in establishing income-based criteria for Social Security benefits, Congress decided that although state law would determine in general who qualifies as an applicant’s spouse, common-law marriages also should be recognized, regardless of any particular State’s view on these relationships. 42 U.S. C. Though these discrete examples establish the constitu- tionality of limited federal laws that regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy, DOMA has a far greater reach; for it enacts a directive applicable to 16 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations. And its operation is directed to a class of persons |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | And its operation is directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect. See ; An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection Under the Constitution of the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts no. 09–13; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, (2010); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (West Supp. 2012); Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amend- ment Act of 2009, 57 Dall. C. Reg. 27 (Dec. 18, 2009); N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law Ann. (West Supp. 2013); Wash. Rev. Code (2012); Citizen Initiative, Same- Sex Marriage, Question 1 (Me. 2012) (results online at http: / / w w w.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2012/tab -ref-2012.html (all Internet sources as visited June 18, 2013, and avail- able in Clerk of Court’s case file)); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. (Lexis 2012); An Act to Amend Title 13 of the Delaware Code Relating to Domestic Relations to Provide for Same-Gender Civil Marriage and to Convert Exist- ing Civil Unions to Civil Marriages, 79 Del. Laws ch. 19 (2013); An act relating to marriage; providing for civil marriage between two persons; providing for exemptions and protections based on religious association, 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 74; An Act Relating to Domestic Relations— Persons Eligible to Marry, 2013 Rawle I. Laws ch. 4. In order to assess the validity of that intervention it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and au- thority over marriage as a matter of history and tradi- State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons, see, e.g., ; but, subject to those guarantees, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclu- sive province of the States.” U.S. 393, Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of the Court 404 The recognition of civil marriages is central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents and citizens. See 298 (1942) (“Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domi- ciled within its borders”). The definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the “[p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and the en- forcement of marital responsibilities.” “[T]he states, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce [and] the Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the United States on the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | authority to the Government of the United States on the subject of mar- riage and divorce.” 575 (1906); see also In re Burrus, 593–594 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States”). Consistent with this allocation of authority, the Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state- law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations. In De for example, the Court held that, “[t]o decide who is the widow or wid- ower of a deceased author, or who are his executors or next of kin,” under the Copyright Act “requires a reference to the law of the State which created those legal relation- ships” because “there is no federal law of domestic rela- tions.” In order to respect this principle, the federal courts, as a general rule, do not adjudicate issues of marital status even when there might otherwise be a basis for federal jurisdic See Federal courts will not hear divorce and custody cases even if they arise in diver- sity because of “the virtually exclusive primacy of the 18 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court States in the regulation of domestic relations.” (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). The significance of state responsibilities for the defini- tion and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for “when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.” Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383–384 (1930). Marriage laws vary in some respects from State to State. For example, the required minimum age is 16 in Vermont, but only 13 in New Hampshire. Compare Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, (2012), with N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (West Supp. 2012). Likewise the permissible degree of consanguinity can vary (most States permit first cousins to marry, but a handful— such as Iowa and Washington, see (2009); (2012)—prohibit the practice). But these rules are in every event consistent within each State. Against this background DOMA rejects the long- established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obli- gations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to con- stitutional guarantees, from one State to the next. De- spite these considerations, it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance. The State’s power in defining the marital |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | the federal balance. The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism. Here the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. When the State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community. DOMA, because of Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 19 Opinion of the Court its reach and extent, departs from this history and tra- dition of reliance on state law to define marriage. “ ‘[D]is- criminations of an unusual character especially sug- gest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’ ” v. Evans, ). The Federal Government uses this state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and dis- abilities. That result requires this Court now to address whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment. What the State of New York treats as alike the federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect. In acting first to recognize and then to allow same-sex marriages, New York was responding “to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. (2011) (slip op., at 9). These actions were without doubt a proper exercise of its sovereign authority within our fed- eral system, all in the way that the Framers of the Constitu- tion intended. The dynamics of state government in the federal system are to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant inter- action with each other. The States’ interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits. Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it can form “but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” 567 By its recognition of the validity of same-sex 20 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court marriages performed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, New York |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, New York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished to be mar- ried, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status. This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledg- ment of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages. It reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving under- standing of the meaning of equality. IV DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Gov- ernment. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare con- gressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group. Depart ment of 534–535 (1973). In determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose, “ ‘[d]iscriminations of an un- usual character’ ” especially require careful considera- (quoting at ). DOMA cannot survive under these principles. The responsibility of the States for the regulation of domestic relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal impact the State’s classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its people. DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 21 Opinion of the Court law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States. The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence. The House Report announced its conclusion that “it is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual mar- riage. H. R. 3396 is appropriately entitled the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’ The effort to redefine |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | entitled the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’ The effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to ex- tend to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.” H. R. Rep. No. 104–664, pp. 12–13 The House concluded that DOMA expresses “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexu- ality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo- Christian) morality.” The stated purpose of the law was to promote an “interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.” Were there any doubt of this far-reaching purpose, the title of the Act confirms it: The Defense of Marriage. The arguments put forward by BLAG are just as candid about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about who may be married. As the title and dynamics of the bill indicate, its purpose is to discourage enactment of state same-sex marriage laws and to restrict the freedom and choice of couples married under those laws if they are enacted. The congressional goal was “to put a thumb on the scales and influence a 22 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws.” –13. The Act’s demon- strated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law. This raises a most serious question under the Constitu- tion’s Fifth Amendment. DOMA’s operation in practice confirms this purpose. When New York adopted a law to permit same-sex mar- riage, it sought to eliminate inequality; but DOMA frus- trates that objective through a system-wide enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of fed- eral law. DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code. The particular case at hand concerns the estate tax, but DOMA is more than a simple determi- nation of what should or should not be allowed as an estate tax refund. Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, crimi- nal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits. DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state- sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The prin- cipal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities. By creating two contra- dictory marriage |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | both rights and responsibilities. By creating two contra- dictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect. By this dynamic DOMA under- mines both the public and private significance of state- sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 23 Opinion of the Court and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recogni This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects, see Lawrence, and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives. Under DOMA, same-sex married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and public ways. By its great reach, DOMA touches many aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the profound. It prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining government healthcare benefits they would otherwise receive. See 5 U.S. C. §901(5), 8905. It deprives them of the Bankruptcy Code’s special protec- tions for domestic-support obligations. See 11 U.S. C. 507(a)(1)(A), 523(a)(5), 523(a)(15). It forces them to follow a complicated procedure to file their state and federal taxes jointly. Technical Bulletin TB–55, 2010 Vt. Tax LEXIS 6 (Oct. 7, 2010); Brief for Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae 34. It prohibits them from being buried together in veterans’ cemeteries. National Ceme- tery Administration Directive 3210/1, p. 37 (June 4, 2008). For certain married couples, DOMA’s unequal effects are even more serious. The federal penal code makes it a crime to “assaul[t], kidna[p], or murde[r] a member of the immediate family” of “a United States official, a United States judge, [or] a Federal law enforcement officer,” 18 U.S. C. with the intent to influence or retaliate against that official, Although a “spouse” qualifies as a member of the officer’s “immediate 24 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court family,” DOMA makes this protection inappli- cable to same-sex spouses. DOMA also brings financial harm to children of same- sex couples. It raises the cost of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | children of same- sex couples. It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses. See 26 U.S. C. Treas. Reg. –1 (2012); IRS Private Letter Ruling 9850011 (Sept. 10, 1998). And it denies or re- duces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security. See Social Security Administration, Social Secu- rity Survivors Benefits 5 (2012) (benefits available to a surviving spouse caring for the couple’s child), online at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10084.pdf. DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force. For instance, because it is ex- pected that spouses will support each other as they pursue educational opportunities, federal law takes into consider- ation a spouse’s income in calculating a student’s fed- eral financial aid eligibility. See 20 U.S. C. Same-sex married couples are exempt from this require- ment. The same is true with respect to federal ethics rules. Federal executive and agency officials are prohibit- ed from “participat[ing] personally and substantially” in matters as to which they or their spouses have a financial interest. 18 U.S. C. A similar statute prohibits Senators, Senate employees, and their spouses from ac- cepting high-value gifts from certain sources, see 2 U.S. C. 1–2(a)(1), and another mandates detailed finan- cial disclosures by numerous high-ranking officials and their spouses. See 5 U.S. C. App. (e). Under DOMA, however, these Government-integrity rules do not apply to same-sex spouses. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 25 Opinion of the Court * * * The power the Constitution grants it also restrains. And though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish that the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is unconsti- tutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person pro- tected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. See –500; Adarand Constructors, While the Fifth Amendment itself |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | United States v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/945737/united-states-v-windsor/ | laws. See –500; Adarand Constructors, While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amend- ment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved. The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA in- structs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the mar- riages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its mar- 26 UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR Opinion of the Court riage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 1 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–307 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. EDITH SCHLAIN WINDSOR, IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THEA CLARA SPYER, ET AL. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | concurring | Ballard v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142876/ballard-v-commissioner/ | I concur in the opinion of the Court and note some points that may be considered in further proceedings, after the cases are remanded. The Court is correct, in my view, in holding, first, that Tax Court Rule 183(c) mandates "that deference is due to factfindings made by the [special] trial judge," ante, at 54, and, second, that "it is the Rule 183(b) report that Rule 183(c) instructs the Tax Court judge to review and adopt, modify, or reject," ante, at 58. The latter holding is supported by the most natural reading of the text of Rule 183. Accepting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's contrary construction would require reading the word "report" in subdivisions (b) and (c) to mean *66 two different things. One additional indication in the text, moreover, is contrary to the Commissioner's position. Rule 183(c) authorizes the Tax Court judge to "recommit the report with instructions" to the special trial judge. Recommittal is generally a formal mechanism for initiating reconsideration or other formal action by the initial decisionmaker. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 72(b) ("The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions"); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53(e)(2) (amended 2003) ("The court after hearing may adopt the [special master's] report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions"); cf. Given that Tax Court Rule 183(c) provides a formal channel for the Tax Court judge to send a report back to the special trial judge for reconsideration, it is difficult to interpret the Rule to permit the informal process the Commissioner and the dissenting opinion defend here. If the Tax Court deems it necessary to allow informal consultation and collaboration between the special trial judge and the Tax Court judge, it might design a rule for that process. If, on the other hand, it were to insist on more formality with deference to the special trial judge's report and an obligation on the part of the Tax Court judge to describe the reasons for any substantial departures from the original findings without requiring disclosure of the initial report, that would present a more problematic approach. It is not often that a rule requiring deference to the original factfinder exists, but the affected parties have no means of ensuring its enforcement. That brings us to the questions of how these cases should be resolved on remand and how the current version of the *67 |
Justice Kennedy | 2,005 | 4 | concurring | Ballard v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142876/ballard-v-commissioner/ | on remand and how the current version of the *67 Rule should be interpreted in later cases. As to the former, this question is difficult because we do not know what happened in the Tax Court, a point that is important to underscore here. From a single affidavit, the majority extrapolates "a novel practice" whereby the Tax Court treats the initial special trial judge report as "an in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular judge and the special trial judge." Ante, at 57. I interpret the opinion as indicating that there might be such a practice, not that there is. The dissent, in contrast, appears to assume that any changes to the initial report were the result of reconsideration by the special trial judge or informal suggestions by the Tax Court judge. Post, at 70-71 (opinion of REHNQUIST, C. J.). Given the sparse record before us, I would not be so quick to make either assumption, particularly given that the Commissioner, charged with defending the Tax Court's decision, is no more privy to the inner workings of the Tax Court than we are. Given the lingering uncertainty about whether the initial report was in fact altered or superseded, and the extent of any changes, there are factual questions that still must be resolved. If the initial report was not substantially altered, then there will have been no violation of the Rule. If, on the other hand, substantial revisions were made during a collaborative effort between the special trial judge and the Tax Court judge, the Tax Court might remedy that breach of the Rule in different ways. For instance, it could simply recommit the special trial judge's initial report and start over from there. More likely in these circumstances the remedy would be for the Tax Court to disclose the report that Judge Couvillion submitted on or before September 2, 1998. This leads to the question of how Rule 183 should be interpreted in future cases. Rule 183's requirement of deference to the special trial judge surely implies that the parties to the litigation will have the means of knowing whether deference *68 has been given and of mounting a challenge if it has not. Thus, a reasonable reading of the Rule requires the litigants and the courts of appeals to be able to evaluate any changes made to the findings of fact in the special trial judge's initial report. Including the original findings of fact in the record on appeal would make that possible. All of these matters should be addressed in the first instance by |
per_curiam | 1,982 | 200 | per_curiam | Princeton Univ. v. Schmid | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110640/princeton-univ-v-schmid/ | I Appellee Schmid was arrested and charged with criminal trespass while distributing political materials on the campus of Princeton University. Schmid was not a student at Princeton University. Under University regulations then in effect, members of the public who wished to distribute materials on the campus were required to receive permission from University officials. Appellee was tried in Princeton Borough Municipal Court and on October 20, 1978, the trial judge issued an opinion convicting appellee and fining him $15 plus $10 costs. A de novo trial in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, also resulted in conviction and the same fine was imposed. While appeal was pending to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, the case was certified for review by the New Jersey Supreme Court. That court invited the University to intervene and participate as a party, which it did. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that appellee's rights of speech and assembly under the New Jersey Constitution had been violated. The University filed a notice of appeal and jurisdictional statement. Its claim is that the judgment below deprives it *102 of its rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The State of New Jersey did not file a separate jurisdictional statement but joined in that of the University. We postponed jurisdiction, and now dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. II The State of New Jersey has filed a brief in this Court asking us to review and decide the issues presented, but stating that it "deems it neither necessary nor appropriate to express an opinion on the merits of the respective positions of the private parties to this action." Brief for Appellant State of New Jersey 4. Had the University not been a party to this case in the New Jersey Supreme Court and had the State filed a jurisdictional statement urging reversal, the existence of a case or controversy and of jurisdiction in this Court could not be doubted. However, if the State were the sole appellant and its jurisdictional statement simply asked for review and declined to take a position on the merits, we would have dismissed the appeal for want of a case or controversy. We do not sit to decide hypothetical issues or to give advisory opinions about issues as to which there are not adverse parties before us. See, e. g., Sierra ; Thus the presence of the State of New Jersey in this case does not provide a sound jurisdictional basis for undertaking to decide difficult constitutional issues. |
Subsets and Splits