author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice O'Connor | 2,004 | 14 | concurring | Pliler v. Ford | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136992/pliler-v-ford/ | I join the Court's opinion because it is limited to the narrow question whether the notifications crafted by the Ninth Circuit must be given. The propriety of the stay-and-abeyance procedure generally is not addressed. The District Court did not employ that procedure, nor did the Ninth Circuit hold that it must be applied in every case. There is, therefore, no need for us to pass on it in this case, and the Court properly avoids doing so. I note, however, that the procedure is not an idiosyncratic one; as JUSTICE BREYER describes, post, at 239 (dissenting opinion), seven of the eight Circuits to consider it have approved stay-and-abeyance as an appropriate exercise of a district court's equitable powers. *235 For the reasons given by the majority, ante, at 232-233, it is not incumbent upon a district court to establish whether the statute of limitations has already run before explaining the options available to a habeas petitioner who has filed a mixed petition. Nevertheless, if the petitioner is affirmatively misled, either by the court or by the State, equitable tolling might well be appropriate. This is a question for the Ninth Circuit to consider on remand. See ante, at 234. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, concurring in the judgment. While I fully agree with the views expressed by JUSTICE GINSBURG, post this page, and JUSTICE BREYER, post, p. 237 (dissenting opinions), I am persuaded that the judgment entered by the Court remanding to the Ninth Circuit to determine the propriety of equitable tolling is both consistent with those views and correct. I therefore concur in that judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111429/burger-king-corp-v-rudzewicz/ | In my opinion there is a significant element of unfairness in requiring a franchisee to defend a case of this kind in the forum chosen by the franchisor. It is undisputed that appellee maintained no place of business in Florida, that he had no employees in that State, and that he was not licensed to do business there. Appellee did not prepare his French fries, shakes, and hamburgers in Michigan, and then deliver them into the stream of commerce "with the expectation that they [would] be purchased by consumers in" Florida. Ante, at 473. To the contrary, appellee did business only in Michigan, his business, property, and payroll taxes were payable in that State, and he sold all of his products there. Throughout the business relationship, appellee's principal contacts with appellant were with its Michigan office. Notwithstanding its disclaimer, ante, at 478, the Court seems ultimately to rely on nothing more than standard boilerplate language contained in various documents, ante, at 481, *488 to establish that appellee " `purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Florida's laws.' " Ante, at 482. Such superficial analysis creates a potential for unfairness not only in negotiations between franchisors and their franchisees but, more significantly, in the resolution of the disputes that inevitably arise from time to time in such relationships. Judge Vance's opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adequately explains why I would affirm the judgment of that court. I particularly find the following more persuasive than what this Court has written today: "Nothing in the course of negotiations gave Rudzewicz reason to anticipate a Burger King suit outside of Michigan. The only face-to-face or even oral contact Rudzewicz had with Burger King throughout months of protracted negotiations was with representatives of the Michigan office. Burger King had the Michigan office interview Rudzewicz and MacShara, appraise their application, discuss price terms, recommend the site which the defendants finally agreed to, and attend the final closing ceremony. There is no evidence that Rudzewicz ever negotiated with anyone in Miami or even sent mail there during negotiations. He maintained no staff in the state of Florida, and as far as the record reveals, he has never even visited the state. "The contracts contemplated the startup of a local Michigan restaurant whose profits would derive solely from food sales made to customers in Drayton Plains. The sale, which involved the use of an intangible trademark in Michigan and occupancy of a Burger King facility there, required no performance in the state of Florida. Under the contract, the local Michigan district |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111429/burger-king-corp-v-rudzewicz/ | state of Florida. Under the contract, the local Michigan district office was responsible for providing all of the services due Rudzewicz, including advertising and management consultation. Supervision, moreover, emanated from that office alone. To Rudzewicz, the Michigan office was for all intents and purposes the embodiment *489 of Burger King. He had reason to believe that his working relationship with Burger King began and ended in Michigan, not at the distant and anonymous Florida headquarters. "Given that the office in Rudzewicz' home state conducted all of the negotiations and wholly supervised the contract, we believe that he had reason to assume that the state of the supervisory office would be the same state in which Burger King would file suit. Rudzewicz lacked fair notice that the distant corporate headquarters which insulated itself from direct dealings with him would later seek to assert jurisdiction over him in the courts of its own home state. "Just as Rudzewicz lacked notice of the possibility of suit in Florida, he was financially unprepared to meet its added costs. The franchise relationship in particular is fraught with potential for financial surprise. The device of the franchise gives local retailers the access to national trademark recognition which enables them to compete with better-financed, more efficient chain stores. This national affiliation, however, does not alter the fact that the typical franchise store is a local concern serving at best a neighborhood or community. Neither the revenues of a local business nor the geographical range of its market prepares the average franchise owner for the cost of distant litigation. "The particular distribution of bargaining power in the franchise relationship further impairs the franchisee's financial preparedness. In a franchise contract, `the franchisor normally occupies [the] dominant role'. "We discern a characteristic disparity of bargaining power in the facts of this case. There is no indication that Rudzewicz had any latitude to negotiate a reduced rent or franchise fee in exchange for the added risk of suit in Florida. He signed a standard form contract whose terms were non-negotiable and which appeared *490 in some respects to vary from the more favorable terms agreed to in earlier discussions. In fact, the final contract required a minimum monthly rent computed on a base far in excess of that discussed in oral negotiations. Burger King resisted price concessions, only to sue Rudzewicz far from home. In doing so, it severely impaired his ability to call Michigan witnesses who might be essential to his defense and counterclaim. "In sum, we hold that the circumstances of the Drayton Plains franchise and the negotiations which |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | dissenting | Miller v. French | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118378/miller-v-french/ | The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) says that "any party or intervener" may move to terminate any "prospective relief" previously granted by the court, 18 U.S. C. 3626(b)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. IV), and that the court shall terminate (or modify) that relief unless it is "necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of [a] Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation [and is] the least intrusive means" to do so. 18 U.S. C. 3626(b)(3). We here consider a related procedural provision of the PLRA. It says that "[a]ny motion to modify or terminate prospective relief shall operate as a stay" of that prospective relief "during the period" beginning (no later than) the 90th day after the filing of the motion and ending when the motion is decided. 3626(e)(2). This provision means *354 approximately the following: Suppose that a district court, in 1980, had entered an injunction governing present and future prison conditions. Suppose further that in 1996 a party filed a motion under the PLRA asking the court to terminate (or to modify) the 1980 injunction. That district court would have no more than 90 days to decide whether to grant the motion. After those 90 days, the 1980 injunction would terminate automaticallyregaining life only if, when, and to the extent that the judge eventually decided to deny the PLRA motion. The majority interprets the words "shall operate as a stay" to mean, in terms of my example, that the 1980 injunction must become ineffective after the 90th day, no matter what. The Solicitor General, however, believes that the view adopted by the majority interpretation is too rigid and calls into doubt the constitutionality of the provision. He argues that the statute is silent as to whether the district court can modify or suspend the operation of the automatic stay. He would find in that silence sufficient authority for the court to create an exception to the 90-day time limit where circumstances make it necessary to do so. As so read, the statute would neither displace the courts' traditional equitable authority nor raise significant constitutional difficulties. See ; Edward J. DeBartolo I agree with the Solicitor General and believe we should adopt that "`reasonable construction' " of the statute. stating "`every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality' "). *355 I At the outset, one must understand why a more flexible interpretation of the statute might be needed. To do so, one must keep in mind the extreme circumstances that at least some prison litigation originally |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | dissenting | Miller v. French | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118378/miller-v-french/ | the extreme circumstances that at least some prison litigation originally sought to correct, the complexity of the resulting judicial decrees, and the potential difficulties arising out of the subsequent need to review those decrees in order to make certain they follow Congress' PLRA directives. A hypothetical example based on actual circumstances may help. In January a Federal District Court made 81 factual findings describing extremely poorindeed "barbaric and shocking"prison conditions in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Morales These conditions included prisons typically operating with twice the number of prisoners they were designed to hold; inmates living in 16 square feet of space (i. e., only 4 feet by 4 feet); inmates without medical care, without psychiatric care, without beds, without mattresses, without hot water, without soap or towels or toothbrushes or underwear; food prepared on a budget of $1.50 per day and "tons of food destroyed because of rats, vermin, worms, and spoilage"; "no working toilets or showers," "urinals [that] flush into the sinks," "plumbing systems in a state of collapse," and a "stench" that was "omnipresent"; "exposed wiring no fire extinguisher, [and] poor ventilation"; "calabozos," or dungeons, "like cages with bars on the top" or with two slits in a steel door opening onto a central corridor, the floors of which were "covered with raw sewage" and which contained prisoners with severe mental illnesses, "caged like wild animals," sometimes for months; areas of a prison where mentally ill inmates were "kept in cells naked, without beds, without mattresses, without any private possessions, and most of them without toilets that work and without drinking water." 26- *356 27, 29, These conditions had led to epidemics of communicable diseases, untreated mental illness, suicides, and murders. at The District Court held that these conditions amounted to constitutionally forbidden "cruel and unusual punishment." It entered 30 specific orders designed to produce constitutionally mandated improvement by requiring the prison system to, for example, screen food handlers for communicable diseases, close the "calabozos," move mentally ill patients to hospitals, fix broken plumbing, and provide at least 35 square feet (i. e., 5 feet by 7 feet) of living space to each prisoner. The very pervasiveness and seriousness of the conditions described in the court's opinion made those conditions difficult to cure quickly. Over the next decade, the District Court entered further orders embodied in 15 published opinions, affecting 21 prison institutions. These orders concerned, inter alia, overcrowding, security, disciplinary proceedings, prisoner classification, rehabilitation, parole, and drug addiction treatment. Not surprisingly, the related proceedings involved extensive evidence and argument consuming thousands of pages of transcript. See |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | dissenting | Miller v. French | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118378/miller-v-french/ | evidence and argument consuming thousands of pages of transcript. See Morales Their implementation involved the services of two monitors, two assistants, and a Special Master. Along the way, the court documented a degree of "administrative chaos" in the prison system, Morales and entered findings of contempt of court against the Commonwealth, followed by the assessment and collection of more than $74 million in fines. See Morales Prison conditions subsequently have improved in some respects. Morales I express no opinion as to whether, or which of, the earlier orders are still needed. But my *357 brief summary of the litigation should illustrate the potential difficulties involved in making the determination of continuing necessity required by the PLRA. Where prison litigation is as complex as the litigation I have just described, it may prove difficult for a district court to reach a fair and accurate decision about which orders remain necessary, and are the "least intrusive means" available, to prevent or correct a continuing violation of federal law. The orders, which were needed to resolve serious constitutional problems and may still be needed where compliance has not yet been assured, are complex, interrelated, and applicable to many different institutions. Ninety days might not provide sufficient time to ascertain the views of several different parties, including monitors, to allow them to present evidence, and to permit each to respond to the arguments and evidence of the others. It is at least possible, then, that the statute, as the majority reads it, would sometimes terminate a complex system of orders entered over a period of years by a court familiar with the local problemperhaps only to reinstate those orders later, when the termination motion can be decided. Such an automatic termination could leave constitutionally prohibited conditions unremedied, at least temporarily. Alternatively, the threat of termination could lead a district court to abbreviate proceedings that fairness would otherwise demand. At a minimum, the mandatory automatic stay would provide a recipe for uncertainty, as complex judicial orders that have long governed the administration of particular prison systems suddenly turn off, then (perhaps selectively) back on. So read, the statute directly interferes with a court's exercise of its traditional equitable authority, rendering temporarily ineffective pre-existing remedies aimed at correcting past, and perhaps ongoing, violations of the Constitution. That interpretation, as the majority itself concedes, might give rise to serious constitutional problems. Ante, at 350. *358 II The Solicitor General's more flexible reading of the statute avoids all these problems. He notes that the relevant language says that the motion to modify or terminate prospective relief "shall operate |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | dissenting | Miller v. French | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118378/miller-v-french/ | the motion to modify or terminate prospective relief "shall operate as a stay" after a period of 30 days, extendable for "good cause" to 90 days. 18 U.S. C. 3626(e)(2); see also Brief for United States 12. The language says nothing, however, about the district court's power to modify or suspend the operation of the "stay." In the Solicitor General's view, the "stay" would determine the legal status quo; but the district court would retain its traditional equitable power to change that status quo once the party seeking the modification or suspension of the operation of the stay demonstrates that the stay "would cause irreparable injury, that the termination motion is likely to be defeated, and that the merits of the motion cannot be resolved before the automatic stay takes effect." Where this is shown, the "court has discretion to suspend the automatic stay and require prison officials to comply with outstanding court orders until the court resolves the termination motion on the merits," subject to immediate appellate review, 18 U.S. C. 3626(e)(4). Is this interpretation a "reasonable construction" of the statute? Edward J. DeBartolo 485 U. S., at I note first that the statutory language is open to the Solicitor General's interpretation. A district court ordinarily can stay the operation of a judicial order (such as a stay or injunction), see Radio, when a party demonstrates the need to do so in accordance with traditional equitable criteria ; 1 U.S. 414, 0 (19)). There is no logical inconsistency in saying both (1) a motion (to terminate) "shall operate as a stay," and (2) the court retains the power *359 to modify or delay the operation of the stay in appropriate circumstances. The statutory language says nothing about this last-mentioned power. It is silent. It does not direct the district court to leave the stay in place come what may. Nor does this more flexible interpretation deprive the procedural provision of meaning. The filing of the motion to terminate prospective relief will still, after a certain period, operate as a stay without further action by the court. Thus, the motion automatically changes the status quo and imposes upon the party wishing to suspend the automatic stay the burden of demonstrating strong, special reasons for doing so. The word "automatic" in the various subsection titles does not prove the contrary, for that word often means selfstarting, not unstoppable. See Websters Third New International Dictionary 148 (1993). Indeed, the Bankruptcy Act uses the words "automatic stay" to describe a provision stating that "a petition filed operates as a stay" of certain other |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | dissenting | Miller v. French | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118378/miller-v-french/ | "a petition filed operates as a stay" of certain other judicial proceedingsdespite the fact that a later portion of that same provision makes clear that under certain circumstances the bankruptcy court may terminate, annul, or modify the stay. 11 U.S. C. 362(d); see also 143 Cong. Rec. S12269 (Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (explaining that 3626(e)(2) was modeled after the Bankruptcy Act provision). And the Poultry Producers Financial Protection Act of 1987 specifies that a court of appeals decree affirming an order of the Secretary of Agriculture "shall operate as an injunction" restraining the "live poultry dealer" from violating that order, 7 U.S. C. 228b-3(g); yet it appears that no one has ever suggested that a court of appeals lacks the power to modify that "injunction" where appropriate. Moreover, the change in the legal status quo that the automatic stay would bring about, and the need to demonstrate a special need to lift the stay (according to traditional equitable criteria), mean that the stay would remain in effect in all but highly unusual cases. *360 In addition, the surrounding procedural provisions are most naturally read as favoring the flexible interpretation. The immediately preceding provision requires the court to rule "promptly" upon the motion to terminate and says that "[m]andamus shall lie to remedy any failure to issue a prompt ruling." 18 U.S. C. 3626(e)(1). If a motion to terminate takes effect automatically through the "stay" after 30 or 90 days, it is difficult to understand what purpose would be served by providing for mandamusa procedure that itself (in so complicated a matter) could take several weeks. But if the automatic stay might be modified or lifted in an unusual case, providing for mandamus makes considerable sense. It guarantees that an appellate court will make certain that unusual circumstances do in fact justify any such modification or lifting of the stay. A later provision that provides for immediate appeal of any order "staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay" can be read as providing for similar appellate review for similar reasons. 3626(e)(4). Further, the legislative history is neutral, for it is silent on this issue. Yet there is relevant judicial precedent. That precedent does not read statutory silence as denying judges authority to exercise their traditional equitable powers. Rather, it reads statutory silence as authorizing the exercise of those powers. This Court has said, for example, that "[o]ne thing is clear. Where Congress wished to deprive the courts of this historic power, it knew how to use apt words only once has it done so |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | dissenting | Miller v. French | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118378/miller-v-french/ | to use apt words only once has it done so and in a statute born of the exigencies of war." Compare with and 2 U. S., at -706 These cases recognize the importance of permitting courts in equity cases to tailor relief, and related *361 relief procedure, to the exigencies of particular cases and individual circumstances. In doing so, they recognize the fact that in certain circumstances justice requires the flexibility necessary to treat different cases differentlythe rationale that underlies equity itself. Cf. Hecht 1 U.S. 1, 9 (19) Finally, the more flexible interpretation is consistent with Congress' purposes as revealed in the statute. Those purposes include the avoidance of new judicial relief that is overly broad or no longer necessary and the reassessment of pre-existing relief to bring it into conformity with these standards. But Congress has simultaneously expressed its intent to maintain relief that is narrowly drawn and necessary to end unconstitutional practices. See 18 U.S. C. 3626(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(3). The statute, as flexibly interpreted, risks interfering with the first set of objectives only to the extent that the speedy appellate review provided in the statute fails to control district court error. The same interpretation avoids the improper provisional termination of relief that is constitutionally necessary. The risk of an occasional small additional delay seems a comparatively small price to pay (in terms of the statute's entire set of purposes) to avoid the serious constitutional problems that accompany the majority's more rigid interpretation. The upshot is a statute that, when read in light of its language, structure, purpose, and history, is open to an interpretation that would allow a court to modify or suspend the automatic stay when a party, in accordance with traditional equitable criteria, has demonstrated a need for such an exception. That interpretation reflects this Court's historic reluctance to read a statute as depriving courts of their traditional equitable powers. It also avoids constitutional difficulties that might arise in unusual cases. *362 I do not argue that this interpretation reflects the most natural reading of the statute's language. Nor do I assert that each individual legislator would have endorsed that reading at the time. But such an interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. That reading harmonizes the statute's language with other basic legal principles, including constitutional principles. And, in doing so, it better fits the full set of legislative objectives embodied in the statute than does the more rigid reading that the majority adopts. For these reasons, I believe that the Solicitor General's more flexible reading is the proper reading of the statute |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | This case requires us to decide whether two California jury instructions used in the penalty phase of petitioner's capital murder trial and in other California capital cases before each was modified in 1983 and respectively, are consistent with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. We hold that they are. Petitioner Richard Boyde was found guilty by a jury in the robbery, kidnaping, and murder of Dickie Gibson, the night clerk at a 7-Eleven Store in Riverside, California. The State introduced evidence at trial that about 2:30 a.m. on January 15, 1981, Boyde entered the store and robbed the clerk at gunpoint of $33 from the cash register. Petitioner then *373 forced Gibson into a waiting car, which was driven by petitioner's nephew, and the three men drove to a nearby orange grove. There, Boyde brought Gibson into the grove and ordered him to kneel down with his hands behind his head. As Gibson begged for his life, Boyde shot him once in the back of the head and again in the forehead, killing him. The jury returned a special verdict that Boyde personally committed the homicide with "express malice aforethought and premeditation and deliberation." At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was instructed, inter alia, in accordance with instructions 8.84.1 and 8.84.2, 1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC), both of which have since been amended. The former lists 11 factors that the jury "shall consider, take into account and be guided by" in determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment.[1] The eleventh is a *374 "catch-all," factor (k), which reads: "Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."[2] The court's concluding instruction, pursuant to CALJIC 8.84.2, again told the jury to consider all applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances and followed with this direction: "If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole." (Emphasis added.) [3] After hearing *375 six days of testimony concerning the appropriate penalty, the jury returned a verdict imposing the sentence of death, and the trial court denied Boyde's motion to reduce the sentence. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed. It rejected petitioner's contention that the jury instructions violated the Eighth Amendment because the so-called "unadorned version" of factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | of factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider mitigating evidence of his background and character. The court noted that all of the defense evidence at the penalty phase related to Boyde's background and character, that the jury was instructed to consider " `all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case,' " and that the prosecutor "never suggested that the background and character evidence could not be considered." Therefore, the court found it "inconceivable the jury would have believed that, though it was permitted to hear defendant's *376 background and character evidence and his attorney's lengthy argument concerning that evidence, it could not consider that evidence." With regard to the "shall impose" language of CALJIC 8.84.2, the court agreed with petitioner that the instruction could not permissibly require a juror to vote for the death penalty " `unless, upon completion of the "weighing" process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances.' " 758 P. 2d, at 48 ). It concluded, however, that in this case "[t]he jury was adequately informed as to its discretion in determining whether death was the appropriate penalty." 758 P. 2d, at 48. Three justices dissented from the court's affirmance of the death sentence. The dissenters argued that the mandatory feature of instruction 8.84.2 misled the jury into believing that it was required to impose the death penalty if the aggravating factors "outweighed" the mitigating factors, even though an individual juror might not have thought death was the appropriate penalty in this case. -57. We granted certiorari, and now affirm. Petitioner reiterates in this Court his argument that the mandatory nature of former CALJIC 8.84.2 resulted in a sentencing proceeding that violated the Eighth Amendment, because the instruction prevented the jury from making an "individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty." See Specifically, Boyde contends that the "shall impose" language of the jury instruction precluded the jury from evaluating the "absolute weight" of the aggravating circumstances and determining whether they justified the death penalty. He further asserts that the jury was prevented from deciding whether, in light of all the aggravating and mitigating evidence, death was the appropriate penalty. In response, the State argues that the sentencing proceeding was consistent *377 with the Eighth Amendment, because a reasonable juror would interpret the instruction as allowing for the exercise of discretion and moral judgment about the appropriate penalty in the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We need not discuss petitioner's claim at length, because we conclude that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | not discuss petitioner's claim at length, because we conclude that it is foreclosed by our decision earlier this Term in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 299. In Blystone, we rejected a challenge to an instruction with similar mandatory language, holding that "[t]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence." Ante, at 307. Although Blystone, unlike Boyde, did not present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of his capital trial, the legal principle we expounded in Blystone clearly requires rejection of Boyde's claim as well, because the mandatory language of CALJIC 8.84.2 is not alleged to have interfered with the consideration of mitigating evidence. Petitioner suggests that the jury must have freedom to decline to impose the death penalty even if the jury decides that the aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances. But there is no such constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence "in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty." Petitioner's claim that the "shall impose" language of CALJIC 8.84.2 unconstitutionally prevents "individualized assessment" by the jury is thus without merit. The second issue in this case is whether petitioner's capital sentencing proceedings violated the Eighth Amendment because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with former CALJIC 8.84.1, including the "unadorned" factor (k). The Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence *378 offered by petitioner. See ; ; In assessing the effect of a challenged jury instruction, we follow the familiar rule stated in : "In determining the effect of this instruction on the validity of respondent's conviction, we accept at the outset the well-established proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Petitioner contends that none of the 11 statutory factors in CALJIC 8.84.1 allowed the jury to consider non-crime-related factors, such as his background and character, which might provide a basis for a sentence less than death. Nine of the factors, he argues, focused only on the immediate circumstances of the crime itself. Two others, factors (b) and (c), which center on the presence or absence of prior violent criminal activity and prior felony convictions, were in petitioner's view simply vehicles for the consideration of aggravating evidence not directly related to the crime. Finally, petitioner claims that the "catchall" factor (k) did |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | crime. Finally, petitioner claims that the "catchall" factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider and give effect to non-crime-related mitigating evidence, because its language "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime" limited the jury to other evidence that was related to the crime. The legal standard for reviewing jury instructions claimed to restrict impermissibly a jury's consideration of relevant evidence is less than clear from our cases. In we said that "[t]he question. is what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning." See also But our subsequent decisions, while sometimes purporting *379 to apply the Francis standard, have not adhered strictly to that formulation. In -542 we made reference both to what a reasonable juror "could" have done and what he "would" have done. And two Terms ago in we alluded to at least three different inquiries for evaluating such a challenge: whether reasonable jurors "could have" drawn an impermissible interpretation from the trial court's instructions, ; whether there is a "substantial possibility that the jury may have rested its verdict on the `improper' ground," ; and how reasonable jurors "would have" applied and understood the instructions. Other opinions in the area likewise have produced a variety of tests and standards. See, e. g., ("[A] reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence") ; ("[N]either of the Special Issues as they would have been understood by reasonable jurors gave the jury the opportunity to consider petitioner's mitigating evidence") ; see also Although there may not be great differences among these various phrasings, it is important to settle upon a single formulation for this Court and other courts to employ in deciding this kind of federal question. Our cases, understandably, do not provide a single standard for determining whether various claimed errors in instructing a jury require reversal of a conviction. In some instances, to be sure, we have held that "when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative *380 theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside. See, e. g.," ; see also In those cases, a jury is clearly instructed by the court that it may convict a defendant on an impermissible legal theory, as well as on a proper theory or theories. Although it is possible that the guilty verdict may have had a proper basis, "it is equally likely that the verdict rested on an unconstitutional ground," |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | equally likely that the verdict rested on an unconstitutional ground," Bachellar, at and we have declined to choose between two such likely possibilities. In this case we are presented with a single jury instruction. The instruction is not concededly erroneous, nor found so by a court, as was the case in The claim is that the instruction is ambiguous and therefore subject to an erroneous interpretation. We think the proper inquiry in such a case is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to have been impermissibly inhibited by the instruction, a capital sentencing proceeding is not inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment if there is only a possibility of such an inhibition. This "reasonable likelihood" standard, we think, better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy than does a standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical "reasonable" juror could or might have interpreted the instruction. There is, of course, a strong policy in favor of accurate determination of the appropriate sentence in a capital case, but there is an equally strong policy against retrials years after the first trial where the claimed error amounts to no more than speculation.[4] Jurors do not sit in *381 solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that lawyers might. Differences among them in interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting. Applying this standard to factor (k) of CALJIC 8.84.1 standing alone, we think there is not a reasonable likelihood that Boyde's jurors interpreted the trial court's instructions to prevent consideration of mitigating evidence of background and character. The jury was instructed, according to factor (k), that "you shall consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime," and the term "extenuate" was defined by the court to mean "to lessen the seriousness of a crime as by giving an excuse." App. 34. Petitioner contends that this instruction did not permit the jury to give effect to evidence presented by psychologists, family, and friends of his impoverished and deprived childhood, his inadequacies as a school student, and his strength of character in the face of these obstacles. But as |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | of character in the face of these obstacles. But as we explained last *382 Term in : " `evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.' " 492 U.S., at (quoting ) Petitioner had an opportunity through factor (k) to argue that his background and character "extenuated" or "excused" the seriousness of the crime, and we see no reason to believe that reasonable jurors would resist the view, "long held by society," that in an appropriate case such evidence would counsel imposition of a sentence less than death. The instruction did not, as petitioner seems to suggest, limit the jury's consideration to "any other circumstance of the crime which extenuates the gravity of the crime." The jury was directed to consider any other circumstance that might excuse the crime, which certainly includes a defendant's background and character.[5] *383 Even were the language of the instruction less clear than we think, the context of the proceedings would have led reasonable jurors to believe that evidence of petitioner's background and character could be considered in mitigation. Other factors listed in CALJIC 8.84.1 allow for consideration of mitigating evidence not associated with the crime itself, such as the absence of prior criminal activity by a defendant, the absence of prior felony convictions, and youth. When factor (k) is viewed together with those instructions, it seems even more improbable that jurors would arrive at an interpretation that precludes consideration of all non-crime-related evidence. All of the defense evidence presented at the penalty phase four days of testimony consuming over 400 pages of trial transcript related to petitioner's background and character, and we think it unlikely that reasonable jurors would believe the court's instructions transformed all of this "favorable testimony into a virtual charade." The jury was instructed that it "shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case," App. 33 and in our view reasonable jurors surely would not have felt constrained by the factor (k) instruction to ignore all of the evidence *384 presented by petitioner during the sentencing phase. Presentation of mitigating evidence alone, of course, does not guarantee that a jury will feel entitled to consider that evidence. But the introduction without objection of volumes of mitigating evidence certainly is relevant to deciding how a jury would understand an |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | is relevant to deciding how a jury would understand an instruction which is at worst ambiguous. This case is unlike those instances where we have found broad descriptions of the evidence to be considered insufficient to cure statutes or instructions which clearly directed the sentencer to disregard evidence. See, e. g., ; (Even under Ohio's "liberal" construction of the death penalty statute, "only the three factors specified in the statute can be considered in mitigation of the defendant's sentence"). Petitioner also asserts that arguments by the prosecutor immediately before the jury's sentencing deliberations reinforced an impermissible interpretation of factor (k) and made it likely that jurors would arrive at such an understanding. But arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, see Tr. 3933, and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law. See ; ; Arguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by the court. E. g., This is not to say that prosecutorial misrepresentations may never have a decisive effect on the jury, but only that they are not to be judged as *385 having the same force as an instruction from the court. And the arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be judged in the context in which they are made. Greer, ; ; United U.S. 1, ; see also We find no objectionable prosecutorial argument in this case. Petitioner maintains that the prosecutor encouraged an intolerably narrow view of factor (k) when he argued to the jury that the mitigating evidence did not "suggest that [petitioner's] crime is less serious or that the gravity of the crime is any less," App. 24, and that "[n]othing I have heard lessens the seriousness of this crime." But we agree with the Supreme Court of California, which was without dissent on this point, that "[a]lthough the prosecutor argued that in his view the evidence did not sufficiently mitigate Boyde's conduct, he never suggested that the background and character evidence could not be considered." 46 Cal. 3d, His principal tack was not to contend that background and character were irrelevant, but to urge the jury that despite petitioner's past difficulties, he must accept responsibility for his actions. See App. 28-30. Indeed, the prosecutor explicitly assumed that petitioner's character evidence was a proper factor in the weighing process, but argued |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Boyde v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112386/boyde-v-california/ | was a proper factor in the weighing process, but argued that it was minimal in relation to the aggravating circumstances: "The Defendant can dance. The Defendant may have some artistic talent. The Defendant may, in fact, have been good with children. During the course of twenty-four years, even on a basis of just random luck, you are going to have to have picked up something or *386A done something we can all approve of, but if you consider that on the weight that goes against it, it is not even close." Tr. 4820-4821 Defense counsel also stressed a broad reading of factor (k) in his argument to the jury: "[I]t is almost a catchall phrase. Any other circumstance, and it means just that, any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse." App. 31.[6] In sum, we conclude there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in petitioner's case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by petitioner. We thus hold that the giving of the jury instructions at issue in this case, former CALJIC 8.84.1 and 8.84.2, did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is Affirmed. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Jefferson v. City of Tarrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118153/jefferson-v-city-of-tarrant/ | This case, still sub judice in Alabama, was brought to this Court too soon. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Alabama Wrongful Death Act, 410 (1993), governs recovery when a decedent's estate claims, under 42 U.S. C. that the death in question resulted from a deprivation of federal rights. We do not decide that issue, however, because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction at the current stage of the proceedings. Congress has limited our review of state-court decisions to "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S. C. 1257(a). The decision we confront does not qualify as a "final judgment" within the meaning of 1257(a). The Alabama Supreme Court decided the federal-law issue on an interlocutory certification from the trial court, then remanded the cause for further proceedings on petitioners' remaining state-law claims. The outcome of those further proceedings could moot the federal question we agreed to decide. If the federal question does not become moot, petitioners will be free *78 to seek our review when the state-court proceedings reach an end. We accordingly dismiss the writ for want of a final judgment. I Petitioners commenced this action against the city of Tarrant, Alabama (City), to recover damages for the death of Alberta Jefferson. Ms. Jefferson, an African-American woman, died in a fire at her Tarrant City home on December 4, 1993. Petitioners' complaint, App. 1-11, alleges that the City firefighters did not attempt to rescue Ms. Jefferson promptly after they arrived on the scene, nor did they try to revive her when they carried her from her house. The complaint further alleges that these omissions resulted from "the selective denial of fire protection to disfavored minorities," and proximately caused Ms. Jefferson's death. The City, however, maintains that the Tarrant Fire Department responded to the alarm call as quickly as possible and that Ms. Jefferson had already died by the time the firefighters arrived. Petitioners Melvin, Leon, and Benjamin Jefferson, as administrator and survivors of Alberta Jefferson, filed their complaint against Tarrant City in an Alabama Circuit Court on June 21, 1994. The Jeffersons asserted two claims under state law: one for wrongful death, and the other for the common-law tort of outrage. They also asserted two claims under 42 U.S. C. : one alleging that Alberta Jefferson's death resulted from the deliberate indifference of the City and its agents, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the other alleging that Ms. Jefferson's death resulted from a practice of invidious racial |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Jefferson v. City of Tarrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118153/jefferson-v-city-of-tarrant/ | Ms. Jefferson's death resulted from a practice of invidious racial discrimination, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In June 1995, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings on the claims and for summary judgment on all claims. In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the *79 City argued that the survival remedy provided by the Alabama Wrongful Death Act governed the Jeffersons' potential recovery for the City's alleged constitutional torts.[1] For this argument, the City relied on In that case, we held that 42 U.S. C. 1988(a) requires the application of state-law survival remedies in actions unless those remedies are "`inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.' " The Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted the State's Wrongful Death Act as providing a punitive damages remedy only. See, e. g., But plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages against a municipality. See Hence, according to respondent, petitioners could obtain no damages against the City under The Alabama trial court denied the summary judgment motion in its entirety, and it denied in part the motion for judgment on the pleadings. As to the latter motion, the court ruled that, notwithstanding the punitive-damages-only limitation in the state Wrongful Death Act, the Jeffersons could recover compensatory damages upon proof that the City violated Alberta Jefferson's constitutional rights. The trial court certified the damages question for immediate review, and the Alabama Supreme Court granted the City permission *80 to appeal from the denial of its motion for judgment on the pleadings.[2] On the interlocutory appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed. Relying on its earlier opinion in the court held that the state Act, including its allowance of punitive damages only, governed petitioners' potential recovery on their claims. The court remanded "for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." Dissenting Justices Houston and Cook would have affirmed the trial court's ruling. We granted certiorari to resolve the following question: "Whether, when a decedent's death is alleged to have resulted from a deprivation of federal rights occurring in Alabama, the Alabama Wrongful Death Act, 410 (1993), governs the recovery by the representative of the decedent's estate under 42 U.S. C. ?" In its brief on the merits, respondent for the first time raised a nonwaivable impediment: The City asserted that we lack jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of the Alabama Supreme Court. We agree, and we now dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. II From the earliest days of our judiciary, Congress has vested in this Court authority to review federal-question decisions made by state courts. For just |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Jefferson v. City of Tarrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118153/jefferson-v-city-of-tarrant/ | to review federal-question decisions made by state courts. For just as long, Congress has limited that power to cases in which the State's judgment is final. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 25, The current *81 statute regulating our jurisdiction to review state-court decisions provides: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States." 28 U.S. C. 1257(a). This provision establishes a firm final judgment rule. To be reviewable by this Court, a state-court judgment must be final "in two senses: it must be subject to no further review or correction in any other state tribunal; it must also be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein. It must be the final word of a final court." Market Street R. As we have recognized, the finality rule "is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system." Radio Station WOW, The Alabama Supreme Court's decision was not a "final judgment." It was avowedly interlocutory. Far from terminating the litigation, the court answered a single certified question that affected only two of the four counts in petitioners' complaint. The court then remanded the case for further proceedings. Absent settlement or further dispositive motions, the proceedings on remand will include a trial on the merits of the state-law claims. In the relevant respect, this case is identical to where we dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. See ("Because the Colorado Supreme Court remanded this case for trial, its decision is not final `as an effective determination of the litigation.' " (citation omitted)). Petitioners contend that this case comes within the "limited set of situations in which we have found finality as to the federal issue despite the ordering of further proceedings in the lower state courts." We do not agree. This is not a case in which "the federal issue, finally decided by the highest |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Jefferson v. City of Tarrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118153/jefferson-v-city-of-tarrant/ | in which "the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings." Cox Broadcasting Resolution of the state-law claims could effectively moot the federal-law question raised here. Most notably, the City maintains that its fire department responded promptly to the call reporting that Ms. Jefferson's residence was in flames, but that Ms. Jefferson was already dead when they arrived. On the City's view of the facts, its personnel could have done nothing more to save Ms. Jefferson's life. See App. 45-47. If the City prevails on this account of the facts, then any claim will necessarily fail, however incorrect the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling, for the City will have established that its actions did not cause Ms. Jefferson's death. Nor is this an instance "where the federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case." Cox Broadcasting If the Alabama Supreme Court's decision on the federal claim ultimately makes a difference to the Jeffersonsin particular, if they prevail on their state claims but recover less than they might have under federal law, or if their state claims fail for reasons that do not also dispose of their federal claimsthey will be free to seek our review once the statecourt *83 litigation comes to an end. Even if the Alabama Supreme Court adheres to its interlocutory ruling as "law of the case," that determination will in no way limit our ability to review the issue on final judgment. See, e. g., ; see also R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 642 ("If a state court judgment is not final for purposes of Supreme Court review, the federal questions it determines will (if not mooted) be open in the Supreme Court on later review of the final judgment, whether or not under state law the initial adjudication is the law of the case on the second state review."); R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 104-105 (7th ed. 1993) (citing cases). We acknowledge that one of our prior decisions might be read to support the view that parties in the Jeffersons' situation need not present their federal questions to the state courts a second time before obtaining review in this Court. See U.S. 39, In Ritchie, we permitted immediate review of a Pennsylvania |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Jefferson v. City of Tarrant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118153/jefferson-v-city-of-tarrant/ | 39, In Ritchie, we permitted immediate review of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling that required the Commonwealth's Children and Youth Services (CYS) to disclose to a criminal defendant the contents of a child protective service file regarding a key witness. The Court asserted jurisdiction in that case because of the "unusual" situation presented: We doubted whether there would be any subsequent opportunity to raise the federal questions, see ib and we were reluctant to put the CYS in the bind of either disclosing a confidential file or being held in contempt, see Ritchie is an extraordinary case and we confine it to the precise circumstances the Court there confronted. We now clarify that Ritchie does not augur expansion of the exceptions *84 stated in Cox Broadcasting Corp., and we reject any construction of Ritchie that would contradict this opinion. This case fits within no exceptional category. It presents the typical situation in which the state courts have resolved some but not all of petitioners' claims. Our jurisdiction therefore founders on the rule that a state-court decision is not final unless and until it has effectively determined the entire litigation. Because the Alabama Supreme Court has not yet rendered a final judgment, we lack jurisdiction to review its decision on the Jeffersons' claims. * * * For the reasons stated, the writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is so ordered. |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | Appellants, discharged federal probationary employees, were denied unemployment compensation by the New York State Department of Labor, an "agent of the United States" under agreement with the Secretary of Labor for the administration of the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) Program, 5 U.S. C. 8501 et seq. Appellants brought this class suit against that state agency in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, joining as defendants the United States Department of Labor, which is charged with overall responsibility for the program, and the United States Post Office Department and Department of the Treasury, which are appellants' former employing agencies. Appellants alleged that the state agency had based its adverse determinations on findings of fact made ex parte by the federal employing agencies, and that the state agency had refused to afford either appellant a hearing *616 at which he or she could attempt to contest those federal findings. The result, appellants claimed, was a deprivation of any opportunity to be heard, in violation of the UCFE statutes and of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought certification as representatives of the class of persons similarly situated, the convening of a three-judge court, and declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The District Court viewed the suit as a constitutional attack on 5 U.S. C. 8506 (a),[1] which, inter alia, makes the findings of the federal employing agency "final and conclusive" on the state agency, and on the regulations of the Secretary of Labor promulgated, pursuant to 5 U.S. C. 8508, to enforce the program.[2] A three-judge *617 court was convened. That court, in an opinion reported at first examined the statutory claim and held that 8506 (a) does not require that appellants receive either a state or a federal hearing to contest the employing agency's findings. Next, the court noted that jurisdiction over the claims against the federal defendants had been alleged only under 28 U.S. C. 1361, providing for mandamus actions. Holding that 1361 will not support a constitutional challenge to a statute, the court dismissed the constitutional claims against the federal defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[3] Finally, turning to the constitutional claims against the state defendants, the court, apparently assuming for purposes of argument that the federal defendants were not constitutionally required to afford appellants a hearing, treated the claims as asserting that *618 denial of a state hearing was, in effect, a denial of any hearing on the federal findings. The court held that the denial of a hearing by the state agency did not violate either the Due Process or the Equal |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | did not violate either the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction of appellants' appeal, We are of the view that decision upon appellants' statutory and constitutional claims would be premature. We cannot discover in the record that the state agency, in notifying appellants of the adverse determinations, informed them, as required by 20 CFR 609.20, of their "right to additional information or reconsideration and correction" of the findings by the employing agencies. Nor can we discover from the record whether or not appellants invoked 20 CFR 609.23, entitling them to request their employing agencies "to reconsider and correct" those findings. The "findings" of appellant Christian's federal employer, the United States Post Office Department, were that Christian was discharged because of excessive absences. The "findings" of appellant Green's employer, the Department of the Treasury, were that Green was discharged for consuming an alcoholic beverage within 24 hours of going on duty as a sky marshal. It is clear that neither was afforded a prior hearing by his or her agency or any opportunity to challenge the justifications for discharge.[4] Each then applied for unemployment compensation through the New York State Department of Labor. As required by 8506, New York requested and obtained *619 from each agency its "findings" describing the nature of the employment, including the reasons for the discharge. On the basis of those findings, the state officials made an initial determination that neither appellant qualified for compensation under the applicable state standards.[5] We find nothing whatever in the record to show compliance by the state agency with 20 CFR 609.20. All that appears is that the New York officials sent each appellant a letter that included (a) a recitation that no employment benefits could be paid, (b) the state rule that required that conclusion, (c) a short summary of the findings of the federal agency, and (d) a statement that the individual could request a hearing before an impartial state referee. Indeed, the letter appears to be a form letter appropriate in cases of private and state employee applicants, but not tailored for the situation of the federal employee applicant given rights of reconsideration and correction by the Secretary's regulations. Appellant Christian requested and obtained a hearing *620 before a state referee. The referee permitted her to introduce evidence to rebut the federal findings, credited that evidence, and recommended that she be provided unemployment compensation. The state Appeals Board, however, reversed on the ground that 8506 prohibited re-examination of the facts found by the federal agency. Appellant Green had not obtained a hearing at |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | federal agency. Appellant Green had not obtained a hearing at the time this suit was filed, and the record does not disclose whether he requested one.[6] The UCFE Program does not, as the state Appeals Board recognized, contemplate a hearing before the state agency for correction of factual findings of the federal employer. But, while prohibiting state re-examination of the facts, 8506 (a) also requires an opportunity for federal re-examination: "The regulations [promulgated by the Secretary of Labor] shall include provision for correction by the employing agency of errors and omissions. Findings made in accordance with the regulations are final and conclusive for the purpose of [state adjudication]." The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor plainly attach great significance to the right of the discharged employee to have the employing agency reconsider its stated reasons for his discharge. The crucial requirement that triggers this reconsideration is the obligation imposed upon the state agency to notify the applicant of the content of the federal findings, which notice "shall [also] inform the Federal civilian employee of his right to additional information or reconsideration and correction of such findings." 20 CFR 609.20. Thereupon, the employee may obtain additional information *621 from the employing agency concerning the basis of its findings, 609.22. Whether or not he avails himself of that opportunity, he may file a request for reconsideration and correction, "together with such information as supports his request, through the State agency before which the claim is pending" 609.23. Upon receipt of such a request, the federal agency must consider any information submitted by the employee, promptly correct any errors or omissions, and either affirm, modify, or reverse its original findings in writing. 609.9. Finally, the State is required to stay its adjudicatory process pending federal reconsideration, although it is conclusively bound by any factual findings of the federal agency, 609.23 (a), 609.18 (c), when it applies its own law to redetermine eligibility. 609.24 (c), (d). Appellants' contention that 8506 (a) works a denial of due process and equal protection by depriving them of a hearing before the state agency is thus misdirected. Congress has precluded a hearing on the federal findings in any state forum, but it has required the Secretary of Labor to provide a "hearing" of some dimensions in conjunction with the mandated procedures for reconsideration. Whether a more comprehensive hearing than 609.22-609.24 of the regulations now provide is required either by the language of 8506 (a) or by the Constitutionand we intimate no views on those questions the regulations of the Department of Labor, as implemented by the federal |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | of the Department of Labor, as implemented by the federal agencies subject to those regulations, should be the focal point of the inquiry.[7] *622 The absence of any indication in the record that this federal administrative procedure was followed is, in our view, a bar to our consideration of appellants' attack upon the validity of the regulations. It is true that the fact that the employing agency's decision is not statutorily subject to judicial review does not preclude review of the agency's procedure used to reach that determination. See ; L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 371-372 (1965). But there are sound practical reasons for declining such review where the agency has not had the opportunity to apply its challenged procedure to a determination that is clearly within its subject-matter jurisdiction. The most obvious reasons relate to economy. A favorable agency decision on the merits of the claim may moot the objections to the procedure employed. And "it is generally more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages," But there are also persuasive reasons more directly related to the presentation of the procedural claim, as we have noted in cases involving the analogous requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to application for judicial review of the merits. See ; Appellants' criticism, on this appeal, of the federal administrative remedy as an "ex parte" determination amply demonstrates the point. The regulations clearly require that the agency *623 receive and consider any additional information the employee submits. Thus, the question is not whether there is to be some form of adversary proceeding, but whether that proceeding must be as elaborate as appellants contend.[8] That determination would be hazardous on the scant record before us. The regulations appear capable of accommodating various kinds of issues, and their requirements should be construed with an eye to the nature of the agencies involved and the employment relationship. We cannot know at this stage what particular procedures will be applied, whether credibility determinations will arise, how they will be treated if they do, or even what official within a federal employing agency will be responsible for the reconsideration. Removal of these uncertainties from the case may significantly advance judicial resolution of appellants' claims, while occasioning no great cost to them.[9] But we cannot determine on this record whether the District Court would have dismissed this suit for failure to invoke the federal administrative procedures. The adverse notification provided by New York clearly fails to |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | The adverse notification provided by New York clearly fails to satisfy the notice requirement of 20 CFR 609.20 of the Secretary's regulations. Without that crucial information concerning their rights, appellants could hardly be found to have waived them by proceeding in the state forum.[10] Yet the record is silent concerning whether *624 such information was provided, either with the state notice or otherwise. Under the circumstances, we vacate the District Court's dismissal of the suit as to both federal and state defendants and remand to the District Court with directions to determine whether appellants should be permitted to invoke the federal procedures. In such case, the suit should be retained on the docket for final decision following the federal redetermination proceedings. So ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Code of Federal Regulations Title 20: Employees' Benefits Part 609Unemployment Compensation for Federal Civilian Employees 609.1 Definitions. (b) "Federal agency" means any department, agency, or governmental body of the United States, including *625 any instrumentality wholly or partially owned by the United States, employing individuals in Federal civilian service. (f) "Federal findings" means the facts found by a Federal agency as to (1) whether an individual has performed Federal civilian service for such agency during the base period specified on a Form ES-931; (2) the period or periods of such Federal civilian service; (3) the individual's Federal civilian wages for the base period specified on such form; and (4) the reasons for termination of his Federal civilian service. 609.6 Federal findings on Form ES-931. (a) Within 4 work days after receipt from a State agency or the Secretary of a Form ES-931 a Federal agency shall make its Federal findings, complete all copies of the form, and transmit its Federal findings to the State agency or the Secretary, as appropriate, on such form or as a part thereof. If documents necessary for completion of a Form ES-931 have been assigned to an agency records center or the Federal Records Center in St. Louis the Federal agency shall obtain the necessary information from the records center. Any records center shall give priority to such request. (b) If a completed Form ES-931 cannot be returned within 4 work days of receipt the Federal agency immediately shall inform the State agency or the Secretary, as appropriate, and shall include an estimated date by which the completed form will be returned. (c) Each Federal agency shall maintain a control of the Forms ES-931 received by it that will enable it to ascertain at any time the number of such forms that have not been returned |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | the number of such forms that have not been returned to the requesting State agency *626 or the Secretary and the date of the Federal agency's receipt of such unreturned forms. 609.7 Corrected Federal findings. If a Federal agency ascertains at any time within 1 year after it has returned a completed Form ES-981 [sic] to a State agency or the Secretary that any of its Federal findings were erroneous it shall promptly correct its error and forward corrected Federal findings to the State agency or the Secretary, as appropriate. 609.8 Answering requests for additional information. On receipt of a request for additional information under 609.22 a Federal agency except where it would be inconsistent with general policies followed in the case of separations for security reasons shall furnish in writing to the requesting authority such additional information as (1) will enable a Federal civilian employee to understand the basis for Federal findings or (2) will enable the requesting authority to correctly apply a State unemployment compensation law. 609.9 Answering requests for correction of Federal findings. On receipt of a request for reconsideration and correction of Federal findings under 609.23 a Federal agency shall consider the information supplied in connection with such request and shall review its Federal findings. The Federal agency promptly shall correct any errors or omissions in its Federal findings and shall affirm, modify, or reverse any or all of its Federal findings in writing. The Federal agency then shall forward its reconsidered Federal findings to the requesting authority. *627 609.18 Finality of Federal findings. (a) Federal findings under 609.6 or 609.7 shall be final and conclusive except that Federal findings which contradict the reasons given by a Federal civilian employee for his resignation or which relate to the validity of such reasons shall not be final and conclusive unless such employee has been afforded an opportunity for a fair hearing on any issue involved in the alleged reasons for resignation. Such opportunity for hearing may be afforded by the Federal agency or the U. S. Civil Service Commission at any appropriate stage with respect to any personnel action, or upon request for reconsideration under 609.23. (b) Additional information submitted by a Federal agency under 609.8 shall be considered part of the original Federal findings which, as so supplemented, shall be final and conclusive, as provided in paragraph (a) of this section. (c) Federal findings which after reconsideration under 609.9 have been affirmed, modified, or reversed by the Federal agency shall be final and conclusive, as provided in paragraph (a) of this section. 609.19 Determination of entitlement. |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | in paragraph (a) of this section. 609.19 Determination of entitlement. (a) Entitlement. The State agency of a State whose unemployment compensation law applies to a Federal civilian employee under 609.15 promptly shall determine such employee's entitlement to compensation and pay such compensation in the same amounts, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions as would apply to such employee if his Federal civilian service and wages had been included as employment and wages under the State unemployment compensation law except that 609.31 shall apply to the Virgin Islands agency in lieu of this paragraph. *628 (b) Determination in absence of Form ES-931. (1) If a Form ES-931 has not been received from a Federal agency by the 12th day after such form was forwarded to such agency, a State agency shall determine entitlement to compensation on the basis of a Federal civilian employee's statement under oath if in addition to furnishing such statement such employee submits for examination any document issued by a Federal agency (as for example Standard Form 50 or W-2) showing that he performed service for such agency. (2) If a Form ES-931 received from a Federal agency after such determination contains Federal findings which would result in a change in the Federal civilian employee's entitlement to compensation the State agency promptly shall make a redetermination and give such employee notice thereof. All payments of compensation made after such redetermination shall be in accordance therewith and all payments of compensation made prior to such determination shall be adjusted in accordance therewith. If the Federal civilian employee has received compensation not in accordance with the redetermination 609.21 shall apply. 609.20 Notice of determination. A notice of determination or redetermination shall be given to a Federal civilian employee with respect to any determination or redetermination under 609.19 or 609.31. Such notice shall be given in the same manner as notice of determination or redetermination is given to claimants under the State unemployment compensation law. The notice shall include the Federal findings and shall inform the Federal civilian employee of his right to additional information or reconsideration and correction of such findings. The State agency shall set forth the Federal findings in *629 sufficient detail to enable the Federal civilian employee to determine whether he wishes to request reconsideration or correction of any such findings. 609.22 Procedure for obtaining additional information. (a) Request by Federal civilian employee. If a Federal civilian employee needs additional information in order to understand the basis for a Federal finding in connection with a claim for compensation under the UCFE program he |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | with a claim for compensation under the UCFE program he may file a request through the State agency, or the Secretary if the State agency does not determine claims under the UCFE program, for more specific information from the Federal agency which made such Federal finding. Such request shall be mailed by the State agency or the Secretary to the appropriate Federal agency. If notice of a determination of entitlement has been given to the Federal civilian employee before a request for additional information is filed, such employee must file concurrently with such request a timely appeal or request for redetermination under the State unemployment compensation law. No hearing on such appeal shall be scheduled before the State agency receives from the Federal agency the additional information requested. (b) Request by State agency. If at any stage of determining a Federal civilian employee's entitlement to compensation a State agency, State administrative appeal authority (including the referee in the Virgin Islands), or the Secretary determines that Federal findings do not contain sufficient information to enable correct application of the State unemployment compensation law a request may be made for additional facts from the appropriate Federal agency. *630 609.23 Procedure for obtaining correction of Federal findings. (a) Request by Federal civilian employee. A Federal civilian employee who wishes a Federal agency to reconsider and correct Federal findings in connection with a claim for compensation under the UCFE program may file a request for such reconsideration and correction, together with such information as supports his request, through the State agency before which the claim is pending or through the Secretary if the State agency does not determine claims under the UCFE program. Such request shall be mailed by the State agency or the Secretary to the appropriate Federal agency. If notice of a determination of entitlement has been given to the Federal civilian employee before a request for reconsideration and correction of Federal findings is filed, such employee must file concurrently with such request a timely appeal under the State unemployment compensation law. No hearing on such appeal shall be scheduled before the State agency receives from the Federal agency its reconsidered Federal findings. (b) Request by State agency. A State agency, State administrative appeal authority (including the referee in the Virgin Islands), or the Secretary may request a Federal agency to reconsider and correct its Federal findings at any stage in determining a Federal civilian employee's entitlement to compensation. 609.24 Procedure after correction of Federal findings. (a) A State agency shall forward to the affected Federal civilian employee a copy of reconsidered |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108912/christian-v-new-york-state-dept-of-labor/ | to the affected Federal civilian employee a copy of reconsidered Federal findings or additional information furnished by a Federal agency. (b) If additional information or reconsidered Federal findings provide a basis under the State unemployment *631 compensation law for the State agency to redetermine such employee's entitlement to compensation the State agency promptly shall make a redetermination and give notice thereof to the affected Federal civilian employee. (c) If a State agency after reviewing additional information or reconsidered Federal findings submitted by a Federal agency does not consider that there is a basis for making a redetermination the State agency promptly shall set a date for hearing the Federal civilian employee's appeal. (d) If Federal findings are corrected under 609.7 a State agency shall notify the affected Federal civilian employee of such correction. If the State unemployment compensation law permits and the corrected Federal findings afford a basis for such action the State agency shall redetermine such employee's entitlement to compensation and give notice of redetermination to such employee. 609.25 Appeal by Federal civilian employee. (a) A determination or redetermination by a State agency as to a Federal civilian employee's entitlement to compensation is subject to review, except for Federal findings which are final and conclusive under 609.18, in the same manner and to the same extent as other determinations of entitlement under the State unemployment compensation law. |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | This case presents the question whether a party who has had issues of fact adjudicated adversely to it in an equitable action may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new party. The respondent brought this stockholder's class action against the petitioners in a Federal District Court. The complaint alleged that the petitioners, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. (Parklane), and 13 of its officers, directors, and stockholders, had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger.[1] The proxy statement, according to the complaint, had violated 14 (a), 10 (b), and 20 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 4, 891, 899, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 78n (a), 78j (b), and 78t (a), as well as various rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The complaint sought damages, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs. Before this action came to trial, the SEC filed suit against the same defendants in the Federal District Court, alleging that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had ben alleged in the respondent's complaint. Injunctive relief was requested. After a 4-day *5 trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this judgment. The respondent in the present case then moved for partial summary judgment against the petitioners, asserting that the petitioners were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues that had been resolved against them in the action brought by the SEC.[2] The District Court denied the motion on the ground that such an application of collateral estoppel would deny the petitioners their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. The appellate court concluded that "the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial only with respect to issues of fact, [and] once those issues have been fully and fairly adjudicated in a prior proceeding, nothing remains for trial, either with or without a jury." Because of an intercircuit conflict,[3] we granted certiorari. *6 I The threshold question to be considered |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | granted certiorari. *6 I The threshold question to be considered is whether, quite apart from the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the petitioners can be precluded from relitigating facts resolved adversely to them in a prior equitable proceeding with another party under the general law of collateral estoppel. Specifically, we must determine whether a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that judgment "offensively" to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding.[4] A Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata,[5] has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Until relatively recently, however, the scope of collateral estoppel was limited by the doctrine of mutuality of parties. Under this mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a prior judgment *7 as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were bound by the judgment.[6] Based on the premise that it is somehow unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment when he himself would not be so bound,[7] the mutuality requirement provided a party who had litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues with new parties. By failing to recognize the obvious difference in position between a party who has never litigated an issue and one who has fully litigated and lost, the mutuality requirement was criticized almost from its inception.[8] Recognizing the validity of this criticism, the Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, abandoned the mutuality requirement, at least in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent after a federal court in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid.[9] The *8 "broader question" before the Court, however, was "whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue." The Court strongly suggested a negative answer to that question: "In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative usesproductive |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative usesproductive or otherwiseto relitigation of a decided issue. And, still assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is reason to be concerned about the plaintiff's allocation of resources. Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or `a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.' Kerotest Mfg. Although neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard."[10] *9 B The Blonder-Tongue case involved defensive use of collateral estoppela plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost against another defendant. The present case, by contrast, involves offensive use of collateral estoppela plaintiff is seeking to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff. In both the offensive and defensive use situations, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated and lost in an earlier action. Nevertheless, several reasons have been advanced why the two situations should be treated differently.[11] First, offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive use does. Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely "switching adversaries." Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings[12] Thus defensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join *330 all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Offensive use of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. E. g., ; Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action.[13] A second argument against offensive use of collateral estoppel is that it may be unfair to a defendant. If a defendant in the |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | be unfair to a defendant. If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable. The (CA2); cf. 346 F.2d 5 (CA2) (application of offensive collateral estoppel denied where defendant did not appeal an adverse judgment awarding damages of $35,000 and defendant was later sued for over $7 million). Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.[14] Still another situation where it might be *331 unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result.[15] C We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.[16] The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel. In the present case, however, none of the circumstances that might justify reluctance to allow the offensive use of collateral estoppel is present. The application of offensive collateral *3 estoppel will not here reward a private plaintiff who could have joined in the previous action, since the respondent probably could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the SEC even had he so desired.[17] Similarly, there is no unfairness to the petitioners in applying offensive collateral estoppel in this case. First, in light of the serious allegations made in the SEC's complaint against the petitioners, as well as the foreseeability of subsequent private suits that typically follow a successful Government judgment, the petitioners had every incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and vigorously.[18] Second, the judgment in the SEC action was not inconsistent with any previous decision. Finally, there will in the respondent's action be no procedural opportunities available to the petitioners that were unavailable in the first action of a kind that might be likely to cause a different result.[19] We conclude, therefore, that none of the considerations that would justify a refusal to allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel is |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | refusal to allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel is present in this case. Since the petitioners received a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate their claims in the *333 SEC action, the contemporary law of collateral estoppel leads inescapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether the proxy statement was materially false and misleading. II The question that remains is whether, notwithstanding the law of collateral estoppel, the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this case would violate the petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.[20] A "[T]he thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791." At common law, a litigant was not entitled to have a jury determine issues that had been previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity.[21] Recognition that an equitable determination could have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action was the major premise of this Court's decision in Beacon Theatres, In that case the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain arrangements between it *334 and the defendant were not in violation of the antitrust laws, and asked for an injunction to prevent the defendant from instituting an antitrust action to challenge the arrangements. The defendant denied the allegations and counter-claimed for treble damages under the antitrust laws, requesting a trial by jury of the issues common to both the legal and equitable claims. The Court of Appeals upheld denial of the request, but this Court reversed, stating: "[T]he effect of the action of the District Court could be, as the Court of Appeals believed, `to limit the petitioner's opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue which has a bearing upon its treble damage suit,' for determination of the issue of clearances by the judge might `operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.' " It is thus clear that the Court in the Beacon Theatres case thought that if an issue common to both legal and equitable claims was first determined by a judge, relitigation of the issue before a jury might be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral estoppel. To avoid this result, the Court held that when legal and equitable claims are joined in the same action, the trial judge has only limited discretion in determining the sequence of trial and "that discretion must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial."[22] Both the premise of Beacon Theatres, and the |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | jury trial."[22] Both the premise of Beacon Theatres, and the fact that it enunciated no more than a general prudential rule were confirmed by this Court's decision in 382 U.S. 3. In that case the Court held that a bankruptcy court, sitting as a statutory court of equity, is empowered to adjudicate *335 equitable claims prior to legal claims, even though the factual issues decided in the equity action would have been triable by a jury under the Seventh Amendment if the legal claims had been adjudicated first. The Court stated: "Both Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen recognize that there might be situations in which the Court could proceed to resolve the equitable claim first even though the results might be dispositive of the issues involved in the legal claim." Thus the Court in recognized that an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not violate the Seventh Amendment. B Despite the strong support to be found both in history and in the recent decisional law of this Court for the proposition that an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action, the petitioners argue that application of collateral estoppel in this case would nevertheless violate their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The petitioners contend that since the scope of the Amendment must be determined by reference to the common law as it existed in 1791, and since the common law permitted collateral estoppel only where there was mutuality of parties, collateral estoppel cannot constitutionally be applied when such mutuality is absent. The petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason, however, why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether or not mutuality of parties is present. A litigant who has lost because of adverse factual findings in an equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same party or a new party. In either case, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated questions of fact, and has had the facts determined against him in an earlier proceeding. *336 In either case there is no further factfinding function for the jury to perform, since the common factual issues have been resolved in the previous action. Cf. Ex parte Peterson, ("No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined"). The Seventh Amendment has never been interpreted in the rigid manner advocated by the petitioners. On |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109964/parklane-hosiery-co-v-shore/ | interpreted in the rigid manner advocated by the petitioners. On the contrary, many procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury's historic domain have been found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment. See (directed verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Gasoline Products (retrial limited to question of damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment even though there was no practice at common law for setting aside a verdict in part); Fidelity & Deposit 319-1 (summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment).[23] The Galloway case is particularly instructive. There the party against whom a directed verdict had been entered argued that the procedure was unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. In rejecting this claim, the Court said: "The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according *337 to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were `the rules of the common law' then prevalent, including those relating to the procedure by which the judge regulated the jury's role on questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable system. "The more logical conclusion, we think, and the one which both history and the previous decisions here support, is that the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions." 392 The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas defining the scope of the jury's function, has evolved since 1791. Under the rationale of the Galloway case, these developments are not repugnant to the Seventh Amendment simply for the reason that they did not exist in 1791. Thus if, as we have held, the law of collateral estoppel forecloses the petitioners from relitigating the factual issues determined against them in the SEC action, nothing in the Seventh Amendment dictates a different result, even though because of lack of mutuality there would have been no collateral estoppel in 1791.[24] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,984 | 19 | majority | McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111065/mcdonough-power-equipment-inc-v-greenwood/ | Respondents, Billy Greenwood and his parents, sued petitioner McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., to recover damages sustained by Billy when his feet came in contact with the blades of a riding lawnmower manufactured by petitioner. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas entered judgment for petitioner upon a jury verdict and denied respondents' motion for new trial. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court and ordered a new trial. It held that the failure of a juror to respond affirmatively to a question on voir dire seeking to elicit information about previous injuries to members of the juror's immediate family had "prejudiced the Greenwoods' right to peremptory challenge," and that a new trial was necessary to cure this error. We granted certiorari, and now hold that respondents are not entitled to a new trial unless the juror's failure to disclose denied respondents their right to an impartial jury. During the voir dire prior to the empaneling of the six-member jury, respondents' attorney asked prospective jurors the following question: *550 "Now, how many of you have yourself or any members of your immediate family sustained any severe injury, not necessarily as severe as Billy, but sustained any injuries whether it was an accident at home, or on the farm or at work that resulted in any disability or prolonged pain and suffering, that is you or any members of your immediate family?" App. 19. Ronald Payton, who eventually became a juror, did not respond to this question, which was addressed to the panel as a whole. After a trial which extended over a 3-week period, the jury found for petitioner McDonough.[1] Four days after judgment was entered for petitioner, respondents moved under local Rule 23A for permission to approach the members of the jury. In support of their motion respondents asserted that they were of "information and belief" that juror Payton's son may have been injured at one time, a fact which had not been revealed during voir dire. The District Court ruled that respondents had failed to show just cause to approach the jury. Undeterred, the next day respondents filed a second motion for permission to approach the jury, attaching an affidavit from respondent John Greenwood,[2] who asserted that in *551 the course of his employment as a Navy recruiter, he had reviewed the enlistment application of juror Payton's son. In that application Payton's son stated that he had been injured in the explosion of a truck tire. The District Court granted respondents permission to approach juror |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,984 | 19 | majority | McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111065/mcdonough-power-equipment-inc-v-greenwood/ | tire. The District Court granted respondents permission to approach juror Payton regarding the injuries allegedly sustained by his son. The District Court directed that the inquiry should be brief and polite and made in a manner convenient to the juror. The District Court noted that it was not "overly impressed with the significance of this particular situation." No provision was made to record the inquiry of juror Payton. On the same day that the District Court granted respondents permission to approach juror Payton, respondents moved for a new trial, asserting 18 grounds in justification, including the District Court's alleged error in denying respondents' motion to approach the jury. This was the only instance when respondents even tangentially referred the District Court to the juror's failure to respond as a ground for a new trial. Shortly after the parties placed a telephone conference call to juror Payton, the District Court denied respondents' motion for a new trial, finding that the "matter was fairly and thoroughly tried and that the jury's verdict was a just one, well-supported by the evidence." The District Court was never informed of the results of the examination of juror Payton, nor did respondents ever directly assert before the District Court that juror Payton's nondisclosure warranted a new trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeals proceeded directly to the merits of respondents' claim that juror Payton's silence had prejudiced their right to exercise peremptory challenges, rather than remanding the case back to the District Court for a hearing.[3] The Court of Appeals simply recited the *552 recollections of counsel for each party of their conference telephone call with juror Payton contained in their appellate briefs, stating that the "unrevealed information" indicated probable bias "because it revealed a particularly narrow concept of what constitutes a serious injury." The Court of Appeals assumed that juror Payton had answered in good faith, but stated: "Good faith, however, is irrelevant to our inquiry. If an average prospective juror would have disclosed the information, and that information would have been significant and cogent evidence of the juror's probable bias, a new trial is required to rectify the failure to disclose it." *553 This Court has long held that " `[a litigant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,' for there are no perfect trials." quoting and Trials are costly, not only for the parties, but also for the jurors performing their civic duty and for society which pays the judges and support personnel who manage the trials. It seems doubtful that our judicial system would have the resources to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,984 | 19 | majority | McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111065/mcdonough-power-equipment-inc-v-greenwood/ | doubtful that our judicial system would have the resources to provide litigants with perfect trials, were they possible, and still keep abreast of its constantly increasing caseload. Even this straightforward products liability suit extended over a 3-week period. We have also come a long way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were considered " `citadels of technicality.' " quoting Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A. B. A. J. 222 (1925). The harmless-error rules adopted by this Court and Congress embody the principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for "error" and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial. See at -760. For example, the general rule governing motions for a new trial in the district courts is contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, which provides: "No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." (Emphasis added.) *554 While in a narrow sense Rule 61 applies only to the district courts, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1, it is well settled that the appellate courts should act in accordance with the salutary policy embodied in Rule 61. See, e. g., ; ; De Congress has further reinforced the application of Rule 61 by enacting the harmless-error statute, 28 U.S. C. 2111, which applies directly to appellate courts and which incorporates the same principle as that found in Rule 61. See ; United[4] The ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case must be assessed against this background. One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact "a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." Voir dire examination serves to protect that right by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror's being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,984 | 19 | majority | McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111065/mcdonough-power-equipment-inc-v-greenwood/ | The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious. *555 The critical question posed to juror Payton in this case asked about "injuries that resulted in any disability or prolonged pain or suffering." App. 19. Juror Payton apparently believed that his son's broken leg sustained as a result of an exploding tire was not such an injury. In response to a similar question from petitioner's counsel, however, another juror related such a minor incident as the fact that his 6-year-old son once caught his finger in a bike chain. Yet another juror failed to respond to the question posed to juror Payton, and only the subsequent questioning of petitioner's counsel brought out that her husband had been injured in a machinery accident. The varied responses to respondents' question on voir dire testify to the fact that jurors are not necessarily experts in English usage. Called as they are from all walks of life, many may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily understood by lawyers and judges. Moreover, the statutory qualifications for jurors require only a minimal competency in the English language. 28 U.S. C. 1865 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Thus, we cannot say, and we doubt that the Court of Appeals could say, which of these three jurors was closer to the "average juror" in his or her response to the question, but it is evident that such a standard is difficult to apply and productive of uncertainties. To invalidate the result of a 3-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, though honest, response to a question, is to insist on something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give. A trial represents an important investment of private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir dire examination. Whatever the merits of the Court of Appeals' standard in a world which would redo and reconstruct what had gone *556 before upon any evidence of abstract imperfection, we think it is contrary to the practical necessities of judicial management reflected in Rule 61 and 2111. We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | I concur in Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C of the Court's opinion. I Nothing in the record before us or the opinions below indicates that subsections 1(1) and 1(2) of the preamble to Missouri's abortion regulation statute will affect a woman's decision to have an abortion. JUSTICE STEVENS, following appellees, see Brief for Appellees 22, suggests that the preamble may also "interfere] with contraceptive choices," post, at 5, because certain contraceptive devices act on a female ovum after it has been fertilized by a male sperm. The Missouri Act defines "conception" as "the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a male," (3) and invests "unborn children" with "protectable interests in life, health, and well-being," 1.205.1(2), from "the moment of conception" 1.205.3. JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that any possible interference with a woman's right to use such postfertilization contraceptive devices would be unconstitutional under and our subsequent contraception cases. Post, at 5-6. Similarly, certain amici suggest that the Missouri Act's preamble may prohibit the developing technology of in vitro fertilization, a technique used to aid couples otherwise unable to bear children in which a number of ova are removed from the woman and fertilized by male sperm. This process often produces excess fertilized ova ("unborn children" under the Missouri Act's definition) that are discarded rather than reinserted into the woman's uterus. Brief for Association of Reproductive Health Professionals *523 et al. as Amici Curiae 38. It may be correct that the use of postfertilization contraceptive devices is constitutionally protected by Griswold and its progeny, but, as with a woman's abortion decision, nothing in the record or the opinions below indicates that the preamble will affect a woman's decision to practice contraception. For that matter, nothing in appellees' original complaint, App. 8-21, or their motion in limine to limit testimony and evidence on their challenge to the preamble, indicates that appellees sought to enjoin potential violations of Griswold. Neither is there any indication of the possibility that the preamble might be applied to prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization. I agree with the Court, therefore, that all of these intimations of unconstitutionality are simply too hypothetical to support the use of declaratory judgment procedures and injunctive remedies in this case. Similarly, it seems to me to follow directly from our previous decisions concerning state or federal funding of abortions, and that appellees' facial challenge to the constitutionality of Missouri's ban on the utilization of public facilities and the participation of public employees in the performance of abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother, Mo. Rev. Stat. 188.210, 188.215 cannot succeed. Given Missouri's definition of "public facility" as "any public institution, public facility, public equipment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any agency or political subdivisions thereof," 188.200(2), there may be conceivable applications of the ban on the use of public facilities that would be unconstitutional. Appellees and amici suggest that the State could try to enforce the ban against private hospitals using public water and sewage lines, or against private hospitals leasing state-owned equipment or state land. See Brief for Appellees 49-50; Brief for National Association of Public Hospitals as Amicus Curiae *524 9-. Whether some or all of these or other applications of 188.215 would be constitutional need not be decided here. Maher, Poelker, and McRae stand for the proposition that some quite straightforward applications of the Missouri ban on the use of public facilities for performing abortions would be constitutional and that is enough to defeat appellees' assertion that the ban is facially unconstitutional. "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the relevant statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an `overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." United I also agree with the Court that, under the interpretation of 188.205 urged by the State and adopted by the Court, there is no longer a case or controversy before us over the constitutionality of that provision. I would note, however, that this interpretation of 188.205 is not binding on the Supreme Court of Missouri which has the final word on the meaning of that State's statutes. ; Should it happen that 188.205, as ultimately interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court, does prohibit publicly employed health professionals from giving specific medical advice to pregnant women, "the vacation and dismissal of the complaint that has become moot `clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties,' should subsequent events rekindle their controversy." quoting United Unless such events make their appearance and give rise to relitigation, I agree that we and all federal *525 courts are without jurisdiction to hear the merits of this moot dispute. II In its interpretation of Missouri's "determination of viability" provision, Mo. Rev. Stat. 188.029 see ante, at 513-521, the plurality |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | Mo. Rev. Stat. 188.029 see ante, at 513-521, the plurality has proceeded in a manner unnecessary to deciding the question at hand. I agree with the plurality that it was plain error for the Court of Appeals to interpret the second sentence of 188.029 as meaning that "doctors must perform tests to find gestational age, fetal weight and lung maturity." When read together with the first sentence of 188.029 which requires a physician to "determine if the unborn child is viable by using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinary skillful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the same or similar conditions" it would be contradictory nonsense to read the second sentence as requiring a physician to perform viability examinations and tests in situations where it would be careless and imprudent to do so. The plurality is quite correct: "the viability-testing provision makes sense only if the second sentence is read to require only those tests that are useful to making subsidiary findings as to viability," ante, at 514, and, I would add, only those examinations and tests that it would not be imprudent or careless to perform in the particular medical situation before the physician. Unlike the plurality, I do not understand these viability testing requirements to conflict with any of the Court's past decisions concerning state regulation of abortion. Therefore, there is no necessity to accept the State's invitation to reexamine the constitutional validity of Where there is no need to decide a constitutional question, it is a venerable principle of this Court's adjudicatory processes not to do so, for "t]he Court will not `anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the *526 necessity of deciding it.' " quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Neither will it generally "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Quite simply, "i]t is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." The Court today has accepted the State's every interpretation of its abortion statute and has upheld, under our existing precedents, every provision of that statute which is properly before us. Precisely for this reason reconsideration of falls not into any "good-cause exception" to this "fundamental rule of judicial restraint" Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold See post, at 532-533 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion statute |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | judgment). When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of there will be time enough to reexamine And to do so carefully. In assessing 188.029 it is especially important to recognize that appellees did not appeal the District Court's ruling that the first sentence of 188.029 is constitutional. 662 F. Supp. 7, There is, accordingly, no dispute between the parties before us over the constitutionality of the "presumption of viability at 20 weeks," ante, at 515, created by the first sentence of 188.029. If anything might arguably conflict with the Court's previous decisions concerning the determination of viability, I would think it is the introduction of this presumption. The plurality, see ante, at 515, refers to a passage from Planned Parenthood of Central : "The time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must *527 be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician." The 20-week presumption of viability in the first sentence of 188.029, it could be argued (though, I would think, unsuccessfully), restricts "the judgment of the responsible attending physician," by imposing on that physician the burden of overcoming the presumption. This presumption may be a "superimposition] of] state regulation on the medical determination whether a particular fetus is viable," ante, at 517, but, if so, it is a restriction on the physician's judgment that is not before us. As the plurality properly interprets the second sentence of 188.029, it does nothing more than delineate means by which the unchallenged 20-week presumption of viability may be overcome if those means are useful in doing so and can be prudently employed. Contrary to the plurality's suggestion, see ante, at 517, the District Court did not think the second sentence of 188.029 unconstitutional for this reason. Rather, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals thought the second sentence to be unconstitutional precisely because they interpreted that sentence to impose state regulation on the determination of viability that it does not impose. Appellees suggest that the interpretation of 188.029 urged by the State may "virtually eliminate] the constitutional issue in this case." Brief for Appellees 30. Appellees therefore propose that we should abstain from deciding that provision's constitutionality "in order to allow the state courts to render the saving construction the State has proposed." Where the lower court has so clearly fallen into error I do not think abstention is necessary or prudent. ingly, I consider the constitutionality of the second sentence of 188.029, as interpreted |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | the constitutionality of the second sentence of 188.029, as interpreted by the State, to determine whether the constitutional issue is actually eliminated. I do not think the second sentence of 188.029, as interpreted by the Court, imposes a degree of state regulation on the medical determination of viability that in any way conflicts with prior decisions of this Court. As the plurality *528 recognizes, the requirement that, where not imprudent, physicians perform examinations and tests useful to making subsidiary findings to determine viability "promotes] the State's interest in potential human life rather than in maternal health." Ante, at 515. No decision of this Court has held that the State may not directly promote its interest in potential life when viability is possible. Quite the contrary. In the Court considered a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania statute requiring that a second physician be present during an abortion performed "when viability is possible." For guidance, the Court looked to the earlier decision in Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., upholding a Missouri statute requiring the presence of a second physician during an abortion performed after viability. ; The majority struck down the Pennsylvania statute merely because the statute had no exception for emergency situations and not because it found a constitutional difference between the State's promotion of its interest in potential life when viability is possible and when viability is certain. -771. Despite the clear recognition by the majority that the Pennsylvania and Missouri statutes differed in this respect, there is no hint in the opinion of the Court that the State's interest in potential life differs depending on whether it seeks to further that interest postviability or when viability is possible. Thus, all nine Members of the Court appear to have agreed that it is not constitutionally impermissible for the State to enact regulations designed to protect the State's interest in potential life when viability is possible. See ; That is exactly what Missouri has done in 188.029. *529 Similarly, the basis for reliance by the District Court and the Court of Appeals below on 4 U.S. 379 disappears when 188.029 is properly interpreted. In Colautti, the Court observed: "Because this point of viability] may differ with each pregnancy, neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor as the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical point." The courts below, on |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | fetus. Viability is the critical point." The courts below, on the interpretation of 188.029 rejected here, found the second sentence of that provision at odds with this passage from Colautti. See ; On this Court's interpretation of 188.029 it is clear that Missouri has not substituted any of the "elements entering into the ascertainment of viability" as "the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus." All the second sentence of 188.029 does is to require, when not imprudent, the performance of "those tests that are useful to making subsidiary findings as to viability." Ante, at 514 (emphasis added). Thus, consistent with Colautti, viability remains the "critical point" under 188.029. Finally, and rather halfheartedly, the plurality suggests that the marginal increase in the cost of an abortion created by Missouri's viability testing provision may make 188.029, even as interpreted, suspect under this Court's decision in 434-4 striking down a second-trimester hospitalization requirement. See ante, at 517. I dissented from the Court's opinion in because it was my view that, even apart from 's trimester framework which I continue to consider problematic, see at *530 828 the majority had distorted and misapplied its own standard for evaluating state regulation of abortion which the Court had applied with fair consistency in the past: that, previability, "a regulation imposed on a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion." (internal quotations omitted). It is clear to me that requiring the performance of examinations and tests useful to determining whether a fetus is viable, when viability is possible, and when it would not be medically imprudent to do so, does not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision. On this ground alone I would reject the suggestion that 188.029 as interpreted is unconstitutional. More to the point, however, just as I see no conflict between 188.029 and Colautti or any decision of this Court concerning a State's ability to give effect to its interest in potential life, I see no conflict between 188.029 and the Court's opinion in The second-trimester hospitalization requirement struck down in imposed, in the majority's view, "a heavy, and unnecessary, burden," more than doubling the cost of "women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." ; see also By contrast, the cost of examinations and tests that could usefully and prudently be performed when a woman is 20-24 weeks pregnant to determine whether the fetus is viable would only marginally, if at all, increase the cost of an |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | only marginally, if at all, increase the cost of an abortion. See Brief for American Association of Prolife Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 3 ("At twenty weeks gestation, an ultrasound examination to determine gestational age is standard medical practice. It is routinely provided by the plaintiff clinics. An ultrasound examination can effectively provide all three designated findings of sec. 188.029"); ; ("There are a number of different * methods in standard medical practice to determine fetal lung maturity at twenty or more weeks gestation. The most simple and most obvious is by inference. It is well known that fetal lungs do not mature until 33-34 weeks gestation. If an assessment of the gestational age indicates that the child is less than thirty-three weeks, a general finding can be made that the fetal lungs are not mature. This finding can then be used by the physician in making his determination of viability under section 188.029"); cf. Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 42 (no suggestion that fetal weight and gestational age cannot be determined from the same sonogram); citing Smith, Frey, & Johnson, Assessing Gestational Age, 33 Am. Fam. Physician 215, 219-220 Moreover, the examinations and tests required by 188.029 are to be performed when viability is possible. This feature of 188.029 distinguishes it from the second-trimester hospitalization requirement struck down by the majority. As the Court recognized in the State's compelling interest in potential life postviability renders its interest in determining the critical point of viability equally compelling. See Under the Court's precedents, the same cannot be said for the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. As I understand the Court's opinion in therefore, the plurality's suggestion today that casts doubt on the validity of 188.029, even as the Court has interpreted it, is without foundation and cannot provide a basis for reevaluating ingly, because the Court of Appeals misinterpreted 188.029, and because, properly interpreted, 188.029 is not inconsistent with any of this Court's prior precedents, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. In sum, I concur in Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment as to Part II-D. *532 JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C of the opinion of the Court. As to Part II-D, I share JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S view, post, at 5, that it effectively would overrule I think that should be done, but would do it more explicitly. Since today we contrive to avoid doing it, and indeed to avoid |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | we contrive to avoid doing it, and indeed to avoid almost any decision of national import, I need not set forth my reasons, some of which have been well recited in dissents of my colleagues in other cases. See, e. g., ; ; ; The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph of judicial statesmanship. It is not that, unless it is statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper business since the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical a sovereignty which therefore quite properly, but to the great damage of the Court, makes it the object of the sort of organized public pressure that political institutions in a democracy ought to receive. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S assertion, ante, at 526, that a " `fundamental rule of judicial restraint' " requires us to avoid reconsidering cannot be taken seriously. By finessing we do not, as she suggests, ib adhere to the strict and venerable rule that we should avoid " `deciding] questions of a constitutional nature.' " We have not disposed of this case on some statutory or procedural ground, but have decided, and could not avoid deciding, whether the Missouri statute meets the requirements of the United States Constitution. *533 The only choice available is whether, in deciding that constitutional question, we should use as the benchmark, or something else. What is involved, therefore, is not the rule of avoiding constitutional issues where possible, but the quite separate principle that we will not " `formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' " Ante, at 526. The latter is a sound general principle, but one often departed from when good reason exists. Just this Term, for example, in an opinion authored by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, despite the fact that we had already held a racially based set-aside unconstitutional because unsupported by evidence of identified discrimination, which was all that was needed to decide the case, we went on to outline the criteria for properly tailoring race-based remedies in cases where such evidence is present. Also this Term, in an opinion joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, we announced the constitutional rule that deprivation of the right to confer with counsel during trial violates the Sixth Amendment even if no prejudice can be shown, despite our finding that there had been no such deprivation on the facts before us which was all that was needed to decide that case. ; see |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | all that was needed to decide that case. ; see I have not identified with certainty the first instance of our deciding a case on broader constitutional grounds than absolutely necessary, but it is assuredly no later than where we held that mandamus could constitutionally issue against the Secretary of State, although that was unnecessary given our holding that the law authorizing issuance of the mandamus by this Court was unconstitutional. The Court has often spoken more broadly than needed in precisely the fashion at issue here, announcing a new rule of constitutional law when it could have reached the identical result by applying the rule thereby displaced. To describe *534 two recent opinions that JUSTICE O'CONNOR joined: In we overruled our prior holding that a "deprivation" of liberty or property could occur through negligent governmental acts, ignoring the availability of the alternative constitutional ground that, even if a deprivation had occurred, the State's postdeprivation remedies satisfied due process, see at 3-343 In we replaced the pre-existing "two-pronged" constitutional test for probable cause with a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, ignoring the concurrence's argument that the same outcome could have been reached under the old test, see It is rare, of course, that the Court goes out of its way to acknowledge that its judgment could have been reached under the old constitutional rule, making its adoption of the new one unnecessary to the decision, but even such explicit acknowledgment is not unheard of. See Commonwealth Edison ; 2 U.S. 637 For a sampling of other cases where the availability of a narrower, well-established ground is simply ignored in the Court's opinion adopting a new constitutional rule, though pointed out in separate opinions of some Justices, see Michelin Tire ; 380 U.S. 0 ; and 367 U.S. 3 It would be wrong, in any decision, to ignore the reality that our policy not to "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts" has a frequently applied good-cause exception. But it seems particularly perverse to convert the policy into an absolute in the present case, in order to place beyond reach the inexpressibly "broader-than-was-required-by-the-precise-facts" structure established by The real question, then, is whether there are valid reasons to go beyond the most stingy possible holding today. It seems to me there are not only valid but compelling ones. *535 Ordinarily, speaking no more broadly than is absolutely required avoids throwing settled law into confusion; doing so today preserves a chaos that is evident to anyone who can read and count. Alone sufficient to justify a broad holding is |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | and count. Alone sufficient to justify a broad holding is the fact that our retaining control, through of what I believe to be, and many of our citizens recognize to be, a political issue, continuously distorts the public perception of the role of this Court. We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us their unelected and life-tenured judges who have been awarded those extraordinary, undemocratic characteristics precisely in order that we might follow the law despite the popular will to follow the popular will. Indeed, I expect we can look forward to even more of that than before, given our indecisive decision today. And if these reasons for taking the unexceptional course of reaching a broader holding are not enough, then consider the nature of the constitutional question we avoid: In most cases, we do no harm by not speaking more broadly than the decision requires. Anyone affected by the conduct that the avoided holding would have prohibited will be able to challenge it himself and have his day in court to make the argument. Not so with respect to the harm that many States believed, pre-, and many may continue to believe, is caused by largely unrestricted abortion. That will continue to occur if the States have the constitutional power to prohibit it, and would do so, but we skillfully avoid telling them so. Perhaps those abortions cannot constitutionally be proscribed. That is surely an arguable question, the question that reconsideration of entails. But what is not at all arguable, it seems to me, is that we should decide now and not insist that we be run into a corner before we grudgingly yield up our judgment. The only sound reason for the latter course is to prevent a change in the law but to think that desirable begs the question to be decided. *536 It was an arguable question today whether 188.029 of the Missouri law contravened this Court's understanding of*] and I would have examined rather than *537 examining the contravention. Given the Court's newly contracted abstemiousness, what will it take, one must wonder, to permit us to reach that fundamental question? The result of our vote today is that we will not reconsider that prior opinion, even if most of the Justices think it is wrong, unless we have before us a statute that in fact contradicts it and even then (under our newly discovered "no-broader-than-necessary" requirement) only minor problematical aspects of will be reconsidered, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | "no-broader-than-necessary" requirement) only minor problematical aspects of will be reconsidered, unless one expects state legislatures to adopt provisions whose compliance with cannot even be argued with a straight face. It thus appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion law, constructed overnight in must be disassembled doorjamb by doorjamb, and never entirely brought down, no matter how wrong it may be. Of the four courses we might have chosen today to reaffirm to overrule it explicitly, to overrule it sub silentio, or to avoid the question the last is the least responsible. On the question of the constitutionality of 188.029, I concur in the judgment of the Court and strongly dissent from the manner in which it has been reached. JUSTICE O'CONNOR would nevertheless uphold the law because it "does not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision." Ante, at 530. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the required tests impose only a marginal cost on the abortion procedure, far less of an increase than the cost-doubling hospitalization requirement invalidated in See ante, at 530-. The fact that the challenged regulation is less costly than what we struck down in tells us only that we cannot decide the present case on the basis of that earlier decision. It does not tell us whether the present requirement is an "undue burden," and I know of no basis for determining that this particular burden (or any other for that matter) is "due." One could with equal justification conclude that it is not. To avoid the question of 's validity, with the attendant costs that this will have for the Court and for the principles of self-governance, on the basis of a standard that offers "no guide but the Court's own discretion," merely adds to the irrationality of what we do today. Similarly irrational is the new concept that JUSTICE O'CONNOR introduces into the law in order to achieve her result, the notion of a State's "interest in potential life when viability is possible." Ante, at 528. Since "viability" means the mere possibility (not the certainty) of survivability outside the womb, "possible viability" must mean the possibility of a possibility of survivability outside the womb. Perhaps our next opinion will expand the third trimester into the second even further, by approving state action designed to take account of "the chance of possible viability." JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Today, and the fundamental constitutional right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are not secure. Although the Court extricates itself from this case without making a single, even incremental, change in the law of abortion, the plurality and JUSTICE SCALIA would overrule (the first silently, the other explicitly) and would return to the States *538 virtually unfettered authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term. Although today, no less than yesterday, the Constitution and the decisions of this Court prohibit a State from enacting laws that inhibit women from the meaningful exercise of that right, a plurality of this Court implicitly invites every state legislature to enact more and more restrictive abortion regulations in order to provoke more and more test cases, in the hope that sometime down the line the Court will return the law of procreative freedom to the severe limitations that generally prevailed in this country before January 22, 1973. Never in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court that so foments disregard for the law and for our standing decisions. Nor in my memory has a plurality gone about its business in such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review, from its effort to read the real meaning out of the Missouri statute, to its intended evisceration of precedents and its deafening silence about the constitutional protections that it would jettison, the plurality obscures the portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plurality announces that its analysis leaves "undisturbed," albeit "modified] and narrowed]." Ante, at 521. But this disclaimer is totally meaningless. The plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who would do away with explicitly, but turns a stone face to anyone in search of what the plurality conceives as the scope of a woman's right under the Due Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy free from the coercive and brooding influence of the State. The simple truth is that would not survive the plurality's analysis, and that the plurality provides no substitute for 's protective umbrella. I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since was decided. I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court. I dissent. *5 I THE CHIEF JUSTICE parades through the four challenged sections of the Missouri statute seriatim. I shall not do this, but shall relegate most of my comments as to those sections to the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | most of my comments as to those sections to the margin.1] Although I disagree with the Court's consideration *5 of 1.205, 188.210, and 188.215, and am especially disturbed by its misapplication of our past decisions in upholding Missouri's ban on the performance of abortions at * "public facilities," its discussion of these provisions is merely prologue to the plurality's consideration of the statute's viability-testing requirement, 188.029 the only section of the Missouri statute that the plurality construes as implicating itself. There, tucked away at the end of its opinion, the plurality suggests a radical reversal of the law of abortion; and there, primarily, I direct my attention. In the plurality's view, the viability-testing provision imposes a burden on second-trimester abortions as a way of furthering the State's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. Since under the framework, the State may not fully regulate abortion in the interest of potential life (as opposed to maternal health) until the third trimester, the plurality finds it necessary, in order to save the Missouri testing provision, to throw out 's trimester framework. Ante, at 518-520. In flat contradiction to the plurality concludes that the State's interest in potential life is compelling before viability, and upholds the testing provision *542 because it "permissibly furthers" that state interest. Ante, at 519. A At the outset, I note that in its haste to limit abortion rights, the plurality compounds the errors of its analysis by needlessly reaching out to address constitutional questions that are not actually presented. The conflict between 188.029 and 's trimester framework, which purportedly drives the plurality to reconsider our past decisions, is a contrived conflict: the product of an aggressive misreading of the viability-testing requirement and a needlessly wooden application of the framework. The plurality's reading of 188.029 is irreconcilable with the plain language of the statute and is in derogation of this Court's settled view that "district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.' " quoting Abruptly setting aside the construction of 188.029 adopted by both the District Court and Court of Appeals as "plain error," the plurality reads the viability-testing provision as requiring only that before a physician may perform an abortion on a woman whom he believes to be carrying a fetus of 20 or more weeks gestational age, the doctor must determine whether the fetus is viable and, as part of that exercise, must, to the extent feasible and consistent with sound medical practice, conduct tests necessary to make findings of gestational |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | medical practice, conduct tests necessary to make findings of gestational age, weight, and lung maturity. Ante, at 514-517. But the plurality's reading of the provision, according to which the statute requires the physician to perform tests only in order to determine viability, ignores the statutory language explicitly directing that "the physician shall perform or cause to be performed such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings" in the mother's medical record. 188.029 (emphasis added). The *543 statute's plain language requires the physician to undertake whatever tests are necessary to determine gestational age, weight, and lung maturity, regardless of whether these tests are necessary to a finding of viability, and regardless of whether the tests subject the pregnant woman or the fetus to additional health risks or add substantially to the cost of an abortion.2] Had the plurality read the statute as written, it would have had no cause to reconsider the framework. As properly construed, the viability-testing provision does not pass constitutional muster under even a rational-basis standard, the least restrictive level of review applied by this Court. See By mandating tests to determine fetal weight and lung maturity for every fetus thought to be more than 20 weeks gestational age, the statute requires physicians to undertake procedures, such as amniocentesis, that, in the situation presented, have no medical justification, impose significant additional health risks on both the pregnant woman and the fetus, and bear no rational relation to the State's interest in protecting fetal life.3] As written, 188.029 is an arbitrary imposition of discomfort, risk, and expense, furthering no discernible interest except to make the procurement of an abortion as arduous and difficult as possible. Thus, were it not for *544 the plurality's tortured effort to avoid the plain import of 188.029, it could have struck down the testing provision as patently irrational irrespective of the framework.4] The plurality eschews this straightforward resolution, in the hope of precipitating a constitutional crisis. Far from avoiding constitutional difficulty, the plurality attempts to engineer a dramatic retrenchment in our jurisprudence by exaggerating the conflict between its untenable construction of 188.029 and the trimester framework. No one contests that under the framework the State, in order to promote its interest in potential human life, may regulate and even proscribe nontherapeutic abortions once the fetus becomes viable. 410 U. S., at 1-165. If, as the plurality appears to hold, the testing provision simply requires a physician to use appropriate and medically sound tests |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | requires a physician to use appropriate and medically sound tests to determine whether the fetus is actually viable when the estimated gestational age is greater than 20 weeks (and therefore within what the District Court found to be the margin of error for viability, ante, at 515-516), then I see little or no conflict with5] Nothing in or any of its progeny, holds that a State may not effectuate its compelling interest in the potential life of a viable fetus by seeking to ensure that no viable fetus is mistakenly aborted because of the inherent lack of precision in estimates of gestational age. A requirement that a physician make a finding of viability, one way or *545 the other, for every fetus that falls within the range of possible viability does no more than preserve the State's recognized authority. Although, as the plurality correctly points out, such a testing requirement would have the effect of imposing additional costs on second-trimester abortions where the tests indicated that the fetus was not viable, these costs would be merely incidental to, and a necessary accommodation of, the State's unquestioned right to prohibit nontherapeutic abortions after the point of viability. In short, the testing provision, as construed by the plurality, is consistent with the framework and could be upheld effortlessly under current doctrine.6] How ironic it is, then, and disingenuous, that the plurality scolds the Court of Appeals for adopting a construction of the statute that fails to avoid constitutional difficulties. Ante, at * 514, 515. By distorting the statute, the plurality manages to avoid invalidating the testing provision on what should have been noncontroversial constitutional grounds; having done so, however, the plurality rushes headlong into a much deeper constitutional thicket, brushing past an obvious basis for upholding 188.029 in search of a pretext for scuttling the trimester framework. Evidently, from the plurality's perspective, the real problem with the Court of Appeals' construction of 188.029 is not that it raised a constitutional difficulty, but that it raised the wrong constitutional difficulty one not implicating The plurality has remedied that, traditional canons of construction and judicial forbearance notwithstanding. B Having set up the conflict between 188.029 and the trimester framework, the plurality summarily discards 's analytic core as " `unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.' " Ante, at 518, quoting This is so, the plurality claims, because the key elements of the framework do not appear in the text of the Constitution, because the framework more closely resembles a regulatory code than a body of constitutional doctrine, and because under the framework the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | body of constitutional doctrine, and because under the framework the State's interest in potential human life is considered compelling only after viability, when, in fact, that interest is equally compelling throughout pregnancy. Ante, at 519-520. The plurality does not bother to explain these alleged flaws in Bald assertion masquerades as reasoning. The object, quite clearly, is not to persuade, but to prevail. 1 The plurality opinion is far more remarkable for the arguments that it does not advance than for those that it does. The plurality does not even mention, much less join, the true jurisprudential debate underlying this case: whether the Constitution includes an "unenumerated" general right to *547 privacy as recognized in many of our decisions, most notably and and, more specifically, whether, and to what extent, such a right to privacy extends to matters of childbearing and family life, including abortion. See, e. g., 5 U.S. 438 ; ; ;7] These are questions of unsurpassed significance in this Court's interpretation of the Constitution, and mark the battleground upon which this case was fought, by the parties, by the United States as amicus on behalf of petitioners, and by an unprecedented number of amici. On these grounds, abandoned by the plurality, the Court should decide this case. But rather than arguing that the text of the Constitution makes no mention of the right to privacy, the plurality complains that the critical elements of the framework trimesters *548 and viability do not appear in the Constitution and are, therefore, somehow inconsistent with a Constitution cast in general terms. Ante, at 518-519. Were this a true concern, we would have to abandon most of our constitutional jurisprudence. As the plurality well knows, or should know, the "critical elements" of countless constitutional doctrines nowhere appear in the Constitution's text. The Constitution makes no mention, for example, of the First Amendment's "actual malice" standard for proving certain libels, see New York Times (19), or of the standard for determining when speech is obscene. See Similarly, the Constitution makes no mention of the rational-basis test, or the specific verbal formulations of intermediate and strict scrutiny by which this Court evaluates claims under the Equal Protection Clause. The reason is simple. Like the framework, these tests or standards are not, and do not purport to be, rights protected by the Constitution. Rather, they are judge-made methods for evaluating and measuring the strength and scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the constitutional rights of individuals against the competing interests of government. With respect to the framework, the general constitutional principle, indeed the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | respect to the framework, the general constitutional principle, indeed the fundamental constitutional right, for which it was developed is the right to privacy, see, e. g., a species of "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause, which under our past decisions safeguards the right of women to exercise some control over their own role in procreation. As we recently reaffirmed in few decisions are "more basic to individual dignity and autonomy" or more appropriate to that "certain private sphere of individual liberty" that the Constitution reserves from the intrusive reach of government than the right to make the uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision whether to end *549 a pregnancy. It is this general principle, the " `moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole,' " quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 288-289 that is found in the Constitution. See -153. The trimester framework simply defines and limits that right to privacy in the abortion context to accommodate, not destroy, a State's legitimate interest in protecting the health of pregnant women and in preserving potential human life. Fashioning such accommodations between individual rights and the legitimate interests of government, establishing benchmarks and standards with which to evaluate the competing claims of individuals and government, lies at the very heart of constitutional adjudication. To the extent that the trimester framework is useful in this enterprise, it is not only consistent with constitutional interpretation, but necessary to the wise and just exercise of this Court's paramount authority to define the scope of constitutional rights. 2 The plurality next alleges that the result of the trimester framework has "been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine." Ante, at 518. Again, if this were a true and genuine concern, we would have to abandon vast areas of our constitutional jurisprudence. The plurality complains that under the trimester framework the Court has distinguished between a city ordinance requiring that second-trimester abortions be performed in clinics and a state law requiring that these abortions be performed in hospitals, or between laws requiring that certain information be furnished to a woman by a physician or his assistant and those requiring that such information be furnished by the physician exclusively. Ante, at 518, n. 15, citing *550 and Are these distinctions any finer, or more "regulatory," than the distinctions we have often drawn in our First Amendment jurisprudence, where, for example, we have held that a "release time" program permitting public-school students |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | have held that a "release time" program permitting public-school students to leave school grounds during school hours to receive religious instruction does not violate the Establishment Clause, even though a release-time program permitting religious instruction on school grounds does violate the Clause? Compare with Illinois ex rel. Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes factual distinctions no less intricate. Just this Term, for example, we held that while an aerial observation from a helicopter hovering at 0 feet does not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy, such an expectation of privacy would be violated by a helicopter observation from an unusually low altitude. Similarly, in a Sixth Amendment case, the Court held that although an overnight ban on attorney-client communication violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel, that right was not violated when a trial judge separated a defendant from his lawyer during a 15-minute recess after the defendant's direct testimony. That numerous constitutional doctrines result in narrow differentiations between similar circumstances does not mean that this Court has abandoned adjudication in favor of regulation. Rather, these careful distinctions reflect the process of constitutional adjudication itself, which is often highly fact specific, requiring such determinations as whether state laws are "unduly burdensome" or "reasonable" or bear a "rational" or "necessary" relation to asserted state interests. In a recent due process case, THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote for the *551 Court: "M]any branches of the law abound in nice distinctions that may be troublesome but have been thought nonetheless necessary: `I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized.' " quoting LeRoy Fibre 232 U.S. 3, These "differences of degree" fully account for our holdings in and Those decisions rest on this Court's reasoned and accurate judgment that hospitalization and doctor-counseling requirements unduly burdened the right of women to terminate a pregnancy and were not rationally related to the State's asserted interest in the health of pregnant women, while Virginia's substantially less restrictive regulations were not unduly burdensome and did rationally serve the State's interest.8] That the Court exercised its best judgment in evaluating these markedly different statutory schemes no more established the Court as an " `ex officio medical board,' " ante, at 519, quoting Planned Parenthood of Central than our decisions involving religion in the public schools establish the Court as a national school board, or our decisions concerning prison regulations establish the Court as *552 a bureau of prisons. See v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 1 If, in delicate and complicated |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 1 If, in delicate and complicated areas of constitutional law, our legal judgments "have become increasingly intricate," ante, at 518, it is not, as the plurality contends, because we have overstepped our judicial role. Quite the opposite: the rules are intricate because we have remained conscientious in our duty to do justice carefully, especially when fundamental rights rise or fall with our decisions. 3 Finally, the plurality asserts that the trimester framework cannot stand because the State's interest in potential life is compelling throughout pregnancy, not merely after viability. Ante, at 519. The opinion contains not one word of rationale for its view of the State's interest. This "it-is-so-because-we-say-so" jurisprudence constitutes nothing other than an attempted exercise of brute force; reason, much less persuasion, has no place. In answering the plurality's claim that the State's interest in the fetus is uniform and compelling throughout pregnancy, I cannot improve upon what JUSTICE STEVENS has written: "I should think it obvious that the State's interest in the protection of an embryo even if that interest is defined as `protecting those who will be citizens' increases progressively and dramatically as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by day. The development of a fetus and pregnancy itself are not static conditions, and the assertion that the government's interest is static simply ignores this reality. U]nless the religious view that a fetus is a `person' is adopted there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed, if *553 there is not such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures. And if distinctions may be drawn between a fetus and a human being in terms of the state interest in their protection even though the fetus represents one of `those who will be citizens' it seems to me quite odd to argue that distinctions may not also be drawn between the state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting the 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth. Recognition of this distinction is supported not only by logic, but also by history and by our shared experiences." -779 See also -147. For my own part, I remain convinced, as six other Members of this Court 16 years ago were convinced, that the framework, and the viability standard in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | viability standard in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while recognizing and accommodating the State's interest in potential human life. The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman. At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling. As a practical matter, because viability follows "quickening" the point at which a woman feels movement in her womb and because viability occurs no earlier than 23 weeks gestational age, it establishes an easily applicable standard for regulating abortion while *554 providing a pregnant woman ample time to exercise her fundamental right with her responsible physician to terminate her pregnancy.9] Although I have stated previously for a majority of this Court that "c]onstitutional rights do not always have easily ascertainable boundaries," to seek and establish those boundaries remains the special responsibility of this Court. In we discharged that responsibility as logic and science compelled. The plurality today advances not one reasonable argument as to why our judgment in that case was wrong and should be abandoned. C Having contrived an opportunity to reconsider the framework, and then having discarded that framework, the plurality finds the testing provision unobjectionable because it "permissibly furthers the State's interest in protecting potential human life." Ante, at 519-520. This newly minted *555 standard is circular and totally meaningless. Whether a challenged abortion regulation "permissibly furthers" a legitimate state interest is the question that courts must answer in abortion cases, not the standard for courts to apply. In keeping with the rest of its opinion, the plurality makes no attempt to explain or to justify its new standard, either in the abstract or as applied in this case. Nor could it. The "permissibly furthers" standard has no independent meaning, and consists of nothing other than what a majority of this Court may believe at any given moment in any given case. The plurality's novel test appears to be nothing more than a dressed-up version of rational-basis review, this Court's most lenient level of scrutiny. One thing is clear, however: were the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | level of scrutiny. One thing is clear, however: were the plurality's "permissibly furthers" standard adopted by the Court, for all practical purposes, would be overruled.10] The "permissibly furthers" standard completely disregards the irreducible minimum of : the Court's recognition that a woman has a limited fundamental constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. That right receives no meaningful recognition in the plurality's written opinion. Since, in the plurality's view, the State's interest in potential life is compelling as of the moment of conception, and is therefore served only if abortion is abolished, every hindrance to a woman's ability to obtain an abortion must be "permissible." Indeed, the more severe the hindrance, the more effectively (and permissibly) the State's interest would be furthered. A tax on abortions or a criminal prohibition would both satisfy the plurality's standard. So, for that *5 matter, would a requirement that a pregnant woman memorize and recite today's plurality opinion before seeking an abortion. The plurality pretends that survives, explaining that the facts of this case differ from those in : here, Missouri has chosen to assert its interest in potential life only at the point of viability, whereas, in Texas had asserted that interest from the point of conception, criminalizing all abortions, except where the life of the mother was at stake. Ante, at 521. This, of course, is a distinction without a difference. The plurality repudiates every principle for which stands; in good conscience, it cannot possibly believe that lies "undisturbed" merely because this case does not call upon the Court to reconsider the Texas statute, or one like it. If the Constitution permits a State to enact any statute that reasonably furthers its interest in potential life, and if that interest arises as of conception, why would the Texas statute fail to pass muster? One suspects that the plurality agrees. It is impossible to read the plurality opinion and especially its final paragraph, without recognizing its implicit invitation to every State to enact more and more restrictive abortion laws, and to assert their interest in potential life as of the moment of conception. All these laws will satisfy the plurality's nonscrutiny, until sometime, a new regime of old dissenters and new appointees will declare what the plurality intends: that is no longer good law.11] *557 D Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a landmark case of the last generation, and casts into darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in this country who had come to believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | to believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise some control over her unique ability to bear children. The plurality does so either oblivious or insensitive to the fact that millions of women, and their families, have ordered their lives around the right to reproductive choice, and that this right has become vital to the full participation of women in the economic and political walks of American life. The plurality would clear the way once again for government to force upon women the physical labor and specific and direct medical and psychological harms that may accompany carrying a fetus to term. The plurality would clear the way again for the State to conscript a woman's body and to force upon her a "distressful life and future." The result, as we know from experience, see Cates & Rochat, Illegal Abortions in the United States: 1972-1974, 8 Family Planning Perspectives 86, 92 would be that every year hundreds of thousands of women, in desperation, would defy the law, and place their health and safety in the unclean and unsympathetic hands of back-alley abortionists, or they would attempt to perform abortions upon themselves, *558 with disastrous results. Every year, many women, especially poor and minority women, would die or suffer debilitating physical trauma, all in the name of enforced morality or religious dictates or lack of compassion, as it may be. Of the aspirations and settled understandings of American women, of the inevitable and brutal consequences of what it is doing, the tough-approach plurality utters not a word. This silence is callous. It is also profoundly destructive of this Court as an institution. To overturn a constitutional decision is a rare and grave undertaking. To overturn a constitutional decision that secured a fundamental personal liberty to millions of persons would be unprecedented in our 200 years of constitutional history. Although the doctrine of stare decisis applies with somewhat diminished force in constitutional cases generally, ante, at 518, even in ordinary constitutional cases "any departure from stare decisis demands special justification." See also ). This requirement of justification applies with unique force where, as here, the Court's abrogation of precedent would destroy people's firm belief, based on past decisions of this Court, that they possess an unabridgeable right to undertake certain conduct.] *559 As discussed at perhaps too great length above, the plurality makes no serious attempt to carry "the heavy burden of persuading that changes in society or in the law dictate" the abandonment of and its numerous progeny, 474 U. S., at much less the greater burden of explaining the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | S., at much less the greater burden of explaining the abrogation of a fundamental personal freedom. Instead, the plurality pretends that it leaves standing, and refuses even to discuss the real issue underlying this case: whether the Constitution includes an unenumerated right to privacy that encompasses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. To the extent that the plurality does criticize the framework, these criticisms are pure ipse dixit. This comes at a cost. The doctrine of stare decisis "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact." -. Today's decision involves the most politically divisive domestic legal issue of our time. By refusing to explain or to justify its proposed revolutionary revision in the law of abortion, and by refusing to abide not only by our precedents, but also by our canons for reconsidering those precedents, the plurality invites charges of cowardice and *0 illegitimacy to our door. I cannot say that these would be undeserved. II For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Having joined Part II-C of the Court's opinion, I shall not comment on 188.205 of the Missouri statute. With respect to the challenged portions of 188.210 and 188.215, I agree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante, at 5-, n. 1 (concurring in part and dissenting in part), that the record identifies a sufficient number of unconstitutional applications to support the Court of Appeals' judgment invalidating those provisions. The reasons why I would also affirm that court's invalidation of 188.029, the viability testing provision, and 1.205.1(1), (2) of the preamble,1] require separate explanation. I It seems to me that in Part II-D of its opinion, the plurality strains to place a construction on 188.0292] that enables *1 it to conclude: "W]e would modify and narrow and succeeding cases," ante, at 521. That statement is ill advised because there is no need to modify even slightly the holdings of prior cases in order to uphold 188.029. For the most plausible nonliteral construction, as both JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante, at 542-544 (concurring in part and dissenting in part), and JUSTICE O'CONNOR, ante, at 525- (concurring in part and concurring in judgment), have demonstrated, is constitutional and entirely consistent with our |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | judgment), have demonstrated, is constitutional and entirely consistent with our precedents. I am unable to accept JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S construction of the second sentence in 188.029, however, because I believe it is foreclosed by two controlling principles of statutory interpretation. First, it is our settled practice to accept "the interpretation of state law in which the District Court and the Court of Appeals have concurred even if an examination of the state-law issue without such guidance might have justified a different conclusion."3] Second, "t]he fact that a particular application of the clear terms of a statute might be unconstitutional does not provide us with a justification for ignoring the plain meaning of the statute." Public 491 U.S. 4,4] In this case, I agree with the Court of Appeals, and the District Court, 662 F. Supp. 7, that the meaning of the second sentence of 188.029 is too plain to be ignored. The sentence twice uses the mandatory term "shall," and contains no qualifying language. If it is implicitly limited to tests that are useful in determining viability, it adds nothing to the requirement imposed by the preceding sentence. My interpretation of the plain language is supported by the structure of the statute as a whole, particularly the preamble, which "finds" that life "begins at conception" and further commands that state laws shall be construed to provide the maximum protection to "the unborn child at every stage of development." Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.205.1(1), 1.205.2 I agree with the District Court that "o]bviously, the purpose of this law is to protect the potential life of the fetus, rather than to safeguard maternal health." A literal reading of the statute tends to accomplish that goal. Thus it is not "incongruous," ante, at 515, to assume that the Missouri Legislature was trying to protect the potential human life of nonviable fetuses by making the abortion decision more costly.5] On the contrary, I am satisfied that the Court of Appeals, as well as the District Court, correctly concluded that the Missouri Legislature meant exactly what it said in the second sentence of 188.029. I am also satisfied, *3 for the reasons stated by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, that the testing provision is manifestly unconstitutional under "irrespective of the v.] framework." Ante, at 544 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). II The Missouri statute defines "conception" as "the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a male," (3) even though standard medical texts equate "conception" with implantation in the uterus, occurring about six days after fertilization.6] Missouri's declaration therefore implies regulation not only of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | after fertilization.6] Missouri's declaration therefore implies regulation not only of previability abortions, but also of common forms of contraception such as the IUD and the morning-after pill.7] Because the preamble, read in context, threatens serious encroachments upon the liberty of the pregnant woman and the health professional, I am persuaded that these plaintiffs, appellees before us, have *5 standing to challenge its constitutionality. -1076. To the extent that the Missouri statute interferes with contraceptive choices, I have no doubt that it is unconstitutional under the Court's holdings in ; 5 U.S. 438 ; and The place of Griswold in the mosaic of decisions defining a woman's liberty interest was accurately stated by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in : "I]n] the Court's opinion in Griswold understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision. Yet, the law did not violate any provision of the Bill of Rights, nor any other specific provision of the Constitution. So it was clear to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the statute substantively invaded the `liberty' that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long line of pre-Skrupa cases decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such. "Several decisions of this Court make clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ]; ]; 262 U.S. 0 ]. See also *5 ]; ]. As recently as last Term, in 5 U.S. 438, ], we recognized `the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.' That right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. `Certainly the interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self during pregnancy and the interests that will be affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a child are of a far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy than the right to send a child to private school protected in or the right to teach a foreign language protected in 262 U.S. 0' "Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct in holding that |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | "Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct in holding that the right asserted by Jane is embraced within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.)8] One might argue that the Griswold holding applies to devices "preventing conception," that is, fertilization but not to those preventing implantation, and therefore, that Griswold does not protect a woman's choice to use an IUD or take a morning-after pill. There is unquestionably *6 a theological basis for such an argument,9] just as there was unquestionably a theological basis for the statute that the Court invalidated in Griswold. Our jurisprudence, however, has consistently required a secular basis for valid legislation. See, e. g., 449 U.S.10] Because I am not aware of any secular basis for differentiating between contraceptive procedures that are effective immediately before and those that are effective immediately after fertilization, I believe it inescapably follows that the preamble to the Missouri statute is invalid under Griswold and its progeny. Indeed, I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This conclusion does not, and could not, rest on the fact that the statement happens to coincide with the tenets of certain religions, see ; or on the fact that the legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious considerations, see Rather, it rests on the fact that the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths,11] serves no identifiable *7 secular purpose. That fact alone compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause.]Wallace v. Jaffree, My concern can best be explained by reference to the position on this issue that was widely accepted by the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church for many years. The position is summarized in a report, entitled "Catholic Teaching On Abortion," prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. It states in part: "The disagreement over the status of the unformed as against the formed fetus was crucial for Christian teaching on the soul. It was widely held that the soul was not present until the formation of the fetus or 80 days after conception, for males and females respectively. Thus, abortion of the `unformed' or `inanimate' fetus (from anima, soul) was something less than true homicide, rather a form of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | was something less than true homicide, rather a form of anticipatory or quasi-homicide. This view received its definitive treatment in St. Thomas Aquinas and became for a time the dominant interpretation in the Latin Church. "For St. Thomas, as for mediaeval Christendom generally, there is a lapse of time approximately to 80 days after conception and before the soul's infusion. "For St. Thomas, `seed and what is not seed is determined by sensation and movement.' What is destroyed in abortion of the unformed fetus is seed, not man. This distinction received its most careful analysis in St. Thomas. It was the general belief of Christendom, reflected, *8 for example, in the Council of Trent (1545-13), which restricted penalties for homicide to abortion of an animated fetus only." C. Whittier, Catholic Teaching on Abortion: Its Origin and Later Development reprinted in Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae 13a, 17a (quoting In octo libros politicorum 7., attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas). If the views of St. Thomas were held as widely today as they were in the Middle Ages, and if a state legislature were to enact a statute prefaced with a "finding" that female life begins 80 days after conception and male life begins days after conception, I have no doubt that this Court would promptly conclude that such an endorsement of a particular religious tenet is violative of the Establishment Clause. In my opinion the difference between that hypothetical statute and Missouri's preamble reflects nothing more than a difference in theological doctrine. The preamble to the Missouri statute endorses the theological position that there is the same secular interest in preserving the life of a fetus during the first or 80 days of pregnancy as there is after viability indeed, after the time when the fetus has become a "person" with legal rights protected by the Constitution.13] To sustain that position as a matter of law, I believe Missouri has the burden of identifying the secular interests that differentiate the first days of pregnancy from the period immediately *9 before or after fertilization when, as Griswold and related cases establish, the Constitution allows the use of contraceptive procedures to prevent potential life from developing into full personhood. Focusing our attention on the first several weeks of pregnancy is especially appropriate because that is the period when the vast majority of abortions are actually performed. As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth. There can be no interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, that interest is valid. In fact, if one prescinds the theological concept of ensoulment or one accepts St. Thomas Aquinas' view that ensoulment does not occur for at least days a State has no greater secular interest in protecting the potential life of an embryo that is still "seed" than in protecting the potential life of a sperm or an unfertilized ovum. There have been times in history when military and economic interests would have been served by an increase in population. No one argues today, however, that Missouri can assert a societal interest in increasing its population as its secular reason for fostering potential life. Indeed, our national policy, as reflected in legislation the Court upheld last Term, is to prevent the potential life that is produced by "pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adolescents." ; accord, If the secular analysis were based on a strict balancing of fiscal costs and benefits, the economic costs of unlimited childbearing would outweigh those of abortion. There is, of course, an important and unquestionably valid secular interest in "protecting a young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect decision," Planned Parenthood of Central *570 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although that interest is served by a requirement that the woman receive medical and, in appropriate circumstances, parental, advice,14] it does not justify the state legislature's official endorsement of the theological tenet embodied in 1.205.1(1), (2). The State's suggestion that the "finding" in the preamble to its abortion statute is, in effect, an amendment to its tort, property, and criminal laws is not persuasive. The Court of Appeals concluded that the preamble "is simply an impermissible state adoption of a theory of when life begins to justify its abortion regulations." Supporting that construction is the state constitutional prohibition against legislative enactments pertaining to more than one subject matter. Mo. Const., Art. 3, 23. See In re Ray, ; Moreover, none of the tort, property, or criminal law cases cited by the State was either based on or buttressed by a theological answer to the question of when life begins. Rather, the Missouri courts, as well as a number of other state courts, had already concluded that a "fetus is a `person,' `minor,' or `minor child' within |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | concurring | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | a "fetus is a `person,' `minor,' or `minor child' within the meaning of their particular wrongful death statutes." *57115] Bolstering my conclusion that the preamble violates the First Amendment is the fact that the intensely divisive character of much of the national debate over the abortion issue reflects the deeply held religious convictions of many participants in the debate.16] The Missouri Legislature may not inject its endorsement of a particular religious tradition into this debate, for "t]he Establishment Clause does not allow public bodies to foment such disagreement." See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, post, at 651 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my opinion the preamble to the Missouri statute is unconstitutional for two reasons. To the extent that it has substantive impact on the freedom to use contraceptive procedures, it is inconsistent with the central holding in Griswold. To the extent that it merely makes "legislative findings without operative effect," as the State argues, Brief for Appellants 22, it violates the Establishment Clause of the First *572 Amendment. Contrary to the theological "finding" of the Missouri Legislature, a woman's constitutionally protected liberty encompasses the right to act on her own belief that to paraphrase St. Thomas Aquinas until a seed has acquired the powers of sensation and movement, the life of a human being has not yet begun.17] |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | majority | Community Communications Co. v. Boulder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110638/community-communications-co-v-boulder/ | The question presented in this case, in which District Court for District of Colorado granted preliminary injunctive relief, is wher a "home rule" municipality, granted by state constitution extensive powers of self-government in local and municipal matters, enjoys "state action" from Sherman Act liability announced in I Respondent city of Boulder is organized as a "home rule" municipality under Constitution of State of Colorado.[1] The city is thus entitled to exercise " full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters," and with respect to such matters City Charter and ordinances *44 supersede laws of State. Under that Charter, all municipal legislative powers are exercised by an elected City Council.[2] In 1964 City Council enacted an ordinance granting to Colorado Televents, Inc., a 20-year, revocable, nonexclusive permit to conduct a cable television business within city limits. This permit was assigned to petitioner in 1966, and since that time petitioner has provided cable television service to University Hill area of Boulder, an area where some 20% of city's population lives, and where, for geographical reasons, broadcast television signals cannot be received. From 1966 until February due to limited service that could be provided with technology n available, petitioner's service consisted essentially of retransmissions of programming broadcast from Denver and Cheyenne, Wyo. Petitioner's market was refore confined to University Hill area. However, markedly improved technology became available in late 1970's, enabling petitioner to offer many more channels of entertainment than could be provided by local broadcast television.[3] Thus presented with an opportunity *45 to expand its business into or areas of city, petitioner in May 1979 informed City Council that it planned such an expansion. But new technology offered opportunities to potential competitors, as well, and in July 1979 one of m, newly formed Boulder Communications (BCC),[4] also wrote to City Council, expressing its interest in obtaining a permit to provide competing cable television service throughout city.[5] The City Council's response, after reviewing its cable television[6] was enactment of an "emergency" ordinance *46 prohibiting petitioner from expanding its business into or areas of city for a period of three months.[7] The City Council announced that during this moratorium it planned to draft a model cable television ordinance and to invite new businesses to enter Boulder market under its terms, but that moratorium was necessary because petitioner's continued expansion during drafting of model ordinance would discourage potential competitors from entering market.[8] Petitioner filed this suit in United States District Court for District of Colorado, and sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction to prevent city from restricting petitioner's *47 proposed business expansion, alleging |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | majority | Community Communications Co. v. Boulder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110638/community-communications-co-v-boulder/ | prevent city from restricting petitioner's *47 proposed business expansion, alleging that such a restriction would violate 1 of Sherman Act.[9] The city responded that its moratorium ordinance could not be violative of antitrust laws, eir because that ordinance constituted an exercise of city's police powers, or because Boulder enjoyed antitrust immunity under Parker doctrine. The District Court considered city's status as a home rule municipality, but determined that that status gave autonomy to city only in matters of local concern, and that operations of cable television embrace "wider concerns, including interstate commerce [and] First Amendment rights of communicators." Then, assuming, arguendo, that ordinance was within city's authority as a home rule municipality, District Court considered City of and concluded that Parker was "wholly inapplicable," and that city was refore subject to antitrust[10] Petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction was accordingly granted. On appeal, a divided panel of United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit reversed. The majority, after examining Colorado law, rejected District Court's conclusion that regulation of cable television business was beyond home rule authority *48 of city. The majority n addressed question of city's claimed Parker It distinguished present case from City of on ground that, in contrast to municipally operated revenueproducing utility companies at issue re, "no proprietary interest of City is here involved." After noting that city's regulation "was only control or active supervision exercised by state or local government, and represented only expression of as to subject matter," majority held that city's actions refore satisfied criteria for a Parker[11] We granted certiorari, We reverse. II A addressed question wher federal antitrust laws prohibited a State, in exercise of its sovereign powers, from imposing certain anticompetitive restraints. These took form of a "marketing program" adopted by State of California for 1940 raisin crop; that program prevented appellee from freely marketing his crop in interstate commerce. Parker noted that California's program "derived its authority *49 from legislative command of state," and went on to hold that program was refore exempt, by virtue of Sherman Act's own limitations, from antitrust attack: "We find nothing in language of Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under Constitution, states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from ir authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." -351. The availability of this to a State's municipalities |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | majority | Community Communications Co. v. Boulder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110638/community-communications-co-v-boulder/ | Congress." -351. The availability of this to a State's municipalities was question presented in City of In that case, petitioners were Louisiana cities empowered to own and operate electric utility systems both within and beyond ir municipal limits. Respondent brought suit against petitioners under Sherman Act, alleging that y had committed various antitrust offenses in conduct of ir utility systems, to injury of respondent. Petitioners invoked Parker doctrine as entitling m to dismissal of suit. The District Court accepted this argument and dismissed. But Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a "subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from operation of antitrust laws," City of and directing District Court on remand to examine "wher state legislature contemplated a certain type of anticompetitive restraint," ibid.[12] *50 This Court affirmed. In doing so, a majority rejected at outset petitioners' claim that, quite apart from Parker, "Congress never intended to subject local governments to antitrust laws." A plurality opinion for four Justices n addressed petitioners' argument that Parker, properly construed, extended to "all governmental entities, wher state agencies or subdivisions of a State,. simply by reason of ir status as such." The plurality opinion rejected this argument, after a discussion of Parker, and[13] These precedents were construed as holding that Parker reflects federalism principle that we are a Nation of States, a principle that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States. The plurality opinion said: "Cities are not mselves sovereign; y do not receive all federal deference of States that create m. Parker's limitation of to `official action directed by a state,' is consistent with fact that States' subdivisions generally have not been treated as *51 equivalents of States mselves. In light of serious economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place ir own parochial interests above Nation's economic goals reflected in antitrust laws, we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from ir reach." -413 The opinion emphasized, however, that State as sovereign might sanction anticompetitive municipal activities and reby immunize municipalities from antitrust Under plurality's standard, Parker doctrine would shield from antitrust liability municipal conduct engaged in "pursuant to state to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." This was simply a recognition that a State may frequently choose to effect its policies through instrumentality of its cities and towns. It was stressed, however, that "state " relied upon would have to be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed." This standard has since been adopted by a majority of Court. New Motor Vehicle Board of ; |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | majority | Community Communications Co. v. Boulder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110638/community-communications-co-v-boulder/ | a majority of Court. New Motor Vehicle Board of ; California Retail Liquor Dealers[14] *52 B Our precedents thus reveal that Boulder's moratorium ordinance cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constitutes action of State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity, see Parker, or unless it constitutes municipal action in furrance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state see City of Orrin W. Fox and Boulder argues that se criteria are met by direct delegation of powers to municipalities through Home Rule Amendment to Colorado Constitution. It contends that this delegation satisfies both Parker and City of standards. We take up se arguments in turn. (1) Respondent city's Parker argument emphasizes that through Home Rule Amendment people of State of Colorado have vested in city of Boulder " `every power retofore possessed by legislature in local and municipal affairs.' "[15] The power thus possessed by Boulder's *53 City Council assertedly embraces regulation of cable television, which is claimed to pose essentially local problems.[16] Thus, it is suggested, city's cable television moratorium ordinance is an "act of government" performed by city acting as State in local matters, which meets "state action" criterion of Parker.[17] We reject this argument: it both misstates letter of law and misunderstands its spirit. The Parker state-action reflects Congress' intention to embody in Sherman Act federalism principle that States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limitation: Ours is a "dual system of government," Parker, which has no place for sovereign cities. As this Court stated long ago, all sovereign authority "within geographical limits of United States" resides eir with " Government of United States, or [with] States of Union. There exist within broad domain of sovereignty but se two. There may be cities, counties, and or organized bodies with limited legislative *54 functions, but y are all derived from, or exist in, subordination to one or or of se." United The dissent in Court of Appeals correctly discerned this limitation upon federalism principle: "We are a nation not of `city-states' but of States." Parker itself took this view. When Parker examined Congress' intentions in enacting antitrust laws, opinion, as previously indicated, noted: "[N]othing in language of Sherman Act or in its history suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S., -351 Thus Parker recognized Congress' intention to limit |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | majority | Community Communications Co. v. Boulder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110638/community-communications-co-v-boulder/ | 317 U.S., -351 Thus Parker recognized Congress' intention to limit state-action based upon federalism principle of limited state sovereignty. City of Orrin W. Fox and reaffirmed both vitality and intrinsic limits of Parker state-action doctrine. It was expressly recognized by plurality opinion in City of that municipalities "are not mselves sovereign," and that accordingly y could partake of Parker only to extent that y acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state The Court adopted this view in Orrin W. Fox 439 U. S., at and 445 U. S., at We turn n to Boulder's contention that its actions were undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state (2) Boulder first argues that requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" is fulfilled by Colorado Home Rule Amendment's "guarantee of local autonomy." It contends, quoting from City of *55 415, that by this means Colorado has "comprehended within powers granted" to Boulder power to enact challenged ordinance, and that Colorado has reby "contemplated" Boulder's enactment of an anticompetitive regulatory program. Furr, Boulder contends that it may be inferred, "from authority given" to Boulder "to operate in a particular area" here, asserted home rule authority to regulate cable television "that legislature contemplated kind of action complained of." (Emphasis supplied.) Boulder refore concludes that "adequate state mandate" required by City of is present here.[18] But plainly requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" is not satisfied when State's position is one of mere neutrality respecting municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A State that allows its municipalities to do as y please can hardly be said to have "contemplated" specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought. Nor can those actions be truly described as "comprehended within powers granted," since term, "granted," necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of subject by State. The State did not do so here: The relationship of State of Colorado to Boulder's moratorium ordinance is one of precise neutrality. As majority in Court of Appeals below acknowledged: "[W]e are here concerned with City action in absence of any regulation whatever by State of Colorado. Under se circumstances re is no interaction of state and local regulation. We have only action or exercise of authority by City." 630 F.2d, Indeed, Boulder argues that *56 as to local matters regulated by a home rule city, Colorado General Assembly is without power to act. Cf. City of and n. 44. Thus in Boulder's view, it can pursue its course of regulating cable television competition, while anor home rule city can choose to prescribe monopoly service, while |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | majority | Community Communications Co. v. Boulder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110638/community-communications-co-v-boulder/ | home rule city can choose to prescribe monopoly service, while still anor can elect free-market competition: and all of se policies are equally "contemplated," and "comprehended within powers granted." Acceptance of such a proposition that general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances would wholly eviscerate concepts of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" that our precedents require. III Respondents argue that denial of Parker in present case will have serious adverse consequences for cities, and will unduly burden federal courts. But this argument is simply an attack upon wisdom of longstanding congressional commitment to of free markets and open competition embodied in antitrust laws.[19] Those laws, like or federal laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon "persons," of course apply to municipalities as well as to or corporate entities.[20] Moreover, judicial enforcement *57 of Congress' will regarding state-action renders a State "no less able to allocate governmental power between itself and its political subdivisions. It means only that when State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, State's subdivisions in exercising ir delegated power must obey antitrust laws." City of As was observed in that case: "Today's decision does not threaten legitimate exercise of governmental power, nor does it preclude municipal government from providing services on a monopoly basis. Parker and its progeny make clear that a State properly may direct or authorize its instrumentalities to act in a way which, if it did not reflect state would be inconsistent with antitrust laws. [A]ssuming that municipality is authorized to provide a service on a monopoly basis, se limitations on municipal action will not hobble execution of legitimate governmental programs." The judgment of Court of Appeals is reversed, and action is remanded for furr proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Ybarra v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110158/ybarra-v-illinois/ | An Illinois statute authorizes law enforcement officers to detain and search any person found on premises being searched pursuant to a search warrant, to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described in the warrant.[1] The question before us is whether the application of this statute to the facts of the present case violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. I On March 1, 1976, a special agent of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation presented a "Complaint for Search Warrant" to a judge of an Illinois Circuit Court. The complaint recited that the agent had spoken with an informant known to the police to be reliable and: "3. The informant related that over the weekend of 28 and 29 February he was in the [Aurora Tap Tavern, located in the city of Aurora, Ill.] and observed fifteen *88 to twenty-five tin-foil packets on the person of the bartender `Greg' and behind the bar. He also has been in the tavern on at least ten other occasions and has observed tin-foil packets on `Greg' and in a drawer behind the bar. The informant has used heroin in the past and knows that tin-foil packets are a common method of packaging heroin. "4. The informant advised that over the weekend of 28 and 29 February he had a conversation with `Greg' and was advised that `Greg' would have heroin for sale on Monday, March 1, 1976. This conversation took place in the tavern described." On the strength of this complaint, the judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of "the following person or place: [T]he Aurora Tap Tavern. Also the person of `Greg', the bartender, a male white with blondish hair appx. 25 years." The warrant authorized the police to search for "evidence of the offense of possession of a controlled substance," to wit, "[h]eroin, contraband, other controlled substances, money, instrumentalities and narcotics, paraphernalia used in the manufacture, processing and distribution of controlled substances." In the late afternoon of that day, seven or eight officers proceeded to the tavern. Upon entering it, the officers announced their purpose and advised all those present that they were going to conduct a "cursory search for weapons." One of the officers then proceeded to pat down each of the 9 to 13 customers present in the tavern, while the remaining officers engaged in an extensive search of the premises. The police officer who frisked the patrons found the appellant, Ventura Ybarra, in front of the bar standing by a pinball machine. In his first patdown of Ybarra, the officer felt what |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Ybarra v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110158/ybarra-v-illinois/ | In his first patdown of Ybarra, the officer felt what he described as "a cigarette pack with objects in it." He did not remove this pack from Ybarra's pocket. Instead, he moved on and proceeded to pat down other customers. *89 After completing this process the officer returned to Ybarra and frisked him once again. This second search of Ybarra took place approximately 2 to 10 minutes after the first. The officer relocated and retrieved the cigarette pack from Ybarra's pants pocket. Inside the pack he found six tinfoil packets containing a brown powdery substance which later turned out to be heroin. Ybarra was subsequently indicted by an Illinois grand jury for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress all the contraband that had been seized from his person at the Aurora Tap Tavern. At the hearing on this motion the State sought to justify the search by reference to the Illinois statute in question. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the search had been conducted under the authority of subsection (b) of the statute, to "prevent the disposal or concealment of [the] things particularly described in the warrant." The case proceeded to trial before the court sitting without a jury, and Ybarra was found guilty of the possession of heroin. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional "in its application to the facts" of this case. The court acknowledged that, had the warrant directed that a "large retail or commercial establishment" be searched, the statute could not constitutionally have been read to "authorize a `blanket search' of persons or patrons found" therein. The court interpreted the statute as authorizing the search of persons found on premises described in a warrant only if there is "some showing of a connection with those premises, that the police officer reasonably suspected an attack, or that the person searched would destroy or conceal items described in the warrant." Accordingly, the State Appellate Court found that the search of Ybarra had been constitutional because it had been "conducted in a *90 one-room bar where it [was] obvious from the complaint that heroin was being sold or dispensed," because "the six packets of heroin could easily [have been] concealed by the defendant and thus thwart the purpose of the warrant," and because Ybarra was not an "innocent strange[r] having no connection with the premises," The court, therefore, affirmed Ybarra's conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. There followed an appeal to |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Ybarra v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110158/ybarra-v-illinois/ | petition for leave to appeal. There followed an appeal to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. II There is no reason to suppose that, when the search warrant was issued on March 1, 1976, the authorities had probable cause to believe that any person found on the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern, aside from "Greg," would be violating the law.[2] The search warrant complaint did not allege that the bar was frequented by persons illegally purchasing drugs. It did not state that the informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern purchase drugs from "Greg" or from any other person. Nowhere, in fact, did the complaint even mention the patrons of the Aurora Tap Tavern. Not only was probable cause to search Ybarra absent at the time the warrant was issued, it was still absent when the police executed the warrant. Upon entering the tavern, the *91 police did not recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any offense under state or federal law. Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of a suspicious nature to the police officers. In short, the agents knew nothing in particular about Ybarra, except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale. It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed.[3] But, a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. -63. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seizure another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the "legitimate expectations of privacy" of persons, not places. See ; Each patron who walked into the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, was clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. That individualized protection was separate and distinct from *92 the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection possessed by the proprietor |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Ybarra v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110158/ybarra-v-illinois/ | the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection possessed by the proprietor of the tavern or by "Greg." Although the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search "Greg," it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers.[4] Notwithstanding the absence of probable cause to search Ybarra, the State argues that the action of the police in searching him and seizing what was found in his pocket was nonetheless constitutionally permissible. We are asked to find that the first patdown search of Ybarra constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doctrine of If this finding is made, it is then possible to conclude, the State argues, that the second search of Ybarra was constitutionally justified. The argument is that the patdown yielded probable cause to believe that Ybarra was carrying narcotics, and that this probable cause constitutionally supported the second search, no warrant being required in light of the exigencies of the situation coupled with the ease with which Ybarra could have disposed of the illegal substance. We are unable to take even the first step required by this argument. The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently *93 dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for ; When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized him as a person with a criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as Police Agent Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening. At the suppression hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a 3/4-length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March. In short, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous. The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause, an exception whose "narrow scope" this Court "has been careful to maintain."[6] Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Ybarra v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110158/ybarra-v-illinois/ | careful to maintain."[6] Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted. See, e. g., Adams v. Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized *94 "cursory search for weapons" or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The "narrow scope" of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place. What has been said largely disposes of the State's second and alternative argument in this case. Emphasizing the important governmental interest "in effectively controlling traffic in dangerous, hard drugs" and the ease with which the evidence of narcotics possession may be concealed or moved around from person to person, the State contends that the Terry "reasonable belief or suspicion" standard should be made applicable to aid the evidence-gathering function of the search warrant. More precisely, we are asked to construe the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to permit evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on "compact" premises subject to a search warrant, at least where the police have a "reasonable belief" that such persons "are connected with" drug trafficking and "may be concealing or carrying away the contraband." Over 30 years ago, the Court rejected a similar argument in United States v. Di Re, In that case, a federal investigator had been told by an informant that a transaction in counterfeit gasoline ration coupons was going to occur at a particular place. The investigator went to that location at the appointed time and saw the car of one of the suspected parties to the illegal transaction. The investigator went over to the car and observed a man in the driver's seat, another man (Di Re) in the passenger's seat, and the informant in the back. The informant told the investigator that the person in the driver's seat had given him counterfeit coupons. Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched. Among the arguments unsuccessfully advanced by the Government to support the constitutionality of the search of Di Re was the contention that the investigator could *95 lawfully have searched the car, since he had reasonable cause to believe that it contained contraband, and correspondingly could have searched any occupant of the car because the contraband sought was of the sort "which |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Ybarra v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110158/ybarra-v-illinois/ | car because the contraband sought was of the sort "which could easily be concealed on the person."[7] Not deciding whether or not under the Fourth Amendment the car could have been searched, the Court held that it was "not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled."[8] The Di Re case does not, of course, completely control the case at hand. There the Government investigator was proceeding without a search warrant, and here the police possessed a warrant authorizing the search of the Aurora Tap Tavern. Moreover, in Di Re the Government conceded that its officers could not search all the persons in a house being searched pursuant to a search warrant.[9] The State makes no such concession in this case. Yet the governing principle in both cases is basically the same, and we follow that principle today. The "long-prevailing" constitutional standard of probable cause embodies "`the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often opposing interests' in `safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences *96 with privacy and in `seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection.'"[10] For these reasons, we conclude that the searches of Ybarra and the seizure of what was in his pocket contravened the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.[11] Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN and MR. |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | Subject to certain exceptions, the Copyright Act (Act) requires copyright holders to register their works before suing for copyright infringement 17 US C A (Supp 2009) In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a copyright holder’s failure to comply with ’s registration requirement deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to adjudicate his copyright infringement claim We disagree Section 411(a)’s regis tration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction I A The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o pro mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their Writings” Art I, cl 8 Exercising this power, Congress has crafted a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the existence and scope of “[c]opyright protec tion” for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangi 2 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court ble medium of expression” 17 US C This scheme gives copyright owners “the exclusive rights” (with specified statutory exceptions) to distribute, reproduce, or publicly perform their works “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as pro vided” in the Act “is an infringer of the copyright” When such infringement occurs, a copyright owner “is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action” for copyright infringement (emphasis added) This case concerns “the requirements of section 411” to which refers Section 411(a) provides, inter alia and with certain exceptions, that “no civil action for in fringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title”1 This provision is part of the Act’s remedial scheme It establishes a condition—copyright registration—that plaintiffs ordinarily must satisfy before filing an infringe ment claim and invoking the Act’s remedial provisions We address whether also deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement involving unregistered works B The relevant proceedings in this case began after we issued our opinion in New York Times Co v Tasini, 533 US 483 In Tasini, we agreed with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that several owners of online databases and print publishers had infringed the copyrights of six freelance authors by reproducing the authors’ works electronically without first securing their —————— 1 Other sections of the Act—principally the regis tration process, and establish remedial incentives to encourage copy right holders to register their works, see, eg, 17 US C A (2005 ed and Supp |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | see, eg, 17 US C A (2005 ed and Supp 2009) Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court permission See In so holding, we affirmed the principal theory of liability underlying copyright infringe ment suits that other freelance authors had filed after the Court of Appeals had issued its opinion in Tasini These other suits, which were stayed pending our decision in Tasini, resumed after we issued our opinion and were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation The consolidated complaint alleged that the named plaintiffs each own at least one copyright, typically in a freelance article written for a newspaper or a magazine, that they had registered in accordance with The class, however, included both authors who had registered their copyrighted works and authors who had not See App 94 Because of the growing size and complexity of the law suit, the District Court referred the parties to mediation For more than three years, the freelance authors, the publishers (and their insurers), and the electronic data bases (and their insurers) negotiated Finally, in March 2005, they reached a settlement agreement that the par ties intended “to achieve a global peace in the publishing industry” In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, The parties moved the District Court to certify a class for settlement and to approve the settlement agreement Ten freelance authors, including Irvin Muchnick (herein after Muchnick respondents), objected The District Court overruled the objections; certified a settlement class of freelance authors under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3); approved the settlement as fair, reason able, and adequate under Rule 23(e); and entered final judgment At no time did the Muchnick respondents or any other party urge the District Court to dismiss the case, or to refuse to certify the class or approve the settle 4 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court ment, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction The Muchnick respondents appealed, renewing their objections to the settlement on procedural and substantive grounds Shortly before oral argument, the Court of Ap peals sua sponte ordered briefing on the question whether deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdic tion over infringement involving unregistered copyrights All parties filed briefs asserting that the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreement even though it included unreg istered works Relying on two Circuit precedents holding that ’s registration requirement was jurisdictional, see 509 F3d, at 121 ; ), the Court of Appeals concluded that the District |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | ; ), the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to certify a class of arising from the infringement of unregistered works, and also lacked juris diction to approve a settlement with respect to those (citing “widespread agreement among the circuits that section 411(a) is jurisdictional”)2 Judge Walker dissented He concluded “that is more like the [nonjurisdictional] employee-numerosity requirement in [v Y & H Corp, ]” than the jurisdictional statutory time limit in Accordingly, he reasoned that ’s registration re —————— 2 See La Resolana Architects, PA v Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F3d 5, 1200–1201 ; Positive Black Talk Inc v Cash Money Records Inc, F3d 357, ; Xoom, Inc v Imageline, Inc, 323 F3d 279, ; Murray Hill Publica tions, Inc v ABC Communications, Inc, 264 F3d 622, and n 1 ; Brewer-Giorgio v Producers Video, Inc, 216 F3d 1281, 1285 ; Data Gen Corp v Grumman Systems Support Corp, 36 F3d 1147, Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court quirement does not limit federal subject-matter jurisdic tion over infringement suits involving unregistered works Ibid We granted the owners’ and publishers’ petition for a writ of certiorari, and formulated the question presented to ask whether restricts the subject-matter juris diction of the federal courts over copyright infringement actions 555 U S (2009) Because no party supports the Court of Appeals’ jurisdictional holding, we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Court of Appeals’ judg ment3 556 U S (2009) We now reverse II A “Jurisdiction” refers to “a court’s adjudicatory author ity” v Ryan, 540 US 443, Accord ingly, the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdic tion)” implicating that authority Ibid; see also Steel Co v Citizens for Better Environment, 523 US 83, (“subject-matter jurisdiction” refers to “the courts’ statu tory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (em phasis in original)); Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 274 (THOMAS, J, concurring))) While perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules can be confusing in practice Courts—including this Court—have sometimes mischaracterized claim-processing rules or —————— 3 We appointed Deborah Jones Merritt to brief and argue the case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment Ms Merritt has ably discharged her assigned responsibilities 6 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that characterization was not central to the case, and thus did not require close |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | central to the case, and thus did not require close analysis See at 511–512 (citing examples); Steel Co, 523 US, at Our recent cases evince a marked desire to curtail such “drive-by jurisdictional rulings,” ib which too easily can miss the “critical difference[s]” between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdic tional limitations on causes of action, at 456; see also 546 US, at 511 In light of the important distinctions between jurisdic tional prescriptions and claim-processing rules, see, eg, we have encouraged federal courts and liti gants to “facilitat[e]” clarity by using the term “jurisdic tional” only when it is apposite, at In we described the general approach to distin guish “jurisdictional” conditions from claim-processing requirements or elements of a claim: “If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limi tation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdic tional, then courts and litigants will be duly in structed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue But when Congress does not rank a statutory limita tion on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character” 546 US, –516 (citation and footnote omitted) The plaintiff in brought a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate,” inter alia, on the basis of sex 42 US C §2000e–2(a)(1) But employees can bring Title VII only against employers that have “fifteen or more employees” §2000e(b) addressed whether that employee numerosity requirement “affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, in stead, delineates a substantive ingredient of a Title VII Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court claim for relief” 546 US, at 503 We held that it does the latter Our holding turned principally on our examination of the text of the section in which Title VII’s nu merosity requirement appears Section 2000e(b) does not “clearly stat[e]” that the employee numerosity threshold on Title VII’s scope “count[s] as jurisdictional” Id, at 515–516, and n 11 And nothing in our prior Title VII cases compelled the conclusion that even though the nu merosity requirement lacks a clear jurisdictional label, it nonetheless imposed a jurisdictional limit See at 511–513 Similarly, text and structure did not demonstrate that Congress “rank[ed]” that requirement as jurisdictional See at 513–516 As we observed, the employee numerosity requirement is located in a provision “separate” from Title VII’s jurisdiction granting section, distinguishing it from the “amount-in controversy threshold ingredient of subject-matter juris diction in diversity-of-jurisdiction under 28 US C §1332” 546 US, –515 Accordingly, the numerosity requirement could not fairly be read |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | –515 Accordingly, the numerosity requirement could not fairly be read to “ ‘speak in jurisdictional terms or in any way refer to the jurisdic tion of the district courts’ ” Id, ) We thus “refrain[ed] from” construing the numerosity re quirement to “constric[t] or Title VII’s jurisdictional provision” (internal quotation marks omitted) We now apply this same approach to B Section 411(a) provides: “Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under section 106A(a), and sub ject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States 8 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court work shall be instituted until preregistration or regis tration of the copyright claim has been made in accor dance with this title In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by entering an appearance within sixty days af ter such service, but the Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to de termine that issue” We must consider whether “clearly states” that its registration requirement is “jurisdictional” It does not Amicus disagrees, pointing to the presence of the word “jurisdiction” in the last sentence of and contending that the use of the term there indicates the jurisdictional cast of ’s first sentence as well Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in support of Judgment Below 18 (hereinafter Amicus Brief) But this reference to “jurisdiction” cannot bear the weight that amicus places upon it The sentence upon which amicus relies states: “The Register [of Copyrights] may, at his or her op tion, become a party to the [copyright infringement] action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by entering an appearance within sixty days after such service, but the Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of juris diction to determine that issue” (emphasis added) Congress added this sentence to the Act in 1976, 90 Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 9 Opinion of the Court Stat 2583, to clarify that a federal court can determine “the issue of registrability of the copyright claim” even |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | determine “the issue of registrability of the copyright claim” even if the Register does not appear in the infringement suit That clarification was necessary because courts had inter preted ’s precursor provision,4 which imposed a similar registration requirement, as prohibiting copyright owners who had been refused registration by the Register of Copyrights from suing for infringement until the owners first sought mandamus against the Register See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc v Benrus Watch Co, 260 F2d 637, (construing ’s precursor) The 1976 amendment made it clear that a federal court plainly has adjudicatory authority to determine “that issue,” (emphasis added)—ie, the issue of registrability—regardless of whether the Register is a party to the infringement suit The word “jurisdic tion,” as used here, thus says nothing about whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate for infringement of unregistered works Moreover, ’s registration requirement, like Title VII’s numerosity requirement, is located in a provision “separate” from those granting federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over those respective See –515 Federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over copyright infringement actions based on 28 US C § and 1338 But neither which confers subject-matter jurisdiction over questions of federal law, nor which is specific to copyright conditions its jurisdictional grant on whether copyright holders have registered their works before suing for infringement Cf (“Title VII’s jurisdictional provision” does not “specif[y] any threshold ingredient akin to 28 US C mone tary floor”) —————— 4 See Act of Mar 4, 1909, 35 Stat 1078 10 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court Nor does any other factor suggest that 17 US C A ’s registration requirement can be read to “ ‘speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdic tion of the district courts’ ” 546 US, (quoting US, at ) First, and most signifi cantly, expressly allows courts to adjudicate in fringement involving unregistered works in three circumstances: where the work is not a U S work, where the infringement claim concerns rights of attribution and integrity under or where the holder attempted to register the work and registration was refused Sepa rately, permits courts to adjudicate infringement actions over certain kinds of unregistered works where the author “declare[s] an intention to secure copyright in the work” and “makes registration for the work, if required by subsection (a), within three months after [the work’s] first transmission” 17 US C §(1)–(2) It would be at least unusual to ascribe jurisdictional significance to a condition subject to these sorts of exceptions5 That the numerosity requirement in could be |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | sorts of exceptions5 That the numerosity requirement in could be considered an element of a Title VII claim, rather than a prerequisite to initiating a lawsuit, does not change this conclusion, as our decision in demonstrates (upon which relied) held that Title VII’s require ment that sex-discrimination claimants timely file a dis crimination charge with the EEOC before filing a civil action in federal court was nonjurisdictional See US, at 3; 42 US C (establishing —————— 5 Cf US, at 3–, 397 (relying on the fact that Con gress had “approved” at least some cases awarding Title VII relief to claimants who had not complied with the statute’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filing requirement in holding that the filing requirement was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit); United States v Cotton, 535 US 625, (“[J]urisdiction” properly refers to a court’s power to hear a case, a matter that “can never be forfeited or waived”) Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 11 Opinion of the Court specific time periods within which a discrimination claim ant must file a lawsuit after filing a charge with the EEOC) A statutory condition that requires a party to take some action before filing a lawsuit is not automati cally “a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit” US, at 3 (emphasis added) Rather, the jurisdictional analysis must focus on the “legal character” of the re quirement, which we discerned by looking to the condition’s text, context, and relevant historical treat ment, at 3–395; see also National Railroad Passen ger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US 101, –121 We similarly have treated as nonjurisdictional other types of threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit6 The registration requirement in 17 US C A fits in this mold Section 411(a) imposes a precondition to filing a claim that is not clearly labeled jurisdictional, is not located in a jurisdiction-granting provision, and ad mits of congressionally authorized exceptions See §–(c) Section 411(a) thus imposes a type of pre condition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment under our precedents C Amicus insists that our decision in 551 US 205, compels a conclusion contrary to the one we reach today Amicus cites for the proposition that where Congress did not explicitly label a statutory condition as —————— 6 See Jones v Bock, 549 US 199, (treating the adminis trative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)—which states that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner until such administrative remedies as |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | Federal law, by a prisoner until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted,” 42 US C an affirmative defense even though “[t]here is no question that exhaustion is manda tory under the PLRA and that unexhausted cannot be brought in court”); Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 12 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court jurisdictional, a court nevertheless should treat it as such if that is how the condition consistently has been inter preted and if Congress has not disturbed that interpreta tion Amicus Brief 26 Specifically, amicus relies on a footnote in to argue that here, as in it would be improper to characterize the statutory condition as nonjurisdictional because doing so would override “ ‘a century’s worth of precedent’ ” treating ’s registra tion requirement as jurisdictional Amicus Brief 26 (quot ing n 2) This argument focuses on the result in rather than on the analysis we employed did not hold that any statutory condition devoid of an express jurisdictional label should be treated as jurisdictional simply because courts have long treated it as such Nor did it hold that all statutory conditions impos ing a time limit should be considered jurisdictional7 —————— 7 for example, distinguished v Principi, 541 US 401 which characterized as nonjurisdictional an express statutory time limit for initiating postjudgment proceedings for attor ney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act See 551 US, at As we explained, the time limit in “concerned ‘a mode of relief ancillary to the judgment of a court’ that already had plenary jurisdiction” 551 US, at (quoting ; (emphasis added)) also distinguished v Ryan, 540 US 443 and Eberhart v United States, 546 US 12 (per curiam), as cases in which the Court properly held that certain time limits were nonjurisdictional because they were imposed by rules that did not purport to have any jurisdictional significance See 551 US, at 210– involved “time constraints applicable to objec tions to discharge” in bankruptcy proceedings 540 US, at 453 In that case, we first examined 28 US C the statute “conferring jurisdiction over objections to discharge,” and observed that it did not contain a timeliness requirement 540 US, at 453 Rather, the “time constraints applicable to objections to discharge” were contained in the Bankruptcy Rules, which expressly state that they “ ‘shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts’ ” See ibid (quoting Fed Rule Bkrtcy Proc 9030) Eberhart, in turn, treated as nonjurisdictional certain rules that the Court held Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 13 Opinion of the |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 13 Opinion of the Court Rather, stands for the proposition that context, including this Court’s interpretation of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as jurisdictional In we considered 28 US C which re quires parties in a civil action to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment being appealed, and Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which “car ries into practice” 551 US, at 208 After analyz ing ’s specific language and this Court’s historical treatment of the type of limitation imposes (ie, statutory deadlines for filing appeals), we concluded that Congress had ranked the statutory condition as jurisdic tional Our focus in on the historical treatment of statutory conditions for taking an appeal is thus consis tent with the framework Indeed, em phasized that this Court had long treated such conditions as jurisdictional, including in statutes other than and specifically in statutes that predated the creation of the courts of appeals See 551 US, –210, and n 2 therefore demonstrates that the relevant ques tion here is not (as amicus puts it) whether itself has long been labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type of limitation that imposes is one that is properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an express designation The statutory limitation in was of a type that we had long held did “speak in jurisdictional terms” even absent a “jurisdictional” label, and nothing about ’s text or context, or the historical treatment of that type of limitation, justified a departure from this view That was not the case, however, for the types of conditions in and Here, that same analysis leads us to conclude that does not implicate the subject-matter jurisdiction —————— “closely parallel[ed]” those in 546 US, at 15 14 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court of federal courts Although ’s historical treatment as “jurisdictional” is a factor in the analysis, it is not dispositive The other factors discussed above demon strate that ’s registration requirement is more analogous to the nonjurisdictional conditions we consid ered in and than to the statutory time limit at issue in 8 We thus conclude that ’s regis tration requirement is nonjurisdictional, notwithstanding its prior jurisdictional treatment9 III Amicus argues that even if is nonjurisdictional, we should nonetheless affirm on estoppel grounds the Court of Appeals’ judgment vacating the District Court’s order approving the settlement and dismissing the case According to amicus, petitioners asserted previously in these proceedings that copyright registration was jurisdic tional, and this |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | these proceedings that copyright registration was jurisdic tional, and this assertion should estop them from now asserting a right to waive objections to the authors’ failure to register Amicus urges us to prevent the parties “from ‘playing fast and loose with the courts’ by ‘deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the mo —————— 8 This conclusion mirrors our holding in that Title VII’s EEOC filing requirement was nonjurisdictional, even though some of our own decisions had characterized it as jurisdictional See US, (noting that “the legal character of the requirement was not at issue in those” earlier cases); see also National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US 101, (relying on the analysis in ) 9 Amicus’ remaining jurisdictional argument—that the policy goals underlying copyright registration support construing ’s registra tion provisions as jurisdictional, see Amicus Brief 45—is similarly unavailing We do not agree that a condition should be ranked as jurisdictional merely because it promotes important congressional objectives See 515–516 (holding that Title VII’s numerosity requirement is nonjurisdic tional even though it serves the important policy goal of “spar[ing] very small businesses from Title VII liability”) Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 15 Opinion of the Court ment’ ” Amicus Brief 58 ) We agree that some statements in the parties’ submis sions to the District Court and the Court of Appeals are in tension with their arguments here But we decline to apply judicial estoppel As we explained in New Hamp shire, that doctrine typically applies when, among other things, a “party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial accep tance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first or the second court was misled” Id, at (internal quotation marks omitted) Such circumstances do not exist here for two reasons First, the parties made their prior statements when nego tiating or defending the settlement agreement We do not fault the parties’ lawyers for invoking in the negotiations binding Circuit precedent that supported their clients’ positions Perhaps more importantly, in approving the settlement, the District Court did not adopt petitioners’ interpretation of as jurisdictional Second, when the Court of Appeals asked petitioners to brief whether restricted the District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, they argued that it did not, and the Court of Appeals rejected their arguments See App to Reply Brief for Petitioners 3a–5a, and n 2 Accepting petitioners’ arguments here thus cannot create “inconsistent court determinations” in their favor New at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted) We therefore hold that the |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | 751 (internal quotation marks omitted) We therefore hold that the District Court had authority to adjudicate the parties’ request to approve their settlement IV Our holding that does not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction precludes the need for us to address the parties’ alternative arguments as to 16 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of the Court whether the District Court had authority to approve the settlement even under the Court of Appeals’ erroneous reading of §411 In concluding that the District Court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement, we express no opinion on the settlement’s merits We also decline to address whether ’s registra tion requirement is a mandatory precondition to suit that—like the threshold conditions in Arizona v Califor nia, 530 US 392, ; Day v McDonough, 547 US 198, (habeas statute of limitations); and Hallstrom v Tillamook County, 4 US 20, (19) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 notice provision)—district courts may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement involving unregistered works * * * We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion It is so ordered JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 1 Opinion of GINSBURG, J SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No 08–103 REED ELSEVIER, INC, ET AL, PETITIONERS v IRVIN MUCHNICK ET AL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [March 2, 2010] JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment I agree with the Court’s characterization of 17 US C A (Supp 2009) That provision, which instructs authors to register their copyrights before com mencing suit for infringement, “is a precondition to filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction” Ante, at 1 I further agree that v Y & H Corp, is the controlling prece dent, see ante, at 6, and that 551 US 205 does not counsel otherwise There is, however, undeniable tension between the two decisions Aiming to stave off continuing controversy over what qualifies as “jurisdictional,” and what does not, I set out my under standing of the Court’s opinions in and and the ground on which I would reconcile those rulings In we held nonjurisdictional a prescription confining Title VII’s coverage to employers with 15 or more employees, 42 US C §2000e–2(a)(1) After observ ing that “the 15-employee threshold ‘d[id] not speak in |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | observ ing that “the 15-employee threshold ‘d[id] not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts,’ ” 546 US, ), the opinion announced and applied a “readily admin 2 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of GINSBURG, J istrable bright line”: “If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limi tation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdic tional, then courts and litigants will be duly in structed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue But when Congress does not rank a statutory limita tion on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character Ap plying that readily administrable bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue” 546 US, –516 (citation and footnote omitted) As the above-quoted passage indicates, the unanimous Court anticipated that all federal courts would thereafter adhere to the “bright line” held dispositive that day moved in a different direction A sharply divided Court there held “mandatory and jurisdictional” the time limits for filing a notice of appeal stated in 28 US C (a), (c) 551 US, (internal quotation marks omitted) mentioned only to distinguish it as involving a statute setting “an employee-numerosity requirement, not a time limit” 551 US, at Section 2107’s time limits were “jurisdictional,” explained, because they were contained in a statute, not merely a rule, at 210–213, and because “[t]his Court ha[d] long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ ” Fidel ity to and similarly reasoned decisions,* the dissent in observed, would have yielded the conclu sion that statutory time limits “are only jurisdictional if —————— * Eg, Eberhart v United States, 546 US 12 ; v Principi, 541 US 401 ; v Ryan, 540 US 443 Cite as: 559 U S (2010) 3 Opinion of GINSBURG, J Congress says so” 551 US, at 217 (opinion of Souter, J) and can be reconciled without distort ing either decision, however, on the ground that “rel[ied] on a long line of this Court’s decisions left undis turbed by Congress” Union Pacific R Co v Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Gen Comm of Adjustment, Central Region, 558 U S (2009) (slip op, at 13) (citing 551 US, –) The same is true of our decision, subsequent to in John R Sand & Gravel Co v United States, 552 US 130 There the Court concluded, largely on stare decisis grounds, |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1731/reed-elsevier-inc-v-muchnick/ | 130 There the Court concluded, largely on stare decisis grounds, that the Court of Federal Claims statute of limitations requires sua sponte consideration of a lawsuit’s timeliness Id, at 136 (“[P]etitioner can succeed only by convincing us that this Court has overturned, or that it should now overturn, its earlier precedent”) Plainly read, and both point to the conclusion that is nonjurisdictional Section 411(a) “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts” US, at ’s “readily administrable bright line” is therefore controlling 546 US, at 516 does not detract from that determination Amicus, reading as I do, urges on its authority that we hold jurisdictional lest we disregard “ ‘a cen tury’s worth of precedent’ ” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 26 (quoting 551 US, n 2); see ante, at 12 But in and John R Sand & Gravel Co, as just explained, we relied on longstanding decisions of this Court typing the relevant prescriptions “jurisdictional” 551 US, –210 and United States v Curry, 6 How 106 (1848)); John R Sand & Gravel Co, 552 US, at 136 Amicus cites well over 200 opinions that charac terize as jurisdictional, but not one is from this 4 REED ELSEVIER, INC v MUCHNICK Opinion of GINSBURG, J Court, and most are “ ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no precedential effect,’ ” 546 US, at 511 ); see 546 US, at 511–513; ante, at 5–6 * * * For the reasons stated, I join the Court’s judgment and concur in part in the Court’s opinion |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109556/scott-v-kentucky-parole-bd/ | The Court granted certiorari to decide whether any constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards apply to parole release hearings. At such a hearing a prisoner may be denied parole, or he may be released subject to specified conditions. The constitutional issue is whether either the outright denial, or the imposition of parole conditions, has the kind *61 of impact on liberty that must be preceded by "due process." The question is extremely important,[1] it has been fully briefed and argued and, in my opinion, should now be decided.[2] The Court postpones decision of the issue by sending the case back to the Court of Appeals for its advice on the question whether the litigation is now moot. This action might appear to be supported by a case which became moot because the petitioner's sentence terminated prior to our decision, thus entirely eliminating *62 his interest in any controversy with his parole board.[3] This case, however, is not moot, as a brief reference to the facts will demonstrate. On July 26, 1974, the petitioner Ewell Scott filed a complaint alleging that in November 1973 the Kentucky Parole Board denied him parole. He contended that the denial of parole deprived him of liberty without due process of law because the Parole Board had not provided him the procedural safeguards required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[4] He sought to represent similarly situated prisoners and requested an injunction requiring the Parole Board to modify its procedures and such other relief *63 as the court might consider appropriate. Without bothering to effect service on the defendants, the District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unreported order and this Court granted certiorari, On November 26, 1975, shortly prior to our grant of certiorari, the petitioner was paroled. The respondent Board then suggested that the case had become moot. But, as petitioner points out in his reply, he remains subject to significant restraints that might not have been imposed if he had received the kind of hearing that he claims the Constitution requires. The petitioner is on "close parole supervision," a restrictive status entailing parole conditions in addition to those imposed as a routine matter. One special condition requires petitioner to undergo outpatient treatment at a local mental health center. This parole condition imposes a significant restraint on his liberty. Petitioner claims that a fair hearing might have avoided this condition. If the Court should decide this case in his favor on the merits, the Court unquestionably would have power to order the objectionable condition removed unless petitioner is accorded |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109556/scott-v-kentucky-parole-bd/ | to order the objectionable condition removed unless petitioner is accorded an appropriate hearing. For that reason petitioner retains a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of this litigation, and the Court retains the power to decide the case on the merits. It follows inexorably that the case is not moot. "It is sufficient," as noted in Super Tire Engineering "that the litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest." Although I have no doubt that the mootness issue will be correctly decided after the proceedings on remand have run their course, the remand is nevertheless unfortunate. As dispositions in each of the last three years demonstrate, the underlying issue is one that is capable of repetition, yet *64 review is repeatedly evaded.[5] Delay in deciding the merits will affect not only these litigants, but also other pending litigation and parole procedures in every jurisdiction in the country. A suggestion of mootness which this Court can readily decide should not be permitted to have such far-reaching consequences. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Breyer | 2,012 | 2 | concurring | Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/779833/mohamad-v-palestinian-authority/ | I join the Court’s opinion with one qualification. The word “individual” is open to multiple interpretations, permitting it, linguistically speaking, to include natural persons, corporations, and other entities. Thus, I do not believe that word alone is sufficient to decide this case. The legislative history of the statute, however, makes up for whatever interpretive inadequacies remain after con- sidering language alone. See, e.g., ante, at 9 (describ- ing markup session in which one of the bill’s sponsors proposed an amendment containing the word “individual” to “make it clear” that the statute applied to “individuals and not to corporations”); Hearing on S. 1629 et al. be- fore the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1990) (witness explaining to committee that there would be a “problem” with suing an “independent en- tity or a series of entities that are not governments,” such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization); (allaying concerns that there will be a flood of lawsuits “because of the requirement [in the statute] that an indi- vidual has to identify his or her precise torture[r] and they have to be both in the United States”); see also ante, at 8– 9 (making clear that petitioners’ citations to the legislative 2 MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY BREYER, J., concurring history “do not help their cause”). After examining the history in detail, and considering it along with the reasons that the Court provides, I join the Court’s judgment and opinion |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Horton v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112448/horton-v-california/ | I remain convinced that Justice Stewart correctly articulated the plain-view doctrine in The Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to seize items for which they do not have a warrant when those items are found in plain view and (1) the officers are lawfully in a position to observe the items, (2) the discovery of the items is "inadvertent," and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officers that the items are evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In eschewing the inadvertent discovery requirement, the majority ignores the Fourth Amendment's express command that warrants particularly describe not only the places to be searched, but also the things to be seized. I respectfully dissent from this rewriting of the Fourth Amendment. I The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable *3 searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Amendment protects two distinct interests. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and the requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched" protect an interest in privacy. The prohibition against unreasonable seizures and the requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] the things to be seized" protect a possessory interest in property.[1] See ante, at 133; The Fourth Amendment, by its terms, declares the privacy and possessory interests to be equally important. As this Court recently stated: "Although the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures, neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection." The Amendment protects these equally important interests in precisely the same manner: by requiring a neutral and detached magistrate to evaluate, before the search or seizure, the government's showing of probable cause and its particular description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Accordingly, just as a warrantless *4 search is per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances, so too a seizure of personal property is "per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized." United ). "Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights." United A decision to invade a possessory interest |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.