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per_curiam | 1,982 | 200 | per_curiam | Princeton Univ. v. Schmid | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110640/princeton-univ-v-schmid/ | sound jurisdictional basis for undertaking to decide difficult constitutional issues. Princeton defends its own standing and our jurisdiction on the grounds that it was a party to the case in the New Jersey Supreme Court,[*] that it is bound by the judgment of that *103 court with respect to the validity of its regulations, and that no other forum is available in which to challenge the judgment on federal constitutional grounds. We have determined, however, that we lack jurisdiction with respect to Princeton. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that while the case was pending on appeal, the University substantially amended its regulations governing solicitation, distribution of literature, and similar activities on University property by those not affiliated with the University. 84 N. J., at 539-541, n. 2, -618, n. 2, 633. The opinion below rested on the absence of a reasonable regulatory scheme governing expressional activity on University property, but the regulation at issue is no longer in force. Furthermore, the lower court's opinion was careful not to pass on the validity of the revised regulation under either the Federal or the State Constitution. Thus the issue of the validity of the old regulation is moot, for this case has "lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract questions of law." Princeton does not claim standing on the ground that a private party may intervene and challenge the reversal of a criminal conviction of another party. See Linda R. Its alleged standing in this Court rests on its claim that the judgment below would be res judicata against it and that it has thus finally been deprived of the authority to enforce the regulation as it stood prior to amendment. Since the judgment, however, does not prevent it from having the validity of its new regulation ruled upon in another enforcement action, the University is without standing to invoke our jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. So ordered. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | The Court today holds that a juror who will always impose the death penalty for capital murder is not "impartial" in the sense required by the Sixth Amendment; that the Constitution requires that voir dire directed to this specific "bias" be provided upon the defendant's request; and that the more general questions about "fairness" and ability to "follow the " that were asked during voir dire in this case were inadequate. Because these conclusions seem to me jointly and severally wrong, I dissent. *7 I The Court today reaffirms our oft-repeated holding that the Sixth Amendment (which is binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment) does not require a jury trial at the sentencing phase of a capital case. Ante, at 726. See ; ; ; ; see also In a separate line of cases, however, we have said that the exclusion of persons who merely "express serious reservations about capital punishment" from sentencing juries violates the right to an "impartial jury" under the Sixth Amendment. ; see also ; The two propositions are, of course, contradictory: If capital sentencing is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee, then neither is it subject to the subsidiary requirement that the requisite jury be im The Court effectively concedes that the Sixth Amendment does not apply here, relying instead upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which it says requires that any sentencing jury be "impartial" to the same extent that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury at the guilt phase to be im Ante, at 727. I agree with that. See (sentencing procedures must comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause). I do not agree, however, that unconstitutional "partiality," for either Sixth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment purposes, is established by the fact that a juror's standard of judgmentwhich he applies to the defendant on trial as he would to all others happens to be the standard least favorable to the defense. Assume, for example, a criminal prosecution in which the *74 State plans to prove only elements of circumstantial evidence x, y, and z. Surely counsel for the defendant cannot establish unconstitutional partiality (and hence obtain mandatory recusal) of a juror by getting him to state, on voir dire, that if, in a prosecution for this crime, elements x, y, and z were shown, he would always vote to convict. Such an admission would simply demonstrate that particular juror's standard of judgment regarding how evidence deserves to be weighed and even though application of that standard will, of a certainty, cause the juror to vote |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | standard will, of a certainty, cause the juror to vote to convict in the case at hand, the juror is not therefore "biased" or "partial" in the constitutionally forbidden sense. So also, it seems to me, with jurors' standards of judgment concerning appropriateness of the death penalty. The fact that a particular juror thinks the death penalty proper whenever capital murder is established does not disqualify him. To be sure, the governing sentencing verdicts says that a jury may give less than the death penalty in such circumstances, just as, in the hypothetical case I have propounded, the governing guilt verdicts says that a jury may acquit despite proof of elements x, y, and z. But in neither case does the requirement that a more defense-favorable option be left available to the jury convert into a requirement that all jurors must, on the facts of the case, be amenable to entertaining that option. A State in which the jury does the sentencing no more violates the due process requirement of impartiality by allowing the seating of jurors who favor the death penalty than does a State with judge-imposed sentencing by permitting the people to elect (or the executive to appoint) judges who favor the death penalty. Cf. United ; United cert. denied, ; United ; 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 2.4(b), p. 747 (adherence to a particular legal principle is not a basis for challenging impartiality *742 of a judge). Indeed, it is precisely because such individual juror "biases" are constitutionally permissible that imposed the limitation that a State may not skew the makeup of the jury as a whole by excluding all death-scrupled -523. II In the Court's view, a juror who will always impose the death penalty upon proof of the required aggravating factors [] "will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. " Ante, at 729 (emphasis added); see also ante, at 738-739. I would agree with that if it were true that the instructions required jurors to deem certain evidence to be "mitigating" and to weigh that evidence in deciding the penalty. On that hypothesis, the juror's firm attachment to the death penalty would demonstrate an absence of the constitutionally requisite impartiality, which requires that the decisionmaker be able "conscientiously [to] apply the and find the facts." at ; see also ; The hypothesis, however, is not true as applied to the facts of the present case. Remarkably, the Court rests its *743 judgment upon a juror's inability to comply |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | rests its *743 judgment upon a juror's inability to comply with instructions, without bothering to describe the key instructions. When one considers them, it is perfectly clear that they do not preclude a juror from taking the view that, for capital murder, a death sentence is always warranted. The jury in this case was instructed that "[a]ggravating factors are reasons why the Defendant should be sentenced to death"; that "[m]itigating factors are reasons why the Defendant should not be sentenced to death"; that the jury must "consider all the aggravating factors supported by the evidence and all the mitigating factors supported by the evidence"; and that the jury should impose a death sentence if it found, "from [its] consideration of all the evidence, that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence," App. 22-23.[2] The instructions did not in any way further define what constitutes a "mitigating" or an "aggravating" factor, other than to point out that the jury's finding, at the death-eligibility stage, that petitioner committed a contract killing was necessarily an aggravator. As reflected in these instructions, Illinois permitted each juror to define for himself whether a particular item of evidence was mitigating, in the sense that it provided a "reaso[n] why the Defendant should not be sentenced to death." Thus, it is simply not the case that Illinois precluded a juror from taking the bright-line position that there are no valid reasons why a defendant who has committed a contract killing should not be sentenced to death. Such a juror does not "fail to consider the evidence," ante, at *744 729; cf. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9-(c) ("The court. shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant"); he simply fails to give it the effect the defendant desires.[3] Nor can the Court's exclusion of these death-inclined jurors be justified on the theory thatregardless of what Illinois purports to permitthe Eighth Amendment prohibits a juror from always advocating a death sentence at the weighing stage. Our cases in this area hold, not that the sentencer must give effect to (or even that he must consider ) the evidence offered by the defendant as mitigating, but rather that he must "not be precluded from considering" it, (emphasis added); (same). See also ("`[T]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to *745 consider all relevant mitigating evidence' ") (emphasis added) ); (emphasis added); (emphasis added); (emphasis added); (emphasis added); (emphasis added); (sentencer "must be free to weigh relevant mitigating evidence'') |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | added); (sentencer "must be free to weigh relevant mitigating evidence'') (emphasis added); (emphasis added); (same); ("A jury must be allowed to consider all relevant [mitigating] evidence") (emphasis added). Similarly, where the judge is the final sentencer we have held, not that he must consider mitigating evidence, but only that he may not, on legal grounds, refuse to consider it, 48 U.S. 3, ; (emphasis in original). Woodson and Lockett meant to ensure that the sentencing jury would function as a "link between contemporary community values and the penal system," Witherspoon, n. 5; they did not mean to specify what the content of those values *746 must be.[4] The "conscience of the community," also includes those jurors who are not swayed by mitigating evidence. The Court relies upon dicta contained in our opinion in Ante, at 728-729. In that case, the defendant challenged for cause a juror who stated during voir dire that he would automatically vote to impose a death sentence if the defendant were convicted. The trial court rejected the challenge, and Ross used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Although we noted that the state appellate court had assumed that such a juror would not be able to follow the -85 ), we held that Ross was not deprived of an impartial jury because none of the jurors who actually sat on the petit jury was -88. In reaching that conclusion, however, we expressed the view that had the challenged juror actually served, "the sentence would have to be overturned." The Court attaches great weight to this dictum, which it describes as "announc[ing] our considered view," ante, at 728. This is hyperbole. It is clear on the face of the opinion that the dictum was based entirely on the fact that the state court had assumed that such a juror was unwilling to follow the at the penalty phasea point we did not purport to examine independently. -85. The Ross dictum thus merely reflects the quite modest proposition that a juror who will not follow the is not im Because Illinois would not violate due process by seating a juror who will not be swayed by mitigating evidence at the weighing stage, the Constitution does not entitle petitioner to identify such jurors during voir dire. *747 III Even if I agreed with the Court, however, that jurors who will always advocate a death sentence for capital murder are not "impartial" and must be excused for cause, I would not agree with the further conclusion that the Constitution requires a trial court to make specific inquiries on this |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | requires a trial court to make specific inquiries on this subject during voir dire. In we surveyed our cases concerning the requirements of voir dire and concluded that, except where interracial capital crimes are at issue, trial courts "retai[n] great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire, " ; see also We emphasized that our authority to require specific inquiries on voir dire is particularly narrow with respect to state-court trials, where we may not exercise supervisory authority and are "limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution," Mu', We concluded, as a general matter, that a defendant was entitled to specific questions only if the failure to ask them would render his trial "fundamentally unfair," Thus, we have held that absent some "special circumstance," a "generalized but thorough inquiry into the impartiality of the veniremen" is a constitutionally adequate voir dire. Finally, we have long acknowledged that, in light of the credibility determinations involved, a trial court's finding that a particular juror is impartial may "be overturned only for `manifest error,' " ; see also Mu', Were the Court today extending Witherspoon `s jurybalancing rule so as to require affirmatively that a capital sentencing jury contain a mix of views on the death penalty, that requirement would of course constitute a "special circumstance" necessitating specific inquiry into the subject on voir dire. But that is not what petitioner has sought, and it *748 is not what the Court purports to decree. Its theory, as I have described, is that a juror who will always impose the death penalty for capital murder is one who "will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do, " ante, at 729 (emphasis added). Even assuming (contrary to the reality) that that theory fits the facts of this case (i. e., that the instructions required jurors to be open to voting against the death penalty on the basis of allegedly mitigating circumstances), I see no reason why jurors who will defy this element of the instructions, like jurors who will defy other elements of the instructions, see, e. g., n. cannot be identified by more general questions concerning fairness and willingness to follow the In the present case, the trial court on voir dire specifically asked nine of the jurors who ultimately served whether they would follow the court's instructions even if they disagreed with them, and all nine answered affirmatively. Moreover, all the veniremen were informed of the nature of the case and were instructed |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | informed of the nature of the case and were instructed that, if selected, they would be required to follow the court's instructions; subsequently, all 2 jurors responded negatively to a specific question whether there was any reason why they did not think they could be fair and impartial in this case. These questions, which were part of an extensive voir dire, succeeded in identifying one juror who would be unable to follow the court's instructions at the penalty phase: The juror admitted that, because of the anger he felt over the murder of his friend's parents, his sentiments in favor of the death penalty were so strong that he did not believe he could be fair to petitioner at the sentencing hearing. Taking appropriate account of the opportunity for the trial court to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the veniremen, I see no basis for concluding that its finding that the 2 jurors were impartial was manifestly erroneous. The Court provides two reasons why a specific question must be asked, but neither passes the most gullible scrutiny. *749 First, the Court states that general questions would be insufficient because "such jurors could in all truth and candor respond affirmatively, personally confident that such dogmatic views are fair and impartial" Ante, at 735. In other words, jurors who would always impose the death penalty would be violating the instructions without realizing that that is what they are doing. It seems to me quite obvious that solution of this problem does not require a specific question of each juror, but can be achieved by simply changing the instructions so that these well-intentioned jurors will understand that an aggravators-always-outweigh-mitigators view is prohibited. The record does not reflect that petitioner made any objection to the clarity of the instructions in this regard. Second, the Court asserts that the adequacy of general voir dire questions is belied by "[t]he State's own request for questioning under Witherspoon and " Ante, at 7. Without such questioning, we are told, "Witherspoon and its succeeding cases would be in large measure superfluous." But Witherspoon did not, as this reasoning assumes, give the State a right to exclude jurors ("[I]t is clear beyond peradventure that Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror," -48), and it is therefore quite impossible that anything we say on that subject today could render the holding of Witherspoon "superfluous." What the Court describes, ante, at 733, as a "very short step" from Witherspoon, and is in fact a great leap over an unbridgeable chasm of logic. Witherspoon and succeeding cases held |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | an unbridgeable chasm of logic. Witherspoon and succeeding cases held that the State was not constitutionally prevented from excluding jurors who would on no facts impose death; from which the Court today concludes that a State is constitutionally compelled to exclude jurors who would, on the facts establishing the particular aggravated murder, invariably impose death. The Court's argument that because the Constitution requires one it must require *750 the other obviously rests on a false premise.[5] In any event, the mere fact that Illinois sees fit to request one or another question on voir dire in order to discover one-resultonly jurors cannot, as a logical matter, establish that more general questioning is constitutionally inadequate to do the job. For similar reasons, I reject petitioner's argument that it is "fundamentally unfair" to allow Illinois to make specific inquiries concerning those jurors who will always vote against the death penalty but to preclude the defendant from discovering (and excluding) those jurors who will always vote in favor of death. Brief for Petitioner 4 ). Even if it were unfair, of course, the State should be given the option, which today's opinion does not provide, of abandoning the Witherspoon qualification. (Where the death penalty statute does not contain a unanimity requirement, I am confident prosecutors would prefer that to the wholesale elimination of jurors favoring the death penalty that will be the consequence of today's decision.) But in fact there is no unfairness in the asymmetry. By reason of Illinois' death penalty unanimity requirement, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9-(g) the practical consequences of allowing the two types of jurors to serve are vastly different: A single death penalty opponent can block that punishment, but unwavering advocates cannot impose it. And more fundamentally, the asymmetry is not unfair because, under Illinois as reflected in the *75 statute and instructions in this case, the Witherspoon disqualified juror is a less juror, whereas the juror to be disqualified under the Court's new rule is not. In the first stage of Illinois' two-part sentencing hearing, jurors must determine, on the facts, specified aggravating factors, and at the second, weighing stage, they must impose the death penalty for murder with particular aggravators if they find "no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude [its] imposition." But whereas the finding of aggravation is mandatory, the finding of mitigation is optional; what constitutes mitigation is not defined and is left up to the judgment of each juror. Given that there will always be aggravators to be considered at the weighing stage, the juror who says he will never vote for |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | dissenting | Morgan v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112753/morgan-v-illinois/ | stage, the juror who says he will never vote for the death penalty, no matter what the facts, is saying that he will not apply the (the classic case of partiality) since the facts may show no mitigation. But the juror who says that he will always vote for the death penalty is not promising to be less, since there is no case in which he is by compelled to find a mitigating fact "sufficiently mitigating." The people of Illinois have decided, in other words, that murder with certain aggravators will be punished by death, unless the jury chooses to extend mercy. That scheme complies with our (ever-expanding) death penalty jurisprudence as it existed yesterday. The Court has, in effect, now added the new rule that no merciless jurors can sit. * * * Sixteen years ago, this Court decreedby a sheer act of will, with no pretense of foundation in constitutional text or American traditionthat the People (as in We, the People) cannot decree the death penalty, absolutely and categorically, for any criminal act, even (presumably) genocide; the jury must always be given the option of extending mercy. Woodson, 428 U. S., at -305. Today, obscured within the fog of confusion that is our annually improvised Eighth Amendment, "death is different" jurisprudence, the Court strikes a *752 further blow against the People in its campaign against the death penalty. Not only must mercy be allowed, but now only the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment. Those who agree with the author of Exodus, or with Immanuel Kant,[6] must be banished from American juriesnot because the People have so decreed, but because such jurors do not share the strong penological preferences of this Court. In my view, that not only is not required by the Constitution of the United States; it grossly offends it. |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 968 (Title III), 8 U.S. C. 0-20, permits courts to authorize electronic surveillance[] by Government officers in specified situations. We took this case by writ of *2 certiorari to resolve two questions concerning the implementation of Title III surveillance orders. First, may courts authorize electronic surveillance that requires covert entry[2] into private premises for installation of the necessary equipment? Second, must authorization for such surveillance include a specific statement by the court that it approves of the covert entry?[] I On March 97, Justice Department officials applied to the United District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking authorization under 8 U.S. C. 8 to intercept telephone conversations on two telephones in petitioner's business office. After examining the affidavits submitted in support of the Government's request, the District Court authorized the wiretap for a period of 20 days or until the purpose of the interception was achieved, whichever came first. The court found probable cause to believe that petitioner was a member of a conspiracy the purpose of which was to steal goods being shipped in interstate commerce in violation of 8 U.S. C. 659. Moreover, the court found reason to believe that petitioner's business telephones were being used to further this conspiracy and that means of investigating the conspiracy *22 other than electronic surveillance would be unlikely to succeed and would be dangerous. The wiretap order carefully enumerated the telephones to be affected and the types of conversations to be intercepted. Finally, the court ordered the officials in charge of the interceptions to take all reasonable precautions "to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception," and required the officials to make periodic progress reports. At the end of the 20-day period covered by the March court order, the Government requested an extension of the wiretap authorization. In addition, the Government for the first time asked the court to allow it to intercept all oral communications taking place in petitioner's office, including those not involving the telephone. On April 5, 97, the court granted the Government's second request. Its order concerning the wiretap of petitioner's telephones closely tracked the March order. Finding reasonable cause to believe that petitioner's office was being used by petitioner and others in connection with the alleged conspiracy, the court also authorized, for a maximum period of 20 days, the interception of all oral communications concerning the conspiracy at "the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (5) by eighteen (8) feet in dimension, and |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | approximately fifteen (5) by eighteen (8) feet in dimension, and situated in the northwesterly corner of a one-story building housing Wrap-O-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 05 West St. George Avenue, Linden, New Jersey." The order included protective provisions similar to those in the March wiretapping order.[] The electronic surveillance order of April 5 was extended by court order on April 27, 97. *2 On November 6, petitioner was indicted in a five-count indictment charging that he had been involved in a *2 conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric.[5] At trial, the Government introduced evidence showing that petitioner had been approached in March 97 and asked to store in his New Jersey warehouse "a load of merchandise." Although petitioner declined the request, he directed the requesting party to Higgins, an associate, with whom he agreed to share the $,500 storage fee that was offered. The merchandise stored under this contract proved to be a tractor-trailer full of fabric worth $0,000 that three men stole on April 97, and transported to Higgins' warehouse. Two days after the theft, FBI agents arrested Higgins and the individuals involved in the robbery. The Government introduced into evidence at petitioner's trial various conversations intercepted pursuant to the court *25 orders of March April 5, and April 27, 97. Intercepted telephone conversations showed that petitioner had arranged for the storage at Higgins' warehouse and had helped negotiate the terms for that storage. One telephone conversation that took place after Higgins' arrest made clear that petitioner had given advice to others involved in the robbery to "sit tight" and not to use the telephone. Finally, the Government introduced transcripts of conversations intercepted from petitioner's office under the April 5 bugging order. In these conversations, petitioner had discussed with various participants in the robbery how best to proceed after their confederates had been arrested. The unmistakable inference to be drawn from petitioner's statements in these conversations is that he was an active participant in the scheme to steal the truckload of fabric. Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained through the interception of conversations by means of the device installed in his office. The District Court denied the suppression motion without prejudice to its being renewed following trial. After petitioner was convicted on two counts,[6] he renewed his motion and the court held an evidentiary hearing concerning the method by which the electronic device had been installed. At this hearing it was shown that, although the April 5 court order did not explicitly authorize entry of petitioner's business, the FBI agents |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | not explicitly authorize entry of petitioner's business, the FBI agents assigned the task of implementing the order had entered petitioner's office secretly at midnight on April 5 and had spent three hours in the building installing an electronic bug in the ceiling. All electronic surveillance of petitioner ended on May 6, 97, at which time the agents re-entered petitioner's office and removed the bug. In denying a second time petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the bug, the trial court ruled *26 that under Title III a covert entry to install electronic eavesdropping equipment is not unlawful merely because the court approving the surveillance did not explicitly authorize such an entry. Indeed, in the court's view, "implicit in the court's order [authorizing electronic surveillance] is concomitant authorization for agents to covertly enter the premises in question and install the necessary equipment." As the court concluded that the FBI agents who had installed the electronic device were executing a lawful warrant issued by the court, the sole question was whether the method they chose for execution was reasonable. Under the circumstances, the court found the covert entry of petitioner's office to have been "the safest and most successful method of accomplishing the installation." Indeed, noting that petitioner himself had indicated that such a device could only have been installed through such an entry, the court observed that "[i]n most cases the only form of installing such devices is through breaking and entering. The nature of the act is such that entry must be surreptitious and must not arouse suspicion, and the installation must be done without the knowledge of the residents or occupants." The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. Agreeing with the District Court, it rejected petitioner's contention that separate court authorization was necessary for the covert entry of petitioner's office, although it noted that "the more prudent or preferable approach for government agents would be to include a statement regarding the need of a surreptitious entry in a request for the interception of oral communications when a break-in is contemplated." II Petitioner first contends that the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry of private premises in all cases, irrespective of the reasonableness of the entry or the approval of a court. *27 He contends that Title III is unconstitutional insofar as it enables courts to authorize covert entries for the installation of electronic bugging devices. In several cases this Court has implied that in some circumstances covert entry to install electronic bugging devices would be constitutionally acceptable if done pursuant to a search warrant. |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | be constitutionally acceptable if done pursuant to a search warrant. Thus, for example, in the plurality stated that in conducting electronic surveillance, state police officers had "flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal Government." It emphasized that the bugging equipment was installed through a covert entry of the defendant's home "without a search warrant or other process." Similarly, in it was noted that "[t]his Court has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard." (Emphasis added.) Implicit in decisions such as Silverman and Irvine has been the Court's view that covert entries are constitutional in some circumstances, at least if they are made pursuant to warrant. Moreover, we find no basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all covert entries. It is well established that law officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant where such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed. See, e. g., ; cf. ; 8 U.S. C. 09. Petitioner nonetheless argues that covert entries are unconstitutional for their lack of notice. This argument is frivolous, as was indicated in where the Court stated that "officers need not *28 announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly] authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence."[7] In United we held that Title III provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance. See 8 U.S. C. 8 (8) (d). There is no reason why the same notice is not equally sufficient with respect to electronic surveillances requiring covert entry. We make explicit, therefore, what has long been implicit in our decisions dealing with this subject: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.[8] *29 III Petitioner's second contention is that Congress has not given the courts statutory authority to approve covert entries for the purpose of installing electronic surveillance equipment, even if constitutionally it could have done so. Petitioner emphasizes that although Title III sets forth with meticulous care the circumstances in which electronic surveillance is permitted, there is no comparable indication in the statute that covert entry ever may |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | comparable indication in the statute that covert entry ever may be ordered. Accord, United Title III does not refer explicitly to covert entry. The language, structure, and history of the statute, however, demonstrate that Congress meant to authorize courtsin certain specified circumstancesto approve electronic surveillance without limitation on the means necessary to its accomplishment, so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances. Title III provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of electronic surveillance, prohibiting all secret interception of communications except as authorized by certain state and federal judges in response to applications from specified federal and state law enforcement officials. See 8 U.S. C. 5, and 8; United Although Congress was fully aware of the distinction between bugging and wiretapping, see S. Rep. No. 097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (968), Title III by its terms deals with each form of surveillance in essentially the same manner. See 8 U.S. C. 0 () and (2); n. Orders authorizing interceptions of either wire or oral communications may be entered only after the court has made specific determinations concerning the likelihood that the interception will disclose evidence of criminal conduct. See 8 U.S. C. 8 (). Moreover, with respect to both wiretapping and bugging, an authorizing court must *0 specify the exact scope of the surveillance undertaken, enumerating the parties whose communications are to be overheard (if they are known), the place to be monitored, and the agency that will do the monitoring. See 8 U.S. C. 8 (). The plain effect of the detailed restrictions of 8 is to guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is needed.[9] Once this need has been demonstrated in accord with the requirements of 8, the courts have broad authority to "approv[e] interception of wire or oral communications," 8 U.S. C. 6 (), (2), subject of course to constitutional limitations. See Part II, [0] Nowhere in Title III is there any indication that the authority of courts under 8 is to be limited to approving those methods of interception that do not require covert entry for installation of the intercepting equipment.[] * The legislative history of Title III underscores Congress' understanding that courts would authorize electronic surveillance in situations where covert entry of private premises was necessary. Indeed, a close examination of that history reveals that Congress did not explicitly address the question of covert entries in the Act, only because it did not perceive surveillance requiring such entries to differ in any important way from that performed |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | entries to differ in any important way from that performed without entry. Testimony before subcommittees considering Title III and related bills indicated that covert entries were a necessary part of most electronic bugging operations. See, e. g., Anti-Crime Program: Hearings on H. R. 507, etc., before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., st Sess., 0 Moreover, throughout the Senate Report on Title III indiscriminate reference is made to the types of surveillance this Court reviewed in 88 U.S. and See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 097, at 7-75, 97, 0-02, 05. Apparently Committee members did not find it significant that Berger involved a covert entry, whereas Katz did not. Compare with[2] It is understandable, therefore, that by the time Title III *2 was discussed on the floor of Congress, those Members who referred to covert entries indicated their understanding that such entries would necessarily be a part of bugging authorized under Title III. Thus, for example, in voicing his support for Title III Senator Tydings emphasized the difficulties attendant upon installing necessary equipment: "[S]urveillance is very difficult to use. Tape [sic] must be installed on telephones, and wires strung. Bugs are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment." Cong. Rec. 2989 (968) In the face of this record, one simply cannot assume that Congress, aware that most bugging requires covert entry, nonetheless wished to except surveillance requiring such entries from the broad authorization of Title III, and that it resolved to do so by remaining silent on the subject. On the contrary, the language and history of Title III convey quite a different explanation for Congress' failure to distinguish between surveillance that requires covert entry and that which does not: Those considering the surveillance legislation understood that, by authorizing electronic interception of oral communications in addition to wire communications, they were necessarily authorizing surreptitious entries. Finally, Congress' purpose in enacting the statute would be largely thwarted if we were to accept petitioner's invitation to read into Title III a limitation on the courts' authority under 8. Congress permitted limited electronic surveillance under Title III because it concluded that both wiretapping and bugging were necessary to enable law enforcement authorities to combat successfully certain forms of crime.[]* Absent covert entry, however, almost all electronic bugging would be impossible.[] See United v. Ford, F. Supp. 879, (DC 976), aff'd, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 55 F.2d 6 ; McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry * to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | Problem of Surreptitious Entry * to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After the Court Says "Yes"?, 5 Am. Crim. L. Rev. As recently as 976, a congressional commission established to study and evaluate the effectiveness of Title III concluded that in most cases electronic surveillance cannot be performed without covert entry into the premises being monitored. See U. S. National Commission for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Surveillance 5, and n. 9, 86 (976). The same conclusion was reached by the American Bar Association committee charged with formulating standards governing use of electronic surveillance. See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance 65 n. 75, 9 (App. Draft 97).[5] In sum, we conclude that Congress clearly understood that it was conferring power upon the courts to authorize covert entries ancillary to their responsibility to review and approve surveillance applications under the statute. To read the statute otherwise would be to deny the "respect for the policy of Congress [that] must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose." Nardone v. United 08 U.S. 8, (99).[6] IV Petitioner's final contention is that, if covert entries are to be authorized under Title III, the authorizing court must *5 explicitly set forth its approval of such entries before the fact. In this case, as is customary, the court's order constituted the sole written authorization of the surveillance of petitioner's office. As it did not state in terms that the surveillance was to include a covert entry, petitioner insists that the entry violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Accord, United v. Ford, 80 U. S. App. D. C., at 55 F.2d, at 70; Application of United 56 F.2d 67,[7] The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be issued only "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Finding these words to be "precise and clear," 79 U.S. 76, 8 (965), this Court has interpreted them to require only three things. First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates. See, e. g., 0- ; 07 U.S. 5, 50 ; 0 U.S. (97). Second, those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that "the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction" for a particular offense. 87 U.S. 29, 07 Finally, "warrants must particularly describe the `things to be seized,' " as well as the place to be searched. *6 In the present case, |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | the place to be searched. *6 In the present case, the April 5 court order authorizing the interception of oral communications occurring within petitioner's office was a warrant issued in full compliance with these traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. It was based upon a neutral magistrate's independent finding of probable cause to believe that petitioner had been and was committing specifically enumerated federal crimes, that petitioner's office was being used "in connection with the commission of [these] offenses," and that bugging the office would result in the interception of "oral communications concerning these offenses." App. 6a-7a. Moreover, the exact location and dimensions of petitioner's office were set forth, see n. and the extent of the search was restricted to the "[i]ntercept[ion of] oral communications of Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses at the business office of Larry Dalia" App. 8a.[8] Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that the April 5 order was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment for its failure to specify that it would be executed by means of a covert *7 entry of his office. Nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court's decisions interpreting that language suggests that, in addition to the three requirements discussed above, search warrants also must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant[9]subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures." Recognizing that the specificity required by the Fourth Amendment does not generally extend to the means by which warrants are executed, petitioner further argues that warrants for electronic surveillance are unique because often they impinge upon two different Fourth Amendment interests: The surveillance itself interferes only with the right to hold private conversations, whereas the entry subjects the suspect's property to possible damage and personal effects to unauthorized examination. This view of the Warrant Clause parses too finely the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Often in executing a warrant the police may find it necessary to interfere with privacy rights not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the warrant. For example, police executing an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter *8 the suspect's home in order to take him into custody, and they thereby impinge on both privacy and freedom of movement. See, e. g., United v. Cravero, 55 F.2d 06, 2 (CA5 976) Similarly, officers executing search warrants on |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | 06, 2 (CA5 976) Similarly, officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty. See, e. g., United v. Brown, 556 F.2d 0, 05 ; United v. Gervato, 7 F.2d 0, (CA), cert. denied, U.S. 86 (97). It would extend the Warrant Clause to the extreme to require that, whenever it is reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment rights may be affected in more than one way, the court must set forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the executing officers. Such an interpretation is unnecessary, as we have heldand the Government concedesthat the manner in which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness. See 6 U.S. 57,[20] More important, we would promote empty formalism were we to require magistrates to make explicit what unquestionably is implicit in bugging authorizations:[2] that a covert entry, with its attendant interference with Fourth Amendment interests, may be necessary for the installation of the surveillance equipment. See United v. London, 2 F. Supp. 556, (Md. 976). We conclude, therefore, that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a Title III electronic surveillance order include a *9 specific authorization to enter covertly the premises described in the order.[22] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins except as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I I dissent from Part III for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS which I join. II I also dissent from Part IV. In my view, even reading Title III to authorize covert entries, the Justice Department's present practice of securing specific authorization for covert entries is not only preferable, see ante, this page n. 22, but also constitutionally required. Breaking and entering into private premises for the purpose of planting a bug cannot be characterized as a mere mode of warrant execution to be left to the discretion of the executing officer. See ante, at 7. The practice entails an invasion *260 of privacy of constitutional significance distinct from that which attends nontrespassory surveillance; indeed, it is tantamount to an independent search and seizure. First, rooms may be bugged without the need for surreptitious entry and physical invasion of private premises. See Lopez v. United 7 U.S. 27, 67-68 Second, covert entry, a practice condemned long before we condemned unwarranted eavesdropping, see breaches physical as well as conversational privacy. The home or office itself, that "inviolate place |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Dalia v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110061/dalia-v-united-states/ | conversational privacy. The home or office itself, that "inviolate place which is a man's castle," at 52 n. is invaded. Third, the practice is particularly intrusive and susceptible to abuse since it leaves naked to the hands and eyes of government agents items beyond the reach of simple eavesdropping. Because of these additional intrusions attendant to covert entries, the Constitution requires that government agents who wish to break into private premises first secure specific judicial authorization for the surreptitious entry. Authority for the physical invasion cannot be derived from a Title III order authorizing only electronic surveillance. "[T]he Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by the warrant," 0 U.S. 88, 9 n. 7 (97), in order to assure that those "searches deemed necessary [remain] as limited as possible." 0 U.S. 67 (97). See 79 U.S. 76, 85 (965); Marron v. United 275 U.S. 92, 96 (927).[*] As a consequence, a warrant that describes *26 only the seizure of conversations cannot be read expansively to authorize constitutionally distinct physical invasions of privacy at the discretion of the executing officer. Rather, the Constitution demands that the necessity for home invasion be decided "by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United U.S. 0, (98). I cannot agree that adherence to this principle would amount to "specification of the precise manner" in which Title III orders are executed. See ante, at 7. The warrant could, consistent with the command of the Fourth Amendment, leave the details of how best to proceed with the covert entry to the discretion of the executing officers. The warrant need only state, as under the present Justice Department practice, that "surreptitious entry for the purpose of installing and removing any electronic interception devices [is] to be utilized in accomplishing the oral interception." Ante, at 9 n. 22. Nor can I agree that adherence to the strictures of the Warrant and Particularity Clauses of the Fourth Amendment would amount to "empty formalism." See ante, at 8. Since premises may be bugged through means less drastic than home invasion, requiring police to secure prior approval for covert entries may well prevent unnecessary and improper intrusions. In any event, that the present case may not appear particularly abusive cannot justify the Court's crabbed interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Bradley's *262 admonition almost a century ago has even greater cogency in today's world of ever more intrusive governmental invasions of privacy: "It may be that |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S. C. prohibits submitting false or fraudulent claims for pay ment to the United States, and authorizes qui tam suits, in which private parties bring civil actions in the Government’s name, This case concerns the FCA’s public disclosure bar, which generally forecloses qui tam suits that are “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a congressional, adminis trative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” (footnote omitted).1 We must decide whether a federal agency’s written re sponse to a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S. C. constitutes a “report” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. —————— 1 During the pendency of this case, the Patient Protection and Afford able Care Act, amended the public disclosure bar. Because the amendments are not applicable to pending cases, Graham Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. n. 1 (slip op., at 1, n. 1), this opinion refers to the statute as it existed when the suit was filed. 2 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court We hold that it does. I Petitioner Schindler Elevator Corporation manufac tures, installs, and services elevators and escalators.2 In 1989, Schindler acquired Millar Elevator Industries, Inc., and the two companies merged in 2002. Since 19, Schindler and the United States have en tered into hundreds of contracts that are subject to the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 (VEVRAA). That Act requires contractors like Schindler to report certain information to the Secretary of Labor, including how many of its employees are “qualified covered veterans” under the statute. 38 U.S. C. VEVRAA regulations required Schindler to agree in each of its contracts that it would “submit VETS– 100 Reports no later than September 30 of each year.” 48 CFR (2008); see also Respondent Daniel Kirk, a United States Army veteran who served in Vietnam, was employed by Millar and Schindler from 1978 until 2003. In August 2003, Kirk resigned from Schindler in response to what he saw as Schindler’s efforts to force him out.3 In March 2005, Kirk filed this action against Schindler under the False Claims Act, which imposes civil penalties and treble damages on persons who submit false or —————— 2 Thefacts in this Part, which we must accept as true, are taken from the amended complaint and the filings submitted in opposition to Schindler’s motion to dismiss. 3 Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Office of Fed eral |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | complaint with the Department of Labor’s Office of Fed eral Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), claiming that he had been “improperly demoted and constructively terminated by Schindler despite his status as a Vietnam era veteran.” App. 23a. The OFCCP investigated Schindler’s compliance with VEVRAA and found insuffi cient evidence to support Kirk’s claim. In November the Depart ment of Labor affirmed the OFCCP’s finding. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 Opinion of the Court fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. 31 U.S. C. The FCA authorizes both civil actions by the Attorney General and private qui tam actions to enforce its provisions. When, as here, the Gov ernment chooses not to intervene in a qui tam action, the private relator stands to receive between 25% and 30% of the proceeds of the action. In an amended complaint filed in June 2007, Kirk al leged that Schindler had submitted hundreds of false claims for payment under its Government contracts. According to Kirk, Schindler had violated VEVRAA’s reporting requirements by failing to file certain required VETS–100 and including false information in those it did file. The company’s claims for payment were false, Kirk alleged, because Schindler had falsely certified its compliance with VEVRAA. Kirk did not specify the amount of damages he sought on behalf of the United States, but he asserted that the value of Schindler’s VEVRAA-covered contracts exceeded $100 million. To support his allegations, Kirk pointed to information his wife, Linda Kirk, received from the Department of Labor (DOL) in response to three FOIA requests. Mrs. Kirk had sought all VETS–100 filed by Schindler for the years 18 through The DOL responded by letter or e-mail to each request with information about the records found for each year, including years for which no responsive records were located. The DOL informed Mrs. Kirk that it found no VETS–100 filed by Schindler in 18, 19, 2000, 2002, or 2003. For the other years, the DOL provided Mrs. Kirk with copies of the filed by Schindler, in all. Schindler moved to dismiss on a number of grounds, including that the FCA’s public disclosure bar deprived the District Court of jurisdiction. See The District Court granted the motion, concluding that most of Kirk’s allegations failed to state a claim and that the 4 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court remainder were based upon the public disclosure of alle gations or transactions in an administrative “report” or “investigation.” The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court effectively held that an agency’s |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | vacated and remanded. The court effectively held that an agency’s response to a FOIA request is neither a “report” nor an “investigation” within the meaning of the FCA’s public disclosure bar. See at 103–111 and disagreeing with United States ex rel. (CA3 19)). We granted certio rari, 561 U. S. and now reverse and remand. II Schindler argues that “report” in the FCA’s public dis closure bar carries its ordinary meaning and that the DOL’s written responses to Mrs. Kirk’s FOIA requests are therefore “.” We agree.4 A 1 Adopted in 1986, the FCA’s public disclosure bar pro vides: “No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allega tions or transactions in a criminal, civil, or adminis trative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of —————— 4 Becausewe conclude that a written response to a FOIA request qualifies as a “report” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar, we need not address whether an agency’s search in response to a FOIA request also qualifies as an “investigation.” Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 Opinion of the Court the information.” 31 U.S. C. (footnote omitted). Because the statute does not define “report,” we look first to the word’s ordinary meaning. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. (slip op., at 7) (“Statutory construction must begin with the lan guage employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose” (internal quotation marks omit ted)); Asgrow Seed (15) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning”). A “report” is “some thing that gives information” or a “notification,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1925 (1986), or “[a]n official or formal statement of facts or proceedings,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1300 (6th ed. 10). See also 13 Oxford English Dictionary 650 (2d ed. 1989) (“[a]n account brought by one person to another”); American Heritage Dictionary 1103 (1981) (“[a]n account or announcement that is prepared, presented, or delivered, usually in formal or organized form”); Random House Dictionary 1634 (2d ed. 1987) (“an account or statement describing in detail an event, situation, or the like”). This broad ordinary meaning of “report” is consistent with the generally broad scope of the FCA’s public disclo sure bar. As we explained last Term, to determine the meaning of one word |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | explained last Term, to determine the meaning of one word in the public disclosure bar, we must consider the provision’s “entire text,” read as an “inte grated whole.” Graham Soil and Water Conserva tion Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. n. 12 (slip op., at 8, 12, n. 12); see also Tyler v. Cain, (“We do not construe the meaning of statutory terms in a vacuum”). The other sources of public disclosure in especially “news media,” suggest that the public disclosure bar pro 6 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court vides “a broa[d] sweep.” Graham at (slip op., at 8). The statute also mentions “administrative hearings” twice, reflecting intent to avoid underinclusive ness even at the risk of redundancy. The phrase “allegations or transactions” in (4)(A) additionally suggests a wide-reaching public disclo sure bar. Congress covered not only the disclosure of “allegations” but also “transactions,” a term that courts have recognized as having a broad meaning. See, e.g., (1926) (“ ‘Transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning”); 391 (CA5 2002) (“[T]he ordinary meaning of the term ‘transaction’ is a broad reference to many different types of business dealings between parties”). 2 Nor is there any textual basis for adopting a narrower definition of “report.” The Court of Appeals, in holding that FOIA responses were not “,” looked to the words “hearing, audit, or investigation,” and the phrase “criminal, civil, [and] administrative hearings.” It con cluded that all of these sources “connote the synthesis of information in an investigatory context” to “serve some end of the government.” ; cf. Brief for Respondent 30, n. 15 (“Each is part of the government’s ongoing effort to fight fraud”). Applying the noscitur a sociis canon, the Court of Appeals then determined that these “ ‘neighboring words’ ” mandated a narrower mean ing for “report” than its ordinary meaning. 601 F.3d, at 107. The Court of Appeals committed the very error we re versed in Graham Like the Fourth Circuit in that case, the Second Circuit here applied the noscitur a sociis canon only to the immediately surrounding words, to the exclusion of the rest of the statute. See Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 7 Opinion of the Court n. 6. We emphasized in Graham that “all of the sources [of public disclosure] listed in pro vide interpretive guidance.” 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 8). When all of the sources are considered, the reference to “news media”—which the Court of Appeals did not consider—suggests a much broader scope. The Government similarly |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | did not consider—suggests a much broader scope. The Government similarly errs by focusing only on the adjectives “congressional, administrative, or [GAO],”5 which precede “report.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. It contends that these adjectives suggest that the public disclosure bar applies only to agency “analogous to those that Congress and the GAO would issue or conduct.” As we explained in Graham however, those three adjectives tell us nothing more than that a “report” must be governmental. See 559 U. S., at n. 7 (slip op., at 7, n. 7). The governmental nature of the FOIA responses at issue is not disputed. Finally, applying the ordinary meaning of “report” does not render superfluous the other sources of public disclo sure in Kirk argues that reading “report” to mean “something that gives information” would sub sume the other words in the phrase “report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” Brief for Respondent 23. But Kirk admits that hearings, audits, and investigations are processes “to obtain information.” Those processes are thus clearly different from “something that gives information.” Moreover, the statute contem plates some redundancy: An “audit,” for example, will often be a type of “investigation.” We are not persuaded that we should adopt a “different, somewhat special meaning” of “report” over the word’s —————— 5 Although the statute refers to the “Government Accounting Office,” it is undisputed that Congress meant the General Accounting Office, also known as GAO and now renamed the Government Accountability Office. See Graham 559 U. S., at n. 6 (slip op., at 6, n. 6). 8 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court “primary meaning.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 130, 128 (18). Indeed, we have cautioned recently against interpreting the public disclosure bar in a way inconsistent with a plain reading of its text. In Graham we rejected several arguments for construing the statute narrowly, twice emphasizing that the sole “touch stone” in the statutory text is “public disclosure.” 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 11, 19). We chose in that case simply to give the text its “most natura[l] read[ing],” at (slip op., at 5), and we do so again here. B A written agency response to a FOIA request falls within the ordinary meaning of “report.” FOIA requires each agency receiving a request to “notify the person making such request of [its] determination and the reasons therefor.” 5 U.S. C. When an agency denies a request in whole or in part, it must addi tionally “set forth the names and titles or positions of each |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | “set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial,” “make a reasonable effort to estimate the volume of any [denied] matter,” and “provide any such estimate to the person making the request.” (F). The DOL has adopted more detailed regulations implementing FOIA and man dating a response in writing. See (a) (requiring written notice of the grant of a FOIA request and a description of the manner in which records will be disclosed); (requiring a “brief statement of the reason or reasons for [a] denial,” as well as written notification if a record “cannot be located or has been destroyed” (italics deleted)). So, too, have other federal agencies. See, e.g., ; ; (Dept. of Agriculture). Such an agency response plainly is “something that gives information,” a “notification,” and an “official or formal statement of facts.” Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court Any records the agency produces along with its written FOIA response are part of that response, “just as if they had been reproduced as an appendix to a printed report.” n. 5. Nothing in the public disclosure bar suggests that a document and its attach ments must be disaggregated and evaluated individually. If an allegation or transaction is disclosed in a record attached to a FOIA response, it is disclosed “in” that FOIA response and, therefore, disclosed “in” a report for the purposes of the public disclosure bar.6 The DOL’s three written FOIA responses to Mrs. Kirk, along with their attached records, are thus within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. Each response was an “official or formal statement” that “[gave] informa tion” and “notif[ied]” Mrs. Kirk of the agency’s resolution of her FOIA request. III A In interpreting a statute, “[o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous,” as we have found, and “ ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consis tent.’ ” (17) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). We are not persuaded by asser tions that it would be anomalous to read the public disclo sure bar to encompass written FOIA responses. 1 The drafting history of the public disclosure bar does not contradict our holding. As originally enacted in 1863, the FCA placed no restriction on the sources from which a qui tam relator could acquire information on which to base a —————— 6 It is irrelevant whether a particular record is itself a report. The attached records do not “becom[e]” but simply are part of a report. 10 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | part of a report. 10 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court lawsuit. See Graham 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 12). Accordingly, this Court upheld the recovery of a relator, even though the Government claimed that he had discovered the basis for his lawsuit by reading a federal criminal indictment. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, In response, Congress amended the statute to preclude such “parasitic” qui tam actions based on “evidence or information in the posses sion of the United States at the time such suit was brought.” 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 12–13) (internal quotation marks omitted). Then, in 1986, Congress re placed the so-called Government knowledge bar with the narrower public disclosure bar. at (slip op., at 13). The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be incon sistent with this drafting history to hold that written FOIA responses are The court reasoned that doing so would “essentially resurrect, in a significant subset of cases, the government possession standard repudiated in 1986.” We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. As a threshold matter, “the drafting history of the public disclo sure bar raises more questions than it answers.” Graham at (slip op., at 14). In any event, it is hardly inconsistent with the drafting history to read the public disclosure bar as operating similarly to the Gov ernment knowledge bar in a “subset of cases.” 601 F.3d, at 109. As we have observed, “[r]ather than simply repeal the Government knowledge bar,” the public disclosure bar was “an effort to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.” 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 13) (emphasis added). If anything, the drafting history supports our holding. The sort of case that Kirk has brought seems to us a clas sic example of the “opportunistic” litigation that the public disclosure bar is designed to discourage. (internal Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion of the Court quotation marks omitted). Although Kirk alleges that he became suspicious from his own experiences as a veteran working at Schindler, anyone could have filed the same FOIA requests and then filed the same suit. Similarly, anyone could identify a few regulatory filing and certifica tion requirements, submit FOIA requests until he discov ers a federal contractor who is out of compliance, and potentially reap a windfall in a qui tam action under the FCA. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici Curiae 20 |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | United States of America et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (“Government contractors are required to submit certifications re lated to everything from how they dispose of hazardous materials to their affirmative action plans” (citing 40 U.S. C. and 29 U.S. C. 2 Nor will extending the public disclosure bar to written FOIA responses necessarily lead to unusual consequences. FOIA requires agencies to release some records even absent a request. See 5 U.S. C. (2). Kirk argues that it would be strange that two relators could obtain copies of the same document but that only the relator who got the document in response to a FOIA re quest would find his case barred. This argument assumes that records released under FOIA, but not attached to a written FOIA response, do not fall within the public disclosure bar. We do not decide that question. But even assuming, as Kirk does, that such records are not covered by the public disclosure bar, we —————— 7 There is no merit to the suggestion that the public disclosure bar is intended only to exclude qui tam suits that “ride the investigatory coattails of the government’s own processes.” Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 25, 26; see Graham 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 19) (rejecting the argument that the public disclosure bar applies only to allegations or transactions that “have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer”). 12 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court are not troubled by the different treatment. By its plain terms, the public disclosure bar applies to some meth- ods of public disclosure and not to others. See Graham at (slip op., at 4) (“[T]he FCA’s public disclosure bar deprives courts of jurisdiction over qui tam suits when the relevant information has already entered the public domain through certain channels” ). It would not be anomalous if some methods of FOIA disclosure fell within the scope of the public disclosure bar and some did not. We also are not concerned that potential defendants will now insulate themselves from liability by making a FOIA request for incriminating documents. This argument assumes that the public disclosure of information in a written FOIA response forever taints that information for purposes of the public disclosure bar. But it may be that a relator who comes by that information from a different source has a legitimate argument that his lawsuit is not “based upon” the initial public disclosure. 31 U.S. C. That question has divided the Courts of Appeals, and we do not |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | has divided the Courts of Appeals, and we do not resolve it here. See Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., (describing the split in authority). It may also be that such a relator qualifies for the “original source” exception.8 In any event, the notion that potential defendants will make FOIA requests to insulate themselves from liability —————— 8 An “original source” is “an individual who has direct and independ ent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.” (4)(B). Some Courts of Appeals have narrowly construed the exception to limit “original sources” to those who were the cause of the public disclosure, while others have been more generous. See United States ex rel. (describing a three-way split among the Courts of Appeals). That question is not before us, and we do not decide it. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 13 Opinion of the Court is pure speculation. Cf. Graham 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 19) (rejecting as “strained speculation” an argument that local governments will manipulate the public disclosure bar to escape liability). There is no suggestion that this has occurred in those Circuits that have long held that FOIA responses are “” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. B Even if we accepted these extratextual arguments, Kirk and his amici have provided no principled way to define “report” to exclude FOIA responses without excluding other documents that are indisputably The Gov ernment, for example, struggled to settle on a single defi nition. Compare Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (“report” must be read to “reflect a focus on situations in which the government is conducting, or has completed, some focused inquiry or analysis concerning the relevant facts”) with (“A FOIA response is not a ‘report’ because the federal agency is not charged with uncov ering the truth of any matter”), and Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“[T]he way to think about it is whether or not the agency is engaging in a substantive inquiry into and a sub stantive analysis of information”). It is difficult to see how the Department of Justice’s “Annual Report” of FOIA statistics—something that is indisputably a Government report—would qualify under the latter two definitions. See Dept. of Justice, Freedom of Information Act An- nual Report, Fiscal Year http://www.justice.gov/oip/ annual_report//cover.htm (as visited May 12, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 19 (Kirk conceding that the |
Justice Thomas | 2,011 | 1 | majority | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216735/schindler-elevator-corp-v-united-states-ex-rel-kirk/ | also Tr. of Oral Arg. 19 (Kirk conceding that the DOJ annual report is a report). And even if the first definition arguably encompasses that report, it would seem also to include FOIA responses, which convey the results of a Govern ment agency’s “focused inquiry.” 14 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KIRK Opinion of the Court Kirk also was unable to articulate a workable definition. His various proposed definitions suffer the same deficien cies as the Government’s. Compare Brief for Respondent 27 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–18 with Brief for Respondent 34–39 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. Kirk’s first suggestion would exclude “a lot of things that are labeled report,” at and the second—the definition advanced by the Court of Appeals—would seem to include written FOIA responses, at 28–29. In the end, it appears that the “only argument is that FOIA is a different kind of mis sion”—“a special case.” We see no basis for that distinction and adhere to the principle that undefined statutory terms carry their ordinary meaning. * * * The DOL’s three written FOIA responses in this case, along with the accompanying records produced to Mrs. Kirk, are within the meaning of the public dis closure bar. Whether Kirk’s suit is “based upon allegations or transactions” disclosed in those is a question for the Court of Appeals to resolve on remand. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 1 GINSBURG, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–188 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORPORATION, PETI- TIONER v. UNITED STATES EX REL. |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | dissenting | Vermont v. Brillon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145899/vermont-v-brillon/ | We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether delays caused “solely” by a public defender can be “charged against the State pursuant to the test in” Pet. for Cert. i, ¶1. The case, in my view, does not squarely present that question, for the Vermont Supreme Court, when it found Michael Brillon’s trial unconstitutionally delayed, did not count such delays against the State. The court’s opinion for the most part makes that fact clear; at worst some passages are ambigu ous. Given these circumstances, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. I The relevant time period consists of slightly less than three years, stretching from July 2001, when Brillon was indicted, until mid-June 2004, when he was convicted and sentenced. In light of Brillon’s improper behavior, see ante, at 3–4, the Vermont Supreme Court did not count months 1 through 12 (mid-July 2001 through mid-June 2002) against the State. Noting the objection that Brillon had sought to “intentionally sabotag[e] the criminal pro ceedings against him,” the Vermont Supreme Court was explicit that this time period “do[es] not count against the [S]tate.” 2 VERMONT v. BRILLON BREYER, J., dissenting The Vermont Supreme Court did count months 13 through 17 (mid-June 2002 through November 2002) against the State. It did so under circumstances where (1) Brillon’s counsel, Paul Donaldson, revealed that his con tract with the defender general’s office had expired in June 2002—shortly after (perhaps before!) he took over as Brillon’s counsel, App. 232–233, (2) he stated that this case was “basically the beginning of [his] departure from the contract,” ib and (3) he made no filings, missed several deadlines, did “little or nothing” to “move the case forward,” and made only one brief appearance at a status conference in I believe it fairer to characterize this period, not as a period in which “assigned counsel” failed to move the case forward, ante, at 1, but as a period in which Brillon, in practice, had no assigned counsel. And, given that the State conceded its responsibility for delays caused by another defender who resigned for “contractual reasons,” see infra at 3, it is hardly unreasonable that the Vermont Supreme Court counted this period of delay against the State. The Vermont Supreme Court also counted months 18 through 25 (the end of November 2002 through July 2003) against the State. It did so because the State conceded in its brief that this period of delay “cannot be attributed to the defendant.” App. 78 (emphasis added). This conces sion is not surprising in light of the fact that during |
Justice Breyer | 2,009 | 2 | dissenting | Vermont v. Brillon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145899/vermont-v-brillon/ | is not surprising in light of the fact that during much of this period, Brillon was represented by David Sleigh, a contract attorney, who during the course of his represen tation filed nothing on Brillon’s behalf except a single motion seeking to extend discovery. The record reflects no other actions by Sleigh other than a letter sent to Brillon informing him that “[a]s a result of modifications to our firm’s contract with the Defender General, we will not be representing you in your pending case.” Bril lon was left without counsel for a period of nearly six months. The State explained in conceding its responsibil Cite as: 556 U. S. (2009) 3 BREYER, J., dissenting ity for this delay that Sleigh had been forced to withdraw “for contractual reasons,” and that the defender general’s office had been unable to replace him “for funding rea sons.” Finally, the Vermont Supreme Court counted against the State the last 11 months—from August 2003 to mid- June 2004. But it is impossible to conclude from the opin ion whether it did so because it held the State responsible for the defender’s failure to “move the case forward,” or for other reasons having nothing to do with counsel, namely the judge’s unavailability, see or the fact that “the [case] files were incomplete” and “additional docu ments were needed from the State,” 955 A.2d, at – 1121. Treating the opinion as charging the State on the basis of the defender’s conduct is made more difficult by the fact that Brillon did not argue below that Kathleen Moore, his defender during this period, caused any delays. Appellant’s Reply Brief in No. 2005–167 (Vt.), 2007 WL 990004, *7. II In sum, I can find no convincing reason to believe the Vermont Supreme Court made the error of constitutional law that the majority attributes to it. Rather than read ambiguities in its opinion against it, thereby assuming the presence of the error the Court finds, I would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. As a majority nonetheless wishes to decide the case, I would note that the Vermont Supreme Court has considerable authority to supervise the appointment of public defenders. See Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, 5272 (1998); see also Vt. Rule Crim. Proc. 44 (2003). It consequently warrants leeway when it de cides whether a particular failing is properly attributed to assigned counsel or instead to the failure of the defender general’s office properly to assign counsel. Ante, at 11. I do not believe the Vermont Supreme Court exceeded that 4 VERMONT v. BRILLON BREYER, J., dissenting leeway |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion. Although I also agree with the result the Court reaches in Part II, I *735 reach that result through a somewhat different path of analysis. For 150 years, this Court has consistently held that a forum State may apply its own statute of limitations period to out-of-state claims even though it is longer or shorter than the limitations period that would be applied by the State out of which the claim arose. See ; ; The main question presented in this case is whether this line of authority has been undermined by more recent case law concerning the constitutionality of state choice-of-law rules.[1] See ; Ins. I conclude that it has not. I start, as did the Court in by emphasizing that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to adopt any particular set of rules of conflict of laws; it merely sets certain minimum requirements which each state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state." The minimum requirements imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause[2] are that a forum State should not apply its law unless it has " `a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.' " quoting *736 The constitutional issue in this case is somewhat more complicated than usual because the question is not the typical one of whether a State can constitutionally apply its substantive law where both it and another State have certain contacts with the litigants and the facts underlying the dispute. Rather the question here is whether a forum State can constitutionally apply its limitations period, which has mixed substantive and procedural aspects, where its contacts with the dispute stem only from its status as the forum. Were statutes of limitations purely substantive, the issue would be an easy one, for where, as here, a forum State has no contacts with the underlying dispute, it has no substantive interests and cannot apply its own law on a purely substantive matter. Nor would the issue be difficult if statutes of limitations were purely procedural, for the contacts a State has with a dispute by virtue of being the forum always create state procedural interests that make application of the forum's law on purely procedural questions "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Statutes of limitations, however, defy characterization as either purely procedural or purely substantive. The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance between, on the one hand, |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | State enacts represents a balance between, on the one hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substantive claims and, on the other hand, a combination of its procedural interest in freeing its courts from adjudicating stale claims and its substantive interest in giving individuals repose from ancient breaches of law. A State that has enacted a particular limitations period has simply determined that after that period the interest in vindicating claims becomes outweighed by the combination of the interests in repose and avoiding stale claims. One cannot neatly categorize this complicated temporal balance as either procedural or substantive. *737 Given the complex of interests underlying statutes of limitations, I conclude that the contact a State has with a claim simply by virtue of being the forum creates a sufficient procedural interest to make the application of its limitations period to wholly out-of-state claims consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This is clearest when the forum State's limitations period is shorter than that of the claim State. A forum State's procedural interest in avoiding the adjudication of stale claims is equally applicable to in-state and out-of-state claims. That the State out of which the claim arose may have concluded that at that shorter period its substantive interests outweigh its procedural interest in avoiding stale claims would not make any difference; it would be " `neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,' " for the forum State to conclude that its procedural interest is more weighty than that of the claim State and requires an earlier time bar, as long as the time bar applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to in-state and out-of-state claims alike. The constitutional question is somewhat less clear where, as here, the forum State's limitations period is longer than that of the claim State. In this situation, the claim State's statute of limitations reflects its policy judgment that at the time the suit was filed the combination of the claim State's procedural interest in avoiding stale claims and its substantive interest in repose outweighs its substantive interest in vindicating the plaintiff's substantive rights. Assuming, for the moment, that each State has an equal substantive interest in the repose of defendants, then a forum State that has concluded that its procedural interest is less weighty than that of the claim State does not act unfairly or arbitrarily in applying its longer limitations period. The claim State does not, after all, have any substantive interest in not vindicating rights it has created. Nor will it do to argue that the forum State has no interest in vindicating the substantive rights of |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | State has no interest in vindicating the substantive rights of nonresidents: the forum State cannot discriminate against *738 nonresidents, and if it has concluded that the substantive rights of its citizens outweigh its procedural interests at that period then it cannot be faulted for applying that determination evenhandedly. If the different limitations periods also reflect differing assessments of the substantive interests in the repose of defendants, however, the issue is more complicated. It is, to begin with, not entirely clear whether the interest in the repose of defendants is an interest the State has as a forum or wholly as the creator of the claim at issue. Even if one assumes the latter, determining whether application of the forum State's longer limitations period would thwart the claim State's substantive interest in repose requires a complex assessment of the relative weights of both States' procedural and substantive interests. For example, a claim State may have a substantive interest in vindicating claims that, at a particular period, outweighs its substantive interest in repose standing alone but not the combination of its interests in repose and avoiding the adjudication of stale claims. Such a State would not have its substantive interest in repose thwarted by the claim's adjudication in a State that professed no procedural interest in avoiding stale claims, even if the forum State had less substantive interest in repose than the claim State, because the forum State would be according the claim State's substantive interests all the weight the claim State gives them. Such efforts to break down and weigh the procedural and substantive components and interests served by the various States' limitations periods would, however, involve a difficult, unwieldy and somewhat artificial inquiry that itself implicates the strong procedural interest any forum State has in having administrable choice-of-law rules. In light of the forum State's procedural interests and the inherent ambiguity of any more refined inquiry in this context, there is some force to the conclusion that the forum State's contacts give it sufficient procedural interests to make it " `neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,' " *739 472 U. S., for the State to have a per se rule of applying its own limitations period to out-of-state claims particularly where, as here, the States out of which the claims arise view their statutes of limitations as procedural. See ante, at 729-730, n. 3. The issue, after all, is not whether the decision to apply forum limitations law is wise as a matter of choice-of-law doctrine but whether the decision is within the range of constitutionally permissible choices, and we |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | is within the range of constitutionally permissible choices, and we have already held that distinctions similar to those offered above "are too unsubstantial to form the basis for constitutional distinctions," This conclusion may not be compelled, but the arguments to the contrary are at best arguable, and any merely arguable inconsistency with our current full-faith-and-credit jurisprudence surely does not merit deviating from 150 years of precedent holding that choosing the forum State's limitations period over that of the claim State is constitutionally permissible. The Court's technique of avoiding close examination of the relevant interests by wrapping itself in the mantle of tradition is as troublesome as it is conclusory. It leads the Court to assert broadly (albeit in dicta) that States do not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause by adjudicating out-of-state claims under the forum's own law on, inter alia, remedies, burdens of proof, and burdens of production. Ante, at 728. The constitutionality of refusing to apply the law of the claim State on such issues was not briefed or argued before this Court, and whether, as the Court asserts without support, there are insufficient reasons for "recharacterizing" these issues (at least in part) as substantive is a question that itself presents multiple issues of enormous difficulty and importance which deserve more than the offhand treatment the Court gives them. *0 Even more troublesome is the Court's sweeping dictum that any choice-of-law practice that is "long established and still subsisting" is constitutional. This statement on its face seems to encompass choice-of-law doctrines on purely substantive issues, and the blind reliance on tradition confuses and conflicts with the full-faith-and-credit test we articulated just three years ago in See also -309, n. 11 (stating that a 1934 case giving "controlling constitutional significance" to a traditional choice-of-law test "has scant relevance for today"). That certain choice-of-law practices have so far avoided constitutional scrutiny by this Court is in any event a poor reason for concluding their constitutional validity. Nor is it persuasive that the practice reflected the rule applied by States or in international law around the time of the adoption of the Constitution, see ante, at 723-726, since "[t]he very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties," Milwaukee not to leave matters unchanged.[3] The Court never offers a satisfactory *1 explanation as to why tradition should enable States to engage in practices that, under our current test, are "arbitrary" or "fundamentally unfair." The broad range of choice-of-law practices that may, in one jurisdiction or another, be |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | choice-of-law practices that may, in one jurisdiction or another, be traditional are not before this Court and have not been surveyed by it, and we can only guess what practices today's opinion *2 approves sight unseen. Nor am I much comforted by the fact that the Court opines on the constitutionality of traditional choice-of-law practices only to the extent they are "still subsisting," for few cases involve challenges to practices that no longer subsist. One wonders as well how future courts will determine which practices are traditional enough (or subsist strongly enough) to be constitutional, and about the utility of requiring courts to focus on such an uncertain and formalistic inquiry rather than on the fairness and arbitrariness of the choice-of-law rule at issue. Indeed, the disarray of the Court's test is amply demonstrated by the fact that two of the Justices necessary to form the Court leave open the issue of whether a forum State could constitutionally refuse to apply a shorter limitations period regarded as substantive by the foreign State, see post, at 3 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), even though in many States the subsisting tradition of applying the forum's limitations period recognizes no exception for limitations periods considered substantive by the foreign State. See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 143 and Reporter's Note (1971) (collecting cases).[4] *3 In short, I fear the Court's rationale will cause considerable mischief with no corresponding benefit. This mischief is all the more unfortunate because it appears to stem from the misperception that this case cannot be resolved without conclusively labeling statutes of limitations as either "procedural" or "substantive." Having asked the wrong question (and an unanswerable one), it is no wonder the Court resorts to tradition rather than analysis to answer it. Because I believe a careful examination of the test and the governmental interests created by the relevant contacts provides narrower and sounder grounds for affirming, I concur in the judgment. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Court properly concludes that Kansas did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause when it chose to apply its own statute of limitations in this case. Different issues might have arisen if Texas, Oklahoma, or Louisiana regarded its own shorter statute of limitations as substantive. Such issues, however, are not presented in this case, and they are appropriately left unresolved. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In my view, however, |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | and II of the Court's opinion. In my view, however, the Supreme Court of Kansas violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause when it concluded that the three States in question would apply the interest rates *4 set forth in the regulations of the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The Court correctly states that misconstruing those States' laws would not by itself have violated the Constitution, for the Full Faith and Credit Clause only required the Kansas court to adhere to law that was clearly established in those States and that had been brought to the Kansas court's attention. See ante, at 730-731. Under the standard the Court articulates, however, the Clause was violated. Each of the three States has a statute setting an interest rate that is different from the FPC rate, and the Supreme Court of Kansas offered no valid reason whatsoever for ignoring those statutory rates. Neither has this Court suggested a colorable argument that could support the Kansas court's decision, and its affirmance of that decision effectively converts an important constitutional guarantee into a precatory admonition. The Kansas courts have applied equitable principles to justify their choice of the FPC interest rate in this and analogous cases. See ante, at 720-722; In Shutts III, we noted that "Oklahoma would most likely apply its constitutional and statutory 6% interest rate rather than the much higher Kansas rates applied in this litigation"; that "Texas has never awarded any such interest at a rate greater than 6%, which corresponds with the Texas constitutional and statutory rate"; and that "[t]he Kansas interest rate also conflicts with the rate which is applicable in Louisiana." and n. 7. We supported each of these propositions with appropriate citations to state law, but remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of Kansas could provide "a more thoroughgoing treatment" of the apparent conflicts between its law and the law of the other three States. We then vacated the judgment in the present case and remanded for reconsideration in light of Shutts III. See Sun Oil On remand, the Supreme Court of Kansas considered the Shutts case first, and then applied the conclusions reached *5 there in the case before us today. See Shutts v. Co., ; When one reviews the reasoning of the Kansas court, an undertaking that the majority omits without explanation, that court's failure to give full effect or any effect to the laws of its sister States becomes unmistakable. Adhering to its equitable theory of unjust enrichment, which it now claimed would be adopted by each of the States whose |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | claimed would be adopted by each of the States whose laws it purported to apply, the Kansas court concluded: "Under equitable principles, the states would imply an agreement binding [the oil and gas company] to pay the funds held in suspense to the royalty owners when the FPC approved the respective rate increases sought by [the company], together with interest at the rates and in accordance with the FPC regulations found in 18 CFR 154.102 (1986) to the time of judgment herein. These funds held by [the company] as stakeholder originated in federal law and are thoroughly permeated with interest fixed by federal law in the FPC regulations" Shutts This conclusion was not supported with so much as a single colorable argument. The Kansas court, for example, took note of the following Texas statute: " `When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all accounts and contracts ascertaining the sum payable, commencing on the thirtieth (30th) day from and after the time when the sum is due and payable.' " 732 P. 2d, at 1298 ) This statute was held inapplicable for the following reason. "No Texas court ever mentioned the higher rates set by federal regulations to which [the oil and gas company] had *6 agreed to comply in its corporate undertaking. This issue has not been determined by the Texas Supreme Court." 732 P. 2d, at 1298 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). Thus, the only reason suggested for ignoring the contrary language of the Texas statute was that the Texas Supreme Court had not specifically rejected the Kansas equitable theory. The court cited no case in which the Kansas theory had ever been proposed to the Texas courts; no case suggesting that the Texas courts would "imply an agreement" by the parties to adopt the FPC rates in these circumstances; and no case from any jurisdiction adopting the Kansas theory under which the funds in question were "thoroughly permeated with interest fixed by federal law." In sum, the Kansas court offered not a single affirmative reason for supposing that the Texas courts would adopt the Kansas theory in the face of the contrary language of the Texas statute. The Supreme Court of Kansas dealt with the following Oklahoma statute in an equally unsatisfactory manner. " `The legal rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) in the absence of any contract as to the rate of interest, and by contract the parties may agree to any rate as may be authorized |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | parties may agree to any rate as may be authorized by law, now in effect or hereinafter enacted.' " ) The Kansas court's entire discussion of this statute was as follows: "In the above cases where interest was awarded, the applicable rate was six percent. However, in First Nat. applying Oklahoma law, a federal circuit court awarded interest at the rate of ten percent as provided in the promissory note and rejected the argument that interest must be limited to Oklahoma's legal rate of six percent. Therefore, in equity, the corporate undertaking entered *7 into by [the oil and gas company] and the FPC would probably be viewed by implication as contractual by the Oklahoma courts and the rates required in 18 CFR 154.102 (1986) would be imposed, rather than the statutory six percent." 240 Kan., The court did not explain why it thought that Oklahoma law could properly be inferred from a decision by a federal court. Nor did the court explain why an express agreement in a promissory note should be considered equivalent to the fictional or "implied" agreement that the court chose to find in the case before it. the defendant was the guarantor of the obligation evidenced by the promissory note.) Once again, the Kansas court read its theory of unjust enrichment into another State's law without a shred of affirmative support for doing so. The applicable Louisiana statute provided that " `[a]ll debts shall bear interest at the rate of seven percent per annum from the time they become due, unless otherwise stipulated.' " 732 P. 2d, at 1307 (quoting La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 1938 (West 1977)) After discussing three irrelevant federal decisions, the Kansas court concluded: "We find Louisiana would apply the FPC rates of interest under equitable principles. Whitehall Oil Co. v. Boagni, [255] La. 67." 732 P. 2d, at 1308. Boagni, a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, does not support the proposition for which it was cited. In that case, an oil and gas company was permitted to recover royalties from its lessors after the FPC revised downwards the gas prices to which the royalties were tied. The Louisiana court reached this conclusion by applying equitable principles "to determine conflicting claims under a contract where there is neither express law nor contractual provisions governing a determination of them." So. 2d 702, This holding does not *8 in any way support the proposition that the Louisiana courts would apply equitable principles to reach a result contrary to that dictated by the language of a Louisiana statute. Thus, the Supreme Court |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | the language of a Louisiana statute. Thus, the Supreme Court of Kansas again concluded that one of its sister States would decline to apply its own statute, and the Kansas court again failed to offer any colorable support for its conclusion. At bottom, the Kansas court's insistence on its equitable theory seems based on nothing more than its conviction that it would have been "fair" for the parties to agree that the oil and gas company should pay the same interest rates for suspended royalty payments arising from approved price increases that the company would have had to pay its customers for refunds arising from disapproved price increases. That is a wholly inadequate basis for concluding that three other States would conclude that the parties did make such an agreement. Even assuming that the result imposed on the parties by the Kansas court was "fair," which is not at all obvious, neither that court nor this Court has given any reason for concluding that the parties to the case before us agreed either to adopt the FPC interest rates or to be bound by the Kansas judiciary's notions of equity. The majority does not discuss the Kansas court's analysis of its sister States' statutes, which clearly indicate that rates of 6% or 7% were applicable. Indeed, the Court appears to think that no analysis was necessary because the Kansas court was not bound by the language of the statutes with which it was confronted. See ante, at 732, n. 4 ("Relief cannot be granted in this Court unless decisions plainly contradicting the Kansas court's interpretations were brought to the Kansas court's attention" (emphasis added; citations omitted)). This suggestion is inconsistent with the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and is not dictated by the holding in any of our previous cases. Nor is the Court on firmer ground when it imagines that the Kansas court merely read "standard contract law" into the statutes of its sister *9 States. The "industry practice" of complying with FPC regulations where they are applicable hardly implies an "industry usage" or "common understanding" under which the terms of those regulations are to be applied in other situations where they are not applicable. Neither the Kansas court nor this Court has pointed to a single instance let alone an "industry practice" in which an oil company and its lessor agreed that the FPC interest rates would apply in circumstances like those presented here. Unless "industry usage" means "practices that the Supreme Court of Kansas thinks are fair," neither standard contract law nor |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | concurring | Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112102/sun-oil-co-v-wortman/ | of Kansas thinks are fair," neither standard contract law nor standard logic will support the majority's attempted defense of the Kansas court's result. Today's decision discards important parts of our decision in Shutts III, and of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Faced with the constitutional obligation to apply the substantive law of another State, a court that does not like that law apparently need take only two steps in order to avoid applying it. First, invent a legal theory so novel or strange that the other State has never had an opportunity to reject it; then, on the basis of nothing but unsupported speculation, "predict" that the other State would adopt that theory if it had the chance. To call this giving full faith and credit to the law of another State ignores the language of the Constitution and leaves it without the capacity to fulfill its purpose. Rather than take such a step, I would remand this case to the Supreme Court of Kansas with instructions to give effect to the interest rates established by law in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. I therefore respectfully dissent. |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109671/united-air-lines-inc-v-evans/ | But for her sex, respondent Carolyn Evans presently would enjoy all of the seniority rights that she seeks through this litigation. Petitioner United Air Lines has denied her those rights pursuant to a policy that perpetuates past discrimination by awarding the choicest jobs to those possessing a *561 credential married women were unlawfully prevented from acquiring: continuous tenure with United. While the complaint respondent filed in the District Court was perhaps inartfully drawn,[1] it adequately draws into question this policy of United's. For the reasons stated in the Court's opinion and in my separate opinion in Teamsters v. United States, ante, at 378, I think it indisputable that, absent 703 (h), the seniority system at issue here would constitute an "unlawful employment practice" under Title VII, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2 (a) (2) (1970 ed., Supp. V). And for the reasons developed at length in my separate opinion in Teamsters, ante, at 381-394, I believe 703 (h) does not immunize seniority systems that perpetuate post-Act discrimination. The only remaining question is whether Ms. Evans' complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Her cause of action accrued, if at all, at the time her seniority was recomputed after she was rehired. Although she apparently failed to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after her seniority was determined, Title VII recognizes that certain violations, once commenced, are continuing in nature. In these instances, discriminatees can file charges at any time up to 180 days after the violation ceases. (They can, however, receive backpay only for the two years preceding the filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. V).) In *562 the instant case, the violationtreating respondent as a new employee even though she was wrongfully forced to resignis continuing to this day. Respondent's charge therefore was not time barred, and the Court of Appeals judgment reinstating her complaint should be affirmed.[2] |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | In this Court held that judicial factfinding that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is permissible under the Sixth Amendment. We granted certiorari to consider whether that decision should be overruled. 568 U. S. (2012). drew a distinction between facts that increase the statutory maximum and facts that increase only the mandatory minimum. We conclude that this distinction is inconsistent with our decision in and with the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. See n. 10, 490. Mandatory minimum sentences in- crease the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any 2 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an “ele- ment” that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, is overruled. I Petitioner Allen Ryan Alleyne and an accomplice de- vised a plan to rob a store manager as he drove the store’s daily deposits to a local bank. By feigning car trouble, they tricked the manager to stop. Alleyne’s accomplice approached the manager with a gun and demanded the store’s deposits, which the manager surrendered. Alleyne was later charged with multiple federal offenses, includ- ing robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S. C. and using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, Section 924(c)(1)(A) pro- vides, in relevant part, that anyone who “uses or carries a firearm” in relation to a “crime of violence” shall: “(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; “(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and “(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.” The jury convicted Alleyne. The jury indicated on the verdict form that Alleyne had “[u]sed or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,” but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was “[b]randished.” App. 40. The presentence report recommended a 7-year sentence on the count, which reflected the mandatory min- imum sentence for cases in which a firearm has been “brandished,” (1)(A)(ii). Alleyne objected to this recommendation. He argued that it was clear from the verdict form that the jury did not find brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt and that he was subject only to the Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of THOMAS, J. 5-year minimum |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of THOMAS, J. 5-year minimum for “us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm.” Al- leyne contended that raising his mandatory minimum sentence based on a sentencing judge’s finding that he brandished a firearm would violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The District Court overruled Alleyne’s objection. It explained that, under brandishing was a sentenc- ing factor that the court could find by a preponderance of evidence without running afoul of the Constitution. It found that the evidence supported a finding of brandish- ing, and sentenced Alleyne to seven years’ imprisonment on the count. The Court of Appeals affirmed, likewise noting that Alleyne’s objection was foreclosed by II The Sixth Amendment provides that those “accused” of a “crime” have the right to a trial “by an impartial jury.” This right, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); In re Winship, (1970). The substance and scope of this right depend upon the proper designation of the facts that are elements of the crime. A The question of how to define a “crime”—and, thus, how to determine what facts must be submitted to the jury— has generated a number of divided opinions from this Court. The principal source of disagreement is the consti- tutional status of a special sort of fact known as a “sen- tencing factor.” This term was first used in v. Pennsylvania, to refer to facts that are not found by a jury but that can still increase the defendant’s punishment. Following ’s introduc- 4 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. tion of this term, this Court has made a number of efforts to delimit its boundaries. initially invoked the distinction between “elements” and “sentencing factors” to reject a constitu- tional challenge to Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, (1982). That law provided that anyone convicted of certain felonies would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence if the judge found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the person “ ‘visibly possessed a firearm’ ” in the course of committing specified n. 1. While the Court acknowledged that there were constitutional limits to the State’s ability to “defin[e] crimes and prescrib[e] penal- ties,” it found that the Commonwealth had permissi- bly defined visible possession as a sentencing factor, rather than an element. at In the Court’s view, this allowed the judge, rather than the jury, to find this fact by a preponderance of evidence without violating the Constitution. did |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | by a preponderance of evidence without violating the Constitution. did not address whether legislatures’ freedom to define facts as sentencing factors extended to findings that increased the maximum term of imprisonment for an offense. We foreshadowed an answer to this question in but did not resolve the issue until There, we identi- fied a concrete limit on the types of facts that legislatures may designate as sentencing factors. In the defendant was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment under a New Jersey statute that increased the maximum term of imprisonment from 10 years to 20 years if the trial judge found that the defendant commit- ted his crime with racial In de- fending its sentencing scheme, the State of New Jersey argued that, under the legislature could define racial bias as a sentencing factor to be found by the judge. We declined to extend that far. We explained Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of THOMAS, J. that there was no “principled basis for treating” a fact increasing the maximum term of imprisonment differently than the facts constituting the base offense. 530 U. S., at 476. The historic link between crime and punishment, instead, led us to conclude that any fact that increased the prescribed statutory maximum sentence must be an “ele- ment” of the offense to be found by the jury. n. 10, 490. We, thus, found that ’s sentence had been unconstitutionally enhanced by the judge’s finding of racial bias by a preponderance of evidence. at 491–492. B While only concerned a judicial finding that increased the statutory maximum, the logic of prompted questions about the continuing vitality, if not validity, of ’s holding that facts found to increase the mandatory minimum sentence are sentencing factors and not elements of the crime. We responded two years later in where we considered the same statutory provision and the same question before us today. In the defendant was charged, under (1)(A), with carrying a firearm in the course of committing a drug trafficking crime. The mandatory minimum sen- tence based on the jury’s verdict alone was five years, but the District Court imposed a 7-year mandatory minimum sentence based on its finding, by a preponderance of evi- dence, that the defendant also brandished the firearm. As in this case, challenged his sentence on the ground that the 7-year mandatory minimum sentence was uncon- stitutional under even though the judge’s find- ing did not alter the maximum sentence to which he was exposed. The Court declined to apply to facts that increased the mandatory minimum sentence but not the 6 |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | that increased the mandatory minimum sentence but not the 6 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. maximum In the Court’s view, judicial factfinding that increased the mandatory minimum did not implicate the Sixth Amendment. Be- cause the jury’s verdict “authorized the judge to impose the minimum with or without the finding,” ib the Court was of the view that the factual basis for increasing the minimum sentence was not “ ‘essential’ ” to the defendant’s punishment. at 560–561 (plurality opinion). Instead, it merely limited the judge’s “choices within the author- ized range.” From this, the Court drew a distinction between “facts increasing the defendant’s minimum sentence and facts extending the sentence be- yond the statutory maximum,” The Court limited ’s holding to instances where the factual finding increases the statutory maximum III Alleyne contends that was wrongly decided and that it cannot be reconciled with our reasoning in We agree. A The touchstone for determining whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an “element” or “ingredient” of the charged offense. United (slip op., at 5); n. 10; J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 52 (5th Am. ed. 1846) (hereinafter Archbold). In we held that a fact is by definition an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury if it increases the punishment above what is otherwise legally 530 U. S., n. 10. While declined to extend this principle to facts increasing mandatory minimum sentences, Appren- di’s definition of “elements” necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of THOMAS, J. the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment. 530 U. S., at 483, n. 10; Facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 At common law, the relationship between crime and punishment was clear. As discussed in “[t]he substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific,” meaning “it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense.” Lang, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany 1700–1900, p. 36 (A. Schioppa ed. 1987) (quoted in ). The system left judges with little sentencing discretion: once the facts of the offense were determined by the jury, the “judge was meant simply to impose |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | by the jury, the “judge was meant simply to impose [the prescribed] ” Lang- at 36–37; see also 3 W. Blackstone, Commen- taries on the Laws of England 396 (1768) (“THE judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the determination and sentence of the law” (emphasis deleted)). This Court has recognized that the same was true, in many instances, early on in this country. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978); see, Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass. 245 (1804) (describing state law that specified a punishment for larceny of damages three times the value of the stolen goods). While some early American statutes provided ranges of permissible sentences, K. Stith & J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 9 the ranges themselves were linked to particular facts constituting the elements of the crime. E.g., (12) (discussing 8 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. arson statute that provided for a sentence of 7 to 14 years where the house was occupied at the time of the offense, but a sentence of 3 to 10 if it was not); Ga. Penal Code (17) (robbery “by open force or violence” was punishable by 4 to 20 years’ imprisonment, while “[r]obbery by intimidation, or without using force and violence,” was punishable by 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment). This linkage of facts with particular sentence ranges (defined by both the minimum and the maximum) reflects the intimate connection between crime and punishment. Consistent with this connection between crime and punishment, various treatises defined “crime” as consist- ing of every fact which “is in law essential to the punish- ment sought to be inflicted,” 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Proce- dure 50 (2d ed. 1872) (hereinafter Bishop), or the whole of the wrong “to which the law affixes punishment,” at 51. See also 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure p. 49 (4th ed. 1895) (defining crime as “that wrongful aggregation [of elements] out of which the punishment proceeds”); Archbold 128 (defining crime to include any fact that “annexes a higher degree of punishment”). Nu- merous high courts agreed that this formulation “accu- rately captured the common-law understanding of what facts are elements of a crime.” 530 U. S., at 511–512 (collecting cases). If a fact was by law essential to the penalty, it was an element of the offense. 2 From these widely recognized principles followed a well- established practice of including in the indictment, and submitting to the jury, every fact that was a basis for imposing or increasing punishment. |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | fact that was a basis for imposing or increasing punishment. While an exhaustive history need not be recounted here, see –509 (detailing practices of American courts from the 1840’s onward), a few particularly salient Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of THOMAS, J. examples illustrate the point. In the defendant was indicted for (and convicted of) larceny. The larceny statute established two levels of sentencing based on whether the value of the stolen property exceeded $100. Because punishment varied with value, the state high court found that value was an element of the offense: “Our statutes, it will be remembered, prescribe the punishment for larceny, with reference to the value of the property stolen; and for this reason, as well as be- cause it is in conformity with long established prac- tice, the court are of [the] opinion that the value of the property alleged to be stolen must be set forth in the indictment.” Numerous other contemporaneous court decisions reflect this same understanding. See, Ritchey v. State, 7 Blackf. 168, 169 (Ind. 1844) (holding that indictment for arson must allege value of property destroyed, because statute set punishment based on value); United States v. Fisher, 25 F. Cas. 10 (No. 15,102) (CC Ohio 1849) (McLean, J.) (“A carrier of the mail is subject to a higher penalty where he steals a letter out of the mail, which contains an article of value. And when this offense is committed, the indictment must allege the letter con- tained an article of value, which aggravates the offense and incurs a higher penalty”). A number of contemporaneous treatises similarly took the view that a fact that increased punishment must be charged in the indictment. As one 19th-century commen- tator explained: “Where a statute annexes a higher degree of punish- ment to a common-law felony, if committed under particular circumstances, an indictment for the offence, in order to bring the defendant within that higher de- gree of punishment, must expressly charge it to have 10 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court been committed under those circumstances, and must state the circumstances with certainty and precision. [2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *170].” Archbold 51 (15th ed. 12). Another explained that “the indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.” Bishop at 51. This rule “enabled [the defendant] to determine the species of of- fence” with which he was charged “in order that he may prepare his defence accordingly and that there may be no doubt |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | his defence accordingly and that there may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, if the defendant be convicted.” Archbold 44 (emphasis added). As the Court noted in “[t]he defendant’s ability to predict with certainty the judgment from the face of the felony indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment with crime.” B Consistent with common-law and early American prac- tice, concluded that any “facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defend- ant is exposed” are elements of the crime. (internal quotation marks omitted); n. 10 (“[F]acts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal offense”).1 We held that the Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to have a jury find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. While limited to facts in- creasing the statutory maximum, the principle applied in applies with equal force to facts increasing the —————— 1 In we recognized a narrow exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior conviction. Because the parties do not contest that decision’s vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court mandatory minimum. It is indisputable that a fact triggering a mandatory minimum alters the prescribed range of sentences to which a criminal defendant is exposed. ; 582 (THOMAS, J., dissent- ing). But for a finding of brandishing, the penalty is five years to life in prison; with a finding of brandishing, the penalty becomes seven years to Just as the maximum of life marks the outer boundary of the range, so seven years marks its floor. And because the legally prescribed range is the penalty affixed to the crime, infra, this page, it follows that a fact increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the offense. (THOMAS, J., concur- ring); see also Bishop at 360–361 (if “a statute pre- scribes a particular punishment to be inflicted on those who commit it under special circumstances which it men- tions, or with particular aggravations,” then those special circumstances must be specified in the indictment (em- phasis added)); 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law p. 291 (rev. 7th ed. 1874) (similar). It is impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the crime. See (BREYER, J., concurring in part and concur- ring in judgment) (facts increasing the minimum and facts increasing the maximum cannot |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | (facts increasing the minimum and facts increasing the maximum cannot be distinguished “in terms of logic”). Indeed, criminal statutes have long speci- fied both the floor and ceiling of sentence ranges, which is evidence that both define the legally prescribed penalty. See, at 7–8; N. Y. Penal Code p. 70 (1882) (punishment for first-degree robbery was 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment; second-degree robbery was 5 to 15 years); Va. Code ch. 192, p. 787 (2d ed. 10) (arson committed at night was punishable by 5 to 10 years; arson committed during the day was 3 to 10 years). This histori- cal practice allowed those who violated the law to know, ex 12 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court ante, the contours of the penalty that the legislature af- fixed to the crime—and comports with the obvious truth that the floor of a mandatory range is as relevant to wrongdoers as the ceiling. A fact that increases a sen- tencing floor, thus, forms an essential ingredient of the offense. Moreover, it is impossible to dispute that facts increas- ing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment. ; O’Brien, 560 U. S., at (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2). Elevating the low-end of a sentenc- ing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime: the defendant’s “expected punishment has increased as a result of the narrowed range” and “the prose- cution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory mini- mum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might wish.” (THOMAS, J., concurring). Why else would Congress link an in- creased mandatory minimum to a particular aggravating fact other than to heighten the consequences for that behavior? See 89 (twice noting that a mandatory minimum “ ‘ups the ante’ ” for a criminal defendant); This reality demonstrates that the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.2 —————— 2 Juries must find any facts that increase either the statutory maxi- mum or minimum because the Sixth Amendment applies where a finding of fact both alters the legally prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates the penalty. Importantly, this is distinct from factfinding used to guide judicial discretion in selecting a punishment “within limits fixed by law.” While such findings of fact may lead judges to select sentences that are more severe than the ones they would have selected without those facts, the Sixth Amendment does not govern that |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | without those facts, the Sixth Amendment does not govern that element of sentencing. Infra, at 15–17, and n. 6. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court Defining facts that increase a mandatory statutory minimum to be part of the substantive offense enables the defendant to predict the legally applicable penalty from the face of the indictment. See 530 U. S., at 478–479. It also preserves the historic role of the jury as an intermediary between the State and criminal defend- ants. See United States v. –511 (“This right was designed ‘to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and ‘was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties’ ” (quoting 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1780, pp. 540–541 (4th ed. 1873))); 100 (1970) (“[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in [its] interposition between the accused and his ac- cuser”); (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government”). In adopting a contrary conclusion, relied on the fact that the 7-year minimum sentence could have been imposed with or without a judicial finding of brandishing, because the jury’s finding already authorized a sentence of five years to The dissent repeats this argument today. See post, at 5 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (“The jury’s verdict authorized the judge to impose the precise sentence he imposed for the precise factual reason he imposed it”). While undoubtedly true, this fact is beside the point.3 —————— 3 rejected an argument similar to the one advanced in Har- ris. In the State of New Jersey argued that increasing the defendant’s statutory maximum on the challenged count did not violate the Sixth Amendment because “the judge could have imposed consecu- tive sentences,” in conjunction with other counts, to produce the sen- tence that the defendant actually received on the count at issue. 530 U. S., at 474. We found that this possibility did not preclude a Sixth 14 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court As noted, the essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an element of the crime. When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury. It is no answer to say that the defendant could |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | It is no answer to say that the defendant could have received the same sentence with or without that fact. It is obvious, for example, that a defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for assault, if the jury only finds the facts for larceny, even if the punishments prescribed for each crime are identical. One reason is that each crime has different elements and a defendant can be convicted only if the jury has found each element of the crime of conviction. Similarly, because the fact of brandishing aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless of what sen- tence the defendant might have received if a different range had been applicable. Indeed, if a judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range (i.e., the range applicable without that aggravating fact). Cf. Hobbs v. State, 44 Tex. 353 (1875) (reversing conviction where the defendant was indicted for a crime punishable by 2 to 5 years and sen- tenced to 3 years because the trial court improperly in- structed the jury to sentence the defendant between 2 to 10 years if it found a particular aggravating fact); State v. Callahan, (finding ex post facto violation where a newly enacted law increased the range of punishment, even though defendant was sen- tenced within the range established by the prior law).4 —————— Amendment violation. 4 Many criminal statutes allow for this possibility. For example, an Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court The essential point is that the aggravating fact produced a higher range, which, in turn, conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. It must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Because there is no basis in principle or logic to dis- tinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the minimum, was inconsistent with Ap- prendi. It is, accordingly, overruled.5 C In holding that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury, we take care to note what our holding does not entail. Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discre- tion must be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. See, Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. (slip op., at 11) (“[W]ithin established limits[,] the exercise of [sentencing] discretion does not contravene the Sixth —————— Illinois law provides for a sentence of 2 to 10 years’ imprisonment for intimidation, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, and 3 to 14 years for aggravated intimidation, The elements of aggravated intimidation include all the elements of intimidation plus one enumerated aggravating fact. Under this statute, if a jury found each element of intimidation, but the judge purported to find a fact that elevated the offense to aggravated intimidation, the Sixth Amendment would most certainly be violated, even if the defendant received a sentence that fell within both ranges. See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:52 (West 2007) (sentencing range for simple arson is 2 to 15 years; sentencing range for aggravated arson is 6 to 20 years); Mont. Code Ann. 5–303(2) (sentencing range for kid- napping is 2 to 10 years, but 2 to life for aggravated kidnapping). 5 The force of stare decisis is at its nadir in cases concerning proce- dural rules that implicate fundamental constitutional protections. Because is irreconcilable with the reasoning of and the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, we follow the latter. 16 ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court Amendment even if it is informed by judge-found facts” (emphasis deleted and internal quotation marks omitted)); (“[N]othing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judg- ment within the range prescribed by statute”).6 This position has firm historical roots as well. As Bishop explained: “[W]ithin the limits of any discretion as to the pun- ishment which the law may have allowed, the judge, when he pronounces sentence, may suffer his discre- tion to be influenced by matter shown in aggravation or mitigation, not covered by the allegations of the in- dictment.” Bishop at 54. “[E]stablishing what punishment is available by law and setting a specific punishment within the bounds that the law has prescribed are two different things.” Our decision today is wholly consistent with the broad discretion of judges to select a sentence within the range authorized by law. IV Here, the sentencing range supported by the jury’s verdict was five years’ imprisonment to The District —————— 6 See also United (judges may exercise sentencing discretion through “an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [they] may consider, |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Alleyne v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/903985/alleyne-v-united-states/ | either as to the kind of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it may come”); (“[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England prac- ticed a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law”). Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of THOMAS, J. Opinion of the Court Court imposed the 7-year mandatory minimum sentence based on its finding by a preponderance of evidence that the firearm was “brandished.” Because the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the defendant was subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge, rather than the jury, found brandishing, thus violating petition- er’s Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we vacate the Fourth Circuit’s judgment with respect to Alleyne’s sentence on the (1)(A) conviction and remand the case for resentencing con- sistent with the jury’s verdict. It is so ordered. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 11–9335 ALLEN RYAN ALLEYNE, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | We consider whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by making an arrest based on probable cause but prohibited by state law. I On February 20, 200, two City of Portsmouth police officers stopped a car driven by David Lee Moore. They had heard over the police radio that a person known as "Chubs" was driving with a suspended license, and one of the officers knew Moore by that nickname. The officers determined that Moore's license was in fact suspended, and arrested him for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license, which is punishable under Virginia law by a year in jail and a $2,500 fine, Va.Code Ann. 18.2-11, 18.2-272, 46.2-01(C) The officers subsequently searched Moore and found that he was carrying 16 grams of crack cocaine and $516 in cash.[1] See ; Under state law, the officers should have issued Moore a summons instead of arresting him. Driving on a suspended license, like some other misdemeanors, is not an arrestable offense except as to those who "fail or refuse to discontinue" the violation, and those whom the officer reasonably believes to be likely to disregard a summons, or likely to harm themselves or others. Va.Code Ann. 19.2-74 The intermediate appellate court found none of these circumstances applicable, and Virginia did not appeal that determination. See n. -97, n. Virginia also permits arrest for driving on a suspended license in jurisdictions where "prior general approval has been granted by order of the general district court," Va.Code Ann. 46.2-96; Virginia has never claimed such approval was in effect in the county where Moore was arrested. Moore was charged with possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute it in violation of Virginia law. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence from the arrest search. Virginia law does not, as a general matter, require suppression of evidence obtained in violation of state law. See Moore argued, however, that suppression was required by the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, and after a bench trial found Moore guilty of the drug charge and sentenced him to a 5-year prison term, with one year and six months of the sentence suspended. The conviction was reversed by a panel of Virginia's intermediate court on Fourth Amendment grounds, reinstated by the intermediate court sitting en banc, 622 S.E.2d 25 and finally reversed again by the Virginia Supreme 66 S.E.2d, at 400. The reasoned that since the arresting officers should have issued Moore a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation, the arrest search |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | does not permit search incident to citation, the arrest search violated the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari. 551 U.S. II The Fourth Amendment protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures" of (among other things) the person. In determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history. We look to the statutes and common law of the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve. See 14 L. Ed. 2d 408 ; 91, 11 L. Ed. 2d 976 We are aware of no historical indication that those who ratified the Fourth Amendment understood it as a redundant guarantee of whatever limits on search and seizure legislatures might have enacted.[2]*160 The immediate object of the Fourth Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of assistance that English judges had employed against the colonists, ; 445 U.S. 57, 58-, 100 S. Ct. 171, 6 L. Ed. 2d 69 That suggests, if anything, that founding-era citizens were skeptical of using the rules for search and seizure set by government actors as the index of reasonableness. Joseph Story, among others, saw the Fourth Amendment as "little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law," Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1895, p. 748 (18), which Story defined in opposition to statutes, see Codification of the Common Law in The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story 698, 699, 701 (W. Story ed. 1852). No early case or commentary, to our knowledge, suggested the Amendment was intended to incorporate subsequently enacted statutes. None of the early Fourth Amendment cases that scholars have identified sought to base a constitutional claim on a violation of a state or federal statute concerning arrest. See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L.Rev. 547, 61-614 ;[] see also T. Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 44-45 (1969). Of course such a claim would not have been available against state officers, since the Fourth Amendment was a restriction only upon federal power, see Barron ex rel. 7 Pet. 24, (18). But early Congresses tied the arrest authority of federal officers to state laws of arrest. See United States v. Di Re, 2 U.S. 581, ; United 42 U.S. 411, Moreover, even though several state constitutions also prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures, citizens who claimed officers had violated state restrictions on arrest did not claim that the violations also ran afoul of the state constitutions.[4] The apparent absence of such litigation is particularly striking in light of the fact that searches incident to warrantless arrests (which is |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | the fact that searches incident to warrantless arrests (which is to say arrests in which the officer was not insulated from private suit) were, as one commentator has put it, "taken for granted" at the founding, as were warrantless arrests themselves, *1604 Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 757, 764 (1994). There are a number of possible explanations of why such constitutional claims were not raised. Davies, for example, argues that actions taken in violation of state law could not qualify as state action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints. 98 Mich. L.Rev., at 660-66. Be that as it may, as Moore adduces neither case law nor commentaries to support his view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate statutes, this is "not a case in which the claimant can point to `a clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since.'" 52 U.S. 18, 45, 121 S. Ct. 156, III A When history has not provided a conclusive answer, we have analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Houghton, 526 U.S., at 00, ; see also 52 U.S., at 46, 121 S. Ct. 156. That methodology provides no support for Moore's Fourth Amendment claim. In a long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable. at 54, 121 S. Ct. 156; see also, e.g., 54 U.S. 146, 160 L. Ed. 2d 57 ; U.S. 10, 4 L. Ed. 2d 54 ; 8 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 102, 9 L. Ed. 1879 Our decisions counsel against changing this calculus when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires. We have treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law. In 86 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 70 we reversed a state court that had held the search of a seized vehicle to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment because state law did not explicitly authorize the search. We concluded that whether state law authorized the search was irrelevant. States, we said, remained free "to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution," but regardless of state rules, police could search a lawfully seized vehicle as a matter of federal constitutional law. In 486 U.S. 5, 100 L. Ed. 2d 0 we held that search of an individual's garbage forbidden by California's Constitution was not forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. "[W]hether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," we said, has never "depend[ed] on the law of the particular State in which the search occurs." at 4, While "[i]ndividual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution," ib state law did not alter the content of the Fourth Amendment. We have applied the same principle in the seizure context. 15 L. Ed. 2d 89 held that police officers had acted reasonably in stopping a car, *1605 even though their action violated regulations limiting the authority of plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles. We thought it obvious that the Fourth Amendment's meaning did not change with local law enforcement practiceseven practices set by rule. While those practices "vary from place to place and from time to time," Fourth Amendment protections are not "so variable" and cannot "be made to turn upon such trivialities." Some decisions earlier than these excluded evidence obtained in violation of state law, but those decisions rested on our supervisory power over the federal courts, rather than the Constitution. In Di Re, 2 U.S. 581, federal and state officers collaborated in an investigation that led to an arrest for a federal crime. The Government argued that the legality of an arrest for a federal offense was a matter of federal law. at We concluded, however, that since Congress had provided that arrests with warrants must be made in accordance with state law, the legality of arrests without warrants should also be judged according to state-law standards. at -590, This was plainly not a rule we derived from the Constitution, however, because we repeatedly invited Congress to change it by statutesaying that state law governs the validity of a warrantless arrest "in [the] absence of an applicable federal statute," at and that the Di Re rule applies "except in those cases where Congress has enacted a federal rule," at -590, Later decisions did not expand the rule of Di Re. U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 67, 92 L. Ed. 46 relied on Di Re to suppress evidence obtained under circumstances identical in relevant respects to those in that case. See U.S., at 12, 15, |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | to those in that case. See U.S., at 12, 15, n. 5, 68 S. Ct. 67. And 44 U.S. 1, 61 L. Ed. 2d 4 upheld a warrantless arrest in a case where compliance with state law was not at issue. While our opinion said that "[w]hether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law," it also said that a warrantless arrest satisfies the Constitution so long as the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime." at 6, We need not pick and choose among the dicta: Neither Di Re nor the cases following it held that violations of state arrest law are also violations of the Fourth Amendment, and our more recent decisions, discussed above, have indicated that when States go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections concerning search and seizure remain the same. B We are convinced that the approach of our prior cases is correct, because an arrest based on probable cause serves interests that have long been seen as sufficient to justify the seizure. ; at 54, 121 S. Ct. 156 Moore argues that a State has no interest in arrest when it has a policy against arresting for certain crimes. That is not so, because arrest will still ensure a suspect's appearance at trial, prevent him from continuing his offense, and enable officers to investigate the incident more thoroughly. State arrest restrictions are *1606 more accurately characterized as showing that the State values its interests in forgoing arrests more highly than its interests in making them, see, e.g., Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, D. Whitcomb, B. Lewin, & M. Levine, Issues and Practices: Citation Release 17 (Mar.1984) (describing cost savings as a principal benefit of citation-release ordinances); or as showing that the State places a higher premium on privacy than the Fourth Amendment requires. A State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. If we concluded otherwise, we would often frustrate rather than further state policy. Virginia chooses to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment requires, but it also chooses not to attach to violations of its arrest rules the potent remedies that federal courts have applied to Fourth Amendment violations. Virginia does not, for example, ordinarily exclude from criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of its statutes. See ). Moore would allow |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | in violation of its statutes. See ). Moore would allow Virginia to accord enhanced protection against arrest only on pain of accompanying that protection with federal remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, which often include the exclusionary rule. States unwilling to lose control over the remedy would have to abandon restrictions on arrest altogether. This is an odd consequence of a provision designed to protect against searches and seizures. Even if we thought that state law changed the nature of the Commonwealth's interests for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we would adhere to the probable-cause standard. In determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we have given great weight to the "essential interest in readily administrable rules." 52 U.S., at 47, 121 S. Ct. 156. In we acknowledged that nuanced judgments about the need for warrantless arrest were desirable, but we nonetheless declined to limit to felonies and disturbances of the peace the Fourth Amendment rule allowing arrest based on probable cause to believe a law has been broken in the presence of the arresting officer. at 46-47, 121 S. Ct. 156. The rule extends even to minor misdemeanors, we concluded, because of the need for a bright-line constitutional standard. If the constitutionality of arrest for minor offenses turned in part on inquiries as to risk of flight and danger of repetition, officers might be deterred from making legitimate arrests. at 51, 121 S. Ct. 156. We found little to justify this cost, because there was no "epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests," and hence "a dearth of horribles demanding redress." at 5, 121 S. Ct. 156. Incorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the one we rejected in The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed. The Virginia statute in this case, for example, calls on law enforcement officers to weigh just the sort of case-specific factors that said would deter legitimate arrests if made part of the constitutional inquiry. It would authorize arrest if a misdemeanor suspect fails or refuses to discontinue the unlawful act, or if the officer believes the suspect to be likely to disregard a summons. Va. *1607 Code Ann. 19.2-74.A.1. specifically noted the "extremely poor judgment" displayed in arresting a local resident who would "almost certainly" have discontinued the offense and who had "no place to hide and no incentive to flee." 52 U.S., at 46-47, 121 S. Ct. 156. It nonetheless declined to make those considerations part of the |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | It nonetheless declined to make those considerations part of the constitutional calculus. differs from this case in only one significant respect: It considered (and rejected) federal constitutional remedies for all minor-misdemeanor arrests; Moore seeks them in only that subset of minor-misdemeanor arrests in which there is the least to be gainedthat is, where the State has already acted to constrain officers' discretion and prevent abuse. Here we confront fewer horribles than in and less of a need for redress. Finally, linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would cause them to "vary from place to place and from time to time," 517 U.S., Even at the same place and time, the Fourth Amendment's protections might vary if federal officers were not subject to the same statutory constraints as state officers. In 64 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 147, we noted the practical difficulties posed by the "silver-platter doctrine," which had imposed more stringent limitations on federal officers than on state police acting independent of them. It would be strange to construe a constitutional provision that did not apply to the States at all when it was adopted to now restrict state officers more than federal officers, solely because the States have passed search-and-seizure laws that are the prerogative of independent sovereigns. We conclude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections. IV Moore argues that even if the Constitution allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him. We have recognized, however, that officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. United 8 L. Ed. 2d 427 (). We have described this rule as covering any "lawful arrest," at 25, with constitutional law as the reference point. That is to say, we have equated a lawful arrest with an arrest based on probable cause: "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Moore correctly notes that several important state-court decisions have defined the lawfulness of arrest in terms of compliance with state law. See Brief for Respondent 2- (citing 27 N.Y. 19, 142 N.E. 58, (192); 242 N.Y. 1, ). But it is not surprising that States have used "lawful" as shorthand for compliance with state law, while our constitutional |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | Virginia v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145814/virginia-v-moore/ | as shorthand for compliance with state law, while our constitutional decision in Robinson used "lawful" as shorthand for compliance with constitutional constraints. The interests justifying search are present whenever an officer makes an arrest. A search enables officers to safeguard evidence, and, most critically, to ensure their safety during "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." Robinson, *1608 at 24-25, Officers issuing citations do not face the same danger, and we therefore held in 525 U.S. 11, that they do not have the same authority to search. We cannot agree with the Virginia Supreme that Knowles controls here. The state officers arrested Moore, and therefore faced the risks that are "an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification." Robinson, at 25, The Virginia Supreme may have concluded that Knowles required the exclusion of evidence seized from Moore because, under state law, the officers who arrested Moore should have issued him a citation instead. This argument might have force if the Constitution forbade Moore's arrest, because we have sometimes excluded evidence obtained through unconstitutional methods in order to deter constitutional violations. See Wong 71 U.S. 471, 8 S. Ct. 407, (196). But the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone, and as we have just concluded, it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest. * * * We reaffirm against a novel challenge what we have signaled for more than half a century. When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety. The judgment of the Supreme of Virginia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | second_dissenting | United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108841/united-states-v-12-200-ft-reels-of-super-8mm-film/ | We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of 19 U.S. C. 1305(a), which prohibits all persons from "importing into the United States from any foreign country any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or other representation, figure, or image on or of paper or other material, or any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or immoral." Pursuant to that provision, customs authorities at Los Angeles seized certain movie films, color slides, photographs, and other materials, which claimant sought to import into the United States. A complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California for forfeiture of these items as obscene. Relying on the decision in United which held the statute unconstitutional on its face, the District Court dismissed the complaint. Although we subsequently reversed the decision in United the reasoning that led us to uphold the statute is no longer viable, under the view expressed in my dissent today in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, p. 73. Whatever the extent of the Federal Government's power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is, in my view, clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face. See my dissent in Miller v. California, ante, at 47. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | concurring | Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121157/gonzaga-univ-v-doe/ | The ultimate question, in respect to whether private individuals may bring a lawsuit to enforce a federal statute, through 42 U.S. C. or otherwise, is a question of congressional intent. In my view, the factors set forth in this Court's cases are helpful indications of that intent. See, e. g., ; ; ; But the statute books are too many, the laws too diverse, and their purposes too complex, for any single legal formula to offer more than general guidance. I would not, in effect, predetermine an outcome through the use of a presumptionsuch as the majority's presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth "unambiguously" in the statute's "text and structure." See ante, at 280, 288. At the same time, I do not believe that Congress intended private judicial enforcement of this statute's "school record privacy" provisions. The Court mentions most of the considerations I find persuasive: The phrasing of the relevant prohibition (stating that "[n]o funds shall be made available" to institutions with a "policy or practice" of permitting the release of "education records"), see ante, at 288, n. 6, 288 289; the total absence (in the relevant statutory provision) of any reference to individual "rights" or the like, see ante, at 287; the related provisions that make clear, by creating administrative enforcement processes, that the Spending Clause was not simply a device to obtain federal jurisdiction, *292 see ante, at 289-290; and later statutory insistence upon centralized federal enforcement at the national, not the regional, level, see ante, at 290. I would add one further reason. Much of the statute's key language is broad and nonspecific. The statute, for example, defines its key term, "education records," as (with certain enumerated exceptions) "those records, files, documents, and other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational institution." 20 U.S. C. 1232g(a)(4)(A). This kind of language leaves schools uncertain as to just when they can, or cannot, reveal various kinds of information. It has led, or could lead, to legal claims that would limit, or forbid, such practices as peer grading, see Owasso Independent School Dist. No. teacher evaluations, see school "honor society" recommendations, see or even roll call responses and "bad conduct" marks written down in class, see Tr. of Oral Arg. in O. T. 2001, No. 00-1073, pp. 37-38. And it is open to interpretations that invariably favor confidentiality almost irrespective of conflicting educational needs or the importance, or common sense, of limited disclosures in certain circumstances, say, where individuals are being considered for work with |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | The question in this case is whether the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act), 28 U.S. C. 2680(a), bars a suit based on the Government's licensing of an oral polio vaccine and on its subsequent approval of the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public. I On May 10, 1979, Kevan Berkovitz, then a 2-month-old infant, ingested a dose of Orimune, an oral polio vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories. Within one month, he contracted a severe case of polio. The disease left Berkovitz almost completely paralyzed and unable to breathe without the assistance of a respirator. The Communicable Disease Center, an agency of the Federal Government, determined that Berkovitz had contracted polio from the vaccine. Berkovitz, joined by his parents as guardians, subsequently filed suit against the United in Federal District Court.[1] The complaint alleged that the United was liable for his injuries under the FTCA, 28 U.S. C. 16(b), 2674, because the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS), then a part of the National Institutes of Health, had acted wrongfully in licensing Lederle Laboratories to produce Orimune and because the Bureau of Biologics of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had acted wrongfully in approving release to the public of the particular lot of vaccine containing Berkovitz's dose. According to petitioners, these actions violated federal law and policy regarding the inspection and approval of polio vaccines. The Government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the agency actions fell within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The District Court denied this motion, concluding *5 that neither the licensing of Orimune nor the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public was a "discretionary function" within the meaning of the FTCA. Civ. Action No. 84-2893 (WD Pa., Apr. 30, 1986). At the Government's request, the District Court certified its decision for immediate appeal to the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The court initially rejected the Government's argument that the discretionary function exception bars all claims arising out of the regulatory activities of federal agencies. The court stated that "the discretionary function exception is inapplicable to non-discretionary regulatory actions," and noted that employees of regulatory agencies have no discretion to violate the command of federal statutes or regulations. Contrary to petitioners' claim, however, the court held that federal law imposed no duties on federal agencies with respect to the licensing of polio |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | on federal agencies with respect to the licensing of polio virus vaccines or the approval of the distribution of particular vaccine lots to the public. Likening the applicable regulatory scheme to the scheme found to confer discretionary regulatory authority in United the court concluded that the licensing and release of polio vaccines were wholly discretionary actions and, as such, could not form the basis for suit against the United A dissenting judge argued that the relevant statutes and regulations obligated the DBS to require the submission of test data relating to a vaccine from the manufacturer and to deny a license when the test data showed that the vaccine failed to conform with applicable safety standards. Reading the complaint in this case as alleging a failure on the part of the DBS to act in accordance with these directives, the dissenting judge concluded that the discretionary function exception did not bar petitioners' suit. We granted certiorari, to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the effect of the discretionary *535 function exception on claims arising from the Government's regulation of polio vaccines. Compare ; We now reverse the Third Circuit's judgment. II The FTCA, 28 U.S. C. 16(b), generally authorizes suits against the United for damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."[2] The Act includes a number of exceptions to this broad waiver of sovereign immunity. The exception relevant to this case provides that no liability shall lie for "[a]ny claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S. C. 2680(a). *536 This exception, as we stated in our most recent opinion on the subject, "marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals." United The determination of whether the discretionary function exception bars a suit against the Government is guided by several established principles. This Court stated in Varig that "it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case." In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice. See Thus, the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee's conduct cannot appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect. Cf. Moreover, assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. The basis for the discretionary function exception was Congress' desire to "prevent judicial *537 `second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort." United The exception, properly construed, therefore protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. See In sum, the discretionary function exception insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. This Court's decision in Varig illustrates these propositions. The two cases resolved in that decision were tort suits by the victims of airplane accidents who alleged that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had acted negligently in certifying certain airplanes for operation. The Court characterized the suits as challenging the FAA's decision to certify the airplanes without first inspecting them and held that this decision was a discretionary act for which the Government was immune from liability. In reaching this result, the Court carefully reviewed the statutory and regulatory scheme governing the inspection and certification of airplanes. Congress had given the Secretary of Transportation broad authority to establish and implement a program for enforcing compliance with airplane safety standards. In the exercise of that authority, the FAA, as the Secretary's designee, had devised a system of "spot-checking" airplanes for compliance. This Court first held that the establishment of that system was a discretionary function within the meaning of the FTCA because it represented a policy determination as to how best to "accommodat[e] the goal of air transportation safety and the reality of finite agency |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | of air transportation safety and the reality of finite agency resources." The Court then stated that the discretionary function exception also protected "the acts of FAA employees in executing the `spot-check' program" because under this program the employees "were specifically empowered *538 to make policy judgments regarding the degree of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maximize compliance with FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency resources." Thus, the Court held the challenged acts protected from liability because they were within the range of choice accorded by federal policy and law and were the results of policy determinations.[3] In restating and clarifying the scope of the discretionary function exception, we intend specifically to reject the Government's argument, pressed both in this Court and the Court of Appeals, that the exception precludes liability for any and all acts arising out of the regulatory programs of federal agencies. That argument is rebutted first by the language of the exception, which protects "discretionary" functions, rather than "regulatory" functions. The significance of Congress' choice of language is supported by the legislative history. As this Court previously has indicated, the relevant legislative materials demonstrate that the exception was designed to cover not all acts of regulatory agencies and their employees, but only such acts as are "discretionary" in nature.[4] See at 33-. *539 This coverage accords with Congress' purpose in enacting the exception: to prevent "[j]udicial intervention in the political, social, and economic judgments" of governmental including regulatory agencies. United Moreover, this Court twice before has rejected a variant of the Government's position. See Indian Towing Co. v. United ; Rayonier, Inc. v. United[5] And in Varig, we ignored the precise argument the Government makes in this case, focusing instead on the particular nature of the regulatory conduct at issue. To the extent we have not already put the Government's argument to rest, we do so now. The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. The question in this case is whether the governmental activities challenged by petitioners are of this discretionary nature. III Petitioners' suit raises two broad claims. First, petitioners assert that the DBS violated a federal statute and *540 accompanying regulations in issuing a license to Lederle Laboratories to produce Orimune. Second, petitioners argue that the Bureau of Biologics of the FDA violated federal regulations and policy in approving the release of the particular lot of Orimune that contained Kevan Berkovitz's dose. We examine each of these broad claims by reviewing the applicable regulatory |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | each of these broad claims by reviewing the applicable regulatory scheme and petitioners' specific allegations of agency wrongdoing.[6] Because the decision we review adjudicated a motion to dismiss, we accept all of the factual allegations in petitioners' complaint as true and ask whether, in these circumstances, dismissal of the complaint was appropriate. A Under federal law, a manufacturer must receive a product license prior to marketing a brand of live oral polio vaccine. See as amended, 42 U.S. C. 262(a). In order to become eligible for such a license, a manufacturer must first make a sample of the vaccine product. See 42 CFR 73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 601.2[7] This process *541 begins with the selection of an original virus strain. The manufacturer grows a seed virus from this strain; the seed virus is then used to produce monopools, portions of which are combined to form the consumer-level product. Federal regulations set forth safety criteria for the original strain, see 42 CFR 73.110(b)(2) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 630.10(b)(2) the seed virus, see 42 CFR 73.110(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 630.10(b)(3), (4) and the vaccine monopools, see 42 CFR 73.114 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 630.16 Under the regulations, the manufacturer must conduct a variety of tests to measure the safety of the product at each stage of the manufacturing process. See 42 CFR 73.110, 73.114 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 630.10, 630.16 Upon completion of the manufacturing process and the required testing, the manufacturer is required to submit an application for a product license to the DBS. See 42 CFR 73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 601.2[8] In addition to this application, the manufacturer must submit data from the tests performed and a sample of the finished product. In deciding whether to issue a license, the DBS is required to comply with certain statutory and regulatory provisions. The Public Health Service Act provides: "Licenses for the maintenance of establishments for the propagation or manufacture and preparation of products [including polio vaccines] may be issued only upon a showing that the establishment and the products for which a license is desired meet standards, designed to insure the continued safety, purity, and potency of such products, prescribed in regulations, and licenses for new products may be issued only upon a showing that they *542 meet such standards. All such licenses shall be issued, suspended, and revoked as prescribed by regulations." 351(d), -703, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 262(d). A regulation similarly provides that "[a] product license shall be issued only upon examination of the product and upon a determination that the product complies with |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | product and upon a determination that the product complies with the standards prescribed in the regulations" 42 CFR 73.5(a) (Supp. 1964); see 21 CFR 601.4 In addition, a regulation states that "[a]n application for license shall not be considered as filed" until the DBS receives the information and data regarding the product that the manufacturer is required to submit. 42 CFR 73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 601.2 These statutory and regulatory provisions require the DBS, prior to issuing a product license, to receive all data the manufacturer is required to submit, to examine the product, and to make a determination that the product complies with safety standards. Petitioners' first allegation with regard to the licensing of Orimune is that the DBS issued a product license without first receiving data that the manufacturer must submit showing how the product, at the various stages of the manufacturing process, matched up against regulatory safety standards. See App. 12-13; Brief for Petitioners 5-6. The discretionary function exception does not bar a cause of action based on this allegation. The statute and regulations described above require, as a precondition to licensing, that the DBS receive certain test data from the manufacturer relating to the product's compliance with regulatory standards. See 351(d), -703, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 262(d) (providing that a license shall issue "only upon a showing" by the manufacturer); 42 CFR 73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 601.2 The DBS has no discretion to issue a license without first receiving the required test data; to do so would violate a specific statutory *543 and regulatory directive. Accordingly, to the extent that petitioners' licensing claim is based on a decision of the DBS to issue a license without having received the required test data, the discretionary function exception imposes no bar. Petitioners' other allegation regarding the licensing of Orimune is difficult to describe with precision. Petitioners contend that the DBS licensed Orimune even though the vaccine did not comply with certain regulatory safety standards. See App. 12; Brief for Petitioners 4-6.[9] This charge may be understood in any of three ways. First, petitioners may mean that the DBS licensed Orimune without first making a determination as to whether the vaccine complied with regulatory standards. Second, petitioners may intend to argue that the DBS specifically found that Orimune failed to comply with certain regulatory standards and nonetheless issued a license for the vaccine's manufacture. Third, petitioners may concede that the DBS made a determination of compliance, but allege that this determination was incorrect. Neither *544 petitioners' complaint nor their briefs and argument before this Court make |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | complaint nor their briefs and argument before this Court make entirely clear their theory of the case. If petitioners aver that the DBS licensed Orimune either without determining whether the vaccine complied with regulatory standards or after determining that the vaccine failed to comply, the discretionary function exception does not bar the claim. Under the scheme governing the DBS's regulation of polio vaccines, the DBS may not issue a license except upon an examination of the product and a determination that the product complies with all regulatory standards. See 42 CFR 73.5(a) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 601.4 The agency has no discretion to deviate from this mandated procedure.[10] Petitioners' claim, if interpreted as alleging that the DBS licensed Orimune in the absence of a determination that the vaccine complied with regulatory standards, therefore does not challenge a discretionary function. Rather, the claim charges a failure on the part of the agency to perform its clear duty under federal law. When a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply. If petitioners' claim is that the DBS made a determination that Orimune complied with regulatory standards, but that the determination was incorrect, the question of the applicability of the discretionary function exception requires a somewhat *545 different analysis. In that event, the question turns on whether the manner and method of determining compliance with the safety standards at issue involve agency judgment of the kind protected by the discretionary function exception.[11] Petitioners contend that the determination involves the application of objective scientific standards, see Brief for Petitioners 16-17, whereas the Government asserts that the determination incorporates considerable "policy judgment," Brief for United 36. In making these assertions, the parties have framed the issue appropriately; application of the discretionary function exception to the claim that the determination of compliance was incorrect hinges on whether the agency officials making that determination permissibly exercise policy choice. The parties, however, have not addressed this question in detail, and they have given us no indication of the way in which the DBS interprets and applies the regulations setting forth the criteria for compliance. Given that these regulations are particularly abstruse, we hesitate to decide the question on the scanty record before us. We therefore leave it to the District Court to decide, if petitioners choose to press this claim, whether agency officials appropriately exercise policy judgment in determining that a vaccine product complies with the relevant safety standards. B The regulatory scheme governing release of vaccine lots is distinct from that governing |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | governing release of vaccine lots is distinct from that governing the issuance of licenses. The former set of regulations places an obligation on manufacturers to examine all vaccine lots prior to distribution to ensure that they comply with regulatory standards. See 21 CFR *546 610.1 (1978).[12] These regulations, however, do not impose a corresponding duty on the Bureau of Biologics. Although the regulations empower the Bureau to examine any vaccine lot and prevent the distribution of a noncomplying lot, see 21 CFR 610.2(a) (1978), they do not require the Bureau to take such action in all cases. The regulations generally allow the Bureau to determine the appropriate manner in which to regulate the release of vaccine lots, rather than mandating certain kinds of agency action. The regulatory scheme governing the release of vaccine lots is substantially similar in this respect to the scheme discussed in United Given this regulatory context, the discretionary function exception bars any claims that challenge the Bureau's formulation of policy as to the appropriate way in which to regulate the release of vaccine lots. Cf. In addition, if the policies and programs formulated by the Bureau allow room for implementing officials to make independent policy judgments, the discretionary function exception protects the acts taken by those officials in the exercise of this discretion. Cf. The discretionary function exception, however, does not apply if the acts complained of do not involve the permissible exercise of policy discretion. Thus, if the Bureau's policy leaves no room for an official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or if the act simply does *547 not involve the exercise of such judgment, the discretionary function exception does not bar a claim that the act was negligent or wrongful. Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United Viewed in light of these principles, petitioners' claim regarding the release of the vaccine lot from which Kevan Berkovitz received his dose survives the Government's motion to dismiss. Petitioners allege that, under the authority granted by the regulations, the Bureau of Biologics has adopted a policy of testing all vaccine lots for compliance with safety standards and preventing the distribution to the public of any lots that fail to comply. Petitioners further allege that notwithstanding this policy, which allegedly leaves no room for implementing officials to exercise independent policy judgment, employees of the Bureau knowingly approved the release of a lot that did not comply with safety standards. See App. 13; Brief for Petitioners 20-21; Reply Brief for Petitioners 15-17. Thus, petitioners' complaint is directed at a governmental action that allegedly involved no policy |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Berkovitz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112093/berkovitz-v-united-states/ | directed at a governmental action that allegedly involved no policy discretion. Petitioners, of course, have not proved their factual allegations, but they are not required to do so on a motion to dismiss. If those allegations are correct that is, if the Bureau's policy did not allow the official who took the challenged action to release a noncomplying lot on the basis of policy considerations the discretionary function exception does not bar the claim.[13] Because petitioners may yet show, *548 on the basis of materials obtained in discovery or otherwise, that the conduct challenged here did not involve the permissible exercise of policy discretion, the invocation of the discretionary function exception to dismiss petitioners' lot release claim was improper. IV For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discretionary function exception required the dismissal of petitioners' claims respecting the licensing of Orimune and the release of a particular vaccine lot. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | The Court concludes that the action of a private attorney exercising a peremptory challenge is attributable to the government and therefore may compose a constitutional violation. *632 This conclusion is based on little more than that the challenge occurs in the course of a trial. Not everything that happens in a courtroom is state action. A trial, particularly a civil trial is by design largely a stage on which private parties may act; it is a forum through which they can resolve their disputes in a peaceful and ordered manner. The government erects the platform; it does not thereby become responsible for all that occurs upon it. As much as we would like to eliminate completely from the courtroom the specter of racial discrimination, the Constitution does not sweep that broadly. Because I believe that a peremptory strike by a private litigant is fundamentally a matter of private choice and not state action, I dissent. I In order to establish a constitutional violation, Edmonson must first demonstrate that Leesville's use of a peremptory challenge can fairly be attributed to the government. Unfortunately, our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency. Perhaps this is because the state action determination is so closely tied to the "framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present." See Whatever the reason, and despite the confusion, a coherent principle has emerged. We have stated the rule in various ways, but at base, "constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the [government] is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Constitutional "liability attaches only to those wrongdoers `who carry a badge of authority of [the government] and represent it in some capacity.'" National Collegiate Athletic quoting *633 The Court concludes that this standard is met in the present case. It rests this conclusion primarily on two empirical assertions. First, that private parties use peremptory challenges with the "overt, significant participation of the government." Ante, at 622. Second, that the use of a peremptory challenge by a private party "involves the performance of a traditional function of the government." Ante, at 624. Neither of these assertions is correct. A The Court begins with a perfectly accurate definition of the peremptory challenge. Peremptory challenges "allow parties to exclude a given number of persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury." Ante, at 620. This description is worth more careful analysis, for it belies the Court's later conclusions about the peremptory. The peremptory challenge "allow[s] parties," |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | later conclusions about the peremptory. The peremptory challenge "allow[s] parties," in this case private parties, to exclude potential jurors. It is the nature of a peremptory that its exercise is left wholly within the discretion of the litigant. The purpose of this longstanding practice is to establish for each party an "`arbitrary and capricious species of challenge'" whereby the "`sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another'" may be acted upon. quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353. By allowing the litigant to strike jurors for even the most subtle of discerned biases, the peremptory challenge fosters both the perception and reality of an impartial jury. ; ; ; In both criminal and civil trials, the peremptory challenge is a mechanism for the exercise of private choice in the pursuit of fairness. The peremptory is, by design, *634 an enclave of private action in a government-managed proceeding. The Court amasses much ostensible evidence of the Federal Government's "overt, significant assistance" in the peremptory process. See ante, at 624. Most of this evidence is irrelevant to the issue at hand. The bulk of the practices the Court describesthe establishment of qualifications for jury service, the location and summoning of prospective jurors, the jury wheel, the voter lists, the jury qualification forms, the per diem for jury serviceare independent of the statutory entitlement to peremptory strikes, or of their use. All of this government action is in furtherance of the Government's distinct obligation to provide a qualified jury; the Government would do these things even if there were no peremptory challenges. All of this activity, as well as the trial judge's control over voir dire, see ante, at 623-624, is merely a prerequisite to the use of a peremptory challenge; it does not constitute participation in the challenge. That these actions may be necessary to a peremptory challenge in the sense that there could be no such challenge without a venire from which to selectno more makes the challenge state action than the building of roads and provision of public transportation makes state action of riding on a bus. The entirety of the government's actual participation in the peremptory process boils down to a single fact: "When a lawyer exercises a peremptory challenge, the judge advises the juror he or she has been excused." This is not significant participation. The judge's action in "advising" a juror that he or she has been excused is state action to be sure. It is, however, if not de minimis, far from what our cases have required |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | not de minimis, far from what our cases have required in order to hold the government "responsible" for private action or to find that private actors "represent" the government. See at ; at The government "normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, *635 either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." at As an initial matter, the judge does not "encourage" the use of a peremptory challenge at all. The decision to strike a juror is entirely up to the litigant, and the reasons for doing so are of no consequence to the judge. It is the attorney who strikes. The judge does little more than acquiesce in this decision by excusing the juror. In point of fact, the government has virtually no role in the use of peremptory challenges. Indeed, there are jurisdictions in which, with the consent of the parties, voir dire and jury selection may take place in the absence of any court personnel. See aff'd, ; The alleged state action here is a far cry from that which the Court found, for example, in In that case, state courts were called upon to enforce racially restrictive covenants against sellers of real property who did not wish to discriminate. The coercive power of the State was necessary in order to enforce the private choice of those who had created the covenants: "[B]ut for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint." Moreover, the courts in Shelley were asked to enforce a facially discriminatory contract. In contrast, peremptory challenges are "exercised without a reason stated [and] without inquiry." A judge does not "significantly encourage" discrimination by the mere act of excusing a juror in response to an unexplained request. There is another important distinction between Shelley and this case. The state courts in Shelley used coercive force to impose conformance on parties who did not wish to discriminate. "Enforcement" of peremptory challenges, on *636 the other hand, does not compel anyone to discriminate; the discrimination is wholly a matter of private choice. See Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, Judicial acquiescence does not convert private choice into that of the State. See 457 U. S., at -1005. Nor is this the kind of significant involvement found in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | kind of significant involvement found in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, There, we concluded that the actions of the executrix of an estate in providing notice to creditors that they might file claims could fairly be attributed to the State. The State's involvement in the notice process, we said, was "pervasive and substantial." In particular, a state statute directed the executrix to publish notice. In addition, the District Court in that case had "reinforced the statutory command with an order expressly requiring [the executrix] to `immediately give notice to creditors.'" Notice was not only encouraged by the State, but positively required. There is no comparable state involvement here. No one is compelled by government action to use a peremptory challenge, let alone to use it in a racially discriminatory way. The Court relies also on See ante, at 621, 624. But the decision in that case depended on the perceived symbiotic relationship between a restaurant and the state parking authority from whom it leased space in a public building. The State had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with" the restaurant that it had to be "recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Among the "peculiar facts [and] circumstances" leading to that conclusion was that the State stood to profit from the restaurant's 365 U.S., at 724. As I have shown, the government's involvement in the use of peremptory challenges falls far short of "interdependence" *637 or "joint participation." Whatever the continuing vitality of beyond its facts, see it does not support the Court's conclusion here. is a more appropriate analogy to this case. Metropolitan Edison terminated 's electrical service under authority granted it by the State, pursuant to a procedure approved by the state utility commission. Nonetheless, we held that could not challenge the termination procedure on due process grounds. The termination was not state action because the State had done nothing to encourage the particular termination practice: "Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into `state action.' Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so `state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." The similarity to this case is obvious. The Court's "overt, significant" government participation amounts to the fact that the government provides |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | government participation amounts to the fact that the government provides the mechanism whereby a litigant can choose to exercise a peremptory challenge. That the government allows this choice and that the judge approves it, does not turn this private decision into state action. To the same effect is Flagg In that case, a warehouse company's proposed sale of goods entrusted to it for storage pursuant to the New York Uniform Commercial Code was not fairly attributable to the State. We held that "the State of New York is in no way responsible for Flagg Brothers' decision, a decision which the State in 7-210 permits but does not compel, to threaten to sell these respondents' belongings." *638 Similarly, in the absence of compulsion, or at least encouragement, from the government in the use of peremptory challenges, the government is not responsible. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." 380 U. S., The government neither encourages nor approves such challenges. Accordingly, there is no "overt, significant participation" by the government. B The Court errs also when it concludes that the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a traditional government function. In its definition of the peremptory challenge, the Court asserts, correctly, that jurors struck via peremptories "otherwise. satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury." Ante, at 620. Whatever reason a private litigant may have for using a peremptory challenge, it is not the government's reason. The government otherwise establishes its requirements for jury service, leaving to the private litigant the unfettered discretion to use the strike for any reason. This is not part of the government's function in establishing the requirements for jury service. "`Peremptory challenges are exercised by a party, not in selection of jurors, but in rejection. It is not aimed at disqualification, but is exercised upon qualified jurors as matter of favor to the challenger.'" C. Lincoln, Abbott's Civil Jury Trials 92 (3d ed. 2), quoting For this reason, the Court is incorrect, and inconsistent with its own definition of the peremptory challenge, when it says that "[i]n the jury selection process [in a civil trial], the government and private litigants work for the same end." See ante, at 627. The Court is also incorrect when it says that a litigant exercising a peremptory challenge is performing "a traditional function of the government." See ante, at 624. *639 The peremptory challenge is a practice of ancient origin, part of our common law heritage in criminal trials. See |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | part of our common law heritage in criminal trials. See ; Congress imported this tradition into federal civil trials in 1872. See ch. 333, ; n. 14. The practice of unrestrained private choice in the selection of civil juries is even older than that, however. While there were no peremptory challenges in civil trials at common law, the struck jury system allowed each side in both criminal and civil trials to strike alternately, and without explanation, a fixed number of jurors. See and n. 21, citing J. Proffatt, Trial by Jury 72 (1877), and F. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials 62 (1949). Peremptory challenges are not a traditional government function; the "tradition" is one of unguided private choice. The Court may be correct that "[w]ere it not for peremptory challenges, the entire process of determining who will serve on the jury [would] constitut[e] state action." Ante, at 626. But there are peremptory challenges, and always have been. The peremptory challenge forms no part of the government's responsibility in selecting a jury. A peremptory challenge by a private litigant does not meet the Court's standard; it is not a traditional government function. Beyond this, the Court has misstated the law. The Court cites and for the proposition that state action may be imputed to one who carries out a "traditional governmental function." Ante, at 621. In those cases, the Court held that private control over certain core government activities rendered the private action attributable to the State. In Terry, the activity was a private primary election that effectively determined the outcome of county general elections. In Marsh, a company that owned a town had attempted to prohibit on its sidewalks certain protected speech. *640 In Flagg the Court reviewed these and other cases that found state action in the exercise of certain public functions by private parties. See -160, reviewing Terry, Marsh, and We explained that the government functions in these cases had one thing in common: exclusivity. The public-function doctrine requires that the private actor exercise "a power `traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.'" quoting In order to constitute state action under this doctrine, private conduct must not only comprise something that the government traditionally does, but something that only the government traditionally does. Even if one could fairly characterize the use of a peremptory strike as the performance of the traditional government function of jury selection, it has never been exclusively the function of the government to select juries; peremptory strikes are older than the Republic. is not to the contrary. The Court seeks to derive from |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | not to the contrary. The Court seeks to derive from that case a rule that one who "serve[s] an important function within the government," even if not a government employee, is thereby a state actor. See ante, at 628. Even if this were the law, it would not help the Court's position. The exercise of a peremptory challenge is not an important government function; it is not a government function at all. In any event, West does not stand for such a broad proposition. The doctor in that case was under contract with the State to provide services for the State. More important, the State hired the doctor in order to fulfill the State's constitutional obligation to attend to the necessary medical care of prison inmates. n. 10, 57. The doctor's relation to the State, and the State's responsibility, went beyond mere performance of an important job. The present case is closer to and than to Terry, Marsh, *641 or West. In the former cases, the alleged state activities were those of state-regulated private actors performing what might be considered traditional public functions. See (electrical utility); (school). In each case, the Court held that the performance of such a function, even if state regulated or state funded, was not state action unless the function had been one exclusively the prerogative of the State, or the State had provided such significant encouragement to the challenged action that the State could be held responsible for it. See -353, 357; The use of a peremptory challenge by a private litigant meets neither criterion. C None of this should be news, as this case is fairly well controlled by Polk We there held that a public defender, employed by the State, does not act under color of state law when representing a defendant in a criminal trial.[*] In such a circumstance, government employment is not sufficient to create state action. More important for present purposes, neither is the performance of a lawyer's duties in a courtroom. This is because a lawyer, when representing a private client, cannot at the same time represent the government. Trials in this country are adversarial proceedings. Attorneys for private litigants do not act on behalf of the government, or even the public as a whole; attorneys represent their clients. An attorney's job is to "advanc[e] the `undivided interests of his client.' This is essentially a private function for which state office and authority are not *642 needed." When performing adversarial functions during trial, an attorney for a private litigant acts independently of the government: "[I]t is the function of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | acts independently of the government: "[I]t is the function of the public defender to enter not guilty' pleas, move to suppress State's evidence, object to evidence at trial, cross-examine State's witnesses, and make closing arguments in behalf of defendants. All of these are adversarial functions. We find it peculiarly difficult to detect any color of state law in such activities." Our conclusion in Dodson was that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." It cannot be gainsaid that a peremptory strike is a traditional adversarial act; parties use these strikes to further their own perceived interests, not as an aid to the government's process of jury selection. The Court does not challenge the rule of Dodson, yet concludes that private attorneys performing this adversarial function are state actors. Where is the distinction? The Court wishes to limit the scope of Dodson to the actions of public defenders in an adversarial relationship with the government. Ante, at 626-627. At a minimum then, the Court must concede that Dodson stands for the proposition that a criminal defense attorney is not a state actor when using peremptory strikes on behalf of a client, nor is an attorney representing a private litigant in a civil suit against the government. Both of these propositions are true, but the Court's distinction between this case and Dodson turns state action doctrine on its head. Attorneys in an adversarial relation to the state are not state actors, but that does not mean that attorneys who are not in such a relation are state actors. The Court is plainly wrong when it asserts that "[i]n the jury selection process, the government and private litigants work for the same end." See ante, at 627. In a civil trial, *643 the attorneys for each side are in "an adversarial relation," ibid.; they use their peremptory strikes in direct opposition to one another, and for precisely contrary ends. The government cannot "work for the same end" as both parties. In fact, the government is neutral as to private litigants' use of peremptory strikes. That's the point. The government does not encourage or approve these strikes, or direct that they be used in any particular way, or even that they be used at all. The government is simply not "responsible" for the use of peremptory strikes by private litigants. Constitutional "liability attaches only to those wrongdoers `who carry a badge of authority of [the government] and represent it in some capacity.'" 488 U. S., |
Justice O'Connor | 1,991 | 14 | dissenting | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112610/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-co/ | government] and represent it in some capacity.'" 488 U. S., at A government attorney who uses a peremptory challenge on behalf of the client is, by definition, representing the government. The challenge thereby becomes state action. It is antithetical to the nature of our adversarial process, however, to say that a private attorney acting on behalf of a private client represents the government for constitutional purposes. II Beyond "significant participation" and "traditional function," the Court's final argument is that the exercise of a peremptory challenge by a private litigant is state action because it takes place in a courtroom. Ante, at 628. In the end, this is all the Court is left with; peremptories do not involve the "overt, significant participation of the government," nor do they constitute a "traditional function of the government." The Court is also wrong in its ultimate claim. If Dodson stands for anything, it is that the actions of a lawyer in a courtroom do not become those of the government by virtue of their location. This is true even if those actions are based on race. Racism is a terrible thing. It is irrational, destructive, and mean. Arbitrary discrimination based on race is particularly abhorrent when manifest in a courtroom, a forum *644 established by the government for the resolution of disputes through "quiet rationality." See ante, at 631. But not every opprobrious and inequitable act is a constitutional violation. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits only actions for which the Government can be held responsible. The Government is not responsible for everything that occurs in a courtroom. The Government is not responsible for a peremptory challenge by a private litigant. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Burger | 1,977 | 12 | concurring | GM Leasing Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/ | While I concur in the opinion of the Court, it may be useful to note that the factual setting of this case provides what seems, to me, a classic illustration of the dividing line between an impermissible, warrantless entry and one permissible under the "exigent circumstances" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. After their initial entry into, and retreat from, the petitioner's office-cottage, the IRS agents assigned to the investigation of the fugitive Norman's tax liability placed the premises under 24-hour surveillance. One night during the course of this surveillance, the agents observed cartons and other materials being removed from the premises by persons unknown to them. Against the background facts, such surreptitious nighttime activity constituted an exigent circumstance that would have justified an immediate seizure of the materials being moved in order to protect the interests of the United States. This is especially so since here the premises were controlled by the alter ego of an individual who was not only a delinquent taxpayer, but who was, at the time, a fugitive from justice. Rather than acting immediately, however, the agents chose to wait for approximately a day and a half to two days before making their entry. I agree with the conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances on these facts; however, the Court holds no more than that the agents' delay after observing these highly suspicious events makes that exception to the warrant requirement unavailable to them. By failing to act at once, the exigency was dissipated, and I do not understand our *362 opinion to imply, in any way, that the removal of cartons, which could reasonably have contained relevant records needed by the Government, would not have been an exigent circumstance permitting immediate seizure without the warrant required by the Fourth Amendment. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | This case presents the questions whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 2 U.S. C. 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of (SARA), Stat. 1613, permits a suit for monetary damages against a State in federal court and, if so, whether Congress has the authority to create such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The answer to both questions is "yes." I For about 50 years, the predecessors of respondent Union Gas Co. operated a coal gasification plant near Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, which produced coal tar as a by-product. The plant was dismantled around 1950. A few years later, Pennsylvania took part in major flood-control efforts along the creek. In 1980, shortly after acquiring easements to the property along the creek, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar while excavating the creek. The coal tar began to seep into the creek, and the *6 Environmental Protection Agency determined that the tar was a hazardous substance and declared the site the Nation's first emergency Superfund site. Working together, Pennsylvania and the Federal Government cleaned up the area, and the Federal Government reimbursed the State for clean-up costs of $720,000. To recoup these costs, the United States sued Union Gas under 10 and 106 of CERCLA, 2 U.S. C. 960 and 9606, claiming that Union Gas was liable for such costs because the company and its predecessors had deposited coal tar into the ground near Brodhead Creek. Union Gas filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the Commonwealth was responsible for at least a portion of the costs because it was an "owner or operator" of the hazardous-waste site, 2 U.S. C. 9607(a), and because its flood-control efforts had negligently caused or contributed to the release of the coal tar into the creek. The District Court dismissed the complaint, accepting Pennsylvania's claim that its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, finding no clear expression of congressional intent to hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA. United While Union Gas' petition for certiorari was pending, Congress amended CERCLA by passing SARA. We granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in light of these amendments. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the language of CERCLA, as amended, clearly rendered States liable for monetary damages and that Congress had the power to do so when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. United We |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | so when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. United We granted certiorari, and now affirm. *7 II In this Court held that the principle of sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment rendered the States immune from suits for monetary damages in federal court even where jurisdiction was premised on the presence of a federal question. Congress may override this immunity when it acts pursuant to the power granted it under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it must make its intent to do so "unmistakably clear." See Atascadero State Before turning to the question whether Congress possesses the same power of abrogation under the Commerce Clause, we must first decide whether CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages for conduct described in the statute. If we decide that it does not, then we need not consider the constitutional question. CERCLA both provides a mechanism for cleaning up hazardous-waste sites, 2 U.S. C. 960, 9606 ( ed. and Supp. IV), and imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible for the contamination, 9607. Two general terms, among others, describe those who may be liable under CERCLA for the costs of remedial action: "persons" and "owners or operators." 9607(a). "States" are explicitly included within the statute's definition of "persons." 9601(21). The term "owner or operator" is defined by reference to certain activities that a "person" may undertake. 9601(20)(A). Section 101(20)(D) of SARA excludes from the category of "owners or operators" States that "acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as *8 sovereign." 9601(20)(D).[1] However, 101(20)(D) continues, "[t]he exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title." The express inclusion of States within the statute's definition of "persons," and the plain statement that States are to be considered "owners or operators" in all but very narrow circumstances, together convey a message of unmistakable clarity: Congress intended that States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable under CERCLA. Section 101(20)(D) is an express acknowledgment of Congress' background understanding evidenced first in its inclusion of States as "persons" |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | evidenced first in its inclusion of States as "persons" that States would be liable in any circumstance described in 107(a) from which they were not expressly excluded. The "exclusion" furnished to the States in 101(20)(D) would be unnecessary unless such a background understanding were at work.[2] *9 The plain language of another section of the statute reinforces this conclusion. Section 107(d)(2) of CERCLA, as set forth in 2 U.S. C. 9607(d)(2) ( ed., Supp. IV), headed "State and local governments," provides: "No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person. This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional *10 misconduct by the State or local government." This section is, needless to say, an explicit recognition of the potential liability of States under this statute; Congress need not exempt States from liability unless they would otherwise be liable. Similarly, unless suits against the States were elsewhere permitted, Congress would have had no reason to specify that citizen suits as opposed to the kind of lawsuit involved here could be brought "against any person (including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)." 2 U.S. C. 9659(a)(1). The reservation of States' rights under the Eleventh Amendment would be unnecessary if Congress had not elsewhere in the statute overridden the State's immunity from suit. It is also highly significant that, in 101(20)(D), Congress used language virtually identical to that it chose in waiving the Federal Government's immunity from suits for damages under CERCLA. Section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA, as set forth in 2 U.S. C. 9620(a)(1), provides: "Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title." This is doubtless an " `unequivoca[l] express[ion]' " of the Federal Government's waiver of its own sovereign immunity, United quoting United since we cannot imagine any other plausible explanation for this unqualified language. It can be no coincidence that in describing the potential liability of the States in 101(20)(D), Congress chose language mirroring that of 120(a)(1). In choosing this mirroring language |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | language mirroring that of 120(a)(1). In choosing this mirroring language in 101(20)(D), therefore, Congress must have intended to override the States' immunity from suit, just as it waived the Federal Government's immunity in 120(a)(1). *11 This cascade of plain language does not, however, impress Pennsylvania. In the face of such clarity, the Commonwealth bravely insists that CERCLA merely makes clear that States may be liable to the United States, not that they may be liable to private entities such as Union Gas. The Commonwealth relies principally on this Court's decision in 11 U.S. 279 We held there that Congress had not abrogated the States' immunity from suit in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Nevertheless, we found, the statute's explicit inclusion of state-run hospitals among those to whom the law would apply was not meaningless: since the statute allowed the United States to sue, the inclusion of States within the entities covered by the statute served to permit suits by the United States against the States. Although it is true that the inclusion of States within CERCLA's definition of "persons" would not be rendered meaningless if we held that CERCLA did not subject the States to suits brought by private citizens, it is equally certain that such a holding would deprive the last portion of 101(20)(D) of all meaning. Congress would have had no cause to stress that States would be liable "to the same extent. as any nongovernmental entity," 101(20)(D), if it had meant only that they could be liable to the United States. In United 10-11 we recognized that the Constitution presents no barrier to lawsuits brought by the United States against a State. For purposes of such lawsuits, States are naturally just like "any nongovernmental entity"; there are no special rules dictating when they may be sued by the Federal Government, nor is there a stringent interpretive principle guiding construction of statutes that appear to authorize such suits. Indeed, this Court has gone so far as to hold that no explicit statutory authorization is necessary before the Federal Government may sue a State. See United (197). Unless Congress intended to permit suits brought by private citizens against the States, therefore, the highly specific language of 101(20)(D) was unnecessary. The same can be said about the clause of 101(20)(D) specifying that States would be subject to CERCLA's provisions, "including liability under section 9607 of this title." Section 9607 provides for liability in damages, and liability in damages is considered a special remedy, requiring special statutory language, only where the States' immunity from suits by private citizens is involved. In |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | States' immunity from suits by private citizens is involved. In light of 101(20)(D)'s very precise language, it would be exceedingly odd to interpret this provision as merely a signal that the United States rather than private citizens could sue the States for damages under CERCLA.[3] Moreover, 101(20)(D) does not, as Pennsylvania suggests, render States liable only if they acquire property involuntarily and then contribute to a release of harmful substances at that property. Section 101(20)(D) obviously explains and qualifies the entire definition of "owner or operator" not *13 just that part of the definition applicable to involuntary owners. Nor can it be decisive that 101(20)(D) mentions local governments as well as States. The Commonwealth argues that, because local governments do not enjoy immunity from suit, 101(20)(D)'s reference to local governments means that the section shows no intent to abrogate States' immunity. It was natural, however, for Congress to describe the potential liability of States and local governments in the same breath, since both are governmental entities and both enjoy special exemptions from liability under CERCLA. See 101(20)(D), 107(d)(2). Pennsylvania also argues that 101(20)(D) demonstrates no intent to hold the States liable because this provision limits the States' liability. It is true that this section rescues the States from liability where they obtained ownership of cleanup sites involuntarily. The Commonwealth fails to grasp, however, that a limitation of liability is nonsensical unless liability existed in the first place. We thus hold that the language of CERCLA as amended by SARA clearly evinces an intent to hold States liable in damages in federal court.[] III Our conclusion that CERCLA clearly permits suits for money damages against States in federal court requires us to decide whether the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to enact such a statute. Pennsylvania argues that the principle of sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh *1 Amendment precludes such congressional authority. We do not agree. A Though we have never squarely resolved this issue of congressional power, our decisions mark a trail unmistakably leading to the conclusion that Congress may permit suits against the States for money damages. The trial begins with 377 U.S. 18 (196). There, in responding to a state-owned railway's argument that Congress had no authority to subject the railway to suit, we concluded that "the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce," and that "[b]y empowering Congress to regulate commerce, the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation," Although it is true |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | in the way of such regulation," Although it is true that we have referred to Parden as a case involving a waiver of immunity, 27 U.S. 5, 51 the statements quoted above lay a firm foundation for the argument that Congress' authority to regulate commerce includes the authority directly to abrogate States' immunity from suit. The path continues in 11 U. S., at 286, in which we again acknowledged, quoting Parden, that " `the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.' " Although we declined "to extend Parden to cover every exercise by Congress of its commerce power," we did so in Employees itself only because "the purpose of Congress to give force to the Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the States and putting the States on the same footing as other employers [was] not clear." 11 U.S., at 286-287. Employees' message is plain: the power to regulate commerce includes the power to override States' immunity from suit, but we will *15 not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly. Since Employees, we have twice assumed that Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See 83 U.S. 75-76, ; County of 70 U.S. 226, See also 7 U.S. 6, ; 0 U.S. 332, 33 It is no accident, therefore, that every Court of Appeals to have reached this issue has concluded that Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by the Constitution. See, e. g., United ; In re McVey Inc., (CA7), cert. denied, 8 U.S. 895 ; County of 678 F.2d 112 cert. denied, 59 U.S. 110 ; ; Mills Music, Even if we never before had discussed the specific connection between Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and States' immunity from suit, careful regard for precedent still would mandate the conclusion that Congress has the power to abrogate immunity when exercising its plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce. In we held that Congress may subject States to suits for money damages in federal court when legislating under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and further held that Congress had done so in the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196. Subsequent cases *16 hold firmly to the principle that Congress can override States' immunity under 5. See, e. g., Dellmuth v. Muth, post, p. 223; Atascadero State 73 U. S., at 238; Pennhurst State School and 65 U.S. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | U. S., at 238; Pennhurst State School and 65 U.S. 89, (198); 's rationale is straightforward: "When Congress acts pursuant to 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority." 27 U.S., at 56. In so reasoning, we emphasized the "shift in the federal-state balance" occasioned by the Civil War Amendments, at 55, and in particular quoted extensively from Ex parte Virginia, The following passage from Ex parte Virginia is worth quoting here as well: "Such enforcement [of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment] is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to enact. [I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them." at 36, quoted in at 5-55. Each of these points is as applicable to the Commerce Clause as it is to the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States. It cannot be relevant that the Fourteenth *17 Amendment accomplishes this exchange in two steps ( 1-, plus 5), while the Commerce Clause does it in one. The important point, rather, is that the provision both expands federal power and contracts state power; that is the meaning, in fact, of a "plenary" grant of authority, and the lower courts have rightly concluded that it makes no sense to conceive of 5 as somehow being an "ultraplenary" grant of authority. See, e. g., In re McVey See also at 33 from ( 5) only by reference to the clarity of the congressional intent expressed in the relevant statutes). Pennsylvania attempts to bring this case outside by asserting that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment alters what would otherwise be the proper constitutional balance between federal and state governments." Brief for Petitioner 39. The Commonwealth believes, apparently, that the "constitutional balance" |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | Petitioner 39. The Commonwealth believes, apparently, that the "constitutional balance" existing prior to the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit Congress to override the States' immunity from suit. This claim, of course, begs the very question we face. For its part, JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion casually announces: "Nothing in ['s] reasoning justifies limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution." Post, at 2. The operative word here is, it would appear, "antecedent"; and it is important to emphasize that, according to JUSTICE SCALIA, the Commerce Clause is antecedent, not to the Eleventh Amendment, but to "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment." But, according to Part II of JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion, this "principle" has been with us since the days before the Constitution was ratified since the days, in other words, before the Commerce Clause. In describing the "consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity. was part of the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional *18 provisions did not mean to sweep away," post, at 31-32, JUSTICE SCALIA clearly refers to a state of affairs that existed well before the States ratified the Constitution. JUSTICE SCALIA, therefore, has things backwards: it is not the Commerce Clause that came first, but "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment" that did so. Antecedence takes this case closer to, not further from, Even if "the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment" made its first appearance at the same moment as the Commerce Clause, and not before, JUSTICE SCALIA could no longer rely on chronology in distinguishing Only if it were the Eleventh Amendment itself that introduced the principle of sovereign immunity into the Constitution would the Commerce Clause have preceded this principle. Even then, the order of events would matter only if the Amendment changed things; that is, it would matter only if, before the Eleventh Amendment, the Commerce Clause did authorize Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity. But if Congress enjoyed such power prior to the enactment of this Amendment, we would require a showing far more powerful than JUSTICE SCALIA can muster that the Amendment was intended to obliterate that authority. The language of the Eleventh Amendment gives us no hint that it limits congressional authority; it refers only to "the judicial power" and forbids "constru[ing]" that power to extend to the enumerated suits language plainly intended to rein in the Judiciary, not Congress. It would be a fragile Constitution indeed if subsequent amendments could, without express reference, be interpreted to wipe out the original understanding of |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | reference, be interpreted to wipe out the original understanding of congressional power. JUSTICE SCALIA attempts to avoid the pull of our prior decisions by claiming that Hans answered this constitutional question over 100 years ago. Because Hans was brought into federal court via the Judiciary Act of 1875 and because the Court there held that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, JUSTICE SCALIA argues, that case disposed *19 of the question whether Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity when legislating pursuant to the powers granted it by the Constitution. See post, at 36-37. This argument depends on the notion that, in passing the Judiciary Act, "Congress sought to eliminate [the] state sovereign immunity" that Article III had not eliminated. Post, at 36 (emphasis in original). As JUSTICE SCALIA is well aware, however, the Judiciary Act merely gave effect to the grant of federal-question jurisdiction under Article III, which was not self-executing. Thus, if Article III did not "automatically eliminate" sovereign immunity, see post, at 33, then neither did the Judiciary Act of 1875. That unsurprising conclusion does not begin to address the question whether other congressional enactments, not designed simply to implement Article III's grants of jurisdiction, may override States' immunity. When one recalls, in addition, our conclusion that "Art[icle] III `arising under' jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under 1331," Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 61 U.S. 80, 95 JUSTICE SCALIA's conception of Hans' holding looks particularly exaggerated. Our prior cases thus indicate that Congress has the authority to override States' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause. This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the special nature of the power conferred by that Clause. B We have recognized that the States enjoy no immunity where there has been " `a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.' " (193), quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 657 (H. Dawson ed. 1876) (A. Hamilton). Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent *20 that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. The States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus not "unconsenting"; they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | in ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis. It would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the commerce power. See, e. g., ; (192); 379 U.S. 29 (196). It is not the vastness of this power, however, that is so important here: it is its effect on the power of the States. The Commerce Clause, we long have held, displaces state authority even where Congress has chosen not to act, see (182); Missouri Pacific R. 267 U.S. 0, 08 ; Northwest Central Pipeline 89 U.S. 93 and it sometimes precludes state regulation even though existing federal law does not pre-empt it, see 37 U.S. 617, 621, n. 628-629 ; Northwest Central Pipeline Since the States may not legislate at all in these last two situations, a conclusion that Congress may not create a cause of action for money damages against the States would mean that no one could do so. And in many situations, it is only money damages that will carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause. The case before us brilliantly illuminates these points. The general problem of environmental harm is often not susceptible of a local solution. See 06 U.S. 91 We have, in fact, invalidated one State's effort to deal with the problem *21 of waste disposal on a local level. See A New statute prohibited the treatment and disposal, within the State, of any solid or liquid wastes generated outside the State. Indicating that a law applicable to all wastes would have survived under the Commerce Clause, we held that the exemption of locally produced wastes doomed the statute, -629. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to imagine that a State could forbid the disposal of all wastes. Hence, the Commerce Clause as interpreted in ensures that we often must look to the Federal Government for environmental solutions. And often those solutions, to be satisfactory, must include a cause of action for money damages. The cause of action under consideration, for example, came about only after Congress had tried to solve the problem posed by hazardous substances through other means. Prior statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended, 2 U.S. C. 6901 et seq., had failed in large part because they focused on preventive measures to the exclusion of remedial ones. See Note, Superfund and California's Implementation: Potential Conflict, 19 C. W. L. R. 373, 376, n. 23 The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | majority | Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112291/pennsylvania-v-union-gas-co/ | CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup. See, e. g., 2 U.S. C. 9613(f)(1) ( ed., Supp. IV). Congress did not think it enough, moreover, to permit only the Federal Government to recoup the costs of its own cleanups of hazardous-waste sites; the Government's resources being finite, it could neither pay up front for all necessary cleanups nor undertake many different projects at the same time. Some help was needed, and Congress sought to encourage that help by allowing private parties who voluntarily cleaned up hazardous-waste sites to recover a proportionate amount of the costs of cleanup from the other *22 potentially responsible parties. See ibid.; Mardan v. C. G. C. Music, Ltd., 80 F.2d 15, 157, n. 3 ; Walls v. Waste Resource If States, which comprise a significant class of owners and operators of hazardous-waste sites, see Brief for Respondent 8, need not pay for the costs of cleanup, the overall effect on voluntary cleanups will be substantial. This case thus shows why the space carved out for federal legislation under the commerce power must include the power to hold States financially accountable not only to the Federal Government, but to private citizens as well. It does not follow that Congress, pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause, could authorize suits in federal court that the bare terms of Article III would not permit. No one suggests that if the Commerce Clause confers on Congress the power of abrogation, it must also confer the power to direct that certain state-law suits (not falling under the diversity jurisdiction) be brought in federal court. According to Pennsylvania, however, to decide that Congress may permit suits against States for money damages in federal court is equivalent to holding that Congress may expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III. Pennsylvania argues that the federal judicial power as set forth in Article III does not extend to any suits for damages brought by private citizens against unconsenting States. See Brief for Petitioner 35-36, quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 90, 97 We never have held, however, that Article III does not permit such suits where the States have consented to them. Pennsylvania's argument thus is answered by our conclusion that, in approving the commerce power, the States consented to suits against them based on congressionally created causes of action. Its claim also is answered by 27 U.S. 5 The Fourteenth Amendment does not purport to expand or even change the scope |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Atkins v. Rivera | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111716/atkins-v-rivera/ | This case concerns the means by which a State may calculate eligibility for medical-assistance benefits (Medicaid) under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. In Massachusetts, persons who lack sufficient income, measured on a monthly basis, to meet their basic needs automatically qualify for Medicaid. The Commonwealth, however, also provides Medicaid benefits to persons, like respondents, who earn enough to meet their basic needs, but whose medical expenses within a 6-month period consume the amount by which their earnings exceed what is required for basic needs. Construing the Act's requirement that assistance for the two groups be calculated using the "same methodology," the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held invalid the Commonwealth's use of a 6-month period for measuring medical expenses. The court ruled that inasmuch as a 1-month period is used to measure the income of those with insufficient means, an identical period must be used to measure medical expenses for persons like respondents. Because this holding conflicts with rulings of two Federal Courts of Appeals,[1] we granted certiorari. I Medicaid, enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II), is designed to provide medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary care and services. See The Federal Government shares the costs of Medicaid with States that *157 elect to participate in the program. In return, participating States are to comply with requirements imposed by the Act and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S. C. 1396a (1982 ed. and Supp. II); States participating in the Medicaid program must provide coverage to the "categorically needy." 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1982 ed. and Supp. II). These are persons eligible for cash assistance under either of two programs: Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), 42 U.S. C. 1381 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II), or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S. C. 601 et seq.[2] (1982 ed. and Supp. II). Congress considered these persons "especially deserving of public assistance" for medical expenses, see because one is eligible for AFDC or SSI only if, in a given month, he or she earns less than what has been determined to be required for the basic necessities of life. AFDC and SSI assistance are intended to cover basic necessities, but not medical expenses. Thus, if a person in this category also incurs medical expenses during that month, payment of those expenses would consume funds required for basic necessities. A participating |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Atkins v. Rivera | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111716/atkins-v-rivera/ | expenses would consume funds required for basic necessities. A participating State also may elect to provide medical benefits to the "medically needy," that is, persons who meet the nonfinancial eligibility requirements for cash assistance under AFDC or SSI, but whose income or resources exceed the financial eligibility standards of those programs.[3] See *158 -582. Under 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(17), the medically needy may qualify for financial assistance for medical expenses if they incur such expenses in an amount that effectively reduces their income to the eligibility level. Only when they "spend down" the amount by which their income exceeds that level, are they in roughly the same position as persons eligible for AFDC or SSI: any further expenditures for medical expenses then would have to come from funds required for basic necessities. In creating the spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(17) (1982 ed. and Supp. II), Congress provided that a State is to take into account, "except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs incurred for medical care." Pursuant to this statute, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has instructed state agencies to "use a prospective period of not more than 6 months to compute income" of the medically needy. 42 CFR 435.831 A State electing to assist the medically needy must determine eligibility under standards that are "reasonable" and "comparable for all groups." 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(17). In addition, and significantly for present purposes, state plans for Medicaid must describe "the single standard to be employed in determining income and resource eligibility for all such groups, and the methodology to be employed in determining such eligibility which shall be the same methodology which would be employed under [AFDC or SSI]." 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (emphasis added). *159 II Respondent Rivera is employed outside her home and is the mother of two children. She receives no medical benefits from her job, and earns an amount slightly in excess of that which would permit her to qualify for AFDC. In 1983, Rivera applied to the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare for Medicaid. Massachusetts has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program, Mass. Gen. Laws 118E:1 et seq. and also to provide coverage to medically needy persons. To determine Rivera's eligibility for Medicaid, the Department first calculated her gross monthly income. See 106 Code of Mass. Regs. (CMR) 505.200, 505.210, 505.320 Next, the Department prescribed certain deductions and disregards to arrive at her monthly "countable income" of $535.30.[4] See 106 CMR 505.200 and 506.100-506.200 See also 42 CFR 435.831(a) Rivera's monthly countable income exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Atkins v. Rivera | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111716/atkins-v-rivera/ | 435.831(a) Rivera's monthly countable income exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit by $100.30. See 106 CMR 506.400 See also 42 U.S. C. 1382(c)(1) and 602(a)(13) (1982 ed. and Supp. II). As a result, she did not qualify for Medicaid at that time. She would be able to qualify at a later date, provided her excess income was subject to being consumed or spent down by medical expenses. Massachusetts has adopted a 6-month period over which the spenddown is calculated. Mass. Gen. Laws 118E:10 ; 106 CMR 506.400 and 506.510 This is the maximum permitted under the federal regulations. See 42 CFR 435.831 Accordingly, the Department multiplied Rivera's excess $100.30 by six; she thus could receive Medicaid during the 6-month period beginning with the date of her first medical service only after she spent down $601.80 *160 on medical expenses.[5] The Department's decision denying assistance was upheld by the Welfare Appeals Referee. App. to Pet. for Cert. A46. Rivera then sought injunctive relief in State Superior Court against use of the 6-month period. She argued that the 6-month period for calculating the income of medically needy applicants violates the "same methodology" requirement of 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) and 1396a(a)(17) (1982 ed. and Supp. II), because the Act mandates that AFDC and SSI determinations be calculated on the basis of income earned in a 1-month period. The use of the shorter period would have permitted Rivera to receive Medicaid after incurring only $100.30 in medical expenses.[6] The court certified a class of all persons who have been, are being, or will be subjected to the Department's 6-month spenddown requirement. On a motion for summary judgment, the court found that the Department's use of the 6-month spenddown period violated the statutory requirement that the "same methodology" be used for determining eligibility of the medically needy as is used for the categorically needy. App. to Pet. for Cert. A28. The Department appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. It argued there that, since the eligibility determination for the categorically needy does not involve a spenddown at all, there is no methodology for the Department to match. The Department further argued that federal regulations explicitly allow a 6-month period. *161 The Supreme Judicial Court, by a unanimous panel vote, held that the Massachusetts requirement for a 6-month spenddown period was invalid. It relied in part, -645, on a ruling by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts sustaining an identical challenge to the Department's 6-month spenddown regulation. See v. Heckler, subsequently reversed, cert. pending sub nom. v. Bowen, No. 85-6386. Although noting that |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Atkins v. Rivera | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111716/atkins-v-rivera/ | pending sub nom. v. Bowen, No. 85-6386. Although noting that eligibility determinations for the categorically needy do not involve spenddowns, the court observed that such determinations do require the use of a 1-month computation period. Therefore, it concluded, in providing that the "same methodology" be employed, the Act requires that a 1-month period be applied in eligibility calculations for the medically needy. III Congress created the spenddown provision in 1965 to eliminate a perceived weakness in the medical-assistance program then in effect. See Social Security Amendments of 1960, 601(a), A 1965 Senate Report explained that under existing law some States used an absolute-income cut-off point. An individual with income just under the specified limit thus was able to obtain all the aid provided under the state plan, while one with income just over the limit was unable to obtain any assistance, even if the excess income was small when compared with the cost of the medical care needed. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 78 (1965). To cure this problem, the Medicaid statute was amended to require state eligibility standards to measure income in terms of both the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the medical care required. The standards applied to the medically needy are to be "reasonable" *162 and "comparable for all groups." Congress imposed no further instruction on the spenddown, stating only that a State is to take into account the costs incurred for medical care, "except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary." 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(17). Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has provided, from the inception of Medicaid until the present time, that States may employ a maximum spenddown period of six months. See 45 CFR 248.21(a)(4) (0), originally promulgated as HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Supplement D, Medical Assistance Programs, D-4220(A)(4) (June 17, 1966). This regulation plainly permits what Massachusetts has done. We long have recognized that, perhaps due to the intricacy of the Act, "Congress conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the Act." See (7). The broad delegation to the Secretary in the spenddown provision includes the authority to provide the period in which the spenddown is to be calculated. Because the Secretary's regulation appears supported by the plain language of the statute and is adopted pursuant to the explicit grant of rulemaking authority in 1396a(a)(17), it is " `entitled to more than mere deference or weight.' " quoting Indeed, it is entitled to "legislative effect," at and is controlling "unless [it |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Atkins v. Rivera | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111716/atkins-v-rivera/ | entitled to "legislative effect," at and is controlling "unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute," Chevron U. S. A. IV A Respondents contend that the Secretary's regulation, and Massachusetts' 6-month spenddown enacted pursuant thereto, are "manifestly contrary to the statute." Respondents point to another section of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(10)(C) *163 (i)(III), requiring that a State's plan describe "the single standard to be employed in determining income eligibility. and the methodology to be employed in determining such eligibility, which shall be the same methodology" employed under SSI or AFDC. To respondents, this statutory language is an express congressional mandate that the same methodology, here the 1-month budget period, be applied to eligibility determinations for the medically needy. This requirement, the argument goes, operates as an express limitation on the Secretary's authority to regulate the state administration of spenddowns. Similarly, it is a direct restriction on the States, requiring them to use a 1-month period in which the medically needy must spend down, on medical expenses, their excess income. B The history of the "same methodology" proviso, which first appeared in the Act in 1981, demonstrates that it was never intended to control the length of the spenddown. Rather, the "same methodology" requirement simply instructs States to treat components of income e. g., interest or court-ordered support payments similarly for both medically and categorically needy persons. The "same methodology" proviso was not Congress' first attempt to regulate the relationship between treatment of the categorically needy and treatment of the medically needy. To understand the precise purpose of the "same methodology" proviso requires a brief foray into Congress' earlier efforts to address this relationship, for the proviso reflects Congress' desire to overrule a particular interpretation that had been advanced by the Secretary. When Medicaid was first enacted, Congress did not require that the "same methodology" be used for determining the eligibility of categorically and medically needy individuals. Instead, it required only that a State's Medicaid plan use *164 "comparable" standards for both groups.[7] The Secretary and several Courts of Appeals interpreted the original "comparability" language to require virtually identical treatment. See, e. g., (3), originally codified as 45 CFR 248.2; cert. denied, ; (CA2 7), cert. denied sub nom. (8); (CA4 9). Notably, no one advanced the claim that this "comparability" language prevented States from using a spenddown period of up to six months.[8] Congress concluded that the administrative and judicial interpretation of the "comparability" provision denied States necessary flexibility to set eligibility standards and to adjust the scope of services to fit the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Atkins v. Rivera | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111716/atkins-v-rivera/ | and to adjust the scope of services to fit the varying requirements of medically needy persons. See H. R. Rep. No. 97-208, p. 971 Thus, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Congress amended the *165 Medicaid Act by deleting the "comparability" requirement. After the amendment, a State was required only to include in its plan for the medically needy "a description of the criteria for determining eligibility of individuals for medical assistance." OBRA 2171(a)(3)(C)(i), The Secretary interpreted OBRA to authorize States to use income and resource criteria for medically needy different from those for categorically needy individuals: "States are no longer required to apply a uniform methodology for treating income and resources in such matters as deemed income, interest, court-ordered support payments, and infrequent and irregular income. Rather, the State plan must specify the methodology that will be used, and that methodology must be reasonable." The regulations promulgated by the Secretary accordingly left the States free to use eligibility standards that were unrelated to the standards used in AFDC or SSI, as long as the standards were "reasonable."[9] The Secretary's regulations did not address treatment of excess income for the medically needy or the calculation of spenddowns. Despite the various changes that followed OBRA's passage, many States continued *166 to use a 6-month spenddown, in conformity with the still-existing regulation permitting that choice. Congress disagreed with the Secretary's interpretation. See, e. g., 127 Cong. Rec. 23363 (remarks of Rep. Waxman). This disagreement led to the enactment of the "same methodology" proviso, as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 137(a)(8), The House Report explained that TEFRA "makes clear that the Department [of Health and Human Services] had no authority to alter the rules that applied before September 30, 1981, with respect to medically needy income levels, medically needy resource standards, and the methodology for treating medically needy income and resources." H. R. Rep. No. 97-757, pt. 1, p. 13 The House Report further explained that TEFRA reaffirmed "the financial requirements previously in effect for the medically needy." Thus, the "same methodology" proviso was designed to correct a problem wholly unrelated to the 6-month spenddown, which had remained in force from the inception of Medicaid. The proviso operated solely to invalidate the post-OBRA regulations permitting the income and resource standards in state Medicaid plans to deviate from those used in the AFDC and SSI programs in "such matters as deemed income, interest, court-ordered support payments, and infrequent and irregular income." See Treatment of excess income and the calculation of spenddowns were |
Subsets and Splits